nuclear-news

Canada built its nuclear industry to avoid foreign fuel. Its new SMR reactors will depend on it.

by relying on imported enriched uranium, Canada would give foreign governments the ability to disrupt its nuclear fuel supply during a political dispute.

Canada would need to enrich its own uranium to control the entire fuel chain, but such a facility would cost billions to build and require extensive security, regulation and international safeguards througout its life.

“It would be much more uneconomical for Canada to develop one just for this small modular reactor design.”

Ontario’s first small modular reactor will rely on enriched uranium from the U.S., France and Britain

Colin Butler · CBC News ·  Aug 02, 2026, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-nuclear-supply-chain-smr-darlington-uranium-enrichment-9.7289297

The first reactors in Canada’s planned nuclear expansion will depend on foreign suppliers — including the United States — to enrich and fabricate their fuel, even as Prime Minister Mark Carney argues Canadian sovereignty depends on the country’s ability to supply and control its own energy.

It marks a sharp departure from the Candu reactor system, which gave Canada — the world’s second-largest uranium producer — a largely domestic nuclear supply chain for more than half a century.

Ontario has begun building the first of four planned BWRX-300 small modular reactors, or SMRs, in Clarington, Ont., called the Darlington New Nuclear Project. The American-Japanese-designed light water reactor uses low-enriched uranium, unlike Canada’s Candus, which use fuel made domestically from natural uranium without enrichment.

Ontario Power Generation (OPG), the Crown corporation that operates provincially owned electrical utilities, expects the first BWRX-300 at Darlington to be connected to the grid by the end of 2030. The other three are planned for the mid-2030s.

Cameco, the Saskatoon-based uranium mining and nuclear fuel company, will mine uranium ore in Saskatchewan and convert it in Port Hope, Ont., before it is enriched in the United States. France’s Orano and Britain’s Urenco are also listed by OPG as a supplier of enriched uranium, and an American company will manufacture the finished fuel assemblies in the United States.

Against Candu’s founding logic

Experts say the shift reverses the founding logic in Canada’s nuclear program.

A 1993 Library of Parliament background paper said the reason Candu was created was “to design a reactor tailored to Canadian circumstances” that used natural uranium to avoid “the difficult and expensive process of enrichment or, alternatively, dependence on foreign sources of enriched uranium.”

By placing that step in foreign hands, experts say, the new reactors undermine claims of energy soverignty and expose Canada to long-term geopolitcal risk.

Mark Winfield, a professor at York University who studies sustainable energy, climate change and energy policy, said by relying on imported enriched uranium, Canada would give foreign governments the ability to disrupt its nuclear fuel supply during a political dispute.

“It turns the original rationale for the Candu program completely on its head,” he said. “The whole idea was, going back to the 1950s, that we would have an all-Canadian fuel supply chain that would not be the subject to those kinds of geopolitical risks.”

OPG said spreading the work among suppliers in the United States, Britain and Frnace creates a “robust and resilient supply chain,” but the company still leaves both enrichment and fabrication — the two steps Canada cannot perform for the BWRX-300 — in foreign hands.

Why Ontario went global

Speaking at a recent news conference in Nanticoke, Ont., provincial Energy Minister Stephen Lecce said the province chose a foreign reactor because no Canadian alternative was ready to generate electricity at the required scale.

“There is not a Canadian grid-scale, commercially viable small modular reactor technology to procure,” he said. “So we had to go global.”

He said Ontario chose the American-Japanese BWRX-300 because it was the most advanced option and offered the best chance to reduce the risks associated with building a first-of-its-kind reactor.

Canada does have a new domestic reactor under development, but it was not an alternative for Ontario’s SMR project. The Candu Monark is not an SMR and is currently under assessment by Canada’s nuclear regulator.

The decision to “go global,” as Lecce put it, leaves Ontario dependent on foreign enrichment, but Lecce said the province has reduced the risk by arranging access to suppliers in the United States, France and Britain.

SMRs would use ‘modest’ amount of fuel

Winfield said multiple enrichment suppliers reduce the risk of disruption, but do not eliminate it. Every enrichment facility is outside Canada, while the only company identified that would make the finished fuel assemblies is American.

“I think that’s still a risk. Particularly if the United States decides to use its supply of various uranium for geopolitical leverage, which is clearly not beyond the thinking of the Trump administration,” Winfield said.

