We Talk: Japanese residents warn against ‘nuclear sharing’
Global Stringer, 14 Aug 26, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2026-08-14/We-Talk-Japanese-residents-warn-against-nuclear-sharing–1PB6c6oYkp2/p.html
August 15 marks 81 years since Japan announced its surrender in World War II.
Since taking office in October last year, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government has pushed to revise Japan’s three national security documents and has repeatedly called for a review of the “no introduction” clause of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. The moves have sparked concern in Japan and abroad over the future direction of the country’s nuclear policy.
A poll released by the Japan Association for Public Opinion Research on August 1 found that 76% of respondents support maintaining the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons.
A CGTN stringer in Tokyo spoke with local residents about the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the concept of nuclear sharing, and the possibility of Japan allowing the United States to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory.
One interviewee, Hikaru Kusano, said Japan should never engage in nuclear sharing, warning that it would pose a threat to other countries. Another respondent, Masahiro Sawa, argued that nuclear weapons can never guarantee security and that a world free of nuclear weapons may be the best path forward.
‘U.S. Out of Korea’
August 15, 2026, by Bruce K. Gagnon https://space4peace.blogspot.com/2026/08/us-out-of-korea.html
Currently in South Korea national protest actions are being held at U.S. bases around the country as part of ‘U.S. Out of Korea’ campaign being organized by a vast coalition of peace groups.
The numbers vary but it is believed that between 48,000-60,000 US military personnel and their families now live on Camp Humphreys. (When regular war games are held the numbers rise.) This would make Camp Humphreys the largest U.S. base outside of the continental United States.
Much of the base expansion was due to the closing of the Yongsan U.S. Army base in downtown Seoul. That base had become a toxic mess and since closing it is still partially unavailable for new usage due to the U.S. essentially refusing to clean-up the damages. They have left it to the ROK (Republic of Korea) government to deal with. That is after the U.S. forced the South Korean government to pay about 90% of the costs to relocate Yongsan to Camp Humphreys.
Of course one reason for the move was the toxic mess at Yongsan. But other reasons I have heard was to move the base about 90 minutes to the south thus making it more difficult for North Korea to hit the base in any war. Plus the ROK government didn’t like having Seoul as a prime target.
In 2015 I had the honor to participate in some of these events and below is a report I posted on this blog on August 12, 2015.
Bruce
We were taken to U.S.’s Osan Air Force Base in Pyeongtaek for a guided tour by a prominent local activist. We were driven around the perimeter of the bulging base that is now adding a second runway – likely as a result of Obama’s ‘pivot’ of Pentagon forces into the Asia-Pacific to encircle China. (More airfields are needed for Pentagon warplanes.) In order to make the base expansion possible the U.S. has forced the South Korean government to take even more lands from local farmers. Local citizens and their supporters resisted this land grab by waging a long fierce campaign but their villages and rice fields were eventually stolen.
Osan AFB currently has F-16 and A-10 warplanes stationed there as well as the high-flying U-2 spy planes. In addition the air base hosts PAC-3 (Patriot third generation) missile defense systems that are aimed at China. Their job is to take out the retaliatory response following a U.S. first-strike attack against Chinese nuclear forces. (The U.S. has also recently created a Space Force unit at Osan AFB.)
The tour continued to the nearby US Army base called Camp Humphreys that is also undergoing major expansion. Similar to Osan AFB, the U.S. forced the grabbing of two rice-farming villages near the Army base to provide additional lands for the base expansion. These new facilities at Camp Humphreys will allow the U.S. to move its current base inside downtown Seoul southward making it more difficult for North Korea to retaliate against the U.S. bases following a Pentagon attack on the north.
We had dinner with one rice farmer who lost his land when his village was taken. He and others moved to another nearby location but they couldn’t replace their rice farms in the local area. The farmer, now the mayor of his current small village, had to buy new rice land two hours away and must make that long drive back and forth to work in his rice fields. I was told he spent time in prison for “obstructing” the expansion of the Army base during their protest campaign.
The Pentagon currently has in South Korea about 70 bases and military facilities. In order to pay for the current expansion of its bases the U.S. has demanded that the South Korean government pay for the big changes taking place at these military outposts. (My liberal Democrat Congresswoman Chellie Pingree calls it ‘burden sharing by the host nation’.) Thus for the Korean people it is a double insult – not only is their government an occupied client state of the U.S. empire but the people must increasingly pay for unwanted toxic and dangerous U.S. military operations inside of their country.
Our guide today several times, while driving us around the perimeter of the two bases, said, “The U.S. is a bad country.” I immediately thought how much I wished the American people could take this tour and hear his words. This remarkable activist also spent time in prison for trying to protect his people from the American assault on their culture and way of life. I was told that he helps take care of the elderly farmers who were not able to purchase new rice fields and now struggle to find ways to make money in order to survive.
I came away from Pyeongtaek feeling sad, ashamed of the U.S., and disgusted with those many American people who don’t really care what happens to the people around the world who are displaced by U.S. military bases – or are killed by the soldiers that make war from these outposts on behalf of corporate capitalism.
The invisible geography of Israeli power

Real power belongs to whoever is able to access, process, transfer, restrict, or legally compel the disclosure of the information.
Countries that are rapidly building their own digital systems are entering a market already structured around dependency. A government may require that citizens’ data remain within national borders while simultaneously entrusting a foreign company with managing the platform, updating the software, providing the AI model, or controlling critical layers of the system. This creates the appearance of sovereignty without its substance.
Nowhere are the consequences of this hidden geography more evident than in occupied Palestine.
Data sovereignty is the new oil – but West Asia is pumping raw material while foreign tech giants refine it.
Strategic Culture Foundation, Lorenzo Maria Pacini, August 13, 2026, https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/08/13/the-invisible-geography-of-israeli-power/
On June 10, 2025, two executives from Microsoft France appeared before a French Senate investigative committee tasked with examining public procurement and digital sovereignty. The hearing proceeded in the usual reassuring tone until a question that completely shifted the mood: Could the company guarantee that the data of French citizens – even if hosted on servers located in France – would never be transferred to a foreign authority without the consent of the French government? Anton Carniaux, the subsidiary’s director of public and legal affairs, responded under oath with six words: “No, I cannot guarantee that.”
That statement cut through years of corporate rhetoric built around phrases such as “local cloud regions”, “reliable infrastructure”, and “data residency”. France could host the servers, French citizens could generate the data, and French institutions could pay for the service – yet ultimate authority could still reside elsewhere. The commission drew a clear conclusion. Microsoft was unable to guarantee sovereignty over the data it hosted. That exchange reveals a reality with specific consequences, including – and perhaps above all – for West Asia: the physical location of data no longer coincides with its political location.
Classical power geography teaches that sovereignty occupies territory. Oil belongs to the state beneath whose soil it lies; ports fall under the authority of the country on whose shores they stand; oil pipelines follow the borders they cross. In this tradition, power is read on the surface of the earth. Data follows a different geography.
