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Lingering effects of 2011 disaster take toll in fallout-hit Fukushima, experts warn

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A Buddhist priest prays on a beach in Minamisoma, Fukushima Prefecture, in March 2017. The area was hit hard by the 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster.
 
There are fewer and fewer headlines these days about the catastrophe resulting from the triple core meltdown in March 2011 at Tepco’s Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant. But participants at a recent symposium stressed that the disaster’s lingering effects continue to weigh heavily on people and municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture.
“In the post-disaster reconstruction, Miyagi Prefecture had to start from zero,” said former Fukushima University President Toshio Konno, who is from Onagawa, Miyagi Prefecture, and lost five relatives in the town when it was hit by tsunami caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake. “But Fukushima Prefecture had to start from a negative point because of the additional impact of the nuclear calamity. It is really hard for Fukushima to reach the zero point.”
During the symposium at Tokyo’s Waseda University on Saturday, Konno — who served on a Fukushima Prefectural Government committee tasked with judging whether deaths in the years following the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami were disaster-related — said that as of Sept. 30 last year, there were 3,647 such cases in Japan, of which Fukushima Prefecture accounted for 60 percent.
What’s more, Fukushima is the only prefecture among the three disaster-hit Tohoku prefectures that still sees people die from related causes. Since March 2016, Miyagi and Iwate prefectures, which were also hit by the quake and tsunami, have suffered no disaster-related deaths, while Fukushima has seen 50, Konno said.
He also said that the number of disaster-related suicides in Fukushima has grown over time compared with Iwate and Miyagi. Fukushima saw 10 such suicides in 2011, 13 in 2012, 23 in 2013, 15 in 2014 and 19 in 2015. Corresponding figures in Iwate and Miyagi, respectively, are 17 and 22 in 2011, eight and three in 2012, four and 10 in 2013, three and four in 2014 and three and one in 2015.
Takao Suami, a Waseda professor heading the university’s efforts to provide legal support for the reconstruction, said the government’s Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation was fairly helpful in addressing compensation issues until around the spring of 2014. But Suami said cases have emerged recently in which the utility, now known as Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc., refuses to accept reconciliation proposals put forward by the committee.
Yuichi Kaido, a lawyer working with some 3,000 residents of the village of Iitate on the compensation dispute resolution process, said that even though residents suffered exceedingly high levels of external radiation exposure immediately after the meltdowns — measuring 7 millisieverts on average — due to a delayed evacuation order, the committee proposed in December that only people whose exposure was 9 millisieverts or higher should be entitled to compensation, a threshold which covers just 200 people. (Nuclear power stations are legally required to limit the yearly radiation exposure for residents living nearby to 1 millisievert or less.)
Michitaro Urakawa, a professor emeritus of law at Waseda who says he supports the restart of nuclear plants, said the compensation system for victims of the nuclear disaster has a fundamental flaw. Tepco, he said, is benefitting from the injection of funds for compensation from the central government, while consumers — including low-income people in Fukushima Prefecture who did not have assets worth compensation — are helping the utility return the injected money to the government in the form of increased electricity bills.
Kaido and other lawyers called for reconstruction policies that truly meet the needs of Fukushima people, because compensation cannot cover damage that does not have a monetary value, such as the loss of communities, friendship, business ties and fears about the future, including the threat of health problems due to radiation exposure.
Another problem highlighted at the symposium was the unhealthy financial state of disaster-hit municipalities in Fukushima. Waseda professor Yoshihiro Katayama, a former Tottori governor who was internal affairs minister for the Democratic Party of Japan administration at the time of the meltdowns, said the municipalities will end up with excess personnel, creating a financial burden over the long term.
Disaster-hit municipalities in the prefecture are already facing financial strain. The town of Namie — roughly half of whose area lies within 20 km of the nuclear plant — saw its revenue grow from ¥9.48 billion in 2010 to ¥20 billion in 2016. But the portion of the funds from the central and prefectural governments increased to 87.2 percent from 68.6 percent, reducing the percentage of internal revenue to 12.8 percent from 31.4 percent.
Further, if the municipalities decide to end contracts commissioning administrative services to private firms, the local economy will suffer, Katayama said. He also expressed fear that the municipalities may have lost the know-how to assess the value of real estate, the basis of real estate taxes, an important revenue source.
Katayama also said the aging population will lead to a deep and serious problem in disaster-hit areas because many young people who evacuated will not return, causing such problems as difficulty maintaining the public health insurance system as well as city water and sewage systems. There will also be a shortage of nursing care workers and schools will be forced to close, he warned.
“Although the revenue of disaster-hit municipalities enormously expanded, the time will come when their administrative services have to shrink,” Katayama said. “Currently, the central government is taking special measures. But both the central government and the municipalities concerned must think about how to achieve a soft landing.”
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/01/31/national/social-issues/lingering-effects-2011-disaster-take-toll-fallout-hit-fukushima-experts-warn/

January 31, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

TEPCO refused in 2002 to calculate possible tsunami hitting Fukushima: ex-gov’t official

