The United States, Russia and China are racing to build nuclear reactors on the moon, as scientists warn about the possible risk of a radioactive mishap.
In January, NASA, the US space agency, announced plans to develop a nuclear reactor on the moon by the end of 2030. Russia, working with China, aims to do the same by 2036 as they strive to advance space exploration.
The reactors will be needed to power mining of frozen water trapped deep in the moon’s craters, which scientists believe could supply drinking water, air, and rocket fuel for future bases. The reactors would also provide power for lunar bases.
Here is what we know.
Which countries want to put nuclear reactors on the moon?
The US said NASA’s Lunar Reactor 1 would produce 20 kilowatts of electricity, creating enough power to run on its own for five years without maintenance.
NASA’s reactor is designed to be compact, weighing under 6,000kg (13,200 lbs) and will fit inside a rocket compartment measuring 3.7 metres (12 feet) long by 5.5 metres (18 ft) wide.
Russia is also building a nuclear reactor, which is expected to produce 10 kilowatts. The reactor, called Selena, will be able to run for a decade without maintenance. It will be ready to power a Chinese-led moon base by about 2036.
The Selena reactor is expected to be even lighter than NASA’s, weighing about 1,100 to 1,300kg (2,400 to 2,800 lbs) for an easier and softer landing on the lunar surface.
This would not be the first time nuclear reactors have been placed in outer space.
The Soviet Union launched more than 30 nuclear fission reactors into Earth’s orbit between the late 1960s and the 1980s to power spy satellites during the Cold War.
The small, 1,000kg (2,200 lbs) reactors powered radar-tracking spy satellites using heat from splitting uranium atoms into 3 to 5 kilowatts of electricity. They are no longer operational, and no other country has sent nuclear reactors into space.
The US has spent $20bn on advanced space nuclear programmes over the past 70 years, but has never successfully launched a nuclear reactor into space since an experiment in 1965.
That experiment was carried out to see if nuclear energy could power a satellite. It worked at first but accidentally shut down after just 43 days because a non-nuclear electrical part of the satellite broke down. It is still floating up in space today.
Previous attempts by the US to develop nuclear projects have stalled due to shifting budget priorities.
How do you put nuclear reactors on the moon?
First, scientists will have to build a reactor on Earth, which will then be transported to the moon using a robotic spacecraft that fires rocket engines for a slow and gentle touchdown.
Both the US and Russia say they would keep their reactors switched off until they reach the moon, to keep radioactive risk at a minimum until the last step.
Once set up on the moon, the reactors would be designed to run without maintenance for years, supplying power to bases engaged in mining on the lunar surface.
Why does the moon need a nuclear reactor?
The US, China and Russia want to build bases near the moon’s south pole, close to the known sources of water ice. The ice sits in the permanently shadowed craters, where sunlight has not reached for millions of years.
As well as powering the moon bases, the reactors would also supply enough power for mining. So far, the US, Russia and China want to mine for frozen water which, once released, could be used to support life on the moon at bases where people could live and conduct research.
Tech billionaire Elon Musk has also said he wants to extract minerals such as aluminium, titanium, and silicon, required for manufacturing satellites.
Solar power for such endeavours would be limited as the sun shines on any one spot on the moon only half the time, so solar panels would go dark for about two weeks every month.
Simon Middleburgh, director of Bangor University’s Nuclear Futures Institute (NFI), told Al Jazeera that solar power is too limited to provide the steady flow of energy a moon base would need, while batteries and diesel are too costly, because everything has to be launched from Earth.
Nuclear energy is the “obvious choice”, Middleburgh said, adding that it must be used “responsibly”.
It is likely that three or four reactors working together would be required to provide sufficient energy for mining lunar ice as well as supporting a moon base, he added.
Why the rush?It comes down to geopolitics.
In a December 2025 executive order, US President Donald Trump ordered NASA to build a lunar reactor ready to launch by 2030. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin have revealed similar plans.
In August this year, Sean Duffy, the US transportation secretary, said the US is in a “race to the moon, in a race with China”.
Middleburgh said the 2030 deadline is likely for building the reactor itself, but the harder part will be landing on the moon and safely setting up the system.
“The biggest challenge isn’t really the nuclear technology at all; it is the regulation for launch, the availability of a launch platform itself, and the landing and setting up the system on the lunar surface ready for it to be operated sustainably and safely,” he said.
The race to the moon also comes amid growing military competition beyond Earth. In September, the US announced it had deployed weapons into orbit, which officials said would be used to defend US forces.
While the US did not provide details about these “weapons”, experts say they are likely to be space-based communications jammers, rather than kinetic ones that launch strikes.
The announcement raised concerns about the concept of “space weapons” or the use of space for military purposes, including the potential targeting of satellites that provide GPS, communications and intelligence.
What could go wrong?
Middleburgh told Al Jazeera that an accident during the launch of the reactors would be less frightening than it sounds because uranium alone, before it is used in a reactor, is not very radioactive. However, that changes once the reactor is switched on.
The risk is bigger if a running reactor falls back onto Earth, analysts say.
In 1978, a Soviet satellite carrying a reactor, Kosmos 954, scattered radioactive material across nearly 124,300 square km (48,000sq miles) of northern Canada.
The accident forced an expensive military cleanup of the highly radioactive fragments and microscopic particles.
On the moon, Middleburgh says, any contaminated area would be “extremely localised” if there were to be a similar accident.
Who has sovereignty over the moon?
Legally, no one. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans countries from “claiming” the moon or any part of it, though they have ownership of the equipment they send there. The treaty does not ban nuclear power in space.
Antonino Salmeri, director of the Lunar Policy Platform, a nonprofit, told Al Jazeera that a reactor can be lawful if it follows the treaty’s principles, including peaceful use and avoiding harmful contamination.
Norbert Schorghofer, a senior scientist at the Planetary Science Institute in Arizona, US, told Al Jazeera all signatories “have the right to mine the lunar surface as long as it is for peaceful purposes”.
Whichever country’s reactor gets to the “best” water ice first could claim a “safety zone”, which would not be a land claim but could operate like one. Salmeri said declaring one creates no territorial rights, but a reactor shuts others out anyway, because nobody wants to enter a radioactive area.
A Lunar Policy Platform report released last month points to another problem: Who is responsible if something goes wrong? The report says existing liability rules have not been designed to regulate the use of long-term hazardous equipment on another celestial body.
At present, only one floating nuclear power plant is in operation globally
By Reuters, October 29, 2026
MOSCOW, Oct 28 (Reuters) – Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom could supply floating nuclear power plants to coastal African countries and is in advanced discussions with at least four nations, senior company executives said on Wednesday at a Russia-Africa Summit.
Vladimir Aptekarev, deputy head of Rosatom’s machine-building division, said that 38 of Africa’s more than 50 countries have sufficient coastline to host a Russian-made floating power unit.
At present, only one floating nuclear power plant is in operation globally, in Russia’s remote Chukotka region, dating from 2020. Floating plants use smaller reactors, are contained within a vessel which can be towed to a destination and require less infrastructure on land. They also make it possible to secure a new source of energy quickly and at a lower cost.
“As a first step, a floating nuclear power unit can serve as a good entry point, enabling a country both to address its energy needs and to join the nuclear club,” said Aptekarev.
Rosatom is proposing implementing such projects under a power purchase agreement (PPA) model, with servicing and refuelling cycles carried out in Russia, allowing the unit to operate for up to 60 years.
…………………………………..Rosatom Chief Executive Alexei Likhachev told reporters the company is in advanced discussions on potential floating nuclear power plant projects with Egypt, Togo, Namibia and Tanzania.
For international markets, Rosatom is offering floating power units with a capacity of 100 megawatts with RITM-200M reactors adapted for warm climates.
Rosatom has already reached an agreement with Indonesia on what it describes as the world’s first export supplies of electricity generated by two floating nuclear power units with a combined capacity of 200 megawatts.
the EU is donating €90 billion to Ukraine just for 2026 and 2027 alone, never mind the €200 bn it gave from 2022 to 2025. About one-third of this money is used to manufacture and supply drones. This vast expenditure has transformed Ukrainian territory into a giant high-tech killing field. Traversing such territory is an unprecedented challenge.
Strategic Culture Foundation spoke with Aiden Minnis, a British-Irish volunteer fighting for Russia on the frontline in Kharkov Oblast.
Aiden Minnis left Britain in 2023 as a volunteer to fight for Russia Western politicians and media claim that Russia is bogged down in a Ukrainian quagmire. We are told that Russian forces are taking heavy losses, held in a stalemate by gritty Ukrainian soldiers. Nearly five years after invading, it is claimed, Russia’s military is still confined to Ukraine’s far eastern territory with little progress.
