ASIA « nuclear-news

Three years on, Fukushima’s fishers still deal with impact of treated water release

Japan Times, By Phoebe Amoroso, Aug 24, 2026

March 11 is a date of indescribable weight in Japan — one that conjures images of the devastating earthquake and resulting tsunami that killed nearly 20,000, displaced hundreds of thousands and caused catastrophic damage to the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.

But Aug. 24 has also become a date of significance for the Tohoku region and the rest of East Asia. On this day three years ago, power plant officials began releasing treated water into the Pacific Ocean — a move that, while necessary, is continuing to have an economic impact on the region’s seafood.

“There’s no single perfect method that will ensure understanding among the public (when it comes to the safety of Fukushima’s seafood),” says Tadaaki Sawada.

Sawada is deputy manager of the guidance section for the Fukushima Prefectural Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations (FS Gyoren). Even three years on, he laments the difficulty of eliminating the stigma attached to the northeastern coastal prefecture of Fukushima and its produce.

On the day Sawada spoke with The Japan Times, Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc. (Tepco) completed its 21st discharge of treated water currently held in storage tanks at the No. 1 nuclear plant. Three years into this process expected to take three decades in total, fears of reputational damage have not explicitly emerged within the domestic market, but other consequences have been profound: geopolitical tensions and an exposure of the vulnerabilities that underlie Japan’s fishing industry as a whole.

Difficult choices

Though the primary disasters of March 2011 are in the past, the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant is far from decommissioned.

Nuclear debris remains inside the damaged reactors and still produces heat, so water has to be circulated through the damaged reactors to keep them cool and eventually discarded. A method known as Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) can remove up to 62 radioactive compounds from this water to very low concentrations, but it can’t remove tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen. After ALPS and dilution with seawater, the concentration of tritium in the water reaches 1/40 of the maximum threshold mandated by government regulations.

With on-site water tanks nearing capacity, Tepco — backed by the Japanese government and the International Atomic Energy Agency — announced in 2021 that it would conduct periodic, controlled ocean discharges while monitoring the resulting tritium levels.

The decision provoked strong reactions, not least within Fukushima’s fishing industry. The government had promised fishermen that it wouldn’t release the water without the understanding of local communities, and the move was perceived by many as reneging on that commitment, provoking strong fears over further reputational damage.

But three years on, a strong consumer backlash within Japan has not materialized.

Takeshi Hamada, a professor of fisheries science at Sapporo’s Hokkai-Gakuen University, has studied the economic impact on Japan’s fishing industry. He argues that one key difference between domestic reaction in 2011 compared to the years that followed is related to media coverage.

“Following the Great East Japan Earthquake, most media outlets — including major ones — viewed government information with skepticism,” Hamada says via email. “However, during the ocean release of ALPS-treated water, there was relatively little coverage questioning its safety.”

Instead, criticism mostly emanated from somewhere far away from Japan’s northeastern coast: China.

On the day the first batch of ALPS-treated water was released, Beijing banned the import of all Japanese aquatic products (the ban was partially lifted in June 2025 before being reinstated that November after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments on Japan’s role in a hypothetical Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan).

The impact of the import ban on Japan’s fishing industry has been hard to quantify, but experts believe it has been significant. Compared to the year prior, Hamada calculates that Japanese seafood exports fell by about ¥75.8 billion (about $476 million) between September 2023 and August 2024. Analysis of the next 12 months found that exports had improved in some areas, but total seafood exports were still below the prerelease level.

For Fukushima, the exact costs cannot be isolated. Although it exported almost no seafood to China, export-bound Japanese seafood was redirected into the domestic market, weighing on prices. Based on shirasu (whitebait) prices, which were driven down by bumper catches elsewhere, Hamada estimates that average prices decreased by 8.2%.

The lack of clarity has a direct knock-on effect on compensation promised from Tepco as a condition of the water release. Fishers must demonstrate lower catch volume, catch value and sales value compared to pre-2011 to receive funds for the shortfall. Seafood processors, wholesalers and other retailers can also claim compensation by demonstrating reduced sales due to consumers or buyers avoiding their seafood products.

However, many of the costs remain hidden. In a November 2025 symposium held by the Tokyo Fisheries Promotion Foundation, Soichiro Kato, a lawyer representing affected businesses, said fishers were better placed to seek compensation because fishery federations could negotiate collectively, while many seafood processors without the same collective organizations in place had to deal with Tepco individually. He also criticized Tepco’s criteria as being too rigid and not capturing losses from reverse flow effects.

Fishing for solutions……………………………………………………………………..

Coastal landings are still subject to official radiation monitoring by Fukushima Prefecture, while FS Gyoren also conducts voluntary screening at fish markets to reassure buyers. After more than 100,000 inspections, the federation relaxed its system in April this year to cover fewer species and reduce screening from each landing or sales day to at least once a week. It hopes that this will speed up distribution and make the overall system more efficient, paving the way for expanded sales.

But each step back toward normalcy for Fukushima’s fisheries is a double-edged sword.

“When it comes to how wholesalers and distributors have reacted (to relaxed regulations), naturally, to be honest, no one directly criticizes us,” Sawada says. “But I think some people do have concerns internally. That may naturally result in transactions disappearing or decreasing. It does not appear openly, and it is difficult for us on the fisher and producer side to see.”…………………………………………………………………………….

Although Tepco has made progress toward reducing newly generated water, the discharges are set to continue for decades to come. However, FS Gyoren’s call for more support for Fukushima’s fishing industry is unchanged.

“We want to continue fishing in Fukushima Prefecture as a livelihood, not only in our generation but into our children’s and grandchildren’s generations,” says Sawada. “We want the government and Tepco to provide firm support for that.”
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/08/24/japan/fukushima-seafood-treated-water-three-years-impact/

September 1, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | business and costs, environment, Fukushima continuing | Leave a comment

Beyond China’s humanoid robots, a quieter machine revolution is unfolding

Laura Bicker, 25 Aug 26,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c62m4zn1q6mo

“I take a nap and the world changes,” says Chen Tianyu.

His world certainly does. The 28-year-old keeps up with the latest technology by spending his spare time in factories that are switching to automation. That way he knows what to prioritise when teaching his class about artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics.

In front of him, around 30 college students are studying code. One of them is typing furiously as his eyes dart from the screen to the robot: “The idea is it will grab that cylindrical piece and move it over there.”