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The No. 3 reactor at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant is seen from a Mainichi Shimbun helicopter on Nov. 21, 2017
Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), operator of the disaster-stricken Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant, refused in 2002 to calculate the potential effects of tsunami in case of an earthquake off Fukushima Prefecture when a now-defunct nuclear watchdog told the utility to conduct an evaluation, the Mainichi Shimbun has learned.
A former safety screening division official of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) told the Mainichi Shimbun on Jan. 29 that TEPCO did not accept the agency’s request even though the latter tried to convince the utility after the government released a long-term assessment report that a major earthquake could hit off the Pacific coast including areas off Fukushima Prefecture, possibly triggering massive tsunami. This is the first time that exchanges between the then nuclear agency and TEPCO following the release of the government report have come to light.
In July 2002, the government’s Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion released the long-term assessment report saying that an earthquake similar to the 1896 Sanriku Earthquake could hit off the Pacific from the northern Sanriku to Boso areas. The official held a hearing on TEPCO the following month as to whether the report would affect safety measures at the Fukushima No. 1 plant.
According to the official as well as the statement submitted by the government to the trial of a lawsuit filed by Fukushima nuclear evacuees against TEPCO and the state, NISA told the utility to calculate a possible earthquake-tsunami disaster off the coast from Fukushima to Ibaraki prefectures, pointing out that Tohoku Electric Power Co. had been considering conducting an assessment on areas quite far south. In response, TEPCO representatives showed reluctance, saying that the calculation would “take time and cost money” and that there was no reliable scientific basis in the assessment report. The TEPCO officials reportedly resisted for about 40 minutes on the matter. In the end, the agency accepted the utility’s decision to shelve the earthquake-tsunami estimate.
In 2006, NISA again requested TEPCO to prepare its nuclear plants for massive tsunami exceeding envisioned levels, but the company did not comply, before finally conducting a calculation in 2008. The utility concluded that waves up to a height of 15.7 meters could hit the Fukushima plant, but did not take measures according to the estimate.
The former nuclear agency official said as someone involved in the screening of earthquake resistant measures it was very unfortunate that the accident at the Fukushima plant occurred, but stopped short of commenting on the legitimacy of the agency’s handling of the matter, saying, “I can’t put it in words casually.”
The attorney representing Fukushima nuclear evacuees in the redress suit commented that the finding exposes the maliciousness of TEPCO, while also pointing to the responsibility of the central government. A TEPCO public relations official, meanwhile, said that the company would not comment on the matter because the trial was ongoing.
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180130/p2a/00m/0na/017000c

January 31, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , , , | Leave a comment

Gov’t scrapped proposed Fukushima tsunami simulation 9 yrs before crisis

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Tokyo – The government proposed to Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc. that a simulation of tsunami waves striking Fukushima Prefecture be conducted nine years before the 2011 catastrophe that crippled its nuclear plant, but decided not to after the company objected, a document from an ongoing compensation suit showed Monday.
When the government’s earthquake research unit unveiled a long-term assessment in July 2002 saying that massive tsunami waves could occur anywhere along the Pacific coast in northeastern Japan, a now-defunct nuclear agency told the Fukushima plant operator the following month that a simulation of possible tsunami damage was needed, an agency official’s statement submitted to the Chiba District Court showed.
But Tepco rejected the proposal on the basis of research by a seismologist, according to Shuji Kawahara, the official of the defunct Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
The statement was presented in a lawsuit filed by nuclear disaster evacuees demanding compensation from the government and Tepco. The trial, along with other similar lawsuits filed nationwide, is focused on whether the government and Tepco were able to foresee the huge tsunami triggered by the 2011 earthquake and take preventive measures beforehand.
The magnitude-9.0 earthquake and ensuing tsunami struck northeastern Japan on March 11, 2011, resulting in a blackout at the plant and a consequent loss of reactor cooling functions. The plant suffered multiple meltdowns and hydrogen blasts.
According to Kawahara’s statement, the agency accepted Tepco’s rejection because the long-term assessment did not sufficiently show that a large tsunami was a realistic threat to the plant’s operation. The company also said it would give consideration to tsunami measures in the future.
Kawahara defended the agency’s response as legitimate under nuclear safety regulations in force at the time.
Tepco said it would not comment on matters related to ongoing court proceedings.

January 29, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

Work starts for industrial site in Futaba near Daiichi plant

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Work has begun near the damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant to prepare an area for a new industrial site.
 
A ground-breaking ceremony was held on Sunday in Futaba Town, Fukushima Prefecture, where the disabled plant is located.
 
Speaking at Sunday’s ceremony, Futaba Mayor Shiro Izawa said reconstruction work has finally started in the town.
 
He expressed hope that the site would facilitate the town’s recovery and the decommissioning work of the reactors.
 
The town’s first new industrial site since the accident will be built in its northeastern district.
 
‘The district’s relatively low level of radioactive contamination’ is paving the way for the early resettlement of residents and the resumption of business activities.
 
All residents of the town were ordered to evacuate soon after a major earthquake and tsunami in 2011 that destroyed the plant’s nuclear reactors.
 
The municipality has allocated about 50 hectares for the project. The aim is to make the district partially usable later this year.
 
Reconstruction Minister Masayoshi Yoshino said that along with this project, his ministry plans to decontaminate housing sites so that residents can return.
 
The municipal office says it intends to lease part of the industrial site to companies taking part in the decommissioning of the reactors.
 
The officials say they also plan to set up prefectural archives to preserve records of the 2011 disaster and nuclear accidents. They also plan to build an industrial exchange center where workers can hold meetings and have meals.

