Microsoft pulls out of AI datacentre project in Essex over power supply concerns
Driven by hopes of an economic transformation, many are taking on increasingly risky debt, including companies vital to the AI boom
Development by UK firm Nscale heralded by ministers as largest of its kind in country loses anchor tenant
Gwyn Topham and Aisha Down, Mon 19 Oct 2026 ,
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2026/oct/18/microsoft-drops-huge-ai-datacentre-project-in-essex-over-power-supply-concerns
The development of a huge AI datacentre hailed by the UK government has received a fresh setback after Microsoft pulled out of the project over concerns about power supplies.
The development by the British company Nscale, heralded by ministers as the country’s largest AI datacentre when it was announced in 2025, was planned to open at Loughton in Essex next year.
Doubts had already emerged about the scheme after the Guardian revealed in March that the location was still an operational scaffolding yard.
Now there are further concerns after Microsoft, one of its largest planned customers and expected to have been the anchor tenant, informed the company that it was pulling the plug on its agreement.
It comes a month after it emerged that power supply problems meant the project would face a lengthy wait before coming online.
Keir Starmer’s government had highlighted the Loughton project when announcing the UK’s AI strategy in 2025, describing it as the “largest UK sovereign AI datacentre”. Datacentres are the central nervous system of AI technology such as chatbots.
The end of the deal with Microsoft, first reported in the Telegraph, means Nscale has lost its only publicly announced customer for the Essex datacentre. It is understood that Microsoft remains on board for another project the company has in Norway.
Doubts had already emerged about the scheme after the Guardian revealed in March that the location was still an operational scaffolding yard.
Now there are further concerns after Microsoft, one of its largest planned customers and expected to have been the anchor tenant, informed the company that it was pulling the plug on its agreement.
It comes a month after it emerged that power supply problems meant the project would face a lengthy wait before coming online.
Keir Starmer’s government had highlighted the Loughton project when announcing the UK’s AI strategy in 2025, describing it as the “largest UK sovereign AI datacentre”. Datacentres are the central nervous system of AI technology such as chatbots.
The end of the deal with Microsoft, first reported in the Telegraph, means Nscale has lost its only publicly
Nscale, which is backed by tech companies including Nvidia, has positioned itself as Britain’s “sovereign” datacentre provider but the loss of an anchor tenant for its Loughton project could undermine its ambition to float on Wall Street this year with a potential valuation of $35bn (£26bn).
Targeting the rapid growth of AI to boost the economy, the UK government’s proposals to harness the technology have focused on two Nvidia-backed companies: the London-based Nscale and the US company CoreWeave.
Official figures show investments in AI are among the factors helping Britain’s economy to beat expectations of a weaker growth performance this year as the war in the Middle East rattles global business activity.
Nscale is a “neocloud”, one of a number of companies with deep ties to Nvidia that are building the key infrastructure for the AI boom. It is this relationship with Nvidia that meant it and CoreWeave were chosen as key players in the UK’s sovereign AI push, which happened under Starmer.
There is, however, a growing chorus of voices which suggest that neoclouds may be a vulnerability in the broader AI economy, especially as delays pile up across partners.
Driven by hopes of an economic transformation, many are taking on increasingly risky debt, including companies vital to the AI boom. If Nscale pushes back its initial public offering in New York, these vulnerabilities may come into sharper focus.
The former UK deputy prime minister Nick Clegg and the former Meta chief operating officer Sheryl Sandberg are board members at the company. Clegg holds a 0.25% stake that could be worth $88m if the company floats at a $35bn valuation.
It emerged earlier this month that UK Power Networks (UKPN), which owns and maintains the electricity grid across London and the south-east of England, had informed Nscale that it would not be able to supply enough power to the company’s Loughton datacentre until the early to mid-2030s.
Nscale said it was “committed to the project” but the failure to find a quick fix to the power supply issue underlines how much energy has become a hindrance to datacentre development.
The scaffolding yard site has been cleared by Nscale, and the company is investigating whether it can generate power onsite and whether it can speed up the connection process.
An Nscale spokesperson said: “We remain committed to both the Loughton project and the UK, and we are exploring alternative power sources for the site, in addition to other expansion sites in the UK.
“Our relationship with Microsoft remains strong and long-term, and this unfortunate London-wide grid issue has no impact on our other contracts.”
Deep concerns regarding the Rolls-Royce development at the Wylfa site

Open Letter to Miatta Fahnbulleh MP, Secretary of State for Energy Security
and Net Zero.
Dear Secretary of State, I am contacting you with a letter
written to the former holder of the post, Ed Milliband, expressing my deep
concerns regarding the Rolls-Royce development at the Wylfa site on Ynys
Mon.
Since writing to Ed Miliband, there have been developments that make
the prospects of a nuclear site on the island even more concerning:
1)Increasing threats of war mean that we will be targets for attack. Russia
and Iran have both threatened us, due to our interventions in Ukraine and
the use of British bases for the bombing of Iran. Whatever the rights and
wrongs of these interventions, it is clear that nuclear power stations are
now regular targets for attack. How are we to be protected? How are we to
get off the island in the event of an attack ( or nuclear accident)? There
are two bridges connecting us to the mainland, and even if there were
three, there would be no safe evacuation possible, without the danger of
accidents.
RAF Valley is also on the island, making us a further target.
The waste produced by the possible new nuclear reactors will also serve as
an ongoing target and risk, as it would remain onsite for at least 100
years, being too hot to remove. Our future generations will be responsible
for this; not a legacy we want to bequeath.
2) Increasing droughts and
wildfires have threatened the safety of nuclear plants all over the world,
including at Sizewell B this year. Should the electricity supply be cut to
a nuclear power station, if backup diesel power is then cut off or damaged,
through flooding, as in the case of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, then
there is also disaster, as the reactors cannot be cooled if there is no
electrical power to the station. So, for a nuclear station to be safe,
there needs to be adequate power in the first place. This can no longer be
relied on.
3) A December 2025 Harvard T.H Chan study found a statistical
link between those living close to nuclear power plants and higher cancer
rates in Massachusetts. The strongest link was seen within 20 to 30
kilometers of a nuclear station, and the risk increased as people got
older. There is also a risk to workers.
4) Whereas the Rolls-Royce site has
advertised that the electricity generated at Wylfa would go to homes, it is
now published that energy could go to AI centres being developed on the
island and nearby. How are we to know the end use of the electricity to be
generated by these nuclear reactors?
The World Nuclear Industry Status
Report ( WNISR) 2026 shows that between March 2025 and June 2026, both
solar and wind power have independently surpassed generating electricity
from nuclear reactors. I understand that you want to mitigate the effects
of climate change in the most efficient and safe ways possible. Nuclear
power is neither efficient or safe, particularly under conditions of
conflict, climate change, or indeed pandemic, where routine maintenance is
reduced, as happened during the Covid pandemic.
We implore you to
reconsider pouring more money into these nuclear reactors, yet to receive
the Generic Development Consent order, and instead concentrate our
resources to upgrading the grid, as you propose, and using our excellent
renewable energy sources.
People Against Wylfa B 19th Oct 2026,
https://www.stop-wylfa.org/
New nuclear technology is predicted to transform North Wales.

A major programme delivering Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technology is set
to transform Anglesey and wider North Wales in the coming years. Wylfa on
Anglesey has been selected as the site of the UK’s first SMR nuclear power
station. The move recognises the strong nuclear heritage and expertise of
the area.
Earlier this month, a group of public and private bodies across
industry, local government and the Welsh Government, and led by Bentley
Systems met at a roundtable to discuss benefits for the region. Gary
Pritchard, leader of Isle of Anglesey County Council and Llinos Medi AS/MP
for Anglesey were in attendance. Institution of Civil Engineers Wales Cymru
Fellows provided impartial advice and expertise on building the programme
in its first steps.
The programme will pioneer skills in the region,
develop new vocational and academic training programmes, and create jobs in
Anglesey. ICE Wales Cymru Regional Director Keith Jones said: “ICE Wales
Cymru supports the Welsh and UK governments in the development of Small
Modular Reactors (SMR). Wales is ideally placed to play a very significant
role in clean energy generation and become an energy hub for the UK.
Nuclear power has a key part to play in the transition to net zero”.
Insider Media 19th Oct 2026, https://www.insidermedia.com/news/wales/new-nuclear-technology-set-to-transform-north-wales
UK’s Green Party goes nuclear

I still find the pro-nuclear case unconvincing. Though basically I’m a Faithfull trying to accept that a group of Traitors have won! At least for the moment, in this specific setting
COMMENT from Amory Lovins – on this article
Re land-use: my 2011 Electricity Journal article at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2011.06.005 showed that including the nuclear fuel cycle makes land-use equivalent between groundmount solar and nuclear power. Newer data would probably give solar a modest advantage. Windpower’s land-use is one or two order of magnitude smaller than either, if one avoids the common confusion of area actually occupied by infrastructure (equipment, roads,…) with area spanned across. The latter confusion would say that the area of lampposts in a car park is the area of the car park (leaving no room for cars), when actually it’s roughly 1% of the total area. As noted, the other ~99% can be and often is used for farming, grazing, wildlife, recreation, or solar power. And solar power’s land-use can be displaced by mounting on roofs or other structures (then it’s ample to power the whole world), or by sharing the same land with agriculture via profitable agrivoltaics. In short, the claim that solar and wind use far more land than nuclear power is wrong.
Another point omitted in the discussion in the article below flows from nuclear power’s producing electricity manyfold costlier than solar or windpower (even if they’re equivalently firmed by now-ultracheap batteries or the nine other and generally cheaper carbon-free grid-balancing methods). That lack of a nuclear business case means there’s no climate case either. That’s because of opportunity cost: you can’t spend the same £ on two different things at the same time. Every £ spent on nuclear electricity would have bought far more solar or wind electricity (or efficient use of electricity) and hence displaced far more fossil fuel and carbon emissions. In other words, because nuclear power produces less electricity and displaces less fossil fuel per £ (and per year), it actually makes climate change worse than if more climate-effective competitors were bought instead.
, https://renewextraweekly.blogspot.com/2026/10/green-party-goes-nuclear.html
The Green Party of England and Wales has abandoned it long standing opposition to nuclear power. A bit of a shock. However, its briefing paper on ‘Ending the Green Party’s Blanket Opposition to Nuclear Fission’, produced evidently by the ‘greens for nuclear’ group, says the proposed new policy, now accepted by the Party, ‘does not commit the green party to being a pro-nuclear party in any way beyond committing the party to following contemporary scientific research. We contend this is what the motion is really about: evidence’. OK so let’s look at its marshalling of the evidence.
