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“Having a meeting is not necessarily the same as dialogue, and if it is a one-way explanation meeting, it is no different from an online video or television”

September 21, 2021

The release of treated water into the ocean was explained 532 times in advance…

A request for information disclosure made by NHK has revealed that the government claimed to have held a total of 532 “opinion exchanges” and “briefing sessions” regarding the increasing amount of treated water at the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in the year leading up to April 2012, when it decided to release the water into the ocean.
On the other hand, even after the decision was made, there are still strong opposition to the release of radioactive materials from fishermen in the prefecture, raising questions about the nature of the discussions.

The government says that the decision to release treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the sea was made after listening to the opinions of related parties, based on the report of a national sub-committee which said that “release into the sea or the atmosphere is realistic.
However, even after the decision was made, a series of resolutions and opinion letters opposing the policy were issued by fishery groups and parliamentary assemblies in Fukushima Prefecture, claiming that there was not enough discussion.
Therefore, NHK requested the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which is in charge of the policy, to disclose the documents showing what discussions the government had with the relevant parties before the decision was made.

In response, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) disclosed a list of the subjects and dates of “opinion exchanges” and “briefing sessions” held between January 31, 2011, when the national subcommittee compiled its draft report, and April 13, 2011, when the government decided on the policy of oceanic release.

According to the list, a total of 532 “opinion exchanges” and “briefing sessions” were held in and outside of Fukushima Prefecture over a period of more than one year and two months.
The average number of times per day is two per point, with the highest number of times per day being 14.
The breakdown of the targets, in descending order of frequency, is as follows: heads of local governments in the prefecture 83 times, fishery-related organizations 74 times, and local government councils 72 times.
On the other hand, consumers were interviewed 18 times, the tourism industry 12 times, the head of a local government outside the prefecture 23 times, and the assembly of a local government outside the prefecture 15 times.

Masahiro Matsuura, a professor at Meiji University’s Graduate School of Public Policy who is an expert on science and technology policy and consensus building, said, “It is possible that there was a lack of dialogue in the sense of gaining understanding,” and added, “Having a meeting is not necessarily the same as dialogue, and if it is a one-way explanation meeting, it is no different from an online video or television. Dialogue is only possible when the participating fishermen and the general public speak out and the explanation is given in the form of a catch-all game. Even if an opinion is received, if the bureaucrat without authority continues to say, ‘We will take it back to Tokyo for consideration,’ it is not dialogue. If the prime minister, ministers, and other people who can make substantive decisions came to the meeting and answered specific questions on the spot, it might not have been necessary to hold the meeting as many times. It will be important to evaluate the state of the debate over treated water over time,” he said.

Fishermen: “There was no discussion.
The government has held more than 70 “opinion exchanges” and “briefing sessions” with fishermen, but after the policy was decided, fishermen in Fukushima Prefecture said that the decision was unilateral.
In July 2020, the Soma Futaba Fishermen’s Cooperative Association in the northern part of the prefecture held a total of four briefing sessions for fishermen belonging to the cooperative, divided into four districts.
However, according to the fishermen who participated in the briefings, most of the briefings were about the report compiled by the subcommittee, and they rarely exchanged opinions with each other about the disposal method or reputational measures.
Mr. Masahiro Kikuchi, the vice president of the association, said, “At the time of the briefing, we hadn’t decided whether to release the waste into the ocean or into the air, and there were no concrete explanations about measures against harmful rumors. There were no further meetings, and I feel that the decision was made unilaterally. I think that if they had held monthly meetings with young fishermen, including those who will be responsible for the future of the fishery, and listened to their opinions, they would have come up with an answer that would have satisfied some, if not all, of them.

Co-op: “Not enough explanation to consumers”
More than 70 “opinion exchanges” and “briefing sessions” were held for fishermen, heads of local governments and assemblies in the prefecture, but only 18 briefings were given to consumers.
At Fukushima Prefecture’s Co-op Fukushima, where about 200,000 households in the prefecture are members, no briefing was held by the government before the policy was decided.
Shunkichi Nonaka, the general manager of the co-op, said that he feels that there was an overwhelming lack of opportunities to hear the opinions of consumers, some of whom are opposed to the release of radioactive materials into the ocean due to safety concerns.
Mr. Nonaka said, “All citizens are consumers, and I thought it was necessary to give a broad explanation to consumers, but I think the government and TEPCO did not give enough consideration to this. I think the government and TEPCO should have consulted with us before deciding on the policy of releasing radioactive materials into the ocean and asked us what we thought about it.

The government official said, “We discussed it to a great extent.
Regarding the fact that the government and related parties held more than 500 opinion exchanges and briefing sessions over a period of about one year and two months, Mr. Masato Kino, Counselor of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, said, “We have been visiting related parties who are likely to be affected by the rumors due to the disposal of the treated water, and our staff members have been working together to make a list of them. We believe that we have exchanged opinions with all kinds of people to a considerable extent. There were people who opposed the release of treated water into the ocean, but I believe we have incorporated the opinions we have heard into our decision-making process.
As for the fact that we have not gained the understanding of fishermen and others regarding our policy on the release of radioactive materials, he said, “We are doing our best to prevent rumors. I think we are still at the stage where people don’t feel safe, so our mission is to do our best.
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/lnews/fukushima/20210921/6050015878.html?fbclid=IwAR22Y7RVJ8eTn7_tON6pDmtV6PdnMZU1BAULMXLY-JseTew3 glnFBLeKhvs

September 23, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , , | Leave a comment

Fukushima aims to attract new residents

A sign gives notice of decontamination and building demolition in areas categorized as difficult-to-return zones within Futaba, Fukushima Prefecture.

September 20, 2021

FUKUSHIMA – The central and local governments have begun encouraging people from outside Fukushima Prefecture to move into areas surrounding Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.’s Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, hoping that new residents will revive the areas.

The central government plans to lift evacuation orders in all areas categorized as difficult-to-return zones so that residents wishing to return to their homes can do so within the 2020s. However, in areas where such an order has already been lifted, residents have been slow to return.

300 newcomers sought

I’ve long wanted to contribute to the reconstruction of Fukushima, said Daisuke Yamamoto, 49, an engineer who moved from Sapporo to the city of Tamura, Fukushima Prefecture, in August.

Yamamoto said he aimed to set up his own business there.

The central government’s financial support system, which began in July, encouraged him to move in. The system grants up to 2 million Yen to those who move into 12 municipalities near the nuclear plant from outside the prefecture. Additional funds of up to 4 million Yen will be paid if they launch a business there. The government’s goal is to bring in 300 new people this fiscal year alone.

Local municipalities are preparing for new residents. In July, the Fukushima prefectural government set up a joint support center with the 12 municipalities. In Minami-Soma, vacant houses will be renovated into rental housing. In the village of Katsurao, eight units of municipal apartment housing will be constructed.

10% want to return

Behind the move is the slow return of residents to areas where the evacuation orders were lifted. The Reconstruction Agency and others surveyed the residents of five towns, including Futaba and Okuma, and found that only about 10% wanted to return.

The town of Namie, where the evacuation order was partially lifted in 2017, now has a population of 1,717. In fiscal 2019, 70 people in 49 households moved into the town from outside the prefecture, thanks in part to the presence of factories opened by 10 companies, but the population is still only about a tenth of its pre-disaster size.

The only way to keep the town going is to further increase the number of new arrivals, a town official said.

Commuting, restoring

Over 10 years after the nuclear accident, people who have rebuilt their lives in areas to which they evacuated will have the option of having residences in two locations, commuting to Fukushima Prefecture while carrying on with their present lives elsewhere.

A 66-year-old man who moved his family to Hitachi, Ibaraki Prefecture, has a home in an area categorized as a difficult-to-return zone in Namie. In order to return to that home, he would need to repair the now dilapidated house. His children have found jobs in Ibaraki. The man’s life in Ibaraki, where he grows vegetables in rented fields, has become settled.

I have no choice but to spend two hours each way to get to and from Fukushima, he said.

In a survey conducted last fiscal year by the towns of Futaba, Okuma and Tomioka on their residents, about 60% said they wanted to maintain ties with their hometowns.

The evacuation order for Naraha was lifted in 2015, but the number of residents in the town now has leveled off at 50% of the population before the accident. The town aims to raise the figure to 60% by 2030, or 5,130 people, by subsidizing JR train fares for residents who live in two locations.

The town of Tomioka supports residents who have been evacuated outside the town in the hope of bringing about reconstruction by commuting. It opened social center and support office facilities in Iwaki, Fukushima Prefecture, and Saitama City, which are two places where many evacuated Tomioka residents now live. In those facilities, staff check up on the health of the evacuees or give counseling.

Those who want to go home someday will become important people for the progress of reconstruction, said Yusuke Yamashita, a sociology professor at Tokyo Metropolitan University. The central and local governments should continue to provide assistance from the perspective of reconstruction by commuting.

https://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0007769221

September 20, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , , , | Leave a comment

Regulators: Waste stored poorly at Fukushima plant

Sept. 18, 2021

Japanese nuclear regulators have urged the operator of the disabled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant to improve the way it manages accumulating waste at the complex.

Most of the radioactive waste generated through decommissioning of the plant is being stored at designated outdoor depots.

But wreckage and other clutter that cannot be quickly transported there is instead being kept at interim sites for up to one year in principle.

The Nuclear Regulation Authority says the volume of waste at the interim sites reached 60,000 cubic meters in July, surging more than eight-fold from the figure in January of last year.

It also says the waste has been kept longer than one year in some sites, and not enough patrols are being conducted.

The plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company, says it could not send the waste to the outdoor depots while work was underway to rearrange containers there. It adds that the containers had to be inspected following leaks of radioactive substances.

The company says it will review the temporary storage arrangements and manage waste properly.

The total volume of radioactive waste at the plant reached about 480,000 cubic meters as of March of this year, 10 years after the triple nuclear meltdown accident.

https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20210919_01/

September 20, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , | Leave a comment

Japan’s Plan To Discharge Nuclear Waste Into The Pacific Worries Island Nations

The effects and memory of U.S. nuclear testing endures in the Pacific. “It is a level up from urgent for us,” one Pacific leader says.

Pacific nations and territories aren’t yet convinced their people and waters will be safe when Japan discharges processed nuclear wastewater into the Pacific, as it recently announced it plans to do.

Despite briefings from Japan, and its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Pacific community has yet to fully understand what the ramifications of dropping 1 million tons of wastewater off Japan’s coast might be.

“Currently we are not satisfied there will be no harm to our Blue Pacific,” said Henry Puna, secretary general of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, noting that even basic concerns had not yet been addressed.

Japan triggered immediate and strong opposition when it announced the plan in April, initially from neighboring nations South Korea and China, though countries and territories across the Pacific continue to express their dissatisfaction with Japan’s engagement with them thus far.