A medical record can be created in Riyadh, stored in Bahrain, processed by an algorithm trained in the United States, and managed through a European subsidiary. Which state truly controls it? The conventional answer attributes the data to the individual, company, or government that generated it. In practice, ownership matters less than control. Real power belongs to whoever is able to access, process, transfer, restrict, or legally compel the disclosure of the information.
This principle is stated unambiguously by the U.S. Department of Justice itself. Under the CLOUD Act, providers subject to U.S. jurisdiction can be compelled to hand over data through valid legal proceedings, “regardless of where the company stores it”. Washington presents the law as a legitimate tool for obtaining electronic evidence. On a geopolitical level, it allows U.S. jurisdiction to extend through corporate control, reaching information stored far beyond U.S. territory. The new map of power is drawn not only by borders, cables, and data centers, but by registered offices, encryption keys, legal obligations, system administrators, and the states capable of compelling them to cooperate.
Across Western Asia, governments are investing heavily in cloud computing, artificial intelligence, digital identity, smart cities, and data-driven public services. Saudi Arabia aims to become a leading data economy; the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Turkey are expanding their information management and governance capabilities. Physical capacity is also concentrated in a few regional hubs: a 2025 assessment by the World Bank counted thirty-nine data centers in the UAE and thirty-three in Saudi Arabia – figures lower than the average for high-income countries (eighty-one) but significantly higher than the rest of the region.
The transition is measurable. According to the International Telecommunication Union, in 2024, 70 percent of the population of Arab states used the Internet, compared to 68 percent globally. The regional average, however, masks an 82-percentage-point gap between the least-connected and most-connected economies, while fixed broadband subscriptions remain less than half the global figure. Digital expansion is rapid and, at the same time, deeply unequal.
The provider landscape, on the other hand, is highly concentrated. According to Synergy Research Group, in the third quarter of 2025, Amazon, Microsoft, and Google accounted for 63 percent of global enterprise spending on cloud infrastructure, in a quarterly market that had grown to $107 billion from $68 billion just two years earlier. Countries that are rapidly building their own digital systems are entering a market already structured around dependency. A government may require that citizens’ data remain within national borders while simultaneously entrusting a foreign company with managing the platform, updating the software, providing the AI model, or controlling critical layers of the system. This creates the appearance of sovereignty without its substance.
Data localization answers only one question: where is the information stored? It leaves the crucial questions open. Who controls the encryption keys? Who updates the software? Who can suspend the service? Which country’s laws govern the provider? Who can compel its disclosure, and who possesses the computing power necessary to extract strategic value from it? Keeping servers within national borders does not place them under national control.
Palestine and data as a weapon
Nowhere are the consequences of this hidden geography more evident than in occupied Palestine. Modern warfare increasingly depends on the collection, cross-referencing, and interpretation of enormous amounts of information. Phone records, biometric identifiers, intercepted communications, location histories, and aerial imagery can be transformed into military intelligence through cloud computing and artificial intelligence.
The combined use of Microsoft and OpenAI products by the Israeli military in March 2024 had reached a level nearly two hundred times higher than that of the week preceding October 7, 2023. The data stored on Microsoft servers had more than doubled, exceeding 13.6 petabytes by July 2024, while server usage grew by nearly two-thirds during the first two months of the war. The Azure platform was reportedly used to compile, transcribe, and translate information obtained through mass surveillance, with some of the intelligence cross-referenced with target-acquisition systems.
In September 2025, Microsoft deactivated certain cloud and AI services provided to an Israeli military unit after an internal audit confirmed that its products were being used for mass surveillance of Palestinians; the data in question was stored in the company’s cloud facilities located in Europe. This chain of events is revealing: information collected in Palestine, processed by an Israeli military unit, hosted in Europe, and ultimately subject to a decision made by a U.S. company. The limitation of this measure is equally telling. As Hossam Nasr, a former Microsoft employee and advocate for the No Azure for Apartheid campaign, noted, the bulk of the contract with the Israeli military apparatus remained intact. Big tech companies now occupy positions once reserved almost exclusively for states: they provide capabilities used in intelligence operations, decide whether a customer retains access, investigate alleged abuse, and impose restrictions across borders.
Israel itself recognizes the strategic importance of control over the cloud. The Nimbus project, awarded to Google and Amazon Web Services, was designed to provide Israeli ministries and related public agencies with a comprehensive cloud infrastructure. The contract, worth $1.2 billion, required local infrastructure and was presented as a means of keeping government information within the country’s borders. The main providers, however, remain U.S. companies, embedded in American legal and technological systems.
Nimbus embodies the central paradox of data sovereignty: a government can demand that information remain within its territory while entrusting the storage, computing, and platform management to companies headquartered elsewhere. Israel negotiated hard to reduce this vulnerability. Most countries in West Asia lack Israel’s bargaining power, its technological integration with Washington, or its ability to exert pressure on major American corporations. Here, sovereignty is also a function of negotiating power.
The dispute over data is ultimately a struggle over three strategic rights. The first is the right to collect: governments, digital platforms, telecommunications operators, banks, and security services accumulate information on identity, movements, communications, health, consumption, and behavior. The second is the right to process: raw data acquires strategic value only if the actor possesses the chips, algorithms, cloud platforms, and qualified personnel necessary to process it. The third is the right to compel: the authority, claimed by governments and courts, to force providers to disclose, retain, remove, or restrict information.
The economic concentration behind these three rights is intensifying. UNCTAD reports that the five largest digital multinationals have increased their combined share of industry sales from 21 percent in 2017 to 48 percent in 2025, while their share of assets rose from 17 to 35 percent. Control over data and computing is accumulating faster than infrastructure is spreading. A country that controls only the first right is a supplier of digital raw materials; one that controls data collection and computing can become a digital power; an actor capable of exercising all three possesses something close to digital sovereignty.
The economic stakes are rising rapidly. UNCTAD estimates that the global artificial intelligence market will grow from $189 billion in 2023 to $4,800 billion in 2033 – a twenty-five-fold increase over a decade. Regions that supply data but lack the computing infrastructure and intellectual property necessary to process it risk retaining only a minimal portion of that value. In the 20th century, strategic value lay not only in extracting oil, but in refining it, transporting it, pricing it, and financing it. In the 21st century, the same distinction applies to data: West Asia can generate the raw material, but the decisive power lies in the “data refineries” – that is, in the cloud platforms, AI models, and computing systems that convert information into profit, intelligence, and geopolitical leverage.
Beyond digital colonialism
The solution is not technological isolation. No single West Asian state can reproduce every layer of the global technology stack on its own, and replacing dependence on U.S. suppliers with total reliance on Chinese or other platforms would merely shift the external center of gravity. The risk to avoid is that breaking free from oil dependence could turn into digital colonialism: a scenario in which companies in the region generate the data while foreign platforms own the infrastructure, extract its value, and retain control over access. What is needed is distributed technological autonomy.
