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Why Putin Is Threatening Nuclear War Over Kaliningrad

If an increasingly vulnerable Kaliningrad holds strategic value for Russia and can only be defended by nuclear weapons, then perhaps Western leaders shouldn’t threaten it—and perhaps Western analysts should take more seriously Moscow’s repeated warnings that such threats could meet a nuclear response.

Russia experts shed light on the Kremlin’s calculations.

Andrew Day, Oct 3, 2026, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-putin-is-threatening-nuclear-war-over-kaliningrad/

If the world blows up in a conflict over Kaliningrad—the diminutive Russian exclave sandwiched between Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Sea—at least there would be a silver lining for survivors to appreciate: It would be darkly humorous and ironic.

Kaliningrad—or Koenigsberg, as the formerly German city was called before its capture in 1945 by the Soviet Union—was the birthplace of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, whose most enduring contribution to political theory was a long essay on international relations, Toward Perpetual Peace. In it, Kant outlines some big-brained ideas that governments should implement to not only end active hostilities but create the political conditions for, well, perpetual peace.

Old Kant published that hopeful essay 231 years ago and would certainly be disturbed and disappointed by this week’s headlines. The most riveting came from the New York Post: “Moscow threatens nuclear response over tiny fortress wedged between US allies as clash fears grow.” (The Post really has a knack for this kind of thing, doesn’t it?)

The one from the Associated Press more aptly, if less dramatically, described the latest development. “Russia warns NATO of a possible nuclear response if Kaliningrad is cut off,” it blared.

So, what’s got the Russians so worked up? Top Russia experts told The American Conservative that Moscow assigns profound strategic significance to the exclave and perceives a Western threat against it.

“Kaliningrad gives Russia another warm water port on the Baltic Sea,” said Thomas Graham, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former White House expert under President George W. Bush. “It also holds major military assets to defend Russia’s interest in the region, including access routes to St. Petersburg.”

Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute noted an even more straightforward Russian interest than that. “Russia cares about this because it is internationally-recognized Russian national territory,” Lieven said. “Any attack on it or blockade is therefore legally an act of war against the Russian Federation, to which the Russian government would have to respond or face deep humiliation.”

Those are important points with which few experts would quibble. But what really distinguishes Graham and Lieven is their ability to discern—from Russia’s point of view—a Western threat against Kaliningrad, and to take it seriously. Judging by the comments both men provided, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin didn’t issue the nuclear threats lightly.

“In some NATO countries there has been talk of blockading Kaliningrad, that is, isolating the region from the rest of Russia by land and sea,” Graham said. “Putin would see a blockade as an act of war against Russia. So he is making sure that Europe understands that he will defend Russian land with all necessary means, which could include nuclear weapons.”

Moscow had already been inclined, even before the latest tensions exploded between Russia and the West, to view Kaliningrad as exposed to NATO’s predations. “NATO expansion to Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, and Finland means that Kaliningrad is now surrounded by NATO countries both by land and sea,” Lieven noted.

Sadly, not all Western experts perform such acts of perspective taking. Consider a recent article in The Hill, which, in the view of this editor-cum-columnist at least, actually brought the week’s most disturbing headline: “Kaliningrad is just Putin’s red herring.”

The coauthors—Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet—write that the Kremlin is engaged in “nuclear bluffing” designed to intimidate the West and distract from its own military failures in Ukraine. Early in the piece, the only context they provide for Moscow’s warnings is a new British television miniseries called The Wargame, in which the UK launches retaliatory strikes on Kaliningrad after a Russian attack.

A casual reader of their article could be left with the impression that this TV show was the main thing, perhaps the only thing, motivating Putin’s threatening rhetoric. But a careful reader would learn otherwise, for the authors inadvertently illuminate the kinds of Western behavior that prompted Putin’s warnings.

“Kaliningrad is a hollowed-out shell of what it was before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” they write. “As Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski pointed out earlier this month, ‘There are hardly any [Russian] troops [in the Kaliningrad exclave].’”

But that’s not all that Sikorski said. Toth and Sweet link to an article in Defense News, the first sentence of which is this:

NATO allies could hold drills in proximity of Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave in an attempt to push Moscow to weaken its military posture in Ukraine and withdraw some of its troops there, said Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister

Clearly, Sikorski went far beyond merely commenting on Russia’s force posture in the region. The article emphasizes that he didn’t recommend “offensive” actions against Kaliningrad, but you could hardly blame Putin for failing to appreciate the distinction. Indeed, in the relevant quotes, Sikorski recommends that NATO “aggressively” exercise around Kaliningrad and start treating the exclave as a front in the confrontation between Russia and the West.

Toth and Sweet’s article continues: “Although Kaliningrad is still the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the Baltic Sea itself has effectively become a NATO-controlled lake, after the accession of Sweden and Finland as the newest members of NATO.” Kaliningrad, they write, “is highly vulnerable,” and these days it merely hosts nuclear missiles, its conventional forces having been deployed to Ukraine.

Thus, “Moscow’s nuclear Armageddon bluffing is simply the latest attempt by Putin and his Kremlin cronies to paper over this problem.”

Here the premises lead to the conclusion only in the sense that they crash violently into it. If an increasingly vulnerable Kaliningrad holds strategic value for Russia and can only be defended by nuclear weapons, then perhaps Western leaders shouldn’t threaten it—and perhaps Western analysts should take more seriously Moscow’s repeated warnings that such threats could meet a nuclear response.

And those analysts should understand that the Russian political establishment in general—not just Putin—perceives a Western threat against Kaliningrad that, if acted upon, could precipitate a devastating Russia–NATO conflict. Referring to Sikorski’s apparent suggestion that NATO might isolate the exclave, forcing its surrender, Lieven said, “If this did happen, every Russian with whom I have spoken has said that Russia would have credibly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, followed by their actual use if NATO failed to back down.”

Tensions between Russia and the West are worse than they’ve been since the Cold War, and mutual understanding perhaps worse than even then. In our age, Kant’s dreams of perpetual peace may seem naive if not delusional, but surely our leaders have enough wisdom not to let inexcusable miscalculations over his homeland on the Baltic lead to nuclear war. Right?