January 29, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , , | Leave a comment

Evacuations after Severe Nuclear Accidents by Dr Ian Fairlie,

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Evacuations after Severe Nuclear Accidents by Dr Ian Fairlie, January 27, 2018:

This article discusses three related matters –

  1. The experience of evacuations during the Fukushima nuclear disaster
  2. Whether lengthy evacuations from large cities are feasible?
  3. Some emergency plans for evacuations in North America

(a) Introduction

If another severe nuclear accident, such as Windscale (in 1957), Chernobyl (1986) or Fukushima (2011) were to occur then the adverse health effects would primarily depend on wind direction and on the nature of the accident. The main responses to a nuclear disaster are shelter, evacuation and stable iodine prophylaxis. The most important, in terms of preventing future cancer epidemics, is evacuation. This article is based on North American evacuation plans. Little is known of UK emergency evacuation plans as few, if any, are publicly available.

In North American plans, if a severe nuclear accident were to occur, able citizens would be requested to leave designated evacuation/no entry zones under their own steam and to find accommodation with family and friends in uncontaminated areas. At the same time, Government authorities would evacuate prisons, hospitals, nursing homes, care homes and certain schools.

Little, if any, consideration seems to have been given to how long such evacuations would last. For example, the large majority of the 160,000 people who left or were evacuated from Fukushima Prefecture, Japan during the accident in March 2011 are still living outside the Prefecture. Many are living in makeshift shelters eg shipping containers or prefab houses.

At present, the Japanese Government is attempting to force evacuees (by withdrawing state compensation) to return to less contaminated areas, with little success. Currently, ~7 years after the accident, an area of about 1,000 square km is still subject to evacuation and no entry orders. This compares with the area of 2,700 square km still evacuated and subject to no or restricted entry at Chernobyl ~32 years after the accident.

(b) Experience of the Fukushima Evacuation

In 2015 and 2016, the author visited Fukushima Prefecture in Japan with international study teams. These study tours were informative as they revealed information about the evacuations that differed from official accounts by TEPCO and the Japanese Government. From many discussions with local mayors, councillors, local health groups and small community groups, the following information was revealed.

The most common figure cited for evacuees is 160,000, of which 80,000 were evacuated by the authorities and the rest left on their own, often on foot, cycles and carts. It took about two weeks to evacuate all parts of the initial 20 km (later 30 km) radius evacuation areas around the Fukushima reactors.

The main reason for the delays was that many roads in the Prefecture were jammed with gridlocks which sometimes lasted 24 hours a day, for several days on end on some roads. These traffic jams were partly due to the poor existing road infrastructure and partly due to many road accidents. These jams were of such severity that safety crews for the Fukushima nuclear station had to be moved in and out mostly by helicopter. All public transport by trains and buses ceased. Mobile telephone networks and the internet crashed due to massive demand.

Thousands of people either refused to leave their homelands or returned later. Older farmers often refused to leave their animals behind or be moved from their ancestral lands. In at least a dozen recorded cases, older farmers slaughtered their cow herds rather than leave them behind (dairy cows need to be milked daily): they then committed suicide themselves in several instances (see next section).

According to Hachiya et al (2014), the disaster adversely affected the telecommunications system, water supplies, and electricity supplies including radiation monitoring systems. The local hospital system was dysfunctional; hospitals designated as radiation-emergency facilities were unable to operate because of damage from the earthquake and tsunami, and some were located within designated evacuation zones. Emergency personnel, including fire department personnel, were often asked to leave the area.

At hospitals, evacuations were sometimes carried out hurriedly with the unfortunate result that patients died due to intravenous drips being ripped out, medicaments being left behind, the absence of doctors and nurses who had left, and ambulance road accidents (see next section). Many hastily-allocated reception centres (often primary schools) were either unable or ill-equipped to deal with seriously ill patients.

Much confusion resulted when school children were being bussed home, while their parents were trying to reach schools to collect their children. Government officials, doctors, nurses, care workers, police, firepersons, ambulance drivers, emergency crews, teachers, etc faced the dilemma of whether to stay at their posts or return to look after their families. In the event, many emergency crews refused to enter evacuation zones for fear of radiation exposure.

Stable iodine was not issued to most people. Official evacuation plans were either non-existent or inadequate and, in the event, next to useless. In many cases, local mayors took the lead and ordered and supervised evacuations in their villages without waiting for orders or in defiance of them. Apparently, the higher up the administrative level, the greater the levels of indecision and lack of responsibility.

In the years after the accident, the longer-lasting effects of the evacuations have become apparent. These include family separations, marital break-ups, widespread depression, and further suicides. These are discussed in a recent publication (Morimatsu et al, 2017) which relates the sad, often eloquent, stories of the Fukushima people. They differ sharply from the accounts disseminated by TEPCO.

(c) Deaths from evacuations at Fukushima

Official Japanese Government data reveal that nearly 2,000 people died from the effects of evacuations necessary to avoid high radiation exposures from the Fukushima disaster, including from suicides http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main – cat2/sub – cat2 – 1/20141226_kanrenshi.pdf

The uprooting to unfamiliar areas, cutting of family ties, loss of social support networks, disruption, exhaustion, poor physical conditions and disorientation resulted in many people, in particular older people, apparently losing their will to live. www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/62562.docx

The evacuations also resulted in increased levels of illnesses among evacuees such as hypertension, diabetes mellitus and dyslipidaemia (Hasegawa, 2016), psychiatric and mental health problems (Sugimoto et al, 2012), polycythaemia- a slow growing blood cancer (Sakai et al, 2014 and 2017), cardiovascular disease (Ohiro et al, 2017), liver dysfunction (Takahashi A et al, 2017) and severe psychological distress (Kunii et al, 2016).

