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Public Interest Groups Warn National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) on Plutonium Giveaway

South Carolina Environmental Law Project, Savannah River Site Watch & Nuclear Watch New Mexico September 8, 2026, https://www.scelp.org/news/groups-warn-nnsa-on-plutonium-giveaway

South Carolina – Today, the South Carolina Environmental Law Project (SCELP) sent a letter of demand to the Department of Energy (DOE) and its semi-autonomous agency, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), about their proposed unsound and dangerous management of U.S. plutonium. The letter notified them that they must comply with the federal National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirement for public review of the Trump Administration’s troubling plan to give away 19.7 metric tons of nuclear weapons-grade plutonium to private corporations.

SCELP’S letter, on behalf of Nuclear Watch New Mexico, Savannah River Site Watch, and a private citizen who lives near the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, outlines why NNSA must be held to its legal NEPA obligations. The letter describes how recently issued presidential executive orders:

…constitute a vast change in the prior decisions and purposes of the DOE/NNSA surplus plutonium disposition program that has been in place since at least 1996… This change is also contrary to the larger nuclear non-proliferation policy of the United States restricting the commercial use of plutonium that has been in place for approximately fifty years.

This action follows SCELP’s earlier NEPA lawsuit on behalf of SRS Watch and Nuclear Watch New Mexico. In a landmark settlement, that litigation successfully compelled the NNSA to prepare a nationwide programmatic environmental impact statement on the production of plutonium “pit” bomb cores for nuclear weapons (the “Pit Production PEIS”).

SCELP’s new letter of demand states as follows:

In a generally analogous NEPA situation, my clients are concerned that the Department of Energy and NNSA are radically changing course in their surplus plutonium disposition program without preparing a necessary supplemental programmatic environmental impact statement.

On May 23, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14302 “Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base” which officially terminated DOE’s previous “dilute and dispose” program for excess weapons-grade plutonium. In that program, 40 metric tons of plutonium were to be treated as nuclear waste for underground disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, as analyzed in several earlier NEPA documents.

President Trump’s 2025 decree directed DOE to establish a program to supply surplus plutonium in a form usable by the commercial sector—specifically for advanced nuclear technologies and small modular reactors. Notably, the Executive Order focused extensively on “recycling” and “reprocessing” spent nuclear fuel to remove plutonium for use in reactors. It then contemplated agreements “with domestic nuclear energy companies” that “implement methods to enhance the capacity to manage spent nuclear fuel, including the recycling and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel….” Not only was this significant shift in policy done without required NEPA analysis, but there is no justified demand to use plutonium as nuclear fuel.

In addition to serious proliferation, environmental and radioactive waste concerns, this planned giveaway of weapons-grade plutonium is also linked to the increasingly controversial issues of artificial intelligence and data centers. Still hypothetical and untested advanced nuclear reactors and speculative small modular reactors are being eyed to power future data centers across the country. This urgently underscores the need for a nationwide public programmatic review, which SCELP’s letter of demand seeks.

In May 2026, NNSA announced yet another major policy shift in the plutonium disposition program, again without mandated NEPA review. The government agency selected five private companies to receive the 19.7 metric tons of plutonium: Oklo Inc., Exodys Energy, Shine Technologies, Standard Nuclear, and Flibe Energy, Inc. The current Secretary of Energy, Chris Wright, had to resign from the Oklo board of directors to assume his job as the head of DOE. That continues to raise eyebrows as DOE funnels money to Oklo, a private corporation, for its ill-defined program which will purport to use some of the government’s weapons-grade plutonium.

The Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina is key to the Trump Administration’s plans to give away weapons-grade plutonium to private corporations. As the SCELP letter notes:

[I]n support of its new plutonium utilization program, DOE announced in March its ‘decision to restart HB-Line operations at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina.’ This activity was stated to provide ‘the capability to power America’s nuclear future by recycling surplus plutonium and partnering with industry to produce uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for advanced nuclear reactors. The facility is an integral part of H-Canyon, the only chemical separations facility of its kind in the United States.’

This is ironic. DOE and NNSA have been on the Government Accountability Office’s High Risk List for project mismanagement and waste of taxpayers’ dollars ever since GAO started the List in 1991. An ill-conceived MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at SRS—terminated in 2017—was a ~$7 billion failure for which there has been no government accounting. That boondoggle plutonium MOX fuel facility is now being “repurposed” by NNSA into a new $30 billion production facility to produce plutonium “pit” bomb cores for new-design nuclear weapons, which will be the most expensive building in U.S. history.

SCELP’s letter of demand concludes:

Before bringing suit on the Pit Production PEIS, my clients wrote to NNSA five times reminding the agency of its legal obligations under NEPA. They never received a response. It is my hope that we can avoid a similar predicament. My clients request that DOE and NNSA respond to this letter within 30 days. If NNSA and DOE do not elect to engage, my clients will evaluate what legal actions may be necessary and proceed accordingly. 

Ben Cunningham, SCELP Attorney, commented, “Since the mid ‘90s, DOE and NNSA have scrutinized how to address the surplus plutonium issue many times across several administrations. The public has been engaged in the process each time. NEPA continues to require that same level of scrutiny and public engagement before these agencies commit to a course of action that would place plutonium in private hands.

Tom Clements, Director of SRS Watch, added, “It is imperative that DOE and NNSA immediately halt questionable plans to introduce weapon-grade plutonium into civilian reactors and other nuclear facilities and affirm that it will now begin preparation of the legally required environmental review.”

The Director of Nuclear Watch New Mexico, Jay Coghlan, concluded, “As nuclear threats increase around the world, the last thing we need is government giveaways of nuclear weapons-grade plutonium to private profit-seeking corporations. We are asking the NNSA nicely for the public review legally required by the National Environmental Policy Act. If it blows us off again like it did with the Pit Production PEIS, we’ll discuss it with NNSA in court.”

Contacts:

Tom Clements, Director, SRS Watch, 803-240-7268, tomclements329[at]srswatch.org;

Jay Coghlan, Nuclear Watch NM, 505-989-7342, jay[at]nukewatch.org

Shelby Cohen, Comms Manager, SC Env. Law Project, 864.414.7726, shelby[at]scelp.org 

About the nonprofit organizations: The South Carolina Environmental Law Project has used its legal expertise to protect land, water and communities across South Carolina since 1987. Savannah River Site Watch, based in Columbia, SC, works for the public interest by monitoring activities at the Savannah River Site. Nuclear Watch New Mexico, based in Santa Fe, NM, watchdogs plutonium pit production at both the Los Alamos Lab and SRS. Learn more at scelp.org/srswatch.org/, and nukewatch.org/.

September 13, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium, USA | Leave a comment

Shortage of radioactive ‘rare as diamonds’ material (plutonium) frustrates nuclear start-ups

A shortage of plutonium could hold back a new generation of
nuclear projects, with start-ups battling to secure the radioactive
material given the limited supplies available to civilian projects.


Plutonium, which cannot be mined, is a byproduct of spent uranium-based
fuel used in reactors. Its huge explosive capacity makes it ideal for
nuclear warheads, meaning its usage and extraction have been highly
restricted for decades.

Some designs for a new crop of nuclear projects
require the material to help power their systems, with companies trying to
find an adequate supply to carry out testing as well as eventually running
the reactors.