October 21, 2026 Posted by | Russia, weapons and war | Leave a comment

The politics of deterrence

Nuclear deterrence rests on a paradox. The purpose of nuclear weapons is to prevent their use.

Britain maintains its Trident system on the assumption that the credible threat of devastating retaliation will deter an adversary from attacking. The logic of mutually assured destruction is that neither side can launch a nuclear strike without risking its own destruction. The weapons preserve peace because the consequences of using them would be catastrophic.

But deterrence is a theory about behaviour, not a guarantee of safety.………………….

15 Oct, By Megan Davidson, https://www.commonweal.scot/articles/the-politics-of-deterrence

Does nuclear deterrence really make us safer? As Britain doubles down on military preparedness, we must question whether the logic of deterrence is undermining the pursuit of lasting peace, and whether Scotland could offer a different vision of security.

We are being told to prepare for war. The language of escalation, deterrence and national resilience has returned to British politics, accompanied by warnings that Europe must be ready for a major conflict by 2030. Scotland is now expected to contribute to renewed UK-wide contingency planning, including a modern version of the Cold War-era War Book. These preparations may be prudent. But there is a danger in allowing the possibility of war to become the organising principle of our politics, rather than a danger we should be working to prevent.

Neil Mackay’s argument that Scotland’s opposition to nuclear weapons undermines European security raises an important question: what does it mean to take the threat of war seriously? The answer cannot simply be to prepare to fight one. We must also ask whether the security arrangements we maintain are making conflict less likely, and whether we have become so accustomed to the logic of deterrence that we struggle to imagine security beyond it.

Nuclear deterrence rests on a paradox. The purpose of nuclear weapons is to prevent their use. Britain maintains its Trident system on the assumption that the credible threat of devastating retaliation will deter an adversary from attacking. The logic of mutually assured destruction is that neither side can launch a nuclear strike without risking its own destruction. The weapons preserve peace because the consequences of using them would be catastrophic.

But deterrence is a theory about behaviour, not a guarantee of safety. It depends on leaders making rational calculations, correctly interpreting their adversaries’ intentions and maintaining control during moments of extreme pressure. It cannot eliminate the possibility of miscalculation, accident or escalation. Nor can it ensure that every crisis will unfold according to the assumptions on which the system depends.

There is a fundamental tension here. To deter an attack, the threat of retaliation must be credible. Yet the credibility of that threat depends on maintaining the possibility of an act whose consequences could be irreversible. We are asked to trust that nuclear weapons will preserve peace while accepting that their continued effectiveness depends on the willingness to use them.

This does not prove that deterrence has never prevented conflict. It may have contributed to restraining direct military confrontation between nuclear-armed powers. Nor does it follow that abandoning nuclear weapons would automatically produce a more peaceful world. But the fact that deterrence may have prevented certain attacks does not settle the question of whether our present dependence on it is sustainable, or whether it creates risks of its own.

International relations offers a useful way of understanding this problem: the security dilemma. When one state increases its military capabilities to protect itself, another may interpret that expansion as a threat and respond in kind. The first state then sees the response as confirmation of its original fears. Each side’s attempt to become more secure can leave both feeling less safe.

This does not mean that all states are equally responsible for conflict, or that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can be excused as a misunderstanding. Russia chose to invade, and Ukraine has every right to defend itself. The security dilemma is not a device for erasing responsibility. It helps explain how military competition can become self-reinforcing, even as individual states claim to be acting defensively.

The question, then, is not whether Britain should ignore Russian aggression. It is whether responding to insecurity through military expansion alone can provide a durable solution. If every increase in capability prompts another increase in response, the result may be a more heavily armed continent without a corresponding increase in trust or stability.

That is important as the UK prepares for the possibility of a major European conflict. Contingency planning is not evidence that war is inevitable, and governments have a responsibility to prepare for emergencies. But warnings about a possible conflict by 2030 should be scrutinised, not treated as predictions that settle the debate. We should ask what evidence supports these assessments, what kinds of conflict are being anticipated, and what is being done alongside military preparation to reduce the likelihood of them occurring.

We should also recognise the interests that shape defence policy. Military institutions have legitimate responsibilities to identify threats and secure the capabilities they need. Defence companies, meanwhile, stand to benefit from government contracts and long-term procurement programmes. The existence of those interests does not demonstrate that warnings about war are manufactured. It does mean that decisions involving enormous public expenditure should be open to scrutiny, particularly when urgency risks narrowing the range of policies considered politically acceptable.

There is a further problem with treating nuclear deterrence as synonymous with national security: it can obscure the other vulnerabilities that governments must address. Scotland’s dependence on undersea cables and other critical infrastructure is a case in point. The disruption of communications infrastructure could have serious consequences for economic and social life, particularly for island communities. The UK Government has recognised the need for stronger coordination and resilience in protecting subsea cables. Nuclear weapons cannot, by themselves, solve these practical problems of national security.

“Preparation is not prevention, and the capacity to destroy an adversary is not the same as the capacity to build a more secure world.”

A country can possess the capacity to inflict catastrophic destruction and remain vulnerable to disruption of the systems on which its population depends. A serious defence policy must consider both. This is not an argument for replacing one form of defence with another, but for asking whether our priorities reflect the full range of threats we face.

It is also why diplomacy cannot be treated as a secondary consideration, something to return to once military preparations are complete. Negotiation is not a guarantee of peace. States can negotiate in bad faith, agreements can be broken, and dialogue cannot substitute for the capacity to resist aggression. Yet military strength cannot resolve every political dispute, and the ability to retaliate is not the same as the ability to prevent a crisis from escalating.

In his discussion of negotiation, George Friedman argues that the outcome of a war depends not only on military capability but also on resources, public support and the political survival of leaders. When neither side can achieve its objectives outright, the possibility of a settlement becomes increasingly important. The implication is not that negotiation will always succeed, but that wars ultimately confront political limits that military power alone cannot overcome.

That is a useful corrective to a political culture in which strength is increasingly measured through weapons, spending and readiness. Security requires the capacity to defend against aggression, but it also requires channels of communication, arms-control agreements and diplomatic relationships that reduce the risks of miscalculation. These mechanisms do not eliminate conflict. They can help prevent disputes from becoming catastrophic.

