Time for US to deescalate confrontation with China over Taiwan.
On October 25, 1971, the UN ended the 2 China policy, voting to expel Taiwan, claiming to be the Republic of China, and replacing it with the mainland Peoples Republic of China. Just a year later Nixon’s thaw with mainland China cemented US recognition of the mainland One China policy and de-emphasized supporting the Chiang government on Taiwan.
China’s relationship with Taiwan is essentially none of our business. Yet we continue to risk war 8,000 miles from the Homeland on China’s doorstep by provoking confrontation with China with massive arming of Taiwan’s military.
Current US government and media narrative erases the last 6,000 years of China, Taiwan history to create a new cause célèbre for US military adventurism, America’s No 1 business industry. Without historical context, the US electorate remains clueless of reckless US policy deemed necessary to US national security interests: defending freedom over authoritarianism on the other side of the world.
A review of the long, tortured China, Taiwan history refutes that narrative. Chinese from Southwest China settled Taiwan over 6000 years ago. Beginning in 1624, the Dutch and Spanish moved in to exploit Taiwan’s resources, as Europeans were want to do worldwide. But the Chinese kicked them out by 1683, ruling Taiwan for 212 years till Japan gobbled up Taiwan after in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895.
For the next 50 years Japan used Taiwan (Formosa at the time) as a land based aircraft carrier for their pan Asian adventurism. But at the Cairo Conference in 1943, the Allies declared a major war aim was full return of Formosa to China. This occurred by a UN mandate upon Japan’s surrender in 1945.
With Japan defeated in China, Mao’s communists resumed their civil war to overturn the corrupt, unpopular nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. In 1949, Mao prevailed. Chiang fled with about 2 million of his die hard supporters to Formosa, setting up their own version of the Republic of China renamed Taiwan.
The US looked at the 538 million Chinese living under communism on the mainland, the 2 million on Taiwan living under Chiang’s authoritarianism, and said ‘Nope, we’ll recognize Chiang on tiny Taiwan as the legitimate Chinese government till he can kick out the dreaded commies.’ They even gave Chiang the military assistance to prevent any unification with China which was inevitable without that support. Is it any wonder the people and government of China would embark on eventual reunification, whether taking years, decades, even a century?
On October 25, 1971, the UN ended the 2 China policy, voting to expel Taiwan, claiming to be the Republic of China, and replacing it with the mainland Peoples Republic of China. Just a year later Nixon’s thaw with mainland China cemented US recognition of the mainland One China policy and de-emphasized supporting the Chiang government on Taiwan.
Without abandoning Taiwan completely, the US embarked on 5 decades of ‘strategic ambiguity’ which kept tensions with China over Taiwan’s status on the back burner of US China diplomacy. That changed when President Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ in his second term moved pro Taiwan policy to the front burner. His successors Trump, Biden and Trump again have so turned up the heat, that war with China over its long term plan for eventual absorption of Taiwan into Chinese sovereignty, remains a possibility.
From Strategic Ambiguity we’ve degenerated into reckless trips to Taiwan by US officials and congresspersons and proposed legislation giving the President a blank check to intervene militarily with China should they embark on any, albeit unlikely, military move at reunification. The US keeps advancing multibillion dollar weapons tranches that do nothing for Taiwan’s defense; indeed, provoke Chinese military maneuvers near Taiwan, raising the possibility of US China confrontation.
At his recent summit with Chinese President Xi, Trump got schooled by Xi who told Trump that if Trump doesn’t pull back from arming Taiwan it could lead to “clashes and conflicts” between the two superpowers. Trump might be getting the message. He had his Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao tell Congress that the US was “doing a pause” on a $14 billion Taiwan weapons package to ensure the US has enough weapons to finish off the Iranian regime in so far failed Operation Epic Fury. Facing the biggest military failure in US history, Trump would be wise to put belligerence with China over Taiwan back on the back burner.
Ignoring the 6,000 year long interwoven China, Taiwan history prevents sensible, peace promoting US diplomacy. America made the wrong decision on the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and has chosen to govern in ignorance for the past 77 years. On this issue, ignorance is not bliss. It may mean war.
US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping end unipolar age in Beijing
By Bang Xiao, 16 May 26, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-05-16/us-donald-trump-china-xi-jinping-end-unipolar-age-beijing/106687004
For nearly a decade, the world has braced for a collision.
The dominant United States and a rising China, locked in escalating strategic competition, were said to be hurtling towards a Thucydides Trap that history suggested would be almost impossible to avoid.
This week in Beijing, both Donald Trump and Xi Jinping quietly admitted something the rest of the world has been slow to grasp. Neither of them can afford the collision.
The summit produced no breakthrough trade deal, no joint statement, no big announcement on Taiwan. And yet what it delivered may turn out to be more consequential than any of those things. The public outline of a new global order.
One in which the US and China are not enemies, not rivals, and not partners in the warm Western sense. They are something newer and harder to name. Two structurally interdependent superpowers who have decided, for now, to manage their rivalry rather than let it manage them.
At the state banquet on Thursday night, Xi put the new compact in language no Chinese leader has previously offered an American counterpart in such direct terms.
“The China-US relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” he said.
“We must make it work and never mess it up.”
Beijing gave the framework a name: a “constructive China-US relationship of strategic stability”.
Xi spelled it out in four phrases. Positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay. Sound stability with moderate competition. Constant stability with manageable differences. Enduring stability with promises of peace.
Trump endorsed it. Beijing says the framework will guide bilateral relations for the next three years and beyond.
Read carefully, that is not a thaw. It is the architecture of a new bipolar order.
What was striking about Beijing this week was not just the warmth of the welcome that Xi has staged, it was the unprecedented openness. Cameras were granted access to Zhongnanhai, China’s most secretive political compound, in numbers nearly no foreign press has ever enjoyed.
Xi gave Trump a tour of trees four centuries old, told him the seeds of Chinese roses were on their way home as a gift, and walked beside him into rooms that almost no foreign leader has ever entered.
The only other one to have stood there, it should be said, is Vladimir Putin.
Xi framed the access in personal terms. He told Trump in front of the cameras that he had “chosen this place especially to reciprocate the hospitality extended to me in 2017 at Mar-a-Lago”. It was a private courtesy returned.
Trump went further. He called the relationship “the G2” — the world’s two most important countries.
At the banquet he called Xi “my friend” and described the visit as one of “the most consequential relationships in world history”. He traced the connection between the two peoples back 250 years.
“It’s a special world,” he said, “with the two of us united and together.”
That is the speech of a US president acknowledging a shared story. Nothing in it reads like he will contain a rival.
At the Zhongnanhai tea on Friday, Trump matched Xi’s warmth. He said the two had known each other “almost 12 years” and had “settled problems other people wouldn’t have been able to settle”.
The first test is already in front of them. It is the Strait of Hormuz.
Both leaders publicly agreed this week that the strait should be reopened. Xi indicated he would press Tehran behind the scenes.
What is on the calendar is September 24. That is when Xi will arrive in Washington for the reciprocal state visit Trump confirmed before his departure from China.
It is also, effectively, the deadline for the two most powerful men in the world.
If the Middle East war is not resolved by then, Xi will land in Washington without the commitment he made this week. The G2 will face its first practical test having failed it.
Both sides bet on a wider grey
There was no joint statement issued from Beijing this week. But what Trump delivered at Zhongnanhai, with Xi standing beside him, read like one.
For more than a decade, the US-China relationship has been described in black and white. Rivals or partners. Containment or appeasement. Decoupling or engagement. Democracy or authoritarianism.
This week, both leaders quietly retired the narrative. What they care about most sits in the grey area in between: trade, energy, Iran, supply chains, agriculture and Chinese international students.
The bet is that the grey will keep expanding. If it does, the Cold War tactics of the past decade will lose their grip. Less chip-export brinkmanship. Fewer tariff retaliations. Quieter security frictions. None of it is guaranteed.
The grey holds only if both sides keep their nerve.
The bet rests on a structural reality. Both superpowers are slowing.
China’s growth has decelerated from the highs of the 2000s, weighed down by demographics, a property correction and US tech restrictions.
America’s productivity is real, but its consumer is exhausted, its public debt unprecedented, and its industrial base in semiconductors and rare earths dangerously exposed.
In a slowing world, the cost of confrontation rises. Xi’s “Chinese Dream” of a high-tech, sustainable economy needs continued access to American capital and innovation. Trump’s “Make America Great Again” needs access to the largest consumer market on Earth.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has tightened the screws further. With Iranian oil crippled, Beijing needs the energy flow uninterrupted, and Trump has the leverage. Both leaders know it.
Xi made the convergence explicit at the banquet, in a single line that will be re-read for months: “Achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and making America great again can go hand in hand.”
It was the first time the leader of the Chinese Communist Party has publicly endorsed an American political slogan. Trump raised his glass.
After nearly a decade of trade wars and chip-export controls, both sides have arrived at the same conclusion. Neither can win.