Industry executives and analysts said a shortage of nuclear
fuel recycling facilities around the world would not be easily overcome
given the cost and lengthy development time for new projects.

FT 1st Sept 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/836566de-fd44-43c4-9899-28e05b4fbf33

September 4, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium | Leave a comment

Plutonium—the ‘forever’ radiotoxic weapons-proliferation risk in nuclear reactor spent fuel. How exactly should we manage its containment?

Plutonium—the ‘forever’ radiotoxic weapons-proliferation risk in nuclear reactor spent fuel. How exactly should we manage its containment?

Nick Scarr 55 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2025 Last revised: 27 Aug 2026,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5402553

Abstract

The paper is a research dossier and examines the properties of plutonium in terms of its two principal hazards: toxicity and weapons proliferation. It will then address the question of whether there is a sufficient safety-case for the long-term geological storage of plutonium-bearing spent fuel.

Keywords: Plutonium, GDF, Weapons Proliferation, Criticality, MOX, Reprocessing, Keff, 5f, Pu-240, Pu-239, reactor-grade, prompt neutrons, HALEU, high burnup, geological disposal, plutonium residue, plutonium oxide, IAEA, sellafield, cultural exceptionalism, anhydrite, biological half life, committed dose, biological half-life, predictability fallacy, fission-fusion-fission, Barn rating, mox, inert matrix fuel, TRISO, intergenerational ethics

September 4, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium | Leave a comment

Nuclear Watchdog Sues for Plutonium Pit Production “Special Study”

Jay Coghlan, Nuclear Watch New Mexico, 4 Aug 26, https://nukewatch.org/nuclear-weapons-watchdog-complaint-nnsa-pit-production-special-study

Santa Fe, NM – Nuclear Watch New Mexico has sued the Department of Energy under the Freedom of Information Act for its Special Study of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Leadership and Management of the Plutonium Pit Production Mission. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is the semi-autonomous nuclear weapons agency within DOE.

Plutonium “pits” are the radioactive cores or “triggers” of nuclear weapons. Their
expanded manufacturing has been the chokepoint of resumed industrial-scale nuclear
weapons production by the U.S. Crucially, no future pit production is to maintain the
safety and reliability of the existing stockpile. Instead, it is all for new-design nuclear
weapons for the new arms race. These new weapons can’t be tested because of the
existing global testing moratorium, thereby perhaps degrading confidence in the
stockpile. Or new-design nuclear weapons testing could prompt the U.S. to resume
testing, which would have severe international proliferation consequences.
Plutonium pit production is the NNSA’s most expensive and complex program to date.
However, the independent Government Accountability Office (GAO) has repeatedly
stated that the agency has no credible costs estimates and no “Integrated Master
Schedule” for simultaneous production at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
in northern New Mexico and the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. In fact,
DOE and NNSA have been on the GAO’s “High Risk List” for project mismanagement
and waste of taxpayers’ dollars since 1991. At more than $30 billion, the plutonium pit
plant at SRS is on track to become the most expensive building in U.S. history. A
comparable amount will be spent at LANL on facility upgrades and related projects, for
which the NNSA fails to keep total aggregated costs.

Even the Department of Energy recognizes how deeply troubled NNSA’s plutonium pit
production program is. In August 2025 DOE Deputy Secretary James Danly ordered the
“Special Study” completed within 120 days (i.e., mid-December 2025). On December 16,
2025, Sen. Elizabeth Warren and Rep. John Garamendi, both members of the Armed
Services Committees, unsuccessfully demanded the Special Study.
Nuclear Watch New Mexico filed a Freedom of Information Act request for the Special
Study on December 22, 2025. Having received no substantive response, in April 2026 we
requested expedited processing because of an open public comment period for a Pit
Production Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (that we had to sue NNSA for
to begin with). Having received no further response from DOE we have therefore filed
this litigation in the Washington, DC federal court.

Nuclear Watch New Mexico’s counsel is Jules Zacher, who has successfully represented
us in two previous FOIA lawsuits. Apart from his legal practice, Mr. Zacher is also
chairman of the Board of Directors of the Council for a Livable World, founder of
Citizens for Transparency and on the Executive Board of the Center for Ethics and Rule
of Law at the University of Pennsylvania. He commented, “This Special Study has not
been classified to my knowledge and was completed before the end of 2025. The
American taxpayer deserves to see it. It’s an exorbitant amount of money he and she is
being asked to bear for a deeply troubled and provocative program.”
Jay Coghlan, Director of Nuclear Watch New Mexico, added, “There is a massive
coverup by DOE and NNSA over their plutonium pit production program. To grease
expanded nuclear weapons production, they have rescinded nuclear safety regulations,
illegally restricted the access of the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,
and are withholding crucial documents from the American taxpayer. We hope this
lawsuit will help to bring NNSA’s plutonium house of cards tumbling down.”

August 5, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium, Legal, USA | Leave a comment

Approval for VVER uranium/plutonium fuel production in Germany

Friday, 24 July 2026,
https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/approval-for-vver-fuel-production-in-germany

The Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection, acting on behalf of the federal government, has approved an application from Framatome subsidiary Advanced Nuclear Fuels to expand its facility in Lingen for the production of fuel for VVER-1000 reactors. The approval is subject to strict conditions.

Framatome subsidiary Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) applied in March 2022 under the Atomic Energy Act for permission to begin producing hexagonal pressurised water fuel elements under licence with TVEL, the fuel arm of Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom. The fuel elements are to be manufactured using Russian licences and Russian technology in a joint venture with TVEL for the Eastern European market. The licence application includes some changes to some manufacturing and testing equipment and the installation of some additional equipment in existing buildings to enable the manufacture of VVER fuel elements.

The federal government had already clarified in a supervisory letter to the state that, given the current assessment by federal security authorities regarding the risk of sabotage or espionage, there was no legal basis for denying the permit.

The Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection has now announced that it has approved ANF’s application, subject to a number of conditions, as “after intensive review and inquiries, [it] had no legal grounds under the Atomic Energy Act to reject or limit the application”. The restrictions it has imposed include a general ban on entry to the facility for employees of TVEL or Rosatom, as well as persons authorised by them. Entry is only permitted in very limited cases and under the supervision of the regulatory authority.

In addition, the ministry said the hardware and software of the TVEL-licensed machines must undergo external security audits, and these machines must be data-integrated with the rest of the fuel element factory’s operational technology and information technology infrastructure. Also, the finished gadolinium fuel rods arriving from Russia must be 100% inspected for potential tampering using active and passive scanners according to the ‘four-eyes’ principle. Furthermore, ANF employees must receive regular training and awareness programmes to protect against espionage and sabotage.

Lower Saxony’s environment ministry said the approval could be revisited “if new risks are identified”, particularly in “national security”, Euractiv reported.

ANF was created in 1975 and currently employs around 400 people in Lingen. ANF fabricates fuel rods and assemblies for pressurised water reactors and boiling water reactors for customers worldwide.

In recent years, especially since the war with Ukraine began, nuclear power operators in European Union countries who had previously relied on Russian-supplied fuel have sought alternative suppliers. Nineteen VVER reactors – developed during the time of the Soviet Union and historically reliant on Russian fuel supplies – are currently in operation in the EU, including four VVER-1000 reactors in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, and 15 VVER-440 reactors in the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary and Slovakia.

