Russia Closes Border Crossings With Several NATO States After Finland Lifts Nuclear Ban
by Tyler Durden, Thursday, Jul 02, 2026, https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/russia-closes-border-crossings-several-nato-states-after-finland-lifts-ban-nuclear
Finland’s parliament has finally followed through with a previously threatened move to reverse its decades-long ban on nuclear weapons. The June 17 vote to lift the ban in effect legally authorizes the Nordic country to receive, transport, and facilitate the movement of nuclear weapons on its territory as part of allied operations, with the representatives’ final tally at 125 to 61.
Finland officially became the 31st member of NATO in April 2023 – having abandoned its historic neutrality in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in what was among the fastest accession processes in the Western military alliance’s history. Now it is already willing to host allied nukes on its territory, making it a target of Russian retaliation.
Moscow has long warned against such an ultra-provocative move. The Kremlin said Monday that this requires a response – given also the fact that Russia and Finland share an over 800-mile long border, which is made up largely of Arctic frontier.
“The results of the vote represent both bright and unflattering victory of the blind Russophobia of the past few years over what we have always viewed as pragmatic sanity in Finland,” said Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova.
“And let nobody doubt that [response] measures will be taken timely and effectively. In this light, the Finnish people need to think whether this decision made by their elites will actually enhance security in Finland itself,” she added.
As a start, Russia has moved to shutter more rail crossings to NATO states, including Finland – which is to further severely impact trade:
Russia has closed seven railway border checkpoints with Finland, Estonia and Latvia, according to a government decree published Tuesday.
The suspension, which takes effect July 1, halts the movement of individuals, vehicles and cargo through the designated rail crossings. Five of the shuttered checkpoints are located on the Finnish border, while Estonia and Latvia each have one crossing affected.
Officials have not disclosed the reasons for the closures or when the checkpoints might reopen.
In Estonia, the Ivangorod freight and passenger crossing will remain open, and in Latvia, the Sebezh crossing will also stay open. However, the closures leave Finland with no open railway crossings with Russia, which normally exports fertilizer to Finland by rail.
Finland shut its eastern vehicle and pedestrian border crossings with Russia indefinitely in December 2023 following an influx of asylum seekers.
Since the Ukraine war began, and in context of ratcheting tensions with NATO over its military support to Kiev, Moscow has steadily militarized its border with Finland.
The most significant source of NATO’s nuclear-sharing program is the United States. But lately France has expressed a desire to station some of its atomic arsenal in partner countries, and this could include in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and others.
Europe and Russia Edge Toward Direct War as Nuclear Fears Grow
Ray McGovern and Peter Kuznick examine Europe’s accelerating military buildup, Putin’s warning that Russia is prepared for war, and why they fear diplomacy is giving way to a dangerous escalation between nuclear powers.
Peter Kuznick’s sobering warning: “We’re planning for our own annihilation and extinction as a species.”
ScheerPost Staff, June 29, 2026, https://scheerpost.com/2026/06/29/europe-and-russia-edge-toward-direct-war-as-nuclear-fears-grow/
As Europe dramatically expands military spending and NATO leaders openly prepare for what they describe as a possible future conflict with Russia, questions are growing over whether the world is drifting toward a direct confrontation between nuclear powers.
On this week’s edition of The World This Week, Consortium News Editor Joe Lauria is joined by former CIA analyst Ray McGovern and historian Peter Kuznick to examine the increasingly dangerous escalation surrounding the war in Ukraine. The discussion explores Vladimir Putin’s warning that Russia is prepared for war, Europe’s accelerating militarization, the role of NATO-backed drone attacks deep inside Russian territory, and the growing risk that a single miscalculation could trigger a wider conflict.
While McGovern argues that Moscow continues to exercise restraint despite mounting provocations, Kuznick warns that political pressure, expanding military commitments, and increasingly confrontational rhetoric on all sides are creating conditions in which diplomacy is being replaced by dangerous brinkmanship. Together they examine whether Europe’s leaders are pursuing a coherent long-term strategy—or whether escalating military spending, shrinking diplomacy, and domestic political pressures are moving the world toward an outcome that no one can control.
The conversation also explores the fragile U.S.–Iran ceasefire, shifting global power dynamics, and whether recent political developments in New York signal broader changes inside the Democratic Party. Throughout the discussion, the panel returns to a central warning: in an era of nuclear weapons, great-power confrontation carries risks unlike any previous conflict, making diplomacy more urgent than ever.
Much of this discussion is vital and deserves to be widely shared, but perhaps its most important takeaway—and one that should remain our constant watchword—is Peter Kuznick’s sobering warning: “We’re planning for our own annihilation and extinction as a species.”
The greatest danger isn’t simply the war itself—it’s the gradual normalization of confrontation between nuclear powers.
McGovern argues that despite increasingly provocative developments, Putin has consistently sought to avoid a direct military clash with NATO. Drawing on decades of following Soviet and Russian leadership, he contends that Moscow understands that striking targets inside NATO countries could trigger an uncontrollable escalation with nuclear powers. Instead, he believes Russia is attempting to achieve its objectives inside Ukraine while avoiding actions that would give Western governments justification for expanding the conflict.
Kuznick agrees that Putin has generally exercised restraint but warns that restraint alone may not guarantee stability. He notes that Russian infrastructure continues to come under attack, political pressure inside Russia is growing, and influential voices within the country have begun calling for stronger retaliation against European facilities supporting Ukraine’s military operations. While he does not believe Russia seeks a wider war, he cautions that prolonged escalation increases the chances of miscalculation by all sides.
One of the central themes running throughout the discussion is the collapse of diplomacy. Both guests argue that negotiations have steadily been displaced by military planning, larger defense budgets and increasingly confrontational political rhetoric. Rather than emphasizing diplomatic solutions, many European leaders now frame the conflict as a long-term military struggle requiring sustained increases in defense spending.
The discussion also examines the broader political consequences of Europe’s military buildup. Kuznick argues that dramatically expanding military expenditures inevitably comes at the expense of domestic priorities, including housing, education, healthcare and other social programs. Echoing President Dwight Eisenhower’s famous warning about the military-industrial complex, he suggests that the diversion of public resources toward military production represents a significant political and economic transformation occurring across Europe.
Beyond Ukraine, the panel turns to the fragile ceasefire between the United States and Iran. Although open hostilities have subsided, both McGovern and Kuznick describe the agreement as unstable, pointing to continued military exchanges and unresolved disputes that could quickly reignite a broader regional conflict. The discussion places these tensions within a larger international context in which several major geopolitical flashpoints—from Eastern Europe to the Middle East—remain active simultaneously.
Throughout the conversation, Kuznick and McGovern both invoke the lessons of the Cold War. McGovern references President John F. Kennedy’s warning “To force a choice on another nuclear power between humiliation and using nuclear weapons is a colossal failure of statesmanship.”
Kuznick likewise argues that many of today’s political leaders appear increasingly willing to normalize discussions of military confrontation between nuclear-armed states in ways that would have been considered reckless only a generation ago.
The panel also examines the political dynamics inside Europe itself. Rather than portraying European governments as unified, McGovern argues that many leaders pushing for expanded militarization face declining public support while confronting growing economic pressures at home. Kuznick similarly notes that opinion polls across several countries suggest many citizens remain skeptical of continued military escalation even as governments expand defense commitments.
Despite differences over Russia’s battlefield prospects and the likely trajectory of the war, both analysts ultimately agree on one fundamental point: diplomacy has become dangerously marginalized. They warn that history demonstrates how wars often expand not because governments deliberately seek global conflict, but because repeated cycles of retaliation, political pressure and strategic miscalculation gradually narrow the space for peaceful solutions.
The discussion concludes with a sobering assessment of the international moment. As Europe rearms, NATO prepares for additional military commitments, Russia continues its campaign in Ukraine and tensions remain high across the Middle East, McGovern and Kuznick argue that preventing direct confrontation between nuclear powers should remain the overriding priority. Whether today’s leaders are willing—or able—to reverse the current trajectory through diplomacy remains one of the defining questions of the international order.
The conversation offers a detailed examination of competing interpretations of the conflict, the strategic calculations shaping decisions in Moscow and Western capitals, and the broader implications of a world increasingly organized around military competition rather than negotiation. It is a reminder that while battlefield developments dominate headlines, the greatest danger may lie in the gradual normalization of permanent confrontation between nuclear-armed states.
Russia hearing the European clamour for war, announces it is ready
Alastair Crooke, Strategic Culture Foundation, Mon, 29 Jun 2026, https://www.sott.net/article/507152-Russia-hearing-the-European-clamour-for-war-announces-it-is-ready
The de-escalation framework that unfolded in the U.S.-Iran Lucerne talks largely stayed true to the original Iranian 10-point plan. Meanwhile, President Trump and Vice-President Vance deliberately muddy the waters, claiming that Iran has already agreed to IAEA inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities (a claim repeatedly denied by Iran): Vance announced that the IAEA could have begun inspections this week. No – – the ‘Framework’ only refers to the possible IAEA supervision of the dilution to the 60% enriched stockpile subject to a final agreement with the U.S. having been reached.
Trump, writing on social media, later falsely asserted: “Iran has fully and completely agreed to highest level Nuclear inspections long into the future”. In fact, the IAEA are only inspecting the joint Iran-Russia power station in Bushier at Russia’s request, because Russia wants to ensure compliance on its involvement. In other words, it is a Russian request to satisfy its own IAEA compliance commitment.
Trump then warned Iran that he may have to “finish the job [militarily]” — (if he doesn’t get a very good deal) — which, he says, would take ” about a week”, and adds that Iran will be required to use any unfrozen Iranian funds to be held in ESCROW accounts (accounts controlled by the U.S.) to buy “corn and soybeans for their people, because right now their people are very hungry — and they’re buying exclusively from us”.
So, it’s pretty clear what’s ahead — Trump is reverting to his New York real-estate mode of negotiations. In the Art of the Deal, his 1987 book, ghost written by Tony Schwartz, the text advises the use of “extreme and unpredictable demands to create anxiety and force concessions from rivals”.
Thus, we are back to the General Kellogg playbook – – Kellogg advised Trump that the only thing that works with Putin or the Iranians is pressure — and then still more pressure.
Familiar Trumpian tactics. Show a little initial flexibility to tease out adversaries in order to pull them into negotiations; subsequent false claims of Iranian concessions and extreme demands are then used to increase pressure on Iran (whilst Trump appears tough to the angry neocon constituency and to his ‘base’ back home).
This style of pressure may work for New York real-estate deals, but will be ineffective with both Iran and Russia.
Such threats will be counterproductive with Iran, and place the U.S. on a collision course. “The Islamabad understanding was not the result of pressure and coercion, but rather the result of the resistance and authority of the Iranian nation”, Mr Qalibaf, the chief Iranian negotiator, retorted.
In practical terms, as Will Schryver, a shrewd observer of the U.S. military, notes, Iran has pressure points “more numerous and capable than the U.S. can bring to bear on the battlefield” —
“In my view, [Schryver says], a powerful U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region has become utterly untenable. They’re just trying to save face now. I do not believe, [he concludes] the U.S. military can mount even a 72-hour high-intensity operation at this point in time”.
“But I think they’ll try. Probably just Trump bluff, but it would not surprise me if they try to play one last card to gain the upper hand”. (Maybe after the midterms, and with the U.S. having rebuilt somewhat its munitions shortfall).
To which Iran likely will respond by closing the Strait of Hormuz again, and attacking, pari passu, regional (Gulf) infrastructure. Trump will be gaming the economy who first plays ‘Chicken’. A further military venture likely will only further erode American military standing.
Quite possibly, however, Trump may be prepared to cut his losses in Iran — the war anyway is a liability to his Midterm electoral calculus — by circling back to Ukraine and Russia. The Kiev Independentreleased a report yesterday, quoting a “senior Ukrainian official saying that Trump had privately given Zelensky the greenlight to act “more boldly” against Russia”.
Here we go again, roundabout time — “Trump says he doesn’t really believe Putin will do anything without pressure”, the Ukrainian official added.