And the worst case scenario is already playing out. Both leaders are increasingly distrusted by the rest of the world. That makes the bilateral alignment more valuable to each of them, not less.
A decade ago, Beijing was the rising party seeking acknowledgement. This week, Xi sat across from Trump as a co-equal. Trump accepted the framing.
The unipolar moment ended somewhere between the 2008 financial crisis and Donald Trump’s second inauguration. This week in Beijing was the formal recognition of it.
Where the grey ends
There remains one structural risk: Taiwan.
Xi was unusually pointed on the issue during the bilateral, warning Trump that mishandling Taiwan would push the relationship “into an extremely dangerous situation” of “collision and conflict”.
Beijing chose to release these comments while Trump was still in the country. The framework of strategic stability does not extend to what China considers its red line.
The toasts themselves contained no mention of Taiwan. The hard line was for the bilateral, the soft line for the cameras.
Trump, asked about Taiwan at the Temple of Heaven, deflected with “China is beautiful” and changed the subject. That is not endorsement. But nor is it the unconditional defence Taipei would want to hear.
The new bipolar order, then, is not a stable equilibrium. It is a managed one. It depends on each side resisting the temptation to test the other on the one issue where both have publicly committed to no compromise.
For Australia and other middle powers, the implications run deep. The strategic competition framework that Canberra used to align with Washington has been quietly retired in favour of something messier and more transactional.
The two superpowers have now stood side by side and called themselves partners, friends, co-stewards of the giant ship of human history.
America and China are no longer enemies-in-waiting. They are two slowing giants who have agreed, in Beijing this week, that they need each other more than they once admitted.
The rest of the world has been preparing for a cold war. It has been handed a partnership of necessity between two superpowers who have both reached the limits of confrontation.
That is the order we now live in. And the rest of us will have to adjust.
Trump‑Xi summit: Cautious Progress On Trade, Ties And Some ‘Win‑Wins’.
But importantly, Xi and Trump agreed to establish a Board of Trade and Board of Investment – intended to create a pathway forward to more trade in the months to come.
May 16, 2026 , Yan Bennett for the Conversation, https://scheerpost.com/2026/05/16/trump-xi-summit-cautious-progress-on-trade-ties-and-some-win-wins/
President Donald Trump departed China on May 15, 2026, after a two-day summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping that was scrutinized from every angle for clues on where the relationship is heading.
Trump hailed the trip as “incredible,” while Xi remarked that it marked a “new bilateral relationship.” Other observers were a little less enthusiastic, noting that no major breakthroughs were evident at the highly anticipated meeting of the world’s two most powerful political leaders.
The Conversation turned to Yan Bennett, an expert in U.S.-China relations and author of “American Policy Discourses on China,” to provide her three big takeaways from the summit.
Taiwan: Tough(ish) talk but status quo in place
No one really expected there to be movement on Taiwan – which mainland China lays claims over – although it is clear that Beijing would like the United States to make a firmer stance against the island moving toward a declaration of independence, or for the U.S. to expressly demand reunification.
So what we got was Beijing reiterating that Taiwan remained a priority and a core interest. Xi did this on the first day of the summit, noting that the Taiwan “question” remained “the most important issue in China-U.S. relations,” and that any mishandling of it could lead to “clashes and even conflicts.”
But this was aimed at two things. First, Xi has a domestic audience he needs to address, and Taiwan has long been important to Chinese rhetoric. The Chinese Communist Party has around 100 million members, many of whom would have expected Xi to talk tough on Taiwan – and it was those people he was largely talking to.
But he was also signaling to the U.S. that it shouldn’t support Taiwanese independence. And that won’t ruffle any feathers in Washington. Indeed, the 2025 National Security Strategy stressed that the U.S. opposed unilateral action on Taiwan from “either party” – a signal to Beijing that it opposed Taiwan declaring independence.
Trump did mention arms deals to Taiwan. But the U.S.’s declaratory policy since the Reagan administration is that it doesn’t allow Beijing to enter discussions about what weapons Washington sells to Taiwan. And that hasn’t changed at all, nor has the U.S.’s treaty commitment to Taiwan since 1979 that requires the U.S. to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
Rhetoric aside, everyone is happy with the status quo on Taiwan – it is in no one’s interest for it to change.
But talk of Taiwan has been muddied a little by Xi’s determination to modernize the People’s Liberation Army. The Chinese president has laid out a series of benchmarks including that the PLA should be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. This has been misinterpreted in the U.S. under the so-called “Davidson window” – a concept that has it that China is intent on invading by that time.
In reality, China is nowhere near able to do so. It doesn’t have a “blue water navy” able to operate without port assistance, and the island is incredibly difficult to invade – it only has two places where you can land, and only at certain times of the year. It is also very mountainous. Taiwan is also slowly building its defenses – and learning a lot from Ukraine’s war with Russia – with the intention of becoming “indigestable” to China.
Xi’s modernization timeline also states that the PLA should be a “world class military” – taken to be a peer to the U.S. – by 2049. But the fact that it spends more on internal security than it does on defense indicates where the CCP’s true interests lay – in domestic security rather than external capabilities.
Trade: Tamped down expectations
The big picture is that the U.S. and China have been trying to restabilize what was until fairly recently a very good relationship in terms of economic ties.
Both sides have clear priorities to that extent. China wants to regain the American market it had in the 1990s and early 2000s – and certainly reverse the trend since 2018’s trade war.
Trump since his first administration has made it clear that he sees Chinese control over supply chains and the trade imbalance as a national security issue. Washington also wants to address unfair trade practices, such as the requirement that American companies hand over blueprints, trade secrets, customer lists, marketing plans and more to operate.
So what was achieved in the summit? On the surface, very little. There was some movement on sales of U.S. beef to China. And Trump announced that Beijing would buy 200 aircraft from Boeing – lower than the 500 that had been earlier touted in media reports. And several Chinese companies agreed to buy Nvidia microchips – a continuation of a process that began in late 2025.
That doesn’t seem much, and it was telling that Trump himself wasn’t being very “Trumpian” on what could be achieved during the summit. He wasn’t promising the moon.
A lot of focus will be on technology. China is about 18 months behind the U.S. in microchip development. Some have questioned whether U.S. companies should be selling chips to China, amid fears that China could steal the intellectual property and be able to use higher-technology chips for defense reasons. The U.S. position is it can’t allow Huawei – China’s telecom giant – to take over the whole Chinese market, so it will only allow the sale of what it considers appropriate-level Nvidia chips.
Military matters: Washington wants to talk
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the U.S. always kept the military lines of communications open to avert a catastrophic incident. This hasn’t been the case with Beijing and Washington. We saw that in 2001 when a U.S. aircraft collided with a Chinese jet; and again over the “Chinese spy balloon incident” in 2023.
Washington is seeking to open up a line of communication on military matters, and that is probably why U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth was there in Beijing. Indeed, it is highly unusual for a defense secretary to be at such a summit.
Not that Trump believes he needs China’s help on military matters. He made that clear when asked about possible Beijing assistance prior to the summit.
In fact, little news came out of the summit on Iran. China has criticized the U.S. over the war, but has also quietly been telling Tehran to stop bombing Gulf countries.
Despite some commentary suggesting that Beijing benefits from the U.S. being bogged down in the Middle East, what Xi will want is a resolution before the economic fallout bites in China.
China’s stockpile of Iranian oil will only last a few more weeks and then oil price rises will hit China like a brick.
‘He asked if I would defend them’: Trump shares key details of Xi meeting
Michael Koziol, 16 May, 26, https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/he-asked-if-i-would-defend-them-trump-shares-key-details-of-xi-meeting-20260516-p5zxnw.html
Washington: Xi Jinping asked directly whether the US would defend Taiwan in a war, Donald Trump said, as he divulged key details of his conversations with the Chinese president while flying home from the high-stakes meeting in Beijing.
The two men also spoke “in great detail” about US arms sales to Taiwan, which China would like to stop, and which Trump has not committed to continuing. He said he would make that decision soon, after speaking with the leader of Taiwan.
“President Xi and I talked a lot about Taiwan … he’s against very much what they’re doing,” Trump said aboard Air Force One.
“He does not want to see a fight for independence because that would be a very strong confrontation … I didn’t make a comment on it, I heard him out. I have a lot of respect for him.”
Asked by a reporter whether he would defend Taiwan, Trump said he would not answer – maintaining the long-standing US position of strategic ambiguity. He said he gave the same response to Xi.
“He asked me if I would defend them. I said, ‘I don’t talk about that’. There’s only one person that knows that. You know who it is? Me.”
In December, the Trump administration approved a record $US11.1 billion ($15.5 billion) arms package for the self-governing democracy (over which China claims sovereignty). But the president has delayed approval of another package worth up to $US14 billion.
Trump indicated he did not feel bound by the so-called “six assurances” given to Taiwan in 1982 under then president Ronald Reagan, one of which was that the US would not consult China about arms sales to Taiwan.