The distinction between deterrence and peacebuilding is crucial here. Preventing an attack is not the same as creating the conditions for lasting peace. A nuclear deterrent may be intended to discourage a particular form of aggression, but it cannot resolve territorial disputes, rebuild diplomatic relationships or establish the limits necessary to manage military competition. Nor would unilateral disarmament automatically accomplish those things.

The international movement behind the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons represents an attempt to challenge the assumption that nuclear weapons must remain a permanent feature of international security. As of October 2026, 75 states are parties to the treaty, which prohibits its members from developing, possessing or using nuclear weapons. The nuclear-armed states have not joined, limiting its immediate reach. Nevertheless, its existence demonstrates that the international community is not unanimous in accepting nuclear deterrence as the only credible foundation for security.

For Scotland, this opens a question larger than whether Trident should remain on the Clyde. Britain maintains a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent, but the Trident missile system depends on American technology and a leased stock of missiles, while the UK retains its own warheads and operational responsibility. This is a close strategic partnership, not a simple arrangement in which Washington controls every British nuclear decision. Yet it raises legitimate questions about dependence, sovereignty and the relationship between Britain’s nuclear ambitions and its actual security needs.

An independent Scotland could choose a different role in international affairs: one that combines conventional defence and cooperation with European partners with a stronger commitment to nuclear disarmament. The current suggestion of a Celtic peace alliance offers a possible starting point. Scotland, Wales and Ireland have different constitutional positions and security arrangements, and shared opposition to nuclear weapons would not automatically make them a coherent geopolitical bloc. But cooperation on arms control, disarmament and conflict prevention could give that idea substance.

Such a role would require more than removing nuclear weapons from Scottish territory. It would mean investing in diplomacy, supporting international agreements and developing a credible approach to the practical defence of Scotland. It would also require acknowledging that peace cannot be secured by good intentions alone. A peace-promoting foreign policy must be capable of confronting aggression without accepting permanent escalation as inevitable.

The choice is not between preparing for war and pretending war cannot happen. It is between treating military preparedness as the entirety of security and recognising that preventing conflict is also a strategic responsibility.

Nuclear weapons may be defended as instruments of peace, but that claim deserves the same scrutiny as any other defence policy. If our security depends on the permanent threat of catastrophic retaliation, we should ask what happens when deterrence fails, when leaders miscalculate or when a crisis escapes their control. And we should ask whether sufficient political effort is being devoted to reducing those risks in the first place.

Preparing for war may sometimes be necessary. But preparation is not prevention, and the capacity to destroy an adversary is not the same as the capacity to build a more secure world. If Scotland is to have a meaningful debate about Trident, it must be about more than whether nuclear weapons are necessary. It must also be about what kind of security we want, what risks we are willing to accept, and whether we are prepared to invest as seriously in preventing catastrophe as we are in preparing for it.

October 21, 2026 Posted by | weapons and war | Leave a comment

Worried About Russian Meddling In UK Politics? Wait Till You See What Israel Is Up To

Burnham’s exclusive focus on Russian influence almost laughably beside the point. This furious finger-pointing at the Kremlin is designed with one purpose in mind only: to distract the British public from where the real external meddling in our politics is coming from.

October 16, 2026, Jonathan Cook Substack

Andy Burnham’s government is rolling out a new “Centre for Information Defence”. But the outside actors most aggressively undermining what little remains of British democracy are nowhere in its sights

Russia “interfered” in the 2016 Brexit vote by running some “anti-EU” articles on its RT channel and promoting a few internet trolls. Even MI5 has to admit that this activity had no tangible impact on the referendum campaign.

No matter. British prime minister Andy Burnham has once again revived the incendiary claim that Russian disinformation is an especial threat to British democracy. At the United Nations a few weeks ago he announced plans for a National Centre for Information Defence “to detect, attribute and disrupt these kinds of hostile state information attacks”.

For the new British prime minister, as for his predecessors, this is all about Moscow and the UK’s favourite bogeyman, Vladimir Putin. At the UN, Burnham promised British expertise to other European nations to protect them from Kremlin disinformation.

Meanwhile, evidence continues to mount that another foreign actor is meddling even more aggressively in British politics – and neither Burnham nor MI5 have a word to say about it.

Any evidence of Russia disinformation-peddling in the UK pales in comparison to Israeli influence operations – and that’s just the ones we know about. The head of MI5, Ken McCallum, noted that Russian disinformation was neither sophisticated nor successful. The same cannot be said for Israel’s handiwork.

Israel has been using “hasbara” trolls on social media platforms to manipulate public debates in Britain for years – the thrust of the accusation against Russia. But in Israel’s case, it goes much further than that.

This year the Israeli state massively increased its public diplomacy budget to $730 million to expand its influence operations. That includes flying even more politicians, clergy, academics and influencers to bombard them with pro-Israel propaganda they are then likely to spread back home. According to foreign minister Gideon Saar, Israeli advocacy should be treated “like investing in jets, bombs, and missile interceptors”.

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There was already plenty of evidence through the late 2010s, as I reported at the time, that Israel was helping to organise, stoke and amplify a campaign to smear its arch-critic, Jeremy Corbyn, as an antisemite, in order to prevent him from reaching No 10 Downing Street.

Not least, Israel did so by advancing a new, bogus definition of Jew hatred through the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). Usefully, for Israel, that definition largely ignores hatred of Jews to focus instead on criticism of Israel.

That was the most blatant meddling possible in what remains of Britain’s democratic processes. UK politicians and media not only failed to oppose it, but actively sought to amplify the smears.

Civil war

This week the fanatically pro-Israel US lobby group the Anti-Defamation League revealed that it had been working with leading AI firms, which are increasingly being integrated into social media platforms, to suppress what it calls “antisemitism” – or what the rest of us would refer to as criticism of Israel.

CEO Jonathan Greenblatt observed: “We’ve had excellent collaboration with Silicon Valley.” The platforms, he said, would tackle content the ADL doesn’t like “right in the source code” – that is, before users can see it.