A line of industrial robots are waiting to be programmed, and in another part of the classroom, students are trying to develop robotic medical instruments. As he guides them, Chen declares: “If you are not needed by the world of AI and robotics, then you’ll definitely be among those eliminated”.

For the people in this room, this is a step – or rather a leap – towards a future that China is meticulously building: Xi Jinping’s $20bn (£14.7bn) plan to put his country at the forefront of innovation and in direct competition with the US.

The evidence is all around them. They are in the Hangzhou Technician Institute, one of several huge, purpose-built vocational schools that want to churn out the next generation of tech-savvy engineers. The campus sits on the outskirts of Hangzhou, a former imperial capital whose futuristic skyline is just the first hint of its role as a global tech hub.

Across the country, there are more than two million robots working in China’s factories – which is more than anywhere else – and they are continuing to scale up at extraordinary speed.

It is a commitment that will surely change the world, much like the last time the Chinese economy underwent a massive transformation. It is already shipping its robots across the globe: more than half of the world’s industrial robots are now made in China.

What is less clear is the impact of such sweeping automation in a country that sits at the heart of global manufacturing, trade and innovation. What does this mean for China’s human workforce, for instance? And how would we be able to truly measure the cost of this transformation in a regime that controls information so tightly?

The future of China’s workers is uncertain in the industrial revolution the world has been watching: gleaming solar grids, peak hours made noiseless by electric vehicles, machines that run faster than Usain Bolt. Over the weekend, China hosted the second edition of the World Humanoid Games where robots boxed, sprinted and marched.

What is fuelling this spectacle is another, less visible revolution happening inside factories and classrooms.

The BBC has visited industrial sites where we have been shown robots that do not look human, or dance or leap on stage but weld, paint, lift, assemble and work around the clock without a break or benefits. Some are designed to build more robots. We have also been inside academies where China is training the people who will work alongside its robotic workforce.

This is a front-row seat to what Xi calls China’s “new productive forces” – and how they could reshape the country.

On a factory floor in the southern city of Chengdu, the old and and the new are working side by side.

An assembly line of around 30 middle-aged men and women is screwing, drilling and polishing CRP Technology’s signature product: a robotic arm which performs various industrial tasks. Also in the room are four young engineers crowded around a console, trying to crack the code for a prototype, a new robot that they hope will help build other robots.

One of them, 31-year-old Pang Kai, who is part of the research and development team, pushes the sleek skeleton across the room. Because China’s future workforce is not quite ready to strut out. For now, it can only do simple repetitive movements, such as scan a QR code.

“Maybe in another half year, it can do another task,” Pang says, smiling wistfully. It’s a long road and the team are celebrating every small win.

CRP Technology, which employs around 300 people, has been building robot arms for nine years. Each arm can be tailored to a factory’s needs to help build cars, electronics or wind turbines. The firm says a single arm can be programmed to perform more than 90% of repetitive tasks.

The engineers also wonder if, one day, they can replace the company’s workforce. “We want our new robot to be like human beings. We hope it can think by itself,” says Pang. “We need these kinds of robots because maybe in 10 years, we won’t have enough workers in China.”

A shrinking population and an ageing workforce is another reason Beijing is in a hurry to revolutionise its factories. By 2035, more than a third of China’s population will be over 60, according to official estimates. The country will also lose nearly 60 million people in the next decade – almost equivalent to the population of France – according to some estimates.

The hope is that increased automation will fill this looming gap in the workforce before it starts to affect an already sluggish economy. But the speed of the transition is key. Around 120 million people still work in the manufacturing sector. If China moves too quickly, job losses could follow dealing a catastrophic blow to millions who depend on factory wages.

“In theory, machines can work 24 hours a day, which is certainly an advantage compared with human workers. But machines also require maintenance. Every day we need time for that, and each month the production line also requires inspection and repair,” says Cao Li, vice-president of EV maker Leapmotor.

Increasingly popular in Europe and the UK, the company’s budget-friendly, tech-focused cars come together at the Hangzhou factory with robots aiding the process at every step. At the end of the assembly line, more humans emerge.

The company has more than 25,000 workers and hundreds of them make the final checks as the sparkling new vehicles roll past. Will there be a day when they are no longer needed?

“It’s entirely possible,” Cao says. “And it may come relatively quickly. In workshops, including stamping, welding, and painting, we’ve basically achieved 100% automation.”

China has the edge over the US due to its enormous manufacturing base. Motors, batteries, electronics, gears, sensors – everything needed to build the body of a robot is all at hand.

“China also has an idea. It has a plan. They know where they want to be in five years. They plan at a top level, but they break it down to the regions, to the municipalities,” says Dr Susanne Bieller, General Secretary of the International Federation of Robotics.

“If you want to build a robot in Shenzhen – there’s an entire ecosystem. It takes you less than one hour to source the components you need to make a robot. In Europe it can take you up to a week.”

However, she acknowledges that while China is good at building the body, the US is still leading at building the “brain”, which includes developing the AI to programme robots. And yet Chinese firms, from DeepSeek to Moonshot, have been unveiling new AI models that they say can compete with top US firms.

Driven by an “open-source” approach, where AI start-ups share their code, Chinese innovation has been able to catch up faster than expected, despite US export controls over critical advanced chips. Analysts now believe that the next leg of this race will be determined not by who has the best language model, but who can put this intelligence into millions of machines.

And that is why China is also investing in producing a generation of students learning to imagine what could come next.

At the Hangzhou Technician Institute, for example, children can start from the age of 15. And the scale of what is being taught can feel staggering. There is an entire building dedicated to engines and aeronautics, and a restricted floor for students who will work to keep China at the forefront of processing rare earths – another crucial commodity in the battle with Washington.

Some see this as a solution to China’s stubbornly high youth unemployment rate, with one in five struggling to find a job. “Our students are in demand and can even be pre-booked by companies. They don’t need to worry about employment at all, and we hold competitions as part of their training,” Chen, the young teacher, says.

“It’s better to find your position within the technological wave. In the process of progress, structural changes are bound to occur, and these structural changes are exactly where students’ future employment opportunities lie.”

But China still faces serious economic challenges, from a property crisis that continues to drag on to huge local government debt and persistently low consumption.