On this basis, a concrete order of priorities can be established. The procurement of cloud services must be treated as a national security decision, not as routine IT business: contracts must specify who controls the encryption keys, how foreign legal requests will be handled, and whether data and applications can be migrated to another provider. Health, defense, biometric, judicial, and civil registry data require stricter protection than ordinary commercial information. Governments must invest in interoperable regional cloud capabilities, open standards, independent auditing, and the ability to maintain essential services should a foreign provider revoke access. Above all, data sovereignty must extend beyond storage to encompass the entire chain: collection, classification, computation, access, sharing, and deletion.
For over a century, the geopolitical importance of West Asia has been mapped through oil fields, pipelines, ports, straits, and military bases. Those structures remain central, but another strategic network has spread over them – one made up of databases, cloud contracts, legal jurisdictions, identity systems, AI models, and invisible authorizations. Control over data gives states and corporations the power to map societies, interpret their behaviors, anticipate their political and economic shifts, and translate that knowledge into action.
The states of Western Asia are rapidly building the digital infrastructure upon which their economies and public institutions will rest. Much of the authority governing those systems, however, remains outside the region. In the 21st century, control over a territory will increasingly depend on control over the data that reveals its people, institutions, and resources.
The question posed to the French Senate in June 2025 clearly extends far beyond France: those who cannot guarantee where their data will end up do not fully govern their own territory. And with that data, literally anything can be done.
Takaichi, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and a Strained US Nuclear Umbrella

Takaichi herself raised the underlying issue well before becoming prime minister. In a 2024 book, she revealed that, as a Cabinet minister in 2022, she had objected to language in the National Security Strategy stating that Japan’s basic policy of adhering to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles would remain unchanged
For Japan, the most immediate question is not whether to pursue nuclear weapons itself, but whether to allow its ally’s nuclear-capable assets on Japanese soil.
By Takahashi Kosuke, August 12, 2026
Eighty-one years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki on August 9, Japan is confronting an increasingly difficult contradiction: how to uphold its identity as the only country to have suffered atomic attack in wartime while strengthening deterrence against an increasingly formidable group of nuclear-armed neighbors.
The dilemma came into sharper focus during this year’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki commemorations. Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae stated that Japan “maintains” its Three Non-Nuclear Principles and reaffirmed Tokyo’s commitment to pursuing a world free of nuclear weapons. Yet when asked whether the principles would continue to be explicitly affirmed in the three strategic documents her government plans to revise by the end of the year, Takaichi declined to prejudge the wording.
That ambiguity matters. Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles – not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory – trace back to former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku’s 1967 declaration and have long stood as a symbol of Japan’s postwar identity.
The tension was particularly visible in Nagasaki on August 9. Mayor Suzuki Shiro described nuclear weapons as an “absolute evil,” warned of the dangers of relying on nuclear deterrence, and urged the government to uphold the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Takaichi, by contrast, reiterated Japan’s current adherence to the principles while emphasizing a “realistic and practical” approach toward achieving a world without nuclear weapons…………………………………………………………………………………………………
Takaichi herself raised the underlying issue well before becoming prime minister. In a 2024 book, she revealed that, as a Cabinet minister in 2022, she had objected to language in the National Security Strategy stating that Japan’s basic policy of adhering to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles would remain unchanged…………………………………………………………..
Abandoning the Three Non-Nuclear Principles hastily would carry substantial political and diplomatic costs. They remain closely tied to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and underpin Japan’s credibility in advocating global nuclear disarmament…………………….
For Japan, the choice is not simply whether to pursue nuclear armament or nuclear pacifism. The more immediate question is whether the third principle specifically – “not permitting the introduction” of nuclear weapons – can remain unchanged while Japan simultaneously asks the United States to strengthen extended nuclear deterrence. https://thediplomat.com/2026/08/takaichi-the-three-non-nuclear-principles-and-a-strained-us-nuclear-umbrella/
Why the FBI is working with China and Russia, despite everything
An unexpected turn is reshaping global security beyond the old rivalriesPublished 11 Aug, 2026 An unexpected turn is reshaping global security beyond the old rivalries
11 Aug, 2026 , RT.com Ladislav Zemánek
In an era defined by fierce geopolitical competition, FBI Director Kash Patel has charted a course that prioritizes pragmatism and results.
By building selective yet substantive law-enforcement partnerships with China and Russia, the bureau is demonstrating that great powers can set aside deeper differences to confront transnational crime that endangers citizens everywhere. This development deserves recognition as a mature, interest-based approach, showing that effective governance in a multipolar world requires the capacity to cooperate wherever it delivers concrete gains.
Breaking the ice with Beijing
Patel’s engagement with his Chinese counterparts marks a clear departure from years of a near-total freeze in high-level law-enforcement contacts. In November 2025, he became the first FBI director to visit China since 2016, meeting Vice Minister of Public Security Xu Datong. He returned in July 2026 for discussions with State Councillor and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong.
Chinese officials have called for deepening constructive dialogue grounded in mutual respect. According to Patel, the results were made possible by direct engagement under the Trump administration’s leadership. The relationship did not emerge overnight; it followed President Donald Trump’s May 2025 visit to China and subsequent high-level understandings on fentanyl precursors. What matters is that both sides chose to institutionalize the opening rather than allow it to remain a one-off diplomatic gesture.
Institutionalizing daily cooperation
Four dedicated working groups now operate on cyber fraud, violent crimes against children, counternarcotics, and a fugitive task force. Chinese Ministry of Public Security officers travel to FBI facilities in the US on a monthly rotating basis; FBI personnel make reciprocal trips to China. Officials on both sides report near-daily communication – an intensity of contact that had not existed for years.
This steady exchange has already produced operational results. One notable joint action, Operation Sand Dollar, brought together the FBI, China’s Ministry of Public Security, and Dubai police against a major cyber-scam center. The effort yielded roughly 300 arrests, the seizure of approximately $300 million, and the liberation of thousands of trafficked workers. Such outcomes illustrate the practical value of treating certain criminal networks as shared problems rather than exclusive domains of competition.
Patel has been explicit about the philosophy guiding this work. He has noted that the decision to pursue cooperation with China despite widespread advice against it proves what is possible with almost any counterpart: “The fact that we did it with China when everyone said, ‘Don’t do it,’ and, ‘You can’t do it,’ shows what we can do with almost anyone.” The partnerships are deliberately limited to specific categories of transnational crime; they do not pretend to resolve broader strategic disagreements. That clarity of scope makes them sustainable under the current circumstances.