That is likely not only to remove criticism of Israeli atrocities and criticism of western governments, such as the UK’s, for colluding in Israel’s genocide but turn social media into a playground for bots and Israel apologists, giving them free reign to spread their propaganda without challenge.

We also know, thanks to the work of the French security services – maybe MI5 was too busy chasing Russian bots to notice – that an Israeli cyber agency called Blackcore targeted the SNP in May’s Scottish elections, as well as meddling in elections in France and New York.

Israeli tech firms, especially those dealing in spyware, intelligence and influence operations, are typically closely aligned with the Israeli state and its military. Most of the founders of tech start-ups are alumnae of the Israeli army’s 8200 intelligence unit.

Alongside the SNP, New York mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani and a leftwing French party headed by Jean-Luc Melenchon were targeted. Why? Because, unlike their political rivals, all had dared to speak out against Israel’s genocide in Gaza

With echoes of what happened to Corbyn, Blackcore’s campaigns were designed to smear candidates. In the case of the French elections, fake accounts were created to accuse one candidate of rape and another of paedophilia.

A new documentary, NAZA, shows how Israel has paved the way in using AI in pioneering new ways to kill on a mass scale in Gaza. It selected banks of targets for assassination, often by murdering those “suspects” when they are in family compounds, slaughtering large numbers of bystanders in the process.

It is therefore hardly surprising that tech firms in Israel have been caught using AI in similarly innovative and indiscriminate ways online, to target western publics with disinformation.

In the summer it emerged that the Israeli government had created a website for a fake “scholarly” think-tank. In a short period of time, it produced prodigious quantities of AI-generated content on Israel, optimised for common search terms, that promoted Israeli talking points and constantly suggested criticism of Israel risked fuelling antisemitism.

It was set up not only to influence internet chatbots into echoing its pro-Israel disinformation but also to integrate its content into what experts call the “underlying training data”: that is, the unquestioned assumptions on which chatbots operate.

Back in May 2024 Meta identified fake Israel-based accounts, “posing as Jewish students, African Americans and other concerned citizens”, peddling pro-Israel content in the US and Canada in support of Israel’s slaughter of Palestinians in Gaza.

Two months ago, Meta again found the same kind of dirty tricks emanating from Israel, this time targeting Britain, France and Australia among other countries. The AI-generated accounts posed “as local, civically-engaged brands, news sources, religious organizations, and political activists”.

Notably in the case of the UK and France, the influence campaigns were designed to stoke “anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim” sentiment. Israel has been critically involved in advancing Islamophobic content, fuelling fears of a supposed “Muslim takeover” of Europe to mobilise support for Israel as a bulwark in the Middle East against Islam, and thereby encourage sympathy for its genocidal attacks on Gaza.

As a consequence, the political landscape in Britain has been disfigured. Support for the far-right has been artificially inflated, polarising British society. The path is being paved towards deeper authoritarianism and the possibility of civil war.

Death knell

None of these dire outcomes, the death knell for what little remains of British democracy, is attracting even the mildest interest from the Burnham government or MI5. Instead, they are chasing what so far appears to have been far more marginal Russian output.

But it isn’t just the influence of Israel we should be worried about. The problem runs much deeper, with a host of other noxious outside actors trying to warp and disfigure British politics in ways that closely accord with Israel’s malign intent. Burnham’s Centre for Information Defence will do precisely nothing to tackle any of it.

Here are two other powerful external actors aligned with Israel in distorting British politics.

The billionaire class, a transnational elite that has no loyalty to Britain, interfere in our politics by making our political parties dependent on their donations. They use their money to buy influence with the main parties – which is why for decades it has made little difference whether we vote for the Conservatives or Labour. We get austerity either way, while the billionaires get permission for their forever wars, directing public wealth away from public services into the arms industries and resource grabs.

Jeremy Corbyn tried to break with this model by funding Labour with small donations from ordinary people instead of the billionaires. As a result, he was destroyed by a confected campaign run by the billionaires, in association with Israel and its trolls, to smear him as an antisemite.

Sir Keir Starmer, Corbyn’s successor, went right back to begging for money from Big Business, got the billionaires behind him, and rolled on with the austerity programme.

Is Nigel Farage’s Reform different? Of course, not. Even before reaching power, he’s dependent on crypto-billionaires living in Thailand and Hong Kong.

Meanwhile, the sometime US trillionaire Elon Musk is busy rallying Britain’s new blackshirts, led by serial fraudster Tommy Robinson, to chase after a few “illegal” migrants rather than identifying the real criminals tearing apart Britain: the super-rich like Musk.

The billionaires both wield and conceal their influence through their ownership of the corporate media. They use the media to aggressively promote their own causes – political and economic policies ensuring their further enrichment – by normalising the extreme ideology of neoliberal capitalism, with its promotion of endless resource extraction through forever wars and the fuelling of needless consumption.

The consequence is the destruction of the conditions for human life on the planet. The billionaires hope they can ride out the catastrophe in their bunkers, or cryogenically freeze their bodies until a point in the future when they can be uploaded to the cloud.

One of the media’s most important jobs is to use smear campaigns to destroy anyone, such as Corbyn and now Zack Polanski, who threatens the billionaires’ privileged position by offering a mildly socialist programme of wealth redistribution..

Vassal state

If the UK media wasn’t entirely captured by the billionaire class – serving as its PR division – then we might know more about the role of the United States in meddling in our politics.

The recent claims of a supposed “terrorist plot” outside RAF Fairford – really a US airforce base pretending to be a British base and one from which the US has waged an illegal war of aggression against Iran – should have reminded us that the Pentagon is largely in charge of UK foreign policy.

The US has some 15 major military bases on British soil, plus half a dozen smaller intelligence sites. As the rightwing US podcaster Tucker Carlson recently observed, the fact that Britain has foreign troops crawling all over it makes us little more than an occupied “vassal state”.

The US recently announced a $4 billion upgrade of its UK bases, including establishing storage sites for its nuclear arsenal. The plan caused barely a ripple of interest among British politicians or the media .