August 30, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | China, technology | Leave a comment

Fukushima nuclear wastewater discharge marks three years amid concerns

In a statement issued on Sunday, Masanobu Sakamoto, head of the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations (JF Zengyoren), said the group’s position has not changed, stressing that it remains opposed to discharging wastewater without the understanding of fishermen and the public.

24-Aug-2026, CGTN

It has now been three years since the Japanese government began to discharge contaminated wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station into the Pacific Ocean despite strong opposition and concerns at home and abroad.

Japan unilaterally launched the ocean discharge of nuclear-contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi plant on August 24, 2023. Since then, Japan has conducted 22 rounds of ocean discharge, releasing around 173,000 tonnes of wastewater containing tritium, a radioactive substance that purification equipment cannot remove, according to Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO).

The latest round, held from July 30 to August 17, involved discharging nearly 8,000 tonnes of wastewater.

Over the past three years, TEPCO has paid a total of 96.7 billion yen (roughly $600 million) in compensation for about 1,100 claims as of August 5, including claims related to losses suffered by fishermen and businesses that have had to temporarily suspend or scale back their fishing activities due to the discharge plan.

According to The Japan News by The Yomiuri Shimbun, people in the fishing industry said most of the compensation claims were filed by those outside Fukushima Prefecture, as fishermen in Fukushima receive separate compensation for temporarily suspending their operations.

Despite the compensation, opposition to the controversial operation and worries about local fisheries’ development remain.

Sakamoto noted that some countries and regions continue to impose restrictions on imports of Japanese seafood, while products such as sea cucumbers have been affected by falling prices.

“The markets that have been lost have yet to fully recover, and there are concerns over whether they can be recovered at all,” Sakamoto said, underscoring the serious challenges facing the fishing industry.

He also said government support measures were “insufficient for fishermen.”

According to The Japan News by The Yomiuri Shimbun, abalones from Iwate Prefecture had an average wholesale price of about 120,000 to 140,000 yen per 10 kilograms before the treated water discharge began. However, prices have remained low due to the suspension of exports. In 2025, the price fell as low as 60,000 yen per 10 kilograms.

To ensure food safety, fisheries cooperative associations in Fukushima Prefecture have set their own limit of 50 becquerels of radioactive cesium per kilogram for shipping marine products, stricter than the Japanese government’s standard of 100 becquerels per kilogram, according to the report.

Local fishermen remain committed to ensuring the safety of their products based on scientific standards and rebuilding consumer trust, The Japan News by The Yomiuri Shimbun reported, citing the Soma Futaba Fisheries Cooperative Association.

August 29, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Fukushima continuing, wastes | Leave a comment

Japan to Reuse Fukushima Soil in Regional Cities

Tokyo, Aug. 25 (Jiji Press)
https://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng?g=eco&k=2026082500738 —

The Japanese government decided Tuesday to begin the reuse of soil generated from decontamination work following the 2011 accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc.’s Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant in regional cities.

At a meeting at the prime minister’s office in Tokyo, the government decided to begin the soil reuse program at an early date for flowerbeds at buildings in Sendai in Miyagi Prefecture, northeastern Japan, and the city of Saitama, north of Tokyo, where central government branch offices are located.

It will be the first time for the soil from decontamination work to be used outside Tokyo, except for its use in demonstration projects in Fukushima Prefecture, home to the TEPCO plant, which suffered a triple meltdown following the massive earthquake and tsunami that mainly struck northeastern Japan in March 2011.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara said at the meeting that the reuse of soil from decontamination work will be key to achieving the government’s goal of completing the final disposal of the soil outside Fukushima by March 2045.
Kihara urged attendees to expand the reuse of the soil to regional branch offices in other cities and strengthen public communication about its safety.

August 28, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Japan, wastes | Leave a comment

South Korea helps Egypt expand Russian-built nuclear plant

South Korea’s growing role in Egypt’s Russian-built El Dabaa nuclear plant has helped shield the project from sanctions and enabled expansion

The New Arab Staff, 22 August, 2026

South Korea’s growing role in Egypt’s Russian-built El Dabaa nuclear power plant has helped Cairo shield the project from Western sanctions and paved the way for a major expansion of the site, according to senior Egyptian energy officials.

Electricity and Renewable Energy Minister Mahmoud Esmat said in televised remarks that Egypt was studying the addition of at least two more nuclear units at El Dabaa, with the possibility of eventually expanding the complex from four reactors to six or even eight.

Senior sources at Egypt’s Ministry of Electricity and Energy told The New Arab that the proposed expansion reflected “a state of confidence” surrounding the project following South Korea’s entry as a partner alongside Russia’s Rosatom.

They said South Korean involvement had enabled Egypt to gain access to Western-linked technology while limiting the exposure of companies working on El Dabaa to US and European sanctions imposed on Russian firms following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

According to the sources, the South Korean government is expected to provide financial and technical support for future expansions of El Dabaa, alongside its existing role in completing control systems and turbine-related work.

The arrangement has allowed Russia to retain control of the project’s nuclear core while South Korean companies handle major elements of its conventional power-generation infrastructure.

The sources said South Korea had taken on work that US company General Electric did not proceed with following the outbreak of the Ukraine war.

Egypt currently plans four Russian-designed VVER-1200 reactors at El Dabaa, with a total capacity of 4.8 gigawatts.

The proposed expansion could eventually increase capacity to 9.6 gigawatts by 2040, according to the sources.

Nuclear energy experts said Esmat’s remarks “open the door to transforming El Dabaa from a four-unit plant into a larger nuclear complex”.

No cost estimate, reactor models or timetable have yet been announced for the additional units.

However, the experts said Cairo increasingly views El Dabaa as “the nucleus of a long-term nuclear programme, rather than a standalone project that ends with the operation of four reactors”.

South Korea’s involvement in the project expanded rapidly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine complicated Western-linked supply chains.

Experts at Egypt’s Nuclear Energy Authority told The New Arab that Russian nuclear energy company Rosatom accelerated moves to bring Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power into El Dabaa as the key supplier for the turbine island and associated control systems for the four Russian units.

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power signed a $2.25 billion contract with Russia’s Atomstroyexport in Cairo on 25 August 2022, months after the outbreak of the war and the introduction of Western sanctions…………………………………………………
https://www.newarab.com/news/south-korea-helps-egypt-expand-russian-built-nuclear-plant

August 25, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | business and costs, Egypt, South Korea | Leave a comment

Tepco begins removal of radioactive spent fuel from Fukushima No. 2 reactor

Japan Times 18th Aug 2026,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/08/18/japan/tepco-fuel-removal/

Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings said Monday it has started removing spent nuclear fuel emitting high-level radiation from the pool of the No. 2 reactor at its disaster-stricken Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.

