Conflicts of Interest and Industry Ties Behind the Campaign to Promote Nuclear Power

Report –
Committee to Bridge the Gap, 17th Nov 2026,
https://committeetobridgethegap.org/nuclear-greenwashing/
Conflicts of Interest and Industry Ties Behind the Campaign to Promote Nuclear Power
Nuclear power has become a hot topic, with President Trump, the tech industry, and even some climate activists pushing for a new ‘nuclear renaissance.’ Yet the role of industry interests in this push has gone largely unrecognized – until now. Glowing Reviews, Committee to Bridge the Gap’s major new report, pulls back the curtain on the network of donors, advocates, investors, and industry leaders that, since 2014, has run a sophisticated, well-funded campaign to change public perceptions and government policies on nuclear power. As the Trump administration enacts a historic slashing of nuclear safety regulations and delivers many billions of taxpayer dollars to the nuclear industry, understanding how we got here is critical to choosing where we go next..
In recent years, nuclear power has emerged in the national conversation as an apparent solution to a range of energy woes, from climate-related efforts to decarbonize the grid to meeting the projected energy demands of AI data centers. Public attitudes toward nuclear power have shifted markedly, with recent polls showing higher percentages of U.S. adults in support. U.S. government regulation of and funding for nuclear energy has also shifted dramatically: starting in the first Trump administration and expanding every year since, a slew of bills and executive orders have removed many of the regulatory hurdles faced by nuclear reactor developers, and provided the industry with many billions of dollars in subsidies.
Much of this apparent groundswell of support for nuclear energy can be traced back to what we call the pro-nuclear network (PNN): a relatively small, interconnected cluster of people and organizations with influence, wealth, and nuclear industry ties who have played a singular role in jump-starting this surge. Beginning at a pivotal 2014 meeting in Silicon Valley, the PNN has driven a sophisticated, well-funded campaign to shift public perception and policy, consistently highlighting the benefits of nuclear energy while dismissing concerns about its hazards. The PNN is no fringe group but an influential cohort placed well within the mainstream of energy discourse whose policy papers and spokespeople make frequent appearances in The New York Times, The Economist, and other such prestige outlets.

The nuclear industry is woven extensively into contemporary efforts to promote nuclear energy, single-handedly standing up some “grassroots” advocacy groups and providing substantial funding for others. Pro-nuclear advocates often present their activities as being independent of industry influence, even when such claims are misleading or outright false. Groups and individuals involved in the PNN have collaborated with and received funding from the nuclear industry and nuclear energy investors, money that has enabled the PNN to enlist the support of public relations firms, lobbyists, and academic bodies in engineering industrial-grade public persuasion.
The PNN is supported not only by established nuclear interests, but also by prospective ones: investors. Investment in nuclear energy is booming. Venture capital investment into nuclear energy hovered around a mere $15 million annually between 2015 and 2017, until it began taking off in 2018 and surpassed $1 billion in 2022. By 2025, over $1 billion was invested into nuclear startups in just a single five week period. Billionaires Bill Gates, Peter Thiel, and Marc Andreessen each have large holdings in nuclear companies; each is also involved, to some degree, in efforts to influence public and government support for nuclear power. The PNN can perhaps best be understood as another arena in which the extremely wealthy wield their considerable influence to shape the world for their private benefit.
Former nuclear chief inspector ‘uncomfortable’ with letter sent to chancellor from regulator and industry CEOs

“I feel very uncomfortable with the ONR sending a letter to the government on behalf of the CEOs of the UK’s private nuclear industry.
I don’t believe that the regulator can have a shared purpose with the industry that it is regulating.“
New Civil Engineer 17 Nov, 2026 By Tom Pashby, https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/former-nuclear-chief-inspector-uncomfortable-with-letter-sent-to-chancellor-from-regulator-and-industry-ceos-17-11-2026/
A joint letter sent to chancellor John Healey on behalf of the newly formed UK Nuclear Industry CEO Forum, and signed by Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) chief executive and chief nuclear inspector Mike Finnerty, has made a former nuclear chief inspector “very uncomfortable”.
The letter, published by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) on 12 November, was sent on behalf of the Nuclear Industry CEO Forum, a new group, and marks “the first time industry and regulators have come together to respond collectively to the chancellor’s call for reform,” the ONR said.
It said existing regulation and approaches to delivery are “too slow and fragmented” to meet the “national needs” from the nuclear sector.
“The UK is entering the largest expansion and renewal of its nuclear sector in decades, but current regulatory and delivery approaches are too slow and fragmented to meet national needs,” the letter said.
“Unless pace, coordination and proportionality improve rapidly while maintaining safety, security and sustainability standards, the country risks an energy security gap, diminished defence capability, escalating costs, delayed hazard reduction and the loss of a once-in-a-generation economic opportunity.
“Urgent, system-wide reform is therefore required.”
It was signed by ONR chief executive and chief nuclear inspector Mike Finnerty and listed as being “On behalf of The UK Nuclear Industry CEO Forum”.
- AWE (the Atomic Weapons Establishment) Nuclear Security Technologies
- Babcock International Group, including Cavendish Nuclear
- BAE Systems Submarines
- Great British Energy – Nuclear
- NNB Genco (Hinkley Point C)
- Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
- Nuclear Restoration Services
- Rolls-Royce SMR (small modular reactor)
- Rolls-Royce Submarines
- Sellafield Ltd
- Sizewell C Ltd
- UK National Nuclear Laboratory
In a statement provided with the letter, Finnerty said: “A thriving nuclear sector relies on industry, government and regulators working together with trust and shared purpose, and this joint response shows that collaboration in action.
“This forum gives us a shared platform to learn from each other, build confidence in new ways of working, and hold ourselves collectively accountable for the pace and scale of change, while maintaining a safe and secure industry.”
The letter from the ONR was in response to the then chancellor Rachel Reeves’ letter titled ‘Implementing the nuclear regulatory taskforce review’ on 13 March.
“I am writing to you alongside the publication of the Government Response to the Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce led by John Fingleton,” Reeves said.
“This is a critical report in ensuring we work together to build the nuclear capacity we need at pace.
“It will require substantial change from government, from regulators and from industry at all levels of the supply chain. We will implement the measures we have outlined by December 2027.”
The letter from Reeves went on to say: “Please assess the way your organisation approaches risk management and challenge yourselves on whether those responsible for risk management are properly equipped and empowered to make proportionate judgements on acceptable risk, or if the location or mandate of those decision-makers should change.
It added: “The government has an active interest in the performance and speed of the system as a whole. Delay is not a neutral outcome; it carries its own risks.
“The government will support you in making prompt, well-reasoned, evidence-based decisions, including where those decisions involve managed risk.”
Since the letter was sent, the government changed the sponsor department of the ONR from the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) to the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Desnz).
During an oral evidence session of the House of Lords Industry and Regulators Committee about the ONR on 22 July 2025, Baroness Jo Valentine asked why the DWP was the sponsor department.
She said: “DWP is your sponsoring department; I am surprised by that. Is that logical?”
ONR chair Nicola Crauford responded, saying: “One reason for that is probably partly historical. The ONR was originally part of the HSE (Health and Safety Executive), but we were split off from it; obviously, the HSE is part of the DWP.