Simpliciusspeculates:
“Trump has clearly been frustrated by his inability to settle any of the conflicts he had promised easily. And recently, on the heels of the Iranian memorandum saga, he even admitted that he would now be “turning his attention” back to Ukraine.
“As such, it’s plausible that Trump would have given secret encouragement to the Europeans to ‘shape the battlefield’ in order to “soften” Russia up ahead of whatever next Trump might have planned”.
If this is true (and it probably is), the Europeans are playing with matches and risk lighting a conflagration.
The E3 leaders, Starmer, Merz and Macron, met on 7 June with Zelensky to promise both unwavering support and — in the context of pledging further pressure on Russia —
“underlining the urgent need to scale up the production of interceptors; deep strike capabilities and anti-ballistic missile co-development — and further to support the future sustainability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces”.
In short, the Europeans intend to ratchet up deep strikes into Moscow and St Petersburg, which will likely kill and unsettle their inhabitants.
The E3 carefully planned how to stage-manage the upcoming G7 summit, the EU summit, with Zelensky showcased at both events, promising to increase the pressure on “President Putin to agree to an immediate and complete ceasefire, taking the current contact line for its start-point”. European leaders also pledged to co-ordinate ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara (7-8 July) to achieve increased pledges of military support for Ukraine.
The E3 states are explicitly gearing up with new missiles to strike deeper, and more destructively, into Russia. The British government, for example, has announced that —
“the UK project to develop low-cost advanced long-range strike weapons for Ukraine has reached a significant milestone, with three British-designed systems successfully flight tested. The ground-launched strike weapons reportedly are capable of hitting targets more than 500km distant, at a speed of 600 km/h – whilst carrying a 225 kg warhead”.
According to the Financial Times, Trump was “hugely impressed and enthusiastic” with Ukraine’s recent campaign of long-range strikes on targets deep inside Russia at last week’s G7 summit. At the summit, Trump also agreed to increase sanctions on Russian energy.
It is clear that the E3 had been plotting a major psy-op to convince Trump that Ukraine was not on the back-foot against Russia (as Trump may have been briefed); but rather had regained the front foot, and that the U.S. should support the European agenda to force a Russian capitulation agenda (ceasefire, borders unchanged, reparations paid by Russia and war-crimes trials for Russian officials indicted with crimes, etc).
These developments have brought two major developments out of Russia:
Firstly, senior Kremlin aides, notably Yuri Ushakov, Putin’s spokesman, have been saying over the past three days the ‘spirit’ of the Anchorage summit, and its concomitant understandings, “have effectively collapsed” — “The U.S. abandoned them”. Moscow no longer expects those commitments to be honoured and is focused solely on securing its own “victory” through military means.
Foreign Minister Lavrov went further, describing the Alaska meeting as an American “ploy” designed to buy time for Ukraine to rebuild and rearm its military — essentially likening them to the Minsk Accords that similarly were mounted as a deceit.
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said:
“We also see Washington’s line moving closer to the most rabid anti-Russian policies pursued by the U.S.’s closest European allies – namely, the UK and France”.
This represents a huge strategic shift. Russia no longer seeks a relationship with Washington, though contact with DC will continue.
The second development stems from President Putin’s address at the St George’s Hall to military cadets on 23 June. Putin, in summary, told the young officers that the West manufactures a Russia threat, then accuses Russia of creating that very threat. This, said Putin, is a historically repeated pattern going back to 1941.
Putin implied that a threshold had now been crossed: He stated that whilst, until recently, NATO countries had limited themselves to supporting the Kiev regime to wage war on Russia, the West today is openly talking about preparing for a war against Russia, and is building up their military offensive budgets. German Chancellor Mertz has been quite vocal in this regard, Putin said.
Russia’s response, he said, is focused on modernising its nuclear triad and its Army, and strengthening the combat capability of the Aerospace Forces and the Navy. The explicit mention of the nuclear triad in direct proximity to the discussion of Western preparation for war against Russia was certainly a pointed message to Trump and the Europeans.
Russia has heard the European clamour for war. It has now made the strategic decision in response to prepare for war in Europe.
Senior U.S. Diplomats, Journalists, Academics and Secretaries of Defense Say: the U.S. Provoked Russia in Ukraine
it should come as no surprise that our government is lying now about the war in Ukraine.
it should come as no surprise that our government is lying now about the war in Ukraine.
The Ukraine Papers, by Donald A. Smith, PhD, 27 June 26
It took some years for Americans to realize they’d been lied to about the war in Vietnam. Thanks to the publication of the Pentagon Papers, and thanks to the antiwar movement, Americans eventually learned about the injustices and failures of that war.
Likewise, it took several years after the starts of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for Americans to realize they’d been lied to about those wars as well.
Americans are just now starting to realize that they’ve been lied to about the war in Ukraine. (The propaganda effort has been quite effective, with the New York Times, in particular, acting as a mouthpiece for the government’s position.) More and more mainstream publications are exposing the lies, and a majority of Americans now oppose further arming of Ukraine.
This essay is a summary of what the U.S. government has been hiding about the war in Ukraine, with links to sources for further information.
According to Brown University’s Costs of War project, U.S. military actions since 9/11 directly killed over 900,000 people, with an additional 3.5 million people dying from indirect effects. The wars cost Americans at least $8 trillion and displaced over 38 million people from their homes. The U.S. spends over a trillion dollars a year on its military, if you count all expenditures.
If we go back to the 1960s, the number killed by U.S. wars includes the several million killed in the Vietnam war, the approximately 1 million killed by U.S. support for Indonesian military’s attacks on left wing groups, and the hundreds of thousands, at least, killed in proxy wars and government overthrows in Latin America.
The wars, overthrows, and associated sanctions caused mass migrations worldwide — particularly in Europe and at the southern U.S. border — and destabilized politics. The Lancet medical journal reported that between 1971 and 2021, US and EU sanctions killed over half a million people annually. Yet almost nobody (except for whistleblowers) was held accountable for these disasters; indeed, many of the same people are in Congress or work for the government or the weapons industry.
Moreover, the U.S. government lied about almost all the wars — in particular, about the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, but also about the war in Yugoslavia, as documented in Harper’s Magazine, here (Chapter 3), and here. In short, the Kosovo Liberation Army that the U.S. supported was, basically, a terrorist organization funded by the CIA, and U.S. propaganda greatly overstated the nobility of the U.S. intervention. Likewise, The U.S. backed ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Croatia.
The United States withdrew from the following arms treaties: Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction (START II)Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran deal, Open Skies Treaty, and Conventional Armed Forces Treaty (Russia withdrew after alleged NATO non-compliance)
So, it should come as no surprise that our government is lying now about the war in Ukraine. Specifically, claims by President Biden and others that the Russian invasion was “unprovoked” are greatly exaggerated.
Read what these diplomats, secretaries of Defense, journalists, academics, politicians, and others have to say:
Here the author gives quotations from 30 highly regarded people – certainly not pro Russian propagandists ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Ambassador Jack Matlock (referenced above) said in a 2024 interview: “Why don’t we understand that trying to remove Ukraine from Russian influence and put military bases there would be, in their case, absolutely unacceptable and worthy of defense?” Matlock said the U.S. backed the 2014 coup, and “Obviously, to any Russian leader, not just Vladimir Putin, that would have been an absolutely impossible, hostile act, which they had to react to. And in particular, they were not going to lose their naval base in Crimea.” Finally, Matlock said the Ukrainians are “dominated in their thinking by neo-Nazis — we tend to ignore that, or when Putin points it out, we say he’s lying. He’s not lying.” And Matlock wrote: “I have been appalled that a succession of American presidents and European leaders discarded the diplomacy that ended the Cold War, abandoned the agreements that curbed the nuclear arms race, and provoked a new cold war which has now become hot.”
See this for dozens of mainstream news articles about the presence Nazis in Ukraine and U.S. support for them.
Evidence of U.S. involvement in the coup is overwhelming. The Cato Institute (not a radical Marxist outfit!) wrote America’ Ukraine Hypocrisy which includes:
The extent of the Obama administration’ meddling in Ukraine’ politics was breathtaking. Russian intelligence intercepted and leaked to the international media a [U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria] Nuland telephone call in which she and U.S. ambassador to Ukraine Geoffey Pyatt discussed in detail their preferences for specific personnel in a post-Yanukovych government… Both the Obama administration and most of the American news media portrayed the Euromaidan Revolution as a spontaneous, popular uprising against a corrupt and brutal government… It was a grotesque distortion to portray the events in Ukraine as a purely indigenous, popular uprising.
The 2019 RAND Corporation study Overextending and Unbalancing Russia examines “cost-imposing options that the United States and its allies could pursue across economic, political, and military areas to stress — overextend and unbalance — Russia’s economy and armed forces and the regime’s political standing at home and abroad.” It includes the paragraph:
“Providing lethal aid to Ukraine would exploit Russia’s greatest point of external vulnerability. But any increase in US military arms and advice to Ukraine would need to be carefully calibrated to increase the costs to Russia of sustaining its existing commitment without provoking a much wider conflict in which Russia, by reason of proximity, would have significant advantages.”
The highlighted words indicate that the authors were quite aware that US provocations would cause Russia to respond militarily.
The New Yorker’s Is the F.B.I. Truly Biased Against Trump? contains a telling paragraph on the U.S. government’s efforts to suppress information about exactly what happened in Ukraine:
According to [FBI agent] Buma’s statement, shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, on February 24, 2022, he was told to terminate relations with one of his most valuable sources in that field, Dynamo. The order came from both his supervisors and the F.B.I.’s Foreign Influence Task Force, and, per Buma, superiors told him that the shutdown of Dynamo was based on “highly classified information from the National Security Agency” which he could not access. They also said that it was part of a broader effort, around the time of the invasion, to close off many “sources related to Russia/Ukraine matters.”
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia wanted desperately to be integrated into the West and, up to the end of 2021, pleaded with D.C. to come to an equitable peace in Ukraine, but the U.S. wanted to weaken Russia, and NATO needed an enemy to justify its existence. The expansion of NATO — which violated multiple verbal promises given to Soviet leaders — provoked the war that is now touted as showing the need for NATO.
According to the LA Times’s Russia feels threatened by NATO. There’s history behind that, “some of Russia’s security concerns are real. Offering to discuss them doesn’t qualify as appeasement; Thirty years ago, Russia had a buffer zone of satellite states to its west. Now it has only the unimpressive presence of Belarus.”
From 2018, in Medium’s American Lethal Weapons Could Already Be on the Ukrainian Front Line: “Two weeks ago, the Trump administration announced it will allow the sale of some lethal weapons to Ukraine, including the Javelin anti-tank missile….Butusov identified the [Nazi] Azov Battalion as a recipient of the PSRL-1 [grenade launcher] systems.”
Right before the Russian invasion, in January of 2022, Yahoo News reported: CIA-trained Ukrainian paramilitaries may take central role if Russia invades. After the invasion, in March of 2022, Yahoo News reported: Secret CIA training program in Ukraine helped Kyiv prepare for Russian invasion..
In November of 2023, the Washington Post exposed that “Since 2015, the CIA has spent tens of millions of dollars to transform Ukraine’s Soviet-formed services into potent allies against Moscow, officials said…. The extent of the CIA’s involvement with Ukraine’s security services has not previously been disclosed.” Foreign Policy’s essay of July 11, 2025 mentions the “CIA’s decade of covert support for Ukraine.” ABC News also has an article about CIA involevment in Ukraine since 2015.
Likewise, a New York Times article The Spy War: How the C.I.A. Secretly Helps Ukraine Fight Putin, dated February 25, 2024, revealed that the CIA had been coordinating with Ukrainian intelligence since at least 2014 and that the Ukrainians had been launching assasinations and other kinetic actions in Crimea and Russia. As Mark Episkopos writes in Responsible Statecraft, CIA in Ukraine: Why is this not seen as provocation?: “An explosive new NYT report shows how Washington needlessly fed into Russia’s worst fears and precipitated the invasion, justified or not.”……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
These facts and opinions do not justify Russia’s brutal invasion, but they certainly give the lie to statements by President Biden and others that the invasion was “unprovoked.” Even the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 was provoked: it occurred after, and partially in response to, the U.S.-backed overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Ukraine.