Framatome has “a dual-track approach” to supplying fuel to VVER reactors in operation in the EU. In the short term, it will fabricate fuel identical to the proven design currently used by the reactors. In parallel, Framatome is developing and qualifying European sovereign fuels of its own design for VVER-440 and VVER-1000 reactors. The qualification of a new design requires several years within the framework of regulatory and usual certification practices, Framatome notes.

Framatome had planned to produce both VVER-1000 and VVER-440 fuel under licence from and as part of a joint venture with Rosatom at its subsidiary Advanced Nuclear Fuels in Lingen. However, it was recently reported that Framatome has now decided to produce the VVER-440 fuel at its Romans-sur-Isere fuel production site in south-east France. The company expects to submit a request to the French nuclear regulator, the Autorite de Surete Nucleaire et de Radioprotection, by the end of 2026 for approval of the changes needed at the French plant for the production of VVER-440 fuel.

July 29, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium, Germany, reprocessing, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment

Nuclear Startups Are in “Advanced Negotiations” to Buy Cold War Plutonium

While it seems like a win-win for nuclear waste cleanup and clean energy development in the United States, some critics are concerned about safety and security implications of the deal. Currently, this highly dangerous, weapons-grade material is kept in a highly regulated and secure environment. Selling it to energy companies would significantly compromise oversight. “The plan has generated debate and some unease among nonproliferation experts,” the New York Times reports. “If finalized, it would mark the first time the U.S. government has made weapons-grade plutonium available to private companies.”

By Haley Zaremba – Jun 03, 2026, https://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/Nuclear-Startups-Are-in-Advanced-Negotiations-to-Buy-Cold-War-Plutonium.html

  • The Trump administration is in “advanced negotiations” with nuclear startups, including Oklo, to convert more than 50 tons of weapons-grade plutonium into commercial reactor fuel — the first time the U.S. government would make such material available to private companies.
  • The move is framed as a fix for a critical nuclear fuel supply chain bottleneck, with Russia controlling roughly half of global uranium conversion capacity and squeezing Western reactor development.
  • Nonproliferation experts are raising safety and security concerns, warning that moving weapons-grade material out of tightly controlled government facilities significantly reduces oversight.

As nuclear energy regains favor around the globe, competition for nuclear fuel is heating up. In an era of multiple and compounding energy crises driven by conflict, climate, and the power-hungry artificial intelligence boom, nuclear has resurfaced as a highly strategic option for building up energy security and independence for many nations around the world. But nuclear fuels supply chains are highly concentrated, and many of them are controlled by Russia, presenting critical geopolitical tradeoffs.

Today, there are only five plants in the world that operate large-scale uranium conversion, and half of that capacity is in the hands of the Kremlin, resulting in a critical resource bottleneck and geopolitical pain points. Accordingly, “U.S. nuclear energy faces fuel supply chain vulnerabilities, with tight uranium supplies, geopolitical risks, and rising costs threatening both existing reactors costs and advanced reactor development,” according to a January report from Stanford Energy.

It is therefore in the United States’ strategic interest to build up alternative nuclear fuel supply chains, preferably home- and friend-shored ones. But it’s a little late for the United States to get a foothold in alternative uranium markets, as Russia and China, which never saw a decline in their respective nuclear sectors, have already been cornering them for years.

“Russian and Chinese players have been very keen to secure access to resources in central Asia and Africa, creating a very aggressive competitive environment,” Benjamin Godwin at Prism Strategic Intelligence told the Financial Times last year.

The United States is taking steps to build up its own uranium supply chains, as the country is home to plentiful natural reserves of the 92nd element. But the country is also home to another vast reserve of nuclear fuel that is far more readily accessible — decades of stockpiled nuclear waste. Research into recycling spent nuclear fuel indicates that resource utilization could be boosted by a jaw-dropping 95 percent.

“Used nuclear fuel is an incredible untapped resource in the United States,” Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy Ted Garrish told World Nuclear News back in February. “The Trump Administration is taking a common-sense approach to making sure we’re using our resources in the most efficient ways possible to secure American energy independence and fuel our economic growth.”

And now the Trump administration is looking to a new, and significantly more controversial, source of recycled nuclear fuel — cold-war era nuclear warheads. The government wants to convert weapons-grade plutonium into viable nuclear fuel as part of the Trump administration’s aim to “reestablish the United States as the global leader in nuclear energy.

The United States is sitting on more than 50 tons of plutonium left behind by nuclear weapons programs. The Department of Energy had previously planned to dilute and bury the hazardous material, but the Trump administration wants to give it new life in nuclear reactors and has entered into “advanced negotiations” with a handful of nuclear startups to begin the process of selling the plutonium for use as nuclear fuel.

“A lack of fuel is one of the biggest choke points in expanding nuclear power right now,” said Jacob DeWitte, the chief executive of Oklo, one of the companies in conversation with the Trump administration about acquiring plutonium to power its next-gen small nuclear reactors. “This will help us get more nuclear power online faster.”

While it seems like a win-win for nuclear waste cleanup and clean energy development in the United States, some critics are concerned about safety and security implications of the deal. Currently, this highly dangerous, weapons-grade material is kept in a highly regulated and secure environment. Selling it to energy companies would significantly compromise oversight. “The plan has generated debate and some unease among nonproliferation experts,” the New York Times reports. “If finalized, it would mark the first time the U.S. government has made weapons-grade plutonium available to private companies.”

June 7, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium, USA | Leave a comment

U.S. Turns Cold War Plutonium Into Nuclear Fuel

Oil Price, By Charles Kennedy – May 28, 2026, 

  • The U.S. is exploring the use of Cold War-era plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads as alternative fuel for advanced nuclear reactors due to uranium supply shortages and reliance on foreign enriched uranium.
  • The Department of Energy has shortlisted five nuclear companies, including SMR developers.
  • Critics warn the plan raises nuclear proliferation risks and could prove technically and economically difficult, as converting weapons-grade plutonium into reactor fuel remains highly expensive.

……………………………………………………………. The plutonium considered for distribution to nuclear companies is from dismantled warheads from the Cold War. The radioactive material—50 tons of surplus supply, according to the New York Times—was originally to be diluted and buried, but President Trump last year suspended that plan, per Reuters, which also recalled reports about Washington planning to make 20 tons of plutonium available to private companies.

……………………………There are, of course, opponents to the idea of using weapons-grade nuclear material for nuclear power generation by private companies. Indeed, some Democratic members of Congress have publicly protested the plan.

“The transfer of weapons-usable plutonium to private industry would increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, including to rogue states or terrorists,” Massachusetts senator Ed Markey and representatives Don Beyer and John Garamendi said in a letter from last September. “The United States cannot effectively discourage other countries from using plutonium for civil purposes if we use it ourselves.”

The idea behind the move is to encourage the development of small modular nuclear reactors that could be built much more quickly than conventional ones—at least theoretically. The practical application of SMR technology, however, has stumbled after pioneer NuScale had to scrap its plans to build the first small modular reactor in the U.S. amid much higher than hoped-for costs, leading to insufficient numbers of future buyers willing to sign up for the facility’s output.

Despite these challenges in the MR segment, nuclear is back in a big way, not least thanks to Big Tech’s AI rush, which requires these companies to secure massive amounts of electricity for their facilities—and make it reliable. This is boosting the popularity of nuclear electricity outside the Big Tech community as well—higher electricity bills are making the construction costs of new nuclear power plants more palatable than they would have been a couple of years ago.