Opening a channel to Moscow
The same pragmatic approach is being applied to Russia. Patel is preparing a visit to Moscow and St. Peterburg, tentatively scheduled for mid-October, with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) expected to serve as host. The last sitting FBI director known to have traveled to Russia was Robert Mueller in 2013. Patel’s planned trip builds on quieter collaboration already underway for more than a year against violent criminal networks.
This outreach occurs against the backdrop of Trump’s broader effort to reduce tensions with Moscow. Special envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have made repeated visits, including meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and further contacts are anticipated. Putin’s special envoy on foreign investment and economic cooperation, Kirill Dmitriev, has publicly welcomed the emerging China-Russia-US intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation, signaling that Moscow sees value in the channel.
Complementary signals across government
Patel’s initiative does not stand alone. Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby, long regarded as a China hardliner, has expressed clear interest in visiting China and revitalizing professional military-to-military ties. Colby’s willingness to explore direct engagement signals an important evolution: Even those most focused on strategic competition now recognize that sustained channels of communication and cooperation on discrete issues can reduce miscalculation risks and open space for practical problem-solving………………………………………………… https://www.rt.com/news/644113-fbi-china-russia-cooperation/
One in three North Korean refugees from nuclear test area have mutations

By PERKIN AMALARAJ, FOREIGN NEWS REPORTER, 7 August 2026, https://www.dailymail.com/news/article-16036297/One-three-North-Korean-refugees-nuclear-test-area-mutations.html
One in three North Korean refugees hailing from a nuclear test area have chromosomal mutations, a new study has found.
According to research conducted by South Korea‘s unification ministry, the genes of 64 out of 214 North Korean defectors tested showed genetic changes potentially tied to radiation.
An official at the National Radiation Emergency Medical Centre, which conducted the five-year study, said it was scientifically reasonable to suspect the tests at the Punggye-ri site in the North Hamgyong province were the cause of these mutations.
The latest series of the medical tests were conducted last year, and showed that 26 out of 59 North Koreans who lived in eight cities and counties near Punggye-ri had chromosomal abnormalities – roughly 40%.
The ministry shared the new report with South Korea’s National Assembly – the country’s parliament – but cautioned that there may be environmental factors at play.
Researchers called for more tests to be run to establish a clearer link with the nuclear tests.
They are aiming to recruit 50 new participants, as well as 10 returning subjects for follow-ups, in this year’s tests.
So far, around 800 North Koreans from the eight cities and counties around Punggye-ri have resettled in South Korea.
Punggye-ri was reportedly closed down in 2018 by the North Korean government, in what it said was a measure to ‘ensure the transparency of discontinuance of nuclear tests.’
It was there that North Korea performed its first nuclear test in 2006. Researchers still aren’t sure whether a successful test on a particularly small nuclear device, or a ‘fizzle’ of an ordinary one, was carried out.
Several more were carried out over the years, with two tests taking place in 2016.
In 2017, there was a collapse at the site that was estimated to have left 200 workers dead.
South Korean officials warned after the collapse that further nuclear tests at Punggye-ri could cause a nearby mountain to crumple, releasing radioactive material into the environment.
And Chinese officials warned that the nuclear fallout could spread across ‘an entire hemisphere’ if the mountain caved in.
The dismantling of the nuclear test ground ‘completely closed the tunnel entrances’, the government’s mouthpiece KCNA reported, adding that two tunnels there had been ready for use in ‘powerful underground nuclear tests.’
And analysts observed in 2022 that the site was being rehabilitated for potential nuclear cruise missile warhead tests.
The US, South Korea and Japan said at the time that North Korea would receive an ‘overwhelming, decisive… and unparalleled’ response if testing was resumed.
The U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Is a Test Case for South Korean Uranium Enrichment
U.S. and South Korean policymakers should develop diplomatic and institutional measures to address potential concerns and opposition surrounding nuclear-powered submarine and fuel cooperation.
By Ellen Kim, August 3, 2026,
https://keia.org/analysis/the-u-s-saudi-nuclear-deal-is-a-test-case-for-south-korean-uranium-enrichment/
On July 22, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. However, the future of the agreement became uncertain the following day when President Donald Trump made Saudi Arabia’s normalization of relations with Israel, via accession to the Abraham Accords, a final requirement for its implementation.
The U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement has drawn considerable attention in South Korea because the U.S. administration has opened the possibility of allowing uranium enrichment on Saudi territory, contingent upon the results of a two-year joint feasibility study. During bilateral negotiations to revise the 2015 U.S.-South Korea civil nuclear cooperation agreement, South Korea sought but could not obtain U.S. advance consent to enrich or reprocess U.S. spent nuclear fuel. That situation began to change after President Trump approved a nuclear-powered submarine program for South Korea during his summit with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung last October. The two governments subsequently agreed to cooperate on options for procuring nuclear submarine fuel, and bilateral discussions on civil nuclear cooperation, including on uranium enrichment, resumed with working-level talks held in June of this year.
Against this backdrop, the future of the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement will serve as an important test case for future U.S.-South Korea talks. The decision to conditionally permit uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia, even as the United States remains engaged in a conflict with Iran aimed at preventing the country from acquiring nuclear weapons, has already prompted concerns in Congress that the agreement could fuel an arms race and spur nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
The security environment on the Korean Peninsula is not so different. While the United States and South Korea continue to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea, South Korea’s pursuit of a low-enriched uranium program to support its nuclear-powered submarine program is also likely to face criticism from those concerned about nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. Consequently, even if the U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement ultimately clears congressional approval, growing concerns over nuclear proliferation in the United States and the broader international community could pose significant obstacles to advancing future U.S.-South Korea cooperation on these issues.
For this reason, U.S. and South Korean policymakers should closely examine the U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement and develop diplomatic and institutional measures to address potential concerns and opposition surrounding nuclear-powered submarine and fuel cooperation.
First, South Korea should clearly differentiate its case from that of Saudi Arabia. Unlike Saudi Arabia, South Korea ratified and brought into force the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in 2004. Since then, it has accepted expanded IAEA access and short-notice inspections, strengthened the transparency of its civilian nuclear activities, and faithfully fulfilled its obligations under the international nonproliferation regime. South Korea should emphasize this strong nonproliferation record and make clear that any future uranium enrichment program for nuclear-powered submarine development would operate under the IAEA’s stringent safeguards and verification regime. In addition, Seoul should proactively propose additional enhanced safeguards and verification mechanisms to ensure that nuclear materials cannot be diverted for purposes beyond those agreed upon by Washington and Seoul.
Second, the United States and South Korea should develop a win-win strategy for civil nuclear industry cooperation. South Korea currently operates twenty-six nuclear power reactors and has emerged as a major exporter of nuclear power plants. To compete more effectively with China and Russia, whose influence in the global nuclear market continues to expand, the United States and South Korea should leverage their respective strengths to build a more competitive partnership. Given South Korea’s recent indication of energy as a priority sector for its investment projects in the United States, there is an opportunity to align these investments with expanded bilateral cooperation in the nuclear industry.