And the facts expose stunning hyprocrisy. The U.S. launched numerous unjustified wars, proxy wars, bombings and coups far from U.S. borders; surrounded Russia and China with pro-US allies and military bases (about 800 worldwide); exited multiple arms treaties; and increased military spending to about $1 trillion a year despite $34 trillion in debt and dire domestic needs. Yet we accuse Russia and China of being the aggressors.
Both sides can be at fault in a conflict. The U.S. too has blood on its hands.
Finally, the facts are strong reasons why the U.S. should not be arming Ukraine to the teeth, pushing it to fight to the last Ukrainian and risking a nuclear war. Instead, it should push for a negotiated end to the war. https://theukrainepapers.org/senior-US-diplomats-academics-journalists-and-secretaries-of-defense-say-the-US-provoked-Russia-in-Ukraine.html
Edge of Armageddon: why does one of the world’s top thinkers believe we’re nearing nuclear apocalypse?
Putin is so terrified of Ukraine becoming a member of Nato: that would enable the west to place nukes in the country
“With Nato weapons, Ukrainians bombed St Petersburg and they tried to bomb Moscow. So a country with nuclear weapons is being ‘bombed’ by the British. Not the British pushing the button, but the bombs come from Britain, as well as from Germany and France, with less from the US.”
In a chilling new book, theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli says we’re back on the brink – and this time, leaders chronically lack the nous of Kennedy and Khrushchev. So why is he against rearming?
Stuart Jeffries, Thu 25 Jun 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2026/jun/25/armageddon-physicist-carlo-rovelli-nuclear-apocalypse
Should European members of Nato be rearming in the face of the Russian threat? And if not, I ask Carlo Rovelli, why not? The Italian theoretical physicist seems a good person to answer these questions since his timely new book, 85 Seconds to Midnight, is subtitled A Physicist’s Argument against Rearmament.
Rovelli, 70, brown eyed, genial, with enviably luxuriant grey locks, removes his glasses before answering. “The idea of the Russian military being a threat to Europe is ridiculous. Russia can’t even get to Kyiv! A few years ago, Russia had 4% of the world’s military spending and Nato had 40%.”
At the same time, though, Russia has more than 4,000 nuclear warheads, making it the planet’s biggest stockpiler. “So we cannot take Russia down,” says Rovelli, “because it would react.” Of the three nuclear superpowers – Russia, US and China – only China has resolved not to be a first-use nuclear state. Russia, like the US, reserves the right to respond to conventional attacks with nuclear strikes.
The real problem, Rovelli suggests, is mutual fear. “We are trapped in a lack of reciprocal trust. We sleepwalk through these patterns of everybody becoming more armed, more aggressive.” He cites what happened a few weeks ago in St Petersburg. “With Nato weapons, Ukrainians bombed St Petersburg and they tried to bomb Moscow. So a country with nuclear weapons is being ‘bombed’ by the British. Not the British pushing the button, but the bombs come from Britain, as well as from Germany and France, with less from the US.”
Why was this so frightening for Rovelli? “It’s the first time a [superpower] with nuclear weapons has been actually bombed. There was a situation in which if you have nuclear weapons, you don’t get invaded. You don’t get bombed. No more.”
Rovelli invites me to consider what that bombing looks like from the Kremlin’s perspective. Moscow has long feared western aggression, he argues. A key moment came in 1962 when Americans placed nuclear missiles in Turkey. That, he argues, prompted then Soviet premier Khrushchev to put nuclear weapons in Cuba, the US’s back yard.
True, the Cuban missile crisis was de-escalated by Khrushchev and US president Kennedy, but Russian fear of western invasion persists. That’s why, Rovelli suggests, Putin is so terrified of Ukraine becoming a member of Nato: that would enable the west to place nukes in the country. Hence, Rovelli argues, Putin embarking on his full-blown invasion four years ago.
Rovelli believes this Russian aggression has caused a whirlwind of fears and clamours for rearmament in western Europe. “You have the French government saying French people should be ready again to sacrifice their children; the British government saying we should be ready for war because it might happen; the German government saying all this anti-war sentiment in schools is not good and we should change education, make war more acceptable. This is motivated by the idea that Russia is invading Europe. It’s nonsense.”
But isn’t it sometimes right to be fearful? Indeed, isn’t the lesson of the second world war that western European countries should have rearmed sooner to counter a demagogue bent on expansion? “I think everybody should read Mein Kampf,” he replies, referring to Adolf Hitler’s 1925 autobiography and manifesto. “Mein Kampf does not say, ‘We are German, we are the strongest, we are going to run the world, we are great, we are white, we are Aryans, whatever.’ It says, ‘We are weak. And the only way we have to survive is to become stronger and overcome the others.’ So what fuelled the violence of nazism was fear.”
Today’s Middle Eastern conflict has a similar basis, Rovelli contends. “What fuels the aggressiveness of Israel is fear. What fuels the aggressiveness of Hamas is fear. They are going to destroy us in Gaza unless we are aggressive. To answer fear with fear, to escalate, seems to me disgusting.”
But isn’t this naive? Putin isn’t just acting out of fear, surely, but is prompted by some warped sense of historical destiny to claim Ukraine. “That’s obviously nonsense. You create these narratives that fuel tribal ideology. And that’s exactly what we don’t want. I don’t think anybody has any natural historical right to anything.”
Why should we listen to what theoretical physicists have to say about rearmament? Yes, Rovelli is the go-to guy to explain loop gravity, the theoretical framework that merges quantum mechanics with Einstein’s general theory of relativity. He is also a great populariser of difficult ideas in such books as Seven Brief Lessons on Physics and The Order of Time. But when it comes to war and realpolitik, theoretical physicists have often proved themselves utter boobs.
“We physicists,” Rovelli concedes, “did create this thing [nuclear weapons]. It is our poisoned gift to humankind. But historically, the voices of scientists – raising awareness about the nuclear risk – have been effective.” It was thanks to the wisdom of scientists and other intellectuals, he argues, that Gorbachev and Reagan were convinced to sign the now defunct 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start).
Equally true, though, is that theoretical physicists have been disastrous for humanity. Rovelli cites his countryman Enrico Fermi who in 1934 found a way to shatter atomic nuclei – giving humanity a new source of energy. “But the gift is too great,” writes Rovelli. “A small bit of uranium can release energy to demolish cities, burn alive millions of human beings and destroy civilisation itself.”
Consider too what happened in Copenhagen in 1941 when two great theoretical physicists, the Dane Niels Bohr and the German Werner Heisenberg, met. Bohr, who soon after the meeting was spirited to the US, came away from the meeting convinced that Nazi Germany was making a nuclear bomb to win the war.
Rovelli takes up the story: “Once in the US, Bohr said, ‘Look, this is a sketch given to me by Heisenberg of an atomic bomb.’ And it was definitely not. It was a sketch of a peaceful nuclear reactor. One of the outcomes of that was that the Manhattan Project was motivated by a belief that Nazi Germany was close to having nuclear bombs, which was completely unfounded.”
The unintended consequence, as Rovelli puts it in his book, was “the burning alive of 200,000 men, women and children in Hiroshima and Nagasaki”. Not, as some have argued, to end the war more quickly but as an immense demonstration of US power – or as he puts it: “The scream of the gorilla beating its chest and telling the forest that it is the strongest.”
Surely there were other and possibly better rationales to dropping nuclear weapons on Japan than that? I remind Rovelli of a conversation at Princeton he had with his friend and mentor, the late relativity theorist John Wheeler, who worked on the Manhattan Project. Wheeler believed bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified to spare the enormous number of American lives that would be lost in a mainland invasion.
“John was one of the people I admire most, and half of my thinking is based on what he did,” recalls Rovelli with a sad chuckle. “He was the one who first recognised my work.” But when Wheeler invited the young Rovelli to Princeton, the pair fell to talking about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “I found the argument he used – it’s OK to kill many hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians to save the lives of a few American boys – disgusting. Not a few American boys in America living a life – but sent there to conquer an island which is not American. Japan had already lost the war.”
Rovelli’s early years help explain his revulsion for rearmament. He was jailed as a student for refusing the draft in Italy. “I’m Italian and we remember fascism grew with the idea that war is beautiful. War is what makes us great. War is fantastic.”
Let’s talk about Iran, I suggest. Isn’t it entitled to have nuclear weapons if Israel and the US do? “I don’t think we should think in terms of absolute right,” says Rovelli. “We have to live together, so we have to find compromises. If Iran did not feel under threat, it probably wouldn’t feel the need to go nuclear.”
The title of Rovelli’s book comes from the 2026 edition of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that set the Doomsday Clock at 85 seconds to midnight, the closest we’ve ever been to nuclear catastrophe. For Rovelli, the stupidity of our leaders has increased that risk. He thinks that everybody – from Trump, Putin and Netanyahu to the leaders of Nato and Iran – lacks the good sense shown by Khrushchev, Kennedy, Gorbachev and Reagan each of whom, he believes, helped pull humanity back from Armageddon.
As we finish, Rovelli asks me: “What politician has the courage to say, ‘Rather than making my own country stronger, I want to make humankind better’?’” Perhaps it’s not just my shortcomings but the nature of humanity’s plight in 2026 that no one comes to mind.
85 Seconds to Midnight by Carlo Rovelli is published by Penguin (£9.99). To order your copy, go to guardianbookshop.com. Delivery charges may apply.
If Russia retaliated…
Third World War would be nuclear and the scale of destruction and killing could be orders of magnitude greater. This is the danger that today’s “loud little handful” could lead us toward, for their own narrow, selfish reasons. To date, we should be grateful that we’ve been spared these horrors thanks to President Putin’s restraint. Even though he’s been aware of Western involvement in attacks on Russia, he has steered clear from escalating to the point where the psychological phase transition in the West could take hold.
Before leaving 10 Downing Street, Sir Keir Starmer authorized another large-scale attack on Russia. If we’re not already in a nuclear war, we only have Vladimir Putin’s restraint to thank.
Alex Krainer, Jun 23, 2026, https://alexkrainer.substack.com/p/if-russia-retaliated?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1063805&post_id=203233722&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer resigned yesterday. Before he departed 10 Downing Street the last time, he authorized another strike against Russia. Ukraine, UK’s “one hundred year” ally, conducted one of the largest attacks on Russian territory to date, using air-launched cruise missiles to hit military-related facilities in Voronezh city. The facilities in question produce components for Russian Kh-101 cruse missiles, Iskander-K missiles and Pantsir-S1 air defenses.
The Ukrainians allegedly used a version of UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles and/or AGM-188A, “Rusty Dagger” cruise missile, developed under the U.S. Air Force’s Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) program to provide affordable, mass-produced long-range strike weapons for Ukraine.
Other missiles and drones were aimed at targets in the Moscow Oblast but apparently without any major damage reported. Today, President Putin gave a statement accusing the United States and Europe of directly enabling the strikes by providing satellite intelligence, targeting data, and navigation support for the long range attack and warning that such involvement signifies NATO’s direct entry into the war. Putin was telling the truth, as we know from a leaked 38-min. WebEx conversation of a group of German Generals.
Britain fully involved since (at least) 2024
Two of the four participants were top-level German military brass: commander of the German Air Force, Lieutenant General (Generalleutnant) Ingo Gerhartz; head of Air Force Operations and Training, Brigadier General (Brigadegeneral) Frank Gräfe (also spelled Graefe) — Head of Air Force Operations and Training. They discussed providing Ukraine with the German Taurus cruise missiles in order to provide a briefing on the initiative for German Defense Minister Boris, “Slava Ukraini” Pistorius.
The other two, lower-ranked participants were Oberstleutnant Florstedt and Oberstleutnant Fenske, both from German Air Operations Center. The call, which took place more than two years ago, on 19 February 2024, revealed that Great Britain was already directly involved in conducting strikes against Russia with military personnel who did the mission planning for the Storm Shadow missile strikes and helped loading Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles onto aircraft. And the British definitely want the world to know of their involvement. This article was published on Saturday, 20 June 2026:
Yesterday’s attacks were part of the same operation. Their significance, which is not lost on the Russian people, is that they were almost certainly a calculated provocation. They were conducted on the 85th anniversary of the launch of Operation Barbarossa when Nazi Germany assembled the largest ever invasion force. Defeating that force ultimately claimed the lives of 16 millions Russians.