The wastewater, which contains debris from the Fukushima Daiichi power station destroyed during the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, has been treated and many scientists believe the technology is safe.

But for countries in the Pacific, the nuclear legacy still endures and many have their reservations.

The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, an intergovernmental organization comprising 17 Pacific nations and territories, noted the serious concerns over Japan’s plans in a July meeting and, following a briefing on Tuesday, remains unconvinced.

Puna said one issue was the highly technical nature of the briefings. The former Cook Islands prime minister acknowledged Japan was “as committed as we are to having frank and open dialogue,” but the planned action is less than 18 months away.

Puna said a major issue was that the Pacific nations lacked the expertise to interpret the highly technical plans.

“I just want to note that, for us, the issue is very urgent but also requires very careful thinking,” said Puna. “When you have a major development partner explaining that the only way for it to get rid of more than a million cubic tons of treated, but still contaminated water, is to dump it into an ocean, where we share the same tides, current, and fish, it is a level up from urgent for us.”

An IAEA review of the waste disposal, agreed to on Sept. 9, would focus on safety, regulation and environmental monitoring, and a team of IAEA experts would review the process in a December visit. PIFs concerns have not been allayed, however, so it was in the process of bringing on three independent scientists to assess the plans.

“This is an area of the planet where people see the ocean as an extension of themselves,” Puna added.

The Republic of the Marshall Islands was subjected to 67 nuclear bombings between 1948 and 1956, and the legacy of nuclear testing endures. Islands were scarred or fully vaporized and people were forced from their homes. Across the Pacific, France and the United Kingdom also tested their nuclear prowess around the same time. The fallout has had generational effects.

A recently released study, conducted as part of ongoing collaboration between IAEA and RMI, found that Bikini Atoll, where the U.S. conducted the Castle Bravo test (a 15 megaton thermonuclear bomb) in 1954, is slowly healing from the test though radioactive material remains.

Given RMI’s nuclear history — even with IAEA’s involvement — Marshallese have maintained a “healthy distrust” of governments and agencies, said Giff Johnson, editor of The Marshall Islands Journal.

He said although Japan and Micronesian nations share a long history, and have enjoyed a healthy diplomatic relationship in more recent times, nuclear issues remain contentious. “That in itself is a big hurdle to get over,” Johnson said. “It makes it complicated, diplomatically.”

This is not the first time Japan has riled Pacific nations with nuclear waste. In 1979, Japanese plans to dump 10,000 drums of nuclear waste in the Marianas Trench were met with virulent opposition from political leaders and protests from citizens.

Given the multi-generational legacy of nuclear testing and waste disposal, young activists are also voicing their concerns. Youngsolwara Pacific, a regional collective of young activists, has condemned the Japanese government’s plans and lack of consultation.

According to Talei Luscia Mangioni, a Pasifika researcher at the Australian National University and Youngsolwara Pacific member, Japan’s nuclear behavior seemed to ignore the region’s ongoing Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement and the history of colonizers dumping nuclear waste and testing nuclear weapons.

“Pacific youth acknowledge that this is an act of transboundary harm and is part of a great legacy of where nuclear powers have treated the Pacific as a sacrifice zone,” said Mangioni. “I think that Japan needs to properly consult and engage with Pacific people and their own Japanese civil society instead of making an announcement that they are going to do this, given their history.”

Mangioni was similarly concerned by the proximity of Micronesian nations to the proposed dumping and emphasized that they “have been the vanguard for a lot of nuclear resistance.”

PIFS Secretary General Puna, however, said Micronesia remained part of the forum “family” and said it had endorsed Rhea Moss-Christian, chair of the Marshall Islands National Nuclear Commission, as a representative of its interests on the IAEA safety task force.

Moss-Christian said she was unsure if her involvement with IAEA reassured the Marshallese, and her organization had not yet begun its outreach program in RMI.

Though Japan’s government had been working hard to assure the region’s concerns, whether its plans were robust enough remained to be seen and would be addressed by the task force.

“However, it is still difficult to accept that our backyard should be a dumping ground for our neighbor’s toxic waste, no matter how minimal the risk,” she said.

September 20, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , , | Leave a comment

Clear vision needed for future of still-evacuated Fukushima areas

Access is restricted to the “difficult-to-return zone” in Futaba, Fukushima Prefecture.

September 16, 2021

More than a decade after the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant accident, there remains more than 30,000 hectares of land where the evacuation order is still in place and is not expected to be lifted any time soon.

The government recently announced a plan to rebuild ravaged communities in these areas near the crippled plant with high levels of radiation, known as “kitaku konnan kuiki” (difficult-to-return zone).

Under the plan, the government will decontaminate the land and houses of local residents who want to return to their homes so that the order can be lifted by the end of the 2020s.

Initially, the evacuation order covered more than 110,000 hectares. The measure was lifted for some 80,000 hectares by March last year.

In 2017 and 2018, the government thrashed out a plan to designate some 2,700 hectares of land in six municipalities within the zone as reconstruction priority areas eligible for preferential policy support to help improve the living environment. The plan requires the government to make intensive decontamination efforts in the areas and lift the evacuation order by the spring of 2023.

The local administrations involved asked the national government to make clear when the order will be lifted for the remaining areas in the difficult-to-return zone.

The latest plan unveiled by the government may represent a step forward as it offers a specific timeframe for lifting the measure, albeit for only those who wish to return to their homes. The blueprint has brought a ray of hope to local residents who have been facing a distressingly uncertain future outlook. 

But the fact remains that the government has yet to offer a realistic road map to deliver on its promise to lift the evacuation order for the entire restricted zone sometime in the future, no matter how long it will take.

The government has pledged to tread carefully in this undertaking, holding multiple meetings with residents to ask about their desire to to return home as well as talks with local administrations on the range of areas to be decontaminated.

But it has yet to announce specifics about the decontamination, such as the areas to be covered or the method to be used. 

The residents in these areas have been living as evacuees for more than 10 years. Many of them are likely to find it difficult to decide even if they want to return to where they once lived.

If the government proceeds with the latest plan, it needs to work out details of how it will tackle the challenge in a “careful” manner. The details should cover how the government will confirm the local residents’ wishes and ensure the level of decontamination that can reassure them of the safety of returning to their homes.

Moreover, the land and buildings that nobody wants to return to will not be covered by the plan to lift the order. This will remain a serious issue for the future.

The government has so far spent some 3 trillion yen ($27.45 billion) on decontaminating areas subject to the evacuation order. This effort has allowed some 14,000 residents, or 30 percent of the local population, to return home. It will cost taxpayers a huge additional amount of money to accelerate the cleanup work in the difficult-to-return zone, where nearly 22,000 people are still registered as residents.

The government says the necessary funds will be budgeted from the Fukushima reconstruction special account and other appropriate financing sources. But it admits the total amount of money required cannot be estimated since it depends on the number of local residents who want to return.

In other words, it has no clear and viable plan to raise the necessary funds.

The 2011 special law to deal with contamination by radioactive materials from the Fukushima plant stipulates that it is the government’s “obligation” to deal with radiation pollution caused by the accident.

The government has a duty to offer as soon as possible a clear future vision for tackling this formidable challenge, specifying when and how the evacuation order will be lifted and what kind of policy support will be provided to residents including those who choose not to return to the areas.

https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14441441

September 17, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , , , | Leave a comment

Pacific Forum Members Hold Third Briefing With Japan Regarding Fukushima Treated Nuclear Wastewater

Thursday, 16 September 2021, 6:01 am
Press Release: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

Wed 15th September 2021—Pacific nations continue to raise questions and concerns in closed briefing sessions around plans by Japan to discharge over a million tonnes of treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the Pacific Ocean.

The Government of Japan committed to ongoing dialogue with Forum Members as a priority follow up to the PALM9 Summit in July. This followed Japan’s announcement in April of plans to begin discharge in 2023, for a period of up to 40 years. The announcement drew strong global response, including from the Forum Chair and Leaders.

In his opening comments at the third briefing on Tuesday afternoon, Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Henry Puna noted the issues require “open and frank consultation” along with sustained dialogue at the political and technical level.

Japan officials presented a status update on the ALPS (Advanced Liquid Processing System) Treated Water, interim measures regarding the planned discharge, and outcomes of the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visit to Fukushima.

While appreciative of the information being shared by Japan, Secretary General Puna reiterated the region’s unequivocal need for information as being key to safeguard the Blue Pacific as a nuclear-free zone. “I appeal to the Government of Japan to continue to share the relevant information in its totality, and within agreed timelines.”

“Importantly for us in the Blue Pacific, our fears really lie in the transboundary nature of the impacts. We require nothing less than full and complete disclosure of all information and evidence to enable us to fully understand the nature and extent of the impact, and to enable us to make a comprehensive and unbiased assessment of the impacts of the proposed ALPS water discharge.”

As reiterated by Forum Foreign Ministers on 27 July, the region is actively pursuing efforts to advance Forum Leaders’ commitments to international consultation, international law, and independent expertise to provide guidance and verifiable scientific assessments. To accelerate efforts, the Forum will engage independent experts to support the region’s efforts over the next months.

Thanking the Government of Japan, Secretary General Puna said he is hopeful there will be ways to address Pacific concerns to reach “solutions that are based on science, and consistent with legal and moral obligations.”

https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO2109/S00163/pacific-forum-members-hold-third-briefing-with-japan-regarding-fukushima-treated-nuclear-wastewater.htm

September 17, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , , , | Leave a comment

Lethal radiation levels detected in Fukushima nuke plant reactor lid

A remotely controlled robot inserts a dosimeter into a hole created to measure radiation levels beneath the uppermost lid of the No. 2 reactor’s containment vessel in a study on Sept. 9.

The operator of the crippled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant could be forced to reconsider the plant’s decommissioning process after lethal radiation levels equivalent to those of melted nuclear fuel were detected near one of the lids covering a reactor.

The Nuclear Regulation Authority said Sept. 14 that a radiation reading near the surface of the lid of the No. 2 reactor’s containment vessel was 1.2 sieverts per hour, higher than the level previously assumed.

The discovery came on Sept. 9 during a study by the NRA and Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator of the plant.

TEPCO plans to insert a robotic arm into the No. 2 reactor’s containment vessel from its side in a trial planned for the second half of 2022 to retrieve pieces of melted nuclear fuel.

“We will consider what we can do during the trial on the basis of the detection of the concentration of contamination” in the upper area of the containment vessel, a TEPCO official said.

The round concrete lid, called the shield plug, is 12 meters in diameter and about 60 centimeters thick.

The shield plug consists of three lids placed on top of each other to block extremely high radiation emanating from the reactor core.

Each lid weighs 150 tons.

When operators work on the decommissioning, the shield plug will be removed to allow for the entry into the containment vessel.

