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Why Putin Is Threatening Nuclear War Over Kaliningrad

If an increasingly vulnerable Kaliningrad holds strategic value for Russia and can only be defended by nuclear weapons, then perhaps Western leaders shouldn’t threaten it—and perhaps Western analysts should take more seriously Moscow’s repeated warnings that such threats could meet a nuclear response.

Russia experts shed light on the Kremlin’s calculations.

Andrew Day, Oct 3, 2026, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-putin-is-threatening-nuclear-war-over-kaliningrad/

If the world blows up in a conflict over Kaliningrad—the diminutive Russian exclave sandwiched between Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Sea—at least there would be a silver lining for survivors to appreciate: It would be darkly humorous and ironic.

Kaliningrad—or Koenigsberg, as the formerly German city was called before its capture in 1945 by the Soviet Union—was the birthplace of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, whose most enduring contribution to political theory was a long essay on international relations, Toward Perpetual Peace. In it, Kant outlines some big-brained ideas that governments should implement to not only end active hostilities but create the political conditions for, well, perpetual peace.

Old Kant published that hopeful essay 231 years ago and would certainly be disturbed and disappointed by this week’s headlines. The most riveting came from the New York Post: “Moscow threatens nuclear response over tiny fortress wedged between US allies as clash fears grow.” (The Post really has a knack for this kind of thing, doesn’t it?)

The one from the Associated Press more aptly, if less dramatically, described the latest development. “Russia warns NATO of a possible nuclear response if Kaliningrad is cut off,” it blared.

So, what’s got the Russians so worked up? Top Russia experts told The American Conservative that Moscow assigns profound strategic significance to the exclave and perceives a Western threat against it.

“Kaliningrad gives Russia another warm water port on the Baltic Sea,” said Thomas Graham, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former White House expert under President George W. Bush. “It also holds major military assets to defend Russia’s interest in the region, including access routes to St. Petersburg.”

Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute noted an even more straightforward Russian interest than that. “Russia cares about this because it is internationally-recognized Russian national territory,” Lieven said. “Any attack on it or blockade is therefore legally an act of war against the Russian Federation, to which the Russian government would have to respond or face deep humiliation.”

Those are important points with which few experts would quibble. But what really distinguishes Graham and Lieven is their ability to discern—from Russia’s point of view—a Western threat against Kaliningrad, and to take it seriously. Judging by the comments both men provided, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin didn’t issue the nuclear threats lightly.

“In some NATO countries there has been talk of blockading Kaliningrad, that is, isolating the region from the rest of Russia by land and sea,” Graham said. “Putin would see a blockade as an act of war against Russia. So he is making sure that Europe understands that he will defend Russian land with all necessary means, which could include nuclear weapons.”

Moscow had already been inclined, even before the latest tensions exploded between Russia and the West, to view Kaliningrad as exposed to NATO’s predations. “NATO expansion to Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, and Finland means that Kaliningrad is now surrounded by NATO countries both by land and sea,” Lieven noted.

Sadly, not all Western experts perform such acts of perspective taking. Consider a recent article in The Hill, which, in the view of this editor-cum-columnist at least, actually brought the week’s most disturbing headline: “Kaliningrad is just Putin’s red herring.”

The coauthors—Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet—write that the Kremlin is engaged in “nuclear bluffing” designed to intimidate the West and distract from its own military failures in Ukraine. Early in the piece, the only context they provide for Moscow’s warnings is a new British television miniseries called The Wargame, in which the UK launches retaliatory strikes on Kaliningrad after a Russian attack.

A casual reader of their article could be left with the impression that this TV show was the main thing, perhaps the only thing, motivating Putin’s threatening rhetoric. But a careful reader would learn otherwise, for the authors inadvertently illuminate the kinds of Western behavior that prompted Putin’s warnings.

“Kaliningrad is a hollowed-out shell of what it was before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” they write. “As Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski pointed out earlier this month, ‘There are hardly any [Russian] troops [in the Kaliningrad exclave].’”

But that’s not all that Sikorski said. Toth and Sweet link to an article in Defense News, the first sentence of which is this:

NATO allies could hold drills in proximity of Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave in an attempt to push Moscow to weaken its military posture in Ukraine and withdraw some of its troops there, said Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister

Clearly, Sikorski went far beyond merely commenting on Russia’s force posture in the region. The article emphasizes that he didn’t recommend “offensive” actions against Kaliningrad, but you could hardly blame Putin for failing to appreciate the distinction. Indeed, in the relevant quotes, Sikorski recommends that NATO “aggressively” exercise around Kaliningrad and start treating the exclave as a front in the confrontation between Russia and the West.

Toth and Sweet’s article continues: “Although Kaliningrad is still the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the Baltic Sea itself has effectively become a NATO-controlled lake, after the accession of Sweden and Finland as the newest members of NATO.” Kaliningrad, they write, “is highly vulnerable,” and these days it merely hosts nuclear missiles, its conventional forces having been deployed to Ukraine.

Thus, “Moscow’s nuclear Armageddon bluffing is simply the latest attempt by Putin and his Kremlin cronies to paper over this problem.”

Here the premises lead to the conclusion only in the sense that they crash violently into it. If an increasingly vulnerable Kaliningrad holds strategic value for Russia and can only be defended by nuclear weapons, then perhaps Western leaders shouldn’t threaten it—and perhaps Western analysts should take more seriously Moscow’s repeated warnings that such threats could meet a nuclear response.

And those analysts should understand that the Russian political establishment in general—not just Putin—perceives a Western threat against Kaliningrad that, if acted upon, could precipitate a devastating Russia–NATO conflict. Referring to Sikorski’s apparent suggestion that NATO might isolate the exclave, forcing its surrender, Lieven said, “If this did happen, every Russian with whom I have spoken has said that Russia would have credibly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, followed by their actual use if NATO failed to back down.”

Tensions between Russia and the West are worse than they’ve been since the Cold War, and mutual understanding perhaps worse than even then. In our age, Kant’s dreams of perpetual peace may seem naive if not delusional, but surely our leaders have enough wisdom not to let inexcusable miscalculations over his homeland on the Baltic lead to nuclear war. Right?

October 21, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Russia, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Bridging Geopolitical Divides: International Physiciansfor the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) Revitalizes Dialogue in Russia and China

IPPNW is one of very few professional associations that has not abandoned dialogue with Russian colleagues. Since the summer of 2021, a new, energized cohort of Russian and American medical students and young doctors has hosted informal monthly Zoom calls to build relationships and trust.

Michael Christ, IPPNW Executive Director. September 29, 2026, https://peaceandhealthblog.com/2026/10/14/bridging-geopolitical-divides-ippnw-revitalizes-dialogue-in-russia-and-china/

This month marks the 40th anniversary of the 1986 Reykjavík Summit, the historic meeting where Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev came astonishingly close to completely abolishing the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. While the meeting concluded without an official accord due to US insistence on pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”), it nevertheless laid the critical diplomatic foundation for future landmark nuclear disarmament treaties. It also proved that even bitter adversaries can sit at the negotiating table to tackle head-on the greatest immediate threat to human survival.

Tragically, these hard-fought gains have been lost to a steady breakdown in international diplomacy, a dangerous arms race in nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence, and a resort to threats and war to prosecute disputes. This has made the risk of catastrophic miscalculation higher than at any point since the Cold War.

As we did throughout the 1980s, IPPNW is bridging geopolitical divides by engaging our network of physicians and health partners around the world on the growing threat of nuclear war—especially with colleagues in Russia and China—not as an abstract political calculation, but as the final, untreatable global health epidemic.