All this is increasing the pressure on the President Putin to take the gloves off and strike at NATO targets. He has been careful not to escalate the war in this way. If such an escalation came to pass for whatever reason the world would find itself in a completely unpredictable and extremely dangerous new territory.
One of the most striking experiences in my life was the breakout of war in former Yugoslavia in 1991, and the reason was the almost instant change in collective psychology that took place as soon as the first artillery shells started landing in Croatia. Up until that moment, the vast majority of people – I’d venture to say, well north of 90% – believed that war was unthinkable; that it would never happen. Who could possibly want to fight a war? It seemed impossible; only a small handful of hotheads were advocating for war.
The stories circulating in Western media about the eruption of bottled-up centuries-old hatreds were utter nonsense. The peoples of former Yugoslavia were socially, economically and culturally deeply intertwined. In most cases we didn’t even know who, among our neighbors was a Serb, Croat or a Muslim and many families were mixed. However, once the war actually broke out, it took a life of its own wreaking death and destruction on large scale.
The collective psychology abruptly changed and a war psychology galvanized. It became fashionable to look at events in black and white and to wholly denounce the other side as enemies. Giving the enemy any benefit of the doubt and expressing empathy toward them suddenly became unpatriotic and suspicious.
The loud little handful
I still find it amazing that the war happened. It was clear that some people were pushing for it and that the media gave them disproportionate attention. Long ago, Mark Twain warned us about such people and about the way war psychology could creep into people’s hearts. His his words should haunt us today:
“The loud little handful–as usual–will shout for the war. The pulpit will–warily and cautiously–object–at first; the great, big, dull bulk of the nation will rub its sleepy eyes and try to make out why there should be a war, and will say, earnestly and indignantly, ‘It is unjust and dishonorable, and there is no necessity for it.’Then the handful will shout louder.
A few fair men on the other side will argue and reason against the war with speech and pen, and at first will have a hearing and be applauded; but it will not last long; those others will outshout them, and presently the anti-war audiences will thin out and lose popularity. Before long you will see this curious thing: the speakers stoned from the platform, and free speech strangled by hordes of furious men who in their secret hearts are still at one with those stoned speakers–as earlier–but do not dare say so.
And now the whole nation–pulpit and all–will take up the war-cry, and shout itself hoarse, and mob any honest man who ventures to open his mouth; and presently such mouths will cease to open. Next the statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing falsities, and will diligently study them, and refuse to examine any refutations of them; and thus he will by and by convince himself the war is just, and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception.”
If Russia retaliated, if it responded to British or US-orchestrated attacks and struck at a NATO target, we would see this process erupt on short order. The loud little handful in our midst will be shouting for war until they managed to generate the mass-formation psychosis that would make the war not only possible, but probably inevitable and Europe would fully share Ukraine’s tragic fate. Last two World Wars resulted in large-scale devastation and tens of millions of casualties. In today’s terminology, however, they were conventional wars.
Third World War would be nuclear and the scale of destruction and killing could be orders of magnitude greater. This is the danger that today’s “loud little handful” could lead us toward, for their own narrow, selfish reasons. To date, we should be grateful that we’ve been spared these horrors thanks to President Putin’s restraint. Even though he’s been aware of Western involvement in attacks on Russia, he has steered clear from escalating to the point where the psychological phase transition in the West could take hold.
Grand Deception
In 2017 I published my second book, titled Grand Deception. I felt compelled to write it because I realized that a very powerful network in Western financial centers were busy laying the groundwork for a future great war against Russia, and I felt that their agenda needed to be exposed to the public. Of course, they felt otherwise, so my book was banned after only five weeks. It was republished a few months later by Red Pill Press under a different title, but it only survived for six weeks.
Nevertheless, the cause of defending peace must never be neglected. Making sure that such a war never comes to pass should be the top priority for any thinking person. If we sleepwalk into the third great war on European continent, most of our endeavors in life, our dreams and hopes might not matter much. The way to resist the march to war is, first and foremost, to seek the truth and dare to speak it freely and courageously. We must reject the warmongers among our leaders and call them out on the lies they use to contrive consent for war. Wars are always started with lies.
Our opposition must not be shy or deferential: it must be bold, determined and relentless. We would also do well to turn toward our Russian fellow men and women and tell them loud and clear that we want peace, not war. The German people have done so even though their own leaders are among the most aggressive warmongers of all. On Saturday, 20 June 2026, hundreds of them gathered at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin to assert, “Russia is NOT our enemy,” and laid flowers at the Soviet war memorial. We need millions of people following suit.
We must start without delay to build the foundations for peace in our hearts and minds. There can be no justification for us to sleepwalk into another war. In addition to unprecedented scale of destruction and death, the economic, social and psychological damage from such a conflict would be such that it might take many generations to repair.
Censored Lavrov article Politico refused to publish (FULL TEXT)
This state of affairs poses serious threats to global security. A direct confrontation between NATO and Russia could rapidly escalate into an exchange of nuclear strikes, with catastrophic consequences
The Russian foreign minister has shared his views on NATO expansion and EU militarization, including in the nuclear sphere, and the threat this poses to global security
18 Jun, 2026 , https://www.rt.com/russia/641806-lavrov-censored-politico-article/
The pro-establishment, Brussels-based publication Politico Europe, owned by Germany’s Axel Springer SE, has refused to publish an exclusive article written by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
Lavrov’s article was initially slated for publication in the Brussels-based Politico Europe, but due to a “last-minute decision by the outlet’s editorial team,” the publication was canceled, the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Friday.
In the article, Russia’s highly experienced top diplomat outlined Moscow’s view of the Ukrainian conflict, Europe’s role in escalating the crisis, and the broader implications for global security. Lavrov accused European leaders of using diplomacy as a cover for NATO and EU expansion, while arguing that the West has sought to turn Ukraine into an anti-Russian foothold. He also warned that the EU’s growing militarization, including discussions about nuclear deterrence and “strategic autonomy,” could increase the risk of a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia.
Below is the full text of Lavrov’s article, as published on the Russian Foreign Ministry website:
Some reflections on resolving the Ukrainian crisis, Europe and global security
At a meeting in London on June 7, 2026, the leaders of Britain, France, and Germany, as well as Vladimir Zelensky, laid out five preconditions for Russia to secure a “just and lasting peace” in Ukraine. United Europe now presents this list of demands as the basis for dialogue with Moscow.
Background
More than two decades of negotiations with Europe, as part of the collective West, lead to only one conclusion: engaging Russia in dialogue has served as a diplomatic smokescreen for the geopolitical expansion of Western institutions, above all NATO and the European Union, eastwards, right up to Russia’s borders.
Europe’s complicity in fueling the Ukrainian crisis is undeniable. Together with the United States, European countries orchestrated the Orange Revolution in Kiev in 2004. To create an anti-Russian bridgehead in Ukraine, they spent years buying off politicians and entire parties, rewriting history and educational curricula, cultivating and nurturing Ukrainian nationalism, and going to great lengths to pull Ukraine away from Russia.
In 2013, the European Union outright rejected our proposal for a compromise on the association agreement – a deal Brussels had long been pressing Viktor Yanukovich to sign. It is worth recalling that Ukraine was offered unilateral market opening without reciprocal commitments – terms that would have proved incompatible with Kiev’s continued membership in the CIS free-trade zone. When Viktor Yanukovich requested a deferral, the Europeans incited street riots that swiftly escalated into a coup d’état in Kiev in February 2014.
Germany, France, and Poland then proved themselves to be equally treacherous. Having guaranteed that the agreement reached between the opposition and Viktor Yanukovich would be honored, they washed their hands of it the moment that same opposition, their own handiwork, took power. “Democracy,” they shrugged, “takes unexpected turns.”
Europe thereafter lent its backing to the new authorities. In Odessa on May 2, 2014, the burning alive of dozens of innocent supporters of closer ties with Russia did not draw a single word of condemnation from European capitals.
As co-guarantors of the 2015 Minsk Agreements, France and Germany effectively encouraged the Ukrainian regime to sabotage its own commitments. As Angela Merkel and François Hollande later conceded – after the special military operation had already begun – Kiev’s implementation of the Minsk Agreements, unanimously approved by the UN Security Council, was never genuinely intended. The objective, they admitted, was merely to buy time: to shore up the Armed Forces of Ukraine and flood them with Western weaponry.
Russia, for its part, explored every diplomatic avenue to defuse Europe’s security crisis. However, in January 2022, the United States and NATO rejected Russia’s proposal for legally binding mutual security guarantees. European NATO members actively endorsed that rebuff.
Following the launch of the special military operation, United Europe threw its support behind the British prime minister’s efforts to sabotage the Istanbul negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Boris Johnson’s appeal to Kiev – “don’t sign anything, just fight” – slammed the door on genuine diplomacy for the foreseeable future.
Current situation
So what has prompted European leaders to suddenly shift their rhetoric and start talking about negotiations, and what are they aiming to achieve with these statements? For instance, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has stated that the purpose of any dialogue with Russia is to dictate Europe’s terms. These include paying “reparations” to Ukraine; withdrawing troops from Transnistria and the South Caucasus; abolishing the “foreign agents” law; and accepting strict limits on the size of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces. In her framing, “there can be no just and lasting peace without accountability for Russia.” During the UN Security Council session on May 19, 2026, an EU representative made the point unequivocally: “Supporting Ukraine militarily does not contradict the pursuit of peace, but rather serves as a fundamental prerequisite for any credible, good-faith negotiations.”
Europe’s plan is to talk with Russia while simultaneously pressing ahead with a campaign of legal warfare orchestrated through the Council of Europe. Within this once-respected organization, an entire infrastructure is being assembled for the express purpose of “holding Russia accountable”: a Register of Damage, a Claims Commission, and a Special Tribunal.
The European Union has also given the green light to detaining merchant vessels on the high seas. Several incidents have already taken place in the Baltic and the Atlantic. At the same time, the West studiously averts its gaze from the terrorist acts of sabotage perpetrated by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Black and Mediterranean Seas.
The real objective of Europe’s leaders, then, is not to negotiate with Russia. It is to shore up the Zelensky regime and preserve it as a launchpad for continued confrontation against Russia. With this in mind, European leaders are scrambling to secure a ceasefire as quickly as possible and for one reason only: to prevent the collapse of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the battlefield. The plan is to “freeze” the conflict without addressing its root causes, and then rapidly deploy military contingents from the Anglo-French “coalition of the willing” onto Ukrainian soil.
It is widely known that European elites have invested their “political capital” in the confrontation with Russia, pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into propping up the Kiev regime and ramping up the military budgets of EU member states and NATO. Europe now aims to achieve “defense readiness” against Russia by 2030. Until then, they mean to buy time by whatever means are available. In a strikingly candid remark this April, Belgium’s chief of staff put it bluntly: “We still have a few years. Thanks to the courage and blood of the Ukrainians, who are buying us that time.”
United Europe continues to dream of expansion. It intends to absorb Ukraine and Moldova while pulling Armenia into its sphere of influence. NATO has already expanded eastward, swallowing up Finland and Sweden. As for Ukraine, it is increasingly being eyed as the “striking fist” of a future European military force, independent of the United States and independent of NATO.
Risks to global security
This state of affairs poses serious threats to global security. A direct confrontation between NATO and Russia could rapidly escalate into an exchange of nuclear strikes, with catastrophic consequences
Under the banner of “strategic autonomy,” Europe is witnessing a significant build-up of its military capabilities, including in the nuclear sphere. Paris’s intention to extend its “nuclear umbrella” to several EU and NATO member states is a source of deep concern. This will do nothing to strengthen the security of France itself or of the recipients of its so-called protection.
For all that, Europe’s political and military establishment continues to attribute aggressive plans to Russia – plans that, they claim, reach far beyond Ukraine. The Russian president has stated on numerous occasions that all of this is nonsense, provocation, and disinformation, aimed solely at extracting budget funds for the fight against Russia. That is scarcely the climate for substantive dialogue.