“1982 is a long way, that’s a big, far distance away,” he told reporters on the plane. “[Xi] brought that up, he talked about that to me – so what am I gonna do, say, ‘I don’t want to talk to you about it because I have an agreement that was signed in 1982?’
“I made no commitment either way. I’ll make a determination over the next fairly short period of time. I have to speak to the person – you know who he is – that is running Taiwan.”
Trump said he and Xi also discussed lifting US sanctions on Chinese oil companies that buy oil from Iran, and would decide in the next few days.
The US president’s account of his conversations with his counterpart were far more detailed than the summary given by the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, when answering questions from state-affiliated news agencies.
Wang said the two men spent nine hours together across their several encounters, which included the bilateral meeting, a banquet dinner, a visit to the Temple of Heaven and tea/lunch at Xi’s Zhongnanhai compound.
He emphasised the centrality of the Taiwan question, repeating Xi’s message that “if handled poorly, the two countries will clash, pushing the entire Sino-US relationship into a very dangerous situation”.
Wang added that China hoped the US would take “concrete actions” to safeguard the relationship, which the Chinese are now framing as being one of “constructive strategic stability”.
On Iran, Trump said he did not seek Xi’s assistance in pressuring Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz – but that he believed China would lean on its partner regardless, as Beijing also wanted the passage open and free.
“I’m not asking for any favours, ’cos when you ask for favours you need to do favours in return. We don’t need favours,” Trump said.
He also lashed out at journalists on Air Force One, accusing The New York Times’ veteran correspondent David Sanger of treason after he asserted Trump had failed to achieve the political changes he sought in Iran.
“I had a total military victory. But the fake news, guys like you, write incorrectly. You’re a fake guy,” Trump said to Sanger.
“You should know better, David. You know better. Your editors tell you what to write, and you write it, and you should be ashamed of yourself. I actually think it’s treason.”
He also clashed with a BBC journalist who asked about the missile strike on an Iranian girls’ school at the beginning of the war, which reportedly killed about 175 people.
The US has not taken responsibility despite a New York Times report saying a preliminary investigation confirmed it was an American missile. Trump said it remained under investigation.
Meanwhile, the US State Department announced Israel and Lebanon would extend their ceasefire by a further 45 days following two days of talks in Washington.
Israel is not at war with Lebanon but struck targets associated with the Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorist group in the country, including the capital Beirut, during the war against Iran.
It has continued its strikes leading up to this week’s talks, despite the ceasefire that began on April 16. Lebanon’s Health Ministry said 22 people were killed in attacks on Wednesday, including eight children.
The Washington talks represent the first high-level diplomatic relations between Israel and Lebanon for more than 30 years. State Department spokesman Tommy Piggott said political negotiations would resume in early June and a security discussion would be added on May 29.
While the Beijing summit did not produce many immediate tangible outcomes, Trump said China agreed to buy 200 aircraft from American manufacturer Boeing – less than the 500 the firm initially hoped for – and up to 750 “if they do a good job”
This summit was just “the beginning”, he said, noting he and Xi could meet as many as four times this year. Trump has invited Xi to the White House on September 24 – during the United Nations General Assembly’s high-level week – and Beijing confirmed the Chinese leader would visit the US in the northern autumn.
The two leaders could also meet at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in China in November, and the G20 world leaders’ summit December, hosted at the Trump National Doral resort in Miami.
with Lisa Visentin, Reuters
This Is The REAL Reason For Trump’s Visit To China.
May 14, 2026, Joshua Scheer, https://scheerpost.com/2026/05/14/this-is-the-real-reason-for-trumps-visit-to-china/
Donald Trump didn’t arrive in Beijing as the leader of a confident superpower. He arrived like a salesman carrying a collapsing empire on his back — flanked not by diplomats or peace negotiators, but by Silicon Valley monopolists, Wall Street vultures, and billionaire oligarchs desperate to keep their fortunes alive. Elon Musk. Jensen Huang. Larry Fink. Tim Cook. Blackstone. Goldman Sachs. The entire spectacle looked less like diplomacy and more like a corporate hostage negotiation staged on behalf of an American ruling class suddenly realizing it may have lost the economic war it started.
In this blistering breakdown, Ben Norton argues that Trump’s China summit exposes a geopolitical reality Washington refuses to admit publicly: the U.S. trade war backfired, China adapted, and America’s corporate elite now need Beijing far more than Beijing needs them. As the war on Iran drives inflation higher, supply chains fracture, and rare earth shortages threaten both Silicon Valley and the Pentagon, Trump’s anti-China rhetoric is quietly giving way to panic, flattery, and desperation. The result is an extraordinary image of imperial decline — an American president openly traveling with oligarchs to plead for access to the very economic system Washington spent years trying to cripple.
The best line of all from Ben may be this: “Nothing screams ‘we are an oligarchy’ more than taking oligarchs instead of diplomats to a diplomatic mission.”
And he’s right. We are living in an oligarchy — one where billionaires ride on Air Force One while working people are left paying for inflation, war, tariffs, and economic collapse. The masks are gone. Corporate CEOs now sit beside presidents like unelected cabinet members, openly shaping foreign policy, trade policy, and even war itself.
As the country barrels toward another election in 2028, the deeper crisis is that most major candidates, regardless of party branding, still end up bowing before the same billionaire donor class. The slogans change. The marketing changes. But the power structure remains untouched.
Trump lands in Beijing with over a dozen western moguls in tow ahead of high-stakes talks with Xi
Elon Musk, Tim Cook, and top executives from Nvidia, Qualcomm, BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, Mastercard, Visa, Boeing, and Meta joined the US president
The Cradle, MAY 13, 2026
US President Donald Trump landed in Beijing on 13 May for a crucial meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping to address trade, technology, Taiwan, the war against Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz.
Met with red-carpet treatment in the Chinese capital, Trump was joined by a retinue of more than a dozen billionaires whose companies span major sectors of the US and global economies.
A total of 16 high-profile business leaders accompanied the US president, including Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk and Apple CEO Tim Cook, as well as CEOs from Nvidia, Qualcomm, BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Mastercard, Visa, Boeing, and Meta Platforms President and Vice Chair Dina Powell McCormick.
Trump is scheduled to meet Xi after his first night in Beijing, with the visit centered on what both sides agree to be a crucial moment for the world’s two largest economies.
The US-Israeli war on Iran and the resulting global energy crisis are expected to weigh heavily on the talks.
The US President is expected to urge his Chinese counterpart to pressure Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and move toward a peace deal, as China depends heavily on crude oil shipments through the waterway.
The talks are also expected to cover Taiwan, artificial intelligence, advanced chip exports, trade, and fentanyl, with both sides seeking concessions on long-running disputes that have strained relations between Washington and Beijing……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
The meeting also comes as Washington imposes new sanctions on a China–Iran oil network ahead of Trump’s Beijing visit, tightening efforts to choke off Tehran’s oil revenue while the US–Israeli war on the Islamic Republic and the Hormuz crisis strain global energy markets. https://thecradle.co/articles/trump-lands-in-beijing-with-over-a-dozen-western-moguls-in-tow-ahead-of-high-stakes-talks-with-xi
US-China Summit: A strategic moment for stabilizing bilateral relations
14 May 2026 AIMN Editorial , By Chen Ziqi, https://theaimn.net/us-china-summit-a-strategic-moment-for-stabilizing-bilateral-relations/
US President Donald Trump arrived in Beijing on Wednesday for a new round of face-to-face talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping from May 14 to 15, a meeting arriving at a particularly delicate moment in global politics and the international economy.
It marks the first in-person meeting between the two leaders since the Busan agreement last October, where both sides agreed to suspend further escalation of the US–China trade war for one year.
While a flare-up in the Middle East delayed this meeting by a month, the cooling of tensions with Iran has finally cleared the flight path for what many view as the most consequential diplomatic inflection point of 2026.
Amid a fragile global recovery and uncertainty in international markets, the Beijing meeting is being closely watched for whether both powers can move from “crisis management” to a more sustainable form of strategic equilibrium, with implications for broader global economic stability.
At their first meeting on Thursday morning, President Xi congratulated the United States on its 250th anniversary, while President Trump praised Xi as “a great leader,” setting a warm and friendly tone for the opening of the summit.
President Xi noted that China and the US should be partners, not rivals, empathizing the relationship between the two countries would have implications not only for their peoples, but also for the future of the world. President Trump addressed this is going to be the biggest summit, as top business delegation was with him.
A US official said the two sides are expected to continue discussions on establishing new mechanisms for trade and investment coordination, with cooperation in agriculture, aerospace, and energy also likely to feature prominently.
Beijing, meanwhile, has framed the visit as an opportunity to stabilize bilateral ties amid growing global uncertainty. In remarks on Monday, China’s Foreign Ministry emphasized the need to expand mutually beneficial cooperation, manage differences, and “inject greater stability and certainty into a turbulent and changing world.”
Guidance from strategic analysts
Beijing, meanwhile, has framed the visit as an opportunity to stabilize bilateral ties amid growing global uncertainty. In remarks on Monday, China’s Foreign Ministry emphasized the need to expand mutually beneficial cooperation, manage differences, and “inject greater stability and certainty into a turbulent and changing world.”