But this upbeat Western narrative is flawed and wearing thin. The NATO-backed Ukrainian regime is straining from collapse. The grinding losses on the battlefield, as disproportionate body exchanges attest, the corruption within the Kiev regime, the dredging of conscripts to include women, and the incessant pounding by Russian air strikes are exposing a state teetering on defeat.
Even U.S. President Donald Trump seems to have sobered up from drinking the Kool-Aid about Ukraine winning. He’s peeved and telling Vladimir Zelensky it’s time for him to step aside and cut a peace deal.
There is a growing foreboding sense that European NATO leaders are dreading the inevitable implosion of their “Ukraine project”. As German MEP Michael von der Schulesburg pointed out in an interview with Glenn Diesen, European politicians are increasingly uneasy that their lies about Ukraine will soon be blown wide open. There will be hell to pay for bankrupt economies and impoverished societies, all based on lies.
Still, it is a fair question: why aren’t Russian forces making more rapid advance along the 1,000 kilometer front line? If the Kiev regime is so shaky, why isn’t Russia finishing it off quickly?
Aiden Minnis, a British-Irish volunteer serving in the Russian army, said he believes that victory is coming and is inevitable. But he explains that the advance is deliberately slow. The “meatgrinder” people refer to about the battlefield is not just about inflicting losses of military personnel. He says the conflict in Ukraine is being fought strategically as an attritional war to defeat the Western NATO alliance.
“We have defeated the Ukrainian army three times over from the losses it has suffered,” says Minnis. “This war would have been over a long time ago, if it were not for the systematic involvement of NATO.”
The amount of weaponry and personnel that NATO has funneled into Ukraine is on a scale that few in the West can imagine, he noted.
“NATO effectively runs and directs the war for Ukraine. That includes generals and special forces from NATO countries inside command structures and military units in Ukraine, and not always sheep dipped into the foreign legion either. Some are outright working without cover.
“They use NATO radars and intelligence to conduct combat operations and terrorist attacks inside Russia. None of the fighting, or rather 90 per cent of it in Ukraine, would be possible without massive Western assistance,” says Minnis.
For example, the EU is donating €90 billion to Ukraine just for 2026 and 2027 alone, never mind the €200 bn it gave from 2022 to 2025. About one-third of this money is used to manufacture and supply drones. This vast expenditure has transformed Ukrainian territory into a giant high-tech killing field. Traversing such territory is an unprecedented challenge.
Aiden Minnis left Britain in 2023 as a volunteer to fight for Russia. He has served in Donetsk and Lugansk as a sapper clearing explosives, as well as in the evacuation of civilians and wounded. Currently, he is deployed as a rifleman in a regiment on the front line in Kharkov Oblast near Kupiansk.
The British media have called him a criminal and a traitor. He says he doesn’t care because he has no intention of returning to the United Kingdom.
“I am labelled a traitor, but I only ever swore allegiance to one country… Russia, and I never broke it. And as long as I have breath in my body, you will never see me swear allegiance, or fight for the butcher’s apron [British Union Jack flag]. My soul is Irish and now Russian.”
Minnis says that what the Western media report about the war in Ukraine is “total lies”.
He says that Russian forces are making slow but relentless advances along most of the frontline. The pace is incremental because the Russian military is trying to minimize casualties among its troops and the civilian population.
“If you look at the exchanges of dead soldiers that are agreed upon from time to time, the Ukrainian side’s casualties are 10 times those of Russia.
“Also, despite the scale of this war – the biggest in Europe since World War Two – the number of civilian deaths is relatively low, and that’s because Russia is trying to minimize these casualties,” he says.
Minnis says that another factor that makes advances slow-going is that the NATO-backed regime uses tactics of boobytrapping buildings with civilians inside them. He says that when Russian forces take a village or town, the houses are often rigged with explosives, with families inside. This makes for painstaking work by sappers to defuse boobytraps.
And, of course, the massive deployment of drones is a big problem for infantry. The European Union and Britain have flooded Ukraine with drones that create “death zones.”
“The use of drone walls is in place of dwindling Ukrainian conscripts. These death zones make our ground progress difficult.”
However, Minnis said NATO’s deployment in Ukraine is a double-edged sword. The 27-nation military bloc has certainly made a Russian victory more difficult to achieve. It has prolonged the proxy war with millions of Ukrainian casualties.
But this war of attrition is grinding down the NATO arsenal with colossal impact. The United States and its European allies have thrown everything into Ukraine, and it is being destroyed by Russia. It’s a giant demolition site. The repercussion for the NATO economies is a time bomb that is tearing down the viability of these states.
Ukraine is a quagmire for NATO, not Russia. The battlefield does not have to move westwards; the Western powers are being sucked under.
In World War Two, the Soviet Red Army pushed all the way to Berlin. In today’s war, the new Berlin is in Ukraine, where Russia’s enemies are being ground down, hollowed out, and buried.
Aiden Minnis adds: “Russian leader Vladimir Putin is fighting this war very humanely; dare I say such a thing is possible in a war. But it’s a two-fold strategy: it’s to limit civilian casualties, but also a war of attrition, because what’s happening in real time is the demilitarisation of Ukraine, which won’t be able to wage a war again once this war is won by Russia, and also the demilitarisation and deindustrialization of NATO countries.”
Ukrainian drones hit Russia’s largest data center on Wednesday. This was Ukraine’s fourth strike on Russian data centers in the past week and confirmation of a new reality of war: data centers are valuable enemy assets and they will be targeted.
In 2006, British economist Clive Humby declared “data is the new oil,” and big tech adopted the metaphor. Twenty years later, a dark side of the truism has been revealed. If the places where oil is refined are valuable targets in a war then so, too, are the places where data is refined. We’ve seen this not just in the Russia-Ukraine war, but also with Iran hitting Amazon Web Services data centers in Dubai in retaliation for America’s strikes on the country
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed strikes on Russian data centers and oil refineries in a post on X and called them a “symmetrical response” to Russian aggression. Here we have oil and data together again, not as a metaphor in an economics lecture, but in the pronouncement of a world leader defending his country. conducting a war.
Three of Ukraine’s strikes hit data centers that belonged to Yandex, Russia’s Google-equivalent, and damaged the company’s supercomputers that housed some of its AI models. The latest attack hit a data center operated by Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank. It’s too early to tell what the effects of the strike on the Sberbank data center will be, but the three strikes on Yandex have disrupted internet and communications across Russia.
An online rumor said that the strikes on Yandex had the effect of taking down Russian bot farms, but this wasn’t true. The effects of the strikes on the civilian population were much more severe. Yandex is ubiquitous in Russia — it has its own app store, payment services, dating services, taxi and bus apps, and email services. The company operates six data centers in Russia and the strikes knocked two of them offline completely. People in Russia have lost access to their email, some of their data is seemingly gone, and taxi and bus apps only work intermittently.
ChrisO_wiki, an anonymous researcher who translates Russian social media posts for the western web, chronicled how the Yandex outages are hitting everyday Russians. “A taxi driver from Yekaterinburg says that after the service disruptions, he can no longer view his order history, and the status of trips is updated with a delay,” ChrisO_wiki said in a post on X and Bluesky.
“The loss of Yandex’s cloud services is also having severe impacts on Russian commercial logistics. Those who work with electronic document management are unable to register incoming goods, severely affecting manufacturers and distributors,” they said in another post.
These attacks are just the latest in a long line of strikes on data centers this year. Russia has been targeting Ukrainian data centers for months and Iran hit AWS data centers in Dubai in March, knocking out digital infrastructure in the Middle East.
Klaudia Klonowska, a researcher who studies the effects of emerging technologies on international law, told 404 Media that attacks on data centers are so new that international law around them is still developing. “You have very limited situations in which they would actually qualify as lawful targets when they’re used by the military, and even then, it’s very difficult for the attackers to know whether that’s happening or not,” Klonowska said.
If the data centers are purely processing military data, then they could be legitimate targets, according to Klonowska. But many, if not most, data centers are dual-use, meaning they house both civilian and military data. In many cases, disrupting daily life seems to be part of the point.
When Russia struck data centers in Ukraine in September, state-backed news agencies claimed it hosted data for Palantir that supported Ukrainian intelligence efforts and was a lawful target. Ukraine denied the allegation. “So you see how difficult, because of the nature of these centers, it’s really to pinpoint what is happening with them and who is using them and for what means,” Klonowska said. “Sometimes [Ukraine] mentions that these data centers contribute to Moscow’s revenues that then fuel the war machine. But that’s not enough to make them lawful targets. Retaliation is not enough under law.”
Klonowska noted that it is civilians who suffer most, not the military, when data centers go offline. “There are questions about proportionality given how widespread the attacks are,” she said. “A lack of internet access for very prolonged periods affects everything. It’s all of the civilian services that are being disrupted, which you can imagine also includes things like hospitals, traffic, judicial services, etc. etc.” It’s worth noting that Russia has repeatedly attacked civilian targets in Ukraine, including apartment buildings, public transportation, and hospitals.