“The other reason, I think, is to separate the policy arm from the sponsoring department and, in that way, to ensure the independence of the regulatory body.
“The DWP is not responsible for any activities in the nuclear sector, but DESNZ is and could potentially influence the regulator, hence the separation. That is what I understand; I might be wrong.”
ONR chief executive and chief nuclear inspector Mike Finnerty added: “That’s right.”
Following the July 2026 news that the sponsorship department was changing, Baroness Coffey asked the government “what safety protections are in place for the functioning independence of the Office for Nuclear Regulation after its transfer to the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, recognising that as it is not a non-ministerial department, ministerial directions can be issued”.
Desnz parliamentary under-secretary of state Baroness Curran responded: “The Office for Nuclear Regulation was established under the Energy Act 2013 and will remain an independent public corporation. This change does not affect their statutory basis, legal powers or regulatory decisions.
“Ministers do not intervene on matters of regulatory decision-making. The extent to which Ministers can direct the ONR is set out in the Act and under Section 108 of that Act, any Ministerial direction is reported to Parliament on an annual basis.”
Reacting to the ONR’s 12 November letter, sent to the chancellor on behalf of the UK Nuclear Industry CEO Forum, former Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Nuclear Installations Inspectorate chief inspector Sam Harbison told NCE: “I feel very uncomfortable with the ONR sending a letter to the government on behalf of the CEOs of the UK’s private nuclear industry.
“I feel that it undermines the separation between promotion and regulation that is regarded internationally as the building block for ensuring safety in licensed nuclear activities.”
He added: “In Mike Finnerty’s comments, he refers to ‘industry, government and regulators working together with trust and shared purpose’. I don’t believe that the regulator can have a shared purpose with the industry that it is regulating.
“The regulator’s overriding purpose is to ensure that all the operations carried out under a nuclear licence are carried out safely and they must have the freedom to set whatever standards or conditions they deem necessary to achieve this objective.”
Responding to Harbison’s comments, an Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) spokesperson told NCE: “Our independence is a legal requirement, set out in the Energy Act 2013, whereas the Nuclear Industry CEO Forum letter was a response to the Chancellor’s request for the sector to address and report back on organisational culture following the Nuclear Regulatory Review.
“It does not alter ONR’s regulatory role. Each organisation within the Nuclear Industry CEO Forum has its own strategic objectives and priorities, and the common purpose is that each delivers its own priorities safely and securely.
The spokesperson continued: “ONR’s statutory purposes, legal powers and inspectors’ authority to challenge dutyholders, impose conditions and make final regulatory decisions are unchanged, and those decisions will continue to be made solely on the basis of safety, security and safeguards requirements.
“Being an independent regulator and an enabling regulator are not in conflict; ONR can help the sector work more efficiently while ensuring that the right standards of safety, security and safeguards are maintained.”
€45 billion for Kiev: What could Europeans buy instead?

nterest on the loan will be paid out of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the EU’s seven-year budget.As such, it will be paid by EU taxpayers. Ukraine will only owe the principal, once Russia agrees to pay reparations, or the EU manages to overcome Belgian resistance and seize €210 billion worth of Russian assets currently frozen in Euroclear’s vaults in Brussels.
With neither of these outcomes likely, the European taxpayer will essentially be left to pay interest on €135 billion worth of loans in perpetuity.
The EU’s total aid to Ukraine could have built one million affordable homes
16 Nov, 2026, https://www.sott.net/article/509494-45-billion-for-Kiev-What-could-Europeans-buy-instead
The European Commission wants to borrow another €45 billion to shore up Ukraine’s cratering budget. That’s enough to overhaul the entire bloc’s transport and healthcare programs, and citizens are beginning to question why the money isn’t being spent at home.
According to the Financial Times, the commission plans to approach EU leaders on Wednesday with a familiar proposal: borrow €45 billion ($49.5 billion) on capital markets, use the money to offset Ukraine’s projected €70 billion budget shortfall for next year, pay the interest out of the EU budget, and accept repayment from Kiev only when Russia agrees to pay reparations.
Why does Ukraine need another loan?
The new loan is based on the same sleight of hand as the €90 billion bailout, titled the Ukraine Support Loan, approved by EU leaders last December. It comprises €60 billion in military aid and €30 billion to support Ukraine’s budget, and was originally intended to cover Kiev’s needs for 2026 and 2027. However, Vladimir Zelensky’s campaign of long-range strikes on Russia has blown a $27 billion hole in Kiev’s defense budget, and the European Commission is already moving to hand over next year’s tranche of the loan early.
While this upcoming payout will cover Zelensky’s defense overspend, Ukraine is expecting a budget shortfall of €70 billion next year, according to an EU assessment published in late October. The commission expects its proposed €45 billion loan to fill around two thirds of this gap, with bilateral aid from individual member states and Ukraine’s other donors covering the rest.
Who pays for the loan?
Interest on the loan will be paid out of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the EU’s seven-year budget.As such, it will be paid by EU taxpayers. Ukraine will only owe the principal, once Russia agrees to pay reparations, or the EU manages to overcome Belgian resistance and seize €210 billion worth of Russian assets currently frozen in Euroclear’s vaults in Brussels.
With neither of these outcomes likely, the European taxpayer will essentially be left to pay interest on €135 billion worth of loans in perpetuity.
Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic managed to secure exemptions from financial obligations, including interest payments, on the original €90 billion loan. These three countries, plus Bulgaria, have signaled opposition to the latest €45 billion proposal, according to the Financial Times.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has threatened to veto the EU’s 2028-2034 MFF unless these states are forced to make interest payments, and unless other countries increase their bilateral aid to Kiev. He wrote in a letter to European Council President Antonio Costa last week:
“Bilateral assistance to Ukraine is distributed unevenly and carried mostly by only a few member states,” “A collective commitment that all of us, without exception, will contribute fairly to closing this gap is an essential prerequisite for resolving this issue.”
How much has the EU given Ukraine already?
Since 2022, the EU and its member states have given Ukraine a combined €235.9 billion in military and financial aid, according to data from the European Commission. This figure includes money paid directly from the EU budget, bilateral aid from member states, and weapons purchased from the US under the PURL scheme.
It includes only €24.1 billion paid out of the Ukraine Support Loan. By the time the full €90 billion, plus the proposed €45 billion, is paid out, the EU‘s total contributions to Ukraine will stand at a staggering €346.8 billion. That’s €140 billion more than Ukraine’s official GDP in 2025.
The Ukrainian Finance Ministry claims that it has received only €77.2 billion in external budget support since 2022, although this figure excludes most forms of bilateral aid and most military aid.
What could €235.9 billion buy in Europe?
The EU’s figure of €235.9 billion includes money taken from the bloc’s budget, money borrowed on capital markets, money spent on accommodating Ukrainian refugees inside the EU, and weapons donated to Kiev. Much of this amount could not be spent on domestic programs inside the bloc, but if it could, €235.9 billion would buy:
- One million affordable homes, using construction cost estimates from the European Commission
- 16 large nuclear reactors, using French cost estimates, enough to cover almost 10% of EU electricity consumption for 60 years
- €200 per month in child benefit payments for 10 million families for 9.8 years
- Modernizing every single German hospital five times over, using cost estimates from Berlin’s ‘Hospital Transformation Fund’
- 63 years of funding for the EU’s ‘Connecting Europe Facility’ transport program, or 4,700 km of high-speed rail (an increase of some 40%)
- 371 years of funding for the EU’s ‘EU4Health’ disease prevention program
Some of the €235.9 billion is already being spent propping up the EU’s last viable heavy industry: the weapons industry.