Increased suicide rates occurred among younger and older people following the Fukushima evacuations, but the trends are unclear. A 2014 Japanese Cabinet Office report stated that, between March 2011 and July 2014, 56 suicides in Fukushima Prefecture were linked to the nuclear accident. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/26/national/social-issues/fukushimas-high-number-disaster-related-suicides-likely-due-nuclear-crisis-cabinet-office/#.Vcstm_mrGzl

(d) Should evacuations be ordered?

The above account should not be taken as arguments against evacuations as they constitute an important dose-saving and life-saving strategy during emergencies. Instead, the toll from evacuations should be considered part of the overall toll from nuclear accidents.

In future, deaths from evacuation-related ill-heath and suicides should be included in assessments of the fatality numbers from nuclear disasters. http://www.ianfairlie.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Summing-up-the-Effects-of-the-Fukushima-Nuclear-Disaster-10.pdf

For example, although about 2,000 deaths occurred during and immediately after the evacuations, it can be calculated from UNSCEAR (2013) collective dose estimates that about 5,000 fatal cancers will arise from the radiation exposures at Fukushima, ie taking into account the evacuations. Many more fatal cancers would have occurred if the evacuations had not been carried out.

There is an acute planning dilemma here: if evacuations are carried out (even with good planning) then illnesses and deaths will undoubtedly occur. But if they are not carried out, even more people could die. In such situations, it is necessary to identify the real cause of the problem. And here it is the existence of NPPs near large population centres. In such cases, consideration should be given to the early closure of the NPPs, and switching to safer means of electricity generation.

(e) Very Large Cities: Evacuations for lengthy periods?

If another severe nuclear accident were to occur, the death toll would depend on wind direction and whether the reactors were close to large cities. For example, Pickering NPP is located 20 miles from Toronto in Canada with an urban population of ~5 million; Indian Point NPP in the state of New York US is located 30 miles from New York City (~9 million); and Dungeness NPP is located 50 miles from London, UK (~9 million). These nuclear stations are just major examples of nuclear power stations located relatively close to urban centres, especially in the UK, US, and France.

If the worst were to occur and radioactive plumes from a severe nuclear accident reached large cities, would it be feasible to evacuate them quickly, and would it be feasible to do so for lengthy periods? There appears to be little literature on these questions, but it is expected that severe logistical problems would exist with the timely evacuation of millions of residents, workers and visitors from major cities,

(d) US Evacuation Plans after nuclear accidents – viability?

In the US, viable evacuation plans are a legal NRC requirement for continued reactor operation. But “viability” has often been a contentious legal issue in the past. http://articles.latimes.com/1987-02-07/news/mn-1732_1_davis-besse.

For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, this issue was at the centre of court battles at the Davis Besse reactor in Ohio and the Seabrook nuclear power station in New Hampshire. It played a critical role in the shutdown of the Shoreham reactor on Long Island, New York state. http://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/14/us/around-the-nation-court-delays-license-for-ohio-nuclear-plant.html?mcubz=3.

After a major 1986 earthquake damaged the Perry reactor in Ohio on the north shore of Lake Erie, the then Ohio Governor, Richard Celeste, sued the US NRC to delay its issuance of the plant’s operating license on the grounds of the non-viability of evacuation of large population centres nearby. The US population within 80 km of Perry nuclear station was 2,300,000. Canadian populations would have been affected but were not included. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perry_Nuclear_Generating_Station#cite_note-7

An Ohio state commission concluded evacuation of nearby large cities during a disaster at Perry was not possible. http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2011/09/perry_nuclear_reactors_risk_of.html

 (e) Evacuation plans in Canada

In Canada, the Ontario Government has been developing evacuation plans for the Pickering nuclear station near Toronto since 1980, but whether the feasibility of such plans has kept up with the significant population growth around the station over 40 years is an open question.

Their draft plans have involved many Government Departments and hundreds of individuals. See https://www1.toronto.ca/city_of_toronto/office_of_emergency_management/files/pdf/nuclear_rsp.pdf

https://www.emergencymanagementontario.ca/english/beprepared/ontariohazards/nuclear/nuclear_plan_pickering.html

https://www.emergencymanagementontario.ca/english/beprepared/ontariohazards/nuclear/provincial_nuclear_emergency_response_plan.html#P2618_168284

However, the matter of evacuation is relatively undeveloped: future detailed plans remain to be drawn up by local governments in and near Toronto. This is perhaps unsurprising given the difficulties involved, but it appears that many issues remain to be resolved. For example,

  • How long would it take to untangle traffic jams exiting the city?
  • How long it would take for drivers to reach their emergency vehicles and school buses?
  • Would emergency crews enter contaminated zones to deal with accidents?
  • What happens when residents refuse to leave?
  • How to deal with residents who return?
  • How lomg would evacuations last? Months, years,  decades?

Another issue is what happens when people, who are asked not to leave, decide to evacuate?  In 1979, during the Three Mile Island nuclear accident near Harrisburg in Pennsylvania US, evacuation requests were made for approximately 3,500 vulnerable older people, children and pregnant women. The result was 140,000 immediately fled the area, thus creating large traffic jams which impeded the evacuations of vulnerable people. (Ziegler and Johnson, 1984).

The Canadian plans reveal that, in the event of a severe accident, evacuation will be for a radius of 20 km from the NPPs (in the direction of the plume). This differs from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s two emergency planning zones around NPPs – a plume exposure pathway zone with a radius of 16 km, concerned primarily with exposure to, and inhalation of, airborne radioactive contamination. Secondly, an ingestion and direct radiation pathway zone of 80 km, primarily concerned with ingestion of contaminated foods/ liquids and ground radiation from deposited Cs-137. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perry_Nuclear_Generating_Station#cite_note-6

(f) Conclusions

The experiences of Japanese evacuees after Fukushima discussed above are distressing to read. Their experiences were terrible, so much so that it requires Governments of large cities with nearby NPPs to reconsider their own situations and to address the question… what would happen if radioactive fallout heavily contaminated large areas of their city and required millions of residents to leave for long periods of time, eg several decades?