First it points to an ‘Our World in Data’ chart which it says shows that ‘nuclear power has the lowest carbon footprint and the second lowest death rate of any energy source.’ It’s hard to know where to start with these much debated and controversial topics. It is true that nuclear plants do not generate carbon dioxide when running, but producing the fuel for them does. That’s not the case for renewables like wind and solar, so they also avoid the eco and social impacts of uranium mining and waste management, although their output per GW installed is less and is variable and dependent on location, making comparisons hard. But, though there are debates on the exact difference between nuclear and renewables in CO2 terms, it is small – fossil fuels are much worse.
In terms of the deaths, there are some big uncertainties and controversies. For example, in the video produced by Greens for Nuclear Energy, Prof Gerry Thomas puts the death toll for the Chernobyl disaster at 28 initially, followed by around 19 later. But others put it very much higher, in the thousands including from clean-up workers, and possibly even more globally. Whereas the highest figure I’ve seen for wind, from an anti-wind farm group, is 272 fatalities so far worldwide, while, as the World in Data chart shows, deaths for solar are very low.
It may be true that, thankfully, at Fukushima, with the wind blowing the radiation cloud eastward across the sea and the prompt evacuation of local people, public exposure was reduced and deaths avoided, as Greens for Nuclear note, but there were some staff impacts and the debate on health impacts of nuclear in normal operation on workers and the public globally continues, with, for example, a US study claiming new proof that proximity to nuclear plants can lead to increased local cancer rates.
What about nuclear waste? The background paper says that the risk from nuclear waste (and by implication leaks) were less than was commonly thought, since ‘radioisotopes with long half-lives are inherently less radioactive than ones with short half-lives as they spread their radioactivity over a longer time.’ Even so it did admit that ‘raw spent nuclear fuel remains more radioactive than uranium ore for around 300,000 years’. However, it claimed that ‘the Plutonium can be removed from the spent fuel and reprocessed into new fuel. Fuel treated in this way decays to be less radioactive than uranium ore in 9,000 years’. So that’s fine then! And in case you were worried, it adds that, while some countries did get nuclear bombs from reactor material, that is no longer the case and now ‘there is not a clear connection between states with civilian nuclear power programs and the acquisition of nuclear weapons’. Tell that to those who worry about Iran’s uranium enrichment programme!
Then it moves on to ‘Nuclear Power’s Greatest Advantage’- reliability. Last summer’s heat wave led to many reactors across Europe having to be shut down due to problems with cooling. And in any case, in normal circumstances, reactors have to shut down regularly for spent fuel replacement – unlike renewables such as wind and solar, which do not need any fuel. These renewables do depend on the weather, so there have to be balancing/backup systems, but then, as noted above, that is also true of nuclear plants- they can’t be relied on all the time. The issue is how much will that backup add to the cost of either of them. Some say it will add a lot more to the cost of renewables, but Lazarsd’s LCOE data, which now includes the cost of storage, still has most renewables doing much better than (US) nuclear over almost all the range of cost estimates.
The greens for nuclear briefing does concede that ‘per unit of energy generated wind and solar are cheaper than nuclear’, but it says that is irrelevant since the market ‘is structured so that all producers are paid the price of the most expensive producer – i.e. whatever the cost for wind, solar, and nuclear they are all paid the price of whatever the most expensive electricity source currently being used is, generally natural gas’. However, it adds ‘any Green government would fix the electricity market (likely by bringing it into government control).’. Fine! But how does that make nuclear cheaper? Or faster to install- something that renewables also beat nuclear at hands down.
The Briefing paper may be more convincing when it talks of land use. Wind and solar do take up more space than nuclear plants, although the land needed for uranium mines and waste repositories also has to be taken into account, and the land around wind turbine bases can be used for farming, while solar can be on roof tops and there are agri-solar options for solar farms. The higher use of scarce minerals and materials for some wind and solar technologies is another key issue- although that has to be set alongside the fact that nuclear plants need uranium and reserves of that are not infinite. While there are options for recycling of all materials, including nuclear wastes, perhaps what needs to be said in all cases of impact (including in relation to the use of land and materials), is that we need to reduce demand for energy- that is something greens should all agree on.
The Briefing note ends by reporting that a survey conducted by IPSOS for Greens 4 Nuclear Energy in 2022 ‘found that on balance members of the public would look more favourably on the Green Party if it dropped its anti-nuclear stance’. It said ‘this was especially pronounced for members of the wider green movement’. I thought this was surprising. But when I checked with Google it confirmed that the report said that ‘people involved in environmental campaigning and green groups continue to support nuclear energy for electricity production.’
Sadly the Green4 nuclear web site link on this report is broken, so I could not explore more. But it is true that views may be changing. That may not be surprising given the wave of pro-nuclear propaganda in recent years – even Nature seems to have succumbed. However, I still find the pro-nuclear case unconvincing. Though basically I’m a Faithfull trying to accept that a group of Traitors have won! At least for the moment, in this specific setting.
There may still be some battles ahead, internally and externally – after all there are many who don’t want nuclear, especially if it undermines renewables. And the conference vote may not reflect the views of the wider party membership. So there may yet be a challenge. Though, maybe the big political issue is likely to be what the Green Party will do when and if Small Modular Reactors start spreading, and, as seems likely, local people object. Its deputy leader had earlier spoken out against SMRs. And, more generally, what will it do over the battles for funding between renewables and nuclear as the latter tries to expand? Will try to to sit on the fence on that too?
How much will the AWE Aldermaston build cost West Berkshire in consultants?

By Niki Hinman Local Democracy Reporter, 19 October 2026, https://www.newburytoday.co.uk/news/questions-raised-over-council-ability-to-approve-nuclear-wea-9487315/
Questions over West Berkshire Council’s ability to scrutinise forthcoming planning applications into a multi-billion pound upgrade to AWE Aldermaston have been raised.
The plans are likely to cost the authority tens of thousands of pounds in specialist consultants to evaluate the proposal to upgrade the nuclear weapons facility into a state-of-the-art science park.
The council will have to handle the massive application in the coming weeks, and has said it will need specialist help to deal with it.
The Government’s £15bn defence investment is dedicated specifically to the UK’s nuclear warhead programme as a whole – which encompasses both the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston and its sister site at Burghfield.
Security-cleared consultants working on defence or submarine programmes command a notable market premium.
A Google search puts them upwards of £1,000 per day.
The nuclear weapons factory is soon to submit plans described as ‘being on the scale of London 2012 in complexity’ to the authority, which must then figure out whether they pass planning policies.
The person leading the project from the AWE side is Andrew McNaughton CBE – a prominent British civil engineer.
He led on delivering key components for the London 2012 Olympics and is on record as saying the Future Materials Campus is on the same scale.
The matter came up before West Berkshire Council last night (Thursday).
“Government-funded plans for the multi-billion pound Future Materials Campus (FMC) at AWE’s Aldermaston site will see planning applications coming forward soon,” said Dominic Boeck (Con, Aldermaston).
“How will the council support and engage constructively with residents, local councils and businesses on this enormous development?
“AWE have compared the scale and complexity of the proposed FMC development with London 2012
“What specific assurance can the lead member give that council has sufficient planning, emergency planning and other relevant technical resources and expertise to undertake a thorough and independent assessment of the application, including its implications for residential safety, emergency preparedness and amenity within and around the Aldermaston DEPZ?”
Deputy council leader Denise Gaines (Lib Dem, Hungerford and Kintbury) said: “We take the safety of residents and people at AWE very seriously.
“The anticipated planning application is going through the process.
“At this stage of the proposal it is a pre application.
“This is a confidential part of the process between council officers and the applicant.
“This sets out a clear timetable for a major and complex application.
“As with any planning application it will be assessed by a team of qualified professionals to ensure that all relvant technical and environmental matters are considered and evaluated either in house or by specialist external consultants.”
There is a statement of community involvement.
And the consultation will involve talks with the council’s emergency planning service and the Office for Nuclear Regulation.
“My concern and my community’s concern is the scale of this project,” added Mr Boeck.
“Of course we understand it is a matter of national security, but there are concerns about how this multi-billion pound project will impact us here.
“I appreciate much will be done behind the wire, but the trucks have got to roll.”
When local authorities deal with ‘enormous’ or hyper-scale planning applications like the London 2012 Olympic Games or major urban regenerations, the standard local planning mechanisms are usually adapted, bypassed, or heavily augmented.
Because these applications are far too large, complex, and politically sensitive for a standard local authority planning department to process normally, they are managed through a combination of special purpose vehicles, and strategic planning frameworks
Stop Japan’s Failed Nuclear Plant Waste Coming to Cumbria
Please sign the petition here: https://www.change.org/p/stop-japan-s…
Cumberland Council plans to import sodium coolant, a type of nuclear waste, thousands of miles from Japan to Cumbria, for processing at the Port of Workington, just 885m from Northside Primary School and nearby residential areas including many towns and villages.
Sodium coolant is extremely hazardous, and carries a high risk of violent explosion or fire if exposed to air or water.
It may also contain radioactive elements.
Further concerns include:
- Less than a mile from Northside Primary School, the chemical plant is being designed to convert the hazardous coolant into caustic soda.
- Caustic soda is also a hazardous material and carries enormous risks to the environment over decades if spilled.
- £4.5m of the Workington Town Deal government funding is being used to develop this site, despite the development planning to employ just 20 people over a period of 7 years.
- The Workington Town Deal was promoted as being for the public benefit, not for creating profit for a handful of private businesses.
- The £25m that the site construction phase is predicted to generate is meaningless compared to the certain risk our children and local environments would face as a result of the site’s operation and the £Billions that would likely be required for clean up following operation of this proposed chemical plant for Japan’s failed fast breeder nuclear reactor wastes.
Further Info
Japan’s prototype fast-breeder reactor (FBR), ‘Monju’, was a disaster from the start. It was shut down due to an accident less than 9 months after achieving criticality, and remained closed for 15 years. Reopening in 2008, a second accident closed it for good. Overall, Monju generated electricity for exactly one hour after achieving criticality in 1994 and will cost £Billions to decommission.
Fast breeder reactors use liquid metal as a coolant – usually liquid sodium, which violently explodes on contact with air water. Dounreay, which ran the UK’s own Fast Breeder Reactors, processed the coolant onsite at both reactors. Sodium coolant at Dounreay did contain radioactive caesium.
Cumberland Council are partners in the plan to bring the Monju’s sodium coolant to the Port of Workington.
Ironically, ‘Monju’ was named to represent transcendent wisdom in Buddhist tradition. It has achieved neither wisdom nor its stated aim of electricity generation apart from one hour’s worth.
It has produced tonnes of chemical and radioactive waste some of which the operators the Japan Atomic Energy Agency want to ship thousands of miles to Cumbria instead of dealing with in Japan..