Last month, the company removed 28 unused nuclear fuel assemblies, which have a relatively lower risk, from the same reactor. Tepco hopes to complete the removal of spent fuel by the end of fiscal 2028.

Tepco has already finished removing seven of the 587 spent fuel assemblies from the No. 2 reactor. Removed fuel assemblies are transferred to a safer common storage pool at the nuclear plant in Fukushima Prefecture.

The fuel removal will be suspended from October due to checks on the facility and to secure space in the common pool.

Work related to the transfer of spent fuel started in June. Spent fuel assemblies are put into a container called a cask inside the reactor pool using a remote-controlled crane. Once a cask is filled, it is lifted up from the pool and then down to a trailer outside the reactor building, and the assemblies are moved to the common pool.

Tepco has completed fuel removal from the No. 3 and No. 4 reactors at the nuclear power station, which was heavily damaged in the March 2011 powerful earthquake and tsunami.

Fuel removal is slated to start in fiscal 2027 or fiscal 2028 at the No. 1 reactor, where work to remove debris is still being carried out.

August 23, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Fukushima continuing, wastes | 1 Comment

China Sounds Nuclear Alarm Over Japan’s 44-Tonne Plutonium Stockpile.

WION 20 Aug 26

August 23, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Japan, weapons and war | Leave a comment

We Talk: Japanese residents warn against ‘nuclear sharing’

Global Stringer, 14 Aug 26, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2026-08-14/We-Talk-Japanese-residents-warn-against-nuclear-sharing–1PB6c6oYkp2/p.html

August 15 marks 81 years since Japan announced its surrender in World War II.

Since taking office in October last year, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government has pushed to revise Japan’s three national security documents and has repeatedly called for a review of the “no introduction” clause of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. The moves have sparked concern in Japan and abroad over the future direction of the country’s nuclear policy.

A poll released by the Japan Association for Public Opinion Research on August 1 found that 76% of respondents support maintaining the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons.

A CGTN stringer in Tokyo spoke with local residents about the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the concept of nuclear sharing, and the possibility of Japan allowing the United States to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory.

One interviewee, Hikaru Kusano, said Japan should never engage in nuclear sharing, warning that it would pose a threat to other countries. Another respondent, Masahiro Sawa, argued that nuclear weapons can never guarantee security and that a world free of nuclear weapons may be the best path forward.

August 18, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Japan, politics | Leave a comment

‘U.S. Out of Korea’

August 15, 2026, by Bruce K. Gagnon https://space4peace.blogspot.com/2026/08/us-out-of-korea.html

Currently in South Korea national protest actions are being held at U.S. bases around the country as part of ‘U.S. Out of Korea’ campaign being organized by a vast coalition of peace groups.

The numbers vary but it is believed that between 48,000-60,000 US military personnel and their families now live on Camp Humphreys. (When regular war games are held the numbers rise.) This would make Camp Humphreys the largest U.S. base outside of the continental United States.

Much of the base expansion was due to the closing of the Yongsan U.S. Army base in downtown Seoul. That base had become a toxic mess and since closing it is still partially unavailable for new usage due to the U.S. essentially refusing to clean-up the damages. They have left it to the ROK (Republic of Korea) government to deal with. That is after the U.S. forced the South Korean government to pay about 90% of the costs to relocate Yongsan to Camp Humphreys.

Of course one reason for the move was the toxic mess at Yongsan. But other reasons I have heard was to move the base about 90 minutes to the south thus making it more difficult for North Korea to hit the base in any war. Plus the ROK government didn’t like having Seoul as a prime target.

In 2015 I had the honor to participate in some of these events and below is a report I posted on this blog on August 12, 2015.

Bruce

We were taken to U.S.’s Osan Air Force Base in Pyeongtaek for a guided tour by a prominent local activist. We were driven around the perimeter of the bulging base that is now adding a second runway – likely as a result of Obama’s ‘pivot’ of Pentagon forces into the Asia-Pacific to encircle China. (More airfields are needed for Pentagon warplanes.) In order to make the base expansion possible the U.S. has forced the South Korean government to take even more lands from local farmers. Local citizens and their supporters resisted this land grab by waging a long fierce campaign but their villages and rice fields were eventually stolen.

Osan AFB currently has F-16 and A-10 warplanes stationed there as well as the high-flying U-2 spy planes. In addition the air base hosts PAC-3 (Patriot third generation) missile defense systems that are aimed at China. Their job is to take out the retaliatory response following a U.S. first-strike attack against Chinese nuclear forces. (The U.S. has also recently created a Space Force unit at Osan AFB.)

The tour continued to the nearby US Army base called Camp Humphreys that is also undergoing major expansion. Similar to Osan AFB, the U.S. forced the grabbing of two rice-farming villages near the Army base to provide additional lands for the base expansion. These new facilities at Camp Humphreys will allow the U.S. to move its current base inside downtown Seoul southward making it more difficult for North Korea to retaliate against the U.S. bases following a Pentagon attack on the north.

We had dinner with one rice farmer who lost his land when his village was taken. He and others moved to another nearby location but they couldn’t replace their rice farms in the local area. The farmer, now the mayor of his current small village, had to buy new rice land two hours away and must make that long drive back and forth to work in his rice fields. I was told he spent time in prison for “obstructing” the expansion of the Army base during their protest campaign.

The Pentagon currently has in South Korea about 70 bases and military facilities. In order to pay for the current expansion of its bases the U.S. has demanded that the South Korean government pay for the big changes taking place at these military outposts. (My liberal Democrat Congresswoman Chellie Pingree calls it ‘burden sharing by the host nation’.) Thus for the Korean people it is a double insult – not only is their government an occupied client state of the U.S. empire but the people must increasingly pay for unwanted toxic and dangerous U.S. military operations inside of their country.

Our guide today several times, while driving us around the perimeter of the two bases, said, “The U.S. is a bad country.” I immediately thought how much I wished the American people could take this tour and hear his words. This remarkable activist also spent time in prison for trying to protect his people from the American assault on their culture and way of life. I was told that he helps take care of the elderly farmers who were not able to purchase new rice fields and now struggle to find ways to make money in order to survive.