Analysts broadly agree that the summit reflects a shared near-term interest in stabilizing China–US relations, even as deeper strategic tensions remain unresolved.
Zhao Hai, director of the International Politics Program at the National Institute for Global Strategy, points out that the primary “product” of this summit needs to be predictability. For the private sector, the specific policy is often less damaging than the volatility of not knowing what the policy will be tomorrow.
This mirrors the “managed strategic competition” framework championed by former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. The goal in Beijing is not necessarily to bridge a decade-long trust deficit in a three-day summit, but to prevent further accidental escalation. He said that careful coordination and transparent dialogue are essential to maintaining stability over the long term.
Economic frictions and business impacts
While Chinese state media frame economic relations as both a stabilizing foundation and a key driver of broader China–US ties, US tariff policy continues to sit at the center of bilateral disagreement.
While Beijing views these measures as “unreasonable restrictions,” the Trump administration continues to utilize them as its primary tool of economic leverage.
John McLean, chairman of the China–UK Business Development Centre, noted that shifting US tariff policies are creating deep uncertainty, prompting many companies to delay or reconsider long-term investment plans.
The economic data, however, tells a more nuanced story of self-inflicted wounds. A recent study by the Kiel Institute, a leading German economic research body, found that foreign exporters absorb only about 4% of the tariff burden, with the remaining 96% falling on US business and consumers.
These findings underscore that while tariffs are often framed as protecting American industries, their indirect effects are influencing pricing, supply chains, and investment decisions.
For small and medium-sized enterprises, the consequences are particularly acute. Philip Crawley, who operates a laser equipment import business in California, reported that tariffs imposed last year cost his company millions, forcing it to slow operations, reduce employee pay, and postpone hiring plans.
Glen Calder, president of Calder Brothers in South Carolina, said his steel costs increased by 25% even before US tariffs took effect, as markets anticipated higher trade barriers.
Strategic competition may be conducted at the state level, but its economic consequences are frequently absorbed by businesses, workers, and consumers navigating unpredictable policy environments.
Continued investment interest in China
Perhaps the most surprising element of the current climate is the resilience of corporate interest. Despite these challenges, many US businesses continue to view China as a critical market.
According to the American Chamber of Commerce in China, around 60% of American companies still plan to invest in the Chinese market, reflecting enduring confidence in China’s economic opportunities.
The rationale is clear: China accounts for roughly 17% of global GDP, contributes about 30% of global economic growth, with a and is projected to export nearly $4 trillion in exports in 2025.
Its sheer economic scale and growth make it important for companies to overlook, providing strong incentives to maintain or expand investment even amid uncertainty.
Looking ahead: Cooperation and strategic stability
President Xi noted in today’s meeting that success in one is an opportunity for the other. China has maintained a relatively consistent stance toward Washington, rooted in the idea that the Pacific is large enough for both powers. This summit offers a rare window to clarify intentions and move beyond the zero-sum rhetoric that has dominated the 2020s.
Reducing uncertainty in trade, investment, and technology will benefit businesses and global markets alike, reinforcing long-term stability, which is a shared asset, not a concession. Reducing the “noise” in trade and technology isn’t just a win for diplomats. It’s the oxygen required for global markets to breathe again.
Chen Ziqi is a reporter from CGTN
Amid the Iran chaos, war over Taiwan just became less likely
by Marcus Reubenstein | Apr 15, 2026, https://michaelwest.com.au/amid-the-iran-chaos-war-over-taiwan-just-became-less-likely/
Last week’s meeting between Beijing and Taiwan’s main opposition leader is a bad sign for the China hawks and a sign of rapprochement. Marcus Reubenstein reports.
The combination of the US-Israel war on Iran and the anti-China media narrative in Australia has meant the visit of the leader of Taiwan’s main opposition party, Cheng Li-wun, to China has largely been ignored. Cheng chairs the Kuomintang (KMT) party, and she spent five days in mainland China from the 7th until the 12th of April.
Her public pronouncements indicate a belief that it is not in Taiwan’s interest to pin all of its hopes on an economic and military alliance with the US, and its future is better served with a pivot towards Beijing.
A significant proportion of Taiwan’s population does not want armed conflict with China. More importantly, Taiwan’s political leaders are acknowledging the fact that the US is becoming an increasingly unhinged and unreliable ally.
As reported by NBC News, Cheng points to Ukraine, saying,
“People do not want to see Taiwan become the next Ukraine.”
Add to that mix that Taiwan gets 70% of its oil from the Middle East, there is sentiment in Taiwan that the US bombing of Iran has been disastrously thought out and delivers Taiwan massive economic pain. Will Taiwan risk becoming the centrepiece of a future US military disaster?
In December, Cheng told the New York Times, “Could it be the United States is treating Taiwan as a chess piece, a pawn strategically opposing the Chinese Communist Party at opportune times?”
Taiwan’s ruling DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) had attempted to push a $US40B arms deal with the US through parliament in March, but that was sunk by Cheng’s KMT. The ruling DPP was eventually able to get a deal worth just $US11B through – around one third of an AUKUS submarine.
Cheng’s China visit
The visit to China by Taiwan’s opposition leader took in three very significant cities, Nanjing, Shanghai and Beijing. Shanghai and Beijing, as financial and political capitals, were logical, but Nanjing is of great historical significance.
She visited the Sun Yat‑sen Mausoleum in Nanjing with a large Taiwanese delegation, a site honouring the founding father of the Republic of China, revered in both Taiwan and mainland China. Nanjing is also the site of one of Japan’s greatest wartime atrocities, the so-called Rape of Nanjing.
A small number of hardline figures in Japan’s ruling LDP continue to deny Japanese participated in any wartime atrocities. The LDP’s newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, stating that Japan would send in its military to aid Taiwan in any conflict with China, has dramatically escalated tensions between Beijing and Tokyo.
Takaichi is one of Japan’s most pro-US leaders, and Cheng’s visit to Nanjing would not be lost on the US. By extension, Cheng’s point of visiting Nanjing could be seen as a backhanded message to Japan, which hosts 55,000 US troops, to stay out of Taiwan’s affairs.
Implications for Australia
Cheng’s trip to China has implications for Australia and our foreign policies towards both our biggest trading partner and most important strategic partner.
The Albanese government has gone all in on the US’s East Asia military push, and now the US is showing clear signs of stress. The US has redeployed Thaad missile systems from South Korea to fight its war with Iran, while supercarrier naval vessels based in Japan, and operating in the South China Sea, have also been sent to the Gulf. Despite being the greatest military power in global history, it’s obvious it doesn’t take much to wear US forces thin.
Neither Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Foreign Minister Penny Wong, nor Defence Minister Richard Marles has deviated from Australia’s blind support for the US war on Iran.
The question is, will they follow the US into an inevitably disastrous war against China or, worse still, act as a proxy in a future war?
Australia’s tilt towards offensive military capability, also enthusiastically supported by the LNP opposition, and the billions committed to submarines which may never arrive, do not augur well.
If the US cannot defeat Iran, there is no path to victory against an equally determined China, far better equipped, with the world’s second largest economy, and that is not a pariah state.
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Last week’s meeting between Beijing and Taiwan’s main opposition leader is a bad sign for the China hawks and a sign of rapprochement. Marcus Reubenstein reports.
The combination of the US-Israel war on Iran and the anti-China media narrative in Australia has meant the visit of the leader of Taiwan’s main opposition party, Cheng Li-wun, to China has largely been ignored. Cheng chairs the Kuomintang (KMT) party, and she spent five days in mainland China from the 7th until the 12th of April.
Her public pronouncements indicate a belief that it is not in Taiwan’s interest to pin all of its hopes on an economic and military alliance with the US, and its future is better served with a pivot towards Beijing.
A significant proportion of Taiwan’s population does not want armed conflict with China. More importantly, Taiwan’s political leaders are acknowledging the fact that the US is becoming an increasingly unhinged and unreliable ally.
As reported by NBC News, Cheng points to Ukraine, saying,
People do not want to see Taiwan become the next Ukraine.
Add to that mix that Taiwan gets 70% of its oil from the Middle East, there is sentiment in Taiwan that the US bombing of Iran has been disastrously thought out and delivers Taiwan massive economic pain. Will Taiwan risk becoming the centrepiece of a future US military disaster?
In December, Cheng told the New York Times, “Could it be the United States is treating Taiwan as a chess piece, a pawn strategically opposing the Chinese Communist Party at opportune times?”
Taiwan’s ruling DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) had attempted to push a $US40B arms deal with the US through parliament in March, but that was sunk by Cheng’s KMT. The ruling DPP was eventually able to get a deal worth just $US11B through – around one third of an AUKUS submarine.
Cheng’s China visit
The visit to China by Taiwan’s opposition leader took in three very significant cities, Nanjing, Shanghai and Beijing. Shanghai and Beijing, as financial and political capitals, were logical, but Nanjing is of great historical significance.