Monthly Russian-American Exchanges

Participants in these discussions have gone on to publish relevant articles in medical literature, attended key nuclear disarmament meetings at the UN, and become active in local and national campaigns opposing the threat of nuclear war.

Russian Nonproliferation Conference

At the invitation of the Russian Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), IPPNW’s Chuck Johnson traveled to Moscow to participate in high-level discussions on nuclear weapons. CENESS is a think-tank that fosters dialogue and cooperation on nuclear policy, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy issues. Chuck previously served as the founding director of the IPPNW Geneva Liaison Office before transitioning to his role as policy director.

The 2026 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference took place on March 12–14, 2026, bringing together 289 experts—including diplomats, researchers, academics, and advocates—from 49 countries. Roughly half of the participants were Russian. The event also drew high-level officials from key UN agencies and international organizations, such as Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu, and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi.

During closed-door sessions, participants tackled the major global security challenges in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. A special “New Generation Experts Segment” also gathered approximately 40 young professionals from 20 countries to explore the associated risks and opportunities.The effort was the brainchild of Dr. Joe Hodgkin, an attending hospitalist at Massachusetts General Hospital, and Dr. Olga Trushina, a cardiologist at the Russian Cardiology Research and Production Complex (which was founded by her grandfather, IPPNW co-founder Eugene Chazov). Dr. Hodgkin serves on the Board of Directors of IPPNW’s US affiliate, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and Dr. Trushina is a Co-President of IPPNW. Together, they have renewed and re-imagined IPPNW’s founding mission using modern technologies that are integral to their social and professional lives.

This marked the first time IPPNW was invited to this flagship biennial event. The conference provided a rare, high-value opportunity for IPPNW to engage directly with top Russian and international officials and experts—both during the formal panels and in private meetings on the margins.

Renewed Outreach to China

Chuck Johnson has also been at the leading edge of IPPNW’s efforts to strengthen cooperation and dialogue with health professionals, academics, and professional associations in China.

His consistent outreach to Chinese colleagues during international health partner and UN disarmament meetings in Geneva led to an invitation to lecture at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in the fall of 2025.

While in Beijing, he also met with members of the Chinese Medical Association at their headquarters, securing a commitment from them to invite IPPNW doctors to present to medical professionals in China in the coming year. As a result, an IPPNW delegation attending the annual meeting of the Chinese Medical Association’s Medical Ethics Branch in Hefei, the capital of Anhui province, in July 2026. Chuck was joined by Dr. Joe Hodgkin (PSR-USA) and Dr. Tilman Ruff (MAPW-IPPNW Australia).

This visit was our most significant engagement with China since the 2004 IPPNW World Congress in Beijing. The delegation delivered three plenary lectures at the national medical conference, highlighting the critical role of medical and public health professionals in addressing the growing threat of nuclear war.

Following the conference, the team held multiple high-level meetings with dozens of senior academics, health officials, and organizational leaders in both Hefei and Beijing. These discussions were aided significantly by Dr. Hodgkin’s deep cultural knowledge and fluency in Mandarin, as well as Dr. Ruff’s extensive history and leadership within IPPNW.

The delegation discussed several concrete follow-on activities, including planning additional meetings and co-authoring joint publications in prominent Chinese health and science journals focused on the prevention of nuclear war.

By reviving these critical channels of communication, IPPNW ensures that even in times of intense global friction, the medical community remains a vital bridge toward peace. The US, Russia, and China would do well to revive the “spirit of Reykjavík”, returning to the negotiating table to complete what Reagan and Gorbachev came so close to achieving—saving humankind from the growing threat of nuclear war.

October 20, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | China, health, politics international, Russia, USA | Leave a comment

“Russia cannot lose”

Dmitri Trenin on the Ukraine Proxy War and Why the West Won’t Win

Ian Proud, Oct 14, 2026, https://thepeacemonger.substack.com/p/russia-cannot-lose?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=3221990&post_id=220332256&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

I bumped into Dmitri Trenin for the first time in eight years at the Valdai Discussion Club in Moscow. He was sat behind me during a session and we renewed our acquaintances. When I was based at the British Embassy in Moscow, Dmitri was Director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. He was one of the most valued interlocutors for the Embassy, and seen as a person who always offered a balanced Russian perspective on world events. He is now the President of the Russian International Affairs Council, and I was pleased that he agreed to talk to me on my Peacemonger channel.

Trenin offered a clear-eyed view from Moscow of why the Ukraine war has lasted so long and why a diplomatic settlement remains so difficult. He framed the conflict as existential for Russia. From the Kremlin’s perspective, this is not a limited dispute with Ukraine but a proxy war waged by the West, which has invested hundreds of billions of dollars into the war effort.

Russia, he said, cannot afford to end the fighting without achieving the core objectives it set out with: securing the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, upholding its constitutional obligations after the 2022 referenda in those oblasts, and establishing a security arrangement that prevents Ukraine from becoming a permanent platform for pressure against Russia.

Trenin stressed that Russia does not aim to conquer the whole of Ukraine or invade Europe. Indeed, in an article published early in the war he made the case for Russia not seeking to conquer all of Ukraine and so tie itself into a costly insurgency in the west, while permanently damaging prospects for normalisation with Europe.

He pointed to the years before 2014, when Moscow largely accepted a sovereign Ukraine within its Soviet-era borders, and to the early 2022 talks in which Russia was prepared to accept Ukrainian neutrality and discuss the status of the Donbas, along the lines earlier set out in the Minsk Agreements.

In his telling, Russia’s position hardened in response to Western and Ukrainian actions, not because of a pre-existing plan to absorb more territory in Ukraine.

Security concerns, particularly over NATO expansion and the treatment of Russian speakers and Russian culture in Ukraine, remain central to Putin’s calculus.

The interview also highlighted the very different stakes for the other parties. For the Biden administration the war was cast in ideological terms—democracy versus authoritarianism. For Donald Trump, Trenin argued, it is one piece of a broader effort to rebalance U.S. power and reduce commitments to allies. For Europe, however, the conflict has become existential in a different way.

Trenin said European elites are using the image of a Russian threat to hold the European Union together, justify remilitarization, and brand political opponents as pro-Russian. He described talk of an imminent Russian invasion of Europe as hollow propaganda that serves domestic political purposes more than it reflects actual Russian intentions.

On the question of NATO, Trenin returned to the proposals Russia made in late 2021: permanent Ukrainian neutrality, written into the Ukrainian constitution and international agreements, with no NATO bases, exercises, or military cooperation. He also noted Russia’s earlier call for NATO military infrastructure to be pulled back to 1997 lines.

Any lasting European security arrangement, he suggested, would eventually require some form of military-technical equilibrium and mutual assurances, but that discussion remains secondary to the outcome of the current war.

Looking further ahead, Trenin was cautious but not wholly pessimistic about relations with individual European countries. He said the ball is largely in Europe’s court. If political changes in Germany, France, Britain, and elsewhere weaken the current supranational approach and restore a greater role for national interests, a basic transactional or “neighborly” relationship could become possible.

He does not expect a return to the Greater Europe ideas of the 1990s and 2000s; too much has changed. But he argued that nationalism and the interests of individual states will eventually reassert themselves across Europe, as they have elsewhere in the world.

The conversation reinforced an assessment I’ve held for some time that the war in Ukraine will ultimately be decided by the inescapable mathematics of attrition and whether Europe’s political direction shifts back towards the sovereignty of its members.

Trenin’s account makes plain why Russia will not walk away from the war in Ukraine and why it expects the confrontation with Europe to outlast the fighting itself. As Trenin said to me when we met in Moscow, ‘the relationship with Europe is over’. It was clear during the conversation that that split was as regrettable to him, as it is to me.