And how long would evacuations need to continue….weeks, months, years, or decades? The time length of evacuations is usually avoided in the evacuation plans seen so far. In reality, the answer would depend on Cs-137 concentrations in surface soils. The time period could be decades, as the half-life of the principal radionuclide, Cs-137, is 30 years. This raises the possibility of large cities becoming uninhabited ‘ghost’ towns like Tomioka, Okuma, Namie, Futaba, etc in Japan and Pripyat in Ukraine.

This bleak reality is hard to accept or even comprehend. However it is a matter that some Governments need to address after Fukushima.

Wheatley et al (2017) comprehensively examined the historical records of 216 nuclear accidents, mishaps and near-misses since the mid-1950s. They predicted the future frequencies and severities of nuclear accidents and concluded both were “unacceptably high”. Wheatley et al (2016) also concluded that the relative frequency with which nuclear events cascaded into nuclear disasters remained large enough that, when multiplied by their severity, the aggregate risk to society was “very high”. It is unsurprising that, after Fukushima, several major European states including Germany and Switzerland have decided to phase-out their nuclear reactors.

References

Hachiya M, Tominaga T, Tatsuzaki H, Akashi M (2004) Medical Management of the Consequences of the Fukushima nuclear power plant incident. Drug Dev Res. 2014 Feb;75(1):3-9.

Hasegawa A, Ohira T, Maeda M, Yasumura S Tanigawa K (2016) Emergency Responses and Health Consequences after the Fukushima Accident; Evacuation and Relocation. Clin Oncol (R Coll Radiol) 2016 Apr;28(4):237-44.

Kunii Y et al and Mental Health Group of the Fukushima Health Management Survey(2016) Severe Psychological Distress of Evacuees in Evacuation Zone Caused by the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: The Fukushima Health Management Survey. PLoS One. 2016 Jul 8;11(7).

Morimatsu A; Sonoda M; M.A.; M.K.; Edited by Fields, L (2017) “Seeking Safety: Speeches, Letters and Memoirs by Evacuees from the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Disaster. https://redkimono.org/fukushima-memoirs/

Ohira T and Fukushima Health Management Survey Group (2017) Changes in Cardiovascular Risk Factors After the Great East Japan Earthquake. Asia Pac J Public Health (2017) Mar;29(2_suppl):47S-55S.

Sakai A and Fukushima Health Management Survey Group (2017) Persistent prevalence of polycythaemia among evacuees 4 years after the Great East Japan Earthquake: A follow-up study. Prev Med Rep. 2017 Jan 12;5:251-256

Sakai A, Ohira T, Hosoya M, Ohtsuru A, Satoh H, Kawasaki Y, Suzuki H, Takahashi A, Kobashi G, Ozasa K, Yasumura S, Yamashita S, Kamiya K, Abe M (2014) Life as an evacuee after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident is a cause of polycythaemia: the Fukushima Health Management Survey. BMC Public Health 2014 Dec 23;14:1318.

Sugimoto S Krull S Nomura T Morita and M Tsubokura (2012) The voice of the most vulnerable: lessons from the nuclear crisis in Fukushima, Japan. Bull World Health Organ. 2012 Aug 1; 90(8): 629–630.

Takahashi A et al and Fukushima Health Management Survey Group (2017) Effect of evacuation on liver function after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident: The Fukushima Health Management Survey. J Epidemiol 2017 Apr;27(4):180-185.

UNSCEAR (2013) Levels and effects of radiation exposure due to the nuclear accident after the 2011 great east-Japan earthquake and tsunami. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation . New York.

Weinisch K, Brueckner P (2015) The impact of shadow evacuation on evacuation time estimates for nuclear power plants. J Emerg Manag. 2015 Mar-Apr;13(2):145-58.

Wheatley S, Sovacool B, Sornette D (2016) Reassessing the safety of nuclear power. Energy Research & Social Science Volume 15, May 2016, 96-100.

Wheatley S, Sovacool B, Sornette D (2017) Of Disasters and Dragon Kings: A Statistical Analysis of Nuclear Power Incidents and Accidents. Risk Anal. 2017 Jan;37(1): 99-115.

Ziegler DJ and Johnson JH (1984) Evacuation Behaviour In Response To Nuclear Power Plant Accidents. The Professional Geographer Volume 36, 1984 – Issue 2 Pages 207-215.

http://www.ianfairlie.org/news/evacuations-severe-nuclear-accidents/

Another article from Ian Fairlie from August 2015 deserves another read:

https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201508201025992771/

January 29, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | 2 Comments

72nd financial payment for Tepco: 2.7 billion dollars

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72nd financial payment for Tepco: more than 8,000 billion yen loaned without interest
Tepco announces that it has received the 72nd financial payment from the government support structure which gives it money for compensation: 293.5 billion yen (2.7 billion dollars at the current rate). This amount is about 10 times higher than the last time and this money is loaned without interest.
Tepco has already received a total of 8,032.1 billion yen (73.6 billion dollars at the current rate) if we take into account this payment and this will not be enough.