She visited the Sun Yat‑sen Mausoleum in Nanjing with a large Taiwanese delegation, a site honouring the founding father of the Republic of China, revered in both Taiwan and mainland China. Nanjing is also the site of one of Japan’s greatest wartime atrocities, the so-called Rape of Nanjing.
A small number of hardline figures in Japan’s ruling LDP continue to deny Japanese participated in any wartime atrocities. The LDP’s newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, stating that Japan would send in its military to aid Taiwan in any conflict with China, has dramatically escalated tensions between Beijing and Tokyo.
Takaichi is one of Japan’s most pro-US leaders, and Cheng’s visit to Nanjing would not be lost on the US. By extension, Cheng’s point of visiting Nanjing could be seen as a backhanded message to Japan, which hosts 55,000 US troops, to stay out of Taiwan’s affairs.
Implications for Australia
Cheng’s trip to China has implications for Australia and our foreign policies towards both our biggest trading partner and most important strategic partner.
The Albanese government has gone all in on the US’s East Asia military push, and now the US is showing clear signs of stress. The US has redeployed Thaad missile systems from South Korea to fight its war with Iran, while supercarrier naval vessels based in Japan, and operating in the South China Sea, have also been sent to the Gulf. Despite being the greatest military power in global history, it’s obvious it doesn’t take much to wear US forces thin.
Neither Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Foreign Minister Penny Wong, nor Defence Minister Richard Marles has deviated from Australia’s blind support for the US war on Iran.
The question is, will they follow the US into an inevitably disastrous war against China or, worse still, act as a proxy in a future war?
Australia’s tilt towards offensive military capability, also enthusiastically supported by the LNP opposition, and the billions committed to submarines which may never arrive, do not augur well.
If the US cannot defeat Iran, there is no path to victory against an equally determined China, far better equipped, with the world’s second largest economy, and that is not a pariah state.
Respected US political scientist Professor John Mearsheimer says, US President Donald Trump’s war with Iran is “manna from heaven” for China. He argues the war on Iran has made the US an irresponsible stakeholder in the international system and that China looks like the “adults in the room.”
China’s carrot and stick
China’s approach to Taiwan, and more broadly to much of its global diplomacy, has been a mix of carrot and stick. Beijing is still dangling carrots in front of Taiwan. Reunification with Taiwan remains the endgame,
“but the overwhelming desire is that it should be achieved peacefully.”
Cheng was warmly received by Chinese President Xi Jinping, and following Cheng’s visit, the Chinese government announced a list of ten new policies to promote economic and travel initiatives to strengthen ties between Beijing and Taiwan.
In the background, a looming stick could be an easily achievable Chinese blockade of commercial shipping around Taiwan. As Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates, it doesn’t take a great deal of military firepower to cripple an economy.
What would, or could, Australia do to intervene? Hypothetically, that is a question which may face Australia, but a reconciliation, indeed possible unification between Taiwan and China, would render moot Australia’s current strategic policy.
Taiwan’s future?
While opinions in Taiwan about Cheng are divided, she has a realistic chance of becoming Taiwan’s next president at the 2028 election. To win, she doesn’t only have to run on China policy; there are plenty of domestic issues facing voters. Also, there is no suggestion that a reunified Taiwan would be considered as a province of China. Instead, it would become a special administrative region, citizens would keep their Taiwanese passports, and the New Taiwan Dollar would remain the official currency.The line in the sand for Beijing would be separatist movements and their sympathisers speaking out publicly. Taiwan would also be prohibited from entering into any military alliances or agreements with other nations.
While this is the same set of conditions imposed on Hong Kong, Taiwan hardly has a tradition of democracy. For its first four decades as a territory, it was governed under martial law, and it wasn’t until 1996 that democratic presidential elections were held.
Current president, Lai Ching-te, is unpopular with his approval rating sinking to 33% in late 2025, having recovered to the low 40% mark in the most recent polls. Cheng’s approval rating is lower, reflecting the distrust Taiwanese people have for their political leaders.
In terms of specific issues, concerns over the economy rank first for Taiwanese voters.
The Chinese, that is to say those of Chinese ethnicity, are by and large very pragmatic. Cheng is betting on a belief that close ties with China represent the future and that the
“Taiwanese people will come to distrust Washington more than they distrust Beijing.”
Xi–Zheng Meeting Sends Clear Signal: Peaceful Reunification Framed as Strategic Imperative for Chia’s Future
Author: Xu Jijun, founder of Han Tang Zhi Ku Analytical Centre, Apr 10, 2026
On the morning of 10 April 2026, inside the East Hall of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, met Zheng Liwen, Chair of the Kuomintang. The encounter marked the first meeting between leaders of the two parties in a decade. It unfolded at a moment of mounting global instability and heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait, giving it both historical weight and immediate political relevance.
The meeting was not merely ceremonial. It articulated a shared position that people on both sides of the Strait seek peace and oppose division. It also set out a political direction aimed at returning cross-Strait relations to a path of peaceful development, with the stated goal of eventual peaceful reunification.
A venue heavy with history
For mainland observers, the deeper meaning of the Xi–Zheng meeting is tied closely to its setting. The East Hall has hosted landmark moments in China’s modern history, including events linked to the return of Hong Kong and Macau. Its reuse for high-level dialogue between representatives of the two sides of the Strait carries unmistakable symbolism.
The message conveyed is straightforward. Both sides belong to one China, and Taiwan is regarded as an inseparable part of it. External complexities do not alter this premise. Questions concerning the Chinese nation are framed as matters to be resolved internally, with peaceful dialogue presented as the appropriate course.
A world defined by conflict
The significance of the meeting becomes clearer when placed against the current global backdrop. Armed conflicts in recent years have illustrated the scale of destruction associated with modern warfare.
The Russia–Ukraine conflict continues to impose heavy losses. According to the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE Institute), in its March 2026 assessment, Ukraine has suffered cumulative income losses of approximately 1.7 trillion US dollars since the escalation of hostilities in 2022, including projected losses through the end of 2026. Urban areas have been devastated, energy infrastructure repeatedly targeted, millions displaced, and environmental damage described as long-lasting.
Since February 2026, military action by the United States and Israel against Iran has produced similarly severe consequences. Around 80 per cent of Iran’s air defence systems have been destroyed, along with more than 450 missile installations. Its capacity for ballistic missile retaliation has reportedly fallen by 90 per cent. Production lines for “Shahed” unmanned aerial vehicles have been eliminated, reducing output by 85 per cent. The Iranian navy has seen approximately 160 vessels sunk or disabled, its naval headquarters destroyed, and its control over the Persian Gulf lost. Up to 90 per cent of the defence industrial base, including key shipyards, has been destroyed.
After just 38 days of conflict, Iran’s military capability, built over four decades, has been largely dismantled. Regional shipping has been disrupted, energy markets have experienced sharp volatility, tens of thousands have been killed, and millions displaced. Regional stability has effectively collapsed.
These developments illustrate the destructive potential of modern high-technology warfare. Precision-guided munitions, drone swarms, and long-range strike systems can disable power supplies, destroy transport infrastructure, contaminate land, and set back economic and social development by decades in a matter of weeks.
Taiwan and the global economy
Against this background, the text argues that any attempt to pursue “Taiwan independence” carries serious risks. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would likely exceed the scale and impact of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Taiwan occupies a central position in the global semiconductor industry. Firms such as TSMC hold a dominant share of advanced manufacturing capacity. In the event of war, supply chains would be disrupted immediately.
Simulations by international institutions suggest that, in a worst-case scenario, global GDP could fall by nearly 10 per cent in the first year of a Taiwan Strait conflict. Economic losses could reach 10.6 trillion US dollars, equivalent to around 333 trillion New Taiwan dollars. Taiwan’s own economy could contract by as much as 40 per cent. The shock would be felt across mainland China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union.
The military consequences would be severe. High-density missile strikes, electronic warfare, and naval and air blockades could lead to large-scale destruction of infrastructure on the island. Casualties would be significant, while environmental and humanitarian damage could prove irreversible. Given the close social and cultural ties between people on both sides of the Strait, any armed confrontation would result in profound human cost. Regional tensions would escalate rapidly, posing risks to stability in East Asia and beyond.
Political signalling and red lines
Within this framework, the position presented is that “Taiwan independence” represents a path with no viable outcome. It is described as running counter to shared interests and broader historical trends.
The alternative, as outlined, lies in adherence to the 1992 Consensus and opposition to separatism. Zheng Liwen’s visit, described as a “journey for peace”, emphasised the notion of cross-Strait kinship and was framed as aligning with public sentiment and prevailing conditions.
The meeting between the leaderships of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang reaffirmed a shared political foundation. It also conveyed a clear warning that any attempt at secession would meet firm opposition from the Chinese population as a whole and would carry significant costs.
Peaceful reunification and national strategy
eaceful reunification is presented as both a collective aspiration and a structural requirement for what is described as the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. It is framed as a pathway to shared economic benefits and improved living standards for people in Taiwan within a broader national framework.