Whether plutonium would make an equivalent substitute for uranium in this nuclear renaissance remains questionable, it seems. The fact that the element could be used for the production of nuclear weapons is one problem with the idea. Another problem appears to be of a more technical nature, per the New York Times, which also cited critics as saying the cost of turning plutonium into nuclear fuel was prohibitively high. https://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/US-Turns-Cold-War-Plutonium-Into-Nuclear-Fuel.html

May 31, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium, USA | Leave a comment

Trump plan to give start-ups plutonium harvested from Cold War–era nuclear weapons is risky, experts say

Weapons-grade plutonium can fuel nuclear reactors known as mixed oxide reactors, but none of these exist in the U.S.

By Adam Kovac edited by Claire Cameron, May 28, 2026 https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/experts-warn-against-trump-plan-to-give-cold-war-plutonium-to-nuclear-power-companies/

The Trump administration’s plan to offer plutonium from dismantled Cold War–era nuclear weapons to private energy companies is drawing criticism from experts who say it makes little economic sense and presents a national security threat.

There are currently no operational nuclear reactors in the country that are built to use plutonium-derived fuel. Instead nuclear power plants in the U.S. are powered by a mixture of two uranium isotopes. A small portion, usually around 5 percent, of that fuel is uranium 235, which can also be used to make nuclear weapons. The majority is uranium 238, which cannot sustain a nuclear fission reaction on its own. Because of that balance, if some of this fuel were to fall into the wrong hands, it would be enormously difficult to weaponize, says Scott Roecker, vice president of nuclear materials security at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonprofit dedicated to preventing nuclear catastrophe.

“The most difficult step in getting a nuclear weapon is having enough of that material,” he explains. “The U.S. government has spent probably billions of dollars over the last several decades to remove highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium from countries that don’t need it.”

Plutonium, meanwhile, is considered a human-made element and is a by-product of the reactions that take place inside nuclear reactors. As uranium 238 is bombarded with neutrons inside the reactor, the molecules absorb some of these particles and become the heavier uranium 239, which rapidly decays and eventually becomes extremely radioactive plutonium.

That plutonium can be mixed back with uranium to be used as fuel in specific nuclear reactors called mixed oxide reactors. The U.S. abandoned mixed oxide reactors in the 1970s because they were both difficult and expensive to run. These kinds of reactors do exist elsewhere, though—in Japan, Russia and France—but those countries have encountered their own problems with the reactors, Roecker says.

“In France, the government’s subsidizing that process,” he says. “Only I think 1 percent of the uranium that’s actually reprocessed is being reused. And in Japan, it’s cost the country billions of dollars and has still not started operation, and who knows if it actually ever will.”

The U.S. Department of Energy has defended the plan, saying the private sector could play a vital role in advancing U.S. nuclear power infrastructure. Ted Garrish, assistant secretary for the Office of Nuclear Energy, said in April that decommissioned nuclear fuel “represents an immense, untapped energy resource for the United States.”

“The Surplus Plutonium Utilization Program is anticipated to help companies unlock the next level of private funding to broaden domestic nuclear fuel supplies, spur innovation on American recycling technologies, and unlock private sector funding to fuel the nation’s nuclear renaissance,” said a DOE spokesperson in a statement, adding that five companies have been selected to take part in the program.

Aside from the concern over cost and feasibility, other experts point out that keeping plutonium secure is much more difficult than doing so with typical uranium-based nuclear fuel. Daniel Speyer, a professor of nuclear power plant systems at New York University, says he isn’t convinced that energy start-ups could properly store plutonium. Even if the material is mixed back with uranium, separating the two to isolate the highly fissile material isn’t so difficult as to be impossible—which introduces a clear security threat, he says.

“It’s not something that a small organization really probably could do, but if you give them plutonium in purer form, I think it’s almost a trivial act to make a bomb,” he says. “A simple atomic bomb is not difficult to make.”

The DOE says that any company selected to receive the Cold War–era plutonium will have to show a deep understanding of the technology involved, as well as robust security plans and regulatory compliance. The plan has also met some pushback on Capitol Hill, however. Last September Democratic senator Edward Markey of Massachusetts and two Democratic congressional representatives sent a letter to President Donald Trump raising concerns over the risk to national security.

“The transfer of weapons-usable plutonium to private industry would increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, including to rogue states or terrorists,” they wrote.

May 30, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium, USA | Leave a comment

Plutonium Pit Bomb Production:  the Beginning of the End

The abandoned MOX plant at Savannah River 32 years behind schedule and $10 billion over budget, is 70% complete. Its conversion to the Savannah River Plutonium Pit Facility is already years behind schedule and billions of dollars over budget. Scheduled to open this year, it now is slated to make its first pit in 2035. Savannah River Site remains one of the most polluted places in the U.S. and is near the top of the EPA’s hazardous sites.

Whether the plutonium pit production, costing tens of billions of dollars, is even necessary, though required by Congressional statute, is contentious. NNSA’s own studies indicate that the thousands of pits stored at Pantex are viable for at least another 100 years. One study by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory found the pits in the strategic security stockpile would be reliable for 150 years. Other classified studies about the dependability of existing plutonium pits could demonstrate the same result, and should be released.

Mark Muhich, May 8, 2026, https://www.counterpunch.org/2026/05/08/plutonium-pit-bomb-production-the-beginning-of-the-end/

One portion of a gargantuan plan to modernize the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal, costing $1.5 trillion over the next twenty years, has been opened for public scrutiny and comment beginning this week.

Thanks to years-long legal challenges by environmental and community groups in California, New Mexico and South Carolina, the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, was ordered by a federal district court to reveal plans for the manufacture of plutonium “pits” at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina and Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. Citing the National Environmental Protection Act,1969, U.S. District Judge Mary Geiger Lewis, South Carolina, found that NNSA had ignored NEPA statutes, and required the Department of Energy, and its semi-autonomous nuclear weapons bureau, National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, to produce a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, PEIS, that details the manufacture, transport and waste deposition associated with plutonium pit production in Aiken, S.C. and Los Alamos, N.M.

Plutonium pits are the core of a thermonuclear weapon (hydrogen bomb). Tens of thousands of pits were manufactured during the Cold War. Pit production was concentrated almost entirely at Rocky Flats, Colorado, near Denver. The FBI raided Rocky Flats in 1989, after numerous fires, accidental plutonium releases, and whistleblower reports of dangerous working conditions at the plant. Rockwell International, the general Contractor at Rocky Flats, settled criminal charges of environmental violations for $18. 5 million (less than the bonuses it received from the government) and closed the plant in 1991. Rocky Flats was declared a Superfund site, and after costly remediation was converted into a national wildlife sanctuary. Some of the most polluted sections of Rocky Flats remain radioactive and will be sequestered forever. Communities near Rocky Flats received $375 million in compensation for increased incidents of cancer. The U.S. has manufactured very few plutonium pits since Rocky Flats closed.

Congress mandated renewed production of plutonium pits in 2015 with funding from the Defense Authorization Act. Lawmakers required the manufacture of 30 pits by this year (2026) and 80 pits per year by 2030, an entirely fanciful schedule. During the Cold War, Savannah River Site had produced plutonium but never pits, and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), produces up to ten pits per year for research purposes, but has never produced pits approaching the Congressionally mandated 30 pits per year. Due to frequent accidents and safety violations, LANL has in some years produced zero pits.