As RT columnist Rachel Marsden explored last week, Germany’s military sector has been one of the largest beneficiaries of military aid to Ukraine. Kiev budgeted €46.5 billion for military procurement in 2026, €2.76 billion of which has already been spent on arms purchases from Germany in the first six months of this year.
n addition to the billions of euros spent by Ukraine and its donors on Rheinmetall tank shells and artillery ammunition, Diehl Defense secured major interceptor supply agreements last month, while Hensoldt, Quantum Systems, Helsing, and ARX Robotics also got a €6.6 billion cut of the procurement pie when Merz met Zelensky in Kiev last month.
Merz’s insistence that his fellow EU members step up their contributions makes more sense when the bloc’s program of aid to Ukraine is viewed as a form of welfare for the German military-industrial complex.
What do EU citizens think?
Merz speaks for a vanishingly small number of his citizens, only 10% of whom approve of the job he’s doing. As his Christian Democrats (CDU) are wiped out in state elections, the ‘Gen Z regelt’ protest movement has gathered steam. Demonstrators are calling on Merz to undo compulsory military service and redirect funding from rearmament to schools and social services, and thousands are expected to take part in the ‘Welfare, not Warfare’ demonstrations on Friday.
Organized by a group opposing the EU’s €800 billion ‘ReArm Europe’ program, the protests will take place in 18 countries, including Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden, backed in each country by national trade unions and leftist organizations. These four countries are among Ukraine’s ten largest backers, according to Germany’s Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
Protests against militarization have also taken place in France – where President Emmanuel Macron’s approval rating is hovering around 14% – since early October. These demonstrations have been subsumed by broader student-led and anti-austerity rallies, which have descended into full-blown riots on multiple occasions. More than 12,500 people have been arrested or detained since the protests began in September, according to France’s Justice Ministry.
The most popular political parties in Germany and France – Alice Weidel’s AfD and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, respectively – oppose further aid to Ukraine. The AfD is on track to become the largest party in the German Bundestag whenever the next federal election takes place. In France, Le Pen is currently the favorite to win next year’s presidential election.
Apart from the hypothetical projects that the €235.9 billion given to Ukraine could have funded, the true price of the EU’s financial aid to Kiev can be measured in political capital. Across the bloc, leaders like Macron and Merz who prioritize Zelensky’s needs over those of their own citizens are paying the stiffest price at the ballot box.
What does Ukraine think?
Bulgaria announced this week that it will stop supplying Kiev with military and financial aid, while Poland said that it will no longer purchase American weapons for Ukraine under the PURL initiative. Zelensky’s response was to double down on his demands. In a video address on Sunday, the Ukrainian leader said that his government would prepare “an audit of the work of the existing coalitions supporting Ukraine, which ones are really fulfilling their tasks, and which ones remain empty.”
He also renewed his call for more American-made Patriot and NASAMS air defense missiles ahead of next week’s Ramstein meeting of Ukraine’s Western backers.
Zelensky’s call for an aid “audit” came less than two weeks after Ukrainian anti-corruption agencies concluded that some of his top officials conspired to loot $125 million from the country’s energy ministry, much of it earmarked for the construction of defenses around Ukraine’s substations and transformers. One month earlier, a former head of a state-owned Ukrainian defense company was charged with embezzling around $43 million through fake mediation deals linked to the export and import of military hardware.
Ukraine’s backers seemingly have little interest in finding out where their money is going. Macron asked at a press conference in Paris, shortly after the energy embezzlement scandal broke last year:
“Is it our role to give lessons to Ukraine, which has a scandal of this scale?
“I think that if everything is taking place within the framework of justice and the special procedures, then everything is fine.”
Comment: Scamming war via reciprocal money loops…the longer it lasts, the richer both sides become.
Next nuclear subs to be scrapped hinge on Babcock talks

By Craig Langford, November 18, 2026, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/next-nuclear-subs-to-be-scrapped-hinge-on-babcock-talks/
Plans to dismantle more of the Royal Navy’s laid-up
nuclear submarines after HMS Swiftsure are subject to approvals and commercial negotiations with Babcock, and ministers will set out next steps once Swiftsure is finished, according to an answer given in Parliament.
Graeme Downie, the Labour MP for Dunfermline and Dollar, asked what steps had been taken towards the next stages of the Submarine Recycling Programme and when recycling of the second and third boats would begin.
Luke Pollard, Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, gave the same reply to both questions: “Work continues to develop our future strategy for submarine recycling, focused on translating learning from the initial demonstrator programme into accelerated dismantling of the legacy platforms. The Submarine Disposal Capability Project remains in concept phase, which is assessing options for the capability and its location, with various sites under consideration within the UK.
“Planning for subsequent boats beyond Swiftsure are subject to on-going approval and commercial negotiations with our industry partner, Babcock. I will be making further announcements on next steps after the conclusion of the recycling of Swiftsure.”
Swiftsure, the demonstrator for the programme, is being dismantled at Rosyth by Babcock, and the UK Defence Journal has reported that progress continues in HMS Swiftsure dismantling and that ministers are holding to a deadline this year to finish the work.
Dozens of decommissioned submarines are waiting at Rosyth and Devonport, some for decades, and the backlog has long drawn criticism. The UK Defence Journal has covered how the UK is addressing its nuclear submarine disposal backlog.
Low electricity prices could impact EPR2 programme funding, France’s auditor warns

WNN, 16 November 2026
EDF could face difficulties funding its planned construction of six EPR2 reactors, France’s state audit office, the Cour des Comptes (Court of Auditors) has said.
In February 2022, President Emmanuel Macron announced that the time was right for a nuclear renaissance in France, extending the operation of existing nuclear reactors and unveiling a proposed programme for six new EPR2 reactors, with an option for a further eight EPR2 reactors to follow.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
The first six EPR2 reactors are to be built at Penly, Gravelines and Bugey, all of which are already home to operating nuclear power plants, with construction pencilled in to start in 2027. Each of the three sites will house a pair of EPR2 reactors, starting with Penly, where preparatory works began in 2024. Penly will serve as a pilot and provide a reference for subsequent projects. The cost was originally estimated at EUR51.7 billion (USD56.4 billion), but this was revised to EUR67.4 billion in 2023. In December last year, EDF said its preliminary cost estimate to build the six EPR2 reactors was EUR72.8 billion (USD80.1 billion), at 2020 prices.
In March 2025, France’s Nuclear Policy Council confirmed the main principles and parameters of the financing and regulatory framework for the EPR2 programme. The subsidised loan from the State granted to the EPR2 programme for 60% of the total amount of the programme will be financed by the savings fund of the Caisse des Dépôts. The reactors would also benefit from a contract for difference (CfD) with a strike price of no more than EUR100 (in 2024 euros) per MWh. This mechanism is intended to help cover the full production costs incurred by EDF, with the State making payments to the company whenever market prices fall below this level.