Worried About Russian Meddling In UK Politics? Wait Till You See What Israel Is Up To

Burnham’s exclusive focus on Russian influence almost laughably beside the point. This furious finger-pointing at the Kremlin is designed with one purpose in mind only: to distract the British public from where the real external meddling in our politics is coming from.
October 16, 2026, Jonathan Cook Substack
Andy Burnham’s government is rolling out a new “Centre for Information Defence”. But the outside actors most aggressively undermining what little remains of British democracy are nowhere in its sights
Russia “interfered” in the 2016 Brexit vote by running some “anti-EU” articles on its RT channel and promoting a few internet trolls. Even MI5 has to admit that this activity had no tangible impact on the referendum campaign.
No matter. British prime minister Andy Burnham has once again revived the incendiary claim that Russian disinformation is an especial threat to British democracy. At the United Nations a few weeks ago he announced plans for a National Centre for Information Defence “to detect, attribute and disrupt these kinds of hostile state information attacks”.
For the new British prime minister, as for his predecessors, this is all about Moscow and the UK’s favourite bogeyman, Vladimir Putin. At the UN, Burnham promised British expertise to other European nations to protect them from Kremlin disinformation.
Meanwhile, evidence continues to mount that another foreign actor is meddling even more aggressively in British politics – and neither Burnham nor MI5 have a word to say about it.
Any evidence of Russia disinformation-peddling in the UK pales in comparison to Israeli influence operations – and that’s just the ones we know about. The head of MI5, Ken McCallum, noted that Russian disinformation was neither sophisticated nor successful. The same cannot be said for Israel’s handiwork.
Israel has been using “hasbara” trolls on social media platforms to manipulate public debates in Britain for years – the thrust of the accusation against Russia. But in Israel’s case, it goes much further than that.
This year the Israeli state massively increased its public diplomacy budget to $730 million to expand its influence operations. That includes flying even more politicians, clergy, academics and influencers to bombard them with pro-Israel propaganda they are then likely to spread back home. According to foreign minister Gideon Saar, Israeli advocacy should be treated “like investing in jets, bombs, and missile interceptors”.
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There was already plenty of evidence through the late 2010s, as I reported at the time, that Israel was helping to organise, stoke and amplify a campaign to smear its arch-critic, Jeremy Corbyn, as an antisemite, in order to prevent him from reaching No 10 Downing Street.
Not least, Israel did so by advancing a new, bogus definition of Jew hatred through the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). Usefully, for Israel, that definition largely ignores hatred of Jews to focus instead on criticism of Israel.
That was the most blatant meddling possible in what remains of Britain’s democratic processes. UK politicians and media not only failed to oppose it, but actively sought to amplify the smears.
Civil war
This week the fanatically pro-Israel US lobby group the Anti-Defamation League revealed that it had been working with leading AI firms, which are increasingly being integrated into social media platforms, to suppress what it calls “antisemitism” – or what the rest of us would refer to as criticism of Israel.
CEO Jonathan Greenblatt observed: “We’ve had excellent collaboration with Silicon Valley.” The platforms, he said, would tackle content the ADL doesn’t like “right in the source code” – that is, before users can see it.
That is likely not only to remove criticism of Israeli atrocities and criticism of western governments, such as the UK’s, for colluding in Israel’s genocide but turn social media into a playground for bots and Israel apologists, giving them free reign to spread their propaganda without challenge.
We also know, thanks to the work of the French security services – maybe MI5 was too busy chasing Russian bots to notice – that an Israeli cyber agency called Blackcore targeted the SNP in May’s Scottish elections, as well as meddling in elections in France and New York.
Israeli tech firms, especially those dealing in spyware, intelligence and influence operations, are typically closely aligned with the Israeli state and its military. Most of the founders of tech start-ups are alumnae of the Israeli army’s 8200 intelligence unit.
Alongside the SNP, New York mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani and a leftwing French party headed by Jean-Luc Melenchon were targeted. Why? Because, unlike their political rivals, all had dared to speak out against Israel’s genocide in Gaza
With echoes of what happened to Corbyn, Blackcore’s campaigns were designed to smear candidates. In the case of the French elections, fake accounts were created to accuse one candidate of rape and another of paedophilia.
A new documentary, NAZA, shows how Israel has paved the way in using AI in pioneering new ways to kill on a mass scale in Gaza. It selected banks of targets for assassination, often by murdering those “suspects” when they are in family compounds, slaughtering large numbers of bystanders in the process.
It is therefore hardly surprising that tech firms in Israel have been caught using AI in similarly innovative and indiscriminate ways online, to target western publics with disinformation.
In the summer it emerged that the Israeli government had created a website for a fake “scholarly” think-tank. In a short period of time, it produced prodigious quantities of AI-generated content on Israel, optimised for common search terms, that promoted Israeli talking points and constantly suggested criticism of Israel risked fuelling antisemitism.
It was set up not only to influence internet chatbots into echoing its pro-Israel disinformation but also to integrate its content into what experts call the “underlying training data”: that is, the unquestioned assumptions on which chatbots operate.
Back in May 2024 Meta identified fake Israel-based accounts, “posing as Jewish students, African Americans and other concerned citizens”, peddling pro-Israel content in the US and Canada in support of Israel’s slaughter of Palestinians in Gaza.
Two months ago, Meta again found the same kind of dirty tricks emanating from Israel, this time targeting Britain, France and Australia among other countries. The AI-generated accounts posed “as local, civically-engaged brands, news sources, religious organizations, and political activists”.
Notably in the case of the UK and France, the influence campaigns were designed to stoke “anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim” sentiment. Israel has been critically involved in advancing Islamophobic content, fuelling fears of a supposed “Muslim takeover” of Europe to mobilise support for Israel as a bulwark in the Middle East against Islam, and thereby encourage sympathy for its genocidal attacks on Gaza.
As a consequence, the political landscape in Britain has been disfigured. Support for the far-right has been artificially inflated, polarising British society. The path is being paved towards deeper authoritarianism and the possibility of civil war.
Death knell
None of these dire outcomes, the death knell for what little remains of British democracy, is attracting even the mildest interest from the Burnham government or MI5. Instead, they are chasing what so far appears to have been far more marginal Russian output.
But it isn’t just the influence of Israel we should be worried about. The problem runs much deeper, with a host of other noxious outside actors trying to warp and disfigure British politics in ways that closely accord with Israel’s malign intent. Burnham’s Centre for Information Defence will do precisely nothing to tackle any of it.
Here are two other powerful external actors aligned with Israel in distorting British politics.
The billionaire class, a transnational elite that has no loyalty to Britain, interfere in our politics by making our political parties dependent on their donations. They use their money to buy influence with the main parties – which is why for decades it has made little difference whether we vote for the Conservatives or Labour. We get austerity either way, while the billionaires get permission for their forever wars, directing public wealth away from public services into the arms industries and resource grabs.
Jeremy Corbyn tried to break with this model by funding Labour with small donations from ordinary people instead of the billionaires. As a result, he was destroyed by a confected campaign run by the billionaires, in association with Israel and its trolls, to smear him as an antisemite.
Sir Keir Starmer, Corbyn’s successor, went right back to begging for money from Big Business, got the billionaires behind him, and rolled on with the austerity programme.
Is Nigel Farage’s Reform different? Of course, not. Even before reaching power, he’s dependent on crypto-billionaires living in Thailand and Hong Kong.
Meanwhile, the sometime US trillionaire Elon Musk is busy rallying Britain’s new blackshirts, led by serial fraudster Tommy Robinson, to chase after a few “illegal” migrants rather than identifying the real criminals tearing apart Britain: the super-rich like Musk.
The billionaires both wield and conceal their influence through their ownership of the corporate media. They use the media to aggressively promote their own causes – political and economic policies ensuring their further enrichment – by normalising the extreme ideology of neoliberal capitalism, with its promotion of endless resource extraction through forever wars and the fuelling of needless consumption.
The consequence is the destruction of the conditions for human life on the planet. The billionaires hope they can ride out the catastrophe in their bunkers, or cryogenically freeze their bodies until a point in the future when they can be uploaded to the cloud.
One of the media’s most important jobs is to use smear campaigns to destroy anyone, such as Corbyn and now Zack Polanski, who threatens the billionaires’ privileged position by offering a mildly socialist programme of wealth redistribution..
Vassal state
If the UK media wasn’t entirely captured by the billionaire class – serving as its PR division – then we might know more about the role of the United States in meddling in our politics.
The recent claims of a supposed “terrorist plot” outside RAF Fairford – really a US airforce base pretending to be a British base and one from which the US has waged an illegal war of aggression against Iran – should have reminded us that the Pentagon is largely in charge of UK foreign policy.
The US has some 15 major military bases on British soil, plus half a dozen smaller intelligence sites. As the rightwing US podcaster Tucker Carlson recently observed, the fact that Britain has foreign troops crawling all over it makes us little more than an occupied “vassal state”.
The US recently announced a $4 billion upgrade of its UK bases, including establishing storage sites for its nuclear arsenal. The plan caused barely a ripple of interest among British politicians or the media .
Although our political and media class pretend the UK is an equal partner in a western defence alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the reality is very different. Nato takes its orders from the US, doing Washington’s bidding. That’s why Nato has been pivoting towards America’s biggest economic rival, China, which is, of course, nowhere near the North Atlantic.
When the US snaps its fingers, Britain stands to attention and hikes its spending on the war industries. Along with European governments, the UK is willing to drain its national coffers and scythe through public spending with yet more austerity cuts to support Washington’s military agenda for “full-spectrum global dominance”.
Hidden influence
Much of the US influence on British politics is carefully concealed from view, operating behind closed doors.
In the early 2010s, the US was desperately seeking a pretext to extradite Julian Assange from the UK and lock him up in a super-max jail, hiding him out of sight after his organisation Wikileaks revealed US and British war crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was during this period that Starmer, as the director of public prosecutions, repeatedly jetted off to Washington for secret meetings with US officials.
We will never know what was discussed. Freedom of information requests discovered that his own officials destroyed all records of those meetings.
Once he became a politician, Starmer was recruited to the shadowy Trilateral Commission, originally founded in the 1970s by officials in Jimmy Carter’s administration to deal with the supposed problem of “an excess of democracy” in the US. The commission’s view was that voters were becoming dangerously less passive, at that time over the Vietnam war, and ways needed to be found to return them to docility.
A similar British-American Project cements ties between rising stars in British politics, business and journalism and Washington elites. The power imbalance between the two sides ensures up-and-coming British leaders are readily groomed into an Atlanticist worldview in which the UK is very much the junior partner.