NNSA’s Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement describes the intricate sequence for producing new pits for new nuclear weapons. Existing plutonium pits, around 12,000 plutonium pits, are stored at the Pantex facility in Amarillo, TX, and will be driven in specialized semi-trucks across the country on public highways to LANL and SRS. Once secured at these facilities, any oxidized impurities from aging will be removed using hot sulfuric acid and other agents. The pits are then melted, molded into spheres and machined to extremely precise dimensions. Large volumes of transuranic wastes are produced in the pit production process. Tons of transuranic wastes will be transported over public highways to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, N.M. Radioactive waste from SRS will pass through Atlanta and follow I-20 and I-10 to the WIPP facility.

WIPP is the only facility designed to accept and store transuranic waste from nuclear weapons production. However, the New Mexico Environment Department only permitted WIPP to accept “legacy” transuranic waste from LANL, originating from the first Manhattan Project, 1942-45. NMED has not yet agreed to permit increased volumes of waste at WIPP. Plutonium waste could be stored on site at Los Alamos and Savannah River, though this would generate an entirely new set of environmental problems.

Mandated by the Defense Authorization Act of 2015, NNSA is required to produce 30 plutonium pits by this year, and 80 pits per year by 2030. SRS, slated to fabricate 50 pits per year, has never made a plutonium pit. New buildings to house the pit production in South Carolina “repurposed” a defunct mixed oxide plant. The MOX plant was designed to downblend plutonium pits from nuclear weapons decommissioned per the agreement between the U.S. and Russia to reduce their nearly 100 tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. While the Russians constructed and operated their MOX plant, the MOX plant at Savannah River experienced massive cost overruns and decades of delays. Putin suspended the agreement in 2016, blaming non-compliance on the part of the U.S.

The abandoned MOX plant at Savannah River 32 years behind schedule and $10 billion over budget, is 70% complete. Its conversion to the Savannah River Plutonium Pit Facility is already years behind schedule and billions of dollars over budget. Scheduled to open this year, it now is slated to make its first pit in 2035. Savannah River Site remains one of the most polluted places in the U.S. and is near the top of the EPA’s hazardous sites.

Robert Oppenheimer selected Los Alamos for the design and construction of the first fission atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the decade since, LANL’s research and development of plutonium pits has created thousands of massive transuranic waste dumps on site. Plutonium has leaked into groundwater and has crossed canyons, contaminating native communities like the adjacent San Ildefonso and more distant pueblos. Plutonium is one of the most carcinogenic materials on Earth and has a half-life of 27,000 years.

LANL has never produced 30 pits per year, as mandated by Congress. Between 2007 and 2011, LANL produced 31 pits in total. Selected for its isolation and inaccessibility, LANL has chronic difficulties recruiting and retaining workers. LANL has experienced serious fires and accidents, and has been fined $16 million by the New Mexico Environment Department for neglecting the “legacy” wastes stored on site.

Whether the plutonium pit production, costing tens of billions of dollars, is even necessary, though required by Congressional statute, is contentious. NNSA’s own studies indicate that the thousands of pits stored at Pantex are viable for at least another 100 years. One study by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory found the pits in the strategic security stockpile would be reliable for 150 years. Other classified studies about the dependability of existing plutonium pits could demonstrate the same result, and should be released.

The new plutonium pits proposed in NNSA’s Environmental Impact Statement are designed for entirely new thermonuclear weapons. The W87-1 warhead will arm the new Sentinel missile system, replacing the aging fleet of Minuteman III intercontinental missiles. The Sentinel program is years behind schedule and hundreds of billions of dollars over budget. Cost estimates for the 50 years of Sentinel deployment are over $300 billion.

Ironically, while the NEPA plutonium pit program is being presented to the public this week, the Eleventh Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is ongoing at the United Nations in New York. The NPT was first ratified by 192 countries in 1970, including the U.S. The NPT is the only remaining international nuclear treaty. It calls for the right for countries to peacefully develop nuclear power reactors, and stipulates that nuclear-armed states are obligated to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons arsenals.

NNSA’s Draft PEIS describes new plutonium pit production to be “consistent with the NPT while maintaining nuclear weapons competencies and capabilities at the weapons laboratories.”(p.1-6). The glaring dichotomy if this determination is refuted by the International Court of Justice, finding in 1996 that signatories to the NPT must adhere to

The legal import of [the NPT Article VI] obligation… goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result – nuclear disarmament in all its aspects – by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith.” [Para. 99]

NNSA violated the NEPA requirements to address the environmental damage of federally funded projects. The public now has an opportunity to submit comments to the NNSA until July. In particular, the plutonium pit fabrication for new nuclear weapons contravenes the Non-Proliferation Treaty despite what the draft PEIS asserts, per the decision by the ICJ.

Submit comment by email to  NEPA-SRS@srs.gov

May 14, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Trump accelerates new nuclear warhead production, nearly doubles funding for plutonium “pit” bomb core production.

The Pentagon has always explicitly rejected “minimum-deterrence” in favor of keeping “counterforce” capabilities to wage nuclear war. This is why the U.S. has thousands of nuclear weapons and a $2 trillion “modernization” program to keep them forever. Indefinitely maintaining and expanding nuclear capabilities is contrary to the 1970 NonProliferation Treaty

None of this future pit production is to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing stockpile, but instead is entirely for new-design nuclear weapons

The Trump 2027 budget speeds up this backwards trend. For nuclear warhead production:

April 6, 2026, Jay Coghlan, Nuclear Watch, New Mexico, https://nukewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Trump-Accelerates-Nuclear-Warhead-Production-PR.pdf

Santa Fe, NM – The Trump Administration has released military budget numbers for the federal fiscal year 2027 (which begins October 1, 2026). This still current fiscal year 2026 is already a record breaker for military spending at one trillion dollars. Trump now proposes nearly $1.5 trillion in military spending in FY 2027, of which $1.1 trillion is base funding for the Department of War and an additional $350 million is through so-called budget reconciliation.

On top of all this, Trump will likely seek $200 billion in supplementary appropriations for the war in Iran, for a potential total of $1.7 trillion in military spending in FY 2027 (a 70% increase above FY 2026). At the same time, there is a 10% across-the-board cut to non-military spending. Much of the remaining discretionary funding for education, wildfire protection, environmental regulations, health care, etc., will be constrained by a focus on border control and immigration enforcement.

Trump proposes $53.9 billion for the Department of Energy (DOE) in FY 2027. Sixty-one per cent ($32.8 billion) is for its semi-autonomous nuclear weapons agency, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). DOE’s Office of Science is gutted by $1.1 billion which “eliminates funding for climate change and Green New Scam research.” DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy is eliminated. Nationwide cleanup of legacy Cold War radioactive and toxic wastes at DOE sites is cut by $386 million to $8.2 billion ($3 billion of which is reserved for the Hanford Site; other site-specific cleanup budget numbers are still not yet available).