Even with France and Britain as backup suppliers, Winfield said, it opens the door to “all kinds of vulnerabilities relative to an all-Canadian supply chain. You are at the mercy of whatever external geopolitical events may be occurring.”

The federal government says foreign enrichment doesn’t present a significant supply risk, especially in the short to medium-term.

In an email, Natural Resources Canada said the four planned Darlington SMRs will require “a very small amount” of enriched fuel, which is “modest” compared with the global market, but did not provide a quantity.

Why being first is ‘not a good thing’

While there are other SMRs active in China and Russia, the Darlington facility will be the first SMR in the G7.

“That’s not a good thing, in my opinion,” said M.V. Ramana, a University of British Columbia professor who studies nuclear energy and international security.

“Nuclear power is a very expensive way to generate electricity and the small modular reactor is even more expensive.”

Ramana said SMRs sacrifice the economies of scale available to larger reactors.

A 2014 study suggests they are more expensive per unit in generating capacity unless savings from shared infrastructure can offset the disadvantage, which is what OPG intends for its four-reactor Darlington site.

BWRX-300 designer GE Vernova says smaller reactors can overcome some of that cost disadvantage because they require less machinery than conventional reactors: water circulates through the reactor without powered pumps, while emergency cooling functions use gravity and natural circulation.

The company says this reduces the amount of equipment that must be manufactured, installed and maintained.

However, because Darlington is the design’s first deployment, those projected savings have not yet been demonstrated by a commercially operating unit.

Could Canada enrich its own uranium?

The only way for Canada to eliminate its reliance on foreign suppliers is by establishing its own uranium-enrichment industry.

Lecce said Ontario would be open to discussions, but he acknowledged the decision ultimately rests with the federal government.

Natural Resources Canada said Ottawa has made no decision on commercial enrichment but plans to create a “Nuclear Fuels Table” with the provinces and industry to examine future needs and opportunities.

Ontario is currently the only province committed to building SMRs, but Saskatchewan is advancing plans for the same BWRX-300 technology, while New Brunswick and Alberta are evaluating potential nuclear projects that could include SMRs.

• Canada remains anti-nuke, but its potential path to the bomb is getting shorter

Ramana said Canada would need to enrich its own uranium to control the entire fuel chain, but such a facility would cost billions to build and require extensive security, regulation and international safeguards througout its life.

“In the enrichment business, again, there are economies of scale,” he said. “It would be much more uneconomical for Canada to develop one just for this small modular reactor design.”

Ramana added that the new reactors also create another long-term liability. Canada’s current $26-billion nuclear waste plan was calculated around fuel from the existing Candu reactor fleet.

New reactors could change both the volume and type of spent fuel requiring disposal, but Ramana noted there has been no cost estimate from Canada’s Nuclear Waste Management Organization for adding the spent fuel from four BWRX-300s.

August 5, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Canada, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, Uranium | Leave a comment

Canada remains anti-nuke, but its potential path to the bomb is getting shorter.

This country has all the elements needed for a clandestine nuclear weapons program — if it so desired

Evan Dyer · CBC News · Jul 26, 2026, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-remains-antinuke-road-to-bomb-getting-shorter-9.7283194

For decades, Canada’s official policy on nuclear weapons has been that they shouldn’t exist, and there is no sign that principle is about to be abandoned.

But for reasons of history and geography, Canada is also one of the world’s non-nuclear countries with the easiest technical path to a nuclear weapon. And because of the particular design of its CANDU reactors, it would also be one of the countries best-positioned to produce weapons-grade fissile material without tripping international alerts — although such a move would carry huge geopolitical risks.

Technological changes that are expected in the coming years will likely make Canada even more of a threshold nuclear arms power than it is today, whether it chooses to cross that threshold or not.

“The only thing that inhibits Canada is the will to do it, the political decision to do it,” said nuclear weapons expert Steve Fetter of the University of Maryland, who served as head of national security and international affairs in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

He’s also a member of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control, and the originator of the “Fetter Model,” the standard technique used in arms control verification for detecting the presence of nuclear warheads through radiography.

“Canada was a major participant in the Manhattan Project, as was the U.K.,” Fetter told CBC News. “Immediately after the [Second World War], we froze you out and said, ‘No co-operation.’ So Canada decided — as did the U.K. — to develop its own completely indigenous program.”