I came away from Pyeongtaek feeling sad, ashamed of the U.S., and disgusted with those many American people who don’t really care what happens to the people around the world who are displaced by U.S. military bases – or are killed by the soldiers that make war from these outposts on behalf of corporate capitalism.

August 18, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, South Korea, USA | Leave a comment

The invisible geography of Israeli power

Real power belongs to whoever is able to access, process, transfer, restrict, or legally compel the disclosure of the information.

Countries that are rapidly building their own digital systems are entering a market already structured around dependency. A government may require that citizens’ data remain within national borders while simultaneously entrusting a foreign company with managing the platform, updating the software, providing the AI model, or controlling critical layers of the system. This creates the appearance of sovereignty without its substance.

Nowhere are the consequences of this hidden geography more evident than in occupied Palestine.

Data sovereignty is the new oil – but West Asia is pumping raw material while foreign tech giants refine it.

Strategic Culture Foundation, Lorenzo Maria Pacini, August 13, 2026, https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/08/13/the-invisible-geography-of-israeli-power/

On June 10, 2025, two executives from Microsoft France appeared before a French Senate investigative committee tasked with examining public procurement and digital sovereignty. The hearing proceeded in the usual reassuring tone until a question that completely shifted the mood: Could the company guarantee that the data of French citizens – even if hosted on servers located in France – would never be transferred to a foreign authority without the consent of the French government? Anton Carniaux, the subsidiary’s director of public and legal affairs, responded under oath with six words: “No, I cannot guarantee that.”

That statement cut through years of corporate rhetoric built around phrases such as “local cloud regions”, “reliable infrastructure”, and “data residency”. France could host the servers, French citizens could generate the data, and French institutions could pay for the service – yet ultimate authority could still reside elsewhere. The commission drew a clear conclusion. Microsoft was unable to guarantee sovereignty over the data it hosted. That exchange reveals a reality with specific consequences, including – and perhaps above all – for West Asia: the physical location of data no longer coincides with its political location.

Classical power geography teaches that sovereignty occupies territory. Oil belongs to the state beneath whose soil it lies; ports fall under the authority of the country on whose shores they stand; oil pipelines follow the borders they cross. In this tradition, power is read on the surface of the earth. Data follows a different geography.

A medical record can be created in Riyadh, stored in Bahrain, processed by an algorithm trained in the United States, and managed through a European subsidiary. Which state truly controls it? The conventional answer attributes the data to the individual, company, or government that generated it. In practice, ownership matters less than control. Real power belongs to whoever is able to access, process, transfer, restrict, or legally compel the disclosure of the information.

This principle is stated unambiguously by the U.S. Department of Justice itself. Under the CLOUD Act, providers subject to U.S. jurisdiction can be compelled to hand over data through valid legal proceedings, “regardless of where the company stores it”. Washington presents the law as a legitimate tool for obtaining electronic evidence. On a geopolitical level, it allows U.S. jurisdiction to extend through corporate control, reaching information stored far beyond U.S. territory. The new map of power is drawn not only by borders, cables, and data centers, but by registered offices, encryption keys, legal obligations, system administrators, and the states capable of compelling them to cooperate.

Across Western Asia, governments are investing heavily in cloud computing, artificial intelligence, digital identity, smart cities, and data-driven public services. Saudi Arabia aims to become a leading data economy; the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Turkey are expanding their information management and governance capabilities. Physical capacity is also concentrated in a few regional hubs: a 2025 assessment by the World Bank counted thirty-nine data centers in the UAE and thirty-three in Saudi Arabia – figures lower than the average for high-income countries (eighty-one) but significantly higher than the rest of the region.

The transition is measurable. According to the International Telecommunication Union, in 2024, 70 percent of the population of Arab states used the Internet, compared to 68 percent globally. The regional average, however, masks an 82-percentage-point gap between the least-connected and most-connected economies, while fixed broadband subscriptions remain less than half the global figure. Digital expansion is rapid and, at the same time, deeply unequal.

The provider landscape, on the other hand, is highly concentrated. According to Synergy Research Group, in the third quarter of 2025, Amazon, Microsoft, and Google accounted for 63 percent of global enterprise spending on cloud infrastructure, in a quarterly market that had grown to $107 billion from $68 billion just two years earlier. Countries that are rapidly building their own digital systems are entering a market already structured around dependency. A government may require that citizens’ data remain within national borders while simultaneously entrusting a foreign company with managing the platform, updating the software, providing the AI model, or controlling critical layers of the system. This creates the appearance of sovereignty without its substance.

Data localization answers only one question: where is the information stored? It leaves the crucial questions open. Who controls the encryption keys? Who updates the software? Who can suspend the service? Which country’s laws govern the provider? Who can compel its disclosure, and who possesses the computing power necessary to extract strategic value from it? Keeping servers within national borders does not place them under national control.

Palestine and data as a weapon

Nowhere are the consequences of this hidden geography more evident than in occupied Palestine. Modern warfare increasingly depends on the collection, cross-referencing, and interpretation of enormous amounts of information. Phone records, biometric identifiers, intercepted communications, location histories, and aerial imagery can be transformed into military intelligence through cloud computing and artificial intelligence.

The combined use of Microsoft and OpenAI products by the Israeli military in March 2024 had reached a level nearly two hundred times higher than that of the week preceding October 7, 2023. The data stored on Microsoft servers had more than doubled, exceeding 13.6 petabytes by July 2024, while server usage grew by nearly two-thirds during the first two months of the war. The Azure platform was reportedly used to compile, transcribe, and translate information obtained through mass surveillance, with some of the intelligence cross-referenced with target-acquisition systems.

In September 2025, Microsoft deactivated certain cloud and AI services provided to an Israeli military unit after an internal audit confirmed that its products were being used for mass surveillance of Palestinians; the data in question was stored in the company’s cloud facilities located in Europe. This chain of events is revealing: information collected in Palestine, processed by an Israeli military unit, hosted in Europe, and ultimately subject to a decision made by a U.S. company. The limitation of this measure is equally telling. As Hossam Nasr, a former Microsoft employee and advocate for the No Azure for Apartheid campaign, noted, the bulk of the contract with the Israeli military apparatus remained intact. Big tech companies now occupy positions once reserved almost exclusively for states: they provide capabilities used in intelligence operations, decide whether a customer retains access, investigate alleged abuse, and impose restrictions across borders.