October 20, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Panic in Kiev as AFU’s Starlink “Mysteriously” Throttled One Day After Intelligence Blackout

Simplicius, Oct 15, 2026

A day after Zelensky accused the US of cutting “intelligence support” and not providing early warning against Russia’s ballistic missile strikes on Kiev, pandemonium has ensued in Ukraine.

Now the country’s leadership has accused the US of cutting its Starlink support as well.

It all began with a post by prominent Ukrainian figure Serhii Sternenko who detailed how Starlink terminals in Ukraine were throttled when they passed a certain speed restriction:

As can be seen (on original), he accuses Elon Musk’s SpaceX of meddling, which began a firestorm of hate directed toward Musk from the Ukrainian-aligned side of social media.

Musk immediately responded with a clarification: the military version of Starlink is infact operated by the US DOD under the name Starshield and is not controlled by Musk or SpaceX. You can see him responding directly to the star ex-Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov himself—note that Fedorov claims connectivity was already being restored at the time:

Musk was forced to divest himself of this arm of his company early in the war in order to continue presenting a “neutral” face for his enterprise and not have it messily linked to offensive military actions which he likely knew would be pushed into very ethically “gray” areas of striking Russian civilian and dual-use infrastructure.

Despite all that however, we must admit the timing is a tad suspicious given that Musk had some very strong words about Zelensky only days ago:

First, it should be mentioned that despite Fedorov’s claims of restoration, there were other counter-claims that his announcement was premature and service was in fact still widely failing.

Several Ukrainian brigades had also posted of their issues. Here the 7th Airborne Assault Corps of the AFU: (on original)

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Response Corps of the Air Assault Forces reports that Starlink disruptions are occurring in the Hulyaipole/Orikhiv direction, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, this morning.

The so-called Starshield package, which conducts data transferring for drone flights, has received limitations on speeds of 110-120+ km/h, where the connection can be lost for 10-20 seconds making it difficult to control the drones. Additionally, the launch of high-speed mid-range drones has become almost impossible.

Already, since this morning, some missions of the 7th Corps have had to be cancelled due to these Starlink restrictions and communications problems.

Ukraine’s most authoritative figure on these topics, Serhiy Flash, also confirmed that Starlink restrictions had come into force:

On his TG channel he went into further detail:

Everyone is writing about how the “Starlink” restrictions have impacted long-range missions and frontline logistics, but there’s another major problem for us.

“Starlink” is being used in the most effective current solution (interceptors) for protecting our airspace from jet-powered “Shahed” drones.

In fact, with their actions, our partners are depriving us of one of the few chances we have to defend the country from these jet-powered “Shaheds.”

He points out an important and under-appreciated part of the saga: that Starlink is used not just offensively by Ukrainian long-range drones but also defensively in interceptors that target Russia’s own strike assets which have been hitting Kiev. As such, Russia’s recent crippling strikes on Kiev’s facilities now stand to become even worse if these disruptions continue.

In light of the above, today WaPo dropped the bombshell that the US has in fact been threatening key Ukrainian personnel with an intelligence cut-off should Zelensky continue to hit Russian oil sites………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

the US has been juggling its finite space resources between the various theaters of conflict it has provoked and is trying to simultaneously manage………………………………………………

No matter what really happened with the early warning and Starlink fiasco, the fact remains that the US appears to have sent Ukraine a final ultimatum that intelligence will be completely cut off if Ukraine continues to hit Russian energy, at least according to the earlier reports…………………………

In the meantime, Russia has been devastating Kiev, with another massive strike reportedly being planned for the coming days or sooner.

Last night a record 6 sites related to energy infrastructure were hit around Kiev and Kharkov……………………………..https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/panic-in-kiev-as-afus-starlink-mysteriously?publication_id=1351274&post_id=220385664&isFreemail=false&r=3alev&triedRedirect=true&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

October 19, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Russia, Ukraine, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Ukraine’s worst diplomatic nightmare just got closer

The fuel deal’s real significance lies in diplomacy: Trump and Putin found a way to work together without making Ukraine part of the bargainPublished 11 Oct, 2026 12:36 | Updated 11 Oct, 2026 13:40

11 Oct, 2026 , By Sergey Poletaev, information analyst and publicist, co-founder and editor of the Vatfor project, https://rt-english.com/russia/647043-ukraine-diplomacy-trump-putin/

On the evening of October 9, the presidents of the United States and Russia spoke by phone. The announcement that followed was straightforward: Russia would sell the US 1.8 million metric tons of diesel over the next three months, followed by a million tons a month, and the US would issue temporary licenses authorizing the shipments.

The news drew a furious, bordering on hysterical, response from Kiev and stunned silence from Europe.

Let’s look at why this deal matters, what it has to do with Ukraine, and what might come next.

The tug-of-war championship

Ever since US President Donald Trump returned to office, the central aim of Russian diplomacy has been to separate relations with the US from the Ukraine issue. The White House is open to the idea, too: The US needs Russia as a counterweight to China, and there are substantial economic opportunities. But as we explored in an earlier piece, until recently, neither side managed to pull it off.

Ukraine and its supporters in Europe and the US, meanwhile, have pursued the opposite goal: keeping US-Russia relations tied to the Ukraine conflict.

In February and March 2025, Trump relieved America of responsibility for Ukraine’s fate and handed the job of financing it squarely to Europe. The US retained just three commitments: the relatively modest military supply programs already approved under former President Joe Biden, intelligence sharing, and weapons sales for cash, with Ukraine waiting in line like any other customer.

This maneuver cemented a status quo that neither Europe and Ukraine on one side nor Russia on the other would allow to change, with their respective allies in the US also weighing in. Everyone tried to bring Trump over to their side on Ukraine. Nobody succeeded.

This is why the understandings reached in Anchorage went nowhere: Ukraine’s supporters torpedoed them. It is also why those supporters failed to use Trump to escalate the conflict. Russia prevented deliveries of Tomahawk missiles, the expansion of Starlink coverage over Russian territory, and so on.

Despite the apparent stalemate, Russian officials kept talking to Witkoff and Kushner. The aim was to maintain a channel to Trump and deny Ukraine’s supporters an opening to drag the US back into the war on their side or steer him back onto Biden’s course.

This is why Russian officials at every level distinguish between US and European actions, often explicitly contrasting the two.

A few numbers on oil

Russia is one of the world’s largest diesel exporters, supplying just under 40 million metric tons to the global market in 2025. On July 8, 2026, Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries prompted a temporary ban on diesel and gasoline exports.

Since then, Russia’s refining situation has improved considerably. Gasoline remains in short supply, but a domestic diesel surplus has emerged, and the export ban has begun to loosen in practice. According to Reuters, diesel deliveries to Central Asian countries were already up 19% in September.

A few numbers on oil

The Krivoy Rog school of diplomacy

Back to geopolitics. Until yesterday, Russia had been unable to separate its relationship with the US from the Ukraine issue. Even the war with Iran failed to do the trick, despite keeping oil and petroleum product shipments from the Persian Gulf blocked for more than six months.

Help came from an unexpected quarter. Hoping to bring US diesel prices down at least a little before the congressional elections, Trump asked Zelensky to stop attacking Russian refineries.

Zelensky responded by demanding a sweeping energy truce. We’ll stop hitting refineries, he effectively said, if Russia stops attacking our energy infrastructure and blockading our ports. And you, Trump, have to supply us with missiles for our Patriot systems, and so on.

Getting nowhere with Zelensky, Trump struck a deal directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who offered to supply diesel in exchange for a suspension of sanctions, without any preconditions.