According to Klonowska, international and humanitarian law needs to catch up with the issue and that scholars like herself are only just starting to understand the ramifications. “I think there’s also another bigger question behind all of this,” she said. “Why have we gotten to the point where we have permitted militaries of various states to use civilian commercial data centers for their military purposes? By potentially using them and relying on them, they have opened them up to the possibility of becoming military targets.”
Disentangling civilian and military data probably won’t take data centers off the target list, but it will make international law more clear on which buildings are legitimate targets. It may also change how data centers processing military data are built.
“France has recently announced that they have unveiled their underground data center on the outskirts of Paris that will be exclusively for military use,” Klonowska said. “Just as we expect them not to use schools or hospitals or other civilian residential areas to host weapons or other military equipment, we would, I think, increasingly need to mention this in the case of data centers.”
The idea that a data center might be a military target is not lost on the American communities facing construction of them in their backyards. America’s nuclear weapons scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratories (LANL) have partnered with the University of Michigan in an attempt to build a data center in Ypsilanti Township, Michigan. The people and government of the Township aren’t thrilled about it for a number of reasons and the city attorney has said that the data center would be a “high value target” in wars of the future. Los Alamos pushed back on this in a letter to the community in September, around the same time Russia was striking data centers in Ukraine. LANL accused the township attorney of creating “that terminology without basis. It should not be interpreted as evidence of a known, specific, or imminent threat to the facility or the surrounding community,” the letter said.
“Like other major research facilities, the center would employ appropriate security measures, including controlled access, cameras, and on-site security personnel,” it said. “Los Alamos and U-M would coordinate with local, state, and federal partners on matters related to safety and security.”
It’s easy to see where the people of Ypsilanti Township are coming from. When Ukraine struck three Yandex data centers in Russia over the weekend, its drones slipped past Russia’s air defenses. The idea that a town next to a data center, especially one with ties to America’s nuclear weapons programs, could sustain damage if the data center was ever attacked isn’t unfounded. The data centers smoldering in the world’s war zones proved that the township’s fears aren’t theoretical..
I have been following NATO’s proxy war in Ukraine for several years, and so what is happening now is not a surprise to me. Indeed, it is something that I have been expecting for some time.
First, let’s review what it is that is happening: Russia is bombarding Kiev (Kyiv) on a daily and nightly basis. This is new. Before, Russia’s drones and missiles would arrive in waves, with intermittent periods lasting days or weeks. Now it’s minutes.
Russia is targeting energy infrastructure in a way that they have avoided doing before. They are attacking with an aim to essentially make Kiev uninhabitable this winter, as Ukraine will no longer have the ability to generate and distribute power to its people.
Russia is also destroying Ukraine’s logistics infrastructure: warehouses have been destroyed. The Ukrainian government has said that they have lost 90% of their food logistics.
The battlefields are also looking much more dire for Ukraine. Russia is finally advancing, and the last of the wide belt of so-called “fortress cities” in Donetsk, Slovyansk and Kramotorsk, look set to fall in the coming weeks. After those two cities fall, there is virtually nothing left to stand between the Russians and the Dnieper River, the gateway to Kiev.
This looming disaster was described by pro-Ukraine foreign policy and security analyst Jimmy Rushton, a British journalist for the Kyiv Independent based in Kiev, who explained the danger in September 2025:
“Ukraine has the Donbas line, a network of fortifications stretching across Donetsk…If Ukraine were to abandon these, it would fall back to almost nothing…The ground behind is flat and open, without prepared defenses…”
Indeed, analysts seem to agree that giving up the Donbas defences would amount to “military suicide” for Ukraine.
Nonetheless, after years of “grinding” advances, often described as “glacial” by the Western media, Russia is — slowly but surely — about to claim its prize.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… To Western analysts, it was almost as if Putin didn’t even want to conquer Ukraine.
Well, the shocking truth is that he didn’t. Putin NEVER wanted to “conquer Ukraine”. He only wanted the West to take him seriously when he said “nyet” to Ukraine joining NATO, insisting that Ukraine must stay true to its 1991 Constitution and always remain neutral.
The West’s complete failure to understand what Von Clausewitz called the “nature” of the conflict has rendered them blind to what is actually going on, and will leave them shattered and shocked when this conflict reaches its inevitable conclusion.
“Brotherly peoples”
The reason the Russians have been taking the easy approach to Ukraine lies in the peculiarly Russian concept of literal kinship between slavic nations.
This concept was explained in July 2021, when Vladimir Putin published an essay entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”. In it, he explained how Russians and Ukrainians — as well as Belorussians — were “brotherly peoples” — a triune of nations, all stemming from the same root in Kievan Rus.
To Putin, the trinity of the three nations was one based partly or even mostly on a shared religious faith, namely the Russian Orthodox Church:
“Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus, which was the largest state in Europe. Slavic and other tribes across the vast territory…were bound together by one language, economic ties…and — after the baptism of Rus — the Orthodox faith. The spiritual choice made by St. Vladimir, who was both Prince of Novgorod and Grand Prince of Kiev, still largely determines our affinity today.”
Putin also laments the fact that this “affinity” between Russia and Ukraine has been undermined:……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Millions of Russians live in Eastern Ukraine
………. in Ukraine, which accounted for nearly HALF of that dispossessed Russian population (12 million). In fact, 83% of the pre-2014 population of Donbas — including most of the Eastern and Southern Oblasts — were ethnic Russians or spoke Russian. Overall, almost half of Ukrainians spoke Russian. It is also well-known, for example, that Volodymyr Zelensky was a native Russian speaker, who did not learn Ukrainian until he was elected President.
………………………………………………….., it should be noted that fully one third (1 in 3) of all Russians have relatives in Ukraine. Moreover, prior to the 2014 coup that saw a change in Ukraine’s government, 74% of Russians had a favourable attitude towards Ukraine — it seems that Putin was not the only one who saw them as “brotherly people”.
In fact, of the Russians living in Eastern Ukraine— where the fighting is taking place — 75% or more speak Russian, with high percentages using Russian as their “unique mother tongue”.
A true civil war
From these data points, we can conclude that what is unfolding in the Eastern Ukrainian oblasts is a de factocivil war. Like the American Civil War, it is a case where both sides speak the same language, share a common heritage, with many even sharing familial connections. In other words, it is virtually “brother against brother” (a phrase often used to describe the American Civil War)……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Russians have soured on their Ukrainian “brothers”
When the Maidan Coup happened in 2014, things started to change not just in Ukraine, but also in Russia. When the Russian public began to be bombarded by stories and videos and photos of ethnic Russians slaughtered by the Nazi battalions of Western Ukraine, they were outraged. Right wing Ukrainian nationalist groups like the Azov Battalion, Aidar Battalion, Right Sector, and others murdered thousands of innocent citizens of the Donbas region, whose only “crimes” were that they were ethnically Russian and belonged to the Orthodox Russian Church.
But for these Nazis, those Russian speaking Ukrainians were Untermenschen (subhuman). In fact, Yatsenyuk, the Prime Minister who was hand-picked by the U.S. to lead the government after the coup literally called them that in a declaration.
Nonetheless, on the eve of Putin’s incursion into Ukraine to save the beleaguered Russians in the Donbas, almost half of Russians still had a favourable view of Ukraine.
As of 2026, however, only 16% of Russians still feel that way towards their “slavic brothers”.
The Starobelsk drone strike changed everything
On 22 May, 2026, the Ukrainians — with of course help from the CIA — carried out a drone strike on the academic building and dormitory of the Starobelsk Professional College of the Pedagogical University in Starobelsk, Russia, a place for young women (mostly) to study to become teachers.
The strike was carried out in 3 waves, reminiscent of the Mehab school “double tap” strike the U.S. carried out in Iran. Six young women were killed and 40 injured. The Russian public were outraged. How could a “brotherly people” do this?
The Starobelsk terror attack marked a turning point in public opinion — as well as a corresponding change in Putin’s prosecution of the conflict with Ukraine.
“The gloves are off”
Observers of the conflict in Ukraine have all noticed a marked escalation in Russian attacks over the summer. The drone and missile bombardments, which had been intermittent, are now a daily occurrence. Whereas the attacks had previously come only at night, allowing work and commerce to carry on normally during the day, the attacks are now coming around the clock.
Sensitive command and control units housing NATO advisors and Western personnel, which had mostly been spared in the early years of the conflict, are now being obliterated; bridges, railways and locomotives are also finally on the target list.Logistics centres, warehouses and even data centres are being hit.
Most critically, energy infrastructure, electric and gas systems, which Russia had attacked earlier but never completely destroyed before, is now being completely demolished, leaving cities like Kiev unable to provide heating to its citizens over the coming winter. In previous years, Russia had always allowed Ukraine to keep some of its vital energy systems during the winter — now, Russia is content to let the Ukrainians, their “fraternal people”, freeze in the dark of winter.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Four years of such ferocious attrition has resulted in the almost complete destruction of Ukraine’s ability to fight. While Kiev refuses to provide casualty figures, independent analysts estimate that Ukraine has suffered up to 3 MILLION casualties.