With respect to the Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons agency, the Trump FY 2027 budget:

“… focuses NNSA on its most important mission—producing a robust, credible, and modern nuclear deterrent that protects the American people. The United States must maintain and expand its set of nuclear capabilities that allow the President flexibility to protect the homeland and deter adversaries. Specifically, the Budget makes strong investments to develop new warheads that would bolster deterrence, modernize NNSA’s supporting infrastructure, and extend the life of existing warheads.”

The Pentagon has always explicitly rejected “minimum-deterrence” in favor of keeping “counterforce” capabilities to wage nuclear war. This is why the U.S. has thousands of nuclear weapons and a $2 trillion “modernization” program to keep them forever. Indefinitely maintaining and expanding nuclear capabilities is contrary to the 1970 NonProliferation Treaty, which required the nuclear weapons powers to “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament…” After more than a half-century that has never even begun. An NPT Review Conference, held every five years, is scheduled to begin April 27 at the United Nations. It is widely expected to fail for the third time over fifteen years to make any progress whatsoever toward nuclear disarmament.

The Trump 2027 budget speeds up this backwards trend. For nuclear warhead production:

•    A feasibility study for a new B61-13 limited earth-penetrating bomb is funded at $46.4 million in FY 2027. A full budget request of $1 billion is expected for FY 2028 followed by an average of $870 million for each fiscal year 2029 – 2031.

•    The W80-4 warhead for the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon (i.e., air-launched cruise missile) is funded at $1 billion in FY 2027. There is an average of $970 million in projected costs for each fiscal year 2028-2031.

•    No funding is requested in FY 2027 for the W80-5 warhead for the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile. However, there is an average of $1.4 billion in projected costs for each fiscal year 2028-2031.

•    The W87-1 nuclear warhead program is for the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, with likely multiple warheads for each missile (which is particularly dangerous and destabilizing). The Sentinel ICBM itself is already massively over budget. The W87-1 warhead program is increased 41% from $650 million in FY 2026 to $913 million in FY 2027, with an astounding average of $3.5 billion in projected costs for each fiscal year 2028-2031.

•    The submarine-launched W93 nuclear warhead program, which the United Kingdom has actively lobbied for, is increased 37% from $807 million in FY 2026 to $1.1 billion in FY 2027.  There is an average of $1.95 billion in projected costs for each fiscal year 2028-2031.

•    There is a new “Future Programs” budget line item of $99.8 million in FY 2027 for feasibility studies for other new-design nuclear weapons, followed by an average of $92 million for each fiscal year 2028-2031.  

Plutonium “pit” bomb core production: Plutonium pits are the essential “triggers” for modern nuclear weapons. Pit production has been the chokepoint for resumed industrial-scale nuclear weapons production by the U.S. ever since an FBI raid investigating environmental crimes stopped operations at the Rocky Flats Plant in 1989.

Trump’s FY 2027 budget proposes:

An 83% increase in funding for pit production at the Los Alamos National Laboratory from $1.3 billion in FY 2026 to $2.4 billion in FY 2027. There is an average of $2.3 billion in projected costs for each year FY 2028-2031. NNSA has directed LANL to double pit production to at least 60 pits per year because of increasing delays at the Savannah River Site (SRS).


•    An 87% increase in funding for pit production at SRS from $1.2 billion in FY 2026 to $2.25 billion in FY 2027. There is an average of $2.5 billion in projected costs for each year FY 2028-2031. The Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility’s upper range in estimated costs is now $25 billion, which would make it by far the most expensive building in U.S. history. Gloveboxes at SRS for canceled “dilute and dispose” of surplus plutonium are being diverted to “purification instead of disposition” to create feedstock for manufacturing new plutonium pits. There is only one glovebox left at SRS to process and remove excess plutonium, which could lead to resumed legal conflict with the State of South Carolina.

Total “Plutonium Modernization” for expanded plutonium pit production at both sites is increased 87% from $2.6 billion in FY 2026 to $4.9 billion in 2027. There is an average of $5.1 billion in projected costs for each year FY 2028-2031.

None of this future pit production is to maintain the safety and reliability of the existing stockpile, but instead is entirely for new-design nuclear weapons. This is despite the fact that in 2006 independent experts found that pits have serviceable lifetimes of at least 100 years. The average age of pits is now around 43 years. NNSA has avoided any full pit lifetime studies since 2006 (however, a new one is reportedly pending).

At least 15,000 pits are already stored at NNSA’s Pantex Plant. The independent Government Accountability Office has repeatedly reported that NNSA has no credible cost estimates for pit production, its most expensive and complex program ever. New pits cannot be tested because of the existing international testing moratorium, which could erode confidence in the stockpile. Or, conversely, new pits could prompt the U.S. to resume testing (which Trump has already threatened), after which other nuclear weapons powers would surely follow, thereby rapidly accelerating the new nuclear arms race.

Other nuclear weapons production programs:

•    The “Tritium and Defense Fuels” program is increased by 79% from $520 million in FY 2026 to $881 million in 2027. There is an average of $1.8 billion in projected costs for each fiscal year 2028-2031.

“Non-Nuclear Capability Modernization” for non-nuclear components manufacturing, primarily at the Sandia National Laboratories, is increased 130% from $195.5 million in FY 2026 to $449 million in FY 2027. There is an average of $370 million in projected costs for each fiscal year 2028-2031.

•    “Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition” is increased 10% from $82.3 million in FY 2026 to $90.7 million in FY 2027 (a mere 1.3% of total warhead funding). Rather than being a worthy step toward nuclear disarmament, the stated objective of weapons dismantlements is to “recover critical components and materials to support existing weapon programs, Naval Reactors, and other national priority missions.” There is an estimated backlog of up to 1,500 retired warheads to dismantle and dispose. However, NNSA’s Pantex Plant is so busy rebuilding existing nuclear warheads with new military capabilities that dismantlements have been at a historic low since the end of the Cold War.

In all, NNSA’s budget category of “Total Weapons Activities” is increased 35% from $20.4 billion in FY 2026 to $27.4 billion in FY 2027. There is an average of $29 billion in projected costs for each fiscal year 2028-2031.

Jay Coghlan, Director of Nuclear Watch, commented, “New nuclear weapons won’t give us more security as our nation is being hollowed out by tax cuts for the ultrarich, cuts to domestic programs, and the gutting of programs to address adverse climate change. It is way past time for the nuclear weapons powers to honor their obligations under the 1970 NonProliferation Treaty to negotiate verifiable nuclear disarmament instead of keeping nuclear weapons forever. We should be cleaning up, not building up new nuclear weapons.”

Sources:……………………………………………………………..

April 11, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Blocking Iran’s Other Option: A Plutonium Bomb

By Henry Sokolski, April 03, 2026, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/04/03/blocking_irans_other_option_a_plutonium_bomb_1174454.html

America and Israel want to prevent Tehran from getting a bomb. That’s why the Pentagon and Israel Defense Forces continue to target Tehran’s ability to make weapons uranium. Washington and Jerusalem claim they have obliterated Tehran’s uranium enrichment capability. Perhaps. But, Iran has another pathway to a bomb.

U.S. and Israeli leaders have yet to fully consider Iran’s option to make nuclear weapons from plutonium, a material Iran can extract from spent fuel at its largest reactor at Bushehr. Washington should make sure that Iran doesn’t remove Bushehr’s spent fuel and strip out the plutonium. This can and should be done without bombing the plant.