There are a plethora of other “respected’ think-tanks and organisations whose chief role is to embed US policy ideas, especially those relating to foreign policy, in the thinking of British elites. They include the Bilderberg Group, Chatham House, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Atlantic Council, The British-American Parliamentary Group, and BritishAmerican Business.
The US uses its financial muscle through these organisations and many others to manufacture consent for its extreme neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies. The latest example are massive grants to organisations willing to export Trump’s MAGA ideology to the UK, masquerading as a “public education” initiative.
There is plenty of evidence to show that it was pressure from the Trump administration that led to the unprecedented decision by Starmer’s government to proscribe a civil disobedience group, Palestine Action, for the first time in Britain’s history as a terrorist organisation.
Palestine Action had incensed Israel by targeting its weapons factories on UK soil, highlighting another aspect of British collusion in the Gaza genocide, and had infuriated Trump personally by spraying one of his golf courses in Scotland with the words “Gaza is not 4 sale”.
In truth, the ways that the US meddles directly in British politics are so numerous it is virtually impossible to quantify them. Britain is little more than a colony of the US, receiving diktats on important foreign policy issues – especially regarding US and Israeli interests – that the UK is invariably too frightened to oppose.
Burnham is already rolling over to reverse the UK’s decision to honour a ruling from the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals that Britain has no claim to sovereignty over the Chagos Islands and must return them to Mauritius. The UK has faced a temper tantrum from Trump on the matter because the US operates an illegal military base on one of the islands.
Disobedience by the UK is the exception, not the rule. Which makes Burnham’s exclusive focus on Russian influence almost laughably beside the point. This furious finger-pointing at the Kremlin is designed with one purpose in mind only: to distract the British public from where the real external meddling in our politics is coming from.
Why Boris Johnson Must Answer for Ukraine’s Destruction — and Why the Public Should Decide on Future Ukraine Aid

A conversation with Mary Dejevsky and Commodore RN (Ret’d) Steve Jermy
Ian Proud, Oct 15, 2026, https://thepeacemonger.substack.com/p/why-boris-johnson-must-answer-for?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=3221990&post_id=220504822&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
In this wide-ranging discussion, I am joined by two of Britain’s most experienced and independent voices on the Ukraine war and European security: Mary Dejevsky, former Moscow correspondent for The Times and long-time foreign affairs commentator, and Commodore Steve Jermy RN (Rtd), a decorated naval officer with combat experience dating back to the Falklands War and the author of Strategy for Action.
Prompted by Mary’s powerful Substack essay J’Accuse – Boris Johnson, we examine Boris Johnson’s role in the early phase of the war, the collapse of the April 2022 Istanbul talks, the broader strategic failures of Western policy, the gap between political narrative and military reality, and what a realistic security architecture for Europe might look like once the fighting ends. We also discuss Steve’s support for a petition calling for a pause in UK military aid and a proper public debate (and possible referendum) on Britain’s involvement.
In this conversation we discuss:
– Mary Dejevsky’s case for holding Boris Johnson to account after the war
– The Istanbul negotiations of April 2022 and why the draft agreement collapsed
– Johnson’s Churchillian framing of Zelensky and the early Western response
– Military analysis of Russia’s initial operation and the West’s strategic misjudgements
– The role of other key figures (Liz Truss, Ben Wallace, Tony Radakin)
– Why the West continues to rely on one-sided information and propaganda
– Russia’s actual security objectives versus the “restore the empire” narrative
– Neutrality for Ukraine and the case for reforming or replacing NATO
– A possible future European security architecture centred on the OSCE
– The petition to pause UK support and open a national debate on aid spending
– What a post-war reckoning in Britain might look like.
BRIEFING sent to all Cumberland Councillors Partners in Plan to Bring Failed Japanese Nuclear Reactors Sodium Coolant Process Plant to the Port of Workington
Conclusion The Sodium Coolant Process Plant at the Port of Workington would be an unprecedented and dangerous development, putting residents and primary school children in direct danger of both chemical and potential radiological hazards.
These hazards have not been explained to the public by the developers, which includes the regional planning authority, Cumberland Council, as an enthusiastic and facilitating ‘partner.
There has been a lack of clarity on issues

The following briefing has been shared with all Cumberland Councillors. Cumberland Council are partners in the scheme to bring sodium coolant from the Japanese failed Monju fast breeder nuclear reactors to Cumbria. The council has, we believe, not voted on this so the councillors are unwitting partners (much the same as Cumberland’s partnership with the nuclear dump plan).
For the original briefing with full links not reproduced here please contact: wastwater @ protonmail.com
BRIEFING: Failed Japanese Nuclear Reactors Sodium Coolant Process Plant for the Port of Workington?
by Radiation Free Lakeland 12th October, 2026
History
The Japanese Atomic Energy Agency is proposing to send sodium coolant from the failedMonju Fast Breeder Reactor to the Port of Workington in the UK for processing. A company in the UK has been set up to facilitate this.
ALKALI METAL PROCESSING LIMITED was incorporated at Companies House on 26 July, 2023 by Jacobs Clean Energy Ltd. (the name of this company was changed to Amentum Clean Energy Ltd. on 30 September, 2023) and Cavendish Nuclear.
According to the Director’s Report for the year ending 31 March, 2025: “The company’s sole purpose is to deliver a single contract to design, manufacture, construct, operate and decommission a Sodium Treatment Facility in the United Kingdom,” and,
“the entity, via Cavendish Nuclear Ltd., has beenawarded the next phase of work by the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) to support the decommissioning of the Monju Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR), in Fukui Prefecture, Japan. The next phase of work covers the construction, commissioning, and securing of regulatory permissions for a new facility in the UK which will treat the sodium coolant removed from the Japanese reactor.”
Democratic Deficit:
Cumberland Council Responsible for Regulatory Oversight while also Development Partner.
There has been no standard planning assessment, or democratic scrutiny of technical details, or vote by Cumberland Council to justify Leader Mark Fryer’s enthusiastic promotion of the plan to import and process Japanese nuclear and chemical waste to the Port of Workington.
“This is fantastic news for the port as this new development, subject to the necessary approvals, will bring good quality jobs to Workington and support the wider supply chain and local economy. We’re extending a warm welcome to our new partners and look forward to working with all those involved over the coming weeks and months.“ Cllr Mark Fryer, Leader of Cumberland Council
Meanwhile the developers, “Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum are grateful to Cumberland Council and the Port’s management team for their support in enabling our design and construction programme to move to the next phase. We are fully committed to adding real social value to West Cumbia and this new venture will contribute to the regeneration of the Port of Workington and support the local economy. ” Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum
The Monju Fast Breeder Reactor, Fire and Accidents.
The Monju Fast Breeder Reactor, in Fukui Prefecture, Japan, has had a history of safety failures, cover ups, and operational redundancy.
In 1995, just months after achieving criticality (power transmission), 640 kg of liquid sodium leaked from a cooling system, causing a fire so hot that it buckled steel girders. The reactor was shut down for 15 years, after the operator was found to have covered up the scale of the damage.
Monju was restarted in May 2010 after a public battle in the courts and a number of safety repairs. However, it never connected to the electrical grid.
“Operations were again suspended in August 2010 after a fuel handling machine was accidentally dropped in the reactor during a refuelling outage. The device was retrieved almost one year later.”
Alkali Metal Processing’s client, the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency, was declared in 2015, “not fit to operate the Monju Fast Breeder Reactor” by the Japanese Nuclear Regulation Authority, following failure to carry out regular inspections on almost 10,000 out of 39,000 pieces of equipment at the Monju.” Source: Nucnet Independent Nuclear News.“
Violently Reactive,” requiring “Chemically Resistant Bunds”and “Nuclear Licenced Zones”
The “Nature of business” is listed on Companies House by Alkali Metal Processing Ltd (AMP Ltd) as “Treatment and disposal of non-hazardous waste.”
While legal definitions of ‘hazardous’ and ‘non-hazardous’ waste are necessarily complex and prevaricated, a reasonable definition of ‘non-hazardous’ would be ‘that which does not constitute a direct threat to human and environmental health’
.The description of Alkali Metal Processing Ltd as “Treatment and disposal of non-hazardous waste” is very much at odds with the Technical Brief published by Geomechanics which states:
● Sodium coolant’s violent reaction with water and air drives stringent segregation of drainage, fire and ventilation systems.
● Port (of Workington) siting demands blast- and fire-resisting structures around offloading and treatment units to contain exothermic events.
● Marine berths and transfer lines must be designed to prevent any seawater ingress intosodium-bearing systems.
● Civil design will likely require chemically resistant bunds and sumps to capture and neutralise any sodium leaks.
● Construction phasing must separate conventional port works from nuclear-licensed zones with controlled access and radiological monitoring.
● Emergency planning will centre on sodium fire scenarios, with specialised extinguishing media and exclusion distances.
● Similar import-treatment concepts could be replicated at other UK ports, but only where nuclear licensing constraints are manageable.
Source: Technical Brief from Geomechanics July 28th 2026
Experience of Dounreay’s Sodium Coolant.
The UK has experience of decommissioning the Dounreay fast breeder reactors. The two Dounreay reactors were fast breeder types, similar to the Japanese Monju reactor, and also used alkali metal coolant. The Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR) shut down in 1977, while the larger Prototype Fast Reactor shut down in 1994.
Jason Casper, the reactors’ project director at Dounreay, has written at length about the hazardous nature of disposal of sodium coolant. In previous roles, he led clean-up projects in Idaho in the US, and has experience developing and implementing new technologies for sodium treatment, waste monitoring, and characterisation. He writes, at NS Energy that:
“Dealing with the nature of the coolant—commonly sodium or the sodium-potassium alloy NaK—is a major consideration and one of the most demanding and potentially hazardous aspects in decommissioning liquid metal-cooled reactors. Sodium metal reacts vigorously when exposed to water, releasing hydrogen and large quantities of heat, thereby providing not only an explosive gas mixture but also a source of ignition.
2Na + 2H2O = 2NaOH + H2+ Heat
NaK + 2H2O = NaOH + KOH + H2 + Heat
“The products of combustion are also toxic, and can cause severe caustic and thermal burns on coming into contact with skin, as well as being hazardous to ingest or inhale. Methods of destruction or disposal can range from a purpose-built sodium disposal plant (which essentially treats and neutralises the sodium to produce salt water) to high-temperature incineration, among others.
Around 130 m3 of hydrogen gas and 1100 MJ (30 kW) of heat is generated in the ten-hour process to destroy 160 kg of NaK”
Caustic soda production, however, is not a risk-free venture, especially near to residential areas.
A proposed housing development in Runcorn was cancelled over its proximity to a chemical plant producing caustic soda and chlorine.