Russia’s position
As for negotiations, Vladimir Putin reiterated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum that Russia is not opposed to contacts with any party. We see Europe, however, as a party bent on Russia’s defeat – a stance the Europeans themselves openly avow. Dialogue with Europe, therefore, cannot be conducted as though it were an impartial third-party observer.
Russia would prefer to achieve the goals of the special military operation through diplomacy.
That requires reliably guaranteeing security along Russia’s western borders and ensuring respect and dignity for our citizens and compatriots, including the right to speak their native Russian language and practice the Orthodox Christian faith. Further military, political, and economic expansion by the West is unacceptable: it runs counter to the imperatives of a multipolar world.
European leaders should recognize that the model of regional security built in Europe over decades, ever since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, has been destroyed by their own hands. And it will never be restored. We must now move toward creating a continent-wide security architecture open to all Eurasian countries and reflective of today’s multipolar reality.
The principle of equal and indivisible security, trampled upon by the Euro-Atlanticists, can be embodied within a new Eurasian architecture. When the time is ripe, Europe too will be able to join this great effort.
The key point is that meaningful dialogue requires the restoration of trust, shattered by the anti-Russian actions of the West, and Europe as part of it, in the post-Cold War era. Trust can be recovered only through concrete steps that demonstrate a sincere commitment to moving away from using diplomacy as a cover for expansionist ambitions. Trust cannot be restored, nor can dialogue be resumed, through ultimatums such as the one issued to Russia in London on June 7, 2026.
P.S. It is noteworthy that the London ultimatum was unequivocally reaffirmed by the ambassadors of Britain, France, and Germany at the meeting at the Russian Foreign Ministry on June 11, 2026 – a meeting they had so insistently requested. That was the sole purpose of their visit to the ministry.
ROSATOM report
Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has profoundly altered the
political and strategic environment in which the Russian state nuclear
corporation Rosatom operates. Not only has the war intensified scrutiny of
the corporation’s role in nuclear safety, energy security, and
international governance, but it has also highlighted the extent to which
Rosatom functions today at the intersection of technology, state policy,
and geopolitical influence.
In this report, we at Bellona continue to
analyze Rosatom during wartime. We argue that Rosatom can no longer be
understood solely through the traditional framework of a civilian nuclear
operator or global technology supplier. Rather, it has increasingly emerged
as a multifunctional state instrument—combining industrial, strategic,
and political roles both within Russia and internationally.
Several broader
conclusions emerge from the report: Rosatom’s wartime role has deepened
institutionally and politically, reinforcing its function not only as a
nuclear corporation, but as a strategic component of Russian state policy;
The occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP represents a challenge to
established assumptions in nuclear governance, exposing gaps in
international mechanisms designed to respond to conflict involving nuclear
infrastructure; Despite sanctions pressure and geopolitical disruption,
Rosatom has maintained significant external reach, particularly through
long-term projects in the Global South and through forms of nuclear
diplomacy that remain politically resilient.
Bellona 11th June 2026, https://network.bellona.org/content/uploads/sites/4/2026/06/ROSATOM_report_2026_ENG.pdf
Putin Powerfully Rebuffed The Hawks Who Want Him To Attack NATO
Andrew Korybko, Jun 10, 2026, https://korybko.substack.com/p/putin-powerfully-rebuffed-the-hawks
In his words, talk about Russia attacking NATO “is not simply nonsense; it is a provocation.”
Several top “Non-Russian Pro-Russians” (NRPR) influencers rang the alarm last month about Russia’s alleged plans to attack NATO, which were inspired by top hawk Sergey Karaganov and then Russian Ambassador to the OSCE Dmitry Polyanskiy ominously channeling his rhetoric. Readers can review examples of their warnings here, here, here, here, and here. Casual NRPRs therefore braced themselves for what would have in that scenario almost certainly been the start of World War III had it come to pass.
It obviously hasn’t and it likely won’t ever, however, judging by Putin’s response when he was recently asked about these alleged plans during a meeting with foreign journalists. In his words, “Why would Russia attack Europe or go to war with NATO? What would be the purpose? As I have said before, these claims are not merely nonsense. In my view, they are a deliberate provocation designed to create the impression of a threat that does not actually exist.”
Putin then elaborated that “The objective is to persuade their populations to increase defence spending and, as a first step, to pay for the regime that seized power in Kiev. That, I believe, is the real explanation. It is not simply nonsense; it is a provocation. What surprises me, however, is that some people in European countries appear to believe it. I find that astonishing. The whole notion is simply absurd. It would be amusing if it were not so sad.”
It’s not just “some people in European countries” who “appear to believe it”, but his own top hawk is championing this policy and it was recently amplified to the max by top NRPR influencers, many of whom can be described as “state-adjacent” due to being platformed by publicly financed media, attending government-organized conferences, and/or taking state-secured tours of Donbass. Casual NRPRs are therefore left to wonder whether Putin is telling the truth or is “psyching out the West”.
It’s always best to defer to what Putin himself says in such cases whenever confusion arises, which is due to top NRPR influencers practicing what’s been called “Potemkinism”, or the creation of “alternative realities” about Russian interests and policy for “strategic purposes” (whatever they might be). The most infamous example is that Putin is an anti-Zionist secretly allied with Iran against Israel despite him being a proud lifelong philo-Semite as proven by his many quotes to this end from the official Kremlin website.
Accordingly, while it would be inaccurate describe the fiercely loyal Karaganov as a “provocateur” in the spirit of how Putin condemned such folks who advocate for Russia to attack NATO, he nevertheless powerfully rebuffed hawks such as him as well as the top NRPR influencers who hyped up his rhetoric. That said, Russia’s foreign spy service did indeed warn last month that their country might carry out retaliatory strikes against Latvia if Ukraine launches drones from there, which should be taken seriously.
That’s altogether different than what Karaganov has been pushing for, namely a first strike against NATO that could easily spiral into World War III, and it’s important for casual NRPRs to understand this. As Putin himself phrased it, such talk “is not simply nonsense; it is a provocation.” When those on Russia’s side do it, no matter what their intentions might be, they inadvertently “persuade [Westerners] to increase defence spending and, as a first step, to pay for the regime that seized power in Kiev.”
The view from Moscow: The future of nuclear arms control exists, but the path is hard
there can and should be some new legally binding new arms-control regimes, including strict limitations on nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles
However, the alternative is significantly more costly and dangerous on an existential level. The more nuclear weapons (and nuclear weapons states) that exist, the greater the possibility that nuclear weapons use becomes. This is the ultimate threat to the human civilization, and efforts to limit this threat demand leadership from the great powers today, not tomorrow.
By Dmitry Stefanovich | May 13, 2026, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2026-05/the-view-from-moscow-the-future-of-nuclear-arms-control-exists-but-the-path-is-hard/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=France%20s%20new%20nuclear%20doctrine&utm_campaign=20260608%20Monday%20Newsletter%20%28Copy%29
It is impossible to argue with the fact that today’s arms control architecture is in very bad shape, especially if one focuses on strategic nuclear weapons. While Moscow seems open to at least some limitations, the current thinking in Washington is obsessed with Chinese nuclear buildup (real or alleged), and the only acknowledged solution to the ‘three-body’ problem seems to be purely arithmetical in its nature: In other words, the United States declares that the only way to sustain nuclear deterrence under current circumstances is to have its nuclear arsenal exceed both the Russian and Chinese capabilities. Clearly, neither Russia nor China can ignore such an attitude and would respond in kind.
But despite the current negative trends, arms control remains alive, although the formats that still exist are limited. And in the future, arms control instruments may take many forms: legally and politically binding agreements, unilateral initiatives, and bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Even enhanced notifications and transparency mechanisms could be helpful. Moreover, there is some room for synchronized limitations on certain activities—i.e. deployment of selected weapons only at selected regions—which might contribute to the stabilization of military-political relations between certain countries.
It is also crucial to understand that it is hardly possible that any future arms control could only be bilateral. Furthermore, it is impossible to even imagine the complicated arrangements for inspection mechanisms for every state that possesses nuclear weapons, and the asymmetrical quantitative limitations for them. The arsenals of nuclear weapon states are significantly different, and even the Russian and US nuclear forces postures are not symmetrical. To have a dozen or more inspections per country per year is too much of a logistical challenge if we begin to consider more than two participants for such a regime.
There are other factors as well, including but not limited to the increasing presence of dual-capable systems, growing cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners in the nuclear domain (with NATO declaring itself a “nuclear alliance”). The peculiar part is that while one side perceives such developments as explicitly destabilizing, the other believes them to be stabilizing and enhancing strategic (or integrated) deterrence.
Most important, not only nuclear capabilities contribute to the overall “security equation.” Military conflicts since the end of the 20th century clearly show that non-nuclear long-range precision weapons are indeed a strategic capability, while non-nuclear deterrence is a much more complicated concept. It is now becoming readily apparent that non-nuclear weapon states can inflict significant costs on their adversaries, no matter how many nuclear weapons those adversaries have in their arsenals. Such trends are augmented by rapid scientific and technological change. The role of hypersonic weapons, drone warfare, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and outer space infrastructure is continuously growing, and all these emerging and disruptive technologies are intertwined—jointly contributing to the very complicated landscape of multilateral strategic deterrence.
Last but not least, the renewed possibility of overt nuclear testing is becoming a big challenge. Major countries have hardly forgotten what their nuclear weapon explosions revealed, but there seems to be a growing number of arguments supporting nuclear tests for both political and technological reasons. A deep dive into this issue deserves a separate paper, but what is clear is that should one country test, others will follow—and ultimately, a domino effect would likely follow, leading to the destruction of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as it is, not to mention the grim prospects it would make for the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty to ever enter into force.
A path forward
Still, there are options to address the current polycentric nuclear era of major military-political confrontations. One way is to find a way to engage in behavioral arms control—which basically means looking for mechanisms that limit activities, and not capabilities.
Unilateral and coordinated declarations of one’s capabilities and doctrines might be helpful as well. Joint notification regimes are also a possibility, even if those will be limited initially. For example, the only area where the “Nuclear Five” of the nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT have some symmetry is the sea-based leg of their nuclear deterrence forces. Codifying existing patrol practices regarding nuclear-tipped ballistic missile-armed submarines (known as Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear, or SSBN), and a regime of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launch notifications could be a relatively easy first step that would significantly enhance mutual understanding and revitalize the practices of military-to-military data exchanges. Moreover, increasing the number of SSBNs deployed on deterrent patrols above the agreed “normal’ can become a visible and clear signaling method.
However, to make such arrangements possible, arms control itself should be “re-branded,” so it will be perceived first and foremost as a tool in a state’s national security arsenal rather than anything intended for the good of all humankind. And the term “re-branding” would be absolutely correct to use, because a top-to-bottom overhaul of arms control would indeed contribute to the optimization of military development projects—based on better understanding of the efforts and logic of similar developments in both adversarial and partner countries alike.
Russia, for what it is worth, had already made several proposals regarding somewhat informal arms control mechanisms over the last decade alone. To name a few such proposals, there was the suggestion for a post-INF moratorium on intermediate-range ground-launched missiles deployment; limitations on the scale and geographic locations of military exercises during the COVID-19 pandemic; and an extension of treaty limitations post-New START. Unfortunately, none of those eventually succeeded, although the post-INF moratorium did contribute to a somewhat slowed and scaled-down development and deployment of such systems by both Russia and by the United States. Moreover, as of Spring 2026 neither Russia nor the United States seem to be actively engaged in deploying nuclear warheads beyond the now-defunct New START limits.
Other scenarios
Read more: The view from Moscow: The future of nuclear arms control exists, but the path is hardBut with the expiration of the last of the nuclear arms control treaties, a renewed nuclear arms race is a real possibility, and one that is already occurring in some domains. The exact parameters are hard to determine, because there is only secondary or even tertiary data on the capacities of defense industries and nuclear enterprises for countries like China and Russia, especially given the ongoing “special military operation” that the latter is undertaking in Ukraine. More information is available on the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, while far less can be found on India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea (also known as the DPRK).