The NRA said a huge amount of radioactive cesium that was released during the meltdown of the No. 2 reactor in March 2011 remained between the uppermost lid and middle lid.

In the Sept. 9 study, workers bored two holes measuring 7 cm deep each on the surface of the uppermost lid to measure radiation doses there by deploying remotely controlled robots.

One radiation reading was 1.2 sieverts per hour at a location 4 cm down from the surface in a hole near the center of the lid.

https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14440765?fbclid=IwAR0SKOn-ldGGMqEO0fWHwtrby197XOJRM-zE6xdqqwgUqBratw5g23Kv6k0

September 15, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , , | Leave a comment

TEPCO not informing the Regulation Agency for 2 years about the 25 damaged filters at Fukushima Daiichi NPP

After finishing my stage (*Mako and her husband Ken are comedians) , we attended a Monitoring and Evaluation meeting of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency and a press conference of TEPCO today.

Various terrible things came out at the Regulatory Agency meeting. As for the holes of ALPS high-performance filters, although no photos came out at the press conference with TEPCO no matter how much I requested, I found them in the document from the Regulatory Agency. https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000364892.pdf

It was much worse than I had imagined. TEPCO said they didn’t notice that there were such holes for these two years.

They replaced the 25 filters with holes (*out of 25 filters, means all filters had holes) in 2019.(This incident wasn’t published, nor reported to the Regulatory Agency.)

In 2021, 24 out of 25 filters have holes.The photos are here.These filters are not for ALPS’s contaminated water treatment, but the ones for the treatment of gaseous waste generated in the process.

The terrible thing is, until being asked at the press conference on August 31st, TEPCO had not explained the total damage of the filters two years ago.

When I asked, I got the answer that 25 out of 25 filters were damaged two years ago. Why didn’t TEPCO explain it voluntarily? That’s quite important information, isn’t it?

I wanted to know how TEPCO would explain it at today’s Regulatory Agency meeting and what kind of discussion would develop.

TEPCO reported only this year’s filter damages and didn’t explain the damage of all filters two years ago to the Regulatory Agency!

TEPCO finally gave an oral explanation when they were asked by chance, “What was the situation at the time of the last inspection?” by Mr. Yasui, Inspector General of the Regulatory Agency.

The Regulatory Agency got to know for the first time today about the damage of all 25 high-performance filters two years ago (and this time the 24 of 25 filters were damaged again). It was natural that the members of the Regulatory Agency got angry about the fact and the discussion about a completely damaged high-performance filter did not proceed at all …! !!

During unofficial Q and A session at the end of the meeting, we shared various information with Mr. Takeuchi, the director of the Regulatory Agency.

https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000364892.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0XHuptPWef-HRim6WRhSRNwKjLtf8XYwWXSLIZwyAZv9gmSBTt_sMhE-k

September 15, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , | 1 Comment

Fukushima plant failed to probe cause of faulty filters

TOKYO (AP) — Officials at Japan’s wrecked Fukushima nuclear power plant have acknowledged they neglected to investigate the cause of faulty exhaust filters that are key to preventing radioactive pollution, after being forced to replace them twice.

Representatives of the operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, made the revelation Monday during a regular review of the Fukushima Daiichi plant at a meeting with Japanese regulatory authorities. Three reactors at the plant melted following a massive earthquake and tsunami in 2011.

The filters are designed to prevent particles from escaping into the air from a contaminated water treatment system — called Advanced Liquid Processing System — that removes selected radioactive isotopes in the water to below legal limits.

“At the core of this problem is TEPCO’s attitude,” a Nuclear Regulation Authority commissioner, Nobuhiko Ban, said at the meeting.

TEPCO has been repeatedly criticized for coverups and delayed disclosures of problems at the plant. In February, it said two seismometers at one reactor had remained broken since last year and failed to collect data during a powerful earthquake.

Company officials said that 24 out of 25 filters attached to the water treatment equipment had been found damaged last month, after an alarm went off as workers were moving sludge from the unit to a container, temporarily suspending the water treatment. The operation partially resumed last week after the filters were replaced.

TEPCO said it had detected similar damage in all of the filters two years ago, but never investigated the cause of the problem and did not take any preventive steps after replacing the filters.

Another regulatory commissioner, Satoru Tanaka, said at the meeting that the utility company should have responded to the problem more quickly to minimize the risk of possible radiation leakage into the environment.

TEPCO officials said dust monitors indicated no radiation leaks to the outside or exposure to plant workers inside the water treatment facility.

Akira Ono, head of TEPCO’s decommissioning unit, said he regretted the utility’s failure to address the problem earlier. He promised to improve safety management.

Japanese officials are working with the International Atomic Energy Agency to prepare to discharge into the ocean the wrecked plant’s cooling water, treated so its radioactivity levels are below legal limits. Slated to start in spring 2023, the controversial plan is fiercely opposed by Fukushima’s fishing community, as well as local residents and nearby countries.

Fully decommissioning the nuclear plant is expected to take decades, experts say.

https://apnews.com/article/business-japan-tokyo-water-treatment-pollution-da69a43e2c83704a65336a314d23cbaf?fbclid=IwAR0YswCI0qEL5dgSohVUDcFjd1ygY4fNTPI5HK4kmW1z0zhsTjmnjoZv_Y0

September 15, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , | Leave a comment

Pharyngeal cancer recognized as work-related injury for two convergence workers after Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident

September 09, 2011
The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) has recognized the causal relationship between the cancer and the work, and certified it as a work-related accident.
This is the first time that pharyngeal cancer has been recognized as an occupational injury related to the convergence work of the nuclear power plant accident.

The two victims were a man in his 60s who worked for TEPCO, and a man who worked for a subcontractor who developed the disease in his 40s and later died.

According to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, after the accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant in March 2011, the two men worked on the premises of the plant, removing debris and measuring radiation levels.

However, in December 2018 and January of last year, they both developed pharyngeal cancer and applied for workers’ compensation.

The two men were exposed to about 85 millisieverts and 44 millisieverts, respectively, during their work at the plant.

A panel of experts from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare recognized a causal relationship between the two workers’ radiation doses and their cancer, as their radiation doses exceeded 100 millisieverts, which is the standard for certification.

This is the first time that pharyngeal cancer has been recognized as an occupational injury related to the convergence work of the nuclear power plant accident.

Since the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, six workers have been recognized as suffering from leukemia, thyroid cancer, and lung cancer.


https://www3.nhk.or.jp/lnews/fukushima/20210909/6050015774.html?fbclid=IwAR0eDtsPcLbpT0RfvjyouZtixTlq91HRm6Gr0G-WaPf2IJ-pa8fo8sHy6 uE

September 9, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , | Leave a comment

TEPCO plan to discharge water relies on winning local trust

Storage tanks holding treated contaminated water at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant complex on April 12

September 7, 2021

More than four months have passed since the government gave the green light to plans for Tokyo Electric Power Co. to release treated radioactive water from the crippled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant into the Pacific Ocean.

TEPCO, the plant’s operator, recently announced it would construct a tunnel to discharge the water about 1 kilometer offshore. At the same time, the government unveiled its strategy for responding to concerns the discharge could cause irreparable reputational damage to local businesses, the fishing industry, in particular.

Ever since the nuclear crisis triggered by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami disaster, the utility has been pumping tons of water to cool melted nuclear fuel at the wrecked facility. Rain and ground water have added to the deluge with the result that the volume of radiation-contaminated water has continued to grow rapidly.

The water is stored in more than 1,000 tanks installed within the compound after being treated with special equipment to eliminate most of the highly radioactive materials. TEPCO said the tanks will reach capacity around spring 2023. The plant operator then intends to start releasing the treated water after first diluting it with seawater.

Under TEPCO’s plan, an undersea tunnel will be built to discharge the treated water. It said the tunnel will ensure that the treated water does not re-enter the on-site discharge equipment after it has been diluted.

This will be a gigantic construction project that will start with a geological survey of the seabed, something that must be approved by the Nuclear Regulation Authority.

TEPCO pledged to measure the concentration of tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen produced as a byproduct in nuclear reactors which cannot be removed with filtering equipment, before the water is released into the ocean. This is a welcome effort to allay concerns among local businesses and communities, especially the fisheries industry.

The company, whose reputation has further been tarnished by a series of embarrassing revelations about security lapses, including those at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear plant in Niigata Prefecture, needs to realize it has an obligation to take all possible steps to ensure the operation is conducted safely and be willing to disclose all related information and options.

No matter how cautiously the problem of tritium-tainted water is handled, the plan to release treated contaminated water into the sea is bound to trigger negative publicity and deter people from eating fish caught in local waters.

To deal with this challenge, the government decided to establish a fund to buy catches that can be put in frozen storage. The fund is framed as an emergency relief measure to assist fishermen and fisheries businesses expecting to face sharp drops in sales. It is a well-conceived proposal to help those affected by the nuclear disaster regain their livelihoods, in addition to providing cash to compensate for their economic losses.

But not all marine products are fit for freezing. Frozen fish tend to fetch lower prices compared with when they are sold fresh. How to secure viable operations of the proposed fund remains a key question, but the government has only said that details will be worked out by the end of the year.

Fisheries businesses may not be only targets of rumors that require compensation payouts. To ease anxiety among local businesses, TEPCO said victims alone will not be forced to bear the burden of proof. The company says it will assess economic losses by comparing prices and sales after it starts releasing the contaminated water into the sea with corresponding estimates for before the operation gets under way.

Still, local businesses remain concerned about whether they will receive appropriate compensation from the utility, which rejected out-of-court settlements with a number of plaintiffs in damages lawsuits proposed by the government’s Nuclear Damage Compensation Dispute Resolution Center. The government, which is effectively the utility’s largest shareholder, has a duty to supervise the company to ensure it offers compensation swiftly and appropriately to any new parties that suffer losses as a result of the water discharge operation.

TEPCO hopes to begin discharging the treated water in spring 2023. It has pledged not to “undertake any disposal measure without gaining the understanding of stakeholders.”

The company will not be able to move forward with the plan unless it first wins the trust of the local communities through sincere and honest talks.

https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14435063?fbclid=IwAR2txoqs9WIH195ny_NmOsmTJm92sJua2pWZ4VaiLZtypAL6SQtISVwSjKo

September 8, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , , | Leave a comment

Legacies of Fukushima.

Introduction

Kyle Cleveland

Abstract: This special collection of papers reflects the work of contributing authors to the newly released book Legacies of Fukushima: 3.11 in Context (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021). The edited volume addresses the Fukushima nuclear crisis in Japan, taking a multi-dimensional, cross-disciplinary approach to understanding this epic disaster. The book is an intersectional collaboration that is unique in that it incorporates the work of Japan-area scholars, journalists, nuclear experts and Science, Technology and Society (STS) scholars from Japan and abroad, who discuss the trajectory of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in the first decade since its inception. There are 19 authors whose work is included in the book; this special edition of selected papers for The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus evokes that work, and while they do not entirely represent the scope of the material included in the edited volume, these papers delve into issues that any disaster studies scholar or student of the Fukushima nuclear disaster will find compelling.