The housing development masterplan for the Heath Park Development won two national awards, and the plans were approved by Halton Borough Council in May 2024. However, less than 1 km away, the Inovyn ChlorVinyls chemical plant posed a risk to the people who would live on the development that was too severe to ignore.
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) lodged an objection to the plans based on modelling scenarios such as chemical leaks and spills, and the potential impact on local residents. Information published following a site visit in 2023 warned that an accident at the INEOS Inovyn site may produce a toxic gas cloud or smoke plume, or a “drifting cloud of flammable gas” that “may ignite”
.The HSE report added: “Fires may generate smoke clouds which may lead to breathing difficulties and deposition of soot on property and vegetation.“
The HSE warned that the consequences of a major accident would be a “potential for burns to body” that would be “possibly life threatening”, and that gas could be “potentially fatal if inhaled.“
Despite the accolades for much-needed housing in Runcorn, the development was cancelled by the Secretary of State, Steve Reed, following a public inquiry held in 2025.
Inovyn ChlorVinyls Ltd claims: “Our operations at the Runcorn site are of strategic national importance to the UK and focus mainly on the production of chlorine, caustic soda and chlorinated derivatives” INEOS
The Dounreay experience of dealing with sodium coolant did not include the production of “usable caustic soda.”
While the Waste Hierarchy encourages re-use and recycling of industrial waste, the production of caustic soda represents an additional risk to the local area on top of the already discussed risks of managing sodium coolant.
The inference is that the ‘production of caustic soda’ is a fig leaf attempt to justify bringing Japanese chemical/nuclear all the way across the sea, from the failed Monju reactor, to Cumbria.
Radioactive Elements: High Level Waste and Low Level Waste. Press reports play down the presence of radioactive elements in the sodium coolant earmarked for delivery to Workington from Japan. However a 2020 ‘White Paper:
Disposition Options for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors’ from Idaho National Laboratory states:
“The sodium wastes from Sodium Fast Reactor operations will be in two forms, the bulk sodium from the primary and secondary coolant loops and the residual sodium on Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), piping, and other such components. Sodium bearing wastes not considered SNF or High Level Waste will require disposition at Low Level Waste disposal sites. These wastes will also require chemical deactivation or physical removal prior to disposal. The bulk sodium coolant can often be decontaminated and reused.
The wastes from this decontamination will require storage until disposal either as High Level Waste or Low Level Waste.
The (EBR-II) bulk sodium measured a final concentration of cesium within the primary coolant of approximately 370 Bq/g of cesium before it was decommissioned (Newton et al. 2002). The contamination can be remediated with a suitable cesium trap system. The traps act as a filter for the sodium passing through it, trapping the cesium. Successive traps are installed until acceptable levels of cesium are achieved. The cesium traps will require shielding and storage and eventual disposition either as LLW or Greater Than Class C depending on the activity limits. The bulk sodium can then be drained and converted into anhydrous sodium hydroxide, which is a solid form that can be stored indrums.”
Close Proximity of Sodium Coolant Chemical/Nuclear Plant to Schools and Residential Areas.
The Port of Workington is surrounded by schools and residential areas. Northside Primary School for example, is less than 1 km from the proposed chemical/nuclear process plant
As described above, at Runcorn a housing development was turned down last year following a public inquiry as the residential area would have been just over 1 km away from the INEOS caustic soda and chlorine plant. The refusal, citing safety concerns, was without the additional concern of radioactivity.
As well as being close to schools and residential areas the proposed nuclear waste/chemical plant would be around 1km from “Siddick Ponds … a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), Local Nature Reserve and one of Cumbria’s most important bird sites. ”
Questions remain
Democratic Deficit
The proposal to import Japanese sodium coolant from the failed Monju reactor is being presented to the public as a fait accompli. The regional regulatory planning authority, Cumberland Council is acting as a promotional and facilitating arm of the nuclear industry rather than as an independent local authority responsible for planning oversight. We urge both Parish and Cumberland councillors to question this “partnership” with the developers.
How can Cumberland be both “partner” and planning authority especially on such a controversial, dangerous and largely experimental development?
Questions both here and in Japan
The lack of detailed information from the developers and their partner Cumberland Council has led to questions being asked in Japan by civic society groups of the JAEA and the Office for Nuclear Regulation.
These questions include:
● Media reports and the website of the receiving company state that the receiving plant does not handle radioactive materials. How, then, will the primary system sodium be handled?
Cavendish/Amentum JV win Monju D&D contract:
“Alkali Metal Processing Ltd., a joint venture between Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum, will construct, commission, and secure regulatory permissions for a new facility in the U.K. to treat nonradiological sodium coolant removed from the reactor. The sodium coolant is to be converted into sodium hydroxide for general industrial reuse.”
Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum awarded next phase of contract to support Japan’s Monju reactor decommissioning:
“The material, which presents no radiological hazards, will be safely converted into sodium hydroxide for general industrial reuse.”
And in many ways, a more pressing question, is:
● Given the supposed radiation-free nature of the sodium coolant, why is it being transported allthe way to the UK for processing?
In the UK, Radiation Free Lakeland asked the Office of Nuclear Regulation to detail the volume of sodium being transported; its chemical content; and its radiological content.
In reply, the ONR explained: “we understand that the Port of Workington will handle secondary sodium coolant, which is not radioactive and therefore not in scope of ONR’s purposes.”
However, according to Geomechanics July 28th 2026 Technical Brief, which discusses these exact proposals for the Port of Workington: “Construction phasing must separate conventional port works from nuclear-licensed zones with controlled access and radiological monitoring.”
The only reason for a nuclear-licensed zone is the presence of radioactive materials.
Radiation Free Lakeland have asked the Japanese Atomic Energy Authority the following questions:
●“Why is the sodium coolant proposed to be shipped to the UK when the companies involved are already working with their client, JAEA in Japan at the Monju?
●We would like to know:
a) the quantity of sodium coolant proposed to be imported.
b) details of the chemical content of the sodium coolant proposed to be imported
c) details of the radiological content of the sodium coolant proposed to be imported.
Conclusion
The Sodium Coolant Process Plant at the Port of Workington would be an unprecedented and dangerous development, putting residents and primary school children in direct danger of both chemical and potential radiological hazards.
These hazards have not been explained to the public by the developers, which includes the regional planning authority, Cumberland Council, as an enthusiastic and facilitating ‘partner.
There has been a lack of clarity on issues such as:
● Whether or not the sodium coolant will have radiological content
● Why the development needs to be a nuclear-licensed zone if it does not (as claimed) have radiological content.
● Why the coolant needs to be processed in the UK when the companies involved are already working with JAEA in Japan.
● Why the processing must turn one difficult-to-handle product (sodium coolant) into another which is potentially harmful in the event of an accident (caustic soda), given its proximity to residential areas.
● How a caustic soda plant can be considered safe to develop within 1 km of primary schools and residential areas in Workington when previously such areas have been prevented from development due to the presence of such a plant.
There is also a large question around the democratic processes in local government. Cumberland Council is the planning authority yet, without considering the safety aspects, has gone ahead to welcome the development without scrutiny or due process.
Briefing prepared by Radiation Free Lakeland
RAF reports mystery drones over Britain
Near misses occur days apart
during military exercises, with one object spotted at 17,000ft – 40 times
the legal height limit. Royal Air Force jets reported close encounters with
two unidentified drones in British skies this year, The Telegraph can
disclose. The near misses took place days apart during simulated air combat
training and an air-to-air refuelling exercise over the North Sea. One of
the mystery objects was spotted at an altitude of 17,000ft, more than 40
times the legal height limit for commercial drones. Incident logs seen by
The Telegraph show that the RAF reported the sightings to police and that
“multiple different external investigations” are ongoing. The incidents
occurred amid growing fears that hostile powers are using drones to spy on
the West.
Telegraph 16th Oct 2026,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2026/10/16/raf-mystery-drones-britain/
Work begins on Coulport building for Dreadnought submarines a cost of £7.75bn each
15th October, https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/26637101.work-begins-coulport-building-dreadnought-submarines/
Built at a cost of £7.75bn per unit, four Dreadnought submarines will replace the current Vanguard ships
Work has started on a building which will arm the Royal Navy’s new multi-billion-pound nuclear submarines.
Naval Base Commander Clyde and Commodore Andy Bray recently broke ground on a new facility at Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) Coulport to support future classes of Royal Navy submarines.
Building 300 at the Royal Naval Armament Depot will house the Vertical Embarkation System, or VES, a new facility used to load tactical weapons onto future Dreadnought-class deterrent submarines.
The House of Commons approved replacing the current submarines in 2016, despite opposition from anti-nuclear groups and campaigners concerned about the cost.
Built at a cost of £7.75bn per unit, four Dreadnought submarines will replace the current Vanguard ships, which constantly patrol the seas carrying ballistic missiles equipped with thermonuclear warheads.
Shut down the radiation-damaged Heysham nuclear reactors now
The issue
On December 3rd, 2025, at 11:23 pm our house shook and we heard an explosive, grinding noise. We learnt it was an earthquake of 3.3 magnitude on the Lancashire and Cumbria border that was felt across the whole region. The nuclear power plants of Heysham 1 and 2 on the coast opposite Silverdale and on a geological fault line, were at the epicentre. Another lucky escape….
We the undersigned urge the closure of Heysham 1 and 2 nuclear power stations. These nuclear reactors are now 36 years old and have been given repeated life extensions above and beyond their ‘safe’ lifetime of under 30 years. The graphite cores are cracking due to 36 years of bombardment with radiation.
For many years Heysham’s nuclear reactors have not been fit for purpose, with embrittlement and cracking due to radiation bombardment. The solution from the Office for Nuclear Regulation has been to reluctantly adjust safety limits year on year to accommodate this increasing graphite degradation.
Given what is at stake – the safety of Lancashire, Cumbria and even our overseas neighbours – safety should override the monetary concerns of closure of 2 nuclear plants. But at Heysham, safety isn’t paramount.
The graphite has repeatedly come close to breaching safety levels, in which case the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) would have to prosecute or even shut down the plant. Instead, each time, the regulators have bent to requests from EDF energy, to increase the volume of “allowed” cracks.
What could go wrong?
Dr Ian Fairlie a consultant on radiation in the environment has said the worst case scenario could be that:
“cracks in graphite bricks affect stability of reactor core
● if sudden blockage of cooling channel, or outages, or sudden steam surges, or earth tremors – could result in a serious accident – ie releases of radioactive gases
● + if other safety systems failed at same time there could be a catastrophic accident – ie Chornobyl”
Every single minute that Heysham 1 and 2 operates is a gamble.
A major accident at Heysham would more than tip the balance of any financial concerns over closure. The fallout would cause enormous hardship in the rural and urban conurbations of Lancaster and the South Lakes with potentially disastrous impacts including financial, environmental and public wellbeing.