Military Watch Magazine, based in South Korea, explained in 2025 that Ukraine had already lost 1.7 million troops, and that the rate of losses was accelerating:
“The information indicates that 118,500 personnel were killed or went missing in 2022, 405,400 in 2023, 595,000 in 2024 and 621,000 so far in 2025, which corroborates with a growing body of evidence which has emerged over more than three years that attrition rates have increased tremendously and unsustainably.”…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
What happens next — and when?
Informed observers of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are now debating as to what will trigger the ultimate collapse of the Nazi regime in Kiev. Will it be the devastating air war that is destroying Kiev’s infrastructure and its ability to sustain human life? Or will it be the ultimate destruction of Ukraine’s armed forces, the death of the infamous “last Ukrainian” — the point to which Ukraine’s Western sponsors have vowed to sponsor Kiev’s fight.
Either way, the endgame in Ukraine is already upon us. The front is collapsing, the troops demoralised, under-supplied, under-fed, and under constant pressure all along the 1200-kilometre front, while thousands have been deserting or surrendering. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have simply deserted. Ukraine’s cities are under 24-hour bombardment, the country is losing its ability to generate power and even to feed its population: the shelves in the shops are empty.
I have wanted to write an article for sometime about the differing fates of Russia and Ukraine since the onset of the conflict in 2014. The headline is that Ukraine has never made up the difference in increased trade with Europe having cut its trade with Russia to the bone since 2014. This has inadvertently meant that Europe has had to inject significant sums of capital into Ukraine just to prevent its currency from collapsing as the war has gone on. Russia has diversified its trade away from Europe such that its export model is as strong today as it was in 2014, giving it the liquidity it needs to underwrite the war effort.
Key finding:
Ukraine exported 24% less and imported 46% more in 2025 than in 2014. The war has driven up imports while exports never recovered from the signing of the DCFTA and have been hampered by the war effort.
The yawning trade deficit Ukraine has built since the war started has placed greater strain on European sponsors to provide the capital Ukraine needs to prevent its currency collapsing, in addition to providing funding to meet its fiscal requirements.
This funding challenge for Europe will persist after the war ends until Ukraine can become self-sufficient in boosting exports and/or attracting sufficient foreign investment to offset its trade deficits.
Russia’s export strength and consistent surpluses have been unaffected by war. After the Ukraine crisis started, Russia started to diversify its major energy exports away from Europe, allowing it to weather the progressive reduction of exports to Europe. Indeed, Russia gained a huge windfall in 2022 from surging energy prices. There is no evidence that sanctions have impacted Russia’s export model in a significant way.
Russia has already started to reaccumulate FX reserves after the oil price collapse of late 2014, until before the war started. Following the immobilisation of $300bn in Russian FX reserves, Russia started to accumulate reserves in monetary gold, to sanction-proof future earnings. Russia now has liquid reserves of over $420bn meaning the immobilisation of its foreign currency reserves is no longer an economically limiting factor.
Detailed analysis
Russia’s export model in which it runs consistently large trade surpluses has ensured it can generate the reserves of foreign currency and gold which have undoubtedly helped to bankroll the war in Ukraine. Ukraine’s trade deficit has yawned since the war started, requiring continual injections of European capital to prevent its currency from collapsing.
This helps to explain by Russia can sustain the war for longer; it doesn’t need to take on significant new debt, its debt remaining low at 20%. Ukraine can only fund the war and keep its national accounts in balance with European money that cannot be guaranteed long-term and which, in any case, has increased Ukrainian debt by an average of 20% of GDP each year since the war started. This is not sustainable.
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement of 2014 has disadvantaged Ukraine because it forced a choice away from trading with Russia.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
by encouraging Ukraine to trade with Europe and not with Russia, Europe has imposed a deadweight economic loss on Ukraine which took a sovereign decision to forgo a previously profitable trade relationship, to pursue a political goal of EU integration……………………………………………………………………………..
Dragged into a persistent and growth trade deficit by war, Ukraine needs continued injections of foreign funds to prevent its currency collapsing.…………………………………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………… While Russia would undoubtedly like to see the return of its immobilised assets after the war ends (big question mark) it has nevertheless built up a significant financial buffer to the tune of over $420bn in reserve assets in addition to those assets that remain frozen.
This deep well of reserves undoubtedly helps to underwrite Russia’s war effort without the need for significant borrowing. Russia’s debt today sits at around 20% of GDP.
Under these conditions, there is a growing admission within the US and international media that NATO and Russia are entering a “world war.” In one of the foremost examples, the Financial Times published Saturday a column titled, “Are we sleepwalking into World War III?”
The old imperialist powers retain a military superiority they no longer possess economically.
Ukraine attacked Russia with more than 1,000 drones overnight Saturday, in the largest bombardment of St. Petersburg since the Second World War. The attack, in which Russia’s Defense Ministry counted 1,015 drones across 15 regions, Crimea and the Black Sea, was one of the heaviest bombardments of Russian territory since the war began.
These strikes are directly funded by the NATO powers, which have provided Ukraine with over $100 billion in weapons, and are carried out on the basis of targeting data provided directly by their militaries.
The latest attack is a response by the NATO powers to the warning Russia gave European governments on September 30, that threats to Russia’s territorial integrity would be met with “the entire arsenal of forces and capabilities at its disposal, including nuclear weapons.”
Faced with this blunt warning that their actions risk triggering a nuclear war, the NATO powers are escalating. On October 12, General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s top commander in Europe, threatened to “break” the enemy’s “warfighting system,” including “anything and everything that supports, sustains, or controls that force.”
Under these conditions, there is a growing admission within the US and international media that NATO and Russia are entering a “world war.” In one of the foremost examples, the Financial Times published Saturday a column titled, “Are we sleepwalking into World War III?” by its chief foreign affairs commentator, Gideon Rachman. The title of his essay is taken from a 2012 book by Australian historian Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, which provided an apologetic explanation for the policies of German and European imperialism.
According to Clark, the war was the unforeseen outcome of mistaken judgments. The governments of the time and their leaders were not guilty of planning and starting war to achieve geopolitical and economic objectives. This benign interpretation of the war was especially welcomed by the German government and media, which praised Clark’s work and turned him into an intellectual celebrity.
Building upon Clark’s metaphor, Rachman depicts the imperialist powers as similarly clueless about the consequences of their actions. He writes, “Regions and countries that have for decades taken peace for granted—western Europe, east Asia, the Gulf states—now have to wrestle with the prospect, or the reality, of war.” It has become “commonplace,” he notes, “for world leaders to speculate publicly about the outbreak of a third world war.”
Rachman, citing a quote attributed to Leon Trotsky, declares, “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”
But the US and European leaders are not political somnambulists who are “sleepwalking” into World War III. They have been marching toward it with eyes open since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The first President Bush proclaimed a “new world order” on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War. That war was followed by the intervention in Somalia, the bombing of Bosnia and the 1999 war against Serbia, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the destruction of Libya, the proxy war in Syria and the US-backed Saudi war in Yemen.
Since 2022, these wars have merged into a single global conflagration. It includes the US-NATO war against Russia in Ukraine; the Israeli genocide in Gaza, armed and defended by Washington; the bombing of Iran in June 2025; and the war against Iran launched on February 28 of this year.
The objective is the redivision of the world among the old imperialist powers. This violent and ongoing project includes the breakup of the existing Russian state, which will open up the vast Eurasian landmass to unfettered capitalist exploitation. For the oligarchs of finance capital, the loss of a few hundred million lives would be a small price to pay for this rich prize.
In Rachman’s telling, however, the danger of world war proceeds entirely from the actions of Russia and China. In this narrative, the threat of “world war” began with the decision Putin made in February 2022, with no antecedent history. Rachman asserts that an inflection point was reached when “Putin launched his ‘special military operation.’ In that time, the global political atmosphere has been transformed.”
The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not come out of nowhere. It was a reactionary and desperate response by the Russian capitalist oligarchy to years of provocations by NATO. NATO’s own leadership has said as much. In an interview published by the Washington Post in May 2023, then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared that the war “didn’t start in 2022. The war started in 2014.”
Stoltenberg continued, “And since then, NATO has implemented the biggest reinforcement of our collective defense since the end of the Cold War … Until 2014, NATO allies were reducing defense budgets. Since 2014, all allies across Europe and Canada have significantly increased their defense spending … this is a huge transformation of NATO that started in 2014.”
The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not come out of nowhere. It was a reactionary and desperate response by the Russian capitalist oligarchy to years of provocations by NATO. NATO’s own leadership has said as much. In an interview published by the Washington Post in May 2023, then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared that the war “didn’t start in 2022. The war started in 2014.”