The heavy water route

The U.K., of course, went on to become a nuclear arms power, while Canada did not.

Canada designed the CANDU heavy water reactors that use unenriched, natural uranium containing only about 0.7 per cent of the U-235 isotope needed to make nuclear weapons. Most of the world’s 440-odd nuclear reactors are light water units that require uranium enriched to about four per cent U-235 content.

For this reason, and despite being the world’s second-biggest producer of uranium, Canada has never enriched domestically.

However, the CANDU is anything but a proliferation-proof technology, because it is not only the best kind of reactor for producing the plutonium-239 isotope used in bombs, but also for concealing its production.

“You do produce plutonium in a light water reactor,” said Fetter. “But that plutonium is contained in highly radioactive spent fuel and it’s not really high-quality.”

Light water reactors work by loading enriched uranium, sealing the reactor core and then running it for 18-24 months before shutting down, reopening the core and replacing fuel. This makes it relatively easy to keep track of how much fuel is going in, and what is happening to the spent fuel that comes out. It’s impossible to secretly swap fuel rods while the reactor is generating power.

The Canadian heavy water reactor doesn’t work that way.

Harder to monitor

“All uranium-fuelled reactors produce plutonium. The issue with the CANDU is that it has online refuelling,” explained Ed Lyman, director of nuclear safety for the Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington, D.C. “You’re refuelling continuously, which makes it harder for the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].”

Canada, which produces all of its own uranium, would be in a strong position to divert fissionable material undetected if so inclined, say the experts.

The plutonium produced in a heavy water reactor is also much easier to turn into a nuclear weapon, said Fetter.

“Of the countries that have made nuclear weapons with plutonium, many of them have used a heavy water reactor,” he said.

That’s why India used a Canadian heavy water reactor to produce its first nuclear weapon in 1974, an all-plutonium implosion-type bomb. The “Smiling Buddha” test was the first to break the nuclear monopoly of the “Big Five” UN Security Council powers.

Fetter said the U.S. had heavy water reactors only for the purpose of producing plutonium and tritium. (Tritium, also produced in abundance by the CANDU reactor, is another critical component of a modern two-stage thermonuclear weapon that Canada has in abundance.)

Using riskier fuels

Canada is also branching out into a new kind of technology that will require enriched uranium: the small modular reactor (SMR). Some of the proposed SMRs would use uranium enriched to a level as high as 20 per cent, known as high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU).

HALEU is already a proliferation concern in itself, said Lyman.

“Anything below 20 per cent is considered low-enriched uranium and has a much lower level of oversight. The IAEA considers it indirect-use material you can’t directly use in a bomb,” he explained. “But there’s evidence, both historical and technical, that that’s not true, and that the actual cutoff for weapon-usable uranium is below 20 per cent. Could be 15 per cent, could be 10 per cent.

“And so I worry about this push for advanced reactors, SMRs that use HALEU up near 20 per cent, like the ARC 100 in Canada, that the material itself is in the dangerous band. And if Canada were to pursue a whole fleet of SMRs using HALEU, and especially if they were to build their own enrichment plants to support that, that might give them a threshold capability for bombs, even if they never make highly enriched [over 20 per cent] uranium.”

ARC Canada points out that its proposed reactor in New Brunswick, which would become the only commercial fast-breeder reactor in the world outside Russia, mitigates against proliferation risks by having a long fuel cycle with a core that stays sealed for 20 years.

But there’s another factor: The arrival of SMRs that consume enriched uranium has got the government of Canada thinking about enrichment.

To enrich or not to enrich

“Any country which has a complete fuel cycle is a latent nuclear weapons country, in the sense that it is not far from making a nuclear weapon,” said former IAEA director and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohamed ElBaradei.

Scientists consulted by CBC News said Canada would probably have little economic motive to build its own enrichment facilities. Canada’s nuclear energy strategy foresees importation of enriched uranium from France and the U.S. in the immediate future, even though that often means buying back Canadian-mined uranium after other countries have added value.

But the strategy also notes that “geopolitical volatility has exposed fragility in nuclear fuel supply chains at every stage — mining, milling, refining, conversion, enrichment, and fabrication.”

Canada plans to double its exports of uranium in raw form, “but there is also a compelling case for expanding downstream capabilities selectively.”