In a new report on state support for energy production, the Court of Auditors has now calculated the cost of the project at EUR84 billion at 2025 values.
It added: “At [electricity] prices below EUR70/MWh, EDF’s financing requirements for the construction of future EPR2 reactors would increase significantly. This would also constrain the group’s ability to fund the programme without additional state contributions – beyond the subsidised loans already announced – a point highlighted by the Court in its recent report on EDF’s economic model.
“In unfavourable price scenarios, one option available to the State would be to forgo cash dividends for all or part of the EPR2 construction period. Depending on the scenario, this could affect the trajectory of public finances by as much as EUR65 billion in cumulative terms between 2026 and 2040. As for the contract for difference mechanism, it will have no budgetary impact until the first EPR units are commissioned – which, at the earliest, would be in 2038.”
The European Commission launched an in-depth investigation in April into whether France’s planned public support for its new nuclear programme was within the European Union’s rules on state aid’……………….
https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/low-electricity-prices-could-impact-epr2-programme-funding-auditor-warns
HMS Vengeance patrol shows why we must turn away from nuclear weapons

David Mackenzie, Secure Scotland:
The Royal Navy’s stated intention is to
have one nuclear-armed missile submarine always on patrol to enable what is
called the “continuous at sea deterrent” (CASD) and ready to launch its
nuclear weapons.
These boats commonly carry eight missiles. Each missile
can consist of up to 12 warheads, each about seven times the destructive
power of the US atomic bombs that killed 140,000 children, women and men in
Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. This is enough firepower to incinerate
millions and trigger a global nuclear catastrophe.
The boats were intended
for a submerged patrol of 80 days, not underwater tours of over 200 days.
Vengeance set out on its current trip in mid-April.
Let us all hope the
crew come home safe and soon. The patrol extensions are down to the aged
and dilapidated condition of these subs as well as maintenance
difficulties, including a shortage of engineering expertise and skills. On
Monday, former nuclear submarine commander Robert Forsyth wrote on X:
“Ref Vanguard being unable to relieve Vengeance yet – what is so
disheartening is that several of us have been warning of the approaching
crisis for years – inc a 1 to 1 with @JohnHealey_MP – but to cloth
ears. Now CASD is in danger of coming to an all too abrupt end.”
The National 14th Nov 2026,
https://www.thenational.scot/politics/26729016.hms-vengeance-patrol-shows-must-turn-away-nuclear-weapons/
Nuclear bomb in space would disable 98 per cent of satellites within a week
Just one nuclear explosion in space would have global and
long-lasting repercussions, disabling almost every satellite and creating
technological chaos from which it would take years to recover, warn
experts. Zachary Petersen at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and his
colleagues modelled the effect of a 1 megaton explosion 500 kilometres
above the South Atlantic. They found that an initial spike of X-rays from
the blast was damaging, but it wasn’t the most disruptive part: electrons
released by radioactive fission would become trapped in Earth’s magnetic
field, exposing satellites to a kind of artificial radiation belt, over and
over again.
New Scientist 16th Nov 2026, https://www.newscientist.com/article/2598378-nuclear-bomb-in-space-would-disable-98-per-cent-of-satellites-within-a-week/
Walt Zlotow – Democrats don’t have to wait till new Congress convenes January 3 to end Iran war funding

Walt Zlotow, West Suburban Peace Coalition, Glen Ellyn IL 17 November 2026AIMN Editorial, https://theaimn.net/democrats-dont-have-to-wait-till-new-congress-convenes-january-3-to-end-iran-war-funding/
Funding for Trump’s criminal, failed, unsolvable Iran war runs out December 11. Democrats will remain in the minority thru the lame duck session in 2026. But they can filibuster any Republican regular appropriation bill or short term continuing resolution (CR) to prevent continued war funding December 11.
That would leave Trump with two poor options. Admit defeat by ending all military operations including his blockade of Iranian commerce and preparations for further attacks, or face a government shutdown which would cut off funds to continue the war.
A government shutdown has never before been used to stop a senseless, criminal war. Since the war is opposed by a majority of Democrats (93%) and Republicans (51%), a shutdown would likely both be welcomed by the American people and blamed on Republicans for seeking to continue a war they don’t want making life less affordable.
Alas, Democrats are not fully on board to use the filibuster to end the war when war dough runs out December 11. No signal yet from either House Minority Leader Jeffries or Senate Minority Leader Schumer they will ensure there will be no supplemental funding for Trump to continue his war crimes against the Iranian people after December 11.
Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), as the recipient of over $1.5 million in Israel Lobby money to support Israeli foreign policy, is loathe to end the Iran war. He offered a mild pushback to Trump’s criminality that has murdered over 3,400 Iranians while incurring 21 US military deaths to take out Iran at the behest of Israel. “Congress is going to end the war and the power of the purse is one of the ways of deterring a president who does war without the consent of the American people.” Schumer implied war on Iran would have been approved if only Trump would have followed the Constitution and requested congressional approval
His challenger to lead the Senate next year, Chris Van Hollen, who gets zilch from the Lobby, put it more bluntly and in tune with the November 3 electorate. “I will not support a single dime for Trump’s illegal and senseless war in Iran. It is endangering our troops and civilians throughout the region and driving up prices here at home. Americans made clear at the polls this week: they are sick of this war and want out. For all these reasons Democrats should use our leverage on both funding negotiations and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to defund this war now.”
The Iranian people and its government are not enemies of America. The enemies of America are ensconced in the White House, bombing people in little, unarmed boats in the Caribbean, killing people in Cuba by denying them fuel to run their hospitals, by continuing their war on Iran causing casualties daily while making life less affordable for all Americans but the well off. Democrats must not wait one day beyond the 25 days Trump and his war party have left to squander our treasure on killing instead of healing.
You got a mandate to wage peace November 3, Democrats. Now use it.
Insights into Construction Delays at the Vogtle Nuclear Plant: Primary Sources of Delay Identified by the Independent Construction Monitor

The first new reactors built in the United States in decades—two Westinghouse
AP1000s, Units 3 and 4, at the Vogtle plant in Georgia that started
commercial operations in 2023 and 2024—took more than twice the estimated
time to construct and at more than double the cost.
This experience raises
questions about nuclear power’s economic viability and therefore its role
in the energy transition and energy diversification. To better understand
what went wrong so utilities and reactor consortia can reduce the chances
of such consequential delays in future US reactor builds, the authors
examined testimonies by Vogtle’s independent construction monitor (ICM).
The ICM, Dr. William R. Jacobs Jr., reviewed the project’s progress and
any issues impacting schedule or cost. Jacobs had a unique vantage point
into the unfolding debacle throughout the process, and assessed that the
project’s three primary sources of delay were the following: Vogtle Units
3 and 4 lacked a realistic, achievable schedule.
The integrated project
schedule (IPS) used to manage the project and estimate commercial operation
dates was both incomplete and based on incorrect or unrealistic
assumptions. Private entities involved in the project failed to adhere to
the stringent quality assurance requirements of the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). In particular, the use of a new facility in Lake Charles,
Louisiana, with no previous nuclear-grade manufacturing experience created
lasting problems. Westinghouse lacked sufficient design completion at the
start of the project and the design changed during construction.