January 29, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , , | Leave a comment

The corium of reactor 2 of Fukushima Daiichi is clearly visible

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Fukushima Blog by Pierre Fetet
Translation Hervé Courtois
 
It has been almost seven years since this deadly magma was created thanks to the imbecility of men. 7 years that we talk about it without ever really seeing it. And now Tepco, in January 2018, unveils, for the first time and in a very discreet manner, some very telling images of the corium of Fukushima Daiichi’s reactor 2.
 
Above illustration: screenshot made from a Tepco video
 
At first, all the media published again the photos provided by Tepco, where one sees for example a piece of a fuel assembly’s handle. It was deduced that the rest had melted but nothing more could be said.
 
In a second time, 3 days later, Tepco added a video of 3min34 that shows a selection of footage filmed inside the containment. In this video, we see very precisely corium flows that have solidified on metal structures under the reactor vessel.
 
The camera that filmed this hyper-radioactive material was designed to support 1000 Sieverts. But this device can not hide the ionizing radiation that forms many random clear points on the film.
 
The men who manipulated the probe outside the containment were certainly irradiated because the dose rate is still very high in the reactor. But Tepco has not yet released this information.
 
To summarize in images what happened in March 2011, the corium of reactor 2 passed through the reactor vessel, then made a 1 m wide large hole in the platform just below the reactor vessel:
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Source Tepco
Then it continued on its way encountering obstacles, forming stalactites in various places:
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Screenshots of the Tepco video
Finally, it spread to the bottom of the containment by cutting into the concrete. And there, we lose track because the investigations could not go further.
 
Has it gone far off the ground plate ? Did it join the toric pool by the pipes connecting the enclosure and the pool?
Let’s not forget that an explosion was heard by technicians on March 15, 2011 at 6:10 from reactor 2. Steam explosion?
Do not forget that the water that is injected continuously to cool the corium does not fill the enclosure because it is no longer intact.The water is permanently contaminated by the corium, before reaching the bottom of the plant and the groundwater. Let’s not forget that this moving groundwater flows into the Pacific, despite the ice wall, which is not perfectly watertight.
 
It will be observed that Tepco has not yet dared to provide a picture of the hole in the reactor vessel. It’s like the explosion of reactor 4, there are things that are better not to be disclosed because they tarnish the image of civil nuclear.
 
In the same manner, the people in charge of communication preferred to broadcast uncertain images on the 19th of January rather than these very interesting images which I extracted from the video.
 
Certainly, robotics in a radioactive environment has made real progress, but that hides the reality: we have not yet invented the machines that can dismantle the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. And the forty years promise to complete this dismantling will certainly be insufficient.
 
Let’s not forget that there are all in all 3 coriums to recover and 3 swimming pools full of fuel to empty.
 
While Tepco “amuses” us with its technique, Tepco hopes to release 1 million tons of radioactive water in the Pacific that its has collected on the site, as if this ocean had not already suffered enough. It also makes it possible to forget the thousands of people suffering from thyroid disorders or other various pathologies due to radioactivity and the tens of thousands of displaced people who are being forced to return to contaminated territories.
 
Let’s wait for the big communication from TEPCO: the athletes of 2020 (Tokyo Olympics) must be amazed by the Japanese hyper-technicality so as to forget the basic dangers of ambient radioactivity.
 

January 28, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | 1 Comment

Comparison study of calculated beta- and gamma-ray doses after the Fukushima accident in Minamisoma: skin dose estimated to be 164 mSv over 3 years

Comparison of calculated beta- and gamma-ray doses after the Fukushima accident with data from single-grain luminescence retrospective dosimetry of quartz inclusions in a brick sample
Satoru Endo Keisuke Fujii Tsuyoshi Kajimoto Kenichi Tanaka Valeriy Stepanenko Timofey Kolyzhenkov Aleksey Petukhov Umukusum Akhmedova Viktoriia Bogacheva
Journal of Radiation Research, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrr/rrx099
Published: 27 January 2018

ABSTRACT

To estimate the beta- and gamma-ray doses in a brick sample taken from Odaka, Minami-Soma City, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, a Monte Carlo calculation was performed with Particle and Heavy Ion Transport code System (PHITS) code. The calculated results were compared with data obtained by single-grain retrospective luminescence dosimetry of quartz inclusions in the brick sample. The calculated result agreed well with the measured data. The dose increase measured at the brick surface was explained by the beta-ray contribution, and the slight slope in the dose profile deeper in the brick was due to the gamma-ray contribution. The skin dose was estimated from the calculated result as 164 mGy over 3 years at the sampling site.