We urge the protection of Lancashire, Cumbria and our overseas neighbours by the closure of Heysham 1 and 2 now.
Notes:
Shutting down Heysham 1 and 2 reactors would not mean a major loss of jobs (there may even be more jobs) as the shut reactors would have to be looked after for another decade at least, even before the long process of decommissioning could begin.
December 3rd 2025 Earthquake https://www.thewestmorlandgazette.co.uk/news/25671677.everything-know-house-shaking-earthquake-south-cumbria/
Geological Fault rules out new nuclear build at Heysham say British Energy -2002 https://www.lancashiretelegraph.co.uk/news/5973788.fault-rules-new-build-heysham/
Office for Nuclear Regulation “Graphite Brick Cracking Network” https://www.onr.org.uk/our-expertise/our-research/graphite-brick-cracking-network
Heysham 1 Justifications for Life Extensions despite graphite degradation https://impact.ref.ac.uk/casestudies/CaseStudy.aspx?Id=37232#:~:text=The%20lifetimes%20of%20Hartlepool%20and,accurate%20determination%20of%20residual%20stresses
Office for Nuclear Regulation – Heysham 2 “Review and Consideration of EC 371321/371221 – Safety Case for Operation with Keyway Root Cracking Beyond a Core Burn-up of 16.5 TWd” https://www.onr.org.uk/media/voiegdi3/202406022-2.pdf
Heysham extension “deeply irresponsible” say Green Party councillors – Lancaster City Council https://www.manxradio.com/news/isle-of-man-news/greens-concerned-over-extension-of-lives-of-heysham-nuclear-plants/
To fund the Burnham Government’s priorities, abandon Hinkley Point C, Sizewell C and Wylfa



Experience with Sizewell C shows that private investors are not willing to be exposed to any significant part of this risk and if a deal is to be done the risk will fall on the public, as taxpayers and electricity consumers.
Britain’s three new nuclear projects – Hinkley Point C, Sizewell C and Wylfa – now depend on public money, above all from the National Wealth Fund, which has committed up to £36.6bn to Sizewell C alone: about twice what it can lend to all its other projects. Abandoning all three would save consumers £93–133bn and free the NWF to back renewables, energy storage and the government’s regional and industrial priorities.
. Introduction
If we strip away the rhetoric of a “golden age for nuclear power” and “ripping up rules to fire up nuclear power”, Britain’s nuclear programme looks very tired, with just three projects that have a reasonable chance of completion. Two of these (Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C) had their origins nearly 20 years ago while the third (Wylfa1) was launched under Boris Johnson’s government. Increasingly, what these three projects have most in common is not the reactors, but who is paying for them. The government’s National Wealth Fund (NWF) – set up to catalyse private investment across the economy – has already had to commit up to £36.6bn of the finance for Sizewell C, on top of a loan to design Wylfa’s reactors. If the Advanced Nuclear Framework succeeds in bringing forward the Cottam, Hartlepool and Oldbury projects too, the NWF could find itself committing a further £60bn to nuclear – in total 3.5 times what it has budgeted for the other 24 sectors it exists to support.
A fund created to unlock private investment across the economy risks becoming a vehicle for channelling public money into the most expensive, slowest and least certain to be delivered of all the forms of power generation available. An analysis of costs and benefits suggests that, far from rushing to launch new nuclear projects as the nuclear industry would advocate, the British people would be better served by abandoning these projects. The money and resources released – including by freeing the National Wealth Fund to do the job it was set up to do – can be redeployed to options that will reduce electricity bills, save taxpayers money and improve our prospects of meeting our climate change goals quickly and reliably.
2. Our nuclear capacity
The UK currently has only five operating nuclear power plants: the four remaining Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor stations (4.7GW) which are likely to be retired by 2031/32,2 and Sizewell B (1.2GW), which is expected to operate until 2055. Hinkley Point C (3.26GW) is under construction and will not be complete before 2032.3 Sizewell C (3.26GW) is three years away from an above ground construction start and, if all goes to plan, might be on-line by the start of 2040.4 The Wylfa Small Modular Reactor (SMR) station (1.5GW) is three years from a firm order being placed so is also unlikely to be generating much before 2040.5
Beyond the Hinkley and Sizewell projects, there is no evidence that further large reactor projects will be pursued (the prime site for large reactors is Wylfa and this has been allocated to an SMR project). There are also no specific government-led proposals for projects to follow on from Wylfa. It appears the government is relying on private sector projects to provide additional nuclear capacity and in February 2026 it published its Advanced Nuclear Framework, which is meant to provide government support for private sector-led projects.6 Under this, several forms of support were offered including:
- Finance via the government’s National Wealth Fund;
- Support via Great British Energy – Nuclear in finding sites;
- Help negotiating power purchase agreements such as contracts for difference that would remove any exposure of the plant to the competitive electricity wholesale market;
- Assessment of the projects by Great British Energy – Nuclear.
Two private sector SMR projects – Cottam and Hartlepool, both of about 1GW capacity – had been announced in September 2025 in association with President Trump’s visit to the UK.7 In June 2026, Holtec announced its application to the Advanced Nuclear Framework for the Cottam project.8 By the end of August 2026, X-Energy, the proposed reactor vendor for the Hartlepool site, had not made an application for entry into the Advanced Nuclear Framework.
Beyond Hinkley and Sizewell, there is no evidence that further large reactor projects will be pursued. There are also no specific government-led proposals for projects to follow on from Wylfa.
In July 2026 GE Vernova, via its Polish Partner SGE (Synthos Green Energy), announced an application to the Advanced Nuclear Framework to build up to 14 BWRX-300 SMRs (4.2GW).9 The application involves a proposal to site the first six reactors at the Oldbury site located on the River Severn, currently owned by Great British Energy – Nuclear (GBE-N). This is a problematic site and the Chair of GBE-N, Simon Bowen, told the ESNZ Committee: “If you look at Oldbury, particularly, the site that is close to you, we are aware that the only way to develop the Oldbury site for nuclear development will be with a significant investment in flood defences.”10 SGE’s target to complete the first reactor by 2034 is unrealistic given that it is several years behind the Rolls-Royce Wylfa project, where the first reactor is not expected to be complete before the ‘mid-30s’.11 It lags behind Wylfa in terms of siting, finance, and regulatory approval by the Office for Nuclear Regulation. GBE-N has stated it has not been contacted by SGE about the Oldbury site.12 There is no evidence yet as to whether the Advanced Nuclear Framework will be an effective route for promoting nuclear projects.
So, if there are no further delays with Hinkley Point C, Sizewell C and Wylfa, it is likely that it will be around 2040 before nuclear capacity exceeds today’s levels and even then, will only have got back to 2019 capacity levels. The current government’s target was to essentially remove all fossil-fuel generation by 2030 so new nuclear capacity can play no role in achieving that. If the AGRs are retired in 2031/32 probably on safety grounds (due to graphite moderator issues13) the British electricity system will have to survive with only about 4.5GW of nuclear capacity and no fossil fuel generation for around a decade. So, if there is a need for new base-load capacity, nuclear cannot provide it before 2040, and even then nuclear capacity will be much less than base-load (defined as the lowest level of demand in the year).
The government’s claim that “Unlike traditional large-scale nuclear plants, these projects [SMRs] usually need smaller sites, allowing more flexibility in where they can be built” is belied by the fact that the Wylfa project (1.5GW) and the potential Oldbury project (1.8GW) are substantially larger than any completed nuclear power plant in the UK and the Hartlepool project is about the same size as the AGR stations and Sizewell B. The reality is that sites that are suitable for nuclear projects in terms of physical factors and public acceptance are, and always will be, hard to find and there will be an overwhelming incentive to fit as many SMRs on to an accepted site as possible.
3. Wylfa
In June 2025, the government announced the winner of its competition to select a Small Modular Reactor (SMR) design for deployment in the UK.14 The design was the 470MW Rolls-Royce PWR SMR for which three reactors are expected to be built at the Wylfa site in North Wales (1.5GW). In June 2025, the government announced that it had allocated £2.6bn to the Wylfa project up to the end of fiscal year 2029/3015. A Final Investment Decision (FID) is not expected until 2029 with the process handled by the government-owned Great British Energy – Nuclear (GBE-N) entity. A significant number of hurdles must be overcome before the FID can be taken. These include completion of the Generic Design Assessment by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). This was expected in July 2026, but unofficial reports suggest the decision will not be before December 2027. The delay is said to be due to the need for design changes. The requirements the nuclear regulator imposes will be an important determinant of the reactor cost. The Wylfa site is widely portrayed as being the best of the existing reactor sites for new development and it did undergo some investigation when it was proposed as a site for two large reactors a decade ago. Nevertheless, the site investigations must be rigorous given the site is unlikely to be cleared after reactor operation until perhaps 150 years from now. However, site work done so far will be minimal, much of it funded by GBE-N so remediation costs would be small.
None of the important financial details about the Wylfa project have been announced. These include ownership, finance method, source of finance and power sales arrangements. However, experience with Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C gives strong indications of what would be needed to finalise the project. They include a substantial government equity stake, possibly as high as 100%; a power sales agreement that ensures all investor costs are passed on to consumers/taxpayers; and cheap finance provided from the National Wealth Fund.
Private investors will be wary of this project given that, in addition to the risks all nuclear projects suffer, the design is completely untested and Rolls-Royce has no experience as a vendor of civil nuclear power plants. These risks exist and will not be changed by different methods of funding and finance. All that can be changed is who bears these risks. Experience with Sizewell C shows that private investors are not willing to be exposed to any significant part of this risk and if a deal is to be done the risk will fall on the public, as taxpayers and electricity consumers. A deal will be easiest to reach if government owns all or practically all the equity so that the risk will fall on taxpayer and electricity consumers. This will avoid the lengthy delays that occurred getting the Sizewell C project to an FID from having to negotiate, not very successfully, with potential investors.
Rolls-Royce has not made predictions of the construction cost since the design was little more than a conceptual one. In 2021, it claimed the cost would fall to £1.8bn for the ‘nth of a kind’ (NOAK) with the first expected to be generating by 2030. The NOAK costs would apply when the supply chain is well established, and learning has made the construction process well established and repeatable. In practice, how many reactor orders it will take to get to ‘n’ is not well-established and most reactor designs are superseded by new or modified designs well before they reach any credible ‘n’.16 So, these forecasts have no value in forecasting the actual cost of a Rolls-Royce SMR.