ROSATOM, the Russian firm that built and has operated Bushehr since 2011, says there are 210 tons of spent reactor fuel at the plant. If you check the ROSATOM figure against International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reactor performance logs, the 210 tons of waste contain enough plutonium to make more than 200 nuclear weapons – as many or more than SIPRI estimates Israel has.

It would not take Iran long to remove Bushehr’s spent fuel and chemically strip the plutonium out. In 1977, the U.S. General Accounting Office evaluated leading U.S. nuclear chemist Floyd Culler’s  proposed quick and dirty method of plutonium chemical separation. The facility Culler described was 130 feet by 60 feet by 30 feet (approximately the size of a standard basketball court). It employed technology little more advanced than that required for the production of dairy and the pouring of concrete. Such a plant could fit within a large warehouse and would take no more than six months to build. Until the plant was operational, it would send off no signal and could separate a bomb’s worth of plutonium after only ten days of operation. After that, the plant could separate a bomb’s worth of plutonium in a day.

Two more steps are needed to convert separated plutonium into an insertable metallic core for a nuclear implosion device First, turn the plutonium solution into an oxide and another to convert this oxide into metal. Second, cast and machine this material into a hemisphere. Assuming Iran already had an (implosion) device on the ready, the completion of a bomb could take one to two weeks. This plutonium weapon production timeline is similar to what it would take to extract the uranium hexafluoride in the rubble at Isfahan and then to chemically convert that gas into insertable metal uranium bomb cores. For that reason, the Trump administration should pay as much attention to this back end of the fuel cycle as it is to the front-end, which features uranium enrichment.

What’s odd is that there’s been next to no public discussion of Iran exploiting the Bushehr plutonium option. This may be due to the popular myth that “reactor-grade plutonium” can’t be used to make workable bombs. Robert Selden and Bruce Goodwin, two of America’s top plutonium weapons designers, put this fable to rest, most recently in 2025. As the U.S. Department of Energy has explained, with Iran’s level of weapons sophistication it could use reactor-grade and produce Hiroshima or Nagasaki yields.

The U.S. government used to worry about this possibility. In 2004, the State Department spotlighted Bushehr as a worrisome nuclear weapons plutonium producer. Late in 2012, after Iran shut Bushehr down and withdrew all of the fuel – roughly 20 bombs-worth of near-weapons-grade plutonium – the Pentagon swung into action, launching surveillance drones over the reactor to make sure the plutonium-laden spent fuel didn’t leave the plant to be reprocessed elsewhere. The Iranians put the fuel back, but the concern that Iran was trying to pull a fast one remained.

Now, the Trump Administration is threatening to bomb the largest of Iran’s electrical generating plants, of which Bushehr is in the top ten. Bombing it, much less its spent fuel pond, however, would be a big mistake. The last thing the United States should risk is prompting a radiological release. NPEC-commissioned simulations indicate radiological releases from Bushehr’s  reactor core could force the mandatory evacuation of tens of thousands to millions of Iranians. Attacking the spent fuel pond could result in even larger numbers. Of course, Bushehr would be a legitimate military target if it supported Iranian military operations. However, it doesn’t. Even before U.S. Israeli forces hit the site with two projectiles, the plant was on cold shutdown.

What, then, should our government do? First, the Pentagon should watch to make sure Iran does not remove any of the spent fuel at Bushehr. It could do this with space surveillance assets or, as it did in 2012, with drones. Second, any “peace” deal President Trump cuts with Tehran should include a requirement that there be near-real-time monitoring of the Bushehr reactor and spent fuel pond, much as the IAEA had in place with Iran’s fuel enrichment activities. The IAEA actually asked for this back in 2015. Iran refused. Unfortunately, President Obama didn’t push back. That was a mistake, one the Trump Administration should not continue to make.


Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He was deputy for nonproliferation policy in the Department of Defense (1989–1993), and is the author of China, Russia, and the Coming Cool War (2024).

April 11, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium, Iran, USA | Leave a comment

Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety (CCNS) Nuclear Literacy Program to Educate Nuevomexicano Communities on the LANL Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Plutonium Pit Production

For over eighty years, the People of New Mexico have borne the burden of the 1943 establishment of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Through the Congressional continuing resolution process, LANL may receive an additional $1 billion dollars to support expansion of the number of plutonium triggers, or plutonium pits, fabricated for nuclear weapons. The people of northern New Mexico are unaware of the effects that this potentially may have on nearby communities. The effects of eight decades of nuclear weapons development has had a cumulative impact on New Mexico, especially in Rio Arriba County, which borders Los Alamos County to the north and west.

During the Bush II and Obama Administrations, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) proposed three new weapons systems: the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), and the Interoperable Warhead (IW). Grassroots organizations networked, educated each other, spoke at public meetings, wrote informed public comments, and worked with technical experts, elected officials and the media to understand how increased weapons development would impact frontline communities, which are mostly comprised of Indigenous and Hispanic people. With leadership from New Mexico and colleagues and NGOs throughout the world and through active organizing and public engagement in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, those proposed weapons systems were defeated and eventually canceled. 

January 3, 2026 Posted by | - plutonium | Leave a comment

Los Alamos National Laboratory Reneges on Active Confinement Ventilation Systems at Plutonium Facility, PF-4.

Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety .14 Nov 25

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) continues to neglect its obligations to safely operate its nuclear weapons facilities in a manner required by laws, orders, guidance and common sense. 

A recent report from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or the Board) details the threats from the release of plutonium contaminated air during a seismic event from the LANL Plutonium Facility, or PF-4.  For over 20 years, the Board has recommended that LANL establish active confinement ventilation systems for PF-4, and LANL agreed.  https://www.dnfsb.gov/content/review-los-alamos-plutonium-facility-documented-safety-analysis

Active confinement ventilation systems require negative air pressure in rooms and buildings where plutonium is stored, handled and processed.  In the event of seismic activity, or other possible catastrophic events, the negative air pressure would keep the contamination inside where it could be held and filtered before being released.

The converse, which is called passive confinement systems, would do nothing.  No filtration would occur.  Contaminated air would move out of the building and into the air we breathe.  Depending on the wind direction, radioactive plutonium particles would be deposited in neighborhoods, on hiking trails, fields, school grounds, and in the Rio Grande.

November 15, 2025 Posted by | - plutonium, safety, USA | Leave a comment

Los Alamos National Laboratory Prioritizes Plutonium “Pit” Bomb Core Production Over Safety

Santa Fe, NM – The independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board recently released its Review of the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility Documented Safety Analysis. It concluded that:

“While LANL facility personnel continue to make important upgrades to the Plutonium Facility’s safety systems, many of those projects have encountered delays due to inconsistent funding and other reasons. DOE and LANL should consider prioritizing safety-related infrastructure projects to ensure that the Plutonium Facility safety strategy adequately protects the public, as the facility takes on new and expansive national security missions.” (Page 24)

In early October 2024, the Department of Energy’s semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced with great fanfare that the Los Alamos Lab had produced its first “diamond stamped” plutonium pit for the nuclear weapons stockpile. Tens of billions of taxpayers’ dollars have been sunk into LANL’s long delayed and over budget pit production program. Given no further announcements, it is not currently known whether or not the Lab is meeting its congressionally required production goals. Endemic nuclear safety problems have long been an intractable issue, at one point even forcing a three-year halt to plutonium operations at LANL’s Plutonium Facility-4 (“PF-4”).