INTRODUCTION

The main fission products from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (FDNPP) accident are 129mTe-129Te, 131I, 132Te-132I, 134Cs, 136Cs and 137Cs [1–4]. These radionuclides emit gamma rays and beta rays through β− decay. However, there are few studies about dose estimation from beta-ray irradiation following the FDNPP accident [5–7]. The beta-ray dose contributes to the whole-body dose among small biota, such as insects, plant leaves, and human skin. Therefore, beta-ray dose estimations are important for the risk assessment of the impact of the FDNPP accident (including on small biota) to clarify the effects of this large-scale radiological accident.
Retrospective dosimetry with brick samples has been used to evaluate the gamma-ray dose of the Hiroshima atomic bomb [8–10], the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident [11–14], and the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapon testing [15, 16]. Recently, Stepanenko et al. [17] used retrospective dose evaluation of brick samples to estimate gamma-ray doses and perform beta-ray dose reconstruction for the FDNPP accident with a similar method to that used for a Hiroshima tile sample [18]. They used a single-grain quartz optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) method (similar to that of Ballarini et al. [19], although layer-by-layer consequences for very thin layers of the sample’s aliquots were used for analysis, with separate dose calibration for each quartz grain) with brick samples taken in 2014 from Odaka, Minami-Soma City, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan [17]. Dose enhancement near the surface of the brick was identified by the OSL measurements [17]. Stepanenko et al. suggested that the enhancement was caused by the beta-ray dose from the deposited fission products [17].
To establish the cause of the dose enhancement near the brick surface, we performed a Monte Carlo simulation of a small brick building with radionuclides uniformly distributed on the ground surface. The calculated results were compared with the data measured by Stepanenko et al. [17]. The depth profiles of the dose in the brick sample for beta rays and gamma rays were estimated separately, and the dose enhancement near the brick surface was discussed.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Particle and Heavy Ion Transport code System calculation
The energy deposition as a function of depth in the brick wall of a small building was calculated using the Particle and Heavy Ion Transport code System (PHITS) Monte Carlo code Ver. 2.52 [20]. The calculation geometries are shown in Fig. 1. The calculation regions were 1 m × 1 m for beta rays and 21 m × 21 m for gamma rays. The calculation regions consisted of ground, air, and the small brick building (red region: 0.5 m × 0.5 m square, 1.5 m high, wall thickness of 10 cm). The brick building was located in the center of the soil surface. Beta- or gamma-ray sources were uniformly distributed in the 5-mm-thick soil surface (brown region). To save calculation time, the previously reported mirror condition was used for these calculations [21]. Figure 1a shows the geometry used to calculate the radiation that entered the calculation region (outer source calculation) via the mirror boundary. First, the histories for the particles were accumulated near the mirror boundary (green lines) without the brick building. Second, the particles were generated from the mirror boundary (back line) in Fig. 1b according to the accumulated histories. The generated particles were transported to the brick wall cells (yellow box) of the brick building. Third, radiation was generated from the surface of the 5-mm-thick soil layer (brown region) in the calculation region (inner source calculation) in Fig. 1b. The energy deposition in brick cell layers of 10 m × 10 cm and thicknesses of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 1, 3, 5, 7.5, 10, 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100 mm were obtained by summing the outer and inner source calculations corrected with the number of particles generated per unit area.

 

1.png

(a) Mirror condition calculation, (b) top view and (c) side view of the calculation geometry.

Beta and gamma rays from 129mTe, 129Te, 131I, 132Te, 132I, 134Cs and 137Cs were calculated separately. Beta-ray energy spectra were taken from the literature [5], and the internal conversion electrons of 137Cs were taken from the website of the National Nuclear Data Center [21]. The gamma-ray energies and emission rates for the radionuclides were taken from the National Nuclear Data Center [22].
 
The elemental composition of the brick sample was Si: 28.9, Si: 50.4, Al: 17.5, Fe: 1.4 and Ti: 1.8 wt %, and those of soil and air were taken from the literature [8].
Air dose and tissue dose calculation
 
The air and tissue dose rates at the i-th depth per unit deposition density of 1 Bq/m2, Dijk (Gy Bq−1 s−1 m2), for beta and gamma rays, were calculated from the calculated results of the energy deposition in brick as:
Dijk=Ij⋅fcajc∫∞0EijkmbdE(j=β,γ;k=129mTe,129Te,131I,132Te,132I,134Cs,137Cs),
(1) where Eijk is the energy deposition (J) at the i-th depth by beta or gamma rays from the k-th radionuclide, mb is the brick sample mass (kg), and aj is the area of the source (0.75 and 1 m2 for inner and outer beta calculations, 440.75 and 441 m2 for the inner and outer gamma calculations, respectively). Ij is the emission rate for beta or gamma rays per Bq and fc is the conversion factor of the stopping power ratio [23] for beta rays and the kerma ratio [24] for gamma rays between air or tissue and brick to convert from the brick dose to the air or tissue doses.
Cumulative dose estimation
 
The dose rate at the sampling point can be calculated by the measured deposition density, Ak, for each radionuclide at the sampling point of Odaka, Minami-Some City by multiplying the calculated result by Eq. 1. The change in dose rate over time is assumed to depend only on the half-lives of the radionuclides. Therefore, the cumulative dose, Ditot, for the i-th depth can be integrated by:
Ditot=∑k∑j∫τ0Ak⋅Dijk(12)tTkdt,
(2) where Tk is the half-life for each radionuclide of k = 129mTe, 129Te, 131I, 132Te, 132I, 134Cs and 137Cs (Table 1), and τ is the time period from deposition to the brick sampling date.

 

Capture du 2018-01-27 19-32-40

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Calculated dose rate for beta and gamma rays
 
A 137Cs deposition density of 308 kBq/m2 and the ratio of each radionuclide to 137Cs deposition density taken from the literature [1] were used to obtain Ak for each radionuclide. The deposition densities for the seven radionuclides are listed in Table 2. The beta-ray dose rates on the brick surface and gamma-ray dose rate at a depth of 0.5 mm in the brick at a height of 80 cm are shown in Fig. 2a and b, respectively. 129m, 129Te contributed less to the gamma-ray dose rate, and accounted for the third and fourth largest contribution to the beta-ray dose rate. This is due to the small gamma-ray emission rate per decay of 129m, 129Te of <10%. The gamma- and beta-ray doses decreased by ~10% and ~30%, respectively, over 1 month. The calculated beta-ray dose rate decreased slower than the calculated gamma-ray dose rate.