Both factors adversely impacted procurement and construction and the changes led
to licensing conflicts between what the NRC had certified and what the
consortium built.
Center on Global Energy Policy 15th Nov 2026, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/insights-into-construction-delays-at-the-vogtle-nuclear-plant-primary-sources-of-delay-identified-by-the-independent-construction-monitor/
Australia: The Coalition’s latest energy delusion: nuclear-powered data centres

“nuclear hype has flowed like champagne at a wedding reception” in relation to the growing energy demand of data centres.
November 17, 2026
Coalition MPs are promoting small modular nuclear reactors to power Australia’s growing data centre industry. But the technology remains commercially unproven, expensive and slow, while Big Tech’s commitments fall far short of construction funding.
A new report from the Australian Conservation Foundation debunks the Coalition’s claim that Australia needs nuclear reactors – and in particular small modular reactors (SMRs) – to power data centres.
These claims are being promoted by Liberal Shadow Energy Minister Dan Tehan, Liberal shadow ministers Andrew Hastie and Jonno Duniam, Nationals Leader Matt Canavan, Deputy Leader Darren Chester and Senate Leader Bridget McKenzie. A notable exception is the Queensland LNP government, which does not plan to repeal legislation banning nuclear power.
According to a 2025 report by the International Energy Agency (IEA), data centres accounted for 1.5 per cent of global electricity consumption in 2024 and the figure could reach three per cent by 2030.
In the IEA’s ‘Base Case’ from 2024–2035, 320 gigawatts (GW) of additional capacity are installed to power data centres, of which renewables account for nearly two-thirds and nuclear just 20 GW or 6 per cent.
Over 80 per cent of that projected 20 GW of new nuclear capacity comes from SMRs in the US and China in the IEA’s scenario. However there are good reasons to be sceptical about the deployment of significant SMR capacity – or even modest SMR capacity – by 2035. Or ever.
Indeed the IEA report notes that SMRs “remain to be demonstrated at scale”, that “high levelised costs and regulatory hurdles remain significant barriers to deployment”, and that “emerging challenges” exist such as “establishing supply chains for the higher-purity fuel needed for SMRs”.
Non-binding agreements and non-existent technology
Technology companies have “plans to finance more than 20 GW of SMRs to date”, the IEA claims. But “plans” should not be conflated with secure funding.
Several major technology companies, including Microsoft, Google, Amazon and Meta, have announced nuclear energy partnerships to support growing data-centre demand. However, these commitments are largely non-binding agreements, power purchase arrangements, or modest investments in SMR wannabes rather than direct funding for reactor construction.
A Carnegie analysis notes that AI companies have preferred power purchase offtake agreements – in which a buyer commits to a fixed-price, long-term contract with a power generator to buy electricity – rather than far more expensive and risky direct nuclear ownership or project development. Direct partnerships are mostly with relatively new companies that are developing SMRs, and details are generally opaque.
Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Oracle and NVIDIA have agreements with SMR developers. The Carnegie analysis notes that the terms of agreements are “largely undisclosed” but only include modest investments “structured to support early-stage SMR companies rather than fund construction directly.” The analysis states: “Critically, these agreements are contingent on technologies that have not yet been commercialized.”
‘Nuclear hype has flowed like champagne’
Dawn Stover, editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, notes that “nuclear hype has flowed like champagne at a wedding reception” in relation to the growing energy demand of data centres. However an analysis published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, argues that corporate press releases linking data centres to nuclear power “are all show, with little substance”.
Non-binding agreements and modest investment are no substitute for contractual agreements with clear funding commitments. Nuclear funding commitments from Amazon and Google, the authors note, “are just a fraction of one percent of their annual expenditures earmarked for building data centers”.
Those nuclear commitments are “primarily meant as greenwashing, in order to divert attention from the negative environmental impacts of data center operations” including much larger fossil fuel investments.
Powering data centres in Australia
In Australia, 165 data centres are operating and a further 225 are planned or proposed. Approximately 70 per cent of the electricity used to power data centres in Australia now comes from renewables according to the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO).
AEMO noted in August 2026 that data centre electricity consumption in the National Electricity Market is forecast to increase from 2.8 per cent of the total in 2025/26 to as much as 13 per cent a decade later.
It is in that context that the Coalition is promoting nuclear power for data centres. After a trip to the US, Liberal Shadow Minister Jonno Duniam said: “It was clear to me when talking with representatives of major AI and data centre operatives that, if the moratorium was not in place, these companies would be seriously looking to nuclear SMRs to power their operations …”
That would be a more compelling argument if the ‘major AI and data centre operatives’ were stumping up many billions for new reactors, large or small, in the US or anywhere else. But they aren’t.
Nuclear is no solution
Here is a non-exhaustive list of the reasons why Coalition MPs are barking up the wrong tree by promoting nuclear-powered data centres (for detail see the Australian Conservation Foundation report):
Nuclear power is illegal and unpopular. Federal legislation bans the construction of nuclear power reactors, as do state laws in Queensland, NSW and Victoria.
Coupling unpopular nuclear power with unpopular data centres may be a bridge too far as Crikey noted in August 2025: “A recent Capital Brief/DemosAU poll found that just 20 per cent of respondents support a nuclear plant in their area, even less than the 23 per cent who would support a data centre (imagine how they’d feel about both at once).”
SMRs don’t exist. No SMRs exist worldwide and none are under construction using the standard definition (<300 megawatts, serial modular construction).
Using a loose definition – ignoring modular construction – there are two operating SMRs and five under construction. The combined capacity of those seven projects is 1.2 GW. Far more renewable energy capacity is added every day.
The International Energy Agency expects the addition of nearly 4,800 GW of renewable capacity worldwide in the six years from 2026–31, or 2.2 GW per day on average. SMR additions over that six-year period might or might not reach 1 GW.
Nuclear power is too slow. Based on overseas experience and expert analysis, introducing nuclear power to Australia would likely require around ten years for planning and licensing, followed by another ten years for construction.
SMR advocates claim 3–5 year construction timelines, but the so-called SMRs in China and Russia took 11–12 years to build and around two decades from planning to operation.
Nuclear power is too expensive. Data-centre growth is already placing upward pressure on power prices. Nuclear would not ease these pressures. Electricity from SMRs would be far more expensive than renewable energy.
The latest CSIRO GenCost report gives these 2025 levelised cost estimates: SMR A$433–718 / megawatt-hour, large nuclear $200–328, solar PV $52–88, and onshore wind $78–129.
Nuclear accidents and attacks. In addition to the risk of catastrophic accidents, recent experience in Ukraine and the Middle East highlights the potential for nuclear catastrophe resulting from deliberate or accidental military strikes on nuclear plants.
Nuclear reactors (and data centres) are too thirsty. Nuclear reactors consume large volumes of water daily, and so do data centres.
Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia and author of the ACF’s new report_, ‘Phantom Energy: Small modular reactors and data centres’._
Blykalla Secures World’s First HALEU Enrichment Contract for a Commercial Lead-Cooled Reactor

Sonal C. Patel, Power Mag 19th Nov 2026
Swedish advanced nuclear developer Blykalla has signed an agreement with Urenco that the companies describe as the world’s first high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) enrichment contract for a commercial lead-cooled reactor. The agreement covers Blykalla’s first commercial 55-MWe Swedish Advanced Lead Reactor (SEALER), which the company plans to deploy in the U.S.
The agreement, signed Nov. 12 at Urenco’s London headquarters and announced Nov. 16, calls for Blykalla to supply the uranium feed and Urenco to enrich the material at its Advanced Fuels Facility in Capenhurst, England. Urenco plans to bring the facility online in 2031 and begin deliveries to Blykalla in the early 2030s.
“We expect to be able to announce more about the location and schedule in the near future,” Blykalla CEO Jacob Stedman said in written responses to POWER………………………………………………………….
Neither company disclosed the contract value or the enrichment level specified for the SEALER fuel…………………………………………………………………………
The Urenco agreement, notably, covers only the enrichment stage of the nuclear fuel cycle. Blykalla has not identified the suppliers that will provide the finished fuel for its first commercial reactor…………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Blykalla’s U.S. development program encompasses Fjäll, its first-of-a-kind nuclear demonstration reactor, and the SEALER-55 for commercial deployment. The company initiated pre-application engagement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in June 2026 but has not yet filed a license application……………………………
Blykalla has also established a strategic partnership with U.S. sodium-cooled fast reactor developer Oklo…………………………………………………………………………………
“We are coordinating our commercialization efforts in Sweden and the US through a common supply chain strategy,” Stedman told POWER. https://www.powermag.com/blykalla-secures-worlds-first-haleu-enrichment-contract-for-a-commercial-lead-cooled-reactor/
Energy crisis reinforces comeback of nuclear power, says IEA
Unprecedented disruption in the energy world – primarily resulting from
the war in the Middle East – is set to reinforce the comeback of nuclear
power, according to the International Energy Agency’s latest World Energy
Outlook, which has revised its forecast for nuclear upwards.
World Nuclear News 19th Nov 2026 https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/energy-crisis-reinforces-comeback-of-nuclear-power-says-iea
The Nuclear Financing Gap

Fundamental changes to market structures and risk profiles following deregulation of the world’s electricity markets have left nuclear financing options adrift.
The concern is that the power plant will remain capable over the long term of selling its output at a price that is high enough to cover its costs. Adding to this concern is the possible emergence of any new, competing technology that can sell electricity at a lower price.
NS ENERGY, By Dr Stephen Dansky16th Nov 2026
When the ‘on’ switch was thrown at the first electric power plant, Thomas Edison was not there celebrating with his team of scientists and engineers. Rather, he was celebrating quite a distance away on Wall Street with the bankers who financed his endeavour. Throughout his prolific career, he understood that a great new design is nothing more than an academic exercise unless the banking community is willing to provide the requisite funds for construction.
Today’s nuclear engineers may want to consider that moment in history. The designs for the next generation of nuclear power imply greater safety, and modular construction may improve costs. They may also help countries meet their greenhouse gas targets. Nonetheless, recent research has demonstrated that within deregulated electricity markets, such as those that comprise two-thirds of the US electric market, there should be little expectation of obtaining the requisite financing to construct these new designs.
Market evolution
Much has changed about electricity markets over the last few decades. Previously, all utilities in the US that owned nuclear power plants operated within a regulated cost-of-service framework. These long-standing cost-of-service regulations extend back to several US Supreme Court decisions including Smyth v. Ames and Hope Natural Gas v. Federal Power Commission which led to the ‘used and useful’ doctrine for regulated monopoly utilities. Moreover, all retail customers within the geographic boundaries of a utility’s service territory were legally captive – they could not switch electric providers no matter how high the regulators set the electric rates following placement of a new nuclear plant into the rate base, or how volatile due to an oil embargo. From the viewpoint of lenders and investors, these captive customers provided the ultimate credit support for a utility’s construction plans. Under a regulated monopoly utility framework, the revenue and cost risks of owning a nuclear plant were reduced to a point sufficient to satisfy the financiers.
This regulatory framework supported the financing of more than 90 GW of nuclear capacity in the US. Globally, it supported the financing of over 400 nuclear power plants in 32 countries, and every one of these nuclear plants was financed under some form of government regulation. Referred to as the “sovereign form” of financing by the International Atomic Energy Agency, either the government agreed to assume some or all of the revenue and cost risks, or the government passed the risks on to captive retail customers. Without some form of sovereign assistance, no nuclear power plant in any country has successfully secured financing anywhere in the world.
Within the US, electricity deregulation began with the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, followed by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, and then by various Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rulings. These rulings included Orders 888, 889, 1000, and 2000 to further promote competitive economic efficiencies by providing open access to electric transmission lines and establishing the independent system operators (ISO), thus creating an ‘arms-length’ separation between the operation of the transmission grid and its owners.
Arising from this string of legal and regulatory changes was a restructured electricity market serving approximately two-thirds of the US market. Here, electric utilities were required to divest their regulated electric generating assets, and electric plants are now developed, owned, and operated by non-utility independent power producers (IPPs). No longer are there regulated monopolies for the generation of electricity. There are competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets, and retail customers are free to choose their electric suppliers the same as they choose cell-phone carriers. These IPPs sell their electricity into the wholesale electric grid as a commodity using prices provided by each IPP to the ISO on a daily basis. Cost-of-service regulations are not available to these IPPs. They survive, or not, on their ability to make a return on investment in a competitive market – the same as other competitive businesses such as automotive manufacturing, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, and food products.
The goal of engineering economists several decades ago to deregulate and restructure the electricity generation market, and bring economic efficiencies through competition, has largely succeeded. Numerous studies have shown that deregulation led to increases in operating performance and plant efficiency, as well as lower electricity prices for customers. However, deregulation also shifted some risks away from electric ratepayers and toward power plant investors. There are multiple types of risk which affect the construction and operation of a power plant, and it is the shifting of revenue risk and how this risk affects different types of power plants differently that is a key to private sector investment in power generation.
Changes in dispatch risk
It is well established that the economics of a high fixed cost/low variable cost technology such as nuclear power improve at higher capacity factors, typically represented as the baseload segment of the market. Capacity factors of 90%+ are considered the critical range of operation if nuclear power is to be cost-competitive vis-à-vis competing technologies, and this characteristic has important financing implications. In other words, it is important to maintain a high output quantity (Q) to keep average fixed costs (AFC) down because nuclear plant fixed costs are high relative to its variable costs. Thus, by operating as a baseload unit, the high fixed costs of a nuclear plant can be allocated over a greater quantity of kWh to minimise AFC, which in turn, minimises the plant’s average total electric costs.
Thus, it is economics, not physics, that restricts nuclear plants from being dispatchable (changing Q during the course of a day to meet changes in electric demand) as this would lower Q and, in turn, increase AFC. The nuclear plant would have insufficient cash flow to meet its debt and equity obligations.