Stoltenberg continued, “And since then, NATO has implemented the biggest reinforcement of our collective defense since the end of the Cold War … Until 2014, NATO allies were reducing defense budgets. Since 2014, all allies across Europe and Canada have significantly increased their defense spending … this is a huge transformation of NATO that started in 2014.”
But the Maidan coup was itself an outcome of decades of imperialist policy that had pushed the boundaries of the NATO alliance to Russia’s doorstep.
Rachman correctly centers the driving force of the eruption of global war in “a shift in the global balance of power.” He notes that, “In 1989, the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the G7 nations—the US, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Canada and Japan—accounted for around two-thirds of global economic output … By 2022, the G7 represented about 43 percent of global GDP.”
This shift, according to Rachman, is “encouraging revisionist powers to challenge the global dominance of the US and its allies.” China’s share of world output rose from under 2 percent in 1989 to about 17 percent in 2024, according to World Bank figures.
However, by 2022, Rachman notes, the G7 still accounted for “about half of global military spending.” The old imperialist powers retain a military superiority they no longer possess economically. It is they, not China, that have spent the past 35 years at war, seeking to reverse by force what they are losing in the world economy.
The most bizarre element of Rachman’s column is his effort to blame the reemergence of global war on the public’s opposition to it. He writes that “the growth of anti-war sentiment in the US” has “created an opening for revisionist powers,” that US President Donald Trump “is clearly attracted to the idea that the US should retreat from its security commitments to its allies” and that “the greatest risk of a third world war may lie in that very uncertainty.”
Beset by an all-pervasive capitalist crisis and the growth of working class opposition, the imperialist powers seek through war a way out of their problems. The global eruption of imperialist war is only intensifying the class struggle and the capitalist crisis. It is driving workers and youth into struggle around the world, from the United States to France—where students and workers filled the streets this week against a government that has billions for rearmament and nothing for social needs.
The working class and youth must reject and oppose the insane imperialist militarism that is inciting global conflict and threatening humanity with a nuclear conflagration.
If an increasingly vulnerable Kaliningrad holds strategic value for Russia and can only be defended by nuclear weapons, then perhaps Western leaders shouldn’t threaten it—and perhaps Western analysts should take more seriously Moscow’s repeated warnings that such threats could meet a nuclear response.
Russia experts shed light on the Kremlin’s calculations.
If the world blows up in a conflict over Kaliningrad—the diminutive Russian exclave sandwiched between Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Sea—at least there would be a silver lining for survivors to appreciate: It would be darkly humorous and ironic.
Kaliningrad—or Koenigsberg, as the formerly German city was called before its capture in 1945 by the Soviet Union—was the birthplace of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, whose most enduring contribution to political theory was a long essay on international relations, Toward Perpetual Peace. In it, Kant outlines some big-brained ideas that governments should implement to not only end active hostilities but create the political conditions for, well, perpetual peace.
Old Kant published that hopeful essay 231 years ago and would certainly be disturbed and disappointed by this week’s headlines. The most riveting came from the New York Post: “Moscow threatens nuclear response over tiny fortress wedged between US allies as clash fears grow.” (The Post really has a knack for this kind of thing, doesn’t it?)
The one from the Associated Press more aptly, if less dramatically, described the latest development. “Russia warns NATO of a possible nuclear response if Kaliningrad is cut off,” it blared.
So, what’s got the Russians so worked up? Top Russia experts told The American Conservative that Moscow assigns profound strategic significance to the exclave and perceives a Western threat against it.
“Kaliningrad gives Russia another warm water port on the Baltic Sea,” said Thomas Graham, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former White House expert under President George W. Bush. “It also holds major military assets to defend Russia’s interest in the region, including access routes to St. Petersburg.”
Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute noted an even more straightforward Russian interest than that. “Russia cares about this because it is internationally-recognized Russian national territory,” Lieven said. “Any attack on it or blockade is therefore legally an act of war against the Russian Federation, to which the Russian government would have to respond or face deep humiliation.”
Those are important points with which few experts would quibble. But what really distinguishes Graham and Lieven is their ability to discern—from Russia’s point of view—a Western threat against Kaliningrad, and to take it seriously. Judging by the comments both men provided, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin didn’t issue the nuclear threats lightly.
“In some NATO countries there has been talk of blockading Kaliningrad, that is, isolating the region from the rest of Russia by land and sea,” Graham said. “Putin would see a blockade as an act of war against Russia. So he is making sure that Europe understands that he will defend Russian land with all necessary means, which could include nuclear weapons.”
Moscow had already been inclined, even before the latest tensions exploded between Russia and the West, to view Kaliningrad as exposed to NATO’s predations. “NATO expansion to Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, and Finland means that Kaliningrad is now surrounded by NATO countries both by land and sea,” Lieven noted.
Sadly, not all Western experts perform such acts of perspective taking. Consider a recent article in The Hill, which, in the view of this editor-cum-columnist at least, actually brought the week’s most disturbing headline: “Kaliningrad is just Putin’s red herring.”
The coauthors—Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet—write that the Kremlin is engaged in “nuclear bluffing” designed to intimidate the West and distract from its own military failures in Ukraine. Early in the piece, the only context they provide for Moscow’s warnings is a new British television miniseries called The Wargame, in which the UK launches retaliatory strikes on Kaliningrad after a Russian attack.
A casual reader of their article could be left with the impression that this TV show was the main thing, perhaps the only thing, motivating Putin’s threatening rhetoric. But a careful reader would learn otherwise, for the authors inadvertently illuminate the kinds of Western behavior that prompted Putin’s warnings.
“Kaliningrad is a hollowed-out shell of what it was before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” they write. “As Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski pointed out earlier this month, ‘There are hardly any [Russian] troops [in the Kaliningrad exclave].’”
But that’s not all that Sikorski said. Toth and Sweet link to an article in Defense News, the first sentence of which is this:
NATO allies could hold drills in proximity of Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave in an attempt to push Moscow to weaken its military posture in Ukraine and withdraw some of its troops there, said Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister
Clearly, Sikorski went far beyond merely commenting on Russia’s force posture in the region. The article emphasizes that he didn’t recommend “offensive” actions against Kaliningrad, but you could hardly blame Putin for failing to appreciate the distinction. Indeed, in the relevant quotes, Sikorski recommends that NATO “aggressively” exercise around Kaliningrad and start treating the exclave as a front in the confrontation between Russia and the West.
Toth and Sweet’s article continues: “Although Kaliningrad is still the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the Baltic Sea itself has effectively become a NATO-controlled lake, after the accession of Sweden and Finland as the newest members of NATO.” Kaliningrad, they write, “is highly vulnerable,” and these days it merely hosts nuclear missiles, its conventional forces having been deployed to Ukraine.
Thus, “Moscow’s nuclear Armageddon bluffing is simply the latest attempt by Putin and his Kremlin cronies to paper over this problem.”
Here the premises lead to the conclusion only in the sense that they crash violently into it. If an increasingly vulnerable Kaliningrad holds strategic value for Russia and can only be defended by nuclear weapons, then perhaps Western leaders shouldn’t threaten it—and perhaps Western analysts should take more seriously Moscow’s repeated warnings that such threats could meet a nuclear response.
And those analysts should understand that the Russian political establishment in general—not just Putin—perceives a Western threat against Kaliningrad that, if acted upon, could precipitate a devastating Russia–NATO conflict. Referring to Sikorski’s apparent suggestion that NATO might isolate the exclave, forcing its surrender, Lieven said, “If this did happen, every Russian with whom I have spoken has said that Russia would have credibly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, followed by their actual use if NATO failed to back down.”
Tensions between Russia and the West are worse than they’ve been since the Cold War, and mutual understanding perhaps worse than even then. In our age, Kant’s dreams of perpetual peace may seem naive if not delusional, but surely our leaders have enough wisdom not to let inexcusable miscalculations over his homeland on the Baltic lead to nuclear war. Right?
IPPNW is one of very few professional associations that has not abandoned dialogue with Russian colleagues. Since the summer of 2021, a new, energized cohort of Russian and American medical students and young doctors has hosted informal monthly Zoom calls to build relationships and trust.
This month marks the 40th anniversary of the 1986 Reykjavík Summit, the historic meeting where Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev came astonishingly close to completely abolishing the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. While the meeting concluded without an official accord due to US insistence on pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”), it nevertheless laid the critical diplomatic foundation for future landmark nuclear disarmament treaties. It also proved that even bitter adversaries can sit at the negotiating table to tackle head-on the greatest immediate threat to human survival.
Tragically, these hard-fought gains have been lost to a steady breakdown in international diplomacy, a dangerous arms race in nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence, and a resort to threats and war to prosecute disputes. This has made the risk of catastrophic miscalculation higher than at any point since the Cold War.