The 3.11 disasters were an implausible convergence of events, the massive 9.0 earthquake (the largest on historical record in Japan), a tsunami that took nearly 20,000 lives, which put the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant underwater, leading to 3 nuclear reactors in meltdown, the most convoluted nuclear disaster in history. When the tsunami pushed ashore onto the coast less than an hour after the earthquake, it swamped the Daiichi plant, inundating the reactors and taking out the electrical backup generators, causing a total station blackout. With no power to run instrumentation or take remedial actions, the Daiichi nuclear power plant descended into chaos. The Fukushima crisis was the first multi-reactor meltdown and the only total station blackout (the only time this had happened in the history of nuclear energy). This “beyond-design-basis” event was unprecedented in the history of nuclear energy, and it was considered so unlikely that it left nuclear authorities wholly unprepared to deal with the crisis as it cascaded out of control. TEPCO (the utility that ran the doomed plant) has since maintained that they should not be held legally accountable because these conjoined events, taken together, were the ultimate “Black Swan” disaster. As Charles Casto, a former plant manager and high-ranking administrator in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, who was the chief liaison for the U.S. government during the crisis and who worked closely with the operational staff at the Daiichi plant put it: it was comparable to having the San Francisco earthquake, the Three Mile Island nuclear accident and the Katrina hurricane all happening on the same day.1

Yet as unlikely as they would seem to be, the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami were hardly unprecedented. Japan is roiled by earthquakes constantly, and while the magnitude of the 3.11 quake was unique, in the months that preceded and followed this event there were clusters of smaller quakes, many in the 7 magnitude (Richter Scale) range, that would be significant outside the context of the penultimate quake of 3.11. And the Sanriku coast in Northeastern Japan has been inundated by tsunami often enough that oral tradition among inhabitants of coastline communities has produced a cautionary mindset in which tsunami have always loomed large in the collective imagination. Under the harsh scrutiny of nuclear critics, scholars, journalists, and industry and governmental officials who were by necessity compelled to address its consequences, a more nuanced and critical perspective eventually took hold and Fukushima, much like Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and other nuclear disasters, seems now in retrospect to be all too predictable, and, avoidable.2

Scandals now buzz around Fukushima like parasites on a dead thing, and a withering indictment of nuclear energy in Japan prevails. Corporate collusion, precursors ignored, lessons unlearned, the failure of regulatory oversight, and a lack of accountability have become commonplace in discussions of the nuclear enterprise in Japan. This is not only a scathing indictment of the hubris that brought Japan to this point in the first place, but it reveals a lack of foresight and analytical rigor that sustained the nuclear authorities in their wishful thinking that such an outcome was unimaginable. March 11, 2011, was a day of reckoning and yet the manner in which the disaster has been addressed betrays a callous disregard for human suffering in the aftermath, as communities have been destroyed and people have been offered little solace nor justice by the institutional authorities who were charged with looking after their best interests.3

In an effort to restore its reputational damage, the government and nuclear industry alike have promoted a narrative of resiliency among those most egregiously affected, but the nuclear village itself has proven perhaps to be the most resilient of all: the government maintains a long-term nuclear agenda to restart most of the reactors, despite the humanitarian cost. Japan is invested in nuclear energy not only because it elevates the country’s status as a member of the league of nuclear nations, but has offered, in its most idealistic construct, a potentially significant portion of its overall energy output, with the economic benefits that would entail. By 2011 nuclear power comprised roughly 30% of Japan’s energy supply, but after the nuclear disaster the entire fleet of 54 reactors that were online in 2011 were shuttered to undergo testing and retrofitting under a newly established regulatory regime. Having replaced Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority set stringent new standards, and deemed that 33 reactors are classified as operable. Of these only 9 units at 5 power plants (all in Western Japan) have restarted; another 16 are at various stages in the process of restart renewal. Two reactors are under construction but are stalled pending approval to move forward, and another eight reactors proposed to be deferred indeterminately. The government now plans for 20% of its energy supply to come from nuclear power by 2030 (at the time of this writing in summer, 2021 only 6.5% of Japan’s electricity is nuclear generated).4

As the government seeks to return nuclear energy to a semblance of its former self, throughout the Tōhoku region, and most especially in the evacuated villages in Fukushima adjacent to the Daiichi plant, a sense of foreboding remains and is unlikely to lift anytime soon. Much of the area most affected by the nuclear disaster is in a remote, mountainous region where agriculture and fisheries were major industries before the radioactive fallout irrevocably wrecked the Fukushima brand. A massive exit migration has depopulated towns (a process that was well underway in the economically stagnant rural areas, long before the Fukushima crisis accelerated this process), or resulted in an age stratified population that remains. Elderly landowners, with ancestral roots and property investments have remained, but those under 40, especially with young children, have sought safer domains, free of the worry of radiation exposure and with better long-term career prospects.

Moreover, not only has the agricultural economy and the Fukushima brand been irrevocably tainted by its association with radioactive fallout, but the shuttering of the nuclear plant itself has removed tens of thousands of jobs, as a skeleton staff remains to implement the plant decommissioning at Daiichi. In Tōhoku the nuclear plants had, in an earlier time, been the hub around which communities where organized, and the tertiary industries that helped feed the beast have diminished to such an extent that many men (and in this culture, the nuclear industry is notably gendered) have had to resort to being employed in the emergent massive decontamination industry, essentially now being paid to clean up their own back yards, while subjecting themselves to continuous radiation exposure in the process. Claims that the true radiation exposure incurred in the process are minimal are cold comfort to those who long ago lost faith in the honesty of institutional actors, and it does not forbode well for authorities in their efforts to repair the reputational damage, however well-meaning their actions may be.

Trust in institutional authority is not a renewable commodity. The government and nuclear authorities are now left to reap the whirlwind sown in the toxic breeze of March 2011, as radiation was released on an ill-informed local population, that only days before could never have imagined such a calamity. Although as a matter of the normal regulatory process disaster protocols were in place, these had never been tested in extremis, and there was little concern among those within the nuclear industry and the locals whose communities were dependent on the nuclear plant’s operations for their livelihood that such an event could happen.

In 2016 and again in 2018 I joined with several colleagues to interview the mayors of Namie, Tomioka, Kawauchi, Futuba and Minami-Soma, the evacuated towns most severely affected by the nuclear disaster as it unfolded in the first few weeks of the disaster. In far reaching interviews with the mayors and their administrative staff, the sense of abandonment and betrayal in those more dire times generated a level of animosity that was palatable. Years later, as the political discourse on Fukushima promoted heroic tropes of long-suffering TEPCO staff at the plant5 and the resiliency of locals who remained to rebuild their lives, these feelings had only deepened as the confusion lifted and was given perspective by time and revelations that had not been known until much later, as secrets were revealed and investigative panels painted a more 3-dimensional picture of what had really unfolded in those darkest days. A lack of real-time support during the evacuations, brusque, tone-deaf messaging by TEPCO and the Japanese government, economic finagling that protected TEPCO from ultimate financial and legal accountability and a lack of sheer decency and empathy for those who had suffered the most was burned into the memory of the victims of Fukushima.

These wounds will be slow to heal and leave scars upon the psyche and land that will remain in the lived experience and subsequent oral tradition of this region,6 irrespective of public relation ploys that attempt to downplay the impact of disaster and recast what is a still unfolding disaster into an artificially abbreviated narrative that celebrates recovery that is far from complete. As the 75-year anniversary of the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were commemorated not long before the 10-year anniversary of the Tōhoku disasters, it has been a time for reflection for the survivors of these historic tragedies. These survivors carry the weight of history in their experiences and serve as a reminder that the cost of state actions echo in the trauma endured by Hibakusha and those whose lives were disrupted by these disasters.7

The Tōhoku disasters – and the Fukushima nuclear crisis in particular, which captured the world’s attention and resonated symbolically in a way the tsunami never could – served as a vehicle for Japan to reposition its national brand post-3.11. A decade into the still unfolding disaster, Japan hosted the Olympics in the summer of 2021, and the world’s attention returned to Fukushima, with the torch relay beginning inside the previous evacuation zone, and the baseball games being staged in Koriyama, the largest city nearby the Daiichi plant.

The Japan Olympics were essentially the ultimate consolation prize for the tragic events of 3.11, evoking sympathy for the loss of life, the destruction of a vast swath of infrastructure by the tsunami, and the toxic environment that people in Northeastern Japan have endured. By granting Japan the status of host nation, the IOC offered a symbolic gesture of good will toward Japan. Two generations after the 1964 Olympics helped usher Japan into the modern age, symbolically marking a pivot point in history following the devastation of WWII, which utterly devastated 67 Japanese cities through firebombing and the annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bomb attacks, the 2020 Olympics promised to cast Japan as an exemplar of long-suffering fortitude and civic-minded communitarian spirit. This was soft-power politics refracted through the prism of disaster and recovery rather than pop-culture consumerism.8 The Olympics hold out the prospect of being the ultimate exercise in soft-power and have often been employed as a form of nation building, an opportunity for the host country to showcase an idealized representation of itself. This was a difficult enough feat to achieve with resentment toward the government’s inept response to the events of 3.11 still lingering in the collective memory, but the emergence of the COVID-19 crisis in 2019 largely eclipsed the grand narrative of Fukushima as the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 Olympics became inexorably linked.

The opening ceremony of the Olympics were an eerily sedate and symbolically resonant reflection on how COVID-19 had disrupted the normal operations of the Olympics, evoking confusion and alienation from inter-personal relations upon which the sentiments of Olympian solidarity are grounded. It was as much a commentary on the organization of the games as it was on the higher values the IOC and host nations strive to promote to sustain the idealistic brand of the games.

By the time the Olympics were actually staged, the Japanese authorities had gone down a convoluted path of trying to manage a message that would sanctify the games and burnish Japan’s reputation. Originally this was directed toward the powerful associations attached to the “Fukushima Olympics,” which in the runup to the games was a central concern. Later, this would be almost entirely eclipsed by the COVID pandemic.

“Dreams of Fevered Imaginations”: MOCCO, the Fukushima Reconstruction Puppet.