The transaction itself is not particularly consequential. Yes, it could cool speculative trading ahead of the elections and push prices down somewhat. But the 1.8 million metric tons due to arrive over three months will cover just three or four days of American consumption.

For Russia, the US is an ordinary customer in purely commercial terms. Moscow will make some money selling to America, but it could just as easily have sold these volumes elsewhere. Petroleum products are in short supply worldwide, while Russia has a diesel surplus.

Yet the deal gave both sides what they had been seeking since February 2025: a bilateral relationship detached from Ukraine. So far, that applies to just one specific issue, but getting started is the hard part. Zelensky tried to twist Trump’s arm, pushing him to make Putin stop bombing Kiev, and overplayed his hand. Now Kiev can be bombed relentlessly, and Trump has no reason to care. He got what he wanted.

This does not mean sanctions are finished or that the two powers are entering an era of warm friendship. Oil sanctions are probably here to stay, and as soon as global market conditions change, Washington will turn them back up to full blast. But the sanctions wall can now be taken apart brick by brick, restoring ties wherever both sides stand to gain: launching new energy projects in the Arctic, for example, jointly taking over the surviving Nord Stream 2 pipeline, or resolving the sale of Lukoil’s overseas assets. Ukraine no longer has anything to do with that process or any influence over it.

The art of the backroom deal

Cynics insist that the Trump administration is a complete mess, with the right hand oblivious to what the left is doing. The way this agreement came together suggests otherwise.

After the campaign of long-range strikes against Russia went badly off script, Zelensky once again tried to secure a ceasefire through Trump. He has been trying since early 2025, with no success, but he still held out hope.

Trump could have publicly given Zelensky the boot again. But on Ukraine, he faces opposition not only from Congress but also from parts of his own administration. And an election is just around the corner.

Instead of staging a public showdown, Trump’s team spent more than two months visibly engaged in intensive talks with Ukraine about an energy truce. His envoys, Witkoff and Kushner, traveled to Kiev, and Trump himself showered Zelensky with compliments. In reality, all of it proved to be a screen for a quiet, swift, informal deal with Moscow.

It has since emerged that the first tanker carrying diesel to the US left St. Petersburg on September 22 and is expected to reach the US any day now. In other words, the deal was already well advanced three weeks ago, and both sides were confident it would go through.

That takes some skill. This episode shows that Trump keeps a firm grip on his team and can prevent leaks when he needs to. Even Rubio, prone to breaking ranks, played his part exactly as the boss wanted.

And once the deal was done, there was no longer any need to smile at Zelensky in public. The masks came off. For the first time, Trump publicly declared that Ukraine needs a new president and must hold elections.

The liberal media will inevitably say that Trump is repeating Russian propaganda narratives. In fact, he was saying what he thinks.

The diesel deal does not mean Moscow and Washington will now live in perfect harmony. The differences between them are deep and fundamental, and the recently enacted ‘Graham law’ makes lifting any sanctions impossible for at least the next five years.

But this Friday, Putin and Trump finally managed to get past Ukraine and leave it behind. US-Russia relations now depend on Russia and the US alone.

October 16, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, Russia, Ukraine, USA | Leave a comment

Putin’s Strong Message to Europe at the Valdai Club: Stop the March Towards War

If Russia is weak and having military difficulties, if Putin is intimidated, if NATO is considerably stronger and if there is no immediate threat of a Russian attack, then why is European public opinion always being prepared for a major war?

Europe should therefore pose itself a simple question: is Russia really about to attack NATO — or is Europe preparing for a war that its own rhetoric is helping to make it more plausible?

Ricardo Martins, New Eastern Outlook, October 09, 2026

As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and European leaders increasingly warn of a looming Russian threat, Vladimir Putin used the Valdai Discussion Club to deliver a very different message: Europe is feeding an escalation spiral it may no longer be able to control.

Europe is being told to prepare for war, and the rearmament is being crafted as an economic and political project in itself. Europe is manufacturing a permanent war psychology while simultaneously insisting that Russia poses no imminent military threat.

Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO, has on several occasions told that Russia might at some point launch an attack on NATO territory. The European governments are currently considering matters relating to hybrid attacks which can result in a large number of casualties, the establishment of new security arrangements and how to deal with a major confrontation with Moscow. The tone being used is becoming more and more dramatic, alongside unprecedented defence spending record levels.

With this background in mind, Vladimir Putin gave his reply at the Valdai Discussion Club.

His view was not that war was certain, rather it was the opposite—he advocated stopping the escalation before war became irreversible.

Putin’s argument is that Europe is trapped in a dangerous cycle in which military exercises, sanctions, weapons deliveries, threats and counter-threats are producing precisely the escalation that European governments claim they want to prevent.

This clear message is even more evident in what he said regarding Kaliningrad.

Rutte’s Russia narrative: threat, fear and rearmament

Mark Rutte is now one of the most prominent voices in Europe when warning about Russia.

In June 2025 he famously said to the Europeans: “You should learn to speak Russian or spend more on defence”, on the grounds that the possibility of future Russian aggression would mean a need for considerably increased defence spending over cuts on social security and pensions. He then warned that Russia might be ready to use military force against NATO within five years and, more recently, has spoken of Russia “testing us throughout Europe” as well as accusing Moscow of carrying out hybrid attacks, sabotage and attempts to split up the Alliance.

There is an extraordinary contradiction in Rutte’s most recent rhetoric.

On 30 September he stated that Putin was “a bit worried and a bit rattled” since the situation in Ukraine was supposedly not progressing well. He stressed that “Putin is not winning this” and claimed that Putin could never defeat NATO. At the same time, however, Rutte admitted that there was no immediate threat to NATO territory.

Then what is Europe actually getting ready for?

It is worth posing that question.

The European public is being asked to agree to increased military spending, which could mean cutting back on social priorities, while at the same time a continuous state of insecurity is being fostered concerning Russia. The political message is remarkably consistent in telling people to spend more, to arm more and to get ready more – because Russia might launch an attack.

Fear is a highly effective political tool.

The issue is that fear may also come true on its own.

Putin’s warning over Kaliningrad

When asked about the increasingly aggressive rhetoric concerning Kaliningrad, Putin was especially straightforward.

He denied the notion that Russia was attempting to intimidate Europe, stating that Moscow’s warning was in fact ‘a response to an attempt to intimidate us‘.

He specifically referred to the European statements concerning preparations for a possible war with Russia in 2029 or 2030, the NATO exercises in the Baltic region, and the attempts to detain Russian vessels.

His argument is that this constitutes an escalation, and he gave a warning that was remarkably serious.

According to Putin, if Kaliningrad were the object of a direct attack or blockade, Russia would have to consider putting into use “all the forces and means at our disposal”. He made it clear that this was not necessarily a threat to employ nuclear weapons, but rather an assertion that Russia would make use of whatever measures it regarded as necessary for its defence.

It is exactly the kind of statement which European governments should take seriously — not since it is certain that Russia intends to attack Europe, but because a military confrontation between nuclear powers leaves little room for miscalculation.

The main thing that Putin warned about was an escalation.

His analogy was in the form of a spiral since provocative actions led to countermeasures, these countermeasures in turn caused further escalation, and eventually the process could get to a stage at which no one was completely in control.

That is the true danger.

What is the reason why Europe needs Russia to be its permanent enemy?

Putin’s more general explanation extends beyond Ukraine.

He contends that Europe has never really settled the security arrangements that followed the end of the Cold War. Rather than establishing a true pan-European security structure, NATO extended itself eastward and as a result Russia became increasingly excluded from the European security system.