As we did throughout the 1980s, IPPNW is bridging geopolitical divides by engaging our network of physicians and health partners around the world on the growing threat of nuclear war—especially with colleagues in Russia and China—not as an abstract political calculation, but as the final, untreatable global health epidemic.
Monthly Russian-American Exchanges
IPPNW is one of very few professional associations that has not abandoned dialogue with Russian colleagues. Since the summer of 2021, a new, energized cohort of Russian and American medical students and young doctors has hosted informal monthly Zoom calls to build relationships and trust.
Participants in these discussions have gone on to publish relevant articles in medical literature, attended key nuclear disarmament meetings at the UN, and become active in local and national campaigns opposing the threat of nuclear war.
Russian Nonproliferation Conference
At the invitation of the Russian Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), IPPNW’s Chuck Johnson traveled to Moscow to participate in high-level discussions on nuclear weapons. CENESS is a think-tank that fosters dialogue and cooperation on nuclear policy, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy issues. Chuck previously served as the founding director of the IPPNW Geneva Liaison Office before transitioning to his role as policy director.
The 2026 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference took place on March 12–14, 2026, bringing together 289 experts—including diplomats, researchers, academics, and advocates—from 49 countries. Roughly half of the participants were Russian. The event also drew high-level officials from key UN agencies and international organizations, such as Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu, and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi.
During closed-door sessions, participants tackled the major global security challenges in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. A special “New Generation Experts Segment” also gathered approximately 40 young professionals from 20 countries to explore the associated risks and opportunities.The effort was the brainchild of Dr. Joe Hodgkin, an attending hospitalist at Massachusetts General Hospital, and Dr. Olga Trushina, a cardiologist at the Russian Cardiology Research and Production Complex (which was founded by her grandfather, IPPNW co-founder Eugene Chazov). Dr. Hodgkin serves on the Board of Directors of IPPNW’s US affiliate, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and Dr. Trushina is a Co-President of IPPNW. Together, they have renewed and re-imagined IPPNW’s founding mission using modern technologies that are integral to their social and professional lives.
This marked the first time IPPNW was invited to this flagship biennial event. The conference provided a rare, high-value opportunity for IPPNW to engage directly with top Russian and international officials and experts—both during the formal panels and in private meetings on the margins.
Renewed Outreach to China
Chuck Johnson has also been at the leading edge of IPPNW’s efforts to strengthen cooperation and dialogue with health professionals, academics, and professional associations in China.
His consistent outreach to Chinese colleagues during international health partner and UN disarmament meetings in Geneva led to an invitation to lecture at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in the fall of 2025.
While in Beijing, he also met with members of the Chinese Medical Association at their headquarters, securing a commitment from them to invite IPPNW doctors to present to medical professionals in China in the coming year. As a result, an IPPNW delegation attending the annual meeting of the Chinese Medical Association’s Medical Ethics Branch in Hefei, the capital of Anhui province, in July 2026. Chuck was joined by Dr. Joe Hodgkin (PSR-USA) and Dr. Tilman Ruff (MAPW-IPPNW Australia).
This visit was our most significant engagement with China since the 2004 IPPNW World Congress in Beijing. The delegation delivered three plenary lectures at the national medical conference, highlighting the critical role of medical and public health professionals in addressing the growing threat of nuclear war.
Following the conference, the team held multiple high-level meetings with dozens of senior academics, health officials, and organizational leaders in both Hefei and Beijing. These discussions were aided significantly by Dr. Hodgkin’s deep cultural knowledge and fluency in Mandarin, as well as Dr. Ruff’s extensive history and leadership within IPPNW.
The delegation discussed several concrete follow-on activities, including planning additional meetings and co-authoring joint publications in prominent Chinese health and science journals focused on the prevention of nuclear war.
By reviving these critical channels of communication, IPPNW ensures that even in times of intense global friction, the medical community remains a vital bridge toward peace. The US, Russia, and China would do well to revive the “spirit of Reykjavík”, returning to the negotiating table to complete what Reagan and Gorbachev came so close to achieving—saving humankind from the growing threat of nuclear war.
I bumped into Dmitri Trenin for the first time in eight years at the Valdai Discussion Club in Moscow. He was sat behind me during a session and we renewed our acquaintances. When I was based at the British Embassy in Moscow, Dmitri was Director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. He was one of the most valued interlocutors for the Embassy, and seen as a person who always offered a balanced Russian perspective on world events. He is now the President of the Russian International Affairs Council, and I was pleased that he agreed to talk to me on my Peacemonger channel.
Trenin offered a clear-eyed view from Moscow of why the Ukraine war has lasted so long and why a diplomatic settlement remains so difficult. He framed the conflict as existential for Russia. From the Kremlin’s perspective, this is not a limited dispute with Ukraine but a proxy war waged by the West, which has invested hundreds of billions of dollars into the war effort.
Russia, he said, cannot afford to end the fighting without achieving the core objectives it set out with: securing the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, upholding its constitutional obligations after the 2022 referenda in those oblasts, and establishing a security arrangement that prevents Ukraine from becoming a permanent platform for pressure against Russia.
Trenin stressed that Russia does not aim to conquer the whole of Ukraine or invade Europe. Indeed, in an article published early in the war he made the case for Russia not seeking to conquer all of Ukraine and so tie itself into a costly insurgency in the west, while permanently damaging prospects for normalisation with Europe.
He pointed to the years before 2014, when Moscow largely accepted a sovereign Ukraine within its Soviet-era borders, and to the early 2022 talks in which Russia was prepared to accept Ukrainian neutrality and discuss the status of the Donbas, along the lines earlier set out in the Minsk Agreements.
In his telling, Russia’s position hardened in response to Western and Ukrainian actions, not because of a pre-existing plan to absorb more territory in Ukraine.
Security concerns, particularly over NATO expansion and the treatment of Russian speakers and Russian culture in Ukraine, remain central to Putin’s calculus.
The interview also highlighted the very different stakes for the other parties. For the Biden administration the war was cast in ideological terms—democracy versus authoritarianism. For Donald Trump, Trenin argued, it is one piece of a broader effort to rebalance U.S. power and reduce commitments to allies. For Europe, however, the conflict has become existential in a different way.
Trenin said European elites are using the image of a Russian threat to hold the European Union together, justify remilitarization, and brand political opponents as pro-Russian. He described talk of an imminent Russian invasion of Europe as hollow propaganda that serves domestic political purposes more than it reflects actual Russian intentions.
On the question of NATO, Trenin returned to the proposals Russia made in late 2021: permanent Ukrainian neutrality, written into the Ukrainian constitution and international agreements, with no NATO bases, exercises, or military cooperation. He also noted Russia’s earlier call for NATO military infrastructure to be pulled back to 1997 lines.
Any lasting European security arrangement, he suggested, would eventually require some form of military-technical equilibrium and mutual assurances, but that discussion remains secondary to the outcome of the current war.
Looking further ahead, Trenin was cautious but not wholly pessimistic about relations with individual European countries. He said the ball is largely in Europe’s court. If political changes in Germany, France, Britain, and elsewhere weaken the current supranational approach and restore a greater role for national interests, a basic transactional or “neighborly” relationship could become possible.
He does not expect a return to the Greater Europe ideas of the 1990s and 2000s; too much has changed. But he argued that nationalism and the interests of individual states will eventually reassert themselves across Europe, as they have elsewhere in the world.
The conversation reinforced an assessment I’ve held for some time that the war in Ukraine will ultimately be decided by the inescapable mathematics of attrition and whether Europe’s political direction shifts back towards the sovereignty of its members.
Trenin’s account makes plain why Russia will not walk away from the war in Ukraine and why it expects the confrontation with Europe to outlast the fighting itself. As Trenin said to me when we met in Moscow, ‘the relationship with Europe is over’. It was clear during the conversation that that split was as regrettable to him, as it is to me.
A day after Zelensky accused the US of cutting “intelligence support” and not providing early warning against Russia’s ballistic missile strikes on Kiev, pandemonium has ensued in Ukraine.
Now the country’s leadership has accused the US of cutting its Starlink support as well.
It all began with a post by prominent Ukrainian figure Serhii Sternenko who detailed how Starlink terminals in Ukraine were throttled when they passed a certain speed restriction:
As can be seen (on original), he accuses Elon Musk’s SpaceX of meddling, which began a firestorm of hate directed toward Musk from the Ukrainian-aligned side of social media.
Musk immediately responded with a clarification: the military version of Starlink is infact operated by the US DOD under the name Starshield and is not controlled by Musk or SpaceX. You can see him responding directly to the star ex-Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov himself—note that Fedorov claims connectivity was already being restored at the time:
Musk was forced to divest himself of this arm of his company early in the war in order to continue presenting a “neutral” face for his enterprise and not have it messily linked to offensive military actions which he likely knew would be pushed into very ethically “gray” areas of striking Russian civilian and dual-use infrastructure.