The argument also stresses its role in preventing war, preserving stability, and enabling joint prosperity. At a regional and global level, it is depicted as contributing to stability in the Asia-Pacific and demonstrating China’s role as a responsible major power.
Historical experience is cited to support this position. Periods characterised by adherence to the One China principle and the promotion of peaceful cross-Strait relations have coincided with stability and active exchanges. By contrast, deviations from this approach have led to tension and economic disruption.
A milestone with wider implications
The Xi–Zheng meeting is thus framed as another milestone in the trajectory of cross-Strait relations. It highlights what is described as the mainland’s consistent commitment to the principle that both sides form one family, alongside a stated willingness to pursue peaceful reunification with sincerity.
For the international community, the meeting is presented as an example of the principle that China’s internal affairs should be resolved domestically. It offers a contrast to conflict-driven approaches that have produced severe consequences in other regions.
The conclusion drawn is one of confidence. With sustained efforts on both sides of the Strait, the prospect of peaceful reunification is portrayed as increasingly attainable. The broader objective, the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, is framed as a long-term historical trajectory.
No external force, the argument suggests, will ultimately be able to obstruct this course.
Conclusion
Peaceful reunification is presented as beneficial in the present and significant for generations to come. The current moment is described as a critical historical opportunity. By deepening economic integration, expanding cultural exchange, and strengthening cooperation in social development, both sides of the Strait are encouraged to move towards closer family ties, more integrated industries, broader opportunities for younger generations, and greater shared prosperity.
The overarching message is clear. The opportunity should be seized in the interests of people on both sides of the Strait and in pursuit of a more stable and prosperous future linked to the wider project of national rejuvenation.
Xi Hints At More Top Purges, Issues Warning To ‘Corrupt Elements’ In Chinese Army
by Tyler Durden, Mar 09, 2026, https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/xi-hints-more-top-purges-issues-warning-corrupt-elements-chinese-army
One of the big themes to come out of China over the past several months (and even years) has been Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (apparently ongoing) sweeping purge of PLA military command ranks on the basis of “corruption” – or rather what is most probably perceived disloyalty.
Already there’s been several top dismissals including the firings of multiple members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and dozens of generals – some even placed under house arrest, as well as a broad purge of the Chinese Communist Party.
Xi this weekend hinted there could be more to come, freshly warning Saturday during a speech to delegates from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police that disloyalty to the party – or else selfish dealings and corruption – will not be tolerated.
“There must be no place in the military for those who are disloyal to the party, nor any place for corrupt elements,” Xi said.
He then called for strict oversight in “key areas such as fund flows, the exercise of power, and quality control” during the country’s next five-year plan which is set to be approved later this month.
Here’s more of what he said via Chinese state sources:
It is essential to fully strengthen the Party’s leadership and Party building in the military, and make Party organizations at all levels even stronger, Xi said, stressing the need to translate the Party’s leadership strength into development momentum.
It is important to consolidate the ideological foundation that ensures officers and soldiers follow the Party and its guidance, and ensure that modern weaponry and equipment are placed in the hands of politically committed personnel, Xi said.
A former CIA analyst who follows Chinese elite politics, Christopher K. Johnson, recently told the NY Times of the ongoing purge trend:
“This move is unprecedented in the history of the Chinese military and represents the total annihilation of the high command.”
The PLA has seen significant internal turmoil, especially since the Communist Party’s 20th Congress in late 2022. Several top military figures – including Defense Ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, and CMC Political Work Department head Miao Hua – have disappeared or been removed, and many more followed.
China’s Retaliation: when will it happen?
And more appropriately, what form will it take?
Jerrys take on China, Feb 18, 2026, https://jerrygrey2002.substack.com/p/chinas-retaliation-when-will-it-happen?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1744413&post_id=188346536&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=ln98x&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
A few comments about why China is like it is – first of all, in the last 45 years, there has been no invasions, despite what people like little Marco Rubio of the US and Richard Marles the Australian Defence Minister might say, China is not and does not pose a threat to any of these countries – Japan might think there is a threat, China does not agree, in fact the opposite is true, Japan poses a much larger threat to China than China has ever posed to Japan.
China is concerned about, and in fact does feel threatened by Japan’s military expansion because the last time it happened literally millions of Chinese were murdered by the Japanese. Australia’s defence minister, Marles, asks us to consider why China has the world’s largest military expansion but he’s wrong – we have to hope he’s wrong because he’s been misinformed and is too dim to check out for himself, but more likely he knows he’s lying about this as China spends considerably less money than the US, in terms of not only its population but its geographical size, it’s quite entitled to spend more cash, when on a per capita basis, the amount is tiny compared to the US, on a ratio to GDP, it’s smaller than the US, it’s one third or less than NATO has been required to spend in terms of percentage of GDP and there’s one more very important factor that the US with only two neighbouring countries doesn’t have – that is 14 neighbouring countries with a shared land border.
Here’s another thing. China was invaded when they were weak, the British did it, the Americans did it, the eight nations alliance did it, Britain carved up part of Burma and took away some of China, it carved up India and took away parts of China, the Russians carved up Mongolia and Heilongjiang, taking away parts of China, the Japanese invaded and occupied China for 14 years. The classic twists and mental gymnastics people like Marles make would have us believe that the hundreds of US bases around China are to prevent China from doing what they’ve NEVER done – going out to invade other countries.
He, and several pundits would like us all to believe is that the US is keeping the world safe from China by arming their neighbours, interfering in the Provinces, Regions and the SARs but the reality is, China is building a military that will defend Chinese people inside China and Chinese land that belongs to China now – it’s not looking to reclaim land back, except in disputed regions.
Those disputed regions include parts of Tibet that the British took away and gave to India, parts of the South China Seas that the Japanese took away and both the US and UK, at the end of the Second World War, agreed would come back to China. There’s one military base in Africa, which is in a region shared with many other countries, including the USA, Japan, France, Italy, Germany Spain and even Saudi Arabia. Taiwan is NOT one of these disputed regions – the entire world whether they recognise Beijing or Taipei as the capital, recognises that there is one China and Taiwan is part of it – anyone who suggests that Taiwan is a country is either a liar, deliberately misleading us, or is far too dim to read the Constitution of the Republic of China, which not only claims all of the Chinese Mainland, it also wants those disputed regions back too.
China has something else which its detractors hate to admit and will lie about – that’s a policy of non-interference in the affairs of a sovereign nation – when it invests in another nation, it doesn’t call for democracy or elections, it doesn’t even ask that Communism or Socialism are accepted, it doesn’t send military to protect its assets, it won’t send missionaries to convert their subjects and it won’t impose conditions that force countries to give up their national assets or utilities if they can’t make the payments – if that sounds familiar and if it’s because you’ve been hearing that China will do all of those things and, if you think they have, I’d implore you to find me an example of where it’s happened, outside of opinion pieces written by people who want you to believe they have, almost every incident where we can find any of these things alleged, will be speculative – they’ll tell us what China might do, what China could do, what China may be doing, is alleged to have done or suspected to be involved in.
We might find individual cases of rogue Chinese people, Chinese criminals even and they use these tiny individual examples to tell you that this is “what China does” when that person who has broken the law has usually already been punished by the time they report it in western media and, if they mention that at all, it’ll be after the third paragraph where most of us have stopped reading.
On the other hand, I can find literally hundreds of examples where the USA is doing these things, where the UK and France have done these things, where Germany, Belgium, even Spain and Portugal have done them.
So then some of the comments I have been getting relate to the Port in Darwin, the ports in Panama and the Pirelli saga in Italy. Just for some background here, Sinochem owns 37% of Pirelli, the big Italian tyre company which wants to expand into the USA, of course the US won’t allow that while China has such a controlling interest. The share of Sinochem hasn’t changed, the only change is that the board, and remember Sinochem had controlling interest being the largest single shareholder, has declared that Sinochem no longer has control, giving the board more autonomy, – Sinochem agreed to this, so this isn’t a situation where anything has been taken from China, merely an agreement that the board retains control which a Chinese corporation retains more shares.
Erich, one of my followers said this: “if China doesn’t protect its assets it will lose them like Pirelli in Italy, the Ports in Panama, etc. Maybe at some point China will start caring about these things.”
My response is that it’s not just Erich, it’s literally hundreds of people, probably thousands but many in my responses who are misunderstanding China. China cares very deeply about the assets its people and corporations invest in, particularly overseas, but it will not break international laws, or contractual Agreements in order to protect them from people or governments which do break laws.
China will react to this in the same way it reacts to every other illegal action against it, by negotiations, and where they fail, arbitration, it will, when all else fails, take the appropriate legal action, which might be appeals to the WTO and perhaps even the UN or more likely the local courts – it knows there will be no satisfaction from those appeals but they are the legal mechanisms open to Chinese corporation. China as a government participates in legal and lawful bodies and does not want to overthrow them, to do so, makes China another USA – so the actions China takes, which will definitely be retaliatory, will be legal, they can, and probably will reduce purchases from offending countries, and of course, they will be much more careful in the decisions when investing in those countries both of which are well within their legal rights.