In its recent Review, the Safety Board reported:

“The [2009] Plutonium Facility safety basis described very large potential [radioactive] dose consequences to the public following seismic events…. DOE committed to upgrade and seismically qualify the ventilation system, with a particular focus on a specific ventilation subsystem…”

“As the only facility in the DOE complex that can process large quantities of plutonium in many forms, [PF-4] represents a unique capability for the nation’s nuclear deterrent. The Board has long advocated for the use of safety-related active confinement systems in nuclear facilities for the purposes of confining radioactive materials…Passive confinement systems are not necessarily capable of containing hazardous materials with confidence because they allow a quantity of unfiltered air contaminated with radioactive material to be released from an operating nuclear facility following certain accident scenarios. Safety related active confinement ventilation systems will continue to function during an accident, thereby ensuring that radioactive material is captured by filters before it can be released into the environment… (Page 2, bolded emphases added)

The Safety Board referred to DOE Order 420.1C, Facility Safety, which has a clear requirement that:

“Hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities… must have the means to confine the uncontained radioactive materials to minimize their potential release in facility effluents during normal operations and during and following accidents, up to and including design basis accidents… An active confinement ventilation system [is] the preferred design approach for nuclear facilities with potential for radiological release. Alternate confinement approaches may be acceptable if a technical evaluation demonstrates that the alternate confinement approach results in very high assurance of the confinement of radioactive materials.” (Page 2, bolded emphases added; PF-4 is a Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility)

Plutonium pit production at LANL is slated for a 15% increase to $1.7 billion in FY 2026. But in a clear example of how the NNSA prioritizes nuclear weapons production over safety, the DNFSB reported:

The active confinement safety system “remained the planned safety strategy for the Plutonium Facility for many years… However, in a March 2022 letter to the Board, the NNSA Administrator stated that the planned strategy would shift away from safety class active confinement… A safety class would require substantial facility upgrades far in excess to those that are currently planned… facility personnel also noted that some projects [for alternate confinement approaches] have been paused or delayed due to funding issues…” (Pages 3 and 21, bolded emphases added)

Instead of a technical evaluation demonstrating that “the alternate confinement approach results in very high assurance of the confinement of radioactive materials,” the Board concluded:

“Predicting the amount of release under passive confinement conditions can be quite complex. Fire or explosions could add energy to the facility’s atmosphere and introduce a motive force that could carry hazardous materials through an exhaust path… Therefore, determination of the amount of radioactive material that could escape the facility becomes very complex and uncertain.” (Page 8, bolded emphases added)

In sum, DOE reneged on its commitment to retrofit a safety class confinement system at PF-4, even as it ramps up plutonium pit production. At the same time, LANL has not demonstrated that its “alternate confinement approach results in very high assurance of the confinement of radioactive materials” in the event of an accident or earthquake.

This also contradicts the NNSA’s position that potential radioactive doses are vanishingly small. For example, the agency claims that the “Most Exposed Individual” of the public would have only a one in a million chance of developing a “Latent Cancer Fatality” from an accidental fire in gloveboxes at PF-4, which commonly process molten, pyrophoric plutonium. (Draft LANL Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement, January 2025, Page D-23)

Moreover, pit production that involves plutonium-239 is not the only nuclear safety issue. PF-4 also processes plutonium-238, a dangerous gamma emitter, as a heat source for radioisotope thermoelectric generators (AKA nuclear batteries). The Safety Board’s Review noted:

While newly installed gloveboxes meet seismic requirements, and facility modifications associated with the pit production mission prioritize upgrades for some gloveboxes, others have known seismic vulnerabilities and will not be able to perform their credited post-seismic function. Many of these deficient gloveboxes are associated with processing heat source plutonium, a high-hazard material which accounts for much of the facility’s overall safety risk… Upgrading glovebox support stands is important to return the facility to a safety posture more reliant on credited engineered features…” (Pages 22-23, bolded emphases added)

Moreover, the future of the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is in doubt, without whom the DOE’s chronic nuclear safety record would not be publicly known. The DNFSB’s five-member Board recently lost its quorum because of term limits. The Board desperately needs nominations from the Trump Administration, which so far has not happened either by design or neglect.

Jay Coghlan, Director of Nuclear Watch New Mexico, commented, “We are facing a perfect storm of expanding plutonium pit production and diminishing oversight by the Safety Board. LANL’s expanding nuclear weapons programs are sucking money from the Lab’s other programs that are truly needed, such as nonproliferation, cleanup and renewable energy research (which is being completely eliminated). NNSA’s prioritization of plutonium pit production for the new nuclear arms race and the erosion of nuclear safety could have disastrous results for northern New Mexico.”

The DNFSB’s Review of the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility Documented Safety Analysis is available at https://www.dnfsb.gov/sites/default/files/2025-10/Review of the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility Documented Safety Analysis %5B2026-100-001%5D.pdf https://nukewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/LANL-Prioritizes-Plutonium-Pit-Bomb-Core-Production-Over-Safety.pdf

November 8, 2025 Posted by | - plutonium, USA | Leave a comment

Some 890 tons of Tepco nuclear fuel kept at Aomori reprocessing plant

Aomori – Nov 1, 2025,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/11/01/japan/tepco-nuclear-fuel-aomori-plant/

Some 890 tons of spent nuclear fuel from Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings are being stored at Japan Nuclear Fuel’s reprocessing plant under construction in Aomori Prefecture — the first time a specific amount of nuclear fuel at the plant from an individual company has been confirmed.

Also kept at the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in the village of Rokkasho are about 180 tons of fuel from Japan Atomic Power.

Both numbers were included in the Aomori Prefectural Government’s answer dated Oct. 7 to a questionnaire from a civic organization in the prefecture. The prefecture’s answer was based on explanations from Tepco and Japan Atomic Power

The plant keeps a total of 2,968 tons of used nuclear fuel.

The plant, planned to be completed in fiscal 2026, will start to extract plutonium from used nuclear fuel once it becomes operational.

Under the principle of the peaceful use of plutonium, the Japanese government has a policy of not possessing the radioactive material unless there are specific purposes for it such as use for uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, because it can be used to make nuclear weapons.

With none of the nuclear reactors at Tepco and Japan Atomic Power having restarted and neither companies having clear plans to start so-called pluthermal power generation using MOX fuel, there are concerns that a situation may occur in which Japan possesses plutonium without specific purposes.

In the prefecture’s answer to the questionnaire, Tepco said that it “plans to implement pluthermal power generation at one of its reactors based on a policy that it will consume plutonium definitely.”

The firm also said it assumes that some plutonium will be supplied to a nuclear plant of Electric Power Development, better known as J-Power, which is now being constructed in the town of Oma, Aomori Prefecture. The Oma plant is expected to use MOX fuel at all reactors.

“There is no change in our policy to use our plutonium with our responsibility,” Japan Atomic Power said.

Contacted by reporters, Tepco offered the same explanation as that given to the Aomori government.

Meanwhile, Japan Atomic Power said that it plans to conduct pluthermal power generation at the Tsuruga nuclear power station’s No. 2 reactor in Fukui Prefecture and at the Tokai nuclear plant in Ibaraki Prefecture, although when this would start has yet to be decided.

November 5, 2025 Posted by | - plutonium, Japan | Leave a comment