Such races are occurring even though they are not the most effective way to spend increasingly limited resources. Russian nuclear weapons and delivery systems have been continuously upgraded and modernized throughout the post-Cold War period, for many reasons. The reasons include the degradation of Russia’s conventional forces, US superiority in strategic non-nuclear weapons, concerns about US missile defense, and the general security environment on the Eurasian continent—not to mention the practical need to preserve nuclear weapons’ expertise and to keep Russia’s relevant nuclear infrastructure running throughout periods of economic turmoil. So, there seems to be some capacity for arms racing.
The same is more or less true for China and, probably, France, although the reasons for keeping one’s nuclear weapons enterprise in good shape can be different.
The nuclear arms race itself, which could be said to have been ongoing for at least a decade or even more, only now shows signs of switching from the qualitative to the quantitative. Previously, most nuclear weapon states focused on enhancing the capabilities of their nuclear weapons—and especially their delivery systems—through increased precision, reliability, and survivability. Now it is clear that, although there is a different amount of open-ness and transparency about it, all nuclear weapon states are getting ready to increase their overall nuclear weapon stockpiles. What makes it much more different and much more dangerous compared to the previous Cold War is that this new arms race is essentially multi-domain and multipolar, with much bigger roles played by many more actors—including newly emerging powers.
One should not ignore the link between the growing emphasis on nuclear weapons as an ultimate tool to ensure national security and sovereignty by nuclear weapons states (and to some extent their allies) and the pressure on nuclear non-proliferation, with more countries considering getting a nuclear capability for the very same purpose. This link, if understood correctly, might also contribute to the limitation of “nuclear optimism” by the existing nuclear weapon states and force them to search for collective security solutions.
Limits of negative effects
Presumably, there is an understanding in Moscow and other nuclear capitals that arms-racing each other “into oblivion” (as a former US official once said) is not straightforward, and that there are serious limitations and bottlenecks. This gives some level of optimism that the arms race can be contained, if not through formal mechanisms, but based on mutual understanding that you can’t change the political, industrial, and demographic landscape back to what it once was.
The biggest danger, as viewed from Moscow, is that it is crucial to see a mix of strategic nuclear, strategic non-nuclear, non-strategic nuclear, and missile defense capabilities as a joint system augmented by nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities of allied states and integrated through “space superiority” and AI-enabled unified mission planning. This is perceived as a possibility to combine a disarming and decapitating strike with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons with air and missile defense capabilities preventing a weakened retaliation. The latest military conflicts demonstrate that such “bogeymen scenarios” cannot be ignored, as there is a clear push to bank on selected areas of military superiority by the United States and some of its allies.
Clearly, such threats are well understood; consequently there is a constant development of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as Heavy Bombers and SSBNs, not to mention so-called novel strategic delivery systems, such as Avangard HGV-tipped ICBMs, Burevestnik unlimited range nuclear-powered cruise missiles, and the Poseidon nuclear-powered uncrewed underwater vehicle. Rapidly developing kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace capabilities also contribute to such efforts. There has been a clear focus on survivability and overwhelming second-strike capabilities, so that even a limited number of delivery vehicles intended for the targets on the adversary’s territory will reach their destination. However, actions by the United States and its allies do contribute to the ever-growing decapitation and disarming strike concerns. Ensuring the balance based solely on one’s military power without arms control framework is an extremely complicated task.
How to survive
Finally, there are many reasons to have questions and make accusations against each other because of bad decisions made over the years, including but not limited to the destruction of the ABM Treaty by Washington, as the most dramatic example—it drove both Moscow and Beijing to pursue symmetrical and asymmetrical measures to hedge against possible future technological breakthroughs. The so-called rogue states that have been cited as a primary reason to develop the US missile defenses and forward deploy its assets also continuously enhanced their capabilities. The characterization of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea by some politicians as an “axis of evil” (or “evil tetragon” in Russian) did not help to stabilize things either.
But the problem is that things can get much worse, with countries facing less stable strategic balances and more escalatory force postures. And they surely will evolve in that way, unless joint efforts to find solutions are undertaken.
Ultimately, there can and should be some new legally binding new arms-control regimes, including strict limitations on nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, although it is possible that a “warhead” would be a virtual accounting unit akin to the New START rules, where one Heavy Bomber accounted for one Nuclear Warhead only. This demands a significant volume of political will, especially given the fact that it is impossible to cover all existing concerns within a single document. Before we reach this stage, some informal mechanisms to enhance arms control and risk reduction can be put in place. The path forward will be hard and will need mutual concessions.
However, the alternative is significantly more costly and dangerous on an existential level. The more nuclear weapons (and nuclear weapons states) that exist, the greater the possibility that nuclear weapons use becomes. This is the ultimate threat to the human civilization, and efforts to limit this threat demand leadership from the great powers today, not tomorrow.
Battle for Kiev 2022: The Battle That Never Was [i]
How the west got it wrong… again…
Mike Mihajlovic, Black Mountain Analysis, Jun 06, 2026
Since the opening days of the Special Military Operation (or often called Full-Scale Russian Invasion in the West), the dominant Western narrative has portrayed the Russian advance toward Kiev as the main effort of the invasion: a bold attempt to seize the Ukrainian capital, decapitate the government, and force a rapid Ukrainian surrender. According to this interpretation, the Russian withdrawal from northern Ukraine in March and April 2022 represented a major strategic defeat and one of the most consequential failures of the war.
However, a closer examination of the campaign raises a fundamental question: was the operation around Kiev ever intended to be the decisive battle that many believed it to be?
A realistic analysis suggests that what became known as the “Battle for Kiev” was not a battle for Kiev at all. Rather than constituting the main effort of the invasion, the operation appears to have functioned as a large-scale diversionary and fixing operation designed to tie down Ukrainian forces while Russia pursued its primary strategic objectives elsewhere, particularly in southern Ukraine.
Looking Beyond the Headlines
One of the fundamental problems in analyzing the war is that many commentators and self-proclaimed experts begin by defining Russia’s objectives according to their own assumptions rather than examining what Russian leaders and military planners actually stated or appeared to prioritize. Once these assumed objectives are established, it becomes easy to claim that Russia has failed simply because it did not achieve goals that may never have been part of its original strategy.
This approach often leads to circular reasoning. Analysts first decide what Russia intended to accomplish, then evaluate the campaign against those self-defined objectives. If the battlefield outcome differs from those expectations, the conclusion is presented as evidence of failure. However, serious military analysis requires a different methodology.
The starting point should be facts rather than assumptions. This means examining official statements, force deployments, operational patterns, logistics, resource allocation, and the strategic outcomes that were actually pursued and achieved. Military campaigns are rarely as simple as they appear in headlines, and intentions cannot be determined solely by observing the direction of an advance on a map.
The opening phase of the war provides a clear example. Much of the public discussion focused on the assumption that the capture of Kiev was Russia’s primary objective. Yet a closer examination of force ratios, operational priorities, and the enduring gains achieved elsewhere raises legitimate questions about whether the campaign was intended to accomplish what many Western observers believed.
Regardless of one’s conclusions, objective analysis requires separating assumptions from evidence. Before determining whether a strategy succeeded or failed, it is necessary to establish what the strategy actually was. Only then can the results be evaluated fairly and accurately.
In military history, appearances can be deceiving. Large troop movements, dramatic airborne assaults, and advances toward politically significant objectives often create perceptions that differ from actual operational intent.
The Russian advance from Belarus toward Kiev certainly appeared threatening. Columns of armored vehicles moved south, airborne troops attempted to seize Hostomel Airport, and Russian forces approached the capital from multiple directions. For political leaders, journalists, and outside observers, the conclusion seemed obvious: Russia intended to capture Kiev.
Yet military operations are not judged by appearances alone. They must be examined in terms of force structure, logistics, operational priorities, and the strategic outcomes ultimately achieved.
When viewed through this lens, the campaign begins to look very different.
The Force Problem
Capturing a modern city of nearly three million people is among the most demanding operations in warfare. History demonstrates that urban assaults require overwhelming manpower, extensive logistical support, sustained artillery operations, and sufficient forces not only to seize a city but also to occupy and control it afterward.
Kiev was not Baghdad in 2003, where coalition forces enjoyed complete air superiority and overwhelming technological advantages. Nor was it Prague in 1968, where Soviet forces entered a largely non-resistant city. Kiev was a large, heavily defended capital whose population and military were fully mobilized.
The force allocated to the northern axis raises important questions. While substantial enough to pose a credible threat, it appeared insufficient for the prolonged capture and occupation of a city the size of Kiev.
This discrepancy becomes difficult to ignore. If the objective was truly to seize and hold the Ukrainian capital, why was a force of such limited size assigned to the task?
The answer may lie in understanding what military planners call a fixing operation.
The Art of Fixing the Enemy
A fixing operation is designed not to capture territory but to compel an opponent to commit forces to a particular sector, preventing them from reinforcing other areas where decisive operations are taking place.
Throughout history, armies have used demonstrations, feints, and diversionary offensives to manipulate enemy decision-making. The goal is psychological as much as military. By creating a credible threat, a commander forces the opponent to react.
In the case of Kiev, the threat itself may have been the objective.
No government can risk abandoning its capital during the opening phase of a war. As long as Russian forces remained near Kiev, Ukrainian leaders had little choice but to keep substantial military formations defending the city and its approaches.
Every brigade positioned around Kiev was a brigade unavailable elsewhere.
From this perspective, the operation’s success did not depend on entering Kiev. It depended on convincing Ukraine that Russia intended to do so.
The Real Campaign in the South
While global attention focused on Kiev, some of the war’s most consequential developments occurred hundreds of kilometers away……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Conclusion
The events of early 2022 are likely to remain the subject of debate for decades, especially among the “Western experts”. Access to additional Russian operational records may eventually provide definitive answers regarding Moscow’s intentions.
Yet one conclusion already appears increasingly difficult to ignore: the campaign around Kiev was not the decisive battle it was presented as in much of the Western media.
The threat to Kiev tied down Ukrainian forces, shaped strategic decisions, and dominated international attention. Meanwhile, the most significant territorial and operational gains were made in southern Ukraine, where Russia secured objectives that continue to shape the course of the war.
Whether one views the northern operation as a failed offensive, a successful diversion, or a combination of both, the notion that the war’s opening phase can be understood solely through the lens of a Russian attempt to seize Kiev is increasingly difficult to sustain.
The “Battle for Kiev” may ultimately be remembered not as the battle that determined the war, but as the battle that was never truly intended to be fought in the way the world believed.https://bmanalysis.substack.com/p/battle-for-kiev-2022-the-battle-that?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1105422&post_id=200763450&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
The Karaganov Fallacy – Nuclear strike against Europe IS NOT the right answer for Russia
Karaganov advocates preemptive Russian nuclear strikes against a Europe he deems bellicose, banking on American passivity. Scott Ritter believes conventional missiles, not nukes, are the only credible path.
warlike ruminations by some of NATO’s leading military minds do not exist in a vacuum but rather are reflective of a general posture of war preparation being promoted by the NATO alliance itself. Just ask Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, who recently warned that NATO was in a race against time when it came to preparing for an inevitable war with Russia.
the true lesson is that nuclear wars cannot be won, should never be fought, and as such nuclear weapons should be done away altogether to avoid falling into intellectual traps such as the one offered by Karaganov, where their use is deemed possible.
Mon 01 Jun 2026, Scott Ritter, https://forumgeopolitica.com/article/the-karaganov-fallacy
Editor’s Note : After publishing our article “Is 1914 repeating itself? Will war between Europe and Russia finally break out openly?” where we discussed – among others – the nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federeation and also the Karaganov doctrin, Dmitry Orlov published the article «How to survive a Russian tactical nuclear strike». In today’s article Scott Ritter analyses the Karaganov doctrine and argues that nuclear weapons are not the right tools for Russia.
Back in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the Wallstreet brokerage firm, E.F. Hutton, came up with one of the most iconic television ad campaigns in history, built around the catch phrase “When E.F. Hutton speaks, people listen.”
Sergei Karaganov is the Russian analog to E.F. Hutton—when Karaganov speaks, people listen. The 73-year old political scientist, who currently heads the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy and serves as the dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, has advised both post-Soviet era Russian Presidents, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, and his opinion continues to carry weight among the senior-most decision making circles of the Russian government.