What China will not do is: unilaterally sanction anyone, any country or even any organisation within the country, it will not militarily defend its assets, it will not interfere in the internal affairs of another country but there is no doubt in my mind that if any country persists and acts on threats to China’s investments, there will be repercussions, probably it’s best not to call them retaliations, they are simply normal responses to a situation of risk.
In Australia for example, if they persist with this challenge to the legal investments Landbridge has made, investments that are compliant in every way and even beneficial to the people of the Northern Territory in jobs and payroll taxes, as well as increased business going through it’s port and beneficial to the people of Australia in 4.5 million income tax paid last year, those are the people who will suffer – China will find other suppliers for the things Australia sends – so far, the only one which is not directly sourced elsewhere is iron ore and, if China stops buying that in any great quantity, it will kill Australia’s economy.
Just continuing to use Darwin Port as an example, it is a critical trade hub in Northern Australia, handling minerals, agriculture, and livestock, with 2,295 vessel visits recorded in 2024-25, marking a 31.07% increase on the previous year. Darwin serves as a key gateway to Asia, managing significant exports of manganese, titanium, iron ore, and livestock. Given that China is the major trading partner of Australia, a huge proportion, unfortunately, there’s no way I can find out, would be Chinese owned, flagged, operated or destined ships, they would be travelling between China and Darwin – that’s 44 ships a week, many of which will simply divert to other ports, or, if the asset has been seized they’re more likely to simply stop coming altogether – how can that possibly benefit the warehouses, the truckers, the waste management, the catering and hospitality venues that the sailors use, the customs brokers, the security and surveillance companies – there’s an entire eco-system of industries deriving their income from a well-operated port and Darwin, which is a small city will feel a very heavy impact from no Chinese ships arriving and departing there. There will also be a lot of farmers, miners and other suppliers using that port to ship to China – it will all stop.
So, to think China will just sit back and do nothing is wrong, they are very mindful that their investments are not just at risk but under threat – business leaders in China understand this and are already taking action – there’s an April 2024 KPMG report, that’s almost 2 years old now showing that China’s investments in Australia have declined from a peak in 2016, just after the Free Trade Agreement was signed to the lowest level since 2006. It’s well worth a read if you’re interested, the report defines all kinds of factors but fails to mention the obvious one – Australia simply doesn’t want Chinese investment, they feel threatened by perceptions given to them by media which are completely false.
In keeping with the maxim that one person’s loss is another’s gain, the vast majority of China’s Overseas Direct Investment is now going to One Belt One Road countries – these are safe destinations, they are countries that welcome trade with and investments from China. In the Western world, that’s not many countries. Leaders of Canada and the UK were recently in China seeking investment opportunities, in both cases, they returned to their home countries to media criticism. It remains to be seen how they will handle this but they, as leaders, and their business leaders all know the truth – the media is lying, a few politicians who are actually paid by Washington to further lie about China are losing influence. Some people will assume that I’m either exaggerating about this but the reality is there for all to see, if you don’t believe me, go look up who are the main funders of the Inter Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC). It states clearly on its website that it does not accept funds from governments. But then lists the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican movement, Hello Taiwan the National Democratic Institute and others, all of which are government funded and almost all of which can trace their funds back to Washington DC and congressionally approved expenditure.
The vast majority of the Non-US aligned world realises – there is no threat from China and, once again I reiterate something I’ve said many times, the people telling you China is a threat are more likely to damage your economy and your global standing than China ever will – China isn’t a threat, it’s those people telling you it is, who are.
No evidence to support US claim China conducted nuclear blast test: Monitor
Robert Floyd, executive secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, said in a statement on Friday that the body’s monitoring system “did not detect any event consistent with the characteristics of a nuclear weapon test explosion” at the time of the alleged Chinese test, adding that that assessment remains unchanged after further detailed analyses.
Washington wants Beijing to join a new nuclear weapons treaty after expiration of the New START accord between the US and Russia.
By Al Jazeera and News Agencies, 6 Feb 26, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/7/no-evidence-to-support-us-claim-china-conducted-nuclear-blast-test-monitor
An international monitor said it has seen no evidence to support the claim by a senior United States official who accused China of carrying out a series of clandestine nuclear tests in 2020 and concealing activities that violated nuclear test ban treaties.
US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno made the assertions about China at a United Nations disarmament conference in Geneva, Switzerland, on Friday, just days after a nuclear treaty with Russia expired.
“I can reveal that the US government is aware that China has conducted nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tonnes,” DiNanno said at the conference.
China’s military “sought to conceal testing by obfuscating the nuclear explosions because it recognised these tests violate test ban commitments,” he said.
“China conducted one such yield-producing nuclear test on June 22 of 2020,” he said.
DiNanno also made his allegations on social media in a series of posts, making the case for “new architecture” in nuclear weapons control agreements following the expiration of the New START treaty with Russia this week.
“New START was signed in 2010 and its limits on warheads and launchers are no longer relevant in 2026 when one nuclear power is expanding its arsenal at a scale and pace not seen in over half a century and another continues to maintain and develop a vast range of nuclear systems unconstrained by New START’s terms,” he said.
Robert Floyd, executive secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, said in a statement on Friday that the body’s monitoring system “did not detect any event consistent with the characteristics of a nuclear weapon test explosion” at the time of the alleged Chinese test, adding that that assessment remains unchanged after further detailed analyses.
China’s ambassador on nuclear disarmament, Shen Jian, did not directly address DiNanno’s charge at the conference but said Beijing had always acted prudently and responsibly on nuclear issues while the US had “continued to distort and smear China’s national defence capabilities in its statements”.
We firmly oppose this false narrative and reject the US’s unfounded accusations,” Shen said.
“In fact, the US’s series of negative actions in the field of nuclear arms control are the biggest source of risk to international security,” he said.
Later on social media, Shen said, “China has always honored its commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing”.
Diplomats at the conference said the US allegations were new and concerning.
China, like the US, has signed but not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans explosive nuclear tests. Russia signed and ratified it, but withdrew its ratification in 2023.
US President Donald Trump has previously instructed the US military to prepare for the resumption of nuclear tests, stating that other countries are conducting them without offering details.
The US president said on October 31 that Washington would start testing nuclear weapons “on an equal basis” with Moscow and Beijing, but without elaborating or explaining what kind of nuclear testing he wanted to resume.
He has also said that he would like China to be involved in any future nuclear treaty, but authorities in Beijing have shown little interest in his proposal.
Leaked Nuclear Secrets: China Arrests Top Military Leader Close to Xi Jinping
Vladislav V., January 25, 2026, https://militarnyi.com/en/news/leaked-nuclear-secrets-china-arrests-top-military-leader-close-to-xi-jinping/
China’s top general has been accused of leaking information about the country’s nuclear program to the United States and of accepting bribes to facilitate official promotions, including that of an officer to the post of defense minister.
This was reported by The Wall Street Journal, citing attendees of a closed briefing on the case.
The briefing, attended by some of China’s senior military commanders, took place shortly before the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China issued a statement announcing an investigation into General Zhang Youxia.
He had previously been considered one of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s closest military allies.
The official statement provided minimal details, only noting that Zhang was under investigation for serious violations of party discipline and state law.
Sources familiar with the undisclosed briefing said Zhang is suspected of forming political cliques — a term in the Chinese system that refers to informal networks undermining the Communist Party’s unity.
He is also accused of abusing his authority in the Central Military Commission, the top body overseeing the PLA’s administration.
Investigators are focusing on the period when Zhang headed the influential department responsible for military research, development, and procurement.
According to sources, the general allegedly received large sums in exchange for official appointments and promotions within the military procurement system, which operates with multi-billion-dollar budgets.
Zhang Youxia’s Removal and Its Consequences
Zhang’s removal makes the purge of the PRC general staff one of the largest personnel reshuffles in the Chinese military since the dispersal of protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
Control over the armed forces is widely seen as critical to the power and political survival of Chinese leaders. Historically, internal party struggles have often been won by those with authority and influence over the military.
Zhang’s dismissal highlights Xi’s drive for absolute concentration of power.
As first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, a role combining responsibilities similar to those of a US defense minister, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and national security adviser, Zhang held exceptionally broad authority.
He oversaw strategy, promotions, and budgets, and reported directly to Xi. Analysts had considered him virtually untouchable due to his combat experience and personal ties to Xi.
Zhang had survived previous purges among the generals, retained significant loyalty within the military, and remained in his top post well past the normal retirement age.
Analysts say his removal reflects Xi’s urgent effort to “restore order” in the military leadership, despite Zhang’s planned retirement at the next party congress in 2027.
Xi’s unprecedented consolidation of military power also narrows the circle of decision-makers on Taiwan and other strategic issues, including control of China’s nuclear arsenal.
Analysts note that the older generation of PLA leaders has historically acted as a moderating influence in military planning.
The reshuffle comes as Xi seeks to rapidly modernize the military and achieve strategic objectives, including the declared ability to conduct operations against Taiwan by 2027.