Israel itself recognizes the strategic importance of control over the cloud. The Nimbus project, awarded to Google and Amazon Web Services, was designed to provide Israeli ministries and related public agencies with a comprehensive cloud infrastructure. The contract, worth $1.2 billion, required local infrastructure and was presented as a means of keeping government information within the country’s borders. The main providers, however, remain U.S. companies, embedded in American legal and technological systems.

Nimbus embodies the central paradox of data sovereignty: a government can demand that information remain within its territory while entrusting the storage, computing, and platform management to companies headquartered elsewhere. Israel negotiated hard to reduce this vulnerability. Most countries in West Asia lack Israel’s bargaining power, its technological integration with Washington, or its ability to exert pressure on major American corporations. Here, sovereignty is also a function of negotiating power.

The dispute over data is ultimately a struggle over three strategic rights. The first is the right to collect: governments, digital platforms, telecommunications operators, banks, and security services accumulate information on identity, movements, communications, health, consumption, and behavior. The second is the right to process: raw data acquires strategic value only if the actor possesses the chips, algorithms, cloud platforms, and qualified personnel necessary to process it. The third is the right to compel: the authority, claimed by governments and courts, to force providers to disclose, retain, remove, or restrict information.

The economic concentration behind these three rights is intensifying. UNCTAD reports that the five largest digital multinationals have increased their combined share of industry sales from 21 percent in 2017 to 48 percent in 2025, while their share of assets rose from 17 to 35 percent. Control over data and computing is accumulating faster than infrastructure is spreading. A country that controls only the first right is a supplier of digital raw materials; one that controls data collection and computing can become a digital power; an actor capable of exercising all three possesses something close to digital sovereignty.

The economic stakes are rising rapidly. UNCTAD estimates that the global artificial intelligence market will grow from $189 billion in 2023 to $4,800 billion in 2033 – a twenty-five-fold increase over a decade. Regions that supply data but lack the computing infrastructure and intellectual property necessary to process it risk retaining only a minimal portion of that value. In the 20th century, strategic value lay not only in extracting oil, but in refining it, transporting it, pricing it, and financing it. In the 21st century, the same distinction applies to data: West Asia can generate the raw material, but the decisive power lies in the “data refineries” – that is, in the cloud platforms, AI models, and computing systems that convert information into profit, intelligence, and geopolitical leverage.

Beyond digital colonialism

The solution is not technological isolation. No single West Asian state can reproduce every layer of the global technology stack on its own, and replacing dependence on U.S. suppliers with total reliance on Chinese or other platforms would merely shift the external center of gravity. The risk to avoid is that breaking free from oil dependence could turn into digital colonialism: a scenario in which companies in the region generate the data while foreign platforms own the infrastructure, extract its value, and retain control over access. What is needed is distributed technological autonomy.

On this basis, a concrete order of priorities can be established. The procurement of cloud services must be treated as a national security decision, not as routine IT business: contracts must specify who controls the encryption keys, how foreign legal requests will be handled, and whether data and applications can be migrated to another provider. Health, defense, biometric, judicial, and civil registry data require stricter protection than ordinary commercial information. Governments must invest in interoperable regional cloud capabilities, open standards, independent auditing, and the ability to maintain essential services should a foreign provider revoke access. Above all, data sovereignty must extend beyond storage to encompass the entire chain: collection, classification, computation, access, sharing, and deletion.

For over a century, the geopolitical importance of West Asia has been mapped through oil fields, pipelines, ports, straits, and military bases. Those structures remain central, but another strategic network has spread over them – one made up of databases, cloud contracts, legal jurisdictions, identity systems, AI models, and invisible authorizations. Control over data gives states and corporations the power to map societies, interpret their behaviors, anticipate their political and economic shifts, and translate that knowledge into action.

The states of Western Asia are rapidly building the digital infrastructure upon which their economies and public institutions will rest. Much of the authority governing those systems, however, remains outside the region. In the 21st century, control over a territory will increasingly depend on control over the data that reveals its people, institutions, and resources.

The question posed to the French Senate in June 2025 clearly extends far beyond France: those who cannot guarantee where their data will end up do not fully govern their own territory. And with that data, literally anything can be done.

August 16, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | ASIA, Israel, technology | Leave a comment

Takaichi, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and a Strained US Nuclear Umbrella

Takaichi herself raised the underlying issue well before becoming prime minister. In a 2024 book, she revealed that, as a Cabinet minister in 2022, she had objected to language in the National Security Strategy stating that Japan’s basic policy of adhering to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles would remain unchanged

For Japan, the most immediate question is not whether to pursue nuclear weapons itself, but whether to allow its ally’s nuclear-capable assets on Japanese soil.

By Takahashi Kosuke, August 12, 2026

Eighty-one years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki on August 9, Japan is confronting an increasingly difficult contradiction: how to uphold its identity as the only country to have suffered atomic attack in wartime while strengthening deterrence against an increasingly formidable group of nuclear-armed neighbors.

The dilemma came into sharper focus during this year’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki commemorations. Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae stated that Japan “maintains” its Three Non-Nuclear Principles and reaffirmed Tokyo’s commitment to pursuing a world free of nuclear weapons. Yet when asked whether the principles would continue to be explicitly affirmed in the three strategic documents her government plans to revise by the end of the year, Takaichi declined to prejudge the wording.

That ambiguity matters. Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles – not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory – trace back to former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku’s 1967 declaration and have long stood as a symbol of Japan’s postwar identity.

The tension was particularly visible in Nagasaki on August 9. Mayor Suzuki Shiro described nuclear weapons as an “absolute evil,” warned of the dangers of relying on nuclear deterrence, and urged the government to uphold the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Takaichi, by contrast, reiterated Japan’s current adherence to the principles while emphasizing a “realistic and practical” approach toward achieving a world without nuclear weapons…………………………………………………………………………………………………

Abandoning the Three Non-Nuclear Principles hastily would carry substantial political and diplomatic costs. They remain closely tied to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and underpin Japan’s credibility in advocating global nuclear disarmament…………………….