Despite all that however, we must admit the timing is a tad suspicious given that Musk had some very strong words about Zelensky only days ago:
First, it should be mentioned that despite Fedorov’s claims of restoration, there were other counter-claims that his announcement was premature and service was in fact still widely failing.
Several Ukrainian brigades had also posted of their issues. Here the 7th Airborne Assault Corps of the AFU: (on original)
The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Response Corps of the Air Assault Forces reports that Starlink disruptions are occurring in the Hulyaipole/Orikhiv direction, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, this morning.
The so-called Starshield package, which conducts data transferring for drone flights, has received limitations on speeds of 110-120+ km/h, where the connection can be lost for 10-20 seconds making it difficult to control the drones. Additionally, the launch of high-speed mid-range drones has become almost impossible.
Already, since this morning, some missions of the 7th Corps have had to be cancelled due to these Starlink restrictions and communications problems.
Ukraine’s most authoritative figure on these topics, Serhiy Flash, also confirmed that Starlink restrictions had come into force:
On his TG channel he went into further detail:
Everyone is writing about how the “Starlink” restrictions have impacted long-range missions and frontline logistics, but there’s another major problem for us.
“Starlink” is being used in the most effective current solution (interceptors) for protecting our airspace from jet-powered “Shahed” drones.
In fact, with their actions, our partners are depriving us of one of the few chances we have to defend the country from these jet-powered “Shaheds.”
He points out an important and under-appreciated part of the saga: that Starlink is used not just offensively by Ukrainian long-range drones but also defensively in interceptors that target Russia’s own strike assets which have been hitting Kiev. As such, Russia’s recent crippling strikes on Kiev’s facilities now stand to become even worse if these disruptions continue.
In light of the above, today WaPo dropped the bombshell that the US has in fact been threatening key Ukrainian personnel with an intelligence cut-off should Zelensky continue to hit Russian oil sites………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
the US has been juggling its finite space resources between the various theaters of conflict it has provoked and is trying to simultaneously manage………………………………………………
No matter what really happened with the early warning and Starlink fiasco, the fact remains that the US appears to have sent Ukraine a final ultimatum that intelligence will be completely cut off if Ukraine continues to hit Russian energy, at least according to the earlier reports…………………………
In the meantime, Russia has been devastating Kiev, with another massive strike reportedly being planned for the coming days or sooner.
The fuel deal’s real significance lies in diplomacy: Trump and Putin found a way to work together without making Ukraine part of the bargainPublished 11 Oct, 2026 12:36 | Updated 11 Oct, 2026 13:40
On the evening of October 9, the presidents of the United States and Russia spoke by phone. The announcement that followed was straightforward: Russia would sell the US 1.8 million metric tons of diesel over the next three months, followed by a million tons a month, and the US would issue temporary licenses authorizing the shipments.
The news drew a furious, bordering on hysterical, response from Kiev and stunned silence from Europe.
Let’s look at why this deal matters, what it has to do with Ukraine, and what might come next.
The tug-of-war championship
Ever since US President Donald Trump returned to office, the central aim of Russian diplomacy has been to separate relations with the US from the Ukraine issue. The White House is open to the idea, too: The US needs Russia as a counterweight to China, and there are substantial economic opportunities. But as we explored in an earlier piece, until recently, neither side managed to pull it off.
Ukraine and its supporters in Europe and the US, meanwhile, have pursued the opposite goal: keeping US-Russia relations tied to the Ukraine conflict.
In February and March 2025, Trump relieved America of responsibility for Ukraine’s fate and handed the job of financing it squarely to Europe. The US retained just three commitments: the relatively modest military supply programs already approved under former President Joe Biden, intelligence sharing, and weapons sales for cash, with Ukraine waiting in line like any other customer.
This maneuver cemented a status quo that neither Europe and Ukraine on one side nor Russia on the other would allow to change, with their respective allies in the US also weighing in. Everyone tried to bring Trump over to their side on Ukraine. Nobody succeeded.
This is why the understandings reached in Anchorage went nowhere: Ukraine’s supporters torpedoed them. It is also why those supporters failed to use Trump to escalate the conflict. Russia prevented deliveries of Tomahawk missiles, the expansion of Starlink coverage over Russian territory, and so on.
Despite the apparent stalemate, Russian officials kept talking to Witkoff and Kushner. The aim was to maintain a channel to Trump and deny Ukraine’s supporters an opening to drag the US back into the war on their side or steer him back onto Biden’s course.
This is why Russian officials at every level distinguish between US and European actions, often explicitly contrasting the two.
A few numbers on oil
Russia is one of the world’s largest diesel exporters, supplying just under 40 million metric tons to the global market in 2025. On July 8, 2026, Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries prompted a temporary ban on diesel and gasoline exports.
Since then, Russia’s refining situation has improved considerably. Gasoline remains in short supply, but a domestic diesel surplus has emerged, and the export ban has begun to loosen in practice. According to Reuters, diesel deliveries to Central Asian countries were already up 19% in September.
A few numbers on oil
Russia is one of the world’s largest diesel exporters, supplying just under 40 million metric tons to the global market in 2025. On July 8, 2026, Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries prompted a temporary ban on diesel and gasoline exports.
Since then, Russia’s refining situation has improved considerably. Gasoline remains in short supply, but a domestic diesel surplus has emerged, and the export ban has begun to loosen in practice. According to Reuters, diesel deliveries to Central Asian countries were already up 19% in September.
The Krivoy Rog school of diplomacy
Back to geopolitics. Until yesterday, Russia had been unable to separate its relationship with the US from the Ukraine issue. Even the war with Iran failed to do the trick, despite keeping oil and petroleum product shipments from the Persian Gulf blocked for more than six months.
Help came from an unexpected quarter. Hoping to bring US diesel prices down at least a little before the congressional elections, Trump asked Zelensky to stop attacking Russian refineries.
Zelensky responded by demanding a sweeping energy truce. We’ll stop hitting refineries, he effectively said, if Russia stops attacking our energy infrastructure and blockading our ports. And you, Trump, have to supply us with missiles for our Patriot systems, and so on.
Getting nowhere with Zelensky, Trump struck a deal directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who offered to supply diesel in exchange for a suspension of sanctions, without any preconditions.
The transaction itself is not particularly consequential. Yes, it could cool speculative trading ahead of the elections and push prices down somewhat. But the 1.8 million metric tons due to arrive over three months will cover just three or four days of American consumption.
For Russia, the US is an ordinary customer in purely commercial terms. Moscow will make some money selling to America, but it could just as easily have sold these volumes elsewhere. Petroleum products are in short supply worldwide, while Russia has a diesel surplus.
Yet the deal gave both sides what they had been seeking since February 2025: a bilateral relationship detached from Ukraine. So far, that applies to just one specific issue, but getting started is the hard part. Zelensky tried to twist Trump’s arm, pushing him to make Putin stop bombing Kiev, and overplayed his hand. Now Kiev can be bombed relentlessly, and Trump has no reason to care. He got what he wanted.
This does not mean sanctions are finished or that the two powers are entering an era of warm friendship. Oil sanctions are probably here to stay, and as soon as global market conditions change, Washington will turn them back up to full blast. But the sanctions wall can now be taken apart brick by brick, restoring ties wherever both sides stand to gain: launching new energy projects in the Arctic, for example, jointly taking over the surviving Nord Stream 2 pipeline, or resolving the sale of Lukoil’s overseas assets. Ukraine no longer has anything to do with that process or any influence over it.
The art of the backroom deal
Cynics insist that the Trump administration is a complete mess, with the right hand oblivious to what the left is doing. The way this agreement came together suggests otherwise.
After the campaign of long-range strikes against Russia went badly off script, Zelensky once again tried to secure a ceasefire through Trump. He has been trying since early 2025, with no success, but he still held out hope.
Trump could have publicly given Zelensky the boot again. But on Ukraine, he faces opposition not only from Congress but also from parts of his own administration. And an election is just around the corner.
Instead of staging a public showdown, Trump’s team spent more than two months visibly engaged in intensive talks with Ukraine about an energy truce. His envoys, Witkoff and Kushner, traveled to Kiev, and Trump himself showered Zelensky with compliments. In reality, all of it proved to be a screen for a quiet, swift, informal deal with Moscow.
It has since emerged that the first tanker carrying diesel to the US left St. Petersburg on September 22 and is expected to reach the US any day now. In other words, the deal was already well advanced three weeks ago, and both sides were confident it would go through.
That takes some skill. This episode shows that Trump keeps a firm grip on his team and can prevent leaks when he needs to. Even Rubio, prone to breaking ranks, played his part exactly as the boss wanted.
And once the deal was done, there was no longer any need to smile at Zelensky in public. The masks came off. For the first time, Trump publicly declared that Ukraine needs a new president and must hold elections.