Spectral Threats: China, Russia and Trump’s Greenland Rationale
Were Russia or China to attempt an occupation of Greenland through military means, Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty would come into play, obliging NATO member states, including the United States, to collectively repel the effort.
“There are no Russian and Chinese ships all over the place around Greenland,”
“Russia and/or China has no capacity to occupy Greenland or to take control over Greenland.”
14 January 2026 Dr Binoy Kampmark, https://theaimn.net/spectral-threats-china-russia-and-trumps-greenland-rationale/
The Trump administration’s mania about Greenland, a self-governing territory of Denmark, is something to behold. Its untutored thuggery, its brash assertiveness, and the increasingly strident threats to either use force, bully Denmark into a sale of the island, or simply annex the territory, have officials and commentators scrambling for theories and precedents. The Europeans are terrified that the NATO alliance is under threat from another NATO member. The Greenlanders are anxious and confused. But the ground for further action by Washington is being readied by finding threats barely real and hardly plausible.
The concerns about China and Russia seizing Greenland retells the same nonsense President Donald Trump promoted in kidnapping the Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. Looking past the spurious narcoterrorism claims against the former leader, it fell to the issue of who would control the natural resources of the country. If we don’t get Venezuelan oil now and secure it for American companies, the Chinese or the Russians will. he gangster’s rationale is crudely reductionist, seeing all in a similar veinThe obsession with Beijing and Moscow runs like a forced thread through a dotty, insular rationale that repels evidence and cavorts with myth: “We need that [territory],” reasons the President, “because if you take a look outside Greenland right now, there are Russian destroyers, there are Chinese destroyers and, bigger, there are Russian submarines all over the place. We are not gonna have Russia or China occupy Greenland, and that’s what they’re going to do if we don’t.” On Denmark’s military capabilities in holding the island against any potential aggressor, Trump could only snort with macho dismissiveness. “You know what their defence is? Two dog sleds.”
This scratchy logic is unsustainable for one obvious point. Were Russia or China to attempt an occupation of Greenland through military means, Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty would come into play, obliging NATO member states, including the United States, to collectively repel the effort. With delicious perversity, any US effort to forcibly acquire the territory through use of force would be an attack on its own security, given its obligations under the Treaty. In such cases, it becomes sound to assume, as the Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen does, that the alliance would cease to exist.
Such matters are utterly missed by the rabidly hawkish Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller, who declared that, “Nobody’s going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland.” It was up to the US “to secure the Arctic region, to protect and defend NATO and NATO interests” in incorporating Greenland. To take territory from a NATO ally was essentially doing it good.
Given that the United States already has a military presence on the island at the Pituffik Space Base, and rights under the 1951 agreement that would permit an increase in the number of bases should circumstances require it, along with the Defence Cooperation Agreement finalised with Copenhagen in June 2025, much of Miller’s airings are not merely farcical but redundant. Yet, Trump has made it clear that signatures and understandings reflected in documents are no substitute for physically taking something, the thrill of possession that, by its act, deprives someone else of it. “I think ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do, whether you’re talking about a lease or a treaty,” he told the New York Times. “Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.”
What, then, of these phantom forces from Moscow and Beijing, supposedly lying in wait to seize the frozen prize? “There are no Russian and Chinese ships all over the place around Greenland,” states the very convinced research director of the Oslo-based Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Andreas Østhagen. “Russia and/or China has no capacity to occupy Greenland or to take control over Greenland.”
Danish Foreign Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen is similarly inclined. “The image that’s being painted of Russian and Chinese ships right inside the Nuuk fjord and massive Chinese investments being made is not correct.” Senior “Nordic diplomats” quoted in the Financial Times add to that version, even if the paper is not decent enough to mention which Nordic country they come from. “It is simply not true that the Chinese and Russians are there,” said one. “I have seen the intelligence. There are no ships, no submarines.” Vessel tracking data from Marine Traffic and LSEG have so far failed to disclose the presence of Chinese and Russian ships near the island.
Heating engineer Lars Vintner, based in Greenland’s capital, Nuuk, wondered where these swarming, spectral Chinese were based. “The only Chinese I see,” he told Associated Press,“ is when I go to the fast food market.” This sparse presence extends to the broader security footprint of China in the Arctic, which remains modest despite a growing collaboration with Russia since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. These have included Arctic and coast guard operations, while the Chinese military uses satellites and icebreakers equipped with deep-sea mini submarines, potentially for mapping the seabed.
However negligible and piffling the imaginary threat, analysts, ever ready with a larding quote or a research brief, are always on hand to show concern with such projects as Beijing’s Polar Silk Road, announced in 2018, which is intended as the Arctic extension of its transnational Belt and Road initiative. The subtext: Trump should not seize Greenland, but he might have a point. “China has clear ambitions to expand its footprint and influence in the region, which it considers… an emerging arena for geopolitical competition.” Or so says Helena Legarda of the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin.
The ludicrous nature of Trump’s claims and acquisitive urges supply fertile material for sarcasm. A prominent political figure from one of the alleged conquerors-to-be made an effort almost verging on satire. “Trump needs to hurry up,” mocked the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council and former President Dmitry Medvedev. “According to unverified information, within a few days, there could be a sudden referendum where all 55,000 residents of Greenland might vote to join Russia. And that’s it!” With Trump, “that’s it” never quite covers it.
Faslane nuclear base tugboats may be built in China
UK Defence Journal By George Allison, January 12, 2026
New tugboats intended to support operations at HM Naval Base Clyde, the UK’s nuclear submarine hub at Faslane, may be constructed in China under a major fleet replacement programme, depending on how the contractor applies its global production model.
The vessels form part of the Defence Maritime Services Next Generation programme, under which Serco is replacing a wide range of Royal Navy harbour and support craft. The programme covers tugs, pilot boats and barges used at naval bases across the UK, including Faslane, which hosts the UK’s continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent.
Under the current arrangements, the Ministry of Defence pays Serco to provide support services at the Royal Navy’s principal bases, and allows Serco, as the prime contractor, to determine its own supply chain for vessel replacement.
Build locations and Damen’s production model
Damen operates a distributed shipbuilding model, with construction spread across a network of yards in Europe and Asia depending on vessel type and production capacity. The company has historically built a range of smaller commercial and support vessels at yards in China and Vietnam, including certain classes of tugboats, while other workboat types are constructed at European facilities in countries such as Poland and Romania. Final outfitting, integration and delivery preparation are often carried out in the Netherlands or at European partner yards, depending on the contract.
Neither Serco nor Damen has publicly confirmed the specific build locations for individual vessels within the programme. However, Damen’s established production model suggests that some tugboats could be built outside Europe, including at shipyards in China that form part of Damen’s wider manufacturing network……………………………………………………………………………………………….
Not the first time
A similar issue emerged in Australia in 2025, when the national broadcaster ABC reported that a new fleet of tugboats ordered for the Royal Australian Navy had been built in China under a contract awarded to Dutch shipbuilder Damen. The report said certification documents showed the vessels were constructed at Damen’s Changde shipyard in China, before being delivered to Australia under a civilian-operated support arrangement.
In response to the reporting, Australia’s Department of Defence confirmed that the tugboats had been built in China, while stating that they were not commissioned naval vessels and would be operated by a civilian contractor. Defence officials emphasised that sustainment activity would take place domestically and that the vessels were intended for harbour support roles rather than frontline operations…………………….
Wider security context
In a separate but related context, the Ministry of Defence has in recent months issued internal guidance concerning the use of vehicles containing Chinese-manufactured components, amid broader concerns about information security and connected systems. Media reporting has said warning notices were placed in some MoD-leased vehicles advising personnel not to discuss sensitive matters inside them or connect official devices, and that certain vehicles were restricted from accessing sensitive military sites. The measures were described as precautionary, with no publicly confirmed security breach.
Parliamentary questions have also raised wider issues about reliance on overseas-manufactured systems within defence and government operations. Ministers have acknowledged the need to assess potential vulnerabilities linked to global supply chains, while maintaining that decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis and that there has been no evidence of compromise.
Competing views on cost, transparency and social value
Those defending the programme argue that the arrangements reflect commercial shipbuilding norms rather than a deliberate policy decision. They note that hull construction in Asia can reduce costs and production timelines, with final outfitting, systems integration and acceptance carried out later in Europe under established regulatory oversight. Critics argue that the lack of transparency over build locations risks undermining confidence, especially where vessels operate at nuclear sites. They contend that clearer public disclosure is needed on where vessels are constructed and what safeguards apply during the build process.
Louise Gilmour, secretary of GMB Scotland, said the decision to source the workboats overseas represented a missed opportunity to support domestic shipbuilding capacity, particularly at Ferguson Marine, where the union represents the largest section of the workforce. She said the vessels were well suited to the type of work the yard had carried out for generations and argued that contracts of this scale could play a role in sustaining skills and employment in Scotland.
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/faslane-nuclear-base-tugboats-may-be-built-in-china/
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