For Japan, the choice is not simply whether to pursue nuclear armament or nuclear pacifism. The more immediate question is whether the third principle specifically – “not permitting the introduction” of nuclear weapons – can remain unchanged while Japan simultaneously asks the United States to strengthen extended nuclear deterrence. https://thediplomat.com/2026/08/takaichi-the-three-non-nuclear-principles-and-a-strained-us-nuclear-umbrella/

August 16, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Japan, politics | Leave a comment

Why the FBI is working with China and Russia, despite everything

An unexpected turn is reshaping global security beyond the old rivalriesPublished 11 Aug, 2026 An unexpected turn is reshaping global security beyond the old rivalries

11 Aug, 2026 , RT.com Ladislav Zemánek

In an era defined by fierce geopolitical competition, FBI Director Kash Patel has charted a course that prioritizes pragmatism and results.

By building selective yet substantive law-enforcement partnerships with China and Russia, the bureau is demonstrating that great powers can set aside deeper differences to confront transnational crime that endangers citizens everywhere. This development deserves recognition as a mature, interest-based approach, showing that effective governance in a multipolar world requires the capacity to cooperate wherever it delivers concrete gains.

Breaking the ice with Beijing

Patel’s engagement with his Chinese counterparts marks a clear departure from years of a near-total freeze in high-level law-enforcement contacts. In November 2025, he became the first FBI director to visit China since 2016, meeting Vice Minister of Public Security Xu Datong. He returned in July 2026 for discussions with State Councillor and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong.

Chinese officials have called for deepening constructive dialogue grounded in mutual respect. According to Patel, the results were made possible by direct engagement under the Trump administration’s leadership. The relationship did not emerge overnight; it followed President Donald Trump’s May 2025 visit to China and subsequent high-level understandings on fentanyl precursors. What matters is that both sides chose to institutionalize the opening rather than allow it to remain a one-off diplomatic gesture.

Institutionalizing daily cooperation

Four dedicated working groups now operate on cyber fraud, violent crimes against children, counternarcotics, and a fugitive task force. Chinese Ministry of Public Security officers travel to FBI facilities in the US on a monthly rotating basis; FBI personnel make reciprocal trips to China. Officials on both sides report near-daily communication – an intensity of contact that had not existed for years.

This steady exchange has already produced operational results. One notable joint action, Operation Sand Dollar, brought together the FBI, China’s Ministry of Public Security, and Dubai police against a major cyber-scam center. The effort yielded roughly 300 arrests, the seizure of approximately $300 million, and the liberation of thousands of trafficked workers. Such outcomes illustrate the practical value of treating certain criminal networks as shared problems rather than exclusive domains of competition.

Patel has been explicit about the philosophy guiding this work. He has noted that the decision to pursue cooperation with China despite widespread advice against it proves what is possible with almost any counterpart: “The fact that we did it with China when everyone said, ‘Don’t do it,’ and, ‘You can’t do it,’ shows what we can do with almost anyone.” The partnerships are deliberately limited to specific categories of transnational crime; they do not pretend to resolve broader strategic disagreements. That clarity of scope makes them sustainable under the current circumstances.

Opening a channel to Moscow

The same pragmatic approach is being applied to Russia. Patel is preparing a visit to Moscow and St. Peterburg, tentatively scheduled for mid-October, with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) expected to serve as host. The last sitting FBI director known to have traveled to Russia was Robert Mueller in 2013. Patel’s planned trip builds on quieter collaboration already underway for more than a year against violent criminal networks.

This outreach occurs against the backdrop of Trump’s broader effort to reduce tensions with Moscow. Special envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have made repeated visits, including meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and further contacts are anticipated. Putin’s special envoy on foreign investment and economic cooperation, Kirill Dmitriev, has publicly welcomed the emerging China-Russia-US intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation, signaling that Moscow sees value in the channel.

Complementary signals across government

Patel’s initiative does not stand alone. Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby, long regarded as a China hardliner, has expressed clear interest in visiting China and revitalizing professional military-to-military ties. Colby’s willingness to explore direct engagement signals an important evolution: Even those most focused on strategic competition now recognize that sustained channels of communication and cooperation on discrete issues can reduce miscalculation risks and open space for practical problem-solving………………………………………………… https://www.rt.com/news/644113-fbi-china-russia-cooperation/

August 15, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | China, Russia, safety, USA | Leave a comment

One in three North Korean refugees from nuclear test area have mutations

By PERKIN AMALARAJ, FOREIGN NEWS REPORTER, 7 August 2026, https://www.dailymail.com/news/article-16036297/One-three-North-Korean-refugees-nuclear-test-area-mutations.html

One in three North Korean refugees hailing from a nuclear test area have chromosomal mutations, a new study has found.

According to research conducted by South Korea‘s unification ministry, the genes of 64 out of 214 North Korean defectors tested showed genetic changes potentially tied to radiation.

An official at the National Radiation Emergency Medical Centre, which conducted the five-year study, said it was scientifically reasonable to suspect the tests at the Punggye-ri site in the North Hamgyong province were the cause of these mutations.

The latest series of the medical tests were conducted last year, and showed that 26 out of 59 North Koreans who lived in eight cities and counties near Punggye-ri had chromosomal abnormalities – roughly 40%.

The ministry shared the new report with South Korea’s National Assembly – the country’s parliament – but cautioned that there may be environmental factors at play.

Researchers called for more tests to be run to establish a clearer link with the nuclear tests.

They are aiming to recruit 50 new participants, as well as 10 returning subjects for follow-ups, in this year’s tests.

So far, around 800 North Koreans from the eight cities and counties around Punggye-ri have resettled in South Korea.

Punggye-ri was reportedly closed down in 2018 by the North Korean government, in what it said was a measure to ‘ensure the transparency of discontinuance of nuclear tests.’

It was there that North Korea performed its first nuclear test in 2006. Researchers still aren’t sure whether a successful test on a particularly small nuclear device, or a ‘fizzle’ of an ordinary one, was carried out.

Several more were carried out over the years, with two tests taking place in 2016.

In 2017, there was a collapse at the site that was estimated to have left 200 workers dead.

South Korean officials warned after the collapse that further nuclear tests at Punggye-ri could cause a nearby mountain to crumple, releasing radioactive material into the environment.

And Chinese officials warned that the nuclear fallout could spread across ‘an entire hemisphere’ if the mountain caved in.

The dismantling of the nuclear test ground ‘completely closed the tunnel entrances’, the government’s mouthpiece KCNA reported, adding that two tunnels there had been ready for use in ‘powerful underground nuclear tests.’

And analysts observed in 2022 that the site was being rehabilitated for potential nuclear cruise missile warhead tests.