He referred to Egon Bahr, the late German Social Democrat, who in 1990 had warned that if the division of Europe into hostile blocs was not overcome the Soviet Union would be isolated and a highly unfavourable future would result.

For Putin, Bahr’s warning was foretelling.

He also looked at how relations declined during NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia, as a result of NATO’s enlargement, the changes that took place after the breakup of the Soviet Union and finally in the case of Ukraine. Even if one does not agree with this view, it does show a consistent way of understanding the past three decades from the Russian perspective: Russia has on numerous occasions sought integration with the West, found that this was not desired, and has in the end come to the conclusion that the European order that emerged after the Cold War was designed against Russia.

That is the reason why the message that Putin gave at Valdai was not merely about Ukraine. The main topic was the future of Europe.

Europe’s war preparation may be hiding a deeper crisis………………………………………………………………..

Putin’s answer: the world is changing

The most important aspect of Putin’s speech at Valdai was not Ukraine. It was his conception of the future international order.

Putin stated that the world is moving from Western hegemony towards a multipolar international system and that this transformation is inevitable, adding that the former hegemony would eventually have to acknowledge the reality of a world in which Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and other centres of power demand a greater role.

This is the point at which Europe must make its real strategic choice.

It can continue to base its security mainly on NATO, move ever more closely in line with Washington’s strategic priorities and regard Russia as a permanent adversary.

Alternatively, it could try to regain what Europe once said that it stood for: strategic autonomy, diplomacy, and the ability to build bridges between opposing powers.

Putin’s vision is not the kind of vision held by liberals in Europe. It does not have to be one that Europeans accept without question. It is rather a vision of a world which is no longer arranged around a single dominant centre, and Europe will not be able to stop this transformation.

The choice Europe still has

The Valdai speech concluded with a warning which should be heard well beyond Moscow.

The greater the extent to which the confrontation becomes uncompromising and the more openly the strategic defeat of an opponent is declared, the more likely it is that the conflict will reach its most dangerous stage. He cautions against arrogance, overconfidence and the uncontrolled escalation of reciprocal responses.

This is no appeal for Europe to give in. It is a plea to acknowledge the consequences of confrontation.

Europe should therefore pose itself a simple question: is Russia really about to attack NATO — or is Europe preparing for a war that its own rhetoric is helping to make it more plausible?

Rutte states that there is no immediate Russian attack that NATO is much stronger, and that Putin is intimidated and that Russia is having difficulties.

Then why the hysteria? Why the permanent mobilisation? Why the preparation for a war that nobody claims is imminent?

At Valdai, Putin made it clear that the world is changing, that multipolarity is inevitable, and that military escalation is not a replacement for diplomacy.

Although Europe may reject Putin’s worldview, but it cannot ignore his warning. Because the greatest danger is not necessarily that Russia wants a war with Europe. It may be that, after years of escalating rhetoric, Europe forgets how to prevent one. https://journal-neo.su/2026/10/09/putins-strong-message-to-europe-at-the-valdai-club-stop-the-march-towards-war/

October 15, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | EUROPE, politics international, Russia | Leave a comment

Rosatom and Finland’s Fennovoima claim different wins after tribunal ruling

By Reuters,Reporting by Anastasia Lyrchikova, Additional reporting and writing by Alessandra Prentice Editing by Ros Russell, Alexandra Hudosn October 11, 2026,
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/rosatom-says-it-wins-tribunal-ruling-finnish-nuclear-plant-dispute-2026-10-10/

– Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom and Finnish utility Fennovoima each highlighted different parts of an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) tribunal ruling as ‌favourable on Saturday, in a long-running dispute over the cancelled Hanhikivi-1 nuclear power project.

The parties have been locked in legal disputes since Fennovoima scrapped the 7-billion-euro ($7.8 billion) project in May 2022, citing significant delays and political risks shortly after Russia launched its conflict in Ukraine.

Rosatom said ⁠the tribunal found that Fennovoima had unlawfully terminated the contract for the construction of the planned plant in northern Finland.

“Today’s victory is important, but not final. We will continue to prove that we are right regarding the Finnish project in courts of various instances,” Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev said in a statement, which did not refer to any financial outcome.

Fennovoima said the tribunal found that it had not been entitled to terminate ‌the ⁠contract, but that it was entitled to receive reimbursements of advance payments and interest in excess of 1 billion euros ($1.12 billion).

It said the tribunal offset both sides’ claims, resulting in Rosatom subsidiaries being ordered to pay Fennovoima a net ⁠606 million euros plus interest.

The ICC did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The contract to build the 1.2 gigawatt plant was signed in 2013 with ⁠Fennovoima, a consortium in which Finnish stakeholders including Fortum, Outokumpu and SSAB originally controlled two thirds through a joint venture, and the Russian side ⁠held one third.

After the project’s termination, Fennovoima wound down its operations and is primarily engaged in legal proceedings.

October 15, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Finland, Legal, Russia | Leave a comment

Russia’s nuclear plants are ageing. Who will pay to dismantle them?

by around 2037, Rosatom’s decommissioning and remediation obligations could exceed its net profit. Moreover, the longer decommissioning is delayed, the greater the associated financial, technical and safety risks are likely to become.

Moscow faces a huge decommissioning bill at home even as it expands its nuclear industry abroad.

By Arshak Makichyan, . 4 Oct 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/10/4/russias-nuclear-plants-are-ageing-who-will-pay-to-dismantle-them

The world often discusses the nuclear threat posed by Russia, but far less attention is paid to the nuclear risks within Russia itself, particularly those posed by ageing nuclear power plants, some of whose reactors are already more than 50 years old.

At the same time, Russia is building nuclear power plants around the world, from Turkiye to Bangladesh, while promoting nuclear energy as a “sustainable” alternative to fossil fuels. Russian President Vladimir Putin regularly meets with foreign leaders to discuss existing and potential nuclear projects. Yet one question remains largely overlooked: what happens to these nuclear facilities when they reach the end of their operational lives?

During the Soviet period, nuclear power plants were built across the USSR, including in Lithuania. As part of Lithuania’s accession to the European Union, the country was required to shut down the two Soviet-built reactors at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant. The first reactor was closed in 2004 and the second in 2009. The decommissioning process has proved both extraordinarily expensive and time-consuming. By 2020, the estimated cost had reached 3.3 billion euros ($3.7bn), with only 49 percent of the planned work completed. The process, initially scheduled for completion in 2038, is now expected to continue until 2049.

Russia itself does not seem to be paying much attention to this question. Rosenergoatom plans to decommission 35 reactors. Yet the company’s own estimates point to a funding shortfall of approximately 18.7 billion euros, while the total estimated cost of decommissioning is about 21 billion euros. And these are Rosenergoatom’s own estimates. Actual decommissioning costs are usually significantly higher than initially projected. For example, the cost of decommissioning the former nuclear power plant in Lubmin, Germany, was initially estimated at 1 billion euros but is now estimated at 10 billion euros.

For the time being, however, Russia appears to be postponing the most costly stages of decommissioning. Rather than fully dismantling reactors soon after shutdown, it often places them in long-term “safe” storage, transferring much of the financial and technical burden into the future. Deferred dismantling does not solve the problem, but merely postpones the costly stages of decommissioning, which is particularly concerning given Russia’s existing funding gap.

Environmental NGO Bellona Foundation reports, based on Rosatom’s own projections, that by around 2037, Rosatom’s decommissioning and remediation obligations could exceed its net profit. Moreover, the longer decommissioning is delayed, the greater the associated financial, technical and safety risks are likely to become.