Although our political and media class pretend the UK is an equal partner in a western defence alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the reality is very different. Nato takes its orders from the US, doing Washington’s bidding. That’s why Nato has been pivoting towards America’s biggest economic rival, China, which is, of course, nowhere near the North Atlantic.

When the US snaps its fingers, Britain stands to attention and hikes its spending on the war industries. Along with European governments, the UK is willing to drain its national coffers and scythe through public spending with yet more austerity cuts to support Washington’s military agenda for “full-spectrum global dominance”.

Hidden influence

Much of the US influence on British politics is carefully concealed from view, operating behind closed doors.

In the early 2010s, the US was desperately seeking a pretext to extradite Julian Assange from the UK and lock him up in a super-max jail, hiding him out of sight after his organisation Wikileaks revealed US and British war crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was during this period that Starmer, as the director of public prosecutions, repeatedly jetted off to Washington for secret meetings with US officials.

We will never know what was discussed. Freedom of information requests discovered that his own officials destroyed all records of those meetings.

Once he became a politician, Starmer was recruited to the shadowy Trilateral Commission, originally founded in the 1970s by officials in Jimmy Carter’s administration to deal with the supposed problem of “an excess of democracy” in the US. The commission’s view was that voters were becoming dangerously less passive, at that time over the Vietnam war, and ways needed to be found to return them to docility.

A similar British-American Project cements ties between rising stars in British politics, business and journalism and Washington elites. The power imbalance between the two sides ensures up-and-coming British leaders are readily groomed into an Atlanticist worldview in which the UK is very much the junior partner.

There are a plethora of other “respected’ think-tanks and organisations whose chief role is to embed US policy ideas, especially those relating to foreign policy, in the thinking of British elites. They include the Bilderberg Group, Chatham House, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Atlantic Council, The British-American Parliamentary Group, and BritishAmerican Business.

The US uses its financial muscle through these organisations and many others to manufacture consent for its extreme neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies. The latest example are massive grants to organisations willing to export Trump’s MAGA ideology to the UK, masquerading as a “public education” initiative.

There is plenty of evidence to show that it was pressure from the Trump administration that led to the unprecedented decision by Starmer’s government to proscribe a civil disobedience group, Palestine Action, for the first time in Britain’s history as a terrorist organisation.

Palestine Action had incensed Israel by targeting its weapons factories on UK soil, highlighting another aspect of British collusion in the Gaza genocide, and had infuriated Trump personally by spraying one of his golf courses in Scotland with the words “Gaza is not 4 sale”.

In truth, the ways that the US meddles directly in British politics are so numerous it is virtually impossible to quantify them. Britain is little more than a colony of the US, receiving diktats on important foreign policy issues – especially regarding US and Israeli interests – that the UK is invariably too frightened to oppose.

Burnham is already rolling over to reverse the UK’s decision to honour a ruling from the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals that Britain has no claim to sovereignty over the Chagos Islands and must return them to Mauritius. The UK has faced a temper tantrum from Trump on the matter because the US operates an illegal military base on one of the islands.

Disobedience by the UK is the exception, not the rule. Which makes Burnham’s exclusive focus on Russian influence almost laughably beside the point. This furious finger-pointing at the Kremlin is designed with one purpose in mind only: to distract the British public from where the real external meddling in our politics is coming from.

October 21, 2026 Posted by | Israel, politics, UK | Leave a comment

Why Boris Johnson Must Answer for Ukraine’s Destruction — and Why the Public Should Decide on Future Ukraine Aid

A conversation with Mary Dejevsky and Commodore RN (Ret’d) Steve Jermy

Ian Proud, Oct 15, 2026, https://thepeacemonger.substack.com/p/why-boris-johnson-must-answer-for?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=3221990&post_id=220504822&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

In this wide-ranging discussion, I am joined by two of Britain’s most experienced and independent voices on the Ukraine war and European security: Mary Dejevsky, former Moscow correspondent for The Times and long-time foreign affairs commentator, and Commodore Steve Jermy RN (Rtd), a decorated naval officer with combat experience dating back to the Falklands War and the author of Strategy for Action.

Prompted by Mary’s powerful Substack essay J’Accuse – Boris Johnson, we examine Boris Johnson’s role in the early phase of the war, the collapse of the April 2022 Istanbul talks, the broader strategic failures of Western policy, the gap between political narrative and military reality, and what a realistic security architecture for Europe might look like once the fighting ends. We also discuss Steve’s support for a petition calling for a pause in UK military aid and a proper public debate (and possible referendum) on Britain’s involvement.

In this conversation we discuss:
– Mary Dejevsky’s case for holding Boris Johnson to account after the war
– The Istanbul negotiations of April 2022 and why the draft agreement collapsed
– Johnson’s Churchillian framing of Zelensky and the early Western response
– Military analysis of Russia’s initial operation and the West’s strategic misjudgements
– The role of other key figures (Liz Truss, Ben Wallace, Tony Radakin)
– Why the West continues to rely on one-sided information and propaganda
– Russia’s actual security objectives versus the “restore the empire” narrative
– Neutrality for Ukraine and the case for reforming or replacing NATO
– A possible future European security architecture centred on the OSCE
– The petition to pause UK support and open a national debate on aid spending
– What a post-war reckoning in Britain might look like.

October 21, 2026 Posted by | UK, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

BRIEFING sent to all Cumberland Councillors Partners in Plan to Bring Failed Japanese Nuclear Reactors Sodium Coolant Process Plant to the Port of Workington

Conclusion The Sodium Coolant Process Plant at the Port of Workington would be an unprecedented and dangerous development, putting residents and primary school children in direct danger of both chemical and potential radiological hazards.

These hazards have not been explained to the public by the developers, which includes the regional planning authority, Cumberland Council, as an enthusiastic and facilitating ‘partner.

There has been a lack of clarity on issues

The following briefing has been shared with all Cumberland Councillors. Cumberland Council are partners in the scheme to bring sodium coolant from the Japanese failed Monju fast breeder nuclear reactors to Cumbria. The council has, we believe, not voted on this so the councillors are unwitting partners (much the same as Cumberland’s partnership with the nuclear dump plan).