Karaganov has, for the past several years, been warning about the growing threat to Russia from NATO, and in particular the European nations of NATO who have constructed a world view which postulates Russia as an existential threat which must be decisively confronted and defeated.
In this Karaganov is not wrong.
The language of the Europeans is self-indicting.
According to a newly published German military strategy, Russia represents “the greatest and most immediate threat for the foreseeable future” to Germany and transatlantic security. The classified strategy concludes by declaring “Russia is laying the groundwork for a military attack on NATO member states.”
Germany’s chief of defense, General Carsten Breuer furthered this argument in a 2025 statement to the media where he noted that “There’s an intent and there’s a buildup of the stocks” by Russia for a possible future attack on Nato’s Baltic state members.
Brueuer and Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorious, are using the threat from Russia as an excuse for the rearmament of Germany, with the goal of making the German army the most powerful in Europe by 2029.
Why that date?
According to General Breuer, this is when Russia will attack Europe. “This is what the analysts are assessing,” Breuer said, “in 2029. So we have to be ready by 2029.”
The German analysis is nearly identical to that of their British allies. Former Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Sanders, who retired in the summer of 2025, has warned that a war with Putin was a “realistic possibility” by 2030. “If Russia stops fighting in Ukraine,” Sanders told the British media, “you get to a position where within a matter of months they will have the capability to conduct a limited attack on a NATO member that we will be responsible for supporting, and that happens by 2030.”
These warlike ruminations by some of NATO’s leading military minds do not exist in a vacuum but rather are reflective of a general posture of war preparation being promoted by the NATO alliance itself. Just ask Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, who recently warned that NATO was in a race against time when it came to preparing for an inevitable war with Russia. “We are Russia’s next target,” Rutte said. “I fear that too many are quietly complacent. Too many don’t feel the urgency. And too many believe that time is on our side. It is not. The time for action is now. Conflict is at our door. Russia has brought war back to Europe. And we must be prepared. Russia has brought war back to Europe. We must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents and great-grandparents endured.”
The rhetoric of Breuer, Sanders and Rutte lends itself to an argument where the nations of NATO are responding to Russian aggression. But one must not be fooled into believing that aggression is a one-way street. Enter, stage left, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys, who recently opined that “We [NATO] must show the Russians that we can break through the small fortress they have built in Kaliningrad. NATO has the means to flatten Russian air defense bases and missile systems if necessary.”
Budrys’ lunacy, which even if successful would amount to little more than the collective suicide of NATO, didn’t appear from a vacuum, but rather echoed similar sentiment expressed by General Chris Donahue of the US Army, who serves as the commander of US forces in Europe. Donahue bragged that Kaliningrad, Russia, is approximately 47 miles wide and surrounded by NATO on all sides. He claimed that NATO and the US Army now have the capability to “take that down from the ground in a timeframe that is unheard of and faster than we’ve ever been able to do.” Donahue went on: “We’ve already planned that and we’ve already developed it.”
In many ways, Donahue’s bluster is far more embarrassing that the pugilistic nonsense espoused by his NATO colleagues, if for no other reason than he more than anyone should know both the extreme limitations of US and NATO power (something demonstrated very publicly with the recent US failed aggression against Iran) and the consequences of any NATO attack on Kaliningrad, which would be immediately fatal to Donahue, his staff, and the entire leadership of NATO, given the inevitability and severity of the anticipated Russian retaliation.
And therein lies the rub. NATO’s jingoistic rhetoric aside, there is no conventional military power in Europe, whether singularly or collectively, which poses an existential threat to Russia. Recent NATO military exercises demonstrated just how inexperienced NATO ground forces were in modern combat operations incorporating drone warfare on any appreciative scale. Imagine for a moment a NATO Brigade running into a Rubicon detachment on the battlefield. The results would be as one-sided as they would be fatal to the defeated party, which would in every scenario imaginable be the NATO forces.
The words of Breuer, Sanders, Rutte, Budrys, and Donahue amplify one universal constant when it comes to NATO today: militarily it is very much a paper tiger, incapable of sustained intensive ground combat at any appreciable level. The warlike verbiage spouted by these mouthpieces of mayhem is simply a desperate plea for relevancy in an effort to mobilize public support for a militarization campaign requiring energizing both populations and industry in a way hitherto fore unimaginable in post-Cold War Europe, and for all sense and purposes impossible to achieve today.
As the fictional Commander, Air Group (CAG) told Tom Cruise’s Maverick in the first Top Gun movie, “Son, your mouth is writing checks your body can’t cash.”
Welcome to the NATO collective today.
While Sergei Karaganov and his fellow Russian hardliners are more than justified in taking extreme umbrage at the warlike posturing Europe is assuming today in opposition to Russia, the reality is Europe poses absolutely no threat whatsoever to Russia as things currently stand, and the probability of Europe overcoming the sizeable political and economic hurdles required to build a military force capable of surviving on a Russian battlefield, let alone prevailing, is slim to none.
More worrisome, however, is the nuclear posturing being done by certain NATO countries to compensate for the alliance’s extreme shortcomings regarding conventional military power projection. This nuclear flexing has taken on an even greater urgency now that President Trump’s hostile ambivalence toward NATO and European security throws into question America’s commitment to fulfilling any hypothetical Article 5 scenario—a stance which simultaneously throws into question the reliability of America’s nuclear umbrella. France and the United Kingdom are working to create a joint nuclear doctrine to offset the loss of America’s nuclear arsenal, and both nations are in active discussions with other NATO members to extend their respective nuclear umbrellas over the Arctic, the Baltics, Poland and Germany.
Sergei Karaganov famously postulated that no American President would be willing to trade Boston for Poznan, meaning that if Russia were to hypothetically attack this unfortunate Polish urban center with a nuclear weapon, the United States would not respond in kind.
This, of course, is the kind of hypothesis that should never be tested and, given the fact that Russia faces no threat of an existential nature from the European collective, has zero justification for even being contemplated being tested.
Russia, together with the other major nuclear weapons states (the US, China, UK and France) co-signed a joint statement in early 2022 which affirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The statement went on to declare that “As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war.”
Russia has not officially renounced that joint declaration, which on the surface would indicate that the Karaganov initiative to preemptively use nuclear weapons against Europe has zero viability when it comes to reflecting official Russian policy.
There is, of course, one major problem—Karaganov was instrumental in crafting the 2025 nuclear posture for the Russian Federation, which in part declared that nuclear weapons could come into play in situations where conventional forces are insufficient to deter an opponent or achieve a military objective. So far, the SMO in and of itself does not meet the criteria for preemptive nuclear weapons usage. Whether a large-scale conventional war with NATO would cross this threshold is a separate matter.
But the situation Russia faces today, which Karaganov addresses, involves a nuclear armed power aiding a non-nuclear armed state to launch conventional attacks on Russia that could pose an existential threat. This is, of course, the very definition of what the ongoing proxy conflict between Russia and the collective West over Ukraine is, especially when it comes to the ongoing NATO-backed campaign of drone strikes against strategic Russian targets.
It’s not just Karaganov who is crying foul. Dmitri Polyansky, the Russian Ambassador to the OSCE, noting that the ongoing Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia are only possible with Western military expertise, technology, and intelligence, recently declared that it might already be “too late” to avert a Russian retaliatory strike against European targets directly affiliated with the facilitation of Ukrainian long-range drone strikes against Russia.
But even in this circumstance, nuclear weapons are not necessarily called for, something even Karaganov acknowledges. Conventional missile strikes, using weapons such as the Oreshnik intermediate-range missile, should be mounted against select European targets. But Karaganov then goes further, advocating for the use of nuclear strikes if the conventional missiles don’t “deter Europe.” Here, Karaganov puts value on the need to instill “primal fear” in Europe not by the threat of nuclear weapons, which clearly hasn’t worked, but through their actual use.
In this instance, Karaganov is dead wrong.
The use of nuclear weapons obviates the strategic advantages Russia has accrued by building the World’s largest, most combat capable (and tested) military. It nullifies the escalatory dominance Russia has achieved by deploying the Oreshnik conventional strike system. But worst of all it erases the very doctrinal paradigm that has prevented the world from stumbling down the path of nuclear oblivion—the idea that nuclear wars cannot be won and therefore must never be fought.
The Karaganov doctrine, so to speak, introduced a new paradigm—nuclear wars can, in fact be won, and as such should be fought.
Karaganov proves his thesis by postulating an unproven hypothesis—the US won’t trade Boston for Poznan.
He avoids the uncomfortable question as to whether France or the United Kingdom, singularly or together, would opt to put forward a nuclear response by declaring that Russia would eliminate both these nations and all of Europe if they were to try.
But this begs the question whether a Russian leader would be willing to trade Saint Petersburg or Moscow for London, Berlin and Paris.
Does Karaganov really want to test this hypothesis?
But let’s postulate, just for the sake of argument, that Karaganov’s thesis holds, and that Europe is collectively cowed by a Russian preemptive nuclear strike on Poznan, and the US opts out of sacrificing Boston and doesn’t retaliate.
Then what?
Nuclear war has, to date, been averted by the notion that there can be no winners.
Karaganov’s doctrine flips the script, and declares that there can, in fact, be winners.
But what exactly has been “won”? Decades of deterrence theory will have been washed away, leaving in its stead a massive strategic imbalance that cannot stand. There can be no nuclear deterrence if one side is willing to use nuclear weapons and the other side isn’t. Yes, the United States may likely forego sacrificing Boston or any other American city for a European urban victim of Russian nuclear annihilation. But the United States will need to immediately equalize the nuclear deterrence equation by demonstrating that it, too, can use nuclear weapons, and thus test the hypothesis of whether Russia would be willing to sacrifice Kazan for Tehran.
The answer is likely to be no.
Crisis averted.
Or not.
No longer is the world one where nuclear war cannot be fought, but rather one where nuclear war has become an accepted practice. War gaming and basic game theory hold that once nuclear weapons are used, it is simply a matter of time before matters escalate toward a full nuclear exchange, terminating all life on the planet. This isn’t idle speculation. In 1983 the Pentagon conducted a war game called Proud Prophet, an unscripted event involving the highest levels of the US military and its global warfighting commands, using real-world communication channels, doctrines and secret war plans. The game allowed for the consideration of limited small-scale nuclear strikes, but always ended the same way—global nuclear Armageddon.
Karaganov doesn’t address this issue, with good cause—because no leader, Russian or American, would start a nuclear war in a situation that fell short of manifesting a threat to their respective existential survival, if they knew that no matter what, the result was always the same—everyone dies.
Karaganov has done the world a great service in forcefully postulating the possibility of a winnable limited nuclear war.
Not just because it allows the world to once again embrace the foundational notion that nuclear wars cannot be won, and as such should never be fought.
No, the true lesson is that nuclear wars cannot be won, should never be fought, and as such nuclear weapons should be done away altogether to avoid falling into intellectual traps such as the one offered by Karaganov, where their use is deemed possible.
There is no greater justification for nuclear arms control and disarmament than the scenarios put forward by Karaganov.
And in the present time, when nuclear arms control has been removed from the global diplomatic playbook, the world needs the kind of kick in the seat of the pants that any reasoned reflection on the fallacy of Sergei Karaganov’s nuclear theories brings—without nuclear arms control, our collective demise at the hands of the weapons we refuse to eliminate is all but assured.
Russia adds four Ukrainian groups and ‘Glory to Ukraine’ salute to register of ‘fascist organizations and associated symbols’
January 19, 2024, Source: Meduza, https://meduza.io/en/news/2024/01/18/russia-adds-four-ukrainian-groups-and-glory-to-ukraine-salute-to-register-of-fascist-organizations-and-associated-symbols
Russia’s Justice Ministry has included four Ukrainian organizations in its register of groups that either collaborated with those condemned by the Nuremberg trials or deny the crimes of Nazism, reports Russian state news agency TASS.
The list appeared on the ministry’s website on January 18 and is officially called the “List of organizations specified in parts three and four of Article 6 of the federal law ‘On Commemorating the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945’, as well as the attributes and symbols of these organizations.”