Another major issue is the legacy of radioactive waste. Russia has inherited approximately 774,000 cubic metres of radioactive waste from the Soviet Union. The upcoming decommissioning of 36 reactor units at eight nuclear power plants is expected to generate an additional 800,000 cubic metres of radioactive waste.

Russia already has experience of what happens when industries leave major environmental liabilities behind. In the Kemerovo region, where around half of Russia’s coal is produced, mountains of waste from coal mining scar the landscape. Some of this waste burns, polluting nearby communities. When coal companies go bankrupt, the cost of dealing with what they leave behind can fall to the state and local communities.

But nuclear waste and decommissioned reactors cannot simply be abandoned if the money runs out. The question therefore becomes even more important as Russia’s economic situation deteriorates: what will happen to all these megaprojects if the money needed to maintain, decommission and eventually dismantle them is no longer available?

The countries where Russia is building its numerous nuclear power plants should therefore think about what happens if these projects cannot be maintained or later decommissioned as planned. They need a Plan B in case something goes wrong in Russia. And, as history has repeatedly shown, Russia’s political situation can change unpredictably.

The political consequences of nuclear mismanagement can also be significant. The Chornobyl disaster demonstrated how the Soviet authorities’ attempts to suppress information and downplay the scale of the accident fuelled public distrust and disillusionment, contributing to growing social and political unrest in the late Soviet period. Today, Russia’s continued neglect of nuclear waste and repeated postponement of nuclear plant decommissioning could similarly create conditions for both another environmental catastrophe and growing social unrest, particularly if authorities once again respond to such a crisis with silence or attempts to conceal its scale.

These risks are compounded by Russia’s deteriorating economic situation. In an effort to sustain the war economy, the Russian government has also drastically weakened environmental regulations. National defence is now by far the largest single item in Russia’s federal budget, while environmental protection accounts for only a small fraction of government spending.

Environmental disasters have repeatedly demonstrated that the Russian regime is unwilling to prioritise long-term environmental safety. Russia continues to operate an ageing shadow fleet to transport oil, and the environmental risks associated with that fleet were highlighted by the 2024 Black Sea oil spill, when two ageing Russian tankers released thousands of tonnes of fuel oil into the sea. The spill was described as the Black Sea region’s worst environmental disaster in decades. This broader pattern of environmental negligence raises questions about how the country will manage its ageing nuclear infrastructure and the growing problem of nuclear waste.

These issues should therefore be raised at every international forum where Russia promotes its nuclear industry, such as COPs, where encountering Russian nuclear lobbyists is a common experience. Russia is seeking to secure its place in the future of energy while continuing to use energy as a tool for exerting political influence and power around the world.

All of these issues are particularly concerning because Russia continues to promote its nuclear industry internationally, while independent voices capable of scrutinising its environmental impacts and safety record are increasingly silenced in Russia. As documented in a recent report by the Environmental Crisis Group, repression and the departure of environmental experts and activists have severely weakened Russia’s environmental movement.

Bellona and Greenpeace have been declared “undesirable” organisations in Russia, while EcoDefence, which organised campaigns around environmental and nuclear issues, has been designated a “foreign agent”, and its members have faced criminal prosecution.

Environmental organisations outside Russia continue to draw attention to these risks. EcoDefence in exile, alongside other German activists, campaigns against continued European cooperation with the Russian nuclear industry, which has largely escaped the sanctions imposed on other parts of Russia’s energy sector. According to Vladimir Slivyak, co-chair of EcoDefence, this continued dependence on Russian nuclear technology and services could itself create vulnerabilities that Russia could potentially exploit for sabotage or political pressure.

The result is a shrinking capacity to independently monitor and expose environmental risks inside Russia. This creates a dangerous information gap: a nuclear accident could happen, its scale could be concealed or downplayed by the authorities, and the public could learn the full extent of the disaster only years or even decades later. This is what happened after the 1957 Mayak disaster, when the Soviet authorities concealed the accident and its consequences and did not publicly acknowledge the disaster until 1989, more than three decades later, while thousands of people were left to suffer the long-term consequences of radioactive contamination.

October 9, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | decommission reactor, Russia | Leave a comment

On the Edge of the Abyss: Putin’s Nuclear Warning, Trump’s Iran Brinkmanship and Europe’s Revolt

Joe Lauria , Consortium News, October 4, 2026

This week:

1. Putin’s Warning;

2. New US Warship to Iran;

3. The Crisis of Europe: French Students Burn Their Schools

PLUS: America’s Barbaric Death Penalty.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned the world could face nuclear catastrophe if the West attacks the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Putin told the Valdai Club outside Moscow Thursday humanity has entered a “completely new and unprecedented reality.”

The historical changes underway aren’t fully understood, he said. But over the long run, the erosion of corrosive Western hegemony should create a more stable, democratic, and multipolar world order — but the transition is fraught with danger.

Putin said exceptional, narrow Western interests fuels the peril. The West forced Russia into a defensive war against Ukraine, its tool against Moscow. The war has escalated into NATO-backed attacks on Russian soil.

Putin warned that a direct attack on Kaliningrad, which is separated from mainland Russia by a land corridor, would immediately put “all the weapons” at Russia’s disposal.

“If it comes to direct attack on the Russian Federation, in this case, we mean Kaliningrad, maybe some other territories as well, of course, naturally, immediately, what will be on the agenda is the use by the Russian Federation of all weapons that are at the disposal of our country. It is unavoidable.”

Putin pointed to a Russian foreign ministry statement on Kaliningrad does not mention nuclear weapons. “It mentions, as I have just said, the use of all means and all forces at the disposal of our country and we’ll decide what it is,” Putin said.

“This escalation is based on arrogance and self conceit, and this is what pushes us to the edge of the abyss,” he said.

Putin also knows that the West will twist this warning into a threat. “What’s a different way to stand up to an aggressor? We’re not threatening anyone, but we’re just saying that we don’t have many tools of self defense.”

Iranian Quicksand

Meanwhile, Trump keeps making maniacal threats to destroy Iran, this time, if Teheran had anything to do with the attempt to hijack the Dubai-Tel Aviv jet. He talks a big game on Iran because he’s losing the big war with Iran with mid-terms a month away.

He’s in danger of also losing both Houses and of being impeached, if not convicted. He’s in danger of being humiliated before the whole world as a Big ‘L’ Loser.

So he sticks his chest out, Duce style, and proclaims: “Maybe I will, maybe I won’t. Maybe I’ll kill you all or maybe I won’t. Maybe I’ll decide to spare you.” A rank and unstable amateur coming to terms with ultimate power.

So he sends another aircraft carrier to Iran to keep up the illusion the U.S. has the upper hand in the conflict. That Trump can dictate to Iran. The Nov. 3 election will tell how many Americans are gullible enough to believe that.

Aux Barricades!

They are not so gullible in France, which has more or less kept the revolutionary spirit alive since 1789,………………………………………………………….https://consortiumnews.com/2026/10/03/watch-twtw-edge-of-the-abyss/

October 9, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Russia, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

US, China And Russia Race To Build Nuclear Reactors On The Moon: Report

New Delhi:

The United States, China and Russia are racing to develop nuclear reactors for the Moon as they prepare for future space exploration. The countries believe nuclear power will be important for building permanent lunar bases, exploring resources and supporting missions deeper into space

The US aims to launch a lunar nuclear reactor by 2030, while Russia and China are working towards a joint project by 2036. The plans could power future Moon bases but have also raised safety concerns.

NDTV, Edited by: Siddhi Singh, Oct 04, 2026

New Delhi:

According to The New York Times, NASA in August asked contractors to prepare a nuclear reactor that can survive a space journey and operate without maintenance near the Moon’s south pole. The agency aims to have the reactor ready for launch by December 2030.