For the original briefing with full links not reproduced here please contact: wastwater @ protonmail.com

BRIEFING: Failed Japanese Nuclear Reactors Sodium Coolant Process Plant for the Port of Workington?

by Radiation Free Lakeland 12th October, 2026

History

The Japanese Atomic Energy Agency is proposing to send sodium coolant from the failedMonju Fast Breeder Reactor to the Port of Workington in the UK for processing. A company in the UK has been set up to facilitate this.

ALKALI METAL PROCESSING LIMITED was incorporated at Companies House on 26 July, 2023 by Jacobs Clean Energy Ltd. (the name of this company was changed to Amentum Clean Energy Ltd. on 30 September, 2023) and Cavendish Nuclear.

According to the Director’s Report for the year ending 31 March, 2025: “The company’s sole purpose is to deliver a single contract to design, manufacture, construct, operate and decommission a Sodium Treatment Facility in the United Kingdom,” and,

“the entity, via Cavendish Nuclear Ltd., has beenawarded the next phase of work by the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) to support the decommissioning of the Monju Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR), in Fukui Prefecture, Japan. The next phase of work covers the construction, commissioning, and securing of regulatory permissions for a new facility in the UK which will treat the sodium coolant removed from the Japanese reactor.”

Democratic Deficit:

Cumberland Council Responsible for Regulatory Oversight while also Development Partner.

There has been no standard planning assessment, or democratic scrutiny of technical details, or vote by Cumberland Council to justify Leader Mark Fryer’s enthusiastic promotion of the plan to import and process Japanese nuclear and chemical waste to the Port of Workington.

“This is fantastic news for the port as this new development, subject to the necessary approvals, will bring good quality jobs to Workington and support the wider supply chain and local economy. We’re extending a warm welcome to our new partners and look forward to working with all those involved over the coming weeks and months.“ Cllr Mark Fryer, Leader of Cumberland Council

Meanwhile the developers, “Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum are grateful to Cumberland Council and the Port’s management team for their support in enabling our design and construction programme to move to the next phase. We are fully committed to adding real social value to West Cumbia and this new venture will contribute to the regeneration of the Port of Workington and support the local economy. ” Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum

The Monju Fast Breeder Reactor, Fire and Accidents.

The Monju Fast Breeder Reactor, in Fukui Prefecture, Japan, has had a history of safety failures, cover ups, and operational redundancy.

In 1995, just months after achieving criticality (power transmission), 640 kg of liquid sodium leaked from a cooling system, causing a fire so hot that it buckled steel girders. The reactor was shut down for 15 years, after the operator was found to have covered up the scale of the damage.

Monju was restarted in May 2010 after a public battle in the courts and a number of safety repairs. However, it never connected to the electrical grid.

“Operations were again suspended in August 2010 after a fuel handling machine was accidentally dropped in the reactor during a refuelling outage. The device was retrieved almost one year later.”

Alkali Metal Processing’s client, the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency, was declared in 2015, “not fit to operate the Monju Fast Breeder Reactor” by the Japanese Nuclear Regulation Authority, following failure to carry out regular inspections on almost 10,000 out of 39,000 pieces of equipment at the Monju.” Source: Nucnet Independent Nuclear News.“

Violently Reactive,” requiring “Chemically Resistant Bunds”and “Nuclear Licenced Zones”

The “Nature of business” is listed on Companies House by Alkali Metal Processing Ltd (AMP Ltd) as “Treatment and disposal of non-hazardous waste.”

While legal definitions of ‘hazardous’ and ‘non-hazardous’ waste are necessarily complex and prevaricated, a reasonable definition of ‘non-hazardous’ would be ‘that which does not constitute a direct threat to human and environmental health’

.The description of Alkali Metal Processing Ltd as “Treatment and disposal of non-hazardous waste” is very much at odds with the Technical Brief published by Geomechanics which states:

● Sodium coolant’s violent reaction with water and air drives stringent segregation of drainage, fire and ventilation systems.

● Port (of Workington) siting demands blast- and fire-resisting structures around offloading and treatment units to contain exothermic events.

● Marine berths and transfer lines must be designed to prevent any seawater ingress intosodium-bearing systems.

● Civil design will likely require chemically resistant bunds and sumps to capture and neutralise any sodium leaks.

● Construction phasing must separate conventional port works from nuclear-licensed zones with controlled access and radiological monitoring.

● Emergency planning will centre on sodium fire scenarios, with specialised extinguishing media and exclusion distances.

● Similar import-treatment concepts could be replicated at other UK ports, but only where nuclear licensing constraints are manageable.

Source: Technical Brief from Geomechanics July 28th 2026

Experience of Dounreay’s Sodium Coolant.

The UK has experience of decommissioning the Dounreay fast breeder reactors. The two Dounreay reactors were fast breeder types, similar to the Japanese Monju reactor, and also used alkali metal coolant. The Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR) shut down in 1977, while the larger Prototype Fast Reactor shut down in 1994.

Jason Casper, the reactors’ project director at Dounreay, has written at length about the hazardous nature of disposal of sodium coolant. In previous roles, he led clean-up projects in Idaho in the US, and has experience developing and implementing new technologies for sodium treatment, waste monitoring, and characterisation. He writes, at NS Energy that:

“Dealing with the nature of the coolant—commonly sodium or the sodium-potassium alloy NaK—is a major consideration and one of the most demanding and potentially hazardous aspects in decommissioning liquid metal-cooled reactors. Sodium metal reacts vigorously when exposed to water, releasing hydrogen and large quantities of heat, thereby providing not only an explosive gas mixture but also a source of ignition.

2Na + 2H2O = 2NaOH + H2+ Heat

NaK + 2H2O = NaOH + KOH + H2 + Heat

“The products of combustion are also toxic, and can cause severe caustic and thermal burns on coming into contact with skin, as well as being hazardous to ingest or inhale. Methods of destruction or disposal can range from a purpose-built sodium disposal plant (which essentially treats and neutralises the sodium to produce salt water) to high-temperature incineration, among others.

Around 130 m3 of hydrogen gas and 1100 MJ (30 kW) of heat is generated in the ten-hour process to destroy 160 kg of NaK”

Caustic soda production, however, is not a risk-free venture, especially near to residential areas.