The list includes the following four organizations:
- The Ukrainian People’s Revolutionary Army (UNRA),
- The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA),
- The Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense (UNSO),
- The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).
The list also features the organizations’ slogans, including the salute “Glory to Ukraine” [Slava Ukraini] and the response “Glory to the Heroes” [Heroiam Slava].
The document also includes the organizations’ symbols, such as the Trident of Prince Volodymyr, depicted on Ukraine’s coat of arms.
Russian nuclear weapons, 2026
Bulletin, By Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight-Boyle | May 14, 2026
Russia is in the late stages of a multi-decade-long modernization program to replace all of its Soviet-era nuclear-capable systems with newer versions. However, this program is facing significant challenges that will further delay the entry into force of these newer systems. In this issue of the Nuclear Notebook, we estimate that Russia now possesses approximately 4,400 nuclear warheads for its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces—a slight increase from the previous year. The significant increase in non-strategic nuclear weapons that the Pentagon predicted five years ago has so far not materialized. A nuclear weapons storage site in Belarus appears to be nearing completion. The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, associate director Matt Korda, and senior research associates Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle
This article is freely available in PDF format in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ digital magazine (published by Taylor & Francis) at this link.
Russia is nearing the completion of a decades-long effort to replace most of its strategic and non-strategic nuclear-capable systems with newer versions. But despite Moscow’s continued rhetorical emphasis on its nuclear forces, commercial satellite imagery and other open sources indicate that elements of Russia’s nuclear modernization are proceeding much more slowly than planned: Upgrades to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers face significant delays, and the “significant” increase of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons that US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) predicted five years ago has so far not materialized (Richard 2020, 5).
As of March 2026, we estimate that Russia has a stockpile of approximately 4,400 nuclear warheads assigned for use by long-range strategic launchers and shorter-range tactical nuclear forces. This number is greater than last year, largely due to a change in our estimate of warheads assigned to non-strategic nuclear forces following STRATCOM’s publication of its estimate for the number of warheads in the Russian arsenal. The estimate, which is the first time in more than three decades that the US government has disclosed how many warheads it believes Russia possesses, stated that “Russia’s nuclear warhead arsenal consists of approximately 4,600 nuclear warheads; 2,600 are intended for its strategic triad and up to 2,000 are warheads intended for theater nuclear weapons” (Correll 2026). Given that the US Intelligence Community for several years has estimated Russia has 1,000–2,000 nonstrategic warheads (US Department of State 2025a), the “approximately” in the STRATCOM statement indicates the stockpile is less than 4,600 and the number of nonstrategic warheads is less than 2,000. We were able to match the estimate for strategic warheads, but the total stockpile number
necessitated a revision of our estimate for nonstrategic warheads closer to the estimate we published in 2023 (Kristensen, Korda, and Reynolds 2023).
Of the estimated 4,400 stockpiled warheads, approximately 1,796 strategic warheads are deployed: about 892 on land-based ballistic missiles, about 704 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and about 200 at heavy bomber bases. Another approximately 810 strategic warheads are in storage, along with about 1,794 nonstrategic warheads. In addition to the military stockpile for operational forces, a large number—approximately 1,020—of retired but still largely intact warheads await dismantlement, for a total inventory of approximately 5,420 warheads[1] (see Table 1 on original).
Russia’s nuclear modernization program appears motivated in part by the Kremlin’s strong desire to maintain quantitative and qualitative parity with the United States and to maintain national prestige. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2026-05/russian-nuclear-weapons-2026/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=The%20Russian%20nuclear%20arsenal%20today&utm_campaign=20260518%20Monday%20Newsletter
How Russia signals nuclear resolve with civilian nuclear energy infrastructure.
Iran today: a different geopolitical climate for nuclear energy. In the most recent war in Iran, Russia has so far refrained from making explicit nuclear threats, but the United States and Israel may have adopted a similar ad hoc approach that substitutes threats on civilian nuclear energy infrastructure for traditional nuclear threats.
Trump’s threats suggest that the United States has begun blurring the lines between conventional energy infrastructure, nuclear energy infrastructure, and nuclear weapons.
Bulletin, By Elena Tiedens | Voices of Tomorrow | May 14, 2026
The Russian state-run nuclear energy company Rosatom evacuated hundreds of workers from the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran in late March. The Rosatom employees who remain are responsible for ensuring the safe operation of a nuclear power plant in a war zone—but may also serve the dual purpose of re-affirming Russia’s interests in the region. Long treated as the peaceful counterpart of nuclear weapons, civil nuclear power plants now play a role as a nuclear signaling option in wartime. (Nuclear signaling can be thought of as a non-explicit reminder, at a step below a direct threat, that is meant to call an adversary’s attention to the risk posed by one’s possession of nuclear weapons—though experts disagree on terminology and definitions.)
Russia began its pattern of power plant-based nuclear signaling at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. There, Russia has deterred Ukrainian forces from retaking the plant by threatening nuclear destruction, potentially leading to nuclear weapons use, should Ukraine and its allies attack Zaporizhzhia. In recent months, Russia has made similar statements about the potential for nuclear catastrophe at the Bushehr plant, as a deterrent to further US strikes.
Although this type of nuclear signaling is likely not a fully developed aspect of state nuclear strategy, Russia has increasingly relied on nuclear power plants as an ad hoc line of defense during wartime. Given Rosatom’s global footprint—Rosatom’s civil nuclear energy projects are expanding across the world, with at least 41 civil nuclear energy projects planned in 11 countries ranging from Bangladesh to Hungary—states must reconsider their nuclear energy contracts with the nationalized energy company. And because there are indications that the United States and Israel may be following Russia’s lead in their recent
strikes on Bushehr, the global community must redefine and condemn signaling with nuclear power plants as a new nuclear threat.
Nuclear signaling at Zaporizhzhia. The Russian occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia plant—the largest nuclear power plant in Europe—was a watershed moment in nuclear history: the first military occupation of a civilian nuclear power plant. Russia first invaded the Zaporizhzhia power plant in March 2022, and after Rosatom’s efforts to redirect the plant’s electricity from the Ukrainian to Russian energy grids failed, the Russian military repurposed the plant as a military base from which to launch further operations in Eastern Ukraine.
Russia warned that attempts to retake the plant could trigger a nuclear disaster, followed by potential Russian nuclear weapons use. In September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin said he was not afraid to use nuclear weapons to protect Russian territory, including the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia plant. These statements served as a nuclear deterrent without the deployment of a single warhead—and consequently were less risky for Russia. Although Russia’s occupation of the plant constitutes a serious nuclear, environmental, and humanitarian risk, Russia has attempted to reverse the narrative to signal that a Ukrainian effort to retake the nuclear power plant would be an unjustifiable nuclear risk.
In Ukraine, Russia’s occupation of Zaporizhzhia has become an essential aspect of its nuclear posture, which treats a potential Ukrainian defense of the plant as a nuclear redline. Although Russia has faced international condemnation for its activities in Zaporizhzhia, Russia may view statements about the reactor as less risky and escalatory than those involving weapons capabilities.
Nuclear signaling in the Twelve-Day War. During the Twelve-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025, Russia proved itself willing to use similar rhetoric about the potential for civil nuclear disaster. After the United States got involved toward the end of the war and bombed Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities in Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow, Russia sought to deter further attacks—but without providing political support or military hardware that would detract from its objectives in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Maria Zakharova warned that any US strike on the Bushehr plant “would be an extremely dangerous step with truly unpredictable negative consequences.”
Putin went a step further. When asked how Russia was supporting Iran, Putin implied that continued operation of the Bushehr reactor during the June 2025 war was Russia’s primary means of support for Iran. “Isn’t that support? Iran has not asked us for any other support,” Putin said.
Russia’s approaches in Ukraine and in the Twelve-Day War are not identical, but they both demonstrate a willingness to weaponize civilian nuclear infrastructure through deterring attacks and in service of its strategic objectives.
Iran today: a different geopolitical climate for nuclear energy. In the most recent war in Iran, Russia has so far refrained from making explicit nuclear threats, but the United States and Israel may have adopted a similar ad hoc approach that substitutes threats on civilian nuclear energy infrastructure for traditional nuclear threats. Since mid-March, the United States and Israel have launched four separate strikes that have reportedly hit within the perimeter of the Bushehr nuclear complex. Although the United States and Israel have not claimed responsibility for the strikes—and the projectiles have not hit the reactor or resulted in radiation leaks—the possible targeting of a nuclear power plant is an alarming escalation.
This risk is particularly acute in light of US President Donald Trump’s March 21, 2026, threat to “obliterate their [Iran’s] power plants, starting with the biggest one first.” Some experts have speculated that Trump intended to threaten a strike on Bushehr, which is not Iran’s largest power plant but is the country’s largest nuclear plant. While attacks on civilian energy infrastructure are generally illegal under the Geneva Conventions, a strike on Bushehr would also constitute a risky weaponization with serious nuclear escalation risks beyond those associated with non-nuclear civilian energy infrastructure. Although less thoroughly articulated than Russian threats involving Zaporizhzhia, Trump’s threats suggest that the United States has begun blurring the lines between conventional energy infrastructure, nuclear energy infrastructure, and nuclear weapons.
Rosatom’s reactors worldwide and implications for the global nuclear order. Scholars have begun to identify the new role of nuclear energy infrastructure in war, but what is missing is a serious reckoning with not only the environmental and human effects of attacks on nuclear energy infrastructure but also the ways in which such threats intersect with traditional nuclear signaling. Nuclear energy is not a new wartime technology akin to drones or cyber warfare. Instead, it should be understood as an object of evolving strategic thought. This is not to say that signaling with nuclear power plants isn’t dangerous; to the contrary, it is extraordinarily dangerous. But experts should resist the urge to view nuclear energy and nuclear weapons as distinct threats. The risks of nuclear weapons—physical radiation and uninhibited escalation—can also occur in a world in which nuclear powers see nuclear energy as a platform on which to project their strategic objectives.
This moment not only requires a clear articulation of the risks but also a willingness of all states to reject the use of nuclear energy for wartime signaling. This refusal crucially includes nuclear weapons states but also countries across the world who have increasingly become recipients of Rosatom power plants in what has sometimes been dubbed “the new nuclear age.” As Rosatom’s civil nuclear reactor enterprise expands, Russia’s allies and partners, neutral states, and the global nuclear community must take steps to lessen these risks.
Even for Russian allies and partners like Iran, Rosatom’s nuclear power plants do not serve as a meaningful form of defense but rather as a way for Russia to provide rhetorical—but not tangible—support. For example, Iran has not benefited from Russian signaling as it continues to face devastating losses. Meanwhile Russia has received much-needed financial relief from oil sanctions lifted by the Trump administration. Russia’s allies considering contracts with Rosatom might take the Iranian case as a cautionary tale………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Nuclear energy at the 2026 NPT Review Conference. At the ongoing NPT Review Conference, states have already raised the alarm about threats to nuclear energy infrastructure during wartime. The European Union, for instance, urged Russia “to refrain from carrying [out] attacks on such infrastructure, which constitute a serious threat to nuclear safety and security.” The Non-Aligned Movement broadly condemned strikes on nuclear infrastructure. Both statements treated risks at nuclear energy installations as the unfortunate byproduct of careless actions and armed conflict in the vicinity of power plants. But the connection between nuclear energy and nuclear escalation is not accidental; it is the result of an increasingly prevalent nuclear signaling strategy.
During the Cold War, US and international diplomats saw nuclear energy and other civil nuclear technologies as the peaceful partner to nuclear weapons, an assumption embedded in the NPT and other global nuclear treaties. But recent developments raise the possibility that nuclear energy installations will increasingly become flashpoints in war.
Preventing this outcome requires states to hold each other accountable and to forcefully denounce the use of nuclear energy infrastructure in nuclear signaling. At the NPT Review Conference, state parties should, at a minimum, resolve to follow and implement the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Seven Indispensable Pillars for nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, which include resolutions to maintain the physical integrity and backup power supply of nuclear plants……………….. https://thebulletin.org/2026/05/how-russia-signals-nuclear-resolve-with-civilian-nuclear-energy-infrastructure/
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