Russia, meanwhile, plans to develop a lunar reactor called Selena by 2036 as part of its secretive partnership with China. The project is intended to provide power to lunar stations led by China…………………………………………………….

Safety Concerns Over Nuclear Power In Space

Despite the plans, scientists have warned that rushing to build lunar reactors could create serious risks. Rocket launch failures could cause accidents involving nuclear reactors and potentially spread radioactive material. Experts have also pointed out that installing and maintaining a reactor on the Moon would be challenging.

Unlike reactors on Earth, lunar reactors would be difficult to protect with containment structures, and experts say areas around them may need to be restricted to reduce radiation risks to astronauts and equipment.

As per The New York Times report, both the US and Russia plan to send their reactors to the Moon in an inactive state, reducing some risks during transport. However, experts say accidents cannot be ruled out, even with safety reviews.

Who Owns The Moon?

The race has also raised questions about access to the Moon and its resources. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty states that no country can claim the Moon as its territory. However, questions remain over whether countries can restrict access to areas around their lunar bases and whether they can own the resources they extract from the Moon.

NASA accelerated its plans amid fears that a nuclear reactor built by China and Russia could establish a restricted zone on the Moon, limiting where American astronauts and rovers could travel. Space law experts have questioned whether such zones, even if created for safety reasons, would conflict with the principle of free access to space under the Outer Space Treaty.

The US, China and Russia have yet to prove that their proposed reactors can be installed and operated on the Moon. Their timelines could also change as technical and safety challenges are addressed. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-china-and-russia-race-to-build-nuclear-reactors-on-the-moon-report-12137354

October 7, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | China, Russia, space travel, USA | Leave a comment

Putin: Ready To Use ‘All Weapons’ Including Nuclear, If Kaliningrad Attacked

by Tyler Durden, Saturday, Oct 03, 2026, https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/putin-ready-use-all-weapons-including-nuclear-if-kaliningrad-attacked

Now it’s no longer just high-ranking Kremlin officials saying it, but Russian President Vladimir Putin has now directly weighed in amid the ongoing nuclear threat tit-for-tat involving European officials.

Speaking at the Valdai Discussion Club in Moscow on Thursday, he warned the Western allies to cease their escalation in Ukraine, stressing he’s willing to use “all weapons” in the Russian arsenal in the scenario that Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad comes under attack.

“The drills in the Baltic Sea, following one another… Then the attempts to arrest our ships and vessels. All this is an escalation. And then we began to hear statements regarding the Kaliningrad region,” Putin said.

“If it comes to direct attack against the Russian Federation, in this case on Kaliningrad and possibly some other territories, of course the issue of using all weapons in our country’s arsenal will inevitably and unavoidably emerge on the agenda. This is unavoidable,” he asserted in a warning that includes nuclear weapons.

NATO held recent military drills near Kaliningrad which were broadly described as deterrence operations, which Putin referenced in the remarks.

Rhetoric has been running particularly hot over the exclave which is sandwiched between NATO members Poland and Lithuania all week, as Associated Press earlier described:

The warning sent to NATO echoed statements issued by several Russian embassies in Europe this week which said that Moscow has “information that NATO is preparing (an) air and naval blockade of Kaliningrad and Kaliningrad region.”

The embassies in the U.K. and Ireland posted their statements on their Telegram channels, and the embassy in Belgium released it to the Tass news agency.

The ratcheting accusations from the European side have also centered on charges of a Russian sabotage campaign targeting the Baltics as well as Germany.

Moscow at the start of the week took the rare step of submitting a formal letter to NATO leadership in Brussels.

The letter accused NATO of an “unprecedented escalation of the military-political situation around Russia’s region of Kaliningrad accompanied by highly provocative public statements by NATO Allies’ officials.”

“This dangerous and reckless course entails high risk of the outbreak of a direct armed conflict with the possibility of Russian strikes against decision-making centers of the alliance’s member states right from the outset of the conflict,” the letter said.

NATO was especially incensed and alarmed at this key line of Moscow’s letter:

“Russia will be ready to use the entire arsenal of forces and capabilities at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in order to defend its territory, should NATO countries undertake any attempt aimed at isolating the Kaliningrad region from the rest of the country.”

Apparently this most recent tense back-and-forth over Kaliningrad was initially triggered by a television show which recently aired in the UK this month.

Preview of the provocative UK series The WarGame which started airing this month. The Kremlin has vehemently condemned it, and sees in it some clear messaging and an ominous threat:

Newsweek described, “The statement follows a miniseries aired by British broadcaster Sky News last week, The Wargame, which traces a hypothetical Russian attack on the U.K. and how the country might respond—including by authorizing operations against the Baltic territory of Kaliningrad.”

October 3, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Russia, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Second reactor manufactured for floating nuclear plant

Thursday, 24 September 2026, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/second-reactor-manufactured-for-floating-nuclear-plant

The second RITM-200C small modular reactor unit has been manufactured for the floating nuclear power plant destined to supply electricity to a copper mining centre in Chukotka.

The floating nuclear power plant, FPU-106, will feature two of the 58 MWe RITM-200C reactors – the first was manufactured in May and is at the shipyard awaiting installation. The units have been manufactured at Rosatom’s Mechanical Engineering Division’s ZiO-Podolsk plant.

Anton Lebedev, head of ZiO-Podolsk, said: “2026 has been a landmark year for ZiO-Podolsk’s mechanical engineering teams: for the first time, we have produced a complete set of RITM units for a floating nuclear power plant that will supply power to an industrial cluster in the Russian North. This is an important step in the global development of small modular nuclear power. The plant has also set a record this year: in less than a year, four RITM-family units have already been manufactured, with five more in production.”

The RITM-200C is an adapted version of the RITM-200 reactors used on Russia’s nuclear icebreaker fleet.

In total, the Baimskaya development requires around 300 MWe, therefore, three such 100+ MWe floating power plants are needed, while a fourth will be installed as backup for outages during refuelling and maintenance.

Russia has the world’s only operating floating nuclear power plant, the Akademik Lomonosov which began commercial operation in May 2020. It is based, with its coastal infrastructure, by the city of Pevek – population 5,000 – to which it supplies heat and power in Russia’s Arctic Chukotka region.

The Akademik Lomonosov has two KLT-40S reactors generating 35 MWe each, which are similar to those used in a previous generation of nuclear-powered icebreakers. It has the capacity to provide electricity to a city with a population of up to 100,000 people.

As well as the four floating power units under construction, Rosatom is targeting the export market for floating nuclear power plants.

September 28, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Russia, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment

The Arctic Front Of The “Cordon Sanitaire” Is The Most Threatening To Russia

Andrew Korybko, Sep 16, 2026, https://korybko.substack.com/p/the-arctic-front-of-the-cordon-sanitaire

The military-technical developments there aim to greatly mitigate Russia’s nuclear second-strike capabilities via the Golden Dome in parallel with posing an unprecedented fifth-generation aerial threat via the F-35As that’ll outmatch Russia’s Su-57s by 10:1 without the US and 35:1 if it’s included.

RT reviewed the 2026 Russian Military Yearbook, which is sponsored by the state arms company and meant only for senior members of the national security apparatus. Their article can be read in full here, but the present piece will only focus on the part about “The Very Cold War”. This is in reference to escalating NATO-Russian tensions in the Arctic. The Yearbook details NATO’s large-scale military drills in the Arctic, its allies’ arms build-ups, and their deep displeasure with Russia’s Northern Sea Route.