This economic principle that nuclear plants should not be dispatchable also applies to any of the proposed advanced nuclear plant designs. These new designs do not alter the high fixed cost/low variable cost relationship that is inherent to nuclear power, and it is this relationship that dictates whether a power plant economically operates as a baseload, intermediate, or peaking unit. The new designs do not alter the economic issue at the centre of our analysis with its important financing implication that nuclear plants require baseload operation.
The conundrum, whether analysing existing nuclear plant technology or a proposed advanced modular design, is that the daily quoted price (P) of the electricity supplied by the owner of the plant to the ISO must remain low enough to ensure that the plant will be dispatched by the ISO in order to sell a high quantity (Q) of the plant’s output, and thus be a baseload unit, yet the total revenue (TR = P x Q) must be large enough to cover all costs, including the plant’s high capital costs. This is a tight operating window, and the nuclear plant must be able to satisfy this constraint over the plant’s life, despite changes in competing technologies, regulations, and customer demand in order to attract financing. The debt and equity financiers of the nuclear plant seek to have this operating risk minimised because the tight operating window leaves little cushion to absorb the effects of other long-term revenue risks.
Prior to deregulation, nuclear plant owners were able to eliminate this dispatch risk by designating each nuclear plant as “must run”. Today, under deregulation, this ability no longer exists because the dispatch sequence is determined by the ISO and not by the owner of the power plant.
Changes in price and output quantity risks
Lenders and equity investors have concerns about long-term price certainty for all types of power plants, not just nuclear. The concern is that the power plant will remain capable over the long term of selling its output at a price that is high enough to cover its costs. Adding to this concern is the possible emergence of any new, competing technology that can sell electricity at a lower price. The ISO may sequence the new technology to run each day ahead of the older technology. When this occurs, the new technology will push the older plant ‘up the dispatch curve’ which will result in a shortfall of total revenue for the older technology and affect its ability to make payments to lenders and investors.
Prior to deregulation, power plant owners were able to eliminate this long-term price risk based on the previously noted Supreme Court decisions which established the ‘used and useful’ doctrine for regulated monopoly utilities. Under this doctrine, once a power plant is deemed to be used and useful by the appropriate regulatory body, then the prudently incurred costs, including the plant’s fixed capital and the variable fuel costs, plus a reasonable rate of return, continue to be included in the electric rates charged to customers. Today, under deregulation, this ability no longer exists.
Another financing concern is price volatility…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Advanced reactor strategy shift required
At the end of the day, the issue facing the financial community is not whether a technology provides firm vs. interruptible power, or where it fits into the dispatch queue. For project-financed projects within deregulated markets, the issue boils down to the IRR:WACC ratio. Debt and equity investors will continue to prudently pour money into wind and solar projects (and any other forthcoming technology) that have higher IRR:WACC ratios. Unless nuclear power can increase its IRR:WACC ratio on par with other technologies, either by lowering revenue risk to lower its WACC or by lowering its capital costs to increase its IRR, nuclear power will not succeed in attracting private investment within competitive deregulated markets.
Deregulation is here to stay in those markets that have been deregulated. Given that there are multiple technologies, and more to come, to combat greenhouse gases, there isn’t the political appetite to rescind the successes of deregulation. Today’s designers of advanced modular reactors may want to adjust their marketing plans to exclude deregulated markets and focus on regulated markets where there isn’t the competition for funds against other technologies having higher IRR:WACC ratios.
This article first appeared in Nuclear Engineering International magazine. https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/analysis/the-nuclear-financing-gap/
Darlington’s First SMR Is Late and Over Budget. Ontario Needs to Rethink the Next Three.

the BWRX-300 is still a new design, and the promised economies of repeat construction depend on its becoming stable enough to repeat.
The problem is treating a first-of-a-kind nuclear construction programme as reliably cheap future supply before engineering and costs support that conclusion.
Michael Barnard, 17 Nov 26, https://cleantechnica.com/2026/11/15/darlington-smr-cost-overrun-four-reactor-risk/
Ontario Power Generation has acknowledged that its first GE Vernova Hitachi BWRX-300 small modular reactor at Darlington will exceed its C$7.7 billion approved budget and miss its October 2030 commercial-operation target. There is no replacement cost or completion date yet. OPG expects its engineering, cost and schedule review to be substantially complete by mid-2027.
The reason matters. In its November 10 financial results, OPG identified continuing first-of-a-kind reactor engineering and its effects on construction execution and supply-chain performance. Ontario started physical work while parts of the design governing that work were still evolving. The project is now living with the consequence.
This is not a story about a construction crew failing to install a basemat. The 2.1-million-pound reactor foundation is in place, work on the turbine building has progressed, and the cooling-water tunnel equipment has been assembled. These are real achievements. They do not settle the engineering dependencies, supplier requirements and delivery sequence for a first-of-a-kind reactor. Construction progress and schedule certainty are different things.
Megaproject researcher Bent Flyvbjerg calls the better approach “think slow, act fast.” Engineering, interfaces and execution plans need enough maturity that construction can advance without a succession of disruptive changes. Design and construction can overlap on controlled, ready-to-build work packages. Darlington’s own disclosure shows that the required boundary has not been maintained.
My TFIE Strategy Briefing on Darlington’s SMR examines the November disclosure, the historical nuclear construction record and the consequences for Ontario’s four-reactor plan.
Ontario is an unusually favourable test for the Western SMR industry. OPG operates a large nuclear fleet and has an experienced workforce, an established site, transmission infrastructure and public financial backing. GE Vernova Hitachi has extensive boiling-water reactor experience. Yet the BWRX-300 is still a new design, and the promised economies of repeat construction depend on its becoming stable enough to repeat.
The four-reactor programme originally carried a C$20.9 billion budget. Within that were C$6.1 billion for the first reactor, C$1.6 billion of common infrastructure and C$13.2 billion for Units 2 through 4. The financial proposition depends on the later reactors becoming cheaper after the first teaches suppliers and builders how to execute the design.
In my October 2025 assessment I applied historical nuclear construction reference-class uplifts rather than relying only on the project’s internal estimates. A 67% uplift to the Unit 1 reactor component, with shared infrastructure held unchanged, produces a C$11.8 billion first-stage cost. A 202% uplift produces about C$20.0 billion, or nearly 96% of the original budget for all four reactors. These are illustrative stress outcomes from the historical construction class, not new OPG estimates. They show how much of the programme’s financial margin depends on getting the first design and subsequent learning right.
The uncertainty has already reached Ontario’s electricity planning. In its November 10 filing to the Ontario Energy Board, OPG withdrew the Darlington SMR generation forecast from its 2027–2031 rate application. Previously planned production of about 0.5 TWh in 2030 and 1.9 TWh in 2031 is no longer included. The filing does not announce a post-2031 commissioning date. It shows that the earlier production assumptions cannot support the regulatory request.
Ontario does not need to suspend other electricity decisions while it waits for a revised reactor budget. The Independent Electricity System Operator’s May 2026 LT2 energy procurement secured 1,115 MW of new wind and solar contracts, with expected annual generation of about 2.37 TWh and a weighted average fixed price of C$88.84/MWh. That is approximately the annual electricity a 300 MW reactor would generate at a 90% capacity factor. Ontario also contracted 640 MW of battery capacity at C$563.48 per MW-business day.