By June 2026, GBE–N had let contracts worth nearly £900m for the Wylfa project so the compensation payable as a result of abandoning these contracts would be significantly less than £1bn.17 The government’s National Wealth Fund agreed to lend it £599m to develop the design in April 2026 demonstrating that the design is still far from complete.18
4. Sizewell C
The Sizewell C plant is nearly a decade behind Hinkley Point C and the costs incurred so far are correspondingly smaller. The Final Investment Decision (FID) was taken in July 2025 with the government’s central estimate for completion at the end of 2039 at a cost of £40.5bn (2024 money).19 In the June 2025 Spending Review, ahead of the FID, then-Chancellor Rachel Reeves allocated £14.2bn of public money to be spent on the project by the end of fiscal year 2029/30.20 The government claims the “(p)roject will be built for around 20% less than virtual replica Hinkley Point C”, claiming the project “builds on lessons learnt from the construction of Hinkley Point C.” It is misleading to compare in this way the estimated cost at Final Investment Decision (FID) of a project that has not yet had a chance to go wrong – Sizewell C – with one that has been under construction for eight years – Hinkley Point C – for which five delays and cost increases have been announced. The appropriate comparison is with the forecast costs at the point of FID. For Hinkley Point C it was £24bn (2024 money) compared to £40.5bn (2024) for Sizewell C, a real increase of nearly 70%. The time from Final Investment Decision (FID) to completion for Hinkley Point C was forecast to be nine years whereas for Sizewell C it is forecast to be 14 years. So, the learning from Hinkley Point C has led to large real estimated cost increases and a much longer expected lead-time.
The government was only able to complete the deal by offering huge public subsidies and, even then, had to take nearly half the equity. In the government’s Subsidies Database, the government estimates the value of these subsidies as £54.6bn.
The government was only able to complete the deal by offering huge public subsidies and, even then, had to take nearly half the equity. In the government’s Subsidies Database, the government estimates the value of these subsidies as £54.6bn.21 This is a ‘discounted’ figure so the actual amount paid by taxpayers and electricity consumers will be substantially more.22 During the construction period, consumers will pay a surcharge on their electricity bills. This will pay all the investors’ finance charges (approximately £25bn) and will also provide a ‘gift’ to investors of 60% of the equity the investors will be required to put into the project23 worth about £8bn. Finance will mainly be provided by the government’s National Wealth Fund with a budget of up to £36.6bn, at an advantageous rate initially set at a real rate of only 4.5%.
4.1. What will the price of power from Sizewell C be?
he key element in determining the cost-benefit balance for abandoning Sizewell C is the price consumers must pay for its output. One of the few good features of the Hinkley Point C deal is that consumers know what price they will be charged for power, albeit a very high one, regardless of what costs are. As EDF states in its announcements of cost increases: “Under the terms of the Contract for Difference, there is no impact for UK consumers [of cost increases].”24 The contract was for 35 years whereas for Sizewell C it is for 60 years, so consumers will be locked into the Sizewell deal for 25 years longer. For Sizewell, the price of power will be whatever it takes to generate the revenue the investors are contractually entitled to – consumers have had a blank cheque signed on their behalf. Every project using the EPR technology chosen for Sizewell C has far exceeded the cost and time estimates made when the investment decision was taken. So, the power price forecasts for Sizewell C based on estimates made at the time of FID must be regarded as highly likely to be a gross underestimate of the outturn power price. If construction or operating costs are higher than forecast, they will be passed on to consumers. Sizewell C Ltd has made some highly optimistic predictions about the price of power from Sizewell C claiming it would be £88-102/MWh (2026 money)25 – well below Hinkley. But this comes from the project’s promoter, rests on its best-case assumptions, including no cost overrun at all, and carries no consequences for the company if it proves wrong. Given the record of every EPR built so far, it should be treated as a floor rather than a forecast.
Unlike Hinkley Point C, consumers will be required to pay all the finance costs incurred in the construction period as they arise and they will also pay more than half of the investors’ equity contributions. The National Wealth Fund is providing most of the finance at subsidised rate representing a taxpayer subsidy. These additional costs must be factored into any projection of the cost of power from Sizewell C. So, all things being equal, the price to consumers of power from Sizewell C ought to be significantly less than for Hinkley Point C which had none of these subsidies. However, all things are not equal: the forecast construction cost of Sizewell is 70% higher in real terms than the cost of Hinkley on which the power purchase price of £89.5/MWh (2012 prices) was based.
If the outcome cost and time did reach the HRT, it would mean that the construction cost, which would be passed on to consumers as part of the Regulated Asset Base (RAB), would be double the forecast level for Hinkley Point C, the level on which its power price was calculated.
The Sizewell deal includes a Higher Regulatory Threshold (HRT) level with construction costs £47.7bn and completion in 2043 compared to the central assumption, the Lower Regulatory Threshold (LRT), which assumes a construction cost of £40.5bn and completion at the end of 2039. Sizewell C Ltd’s baseline estimate is completion in July 2039 at a cost of £38.2bn. Unlike the LRT and HRT, this estimate has no contractual force and there will be no financial consequences when it is proved wrong. While the HRT is described by government as having a ‘remote’ probability, all experience with nuclear projects, especially those involving EPR technology, suggests that an outcome of costs less than 20% over budget and a three-year delay would be an unprecedentedly good result. If the outcome cost and time did reach the HRT, it would mean that the construction cost, which would be passed on to consumers as part of the Regulated Asset Base (RAB), would be double the forecast level for Hinkley Point C, the level on which its power price was calculated. At that point, the contractual requirement on investors to continue to invest would end with no penalty to them – they keep the full return on what they have already invested – and government would either have to take over funding or abandon the project. By contrast, if Hinkley Point C is not completed by 203626, the government has the option to tear up the power purchase agreement leaving EDF to try to negotiate a new deal or abandon the project and lose the money it invested in the project.
4.1.1. The NAO report
The NAO report on the Sizewell C project publishes a large amount of data on the project including the forecast range of costs of Sizewell over its entire life in real terms.27 Its lower figures correspond to the LRT values and the higher to the HRT. Its data show the flow of cash during the construction period including the ‘net consumer payments’ figure of £24.7-34.5bn. We assume this includes the consumer contribution to investors’ equity costs. NAO’s figures show the cash flow during operation and the total consumer contribution in that period is £111.8-124.0bn making a total consumer contribution of £136.5-158.5bn.
The NAO analysis reports that the price of power is expected to be £133–155/MWh (2024/25 prices), or £152–178/MWh without the ‘recycling’ of the government’s profit as the 44.9% shareholder. Recycling passes that profit to consumers’ bills instead of to the Exchequer. It is a large subsidy from taxpayers to electricity consumers, and it means the lower price understates the full cost of Sizewell C’s power to the public. It is also a very bad precedent to invest so much taxpayers’ money for no return. The NAO notes: “Recycling is a policy decision, which the government could stop or modify at a later point, changing the cost to consumers.”28……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Given the improbability of the Sizewell C project being completed on time and to budget even under the LRT assumptions, the price of power from Sizewell C will inevitably exceed the price of power from Hinkley Point C and probably by a large amount……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
he savings in consumer power price from abandoning Sizewell C, assuming recycling continues, range from £58bn in the highly optimistic lower price case to £98bn in the still optimistic higher case. If the taxpayer subsidy that recycling represents is withdrawn, the savings go up to £87-132bn.
4.2. What would the cost of abandonment be?
The cost of remediating the Sizewell C site would be relatively small…………………………………………………………..
5. Hinkley Point C……………………………………………………………………………………………
5.2. What would the cost of abandonment be?…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
6. Bygones are bygones
British government ministers have repeatedly failed to abandon projects that were clearly going badly wrong preferring to pass the problem to their successor…………………………………………………………………………………..
7. Opportunity costs
Pursuing nuclear power will inevitably take resources away from options that would more effectively help the UK meet its climate change goals (see Annex 2). Of all the power generation technologies, nuclear power is by far the most capital intensive and the longest to build and the most likely to fail at some point between project announcement to completion. Nuclear power also consumes a large proportion of the government’s financial and human resources…………………………………………………………….
7.1. The National Wealth Fund………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Its financing of Sizewell C, 130% of its budget for other projects, is grossly disproportionate and distortive. Indeed, only £17.8bn of the NWF’s £27.8bn is for loans and equity – the rest is guarantees – so its lending to Sizewell C is about twice what it can lend to all its other projects put together.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
9. Conclusion
It is possible to make some estimate of the costs and benefits of completing Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C and in both cases, the evidence is decisively in favour of immediate abandonment. The case for abandoning Sizewell C is clearly the strongest, but the case for abandoning Hinkley Point C is also strong even after construction has been underway for eight years.
Little is known about the costs and commercial arrangements for the Wylfa project, particularly who will bear the economic risk, but if a deal is to be concluded, it is only likely to be possible if these risks are borne by the public. Wylfa therefore represents a major gamble with public money……………….
For a new government with a substantial mission for regional growth and tackling the cost-of-living crisis, reallocating funds from nuclear energy to economic growth should be viewed as a real option.
…………………………………………………………………………………………
Annexes 1 and 2…………
MULTIPLE REFERENCES ……………. https://policybrief.org/briefs/to-fund-the-burnham-governments-priorities-abandon-hinkley-point-c-sizewell-c-and-wylfa/
UK Civil-Military Nuclear Policy: ‘radical reset’ or ‘misleading fig leaf’?

the deep entangling of civil and military nuclear infrastructures. …………………. study found a net flow of value from civil to military nuclear infrastructures amounting to more than £5 billion per year42.
The declared costs of the UK nuclear-propelled submarine programme are already questioned even by advocates44. Without this massive cross-subsidy, it is clear these burdens would become even more unaffordable4
The government’s nuclear deregulation drive rests on assumption, not evidence, never comparing nuclear with cheaper, faster alternatives, downplaying safety risks, and denying trade-offs outright. A less visible driver, they suggest, is military pressure: sustaining Britain’s submarine-building base costs over £5 billion a year.
Andy Stirling– Emeritus Professor, Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of Sussex, Phil Johnstone– Visiting Fellow, Global Studies, University of Sussex, October 2026, https://policybrief.org/briefs/uk-civil-military-nuclear-policy-radical-reset-or-misleading-fig-leaf/
Much has happened since Starmer’s King’s Speech1 on 26 May 2026. On the face of it, that “radical reset” of arrangements governing both civil and military nuclear activities still stands as the basis for Andy Burnham’s own policy direction on these crucial issues. Certainly, this major boost in official commitments to all things nuclear remains evident in the direction taken by Andy Burnham’s early initiative2. Building on the Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce Review3 initiated in 2025, the biggest overhaul of nuclear regulation for decades seems to be ‘full speed ahead’.