Finally, the most important prerequisite for U.S.-South Korea cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines and fuel is mutual trust. Such cooperation cannot be advanced solely through decisions by the executive branch in the United States; it will ultimately require the support and approval of Congress. However, the current U.S.-South Korea relationship faces multiple challenges spanning security, trade, and other areas. Rather than addressing nuclear cooperation in isolation, both governments should manage the alliance comprehensively and approach these issues with a long-term perspective, resolving them gradually while preserving the broader strength and credibility of the alliance.
Nagasaki warns of risk of nuclear war on 81st A-bomb anniversary

Nikkei Asian Review 9th Aug 2026
Mayor calls nuclear weapons an ‘absolute evil’ that cannot coexist with humanityMayor calls nuclear weapons an ‘absolute evil’ that cannot coexist with humanity
NAGASAKI, Japan (Kyodo) — Nagasaki on Sunday warned nuclear powers and deterrence-reliant nations of the increased risk of a war using nuclear weapons, as the Japanese city marked the 81st anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing with a resolve to prevent such a tragedy from ever happening again.
“Nuclear weapons are not a ‘necessary evil’ but an ‘absolute evil,’ and can never coexist with humanity,” Mayor Shiro Suzuki said in the Peace Declaration read during the annual memorial ceremony for the attack on the southwestern city, which followed the atomic bombing of Hiroshima three days earlier.
Adding cadence and vocal inflection, Suzuki’s powerful voice pierced through the Peace Park as he called the concept of nuclear deterrence “extremely dangerous and fragile.”
This year’s commemoration comes amid geopolitical tensions in the wake of the Middle East conflict and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
A moment of silence was held at 11:02 a.m., when the plutonium device codenamed “Fat Man” was dropped by a U.S. bomber and exploded over Nagasaki. It remains the last place to have suffered a nuclear attack.
Still, more than 12,000 nuclear warheads exist, Suzuki pointed out. He expressed concern over unpredictability in the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, where nuclear states are involved, referring to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the U.S.-led war on Iran.
The commemoration event at the Nagasaki park, located near the hypocenter, was attended by some 3,700 people, including representatives from 98 countries and regions, as well as the European Union.
U.S. Ambassador to Japan George Glass was not present at the ceremony, with Japan’s close security ally represented by Deputy Chief of Mission Aaron Snipe.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi delivered a speech following a brief heckle from the crowd, reiterating what she said in the Hiroshima commemoration last Thursday that Japan “is upholding” the three nonnuclear principles……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. https://asia.nikkei.com/spotlight/society/nagasaki-warns-of-risk-of-nuclear-war-on-81st-a-bomb-anniversary
The political implications of Hiroshima’s scarred “maidens”
Bulletin, By Alex Wellerstein | Article, Feature | August 6, 2026
On May 7, 1955, 25 young Japanese women arrived by airplane at Travis Airfield in California. They had flown there from Iwakuni Airbase in Tokyo a few days prior, with a layover in Honolulu. In California, a crowd greeted their arrival by showering them with flowers—and four women who, to the discomfort of many involved, used the opportunity to give a speech about the dangers of the hydrogen bomb.1
All of the women had been schoolchildren in Hiroshima on the morning of August 6, 1945, when the United States detonated an atomic bomb over the city. Many of them had been at work building firebreaks at the time of the bombing, and had all been severely burned by the attack. They were known in the press as the “Hiroshima Maidens,” and they were part of a trip, organized by a Japanese reverend and an American journalist, and with the hesitant blessing of the US State Department, to bring the women to the United States, so their scars might be healed through the power of American plastic surgery. The primary intent was to ease their individual suffering, but the trip was understood by all involved to be more than that: the wounds being healed were not just physical, but political.
Keloid scars are raised, thick, and irregular slabs of collagen. They can form after any injury, and can appear long after the injury itself. They generally do not hurt, but they can itch. They can also constrain muscle movement, decreasing mobility dramatically, depending on where they have formed. And they are disfiguring. For reasons that are apparently still not well-understood, such scars are more prone to develop in people of Asian, African, and Hispanic descent than in other peoples, and their heighted incidence among survivors of the atomic bombs has suggested that radiation exposure may increase the chances of their forming.
Photographs of the scarred bodies of atomic bomb victims are a common, if still controversial, accompaniment to discussions of the atomic attacks today. But in the immediate years after the end of World War II, they were much rarer. While an October 1945 story in LIFE magazine did feature two photographs of atomic victims, nearly all other popular photographs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the 1940s featured only photographs of the ruined buildings, not ruined bodies.
Less popularly, the bodies of victims were visible in official, technical publications on the “medical effects” of the bombs, with photographs of the victims months or even years after the bombings. These photographs were meant to display, cleanly and clinically, the effects of atomic bombs. They were not intended to provoke a sense of guilt, or even empathy, except as relates to how their audience might be interested in “effects data” for planning for the possible use of atomic bombs against themselves in the future.
Information about the survivors was tightly controlled within Japan by the occupation authorities, who feared that widespread discussion of the atomic bomb could lead to anti-American and pro-Communist sentiment.2
John Hersey’s Hiroshima, published as a full-issue of The New Yorker in August 1946, was the first publication to really give international audiences a view of what the atomic bombings were like from the perspective of the bombed. One of the six survivors that Hersey profiled was an American-educated Methodist reverend, Kiyoshi Tanimoto. Tanimoto’s account is gripping, and prominently features his inability to render the help to others that he wished that he could:
After crossing Koi Bridge and Kannon Bridge, having run the whole way, Mr. Tanimoto saw, as he approached the center, that all the houses had been crushed and many were afire. Here the trees were bare and their trunks were charred. He tried at several points to penetrate the ruins, but the flames always stopped him. Under many houses, people screamed for help, but no one helped; in general, survivors that day assisted only their relatives or immediate neighbors, for they could not comprehend or tolerate a wider circle of misery. The wounded limped past the screams, and Mr. Tanimoto ran past them.
Hersey’s account showed Tanimoto trying to help whom he could, but the magnitude of the disaster was overwhelming. Tanimoto himself suffered from a bout of radiation sickness, but recovered.