The liberal media will inevitably say that Trump is repeating Russian propaganda narratives. In fact, he was saying what he thinks.
The diesel deal does not mean Moscow and Washington will now live in perfect harmony. The differences between them are deep and fundamental, and the recently enacted ‘Graham law’ makes lifting any sanctions impossible for at least the next five years.
But this Friday, Putin and Trump finally managed to get past Ukraine and leave it behind. US-Russia relations now depend on Russia and the US alone.
If Russia is weak and having military difficulties, if Putin is intimidated, if NATO is considerably stronger and if there is no immediate threat of a Russian attack, then why is European public opinion always being prepared for a major war?
Europe should therefore pose itself a simple question: is Russia really about to attack NATO — or is Europe preparing for a war that its own rhetoric is helping to make it more plausible?
As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and European leaders increasingly warn of a looming Russian threat, Vladimir Putin used the Valdai Discussion Club to deliver a very different message: Europe is feeding an escalation spiral it may no longer be able to control.
Europe is being told to prepare for war, and the rearmament is being crafted as an economic and political project in itself. Europe is manufacturing a permanent war psychology while simultaneously insisting that Russia poses no imminent military threat.
Mark Rutte, the Secretary General of NATO, has on several occasions told that Russia might at some point launch an attack on NATO territory. The European governments are currently considering matters relating to hybrid attacks which can result in a large number of casualties, the establishment of new security arrangements and how to deal with a major confrontation with Moscow. The tone being used is becoming more and more dramatic, alongside unprecedented defence spending record levels.
His view was not that war was certain, rather it was the opposite—he advocated stopping the escalation before war became irreversible.
Putin’s argument is that Europe is trapped in a dangerous cycle in which military exercises, sanctions, weapons deliveries, threats and counter-threats are producing precisely the escalation that European governments claim they want to prevent.
This clear message is even more evident in what he said regarding Kaliningrad.
Rutte’s Russia narrative: threat, fear and rearmament
Mark Rutte is now one of the most prominent voices in Europe when warning about Russia.
In June 2025 he famously said to the Europeans: “You should learn to speak Russian or spend more on defence”, on the grounds that the possibility of future Russian aggression would mean a need for considerably increased defence spending over cuts on social security and pensions. He then warned that Russia might be ready to use military force against NATO within five years and, more recently, has spoken of Russia “testing us throughout Europe” as well as accusing Moscow of carrying out hybrid attacks, sabotage and attempts to split up the Alliance.
There is an extraordinary contradiction in Rutte’s most recent rhetoric.
On 30 September he stated that Putin was “a bit worried and a bit rattled” since the situation in Ukraine was supposedly not progressing well. He stressed that “Putin is not winning this” and claimed that Putin could never defeat NATO. At the same time, however, Rutte admitted that there was no immediate threat to NATO territory.
Then what is Europe actually getting ready for?
If Russia is weak and having military difficulties, if Putin is intimidated, if NATO is considerably stronger and if there is no immediate threat of a Russian attack, then why is European public opinion always being prepared for a major war?
It is worth posing that question.
The European public is being asked to agree to increased military spending, which could mean cutting back on social priorities, while at the same time a continuous state of insecurity is being fostered concerning Russia. The political message is remarkably consistent in telling people to spend more, to arm more and to get ready more – because Russia might launch an attack.
Fear is a highly effective political tool.
The issue is that fear may also come true on its own.
Putin’s warning over Kaliningrad
When asked about the increasingly aggressive rhetoric concerning Kaliningrad, Putin was especially straightforward.
He denied the notion that Russia was attempting to intimidate Europe, stating that Moscow’s warning was in fact ‘a response to an attempt to intimidate us‘.
He specifically referred to the European statements concerning preparations for a possible war with Russia in 2029 or 2030, the NATO exercises in the Baltic region, and the attempts to detain Russian vessels.
His argument is that this constitutes an escalation, and he gave a warning that was remarkably serious.
According to Putin, if Kaliningrad were the object of a direct attack or blockade, Russia would have to consider putting into use “all the forces and means at our disposal”. He made it clear that this was not necessarily a threat to employ nuclear weapons, but rather an assertion that Russia would make use of whatever measures it regarded as necessary for its defence.
It is exactly the kind of statement which European governments should take seriously — not since it is certain that Russia intends to attack Europe, but because a military confrontation between nuclear powers leaves little room for miscalculation.
The main thing that Putin warned about was an escalation.
His analogy was in the form of a spiral since provocative actions led to countermeasures, these countermeasures in turn caused further escalation, and eventually the process could get to a stage at which no one was completely in control.
That is the true danger.
What is the reason why Europe needs Russia to be its permanent enemy?
Putin’s more general explanation extends beyond Ukraine.
He contends that Europe has never really settled the security arrangements that followed the end of the Cold War. Rather than establishing a true pan-European security structure, NATO extended itself eastward and as a result Russia became increasingly excluded from the European security system.
He referred to Egon Bahr, the late German Social Democrat, who in 1990 had warned that if the division of Europe into hostile blocs was not overcome the Soviet Union would be isolated and a highly unfavourable future would result.
For Putin, Bahr’s warning was foretelling.
He also looked at how relations declined during NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia, as a result of NATO’s enlargement, the changes that took place after the breakup of the Soviet Union and finally in the case of Ukraine. Even if one does not agree with this view, it does show a consistent way of understanding the past three decades from the Russian perspective: Russia has on numerous occasions sought integration with the West, found that this was not desired, and has in the end come to the conclusion that the European order that emerged after the Cold War was designed against Russia.
That is the reason why the message that Putin gave at Valdai was not merely about Ukraine. The main topic was the future of Europe.
Europe’s war preparation may be hiding a deeper crisis………………………………………………………………..
Putin’s answer: the world is changing
The most important aspect of Putin’s speech at Valdai was not Ukraine. It was his conception of the future international order.
Putin stated that the world is moving from Western hegemony towards a multipolar international system and that this transformation is inevitable, adding that the former hegemony would eventually have to acknowledge the reality of a world in which Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and other centres of power demand a greater role.
This is the point at which Europe must make its real strategic choice.
It can continue to base its security mainly on NATO, move ever more closely in line with Washington’s strategic priorities and regard Russia as a permanent adversary.
Alternatively, it could try to regain what Europe once said that it stood for: strategic autonomy, diplomacy, and the ability to build bridges between opposing powers.
Putin’s vision is not the kind of vision held by liberals in Europe. It does not have to be one that Europeans accept without question. It is rather a vision of a world which is no longer arranged around a single dominant centre, and Europe will not be able to stop this transformation.
The choice Europe still has
The Valdai speech concluded with a warning which should be heard well beyond Moscow.
The greater the extent to which the confrontation becomes uncompromising and the more openly the strategic defeat of an opponent is declared, the more likely it is that the conflict will reach its most dangerous stage. He cautions against arrogance, overconfidence and the uncontrolled escalation of reciprocal responses.
This is no appeal for Europe to give in. It is a plea to acknowledge the consequences of confrontation.
Europe should therefore pose itself a simple question: is Russia really about to attack NATO — or is Europe preparing for a war that its own rhetoric is helping to make it more plausible?
Rutte states that there is no immediate Russian attack that NATO is much stronger, and that Putin is intimidated and that Russia is having difficulties.
Then why the hysteria? Why the permanent mobilisation? Why the preparation for a war that nobody claims is imminent?
At Valdai, Putin made it clear that the world is changing, that multipolarity is inevitable, and that military escalation is not a replacement for diplomacy.
– Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom and Finnish utility Fennovoima each highlighted different parts of an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) tribunal ruling as favourable on Saturday, in a long-running dispute over the cancelled Hanhikivi-1 nuclear power project.
The parties have been locked in legal disputes since Fennovoima scrapped the 7-billion-euro ($7.8 billion) project in May 2022, citing significant delays and political risks shortly after Russia launched its conflict in Ukraine.
Rosatom said the tribunal found that Fennovoima had unlawfully terminated the contract for the construction of the planned plant in northern Finland.
“Today’s victory is important, but not final. We will continue to prove that we are right regarding the Finnish project in courts of various instances,” Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev said in a statement, which did not refer to any financial outcome.
Fennovoima said the tribunal found that it had not been entitled to terminate the contract, but that it was entitled to receive reimbursements of advance payments and interest in excess of 1 billion euros ($1.12 billion).
It said the tribunal offset both sides’ claims, resulting in Rosatom subsidiaries being ordered to pay Fennovoima a net 606 million euros plus interest.
The ICC did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The contract to build the 1.2 gigawatt plant was signed in 2013 with Fennovoima, a consortium in which Finnish stakeholders including Fortum, Outokumpu and SSAB originally controlled two thirds through a joint venture, and the Russian side held one third.
After the project’s termination, Fennovoima wound down its operations and is primarily engaged in legal proceedings.
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