A proposed housing development in Runcorn was cancelled over its proximity to a chemical plant producing caustic soda and chlorine.

The housing development masterplan for the Heath Park Development won two national awards, and the plans were approved by Halton Borough Council in May 2024. However, less than 1 km away, the Inovyn ChlorVinyls chemical plant posed a risk to the people who would live on the development that was too severe to ignore.

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) lodged an objection to the plans based on modelling scenarios such as chemical leaks and spills, and the potential impact on local residents. Information published following a site visit in 2023 warned that an accident at the INEOS Inovyn site may produce a toxic gas cloud or smoke plume, or a “drifting cloud of flammable gas” that “may ignite”

.The HSE report added: “Fires may generate smoke clouds which may lead to breathing difficulties and deposition of soot on property and vegetation.“

The HSE warned that the consequences of a major accident would be a “potential for burns to body” that would be “possibly life threatening”, and that gas could be “potentially fatal if inhaled.“

Despite the accolades for much-needed housing in Runcorn, the development was cancelled by the Secretary of State, Steve Reed, following a public inquiry held in 2025.

Inovyn ChlorVinyls Ltd claims: “Our operations at the Runcorn site are of strategic national importance to the UK and focus mainly on the production of chlorine, caustic soda and chlorinated derivatives” INEOS

The Dounreay experience of dealing with sodium coolant did not include the production of “usable caustic soda.”

While the Waste Hierarchy encourages re-use and recycling of industrial waste, the production of caustic soda represents an additional risk to the local area on top of the already discussed risks of managing sodium coolant.

The inference is that the ‘production of caustic soda’ is a fig leaf attempt to justify bringing Japanese chemical/nuclear all the way across the sea, from the failed Monju reactor, to Cumbria.

Radioactive Elements: High Level Waste and Low Level Waste. Press reports play down the presence of radioactive elements in the sodium coolant earmarked for delivery to Workington from Japan. However a 2020 ‘White Paper:

Disposition Options for Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors’ from Idaho National Laboratory states:

“The sodium wastes from Sodium Fast Reactor operations will be in two forms, the bulk sodium from the primary and secondary coolant loops and the residual sodium on Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), piping, and other such components. Sodium bearing wastes not considered SNF or High Level Waste will require disposition at Low Level Waste disposal sites. These wastes will also require chemical deactivation or physical removal prior to disposal. The bulk sodium coolant can often be decontaminated and reused.

The wastes from this decontamination will require storage until disposal either as High Level Waste or Low Level Waste.

The (EBR-II) bulk sodium measured a final concentration of cesium within the primary coolant of approximately 370 Bq/g of cesium before it was decommissioned (Newton et al. 2002). The contamination can be remediated with a suitable cesium trap system. The traps act as a filter for the sodium passing through it, trapping the cesium. Successive traps are installed until acceptable levels of cesium are achieved. The cesium traps will require shielding and storage and eventual disposition either as LLW or Greater Than Class C depending on the activity limits. The bulk sodium can then be drained and converted into anhydrous sodium hydroxide, which is a solid form that can be stored indrums.”

Close Proximity of Sodium Coolant Chemical/Nuclear Plant to Schools and Residential Areas.

The Port of Workington is surrounded by schools and residential areas. Northside Primary School for example, is less than 1 km from the proposed chemical/nuclear process plant

As described above, at Runcorn a housing development was turned down last year following a public inquiry as the residential area would have been just over 1 km away from the INEOS caustic soda and chlorine plant. The refusal, citing safety concerns, was without the additional concern of radioactivity.

As well as being close to schools and residential areas the proposed nuclear waste/chemical plant would be around 1km from “Siddick Ponds … a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), Local Nature Reserve and one of Cumbria’s most important bird sites. ”

Questions remain

Democratic Deficit

The proposal to import Japanese sodium coolant from the failed Monju reactor is being presented to the public as a fait accompli. The regional regulatory planning authority, Cumberland Council is acting as a promotional and facilitating arm of the nuclear industry rather than as an independent local authority responsible for planning oversight. We urge both Parish and Cumberland councillors to question this “partnership” with the developers.

How can Cumberland be both “partner” and planning authority especially on such a controversial, dangerous and largely experimental development?

Questions both here and in Japan

The lack of detailed information from the developers and their partner Cumberland Council has led to questions being asked in Japan by civic society groups of the JAEA and the Office for Nuclear Regulation.

These questions include:

● Media reports and the website of the receiving company state that the receiving plant does not handle radioactive materials. How, then, will the primary system sodium be handled?

Cavendish/Amentum JV win Monju D&D contract:

“Alkali Metal Processing Ltd., a joint venture between Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum, will construct, commission, and secure regulatory permissions for a new facility in the U.K. to treat nonradiological sodium coolant removed from the reactor. The sodium coolant is to be converted into sodium hydroxide for general industrial reuse.”

Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum awarded next phase of contract to support Japan’s Monju reactor decommissioning:

“The material, which presents no radiological hazards, will be safely converted into sodium hydroxide for general industrial reuse.”

And in many ways, a more pressing question, is:

● Given the supposed radiation-free nature of the sodium coolant, why is it being transported allthe way to the UK for processing?

In the UK, Radiation Free Lakeland asked the Office of Nuclear Regulation to detail the volume of sodium being transported; its chemical content; and its radiological content.

In reply, the ONR explained: “we understand that the Port of Workington will handle secondary sodium coolant, which is not radioactive and therefore not in scope of ONR’s purposes.”

However, according to Geomechanics July 28th 2026 Technical Brief, which discusses these exact proposals for the Port of Workington: “Construction phasing must separate conventional port works from nuclear-licensed zones with controlled access and radiological monitoring.”

The only reason for a nuclear-licensed zone is the presence of radioactive materials.

Radiation Free Lakeland have asked the Japanese Atomic Energy Authority the following questions:

●“Why is the sodium coolant proposed to be shipped to the UK when the companies involved are already working with their client, JAEA in Japan at the Monju?

●We would like to know:

a) the quantity of sodium coolant proposed to be imported.

b) details of the chemical content of the sodium coolant proposed to be imported

c) details of the radiological content of the sodium coolant proposed to be imported.