At the time of Hersey’s book, there was no agreed-upon term to use for those people who were at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the time of the bombings but who had not died. The term “survivor” was common in English usage, but the Japanese have tended to shy away from their equivalent (seizonshai), apparently finding it to contain a bit of guilt or blame in its focus on those who did not die. Conversely, the term “victim” appears to have been used more commonly in Japanese (higaisha) than in English, perhaps again because of its apparent connotation that the violence done to the Japanese was unjust. It is not clear exactly when the term hibakusha—“explosion-affected person”—became the preferred term; it seems like it was used in Japan by the mid-to-late 1950s, and became well-known in English only in the early 1960s.3
In the months after the bombing, his church destroyed, Tanimoto worked as a street preacher in Hiroshima. His message was both theological and political: Looking for someone to blame for the atomic bombing—whether the Americans who had dropped the bomb, or the Japanese military leaders who had started the war—was futile. Seek salvation through God alone. With parishioners, he began the work of rebuilding the church building, but the work was slow, for there was no money and few resources available. In 1948, he traveled to the United States to meet with an old classmate of his, in an effort to raise funds for a new church. While on the ship to San Francisco, he had an idea: He could dedicate his life to peace, and the rebuilding of his ruined Hiroshima would be the focal point for that. Without consulting anyone back home, he began to give sermons around the United States, taking up a collection for Hiroshima’s rebirth. By the end of 1949, he had visited over 250 American cities, and raised about $10,000 for the church.4
Tanimoto ultimately made a connection with the editor of the Saturday Review, Norman Cousins, who enthusiastically supported his plea, and ran an editorial proposing the creation of a World Peace Center in Hiroshima. Although the article claimed to be in the name of the inhabitants of Hiroshima, no one but Tanimoto was ever consulted. A Hiroshima Peace Center Foundation was set up in New York by Cousins, in order to receive American donations.5
A few years later, as part of his peace center efforts, Tanimoto began a Bible study class for a group of women that he apparently called his “Keloid girls.” He had offered other classes to victims of the bombing; the Keloid girls were special because their deformity and their sex was seen to demand a level of social exclusion that went beyond that of other Hiroshima victims. He would eventually petition the Hiroshima government for funds to give them plastic surgery, but was rejected. He then went to the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission, the American-run effort to study the medical effects of the atomic bombings, but he was told that this was outside the commission’s scope. The commission was not in the business of “treatment,” and keloids were not unique radiation effects.6
Eventually, Tanimoto received some funding for surgery on the Keloid Girls within Japan, bringing a group of them to Tokyo in the spring of 1952, just after the end of the American occupation. There was also one male victim in the group, Kiyoshi Kikkawa. The Japanese press, to the surprise of Kikkawa, became completely focused on the women, dubbing them the Genbaku Otome: “Atomic Bomb Maidens.” The women were attractive because of their symbolism of peaceful Japanese resilience. Kikkawa quickly felt it was going too far: At one point in their trip, the “maidens” were taken to tour a prison that held Japanese war criminals, and two of the “maidens” chosen as delegates proclaimed that while they had once held grudges against the Japanese militarists, they now saw them as being in the same situation as the survivors.7
The surgeries were at least somewhat successful. Tanimoto had been in touch with Cousins about the “maidens” ideas, and with this pilot project completed—and its publicity value proven in at least the Japanese context—Cousins was ready to push for an American side of it. This would be larger and grander: more “maidens” (no men, this time), and the surgeries would be done in the United States, where plastic surgery was state-of-the-art. Cousins is credited for transforming their name: Having changed from “Keloid Girls” to “Atomic Bomb Maidens,” they were now the “Hiroshima Maidens.”8
For six months, Cousins sought funding for the project from foundations. It would be expensive: the transportation and lodging alone would cost tens of thousands of dollars, and the operations would drive the cost into the hundreds of thousands. He saw little success, apparently because the foundations blanched at the possible negative publicity that might attach to the project.9………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. , the actual surgeries began. Over the next year, a team of surgeons at Mount Sinai, led by Barsky, performed over 140 operations on the women. When not in surgery, the women lived with host families. The operations were difficult. In some cases, there were dramatic improvements in mobility and appearance. One of the women, Tomako Nakabayashi, age 26, died of a heart attack during her third operation—a point that American newspapers made little of, but led Japanese newspapers to accuse the Americans of treating the women as guinea pigs.17
By the June 1956, 10 of the women were deemed ready to return home. The rest returned in late October 1956. The surgeries involving the women who survived were considered successful, although the reactions of people seeing them for the first time would often be to focus on the scarring that was still visible. But the women appear to have found the physical transformations a great boon, even if, as one later said, “there are lingering wounds in our hearts that have not healed.”18
The story of the “Hiroshima Maidens,” which has been told many times over the years, comes in two distinct modes. The “original” mode is optimistic and, perhaps, a bit naïve. It is the version of the story pushed by Tanimoto and Cousins and most of the press who eagerly covered the women once they arrived in the United States in May 1955. This version is one of rebirth: just as Hiroshima, the city, was in the process of rebuilding after the atomic bomb, so could Hiroshima’s inhabitants rebuild their lives, even their very flesh.
City organizers in Hiroshima embraced their own version of the narrative of the city’s rebirth. Starting in the 1940s, and accelerating in the 1950s and 1960s, they emphasized that the destruction at Hiroshima would be not its end, but its new beginning. There was a tactical element to this: They needed to attract resources for development and rebuilding, and leveraging their status and fame was a potent part of this appeal. It was not an approach that denied that the past destruction had occurred, obviously, for this could not be denied. The “rebirth” narrative would be a way to lean into that story and change its trajectory. Among the hibakusha, there were understandably mixed feelings about the approach. The famous “Atomic Bomb Dome”—the ruin of the former industrial exhibition hall near ground zero—ended up being the only preserved “monument” to the destruction, serving a focal point for Hiroshima’s peaceful rebirth activities, but its preservation was contentious.19
There is a more cynical read on the “Hiroshima Maidens” and the rebirth mode of talking about the bombings. For one, this version of the story almost exclusively focuses on Hiroshima, at the expense Nagasaki, even though the case for the use of the second atomic bomb, only three days after the first, has always seemed much weaker than the case for the use of the first.
The focus on “maidens” also creates additional places for critique. There were married and divorced hibakusha who were rejected from Tanimoto’s project, and after the pilot project’s single male hibakusha, the rest were all women. The exact reasons for this have not been articulated by the players involved, but it seems that Cousins and Tanimoto felt the maidens made for more sympathetic figures and gave the project more of an apolitical appearance.20 As Robert Jacobs has put it, the “Hiroshima Maidens” were:
…generally depicted as childlike, innocent and grateful. They were uniformly spoken of as being “almost pathologically shy,” and then “blossoming in the warmth they shared in the homes of American ‘parents.’” […] The use of the term “maiden” reveals the focus on the lack of romantic prospects for the women while reinforcing the image of their innocence and childlike nature. […] The Japanese women were all students when they suffered the atomic attack, thus sparing them of any complicity in the Japanese war effort, and casting them as victims themselves of Japanese military aggression.21
While the “Hiroshima Maidens” project was being planned, the discourse about the atomic bombings in Japan radically shifted. In early March 1954, the United States tested its first deliverable thermonuclear weapon at the Bikini Atoll, in the Marshall Islands. The detonation resulted in a massive plume of radioactive fallout that contaminated thousands of square miles of ocean and islands downwind of the test site and exposed a Japanese fishing boat, the Lucky Dragon No. 5, which had inadvertently strayed close to the test site. After they returned to Tokyo, the crew began showing the symptoms of radiation sickness, but not before their tuna catch was offloaded in Tokyo fish markets. Thus followed a tuna boycott and massive global attention to the issue of nuclear fallout. One of the crew would eventually die. Within Japan, this Bravo test became a major focal point for an emerging anti-nuclear political activism and generally led to an opening up of long-suppressed public discourse about Japan’s status as a “nuclear victim.”22
The “Hiroshima Maidens” project, however, was not part of this political movement. Tanimoto’s politics were far more conservative, more pro-American, and definitely not anti-nuclear. His was a politics of restoration and “moving on,” and, if anything more specific than that, about suppressing the anti-H-bomb sentiment of the Japanese that was being used to fuel protests against American military presence in Japan.23…………………………………………………………………………………………………..