Wind and solar provide energy on a different hourly profile from a nuclear reactor. The battery procurement buys capacity services, not 640 MW of round-the-clock generation. Ontario’s decision is to assemble a reliable portfolio from the new energy, existing nuclear and hydroelectric generation, storage, interties, transmission and flexible demand. The whole-system cost of that portfolio is the relevant comparator for the next three SMRs, not a claim that a wind farm is a nuclear reactor with a different name.
This distinction also matters for the C$127/MWh comparison in my longer analysis. That figure allocates the renewable contracts’ initial energy payments and separate battery capacity payments across expected renewable production. It establishes a useful procurement spending benchmark. Additional charging, integration, transmission and dependable capacity requirements must be assessed to establish a comparable delivered system service.
Before Ontario commits to Units 2 through 4, it should require a credible outside-view update of the first unit’s cost and schedule, disclosure of outstanding design packages and their interfaces, measured evidence of construction learning, and a system-level comparison against resources that can be delivered during the same period. Each proposed later reactor is an investment decision, not an automatic entitlement created by spending on the first.
Ontario’s existing nuclear fleet is a valuable low-carbon resource. Keeping it productive and refurbishing it where justified remains important. The problem is treating a first-of-a-kind nuclear construction programme as reliably cheap future supply before engineering and costs support that conclusion.
Read the full Darlington assessment for the reference-class cost exposure, financing sensitivities and the investment gates Ontario should apply. The linked Flexibility Mesh report develops the system-services and grid-utilisation side of the comparison.
A.I. Weapons Need Data for Their Training. Ukraine Has a Lot to Offer.

The software models created by A.I. are a black box to humans because their internal reasoning is largely opaque. That is a problem, said Anna Bacciarelli, an analyst of A.I. and conflict at Human Rights Watch, because the “black box obscures accountability” in self-targeting weapons. “It’s hard to pinpoint the moment when something goes wrong,” she said.
The software models created by A.I. are a black box to humans because their internal reasoning is largely opaque. That is a problem, said Anna Bacciarelli, an analyst of A.I. and conflict at Human Rights Watch, because the “black box obscures accountability” in self-targeting weapons. “It’s hard to pinpoint the moment when something goes wrong,” she said.
The Ukrainian government has opened up a trove of five million battlefield videos to defense companies at home and abroad.
Nov. 12, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/12/world/europe/ukraine-ai-weapons.html
Behind this feat lay vast volumes of data. Just as ChatGPT and other A.I. chatbots must be exposed to how humans write, military A.I. systems must be exposed to how humans fight. In Ukraine, this happens through a huge trove of battlefield videos, audio and text data collected over nearly five years.
The war database is being used by about 30 Ukrainian defense companies to develop A.I. weapons. Ukraine is now opening this repository, which it calls Avenger Labs, to firms in allied countries, hoping to deepen security partnerships.
Ukraine is providing the data at no charge, but companies must give the Ukrainian military licenses to any software they develop. Under the first agreement to be reached, 12 British defense companies will gain access. Ukraine is in talks with other countries.
While there is no shortage of Western companies developing autonomous weapons, there is a shortage of the data needed to train them. Ukraine can offer more of it than any other potential partner.
Ukraine is sharing the data even as it remains unsettled internationally how the Geneva Conventions and other laws of war apply to A.I. weapons. Kyiv, which is struggling to draft enough soldiers to hold the front line and is running out of traditional antiaircraft weapons to defend its cities, wants to hasten the development of such weapons for its defense.
Russia, too, has been collecting war data for use in A.I. It is unclear how Moscow handles this information, or whether it shares it with allies like Iran, China and North Korea.
Most A.I. drone systems now in use require a human pilot to confirm a target before striking. But both Russia and Ukraine have employed small numbers of fully autonomous exploding drones, including one model made by Russia that killed three people in a southern Ukrainian city in July.
A former Ukrainian defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, who directed the development of the Avenger Labs platform, has formed an investment fund with a goal of deploying a fully autonomous A.I. weapon next year. Alex Karp, the chief executive of the data analysis company Palantir, is a lead investor.
Recently, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry provided a demonstration of how Ukraine creates A.I. weapons.
When training a killer drone, a first step is deciding what it will kill. A data set must be chosen — thousands or tens of thousands of images of the type of target the weapon should hunt.
Avenger Labs holds more than five million drone surveillance and strike videos. Many of them are raw footage of small, buzzing drones that chase Russian soldiers and blow them up. But a menu bar in the platform can call up thousands of annotated battlefield videos matching a wide range of targets. Among them are tanks during wintertime; trucks at night; and exploding Russian drones viewed through thermal imaging cameras.
The encrypted platform is hosted by a cloud service outside Ukraine. Defense companies do not directly view the videos. They run the data within a so-called sandbox, or isolated computer system. Over time, as they are fed the wartime videos, they learn to identify military targets.
Once an A.I. model becomes proficient in the sandbox, as measured by false positives and false negatives, a company can load it into the targeting computer of an aerial drone, ground robot or sea drone.
With that, the menu item on the Avenger Labs platform — for example, tanks — becomes a menu item on the A.I. weapon. A soldier can click on this menu item, then release a drone to autonomously hunt for the target.
An executive for one company that has used the system for an A.I. model now deployed on the battlefield said statistics from training showed false positives of less than 5 percent. The executive spoke on the condition of anonymity because of a secrecy agreement with Avenger Labs. Whatever the qualms about killer A.I. weapons, the executive said, they will be developed one way or another.
The Ukrainian war database has limitations. It is not clear how relevant the images are to conflicts outside Ukraine, said Kateryna Bondar, a senior fellow at the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
“If you train your computers to recognize Russian assets, what are you going to do with that” away from Ukraine, she asked. In a war in the Middle East, A.I. weaponry might need to recognize, for example, Iranian missile launchers in a desert landscape.
There are also questions about potential unlawful use of the data. The licensing agreement does not include a human rights clause. Ukraine is opening access under government-to-government agreements. These governments, Ukrainian officials say, are responsible for ensuring that their militaries adhere to the Geneva Conventions and other treaties.
In any case, Ukraine is opening its war data into a legal void. Last month at United Nations talks in Geneva, Russian and U.S. diplomats opposed a requirement for “meaningful human control” of lethal autonomous weapons. These talks will resume on Monday to consider a draft treaty.
The software models created by A.I. are a black box to humans because their internal reasoning is largely opaque. That is a problem, said Anna Bacciarelli, an analyst of A.I. and conflict at Human Rights Watch, because the “black box obscures accountability” in self-targeting weapons. “It’s hard to pinpoint the moment when something goes wrong,” she said.
Oleksandra Matviichuk, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and director of the Center for Civil Liberties in Kyiv, said Ukraine and other countries that had ratified the Rome Statute, the agreement that created the International Criminal Court, were obliged to extradite for trial military officers responsible for war crimes, regardless of the weapon used.
Ukraine should be cautious, Ms. Matviichuk said, in sharing data with countries that have not accepted this principle of international law, such as the United States.
Evelina Riabenko contributed reporting.
Andrew E. Kramer is the Kyiv bureau chief for The Times, who has been covering the war in Ukraine
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