On The Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games website, MOCCO is characterized by its creators in this way:

“The local dialect where I was born in Miyagi includes the word ‘Odazumokko’, which refers to a popular person who is lively and mischievous. An example sentence is ‘the only son of the family who runs the stationery shop has always been an incorrigible odazumokko, but he’s made it to Tokyo and is doing shows there.’ The word ‘mokko’ originates from a word for carrying a basket, so we used this word for MOCCO to express that he travels bearing people’s thoughts and ideas.” (Kudō Kankurō, scriptwriter, director, actor) 

“MOCCO appears abruptly out of nowhere. Neither adults nor children are afraid of him and while he might look a bit scary, it is kind of a cute scariness. There is lively talk about MOCCO all over and everyone has respect for him, which he fully realizes. Everyone knows that MOCCO carries with him dreams and hope, so while you’re having fun with him you should make a wish in your heart. Stomp stomp stomp, MOCCO is here!” (Arai Ryōji, picture book creator, illustrator). 

“MOCCO is with you when you are happy or sad, and is somewhere in your tender memories. MOCCO is there when you don’t know what tomorrow holds. MOCCO is always together with everyone”. (Kameda Seiji, music producer of Tōhoku no Sachi).

The design was revealed in May 2019, but the full-motion final rendering of the puppet was performed in Iwate Prefecture, Tōhoku, 50 days before the anticipated start of the 2020 Olympics, and then debuted in Tokyo on July 17, 2020, and was thereafter put on display in Tokyo throughout the duration of the Olympics. Conceived as a collaborative project between children and the puppeteers, who discussed their artistic scribblings of the disaster with the puppet creators, MOCCO looks to be a skeletal bricolage of tsunami debris, rendered in human form. In its dramatic unveiling, MOCCO comes to life bellowing smoke from its mouth, knocking the puppeteers to the ground. Did they imagine this represented the radiation plume? Lacking the redeeming qualities of kitsch that animated the radiated lizard, MOCCO seems nothing less than a modern-day Godzilla for the 3.11 disasters. It immediately reminded me of the grotesquerie of Gunther von Hagen’s platinated human corpses, that were put on display in his exhibit “Human Body Worlds,” discomforting audiences around the world.

Although inspiration may have been provided by children whose lives were disrupted by the Tōhoku disasters, MOCCO seems less the product of an idealist vision of future hope and recovery than an embodiment of their nightmares of having lived through a disaster beyond their imagining. The French playwright Philippe Néricault, (a.k.a. Destouches), famously said: “La critique est aisée et l’art est difficile” (Criticism is easy and art is difficult) and so it is perhaps a cheap shot to parody the intentions of these well-meaning artists who brought this vision to life and paraded it in front of the victims of 3.11 in service of the grand notions of resilient nationalism. But art resonates in our collective unconscious in ways not easy to articulate, and it is hard to imagine that this 10-meter animated puppet comprised of tsunami flotsam on a skeletal frame would be a comforting presence for those who recall the vision of the devastation that lay strewn before them as the tsunami destroyed everything in its path.

Billed as “The Reconstruction Olympics,” Japan was selected as the Olympics host partly in sympathy for the impact the 3.11 disasters had on Japan (the most expensive set of conjoined disasters in world history) and as a form of nation branding in service of a narrative of resiliency, not only with regard to the people of Tōhoku who endured the worst of it, but also of the Japanese nation itself. It is ironic, but hardly surprising, that a kind of political alchemy has rendered the suffering of the victims of the nuclear disaster as a symbol of long-suffering fortitude, while implicitly endorsing the structure of collusive interests which sustain the nuclear village, which set the conditions for the disaster in the first place. For those on the receiving end of this, there has been a withering retrospective accounting of disaster management after 3.11 and hard-earned suspicions about the State’s ability to protect public health while promoting the reactor restarts under the guise of recovery on an Olympics timeline.

The Olympics long ago lost their idealistic luster as representing the epitome of “amateur” athletics and have become a marketing juggernaut and form of symbolic nation branding, providing incentive to hold the games irrespective of the long-term costs they lay at the feet of the hosts. Although the host nation may bask in the short-term glare of world attention and the adoration of their athlete stalking horses, the collusive interests between marketing conglomerates, the International Olympic Committee, and nation-states, they ultimately inherit the economic burdens created by cost overruns and infrastructure projects whose functional use is short-lived and cause for regret as the transient games are played out and the host nation is thereafter left to settle accounts.

At the time of the 10-year anniversary of the 3.11 disasters, competing discourses muddied the waters of institutional memory. The cruel timing of the emergence of the COVID viral pandemic, right on the cusp of the initial scheduling of the Olympics to start in the late summer of 2020, eclipsed the previous focus on Fukushima as the defining motif of these times. Having been saddled with the economic cost of the Tōhoku disasters (the most expensive in world history) the COVID-19 viral pandemic undermined the feel-good rhetoric of the Olympics, which had been branded as the “recovery” and “reconstruction” Olympics, an ode to the protracted efforts of the government to dig itself out of the scurrilous association with its inept response to the crisis. But with COVID-19 running rampant and Japan at the end of the line for vaccinations (with the lowest rate of implementation among affluent countries, in the single digits as of summer 2021), the Olympics were initially postponed and then reluctantly held in defiance of public sentiment (at one point nearly 80% of Japanese citizens opposed holding the Olympics) while Japan imposed a de facto immigration firewall against foreign contagion, a longstanding trope of Japan as an insular, island nation unnerved by the threat of foreign invasion. This was entirely antithetical to the notion of universal inclusion that defines the Olympic mission, and it undermined Japan’s efforts to construct an artifice of salutary resiliency in the face of adversity.

It is difficult to gaze upon the spectacle of the 2020 Japan Olympics being undone by the COVID-19 pandemic and not see this through the lens of the Fukushima disaster response.9 Karl Marx wrote that “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great, world-historical facts and personages occur, as it were, twice. He has forgotten to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.”10

There are obvious parallels between the manner in which the Tōhoku disasters were handled and the Japanese government’s response to both the COVID-19 viral pandemic and the Olympics. These are all epic, culture-transforming events that are historic in scale, and they cast into stark relief all the deficiencies of the State in its inability to address disasters at this scale. Major disasters expose the weakness of governmental institutions to address multi-dimensional complex disasters effectively. While certain aspects of Japanese culture were complicit in this, culture alone cannot account for the systemic failure of institutions, especially when in calmer times these same institutions are held up as exemplars of bureaucratic competence. One of the most shocking things about the Tōhoku disasters is that it highlighted a yawning gap between the stereotype of Japanese hyper-competency and the abject failure of institutions to effectively address the immediate needs of the moment as these severe disasters wreaked havoc, and it exposed an inability to care for people in their darkest hours of need.

In the nuclear crisis, a lack of governmental coordination left local authorities to fend for themselves, playing catch-up in a reactive mode that left them feeling embittered and abandoned. With the COVID pandemic response, a similar dynamic has played out. Despite having experienced at close hand the SARS-COVID outbreak in 2002/2003—which, like the 2019 SARS-2-COVID pandemic, broke in China—and having been reminded by the glancing blow of the 2009 H1N1 (“Swine Flu”) and the MERS Coronavirus crisis of 2012, Japan remained woefully unprepared at a national level to deal with this emerging pandemic. Although comparatively benign “lock-downs” (largely in name only, with no strict enforcement sanctions) limited the spread of the virus, the Japanese authorities doggedly refused to implement wide-spread testing to monitor the pandemic progression, and relied primarily on a local level response whereby medical clinicians were left to their own devices to assess patients, often with no COVID testing to verify their diagnoses, except in the most extreme cases.11

Japan has no national level coordinating body for infectious disease (comparable to the WHO or Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the U.S.), and thus little guidance was given to medical authorities as to what actions were necessary. The political messaging also reflected this, with the government providing periodic announcements while remaining obstinately reactive to the pandemic as it worked its way through the population. With the penultimate date of the Olympics approaching, the Japanese authorities dithered until they were eventually forced to concede to reality and cancel the Olympics. As the COVID pandemic was amplifying in 2020, this may have been the most prudent decision, but then having had this dress rehearsal and a year-long intermission before the Olympics were set to restart in the summer of 2021, the most obvious mitigating action of vaccinating the population was delayed. A couple of months shy of the start of the 2020 Olympics, Japan still had not implemented a wide-spread testing regime or distributed vaccines. Only 3% of the population had been vaccinated by this time – the lowest among affluent countries by far – and what vaccines that had been given targeted those over the age of 65.

Japan enforced a strict exclusionary policy of closing the borders for immigration, allowing only Japanese nationals and long-term residents with occupation-specific visas to enter the country. At the same time, it was obstinately committed to holding the games despite every indication that it would be a logistical shambles and public opinion polls showing that 80% of the population was opposed to holding the Olympics, it was prohibiting immigration, with the result being that no foreign fans were present. As the virus continued to spread, it was decided that even local Japan-based fans could not attend except in limited circumstances and venues. Japan had great incentive to act decisively on “best-policy” practices and had all the essential information to make informed decisions, both to package the Olympics in a coherent and safe manner, and to protect its population from this insidious disease. And yet, with a series of embarrassing off-brand mishaps that highlighted the tone-deaf messaging of the Tokyo Organising Committee, it let opportunity after opportunity slip by with an almost fatalistic concession to circumstances as though they were beyond their control. They weren’t. Now, as with Fukushima, it is a time of reckoning, and an occasion to reflect on lessons unlearned, a lack of institutional accountability and reform and the consequences of governmental dysfunction and neglect.

In his classic work on suicide, the sociologist Émile Durkheim discussed anomie, a state or condition of normlessness, in which social values and norms are disrupted by social change, leading to a state of moral confusion. This well characterizes the decade following the 3.11 disasters in Japan: the economic disruption, loss of faith in government and legal authority, the disorientation of survivors, a spike in suicide and a general malaise as the Tōhoku region recovers from the tsunami and the Fukushima area is decontaminated and warily reinhabited by returning evacuees. Written over a century ago, Durkheim’s work seems prophetic as it encapsulates the anomic times Japan has experienced through the 3.11 disasters and the COVID viral pandemic, with the sideshow of the Olympics failing to provide the grand narrative of recovery that might have helped redeem State authority and mark a transition point to a return to normalcy. In this light, Durkheim’s words seem not only an indictment of the pursuit of economic solutions to social problems, but a commentary on the 2011 triple-disasters on top of the de facto triple-disasters of 3.11, COVID and the Olympics. Durkheim writes:

“The sphere of trade and industry… instead of being still regarded as a means to an end transcending itself, has become the supreme end of individuals and societies alike. Thereupon the appetites thus excited have become freed of any limiting authority. By sanctifying them, so to speak, this apotheosis of well-being has placed them above human law. Their restraint seems like a sort of sacrilege. So long as the producer could gain his profits only in his immediate neighborhood, the restricted amount of possible gain could not overexcite ambition. Now that he may assume to have the entire world as his customer, how could passions accept their former confinement in the face of such limitless prospects?… From top to bottom of the ladder, greed is aroused without knowing where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can calm it, since its goal is far beyond all it can attain. Reality seems valueless by comparison with the dreams of fevered imaginations; reality is therefore abandoned…”12

References

Aven, T. (2015) ‘Implications of black swans to the foundations and practice of risk assessment and management,’ Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 134, pp. 83-91.