Most alarmingly, the Yearbook mentioned that Finland plans to acquire 64 F-35As while Canada will receive 88 of them. It was separately reported that Norway already has 52 F-35As, which is more than double Russia’s estimated 20 or so Su-57s, its fifth-generation analogue. Sweden doesn’t yet have any fifth-generation fighters, but those other three Arctic states will have over 10x as many as Russia does. If the US’ over 500 F-35As are included, then Russia’s fifth-generation fighters will be outmatched by 35:1.

These statistics on their own show that the US is actively implementing its 2021 strategic plan for “Regaining Arctic Dominance” that was cited in the Yearbook, the latter of which also detailed some of NATO’s new radar, drone, ship, icebreaker, missile, and other military-technical plans. They altogether lend credence to one of the cited Russian experts who warned that “Washington never abandoned the thought of redrawing borders in that area.” Here are five background briefings on this new front:

* 14 January: “Greenland Is The Crown Jewel Of ‘Fortress America’”

* 21 January: “The US’ Acquisition Of Greenland Could Lead To A Deal Over Canada’s Arctic Islands”

* 21 May: “Finland Is On Track To Become One Of Russia’s Most Intractable Foes”

* 6 September: “The Historical Russian-Swedish Rivalry Is About To Be Revived Later This Fall”

* 15 September: “Norway’s Military Build-Up Against Russia Poses A Serious Threat To Arctic Security”

To summarize, Trump 2.0 is pursuing a three-pronged strategy against Russia: 1) build Golden Dome missile defense infrastructure in the Arctic to greatly mitigate Russia’s nuclear second-strike capabilities; 2) arm Canada and the Viking Bloc (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland) to threaten Russia; and then 3) likely push Russia’s limits along the Northern Sea Route for the purpose of provoking a crisis that would then render this corridor dangerous and thus greatly reduce its use at minimum.

The pressure that the US is placing upon Russia along the Arctic front via these means complements that which it’s also placing through Polish-led efforts in Central & Eastern Europe and Japanese-led ones in Northeast Asia. All of these fronts consist entirely of US mutual defense allies, but the Turkish-led one along Russia’s entire southern periphery doesn’t, yet a hypothetical special operation there (such as against Azerbaijan) might be deterred by the possibility of the US responding via the other fronts.

Simply put, a “cordon sanitaire” has been assembled around Russia, and this containment noose is being tightened the most by the military-technical developments along the Arctic front than anywhere else. Up till recently, this was the quietest front of the four, but that just shows that its members were moving silently to avoid attracting attention from Russia. The latest Yearbook proves that the Kremlin had been monitoring them all along and is thus planning its response, however, so this front will likely heat up.

September 25, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | ARCTIC, Russia, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

IAEA says cooling tower at Russia’s Kursk Nuclear Power Plant hit by drone

UN nuclear watchdog says it was informed that drone hit cooling tower of a reactor unit; no fire broke out, operating status not changed

Rabia İclal Turan, 19 September 2026

WASHINGTON DC

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said Friday it was informed that a drone hit the cooling tower of a reactor unit at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia.

A statement by the UN nuclear watchdog on US social media platform X said the drone hit the facility, located in the Kursk region bordering Ukraine, early Thursday, but did not specify who informed the IAEA of the incident.

“It was reported that the unit was operating at the time, but its operating mode did not change and there was no fire,” it said.

Quoting IAEA chief Rafael Grossi, the statement said that all attacks on nuclear facilities are “unacceptable” as they could “endanger nuclear safety and security, irrespective of where they occur.”

Grossi reiterated demands for “maximum military restraint” to prevent the risk of a nuclear accident.

The IAEA did not provide details on the source of the drone or circumstances surrounding the incident.

The agency has regularly warned Moscow and Kyiv about dangers to nuclear safety amid the Russia-Ukraine war, which began in February 2022.

In a later statement, Russia’s nuclear state corporation Rosatom confirmed that a drone detonated upon striking the cooling tower of the plant’s no. 1 power unit, causing “minor damage.”

It stated the incident did not affect the facility’s operations and that power unit no. 1 continues to operate at 100% capacity.

“The safety of the plant’s operation is ensured. Radiation levels remain unchanged and consistent with natural background values,” it added.

September 21, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | incidents, Russia, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Russian nuclear ties persist in the West

Bellona September 14, 2026, https://bellona.org/news/nuclear-issues/2026-09-russian-nuclear-ties-persist-in-the-west-as-war-claims-another-life-at-zaporizhzhia

Germany allows VVER fuel production using Russian technology

Germany, meanwhile, has approved a controversial plan that will preserve another form of Russian involvement in Europe’s nuclear industry.

On July 22, authorities in Lower Saxony approved an application by Advanced Nuclear Fuels, a subsidiary of France’s Framatome, to expand its Lingen plant to manufacture hexagonal fuel assemblies for Russian-designed VVER reactors.

The fuel will be manufactured under Russian licenses and using Russian technology through cooperation with Rosatom’s fuel subsidiary TVEL. The decision came despite objections from some 11,000 people and concerns about espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks and Russian access to critical German infrastructure. Authorities imposed safeguards, including restrictions on access by Rosatom and TVEL personnel and security inspections of Russian equipment.

Bellona nuclear expert Dmitry Gorchakov calls the decision “rather strange” and warns that it undermines efforts to reduce European dependence on Russia.

“Unfortunately, this shows the absence of a single clear policy and principles regarding contacts with official Russian structures, both within Germany itself and within the EU,” Gorchakov writes.

More importantly, he argues, allowing Framatome to meet its VVER fuel commitments with Rosatom’s involvement “may slow the development of its own French VVER fuel independent of Rosatom and prolong Rosatom’s dependence and influence on this market in Europe.”

“Bellona does not approve of this decision by the German authorities or of this cooperation between Framatome and Rosatom,” Gorchakov concludes.

Western uranium markets remain dependent on Russia

New figures published in July show why severing those ties remains difficult.

The Euratom Supply Agency reported that European suppliers significantly expanded uranium enrichment services in 2025, increasing their share of the EU market from 63.9% to 72.9%. The volume of Russian enrichment services also increased by 11.6% in physical terms. However, their share of the total volume of European orders declined by 22.55% compared with 23.55% a year earlier and 37% in 2023. Russia supplied nearly 16% of the EU’s natural uranium and 24.4% of its conversion services.

The situation is likewise complicated in the United States. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Russia remained the largest single source of enrichment services purchased by American nuclear operators in 2025, providing 3.284 million SWU — about 26% of the total. That was more than the share supplied by U.S. enrichment capacity itself.

“The published statistics in the EU and the US show the continuing dependence of Western nuclear power plant operators and nuclear fuel cycle enterprises on Russian supplies of uranium and its conversion and enrichment services,” Gorchakov says.

“Despite the existence of major European competitors to Rosatom and technical alternatives, up to 20–25% of nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle services in European and US markets still originate in Russia.”

For Gorchakov, market forces alone are unlikely to break that dependence. “Only official restrictions and sanctions can break this trend,” he writes, arguing that firm limits would both force reductions in Russian purchases and give Western suppliers confidence that investments in new capacity will pay off.

Taken together, the developments underline a contradiction that has persisted since the beginning of the war. Russia’s occupation of Zaporizhzhia has created unprecedented nuclear safety risks in Ukraine, yet Rosatom remains deeply embedded in nuclear supply chains in the countries supporting Kyiv. Europe and the United States are developing alternatives, but July’s figures — and Germany’s decision in Lingen — suggest that breaking those ties will require political decisions as much as new technology and production capacity.

September 19, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | business and costs, Russia | Leave a comment

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