The “Hiroshima Maidens” project, however, was not part of this political movement. Tanimoto’s politics were far more conservative, more pro-American, and definitely not anti-nuclear. His was a politics of restoration and “moving on,” and, if anything more specific than that, about suppressing the anti-H-bomb sentiment of the Japanese that was being used to fuel protests against American military presence in Japan.23
After their surgeries, few of the “maidens” sought additional attention. In the 1980s, Shigeko Sasamori lent her voice and authority as a hibakusha to a growing anti-nuclear movement. But most appear to have sought privacy after their period having their bodies and identities subjected to extreme focus, both positive and negative.27
The hibakusha, as the psychologist Robert Lifton observed in his in-depth study of them, have a complicated relationship with their status as victims. It is a no-win situation: If their victimhood is remarked upon or treated as special, they fear that any assistance rendered is inauthentic and confirms that they carry a stigma. If, on the other hand, they are ignored, they feel abandoned.28
Barsky, the plastic surgeon, continued his own kind of ministry. In 1969, he organized a clinic in Vietnam to operate on Vietnamese and Cambodian children who had been horribly burned by American munitions. The clinic operated on over a thousand children, including Kim Phuc, the famous “napalm girl.” After American surgeons fled during the fall of Saigon, the hospital was kept running, and still operates to this day.29
Scars are a sort of archive of a body’s experiences. They fade, and they can sometimes be healed. Scars in the mind are harder to see. But the scars of history, as played out in politics and attitudes and cultural creations, can outlive the people who experienced them firsthand. What does it mean to remove scars, or to preserve them? What story do the scars of history tell?
Most of the “Hiroshima Maidens” seem to have truly desired to be apolitical, which in this case seems primarily to mean non-controversial. This desire was, of course, impossible to fulfill. Their bodies were, by virtue of where they had been on the morning of August 6, 1945, inherently political. Plastic surgery could hide some of the scars. But being hibakusha appears to have thrust survivors of the bombings into a political position: One’s existence is some kind of statement about power, and so an object for others to use in making their own kinds of political statements. To gaze upon the body of a hibakusha is a political act—but so, also, is looking away.
Notes,………………………………………………………………………………………………………….https://thebulletin.org/2026/08/the-political-implications-of-hiroshimas-scarred-maidens/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=The%20%22Hiroshima%20maidens%22&utm_campaign=20260806%20Thursday%20Newsletter
Japan ‘cannot avoid’ nuclear weapons debate, defense chief Koizumi says
Japan Times, By Jesse Johnson, 19 July 26
Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has urged Japan to more openly debate nuclear weapons’ role in the country’s defense, a rare instance of a sitting Cabinet member broaching the highly contentious issue.
“While this is a difficult issue for Japan to discuss, one topic we cannot avoid is nuclear weapons,” Koizumi said during an online news program recorded Friday ahead of a trip to Europe.
Koizumi’s remarks come as the government weighs updates to key documents outlining Japan’s security policy — including a possible revision of the country’s decades-old pledge not to produce, possess or host nuclear weapons.
Formulated in 1967 and known formally as the country’s “three non-nuclear principles,” the pledge has consistently been upheld by governments since.
Senior government officials have traditionally shied away from public remarks on nuclear arms-related issues, as Japan — the sole country to have been attacked with the devastating weapons — retains strong sensitivities more than 80 years after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
According to an April poll by the Asahi Shimbun daily, 75% of those surveyed said the principles should be maintained, while 21% said they should be revised.
In December, a senior government official who advises Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on security triggered a firestorm after expressing a personal opinion that Japan should have nuclear weapons.
Still, talk of allowing U.S. nuclear weapons to be brought into Japan has grown after Takaichi sidestepped a question about her commitment to maintaining the pledge in its entirety last November in parliament.
In his comments, Koizumi said Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had prompted France to boost its nuclear capabilities and pushed Finland to OK the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory, dramatic shifts that he said were “being advanced under the serious assumption of a potential emergency.”
“Considering this, I believe we must make even greater efforts to explain that the security environment in which Japan finds itself requires us to approach every policy with a strong sense of crisis, discussing and advancing them without any taboos,” Koizumi said……………………………………………………………………………………………… https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/07/19/japan/politics/koizumi-japan-nuclear-weapons-debate/
Hiroshima marks 81st atomic bomb anniversary as mayor deplores the pursuit of nuclear weapons

By ASSOCIATED PRESS, 6 August 2026, https://www.dailymail.com/wires/ap/article-16032643/Hiroshima-marks-81st-atomic-bomb-anniversary-mayor-deplores-pursuit-nuclear-weapons.html
TOKYO (AP) – Hiroshima on Thursday marked the 81st anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of the western Japanese city, with its mayor criticizing major powers for waging wars and urging them to stop justifying the possession of nuclear weapons as a method of deterrence.
“Downplaying the inhumanity of nuclear weapons and accepting the use of force to pursue one´s own prosperity risk cycles of violent retaliation that could ultimately result in another Hiroshima or Nagasaki,” Mayor Kazumi Matsui said.
Too many political leaders still consider nuclear deterrence a realistic approach and legitimize violence, which “simply pushes a world without nuclear weapons further into the distance,” Matsui said in his peace declaration at the ceremony at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. He also called on each citizen to learn lessons from the past and take action.
About 50,000 people, including representatives from some 120 countries and regions including the United States and Iran, were to attend the ceremony. A minute of silence was held while a peace bell rang out at 8:15 a.m., the time when a U.S. B-29 dropped the bomb on the city.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who attended the memorial for the first time as prime minister, said she will take “a realistic approach” toward achieving a world where nuclear weapons are never used, within the framework of the United Nations’ treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
This year´s ceremony comes at a time of looming speculation that Takaichi´s hawkish government, which supports the idea of nuclear deterrence, may ease Japan´s postwar three non-nuclear principles when it compiles new security and defense documents later this year.
Takaichi has advocated a review of the principles for a possibility of dropping the third one – of not permitting nuclear weapons to be brought into the country.