Casto, C.A. (2018) Station blackout: Inside the Fukushima nuclear disaster and recovery. Radius Book Group.

Downer, J. (2014) ‘Disowning Fukushima: Managing the credibility of nuclear reliability assessment in the wake of disaster.’ Regulation & Governance, 8(3), pp. 287-309.

Durkheim, E. (1951) Suicide: A study in sociology. Translated by J. Spaulding and G. Simpson. The Free Press.

Erikson, K. T. (1995) A new species of trouble: The human experience of modern disasters. WW Norton & Company.

Funabashi, Y. (2021) Meltdown: Inside the Fukushima nuclear crisis. Brookings Institution Press.

Haruta, J., Horiguchi, S., Miyachi, J., Teruyama, J., Kimura, S., Iida, J., Ozone, S., Goto, R., Kaneko, M. and Hama, Y. (2021) ‘Primary care physicians’ narratives on COVID‐19 responses in Japan: Professional roles evoked under a pandemic, Journal of General and Family Medicine.

Johnson, D.T., Fukurai, H. and Hirayama, M. (2020) ‘Reflections on the TEPCO trial: Prosecution and acquittal after Japan’s nuclear meltdown’ The Asia‐Pacific Journal, 18(2), pp. 1-35.

Kadota, R. (2014) On the brink: The inside story of Fukushima Daiichi. Kurodahan Press.

Marx Engels Internet Archive. (1995) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte [Online]. Accessed: June 5, 2021. 

Muto R., and Field, N. (2020) “This will still be true tomorrow: Fukushima ain’t got the time for Olympic games: Two texts on nuclear disaster and pandemic,” Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 18(13), no. 2, pp. 1-20.

Ronalds, P. (2019) ‘The ruptures of rhetoric: Cool Japan, Tokyo 2020 and post-3.11 Tōhoku,’ The Japan Foundation: New voices in Japanese Studies, 11, pp. 26-46.

Sakaki, A. and Lukner, K. (2013) ‘Introduction to special issue: Japan’s crisis management amid growing complexity: In search of new approaches,’ Japanese Journal of Political Science, 14(2), pp. 155-176.

The Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, 2020. [Online] Accessed July 6, 2021.

Notes

1

Casto, C.A., 2018.2

Funabashi, Y., 2021. 3

Johnson, D.T., Fukurai, H. and Hirayama, M., 2020. 4

World Nuclear Association, 2021. 5

Kadota, R., 2014. Kadota was the only journalist to interview Daiichi plant manager Yoshida Masao before his untimely death by cancer (not attributable to the Fukushima disaster, according to TEPCO). Kadota’s book promotes a narrative of epic heroism by “The Fukushima 50,” a self-selected group of operational staff at the plant who elected to stay on to fight the battle despite facing the prospect of lethal radiation doses if they remained. This was the basis for a major production film as well. 6

Erikson, K.T., 1995. 7

Ruiko, M., and Field, N., 2020.8

Ronalds, P., 2019.9

Sakaki, A. and Lukner, K., 2013.10

Marx Engels Internet Archive, 1995.11

Haruta, et al., 2021.12

Durkheim, E. 1951, p. 279.

https://apjjf.org/2021/17/Cleveland.html

September 8, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , , | Leave a comment

Media Coverage of Fukushima, Ten Years Later.

Martin Fackler

Abstract: When taking up the unlearned lessons of Fukushima, one of the biggest may have been the need for more robust oversight of the nuclear industry. In Japan, the failure of the major national news media to scrutinize the industry and hold it accountable was particularly glaring. Despite their own claims to serve as watchdogs on officialdom, the major media have instead covered Japan’s powerful nuclear industry with a mix of silent complicity and outright boosterism. This is true both before and after the Fukushima disaster. In the decades after World War II, when the nuclear industry was established, media played an active role in overcoming public resistance to atomic energy and winning at least passive acceptance of it as a science-based means for Japan to secure energy autonomy.

During the Fukushima disaster, the media served government objectives such as preservation of social order by playing down the size of the accident and severity of radiological releases, resulting in widely divergent coverage from serious overseas media. While a short-lived proliferation of more critical and independent coverage followed the disaster, the old patterns returned with a vengeance after the installment of the pro-nuclear administration of Abe Shinzō. This article will examine the roots of the Japanese media’s failure to challenge or scrutinize the nuclear industry, and how this complicity has played out in the post-Fukushima era. It will use a historical analysis to look at how the current patterns of media coverage were actually established in the immediate postwar period, and the formation of public support for civilian nuclear power. 

During my 15 years as a foreign correspondent in Tokyo, including a six-year stint as Tokyo bureau chief of The New York Times (2009-2015), I often covered the same news events as Japanese journalists, standing shoulder-to-shoulder at more press conferences than we’d care to count. While I admire many Japanese colleagues individually as journalists, I was frequently struck by the shortcomings of Japan’s big domestic media and Japanese journalism as an institution. 

But never did I feel these structural weaknesses as keenly as I did in the tense weeks that followed the triple meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

In Minami-soma, a city 25 kilometers north of the stricken plant, where some 20,000 remaining residents were cut off from supplies of food, fuel and medicines, I discovered that journalists from major Japanese media were nowhere to be seen. They had withdrawn from Minami-soma, forbidden by their editors in Tokyo from approaching within 30 or 40 kilometers of Fukushima Daiichi. 

By doing so, they had essentially abandoned the already isolated residents. But you would never know that from the media’s stories, which made no mention of their own pull out or the perceived risks that had prompted this retreat. Instead, the main newspaper articles uniformly repeated official reassurances that there was no cause for alarm because the radiation posed “no immediate danger to human health,” as the chief cabinet secretary at the time, Edano Yukio, so famously put it.1

The mismatch between word and deed—between what the newspapers were telling their audiences and what they were actually doing to protect their own journalists—was glaring. It turned out that this was only the first of several instances during the Fukushima disaster where I witnessed Japan’s major media adhering to the official narrative regardless of the facts on the ground. I refer to this phenomenon as “media capture,” borrowing from the more widely used term “regulatory capture,” which is used to describe a similar failure of government oversight of the nuclear industry.

Over the months and years that followed the meltdowns, I saw numerous instances of national media refusing to take a critical or distanced stance in their coverage of the nuclear industry and its government regulators. Instead, they repeatedly chose to internalize the official narratives and even adhere to the government-approved language. We saw this is the widely diverging narratives that started appearing in the serious foreign press versus the major domestic media as the accident worsened. 

To cite a straightforward example, we started using the word “meltdown” within hours of the first reactor building explosion at the plant, reflecting the almost unanimous view of outside experts that a melting fuel core was the only realistic source of the hydrogen that caused the blast. However, the domestic national dailies and NHK avoided the word “meltdown” (in Japanese, merutodaun) for months, following the insistence of the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI), the powerful government agency that both promoted and regulated Japan’s nuclear industry, that a meltdown had not been confirmed. The big Japanese media used other official euphemisms as well, including “explosion-like event” to describe the massive blast at the Unit 3 reactor building, which blew chunks of concrete hundreds of feet into the air. 

In fact, I even had Japanese journalists calling me to berate me and my newspaper for using the M-word without METI’s permission. Readers of the Japanese national dailies didn’t see the M-word until mid-May, when METI and the plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co. or TEPCO, conceded in public that Fukushima Daiichi had indeed suffered a meltdown in mid-March—three meltdowns, in fact.

In the chapter that I wrote for Legacies of Fukushima: 3.11 in Context, I tried to explain some of the reasons why the civilian nuclear power industry could have such a peculiarly strong grip on the media and their narratives. The nuclear industry was a national project that was promoted by the powerful central ministries as a silver bullet for resource-poor Japan’s dependence on imported energy. This gave it an elevated status as the elite bureaucrats guided Japan’s postwar recovery and economic take-off.

I looked at the media’s dependence on Tokyo’s powerful central ministries, which takes its most visible form in the so-called kisha kurabu, or “press clubs.” These are arrangements that allow national media to station their journalists inside the ministries and agencies, where they are given their own room and exclusive access to officials. Much of the reporting by the major Japanese media starts in the kisha kurabu, where journalists gather to wait for the next press conference or off-record briefing from officials. The kisha kurabu system fosters a passive form of journalism, in which reporters become dependent on the ministry within which they are embedded. In pursuit of a scoop that can make or break a career, the journalists compete for handouts from ministry officials. All too often, they enter a Faustian bargain in which the journalists swap narrative control in exchange for exclusive access to information. The result is a passive form of access journalism that ends up repeating spoon-fed official narratives. 

I also looked to the past at the emergence of newspapers like the Asahi Shimbun during the early to mid-Meiji era, when the national priority was to protect autonomy by finding a way to catch the industrialized West. I argued that this history baked into the mindset of Japanese journalists a feeling of responsibility for the fate of their nation, including its vital energy needs. It also led to an identification with the government, and particularly the elite officialdom, as protectors of Japan and its people from predatory foreign powers. This inclination to side with the state has continued in the postwar period, when journalists have clearly seen themselves as members of a national elite attached to a broader bureaucratic-led system. 

One point that I wanted to underscore was that this media capture was not something so simple or venal as corruption. This is how it is often portrayed by critical Japanese writers, usually freelancers and book authors, who focus on the so-called Nuclear Village, a nexus of business, government, labor unions, academia and news media linked by the cash flowing out of the highly profitable nuclear plants. While money doubtlessly plays a role in many of these relationships, including perhaps the for-profit commercial TV broadcasters, I see no direct evidence that it sways the coverage of the national newspapers. These are privately held companies for whom advertising is a much less important revenue source than subscriptions (or the rent from their valuable real estate holdings in central Tokyo and Osaka).

Regardless of the cause, the result has been generations of postwar journalists who have consistently failed to serve as watchdogs on one of the nation’s most politically powerful industries.2 Starting in the 1990s, public scandals started plaguing the industry, and TEPCO in particular. In 2002, government inspectors announced that TEPCO had been routinely falsifying safety reports to hide minor incidents and equipment problems at reactors including several at Fukushima Daiichi. TEPCO eventually admitted to more than 200 such violations stretching back to 1977. Five years later, TEPCO revealed even more cover-ups of safety issues, which the company had failed to report in the previous inquiry. 

Despite what was clearly a chronic and systemic failure of both internal compliance and government oversight, no one was arrested or charged, and the existing regulatory framework left unchanged. The media could have played a role of holding the regulators’ feet to the fire by exposing the structural problems behind this abysmal record of obfuscation and cover-ups. Instead, the watchdogs chose to remain largely silent, reporting on the government’s revelations, but making few efforts at independent investigative reporting.