But does this renewed momentum make sense, for the most expensive energy on the grid and a military posture that has remained unchanged for decades despite a massively transformed world? What is the evidence underpinning these moves? Where has this been properly interrogated? The Taskforce review is treated as if it has already answered these questions. This briefing will examine whether and to what degree this is so.
Whatever view is taken of nuclear power or nuclear weapons, the major nuclear regulatory reforms now in play are extraordinarily important. Nuclear technologies touch on issues of energy, climate, public spending, environmental protection, health, security and national strategy. If regulation is to be weakened, streamlined or redesigned, all sides might agree that the case for doing so should be rigorous, transparent and evidence-based4.
Accordingly, the stated aims of the Review were to make regulation more efficient, affordable and proportionate. Yet the new nuclear policy is undermined right at the outset by such claims being more assumed than supported by evidence. Indeed, the Taskforce itself says that “[w]e have taken the Government’s commitment to civil and defence nuclear power as given for the purposes of this review”5.
As a result, conclusions are presented as though they are self-evident. Without duly attending to cross-country comparisons6, the UK is asserted to be an “international leader” in nuclear technology7. Existing UK nuclear regulation is likewise said to be “well respected”. But it is not mentioned specifically by whom, nor on what particular grounds, this should be true of a country which has, under any view, slipped far behind others in this field over the past fifty years8. Taking these claims as “given” risks substituting reasoned analysis with nationalistic posturing9.
Nuclear technology is likewise revealingly characterised as a given: as “essential” for national security, energy security and net zero10. Again, detailed evidence for such claims is almost entirely absent. Declared priorities of efficiency, affordability and proportionality are further undermined by failing anywhere in more than 160 pages to substantiate how these values are met by furthering nuclear technologies rather than their many alternatives11. As if nuclear power existed in isolation, the attention is virtually all on this one option alone.
So, it may seem scarcely believable, but is nonetheless true, that the comparative case made by the Taskforce for nuclear power in relation to alternatives is not merely flawed: it is non-existent. Perhaps the reason for this lies in the inconvenience for official interests, of what is an increasingly compelling comparative picture. Despite the official impressions given otherwise, nuclear power is in fact clearly generally more costly12, slower and less effective13 than alternative strategies for economical, secure, firm-equivalent, domestic zero carbon energy14. This is true both internationally15 and even in official UK data16 (on the rare occasions and obscure corners where it is looked at17).
The Taskforce’s conclusions are presented as though they are self-evident: the UK is “international leader” in nuclear technology though it has slipped far behind others in this field over the past fifty years. Taking these claims as “given” risks substituting reasoned analysis with nationalistic posturing.
Nor are these core considerations all that the Taskforce falls short of properly addressing. The Review nowhere refutes that nuclear continues to present disproportionate risks of distinctive low-probability, high-consequence accidents18, yet seemingly does not consider this an issue of importance warranting further discussion. Likewise neglected is a scientific literature increasingly pointing to locally elevated health problems around nuclear facilities19. Even without accepting this evidence, examining it should be a priority.
lso under-addressed by the Taskforce are concerns that nuclear presents: unresolved eye-wateringly expensive radioactive waste challenges20; extraordinary vulnerabilities to climate-driven sea-level rise21; and highly concentrated pre-distributed iconic targets for enemies in times of war22. Again, conclusions may vary, but – unless the aim is simply to force through a manifestly unfavourable option – why not at least look at such issues?
Perhaps most disturbing of all is the wider context. This failure by the Taskforce even to attempt duly detailed comparative analysis is also a feature of high-profile official UK analysis for many years. Again, neither the Taskforce, nor the UK Government now enthusiastically taking up its prescriptions23, make any reference to any official attempt to compare nuclear power with its alternatives. This remarkable blind spot means current deregulatory action is seriously under-substantiated.
In the one area where the Taskforce does address issues of risk, neglect for rigorous assessment comes even more to the fore. In particular, critical attention is given to the long-established international ALARP principle24 – the requirement that risks be reduced “as low as reasonably practicable”. Here, without making underlying evidence readily checkable, the Review simply asserts current interpretations of nuclear risks to be “overly cautious25”.
But ALARP has evolved over many decades26 precisely because nuclear activities can involve severe and long-lasting consequences. Far from being “overly cautious”, a general pattern is for risks that were initially denied to eventually be acknowledged by events27.
So, any move to weaken ALARP inevitably raises questions about trade-offs. Faster approvals, lower costs and greater flexibility may all be desirable goals on their own. Yet it is difficult to see how significant regulatory changes can occur without affecting the balance currently struck between efficiency and protection.
It makes no reference to any official attempt to compare nuclear power with its alternatives. This remarkable blind spot means current deregulatory action is seriously under-substantiated.
Oddly, these trade-offs are also rarely discussed in detail by the Taskforce. And in the ensuing King’s Speech28, they are explicitly framed as a “win-win”. So, it is not so much that a case is made as to why relaxing nuclear regulation will incur benefits greater than risks. The unsupported claim is even stronger: that negative trade-offs effectively don’t exist. Given both the history of nuclear technologies29 and the current world situation30, this again seems an eccentric position to assert without evidence.
All this matters still more, because the Taskforce recommendations now being acted on are not modest adjustments. The Taskforce itself repeatedly calls for “radical reform” and a “radical reset” of the regulatory system31. Keir Starmer put it even more strongly in claiming that his “Government rips up rules to fire-up nuclear power”32. There is no suggestion of any change of direction by Andy Burnham. Yet if the existing nuclear regulatory system is as genuinely well respected as is claimed, why is radical change necessary at all? If radical change is necessary, what exactly is wrong with the current arrangements? Does this contradiction not also suggest rhetoric more than substance?
A further striking feature of the Review is its lack of historical perspective. For nearly two decades, successive UK governments have sought to streamline planning, nuclear licensing and approval procedures33. New institutions have been created. Planning procedures have been reconfigured34. Regulatory processes have been accelerated. Yet despite all this, nuclear projects remain slow, costly and difficult to deliver35.
Before proposing another round of deregulation, then, it seems reasonable to ask why previous attempts failed. Was regulation really the main obstacle? What are the implications if the key difficulties lie in the economics and engineering of nuclear technologies themselves36? What if – like so many technologies before – nuclear power is simply becoming obsolete?37
If there were no alternatives38, the Taskforce’s blinkered focus on nuclear alone might be understandable. But in the UK, as worldwide39, the main story is – again under any view – the phenomenally rapid overtaking of nuclear power by other domestic, secure, zero carbon technologies40. If the Taskforce were to be true to its stated principles of proportionality, efficiency and affordability, surely it would have something to say about this?
Perhaps the most important issue, then, concerns democratic accountability.41 Treating the case for nuclear technologies as ‘given’ diverts attention from the actual pros and cons of nuclear activities to how best they should be regulated. In this, safety problems are not directly denied but implied to be insufficient to outweigh “the UK’s nuclear ambitions”.
Was regulation really the main obstacle? What are the implications if the key difficulties lie in the economics and engineering of nuclear technologies themselves? What if – like so many technologies before – nuclear power is simply becoming obsolete?
What then are the drivers of these ambitions? The Review itself and associated Kings Speech confirm the deep entangling of civil and military nuclear infrastructures. So – albeit not asked officially – the question reasonably arises as to whether the flows of resources from mixed civil and military budgets (as funded by taxpayers or electricity consumers) match the patterns of costs as actually incurred on civil and military sides. Or is there a mismatch that leads one side to gain disproportionately by the sharing of resources? Cui bono?
When this oddly-neglected question was actually addressed by a study in 2024 for a UK Foreign Office-funded research programme, the answer was clear. The study drew on officially stated budgets of government civil and military nuclear-related agencies and programmes and on flows of revenues from consumers for purchase of excessively expensive wholesale nuclear electricity – that would cost less, according to Government data, if alternative zero carbon sources were used. Even when calculated in a conservative way – that diminishes the size of the observed imbalance – this provisional study found a net flow of value from civil to military nuclear infrastructures amounting to more than £5 billion per year42.
In the absence of officially audited figures, this kind of external analysis is all there is in the UK at the moment. Although the Government itself is silent on the matter, it seems clear who benefits from the emphasised integration of civil and military nuclear industrial base. And this corroborates the openly stated position in defence documents discussed earlier in this briefing. The reason for UK perseverance with unnecessarily expensive and otherwise substitutable nuclear power seems largely to reflect military pressures43.
Whatever side they are viewed from, the implications are very serious. The declared costs of the UK nuclear-propelled submarine programme are already questioned even by advocates44. Without this massive cross-subsidy, it is clear these burdens would become even more unaffordable45. So it is evidently for this reason that the Taskforce asserts nuclear technologies to be “essential” for the UK. This seems why the Taskforce links a “high-performing national nuclear enterprise” so strongly to defence objectives.
This picture is reinforced by the provisions of the King’s Speech. Accepting in principle all 47 recommendations of the Nuclear Taskforce, the King’s Speech was even more clear in expressing the remarkable intensity of commitment that exists in UK policy for sustaining a combined civil-military nuclear complex. The Nuclear Regulation Bill itself is explicitly justified as speeding nuclear delivery and reducing costs “in a boost to the UK’s energy sovereignty and the nuclear deterrent”.46
In conclusion, the key point applies even though reasonable people may disagree about the morality, wisdom and efficacy of nuclear weapons as well as about the pros and cons of any future role for nuclear power. Under any view, such disagreements should surely be addressed openly? It is here that both the Taskforce Report, and the wider grounds for current policies being implemented on this basis, might be seen from all sides as problematic.
The core issue is not whether nuclear regulation should change, or how. It is whether proposals for the present “radical reset” are supported by analysis that is sufficiently rigorous, balanced and transparent47 to justify the profound consequences that may follow for UK electricity consumers, taxpayers and citizens in the widest sense. On that question, important doubts remain.
REFERENCES – (many) ……………………………………………………………
Questions raised over new Faslane base ballistic shelters
PLANS to install ballistic security shelters at the UK’s nuclear submarine
base on the Clyde have sparked questions from anti-nuclear campaigners over
what threats military chiefs believe Faslane could face.
Construction firm
Henry Brothers has been appointed to deliver specialist ballistic security
shelters at HMNB Clyde as part of a £2.55 million package of infrastructure
works commissioned by Babcock International Group. The programme also
includes enhanced security fencing and refurbishment of an existing
pressure test building, with Babcock saying the investment will help ensure
facilities supporting the Royal Navy’s Vanguard and Astute-class submarine
fleets remain “resilient, secure and fit for the future”.
However, the
Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) said the plans raise
important questions about both the purpose of the shelters and the risks
associated with hosting the UK’s nuclear weapons system in Scotland.
The National 12th Oct 2026,
https://www.thenational.scot/news/26630106.questions-raised-new-faslane-base-ballistic-shelters/
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