Conclusion

The Sodium Coolant Process Plant at the Port of Workington would be an unprecedented and dangerous development, putting residents and primary school children in direct danger of both chemical and potential radiological hazards.

These hazards have not been explained to the public by the developers, which includes the regional planning authority, Cumberland Council, as an enthusiastic and facilitating ‘partner.

There has been a lack of clarity on issues such as:

● Whether or not the sodium coolant will have radiological content

● Why the development needs to be a nuclear-licensed zone if it does not (as claimed) have radiological content.

● Why the coolant needs to be processed in the UK when the companies involved are already working with JAEA in Japan.

● Why the processing must turn one difficult-to-handle product (sodium coolant) into another which is potentially harmful in the event of an accident (caustic soda), given its proximity to residential areas.

● How a caustic soda plant can be considered safe to develop within 1 km of primary schools and residential areas in Workington when previously such areas have been prevented from development due to the presence of such a plant.

There is also a large question around the democratic processes in local government. Cumberland Council is the planning authority yet, without considering the safety aspects, has gone ahead to welcome the development without scrutiny or due process.

Briefing prepared by Radiation Free Lakeland

October 21, 2026 Posted by | safety, UK | Leave a comment

NASA wants to put a nuclear reactor on the Moon. This US scientist says it could be a very bad idea

Theoretical astrophysicist Dr Ethan Siegel weighs up the pros and cons of building a nuclear reactor on the Moon by 2030

Anita Chandran, Sky at Night Magazine, October 18, 2026

The concept of a lunar base seems straight out of science fiction, but after the recent success of Artemis, NASA is planning to send humans back to the Moon to establish a long-term presence there.

A lunar base would require sustainable power, which is no mean feat in such harsh conditions.

So NASA has proposed building a nuclear reactor on the lunar surface, with the ambitious aim of launching it by 2030.

But the speed of turnaround required and the difficulty of the project have left some scientists wondering about the underlying motivations for the project, as well as questions of feasibility.

We sat down with Dr Ethan R Siegel, astrophysicist and author of the award-winning blog Starts with a Bang, to discuss the practicalities of a nuclear base on the Moon, and why astronomers might be right to remain sceptical.

Why would we want to put a nuclear reactor on the Moon?

On the Moon, we don’t have things like an atmosphere, and we don’t have things like combustion reactions that can easily occur with readily available resources. You need some way to generate power……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

There’s a risk of a failure on the Moon and creating a radiation hazard that would be there permanently on the lunar surface.

It’s not that you get to declare a keep-out zone – it’s that nuclear radiation tells everyone to keep out forever……………

There’s always a tension when you talk about whether the government should fund a project.

Does this project have merits? Will it benefit the nation? Will it lead to a positive return on investment? Will it further the nation’s and humanity’s interests?

On those metrics alone, you can make an argument that we should do this.

The danger is if this is used as an excuse to eliminate other programmes and put those resources towards this nuclear reactor programme instead.

I think these should be two separate issues. We should be looking at what kind of science NASA should invest in.

Then we should be looking at our ambitions for space exploration and a lunar nuclear reactor separately, on their own merits.

I think there is a danger of saying, “We’re just going to have a big buffet and this one project is going to come along and eat everybody’s lunch, like Pac-Man.”

We’ve been talking about one specific endeavour proposed by NASA.

If you look at what has happened to NASA over the past year and a half, it has lost more than 4,000 employees, almost all of them on the science side.

The latest presidential budget calls for a 47% cut to NASA science.

If you look at the full picture, you might fear that science will be cut to serve this new, ambitious project. The signs seem to point towards that being the game plan.

There is also a proposal for a new rule in the United States where scientific proposals will not be decided on the basis of peer review and merit.

They will instead be subject to political review. I think there is a very dangerous game being played – not just with NASA, but with the future of American science.

I would very much like the world to be aware of this existential problem. https://www.skyatnightmagazine.com/news/nasa-nuclear-reactor-on-the-moon-pros-cons

October 21, 2026 Posted by | Uncategorized | Leave a comment

EDF Aiming For 70-Month Construction Target For New EPR2 Nuclear Plants

Schedule would see huge reduction from much-delayed Flamanville-3 project

By Nigel Davies • 15 October 2026
French state utility and nuclear plant operator EDF says optimisation work
is continuing as it aims to meet a 70-month construction time for its new
generation of EPR2 nuclear power plants. In an update posted by French
nuclear society Sfen, EDF said it was still working on a number of key
projects to optimise the EPR2 construction schedule and make the target
possible. France’s most recent commercial reactor project, the
Flamanville-3 EPR, was hit by years of delays and cost overruns and took 17
years from the start of construction to operation.

Nucnet 15th Oct 2025,
https://www.nucnet.org/news/edf-aiming-for-70-month-construction-target-for-new-epr2-nuclear-plants-10-4-2026

October 21, 2026 Posted by | France, politics | Leave a comment

Russia’s Rosatom says truce in place for Zaporizhzhia power supply repairs.

Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom said a truce agreement
was in place as of Thursday to allow repairs at a thermal power station
supplying power to the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant
in southeastern Ukraine. It said the agreement was mediated ⁠by the
International Atomic Energy Agency.

Reuters 15th Oct 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-rosatom-says-truce-place-zaporizhzhia-power-supply-repairs-2026-10-15/

October 21, 2026 Posted by | safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

AWI secures up to £150k in nuclear sales after certification

A manufacturer has secured up to £150,000 in nuclear sector sales after
earning a new industry certification. Alloy Wire International (AWI), based
in Brierley Hill, announced the boost following its achievement of ISO
19443 accreditation, a global quality standard for the nuclear industry.
The company, on Narrowboat Way, has already used the certification to
secure up to £150,000 in new sales from customers supplying parts for
nuclear reactors, mini reactors, and decommissioning projects.

Stourbridge News 18th Oct 2026,
https://www.stourbridgenews.co.uk/news/26635132.awi-secures-150k-nuclear-sale

October 21, 2026 Posted by | Uncategorized | Leave a comment