Of course, such criticisms enjoy the benefits of hindsight, with the accident in 2011 making it easier to see these failures as part of a broader narrative that leads inevitably to Fukushima. But how about after 2011, when the severity of the disaster led to numerous calls for reform? During that time, the national media have also been held up to uncomfortable scrutiny by a jaded and distrustful public, who felt betrayed by their early coverage of the accident. 

Unfortunately, ten years later, nothing seems to have changed.

This was apparent in mid-April of 2021, when the Japanese government announced a decision to release into the Pacific Ocean more than 1.2 million tons of radioactive water that has been building up in hundreds of huge metal tanks on the grounds of the Fukushima Daiichi plant. (The accumulation of contaminated water has plagued the plant from the early days of the disaster. TEPCO has resorted to some high-tech solutions with mixed results, including a mile-long “ice wall” of frozen dirt that failed to fully block the water, much of which flows into the plant from underground.) 

The water stored in these tanks contains tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that is best known for its military use as the fuel for thermonuclear warheads (hence the term “hydrogen bomb”). On the spectrum of radioactive substances, tritium emits relatively low levels of radiation in form of beta particles. But it is a radioactive substance nonetheless, a fact that major media played down or even omitted by choosing, once again, to adopt the industry and government’s language to describe the dump. The main news stories in the major national newspapers and TV broadcasts used the official term for this water, which is shorisui, or “treated water.”

While technically correct, this term euphemistically glosses over the fact that this is not the same as, say, treated sewage water. Nor does treated water convey the fact that this water still contains a radionuclide that emits beta radiation. 

One result was an interesting battle of words that pitted the mainstream media, which used the approved “treated water,” against journalists who were outside the press club’s inner circle. These publications and web sites chose to use clearer terms such as osensui, or “contaminated water.” The leftist daily Tokyo Shimbun, a smaller regional newspaper that has stood out for its more critical coverage of the nuclear disaster, compromised by calling the water osenshorisui, or “contaminated treated water.”3

More eye-opening was the fact that there were actually efforts to enforce use of the officially approved term. As many journalists discovered, there was an army of social media trolls at ready to pile onto anyone with the temerity to use more critical terminology, and particularly “contaminated water.” TEPCO and the government mobilized university experts and PR professionals to police the public sphere for use of words that were deemed “unscientific” and “ideological.”

Of course, the choice of the word “treated” is itself also highly political. It buttressed the larger message put forth by the government and the plant’s operator that the release of this water was no cause for alarm, but something very common and normal that nuclear plants around the world do all the time. By accepting the official terminology, the media were implicitly adopting this framing of the issue, which focused on the claim that the water could be diluted to the point of being harmless when dumped into the Pacific.

Scientifically, this is a valid claim. My point here is not to take sides. Rather, I am criticizing the large domestic media for failing to do the same: i.e., not take sides. By adopting the official narrative, the media were complicit in the government’s and TEPCO’s exclusion of other, also valid counterarguments. One of the biggest is the fact that this release is anything but normal. No nuclear plant has ever conducted an orchestrated release of such a huge quantity of tritium-laden water. (At the time of writing, the amount, 1.2 million tons, is enough to fill almost 500 Olympic-sized swimming pools.) Worse, the release is to be carried out in the same closed, opaque manner as the rest of Japan’s decade-long response to the disaster. Unless TEPCO and METI break with past precedent to allow full international oversight to verify that the water is as clean as they claim it is, we are left once again to trust actors who have consistently violated public faith. 

Just as importantly, there are valid reasons to at least question whether the water is as clean as TEPCO says it is. The company has been telling us for years that it has installed state-of-the-art treatment and filtration technologies that scrub the water of every radioactive particle except tritium. However, in 2018, the plant operator suddenly revealed that 75% of the treated water at the plant still contained excessive amounts of other, more radioactive substances including strontium 90, a dangerous isotope that can embed itself in the living tissue of human bones.4

To be fair, TEPCO may be right in its assessment of the water’s safety. Even so, it is the job of conscientious journalists to take a skeptical attitude toward such claims until they can be independently verified. The media also need to remind why this is necessary, given the company’s and the industry’s history of cover-ups. My goal here is to fault the major domestic media for once again failing to do this, despite the bitter lessons of 2011. Adopting the language of METI and TEPCO privileges the official perspective over others. It shows that the journalists are internalizing the official framing of the event and how it should be discussed and understood. 

Officialdom is thus allowed to set the boundaries of public debate, excluding more critical perspectives as “political,” “unscientific” or even “foreign.” The last characterization reflects the fact that the Chinese and South Korean governments raised some of the loudest objections to the release. The media have tended to frame these as the latest in a litany of self-serving complaints by Asian rivals that like to accuse Japan of failing to apologize for World War II-era atrocities. While Beijing and Seoul may have political motives for seizing on the water issue, this shouldn’t be a reason for journalists to avoid taking up more substantive criticisms about the release. Opposition has appeared in many other countries and reflects the failure of Japan to consult with other nations that share the Pacific Ocean, which will be the site of the mass water dump. 

This is a failure by media, once again, to inform their readers of the existence of alternative narratives that take a dimmer view of the actions taken by Japan’s officialdom, or that point out where government interests diverge from those of Japan’s public. This is also a failure of a different sort: of media to protect their own intellectual independence. By uncritically adopting the official narratives, the journalists are relinquishing the right to frame in their issues. This surrendering of agency is the central fact of the media capture that I described above.

To be clear, Japan is not unique in suffering from the problem of media capture. The press in other democratic countries face similar challenges. In the United States, we use the term “access journalism” to describe the pitfalls of journalists, often in Washington, who trade autonomy for exclusive access to official sources. However, Japan’s version of access journalism is more extreme, producing a uniformly monolithic coverage closer to that in non-democratic societies. The most apt American equivalent may be the period of extreme patriotic fervor between the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, when U.S. media failed to adequately challenge the erroneous claims of the Bush administration that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction.

In Japan’s ongoing Fukushima disaster, this lack of agency manifests itself as a failure to not only set the narrative, but even to decide what is newsworthy. Most of the coverage is essentially an act of regurgitating the information that was distributed at the ministry’s kisha kurabu. Since the news reports are based on information received from ministry officials, not surprisingly they usually showcase the actions of those officials. Both the pages of Japan’s national dailies and the evening news broadcasts of NHK are filled with stories of Japanese officialdom in action, solving some problem or punishing some wrongdoer. Most news reports are mini-dramas in which officials play the starring role. As such, they serve as demonstrations that agency lies in the elite bureaucracies at the center of the postwar Japanese state, and not the major media, which seems to serve as an appendage. 

Even when critical stories appear, they are rarely the work of enterprising reporters unearthing facts that the powerful would rather keep covered. Rather, the revelations tend to come from official actors when they have decided to take action against malfeasance. One example was TEPCO’s cover-ups, mentioned earlier, which were exposed by nuclear regulators, not investigative reporters. A more recent example is revelations that started to become public in March 2021 of years of security lapses at the huge Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear plant in Niigata, facing the Sea of Japan. Over the next two months, news stories dribbled out about workers who were able to access the sensitive areas around the plant’s nuclear reactors without proper ID. In one case in 2015, a man entered the reactor area using the ID of his father, who also worked at the plant. Once again, there lapses were not exposed by intrepid reporters but regulators themselves, who leaked them to prepare the public for their decision to reject TEPCO’s request to restart the plant.5

The lack of media agency is all the more glaring because there have been very notable exceptions. Japan’s journalists have shown that they are capable of true investigative reporting that can define and drive the public narrative. For a brief window of time during the early years of the Fukushima disaster, some major Japanese media experimented with more autonomous journalism. This began in the late summer of 2011, as public disillusionment in the domestic press’s compliant coverage grew. This prompted some media to try to re-engage readers with more hard-hitting reports that challenged the official claims.

The most notable of these efforts was launched by the Asahi Shimbun, Japan’s second-largest daily, which beefed up a new reporting group dedicated to investigative journalism. (By investigative journalism, I mean journalists taking the initiative to pry out hidden truths and assemble these into original, factual narratives that challenge the versions of reality put forth by the powerful.) The Asahi’s investigative division got off to a strong start by winning Japan’s most prestigious press award two years in a row. It scored what it trumpeted as its biggest coup in May 2014, when two of its reporters wrote a front-page story that exposed the dangerously poor crisis management at the plant as it teetered on the brink of catastrophe. The story revealed that the government had hidden testimony by the Fukushima Daiichi plant’s manager during the accident, Yoshida Masao, who later died of cancer. It also recounted what it said was the most explosive revelation of this secret testimony: that hundreds of workers and staff had fled the crippled plant at the most dangerous point in the disaster, despite the fact that Yoshida never gave them the order to leave.

However, the Asahi erred by giving the story a misleading headline, which left readers with the impression that the workers had fled in defiance of Yoshida’s order to stay. (In fact, Yoshida himself says in the testimony that his order didn’t reach these workers—a stunning breakdown in command and control that was lost in the subsequent blow up over the article.) This misstep gave critics the opening that they needed to try to discredit the entire story, and by extension the newspaper’s proactive coverage of the disaster. A host of critics, including the prime minister himself and the rest of the mainstream media, set upon the Asahi with unusual ferocity. After weeks of withering attacks, which essentially accused the newspaper of lacking patriotism and of belittling the heroic plant workers, the Asahi’s president made a dramatic surrender in September 2014, retracting the entire article, gutting the investigative team and resigning his own job to take responsibility for the fiasco.6

Thus marked the end of the Asahi’s short-lived foray into investigative journalism, which I have described in more detail in this journal.7 Suffice it to say here that when forced to make a choice, the Asahi, the nation’s leading liberal voice favored by the intelligentsia, chose to remain on the boat. To preserve the privileged insider status as a member of the kisha kurabu media, the newspaper chose to sacrifice not only its biggest reporting accomplishment of the disaster, but also the journalists who produced it, who were sent into humiliating internal exile. For years afterward, the newspaper shunned proactive reporting on Fukushima, staying within safe confines of the official storyline.

The Asahi’s biggest mistake was its failure to stand behind its journalists. Investigative reporting is by nature a highly risky undertaking, and one that pits a handful of underpaid journalists against some of the most powerful members of society. By not only failing to stand up for its investigative reporters but trying to scapegoat them by punishing them for the mistakes in coverage, the Asahi sent a chilling message to all mainstream journalists: Newspapers don’t have your back. In such an environment, what journalists in their right mind would want to challenge the powers that be?