The US, South Korea and Japan said at the time that North Korea would receive an ‘overwhelming, decisive… and unparalleled’ response if testing was resumed.

August 12, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | health, North Korea | Leave a comment

The U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Is a Test Case for South Korean Uranium Enrichment

U.S. and South Korean policymakers should develop diplomatic and institutional measures to address potential concerns and opposition surrounding nuclear-powered submarine and fuel cooperation.

By Ellen Kim, August 3, 2026,
https://keia.org/analysis/the-u-s-saudi-nuclear-deal-is-a-test-case-for-south-korean-uranium-enrichment/

On July 22, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. However, the future of the agreement became uncertain the following day when President Donald Trump made Saudi Arabia’s normalization of relations with Israel, via accession to the Abraham Accords, a final requirement for its implementation.

The U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement has drawn considerable attention in South Korea because the U.S. administration has opened the possibility of allowing uranium enrichment on Saudi territory, contingent upon the results of a two-year joint feasibility study. During bilateral negotiations to revise the 2015 U.S.-South Korea civil nuclear cooperation agreement, South Korea sought but could not obtain U.S. advance consent to enrich or reprocess U.S. spent nuclear fuel. That situation began to change after President Trump approved a nuclear-powered submarine program for South Korea during his summit with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung last October. The two governments subsequently agreed to cooperate on options for procuring nuclear submarine fuel, and bilateral discussions on civil nuclear cooperation, including on uranium enrichment, resumed with working-level talks held in June of this year.

Against this backdrop, the future of the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement will serve as an important test case for future U.S.-South Korea talks. The decision to conditionally permit uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia, even as the United States remains engaged in a conflict with Iran aimed at preventing the country from acquiring nuclear weapons, has already prompted concerns in Congress that the agreement could fuel an arms race and spur nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

The security environment on the Korean Peninsula is not so different. While the United States and South Korea continue to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea, South Korea’s pursuit of a low-enriched uranium program to support its nuclear-powered submarine program is also likely to face criticism from those concerned about nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. Consequently, even if the U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement ultimately clears congressional approval, growing concerns over nuclear proliferation in the United States and the broader international community could pose significant obstacles to advancing future U.S.-South Korea cooperation on these issues.

For this reason, U.S. and South Korean policymakers should closely examine the U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement and develop diplomatic and institutional measures to address potential concerns and opposition surrounding nuclear-powered submarine and fuel cooperation.

First, South Korea should clearly differentiate its case from that of Saudi Arabia. Unlike Saudi Arabia, South Korea ratified and brought into force the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in 2004. Since then, it has accepted expanded IAEA access and short-notice inspections, strengthened the transparency of its civilian nuclear activities, and faithfully fulfilled its obligations under the international nonproliferation regime. South Korea should emphasize this strong nonproliferation record and make clear that any future uranium enrichment program for nuclear-powered submarine development would operate under the IAEA’s stringent safeguards and verification regime. In addition, Seoul should proactively propose additional enhanced safeguards and verification mechanisms to ensure that nuclear materials cannot be diverted for purposes beyond those agreed upon by Washington and Seoul.

Second, the United States and South Korea should develop a win-win strategy for civil nuclear industry cooperation. South Korea currently operates twenty-six nuclear power reactors and has emerged as a major exporter of nuclear power plants. To compete more effectively with China and Russia, whose influence in the global nuclear market continues to expand, the United States and South Korea should leverage their respective strengths to build a more competitive partnership. Given South Korea’s recent indication of energy as a priority sector for its investment projects in the United States, there is an opportunity to align these investments with expanded bilateral cooperation in the nuclear industry.

Finally, the most important prerequisite for U.S.-South Korea cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines and fuel is mutual trust. Such cooperation cannot be advanced solely through decisions by the executive branch in the United States; it will ultimately require the support and approval of Congress. However, the current U.S.-South Korea relationship faces multiple challenges spanning security, trade, and other areas. Rather than addressing nuclear cooperation in isolation, both governments should manage the alliance comprehensively and approach these issues with a long-term perspective, resolving them gradually while preserving the broader strength and credibility of the alliance.

August 12, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, South Korea | Leave a comment

Nagasaki warns of risk of nuclear war on 81st A-bomb anniversary

Nikkei Asian Review 9th Aug 2026

Mayor calls nuclear weapons an ‘absolute evil’ that cannot coexist with humanityMayor calls nuclear weapons an ‘absolute evil’ that cannot coexist with humanity

NAGASAKI, Japan (Kyodo) — Nagasaki on Sunday warned nuclear powers and deterrence-reliant nations of the increased risk of a war using nuclear weapons, as the Japanese city marked the 81st anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing with a resolve to prevent such a tragedy from ever happening again.

“Nuclear weapons are not a ‘necessary evil’ but an ‘absolute evil,’ and can never coexist with humanity,” Mayor Shiro Suzuki said in the Peace Declaration read during the annual memorial ceremony for the attack on the southwestern city, which followed the atomic bombing of Hiroshima three days earlier.

Adding cadence and vocal inflection, Suzuki’s powerful voice pierced through the Peace Park as he called the concept of nuclear deterrence “extremely dangerous and fragile.”

This year’s commemoration comes amid geopolitical tensions in the wake of the Middle East conflict and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

A moment of silence was held at 11:02 a.m., when the plutonium device codenamed “Fat Man” was dropped by a U.S. bomber and exploded over Nagasaki. It remains the last place to have suffered a nuclear attack.

Still, more than 12,000 nuclear warheads exist, Suzuki pointed out. He expressed concern over unpredictability in the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, where nuclear states are involved, referring to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the U.S.-led war on Iran.

The commemoration event at the Nagasaki park, located near the hypocenter, was attended by some 3,700 people, including representatives from 98 countries and regions, as well as the European Union.

U.S. Ambassador to Japan George Glass was not present at the ceremony, with Japan’s close security ally represented by Deputy Chief of Mission Aaron Snipe.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi delivered a speech following a brief heckle from the crowd, reiterating what she said in the Hiroshima commemoration last Thursday that Japan “is upholding” the three nonnuclear principles……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. https://asia.nikkei.com/spotlight/society/nagasaki-warns-of-risk-of-nuclear-war-on-81st-a-bomb-anniversary

August 11, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Japan, weapons and war | Leave a comment

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