Domestic enrichment might not save Canada money, but would increase its strategic autonomy.

“Canada will continue to monitor the energy security implications of these supply chains,” says the strategy. “The longer-term question of whether Canada should develop domestic enrichment capability remains under assessment.”

Enrichment could get easier

A handful of non-nuclear arms powers have developed enrichment facilities. They include Brazil, Japan, Argentina, Germany and the Netherlands, but only Brazil combines a modern centrifuge facility with a large domestic supply of uranium.

Japan could theoretically produce weapons-grade uranium, but its nuclear technology, like South Korea’s, is largely American, its nuclear program is subject to strict inspections, and it has no uranium mines of its own — in fact it buys much of its supply from Canada.

A Canadian company, Cameco, is currently exploring the next frontier of uranium enrichment. The SILEX method uses laser excitation to separate U-235 more quickly and efficiently than spinning it in a centrifuge.

Already, a centrifuge facility can fit in an area the size of a high school gym. SILEX, said Fetter, “potentially could be even smaller and use less energy than centrifuge enrichment, which would make it harder to detect a clandestine facility.”

The SILEX project has already received U.S. government funding and acquired land in western Kentucky for a plant expected to be operating by 2030.

Crossing the threshold

For all the Carney government’s talk of “a more dangerous and divided world,” there is still no public signal that Canada might abandon its long-held opposition to nuclear arms.

If the strategic situation were to change, Canada would have to decide whether to go the open route and formally depart the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), or pursue nuclear arms through a clandestine program as other countries have done with a mixed record of success.

Plasma physicist Tara Drozdenko worked on nuclear weapons issues under the administrations of Barack Obama and George W. Bush. She represented the United States on NATO’s Senior Group on Proliferation, and headed the Country/Regime Sanctions Unit at the U.S. Department of Treasury, where she managed the government’s nuclear-related sanctions on countries such as Iran and North Korea. 

Today, she’s not sure Washington remains committed to preventing proliferation, or how it would react to a Canadian decision to leave the NPT.

“In a normal administration, there would be condemnation, there would be reproach, there would be a lot of diplomatic efforts,” she told CBC News. “I don’t know what would happen in this administration. Would there be threats? Would there be some people that are like, yeah, everybody should have nuclear weapons? I really can’t predict what this particular administration would do.”

Clandestine plants and secret programs

So far, all the countries that have developed nuclear weapons — Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan and North Korea — began their efforts in secret.

Drozdenko says Canada’s own nuclear industry, the design of its reactors and the fact that it has the world’s best uranium deposits would all give it a strong hand were it ever to pursue such a risky course.

“Canada is probably really well-positioned to do that, if Canada was determined,” said Drozdenko. “You have a lot of land that’s not heavily populated, and if you used technologies that didn’t have a lot of energy or thermal signature, I don’t think the U.S. has its intelligence assets pointed at Canada right now.”

At some point, such a program would inevitably become known.

“It would require withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty, which would be really impactful to the treaty worldwide, especially as a NATO country and up until now a pretty close ally of the U.S. I think that would be pretty catastrophic to that treaty,” Drozdenko said.

Fetter said Canada could probably easily assemble a simple “gun-type” nuclear weapon like the one used on Hiroshima, but would face scientific hurdles if it tried to build a modern thermonuclear weapon without conducting tests. North Korea required half a dozen tests to get there.

In the U.S., Russia and China, supercomputers today have replaced actual testing. Canada has the computing capacity but lacks the detailed data that nuclear arms powers have assembled on materials science, and the complicated timing and interactions inside a nuclear warhead — some of the most closely guarded secrets in the world.

But Fetter also said he didn’t expect North Korea to be able to put a modern, two-stage thermonuclear warhead on a ballistic missile and make it work.

“Canada has a lot of smart people,” he noted.

With Canada embarked on a new era of greater military spending, including the purchase of modern submarines and its first foray into the world of cruise missiles, it is clearly assembling elements that could bring it closer to “breakout” as a nuclear arms power, if it desired.

The question of how other countries would react is the unknowable factor, said Drozdenko.

“Does Canada want to be in the position of North Korea, the pariah state that’s making clandestine nuclear weapons?” she asked.

So far, the answer has always been no.

July 29, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Canada, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, Uranium | Leave a comment