Admirably, some of the Asahi’s investigative reporters did stand their ground even at the cost of their careers at the newspaper. Soon after the debacle, two of the investigative group’s top reporters quit to launch Japan’s first NGO dedicated to investigative journalism, which in 2021 was renamed Tokyo Investigative Newsroom Tansa.8 Another resigned to join Facta, a Japanese magazine dedicated to investigative coverage (and offering stories that cannot be found in the large national newspapers). These decisions to place principle over company and career underscore my broader point: The sources of Japan’s media capture are bigger than the individual reporters and embedded in the structure of media institutions and the practice in Japan of journalism itself. 

The Asahi’s capitulation in 2014 marked the end of not just the Asahi’s but all the mainstream media’s efforts to create new, more critical narratives of the Fukushima disaster. These days, most reporting tends to fall into one of a few prepackaged, safely uncontroversial storylines. There is the Fukushima 50 narrative of successfully overcoming Japan’s biggest trial since World War II. Another is the “baseless rumors” (fuhyō higai) narrative, which casts fears of radiation as over-exaggerated, and usually the creation of women, leftists and foreigners. 

Journalists have told me that the Asahi’s surrender created a powerful prohibition on critical coverage. Having seen what happened to Japan’s leading liberal newspaper, and the star reporters there who lost their careers, few journalists have the stomach to challenge the status quo. The result is a grim new conformity. 

Adding to the pressure to toe the line has been the appearance post-Fukushima of another new, problem-plagued national project: the Tokyo Summer Olympics, originally scheduled for 2020. Coverage of the Olympics has again tended to adhere to official narratives, even as public misgivings grew in Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide’s decision to go forward with the Games a year later, in 2021, in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic. 

From the start, the government has used the Olympics to divert attention from Fukushima while proclaiming that the disaster is now in the past. While there has been critical coverage, it has been the exception and not the rule. Indeed, the media’s silence was deafening when the previous prime minister, Abe Shinzō, told the International Olympic Committee in Buenos Aires in September 2013 that the plant’s “situation was under control,” even as contaminated water was then still bleeding into the Pacific. 

By failing to take the initiative in Fukushima, the media have ended up supporting official efforts to use the Games to put the lid back on the nuclear disaster. The Olympics have become yet one more means for Japan’s elites to regain control of the public sphere, or at least the part of it controlled by the big legacy media. (They have had less success asserting control over the much more anarchic and anonymous world of social media.)

The media’s reluctance to challenge the government has also been apparent during the Covid-19 pandemic. I’m still waiting for the investigative articles that expose the truth behind Tokyo’s biggest failures during the pandemic. The major media emitted barely a peep in response to the government’s blatantly discriminatory decision during the first six months of the pandemic to close Japan’s borders to all foreign nationals, including long-term residents, while allowing Japanese nationals to come and go. More importantly, I would be the first in line to read an investigative exposé into what delayed the roll out of vaccines in Japan.

All too often, coverage of COVID-19 ended up repeating the pattern that we saw in Fukushima. The media once again surrendered their biggest public asset: their power to challenge the official narrative and expose the facts that officials don’t want us to know. Instead, the major domestic media once again show themselves more interested in preserving their privileged insider status. By doing so, they once again do a disservice of their readers.

The need to serve their readers by finding an independent and critical voice should have been the media’s biggest takeaway from Fukushima. Instead, they appear to be merely repeating the mistakes of a decade ago.

References

Brown, A. and Darby, I. (2021) ‘Plan to discharge Fukushima plant water into sea sets a dangerous precedent’, The Japan Times, April 25 [Online]. Accessed: June 25, 2021.

Fackler, M. (2016) ‘Sinking a bold foray into watchdog journalism in Japan’, Columbia Journalism Review [Online]. Accessed: June 25, 2021.

Fackler, M. (2016) ‘The Asahi Shimbun’s failed foray into watchdog journalism’, The Asia Pacific Journal Japan Focus, 14(24) [Online]. Accessed: June 25, 2021.

Jomaru, Y. (2012) Genpatsu to media shinbun jānarizumu ni dome no haiboku [Nuclear Power and the Media: The Second Defeat of Newspaper Journalism]. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Shuppan.

Kyodo. (2021) ‘Another security breach at Tepco nuclear plant uncovered’, The Japan Times, May 9 [Online]. Accessed: June 25, 2021. 

Ogawa, S. (2021) ‘Fukushima dai ichi genpatsu no osen shorisui, seifu ga kaiyō hōshutsu no hōshin o kettei e 1 3 nichi ni mo kanei kakuryō kaigi [Government Moving Toward Decision to Release the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant’s Contaminated Treated Water in the Ocean], Tokyo Shimbun, April 9 [Online]. Accessed: June 25, 2021.

Tansa. (2021) Tokyo investigative newsroom Tansa [Online]. Accessed: June 4, 2021.

Notes

1

SankeiNews (2011). “Edano kanbōchō kankaiken No1 ‘Tadachi ni kenkō shigai wa denai…’” [Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Conference Edano No1 ‘No Immediate Health Damage’]) [Online Video]. Accessed: August 23, 2011.2

Jomaru, 2012.3

Ogawa, 2021.4

Brown and Darby, 2021.5

Kyodo, 2021.6

Fackler, 2016.7

Fackler, 2016.8

Tansa, 2021.

https://apjjf.org/2021/17/Fackler.html

September 8, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021, Japan, media | , , | Leave a comment

10 years after

September 3, 2021

10th testimony of Fonzy, 10 years after the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Thanks to her for continuing to give us news! The vigilance, even if it is less assiduous, is always necessary.

Hello,

I have been silent for several years. I am fine, I still live in the same place, 280 km from the Fukushima Daiichi plant.

Since the accident of the power plant, 10 years have passed. I must confess that it is difficult to be always on the alert, or in a state of alert all the time. Little by little, I am letting go of the restrictions I had imposed on myself. There are still some things I continue to do, for example:

  • Wearing a mask

In 2011, I wore an N95 mask every time I went to Tokyo, even in summer when it was 35 C. Since the N95 mask is expensive, I have been wearing a “normal” mask since 2012, and I still continue to this day. Right now, the mask is almost mandatory even in my neighborhood because of Covid 19.

  • More mushrooms

Shiitake, button mushroom, oyster mushroom,… well all kinds of mushrooms are gone from the table. From time to time, I miss Shiitake, but it will not be fatal not to eat mushrooms. On the other hand, eating mushrooms could be…

  • Buying products from southwestern Japan

I normally buy vegetables that are produced beyond 500 km from the Daiichi plant. The same goes for fruits. In other words, I buy broccoli from Kyoto, but not lettuce from Chiba (250 km). I used to avoid products from the south of Nagano (300 km from Daiichi) or Gifu (400 km from Daiichi), but now I occasionally buy fruits produced there.

  • Eating in restaurants as little as possible

In the early years, I almost never ate in restaurants. When I was forced to attend a party with colleagues, I tried not to eat anything, as it was said that Fukushima products (which should not exceed the limit of 100 Bq/kg) were used in catering. Starting in 2015 or ’16, I began to dine once every two or three months in restaurants that I chose well and that served us products from Kyushu or Shikoku, regions that are in the southwest of Japan.

  • Avoiding the rain

I used to like to walk without an umbrella in the rain, especially with a light rain. After Fukushima, as soon as I feel a drop, I open my umbrella. I always have my umbrella when it might rain later in the day. So I always pay close attention to the weather.

Now I tell you what I don’t do anymore.

  • Mineral water
    Until March 2021, we only drink mineral water, we only use mineral water to make soup, stew, in short everything that is to be eaten at home. However, the water bottles are heavy, we have to go to the supermarket quite often to buy a box of six bottles that we consume quite quickly. It’s not free either… So we decided to stop using mineral water for cooking. We still drink the mineral water whose radioactivity is measured.

Mineral water: cesium and iodine are measured by the gamma spectrometer (Photo Fonzy). The bottle on the left costs 0.6 euros, the bottle on the right 2.15 euros.

  • Fish

For at least eight years after the accident we did not eat fish. However, my partner had colon cancer in 2019, and afterwards he preferred to eat “lightly”, so we resumed the habit of eating fish. I mostly buy fish from southwestern Japan, but occasionally I buy fish from a port near our home, because they are much fresher. I avoid fish from the shallow waters such as sole or turbot.

  • Geiger counter

I walked around with my Geiger counter a lot in 2011, and a little less in 2012, and now … I don’t know where it is anymore, maybe in a drawer, but I haven’t seen it for years. I wonder if my friends who had one still use it.

  • Anti-nuclear demonstrations

For two or three years after Fukushima, there were many anti-nuclear demonstrations organized not only in Tokyo but also throughout Japan. We shouted in front of the Tepco headquarters, in front of the Parliament, in the streets, we were very numerous at one time. There were activists who made anti-nuclear mobilizations every Friday night in front of the Parliament. This was a success for some time. I too participated often, especially in 2011 and 2012. However, they stopped their movement for good in March 2021 because there were, according to them, much less participants lately and they had no budget to continue. Now anti-nuclear demonstrations are very rare, although there are still some who mobilize from time to time. It seems to me that we Japanese are not very demonstrative. We’ll see…

  • Convincing the others

Even though I talked to my friends and relatives about the risks of contamination and the dangers of nuclear power plants, it was almost impossible to convince them to be interested in this kind of problems.

That’s it. I do what I think I can do without too much stress. Still thinking about Fukushima is possible, but now we should have more imagination, because we don’t talk about it anymore. I thank those who continue to think about Fukushima despite so much geographical distance and so many years passed. Thank you for your solidarity.

Fonzy


http://www.fukushima-blog.com/2021/09/10-ans-apres.html?fbclid=IwAR0fXoK3fI0E6mhtRBvAKlCtEHZIdsjqNXdLuKftRhy7WAfIjttLCXGuoI8

September 7, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , , | Leave a comment

Fukushima radiation monitoring posts to be renewed

Japan’s nuclear regulators plan to retain radiation monitoring posts in Fukushima Prefecture by replacing old equipment with new.

About 3,000 monitoring posts were set up at schools and other locations across the prefecture following the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

The annual test and maintenance cost of the equipment is around 5.5 million dollars.

The Nuclear Regulation Authority decided in 2018 to remove about 80 percent of the monitoring posts, saying that radiation levels had remained low and the posts would likely reach their lifespan of about eight years.

But the authority reversed its decision after it met opposition from local residents.

It decided instead to retain the monitoring posts for the time being to ease local people’s concern about radiation levels and their health.

The authority plans to replace parts in radiation detectors and power supply sources with new ones in the next 10 years. About 300 posts will be renewed annually.

Some 450 monitoring posts containing parts that are hard to obtain will be replaced entirely.

The prefectural government of Fukushima says it wants the authority to continue to measure radiation levels.

https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20210905_04/

September 7, 2021 Posted by | Fukushima 2021 | , | Leave a comment