Takaichi said Japan has maintained its postwar three non-nuclear principles, but fell short of expressing commitment for sticking with that policy into the future.
Survivors have expressed frustration and worry over growing support for the possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence by the international community, including Japan.
Japan is under the protection of U.S. nuclear umbrella and has repeatedly sought Washington’s reassurance for its commitment and a stronger protection. Because of that, Japan´s government has rejected the survivors´ request to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons or attend its meetings as observers.
The bombing of Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945, destroyed the city and killed 140,000 people. A second bomb dropped three days later on Nagasaki killed 70,000. Japan surrendered on Aug. 15, ending World War II and Japan´s nearly half-century of aggression in Asia.
The number of survivors has fallen to 91,105, about a quarter of the original number, with their average age exceeding 86. Survivors worry about fading memories, as the youngest of the survivors were too young to clearly recall the attack.
“The horror of nuclear weapons is just one lesson of Hiroshima. Another is the need to build a world in which the threat or use of these weapons becomes unthinkable,” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said in a written statement.
“Hiroshima stands as an inspiring example of resilience, renewal and hope. Across generations, its people remind us that, even after the darkest moments, we can choose – and build – a different future,” he said, calling for “dialogue over division, cooperation over confrontation and common security over narrow advantage.”
Japan begins 22nd release of Fukushima nuclear-contaminated wastewater into ocean

July 31, 2026, https://en.people.cn/n3/2026/0731/c90000-20483845.html
Japan on Thursday began a new round of discharge of nuclear-contaminated wastewater from the crippled Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the sea, marking the 22nd such release since the controversial operation began in 2023.
According to the plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO), about 7,800 tonnes of wastewater containing approximately 1.3 trillion becquerels of radioactive tritium will be released into the ocean.
The latest discharge, also the fourth round of wastewater release for fiscal 2026, is scheduled to continue through Aug. 17.
In the fiscal year that began in April, TEPCO plans to release a total of about 62,400 tonnes of wastewater in eight rounds.
Struck by a 9-magnitude earthquake and the ensuing tsunami on March 11, 2011, the Fukushima nuclear plant suffered core meltdowns that released radiation, resulting in a level-7 nuclear accident, the highest on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale.
Despite concerns and opposition from the international community, Japan unilaterally launched the ocean discharge of nuclear-contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi plant in August 2023. So far, TEPCO has completed 21 rounds of discharges, and around 165,000 tonnes of wastewater have been released into the sea.
China makes major nuclear expansion move, adds four new projects in $25 billion energy investment
China’s latest nuclear expansion will also feature the upgraded Hualong One Version 2.0 technology at the Taipingling Nuclear Power Plant in Guangdong Province.
Interesting Engineering, By Bojan Stojkovski, Aug 01, 2026
China is moving forward with a major expansion of its nuclear energy capacity after approving four new power projects expected to attract more than $25 billion in total investment.
The newly approved facilities include Phase II of the Jinqimen Nuclear Power Plant in Zhejiang Province, Phase III of the Taipingling Nuclear Power Plant in Guangdong Province, the Zhuanghe Nuclear Power Plant in Liaoning Province, and the Laiyang Nuclear Power Plant in Shandong Province.
Together, the projects will add eight new nuclear power generating units, according to media reports, as China continues to increase its reliance on nuclear energy as part of its broader energy strategy.
Six-unit nuclear base in Zhejiang with upgraded reactor technology
The Jinqimen Nuclear Power Plant is set to become the fourth nuclear energy base in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, as China continues expanding its low-carbon power infrastructure. The plant’s Phase II development will use Version 2.0 of Hualong One, China’s domestically developed third-generation nuclear reactor technology, while also allowing participation from private capital. ……
China’s latest nuclear expansion will also feature the upgraded Hualong One Version 2.0 technology at the Taipingling Nuclear Power Plant in Guangdong Province, according to CGN Power Co. Each reactor unit at the facility will have a generating capacity of 1,217 megawatts, with the six-unit plant expected to produce more than 55 billion kWh of electricity annually once fully operational.
Meanwhile, the Zhuanghe Nuclear Power Plant in Liaoning Province and the Laiyang Nuclear Power Plant in Shandong Province represent new nuclear development sites, according to statements from the companies involved.
The Laiyang Nuclear Power Plant in Shandong Province will feature two Guohe One reactors, China’s independently developed third-generation nuclear technology, according to SPIC Industry-Finance Holdings Co. Each unit will have a generating capacity of 1,543 megawatts, marking another addition to China’s expanding nuclear power infrastructure.
Moreover, with an investment of around $18 billion, the Laiyang plant is expected to become China’s largest nuclear power station by installed capacity once all six units are completed. The project also marks the beginning of large-scale, standardized construction of Guohe One reactors, China’s independently developed third-generation nuclear technology…………………..https://interestingengineering.com/energy/china-makes-major-nuclear-expansion-move
‘The heat took him from me’: India’s death toll rises amid escalating heat crisis

As extreme heat claims the lives of workers in
India’s poorest areas, many fear the true mortality rate is being
dangerously undercounted.
Guardian 29th July 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/29/extreme-heat-deaths-india-climate-crisis-environment
“Jobs Jobs Jobs” screams the media again as the nuclear lobby plans to brink Japan’s nuclear wastes to Cumberland

COMMENT Plan to Bring Failed Japanese Fast Breeder Reactor’s Contaminated Sodium to Workington – https://radiationfreelakeland.substack.com/p/plan-to-bring-failed-japanese-fast
Japanese reactor decommissioning to bring jobs to UK
Federica Bedendo 26 July 26, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0kmxl6ydpjo
New “highly skilled jobs” have been promised in the UK as part of plans to clean-up a nuclear reactor in Japan.
Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum are planning to build a facility at the Port of Workington, Cumbria, to support the decommissioning of the Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR), in Fukui Prefecture, Japan.
Cumberland Council, which owns the port, said the plant would support skilled jobs directly and across the supply chain.
Leader Mark Fryer said: “This is fantastic news for the port as this new development, subject to the necessary approvals, will bring good quality jobs to Workington.”
The construction phase is expected to be worth more than £25m and employ about 20 people during its seven-year operation, those behind the plans said.
The FBR was a sodium-cooled reactor that had been designed to burn most of its spent fuel, however it encountered several problems during its lifespan.
The Workington plant would be treating the sodium coolant, turning it into sodium hydroxide, a commercially usable product.
West Cumbria is a well-known area for the nuclear sector, due to the presence of the Sellafield nuclear plant, which is being decommissioned.
The Labour-led council has started work to clear the land at Workington’s Oldside as part of its wider regeneration plans in the town.
The aim is for the area to become a hub for clean energy, manufacturing and logistics, the council said.
A Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum spokesperson said: “We are fully committed to adding real social value to west Cumbia and this new venture will contribute to the regeneration on the Port of Workington and support the local economy.”
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