 

Capture du 2018-01-27 19-34-49.png

Capture du 2018-01-27 19-36-45.png

Capture du 2018-01-27 19-39-01

Air dose rates of (a) beta rays and (b) gamma rays over time.

Beck reported conversion factors for various radionuclides to estimate the air dose rate at a height of 1 m from the unit deposition density of radionuclides [25]. The initial gamma-ray air dose rates (15 March 2011) at a height of 80 cm from the ground for each radionuclide obtained by our calculations were compared with the values estimated by Beck conversion factors [25] interpolated at a relaxation depth of 0.65 g/cm2 (Table 2). The present dose rates were estimated to be 57% lower than those calculated by Beck conversion factors. The present dose rates were in-brick values in one of the walls of the brick building, whereas the Beck conversion factor values were free-in-air values. Therefore, the difference of 57% can be explained by shielding effects, whereby gamma rays from behind the building are neglected.
Cumulative dose
 
The cumulative dose over 3 years, from 12 March 2011 (Unit 1 explosion) to 19 March 2014 (brick sampling by Stepanenko et al.) and the dose rate change over time are shown in Fig. 3. The solid line shows the calculation result, the dashed histograms are the averaged calculation values for the measured sample thickness, and the open circles are Stepanenko’s data [17]. The calculation agreed well with the data measured by Stepanenko et al. in the region deeper than 10 mm. The results indicated that the cumulative dose deeper in the brick was due to gamma rays, and that the dose enhancement at the surface was dominated by the beta-ray contribution. The difference between the calculated and measured doses at the surface was about 2 standard deviations. A possible explanation might be connected with the contributions of low γ emission rate radionuclides, such as 89Sr, 127mTe-127Te, 140Ba-140La, etc. However, the trend in the dose increase at the brick surface was supported by the calculations. Therefore, the single-grain OSL measurement by Stepanenko et al. shows the advantage of dose estimations not only the cumulative gamma-ray dose but also the cumulative beta-ray dose. Thus, we concluded that the single-grain OSL method is a good tool for retrospective beta-ray dose estimation.

 

Capture du 2018-01-27 19-42-01.png

Comparison of the calculated beta rays (chain line), gamma rays (dotted line), beta + gamma rays (solid line), dose averaged over sample depth (dashed histogram), and data measured by Stepanenko et al. (open circles).

 

The calculated tissue dose at a brick depth of 50 μm was assumed to be a skin dose, and would be similar to a 70-μm tissue dose. The skin dose was estimated to be 164 mSv for 3 years at the sampling location.

CONCLUSION

To confirm the cause of the dose enhancement near the surface of a brick sample taken from Odaka, Minami-Soma City, Japan, a Monte Carlo calculation was performed using PHITS code and the calculated results were compared with measurements. The calculated results agreed well with previously published measured data. The dose enhancement at the brick surface in the measured data was explained by the beta-ray contribution, and the gentle slope in the dose profile deeper in the brick was due to the gamma-ray contribution. The calculated result estimated the skin dose to be 164 mGy (164mSv) over 3 years at the sampling location.

Source: https://academic.oup.com/jrr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jrr/rrx099/4827065

 

January 27, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , , | Leave a comment

Simple Error or Calculated Revisionism?

From Majia’s Blog
I was reading a Mainichi news story this morning on airborne radiation levels near Fukushima Daiichi, which remain quite elevated.

What struck me about the reported story is the assertion that the government set the radiation exposure level at 1 millisievert a year after the accident:

Airborne Radiation Near Fukushima Nuke Plant Still Far Higher Than Gov’t Max. (Jan 18, 2018) The Mainichi https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180118/p2a/00m/0na/020000c

Following the March 2011 triple meltdown, the government set a long-term radiation exposure limit of 1 millisievert per year, which breaks down to an hourly airborne radiation dose of 0.23 microsieverts.  The NRA took airborne radiation readings in the Fukushima Prefecture towns of Futaba, Okuma, Namie and Tomioka, and the village of Katsurao. The highest reading registered in the previous year’s survey was 8.89 microsieverts per hour, in Katsurao.

What I find confusing and disconcerting is the fact that the government set the radiation level after the accident at 20 millisieverts a year, not 1.

Was a simple error involved in the reporting here? Or is revisionism under way?

One way I’ve seen propaganda operate over the last five years is for an untruth to be planted and repeated over and over again until it becomes part of the public record as a “truth.”

Yet, the 20 millisievert a year limit has circulated widely in the media as well and will be difficult to replace (e.g., see here https://theconversation.com/acceptable-risk-is-a-better-way-to-think-about-radiation-exposure-in-fukushima-56190).

Was this an error or is it something else entirely?

http://majiasblog.blogspot.fr/2018/01/simple-error-or-calculated-revisionism.html

 

January 27, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , | Leave a comment

Fukushima Unit 2 in the News Again

From Majia’s Blog

TEPCO tells us they have identified the remains of “part of a nuclear fuel assembly” scattered at the bottom of unit 2’s containment vessel:

CHIKAKO KAWAHARA January 20, 2018 Melted nuclear fuel seen inside No. 2 reactor or at Fukushima plant. The Asahi Shimbun http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201801200017.html

A remote-controlled camera captured what appears to be melted fuel inside a reactor of the stricken Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. said. The released footage showed pebble-like nuclear fuel debris and part of a nuclear fuel assembly scattered at the bottom of a containment vessel, located just below the pressure vessel.

Where is the rest of the fuel?

Fukushima’s reactor 2 held quite a bit more than a single fuel assembly. According to a November 16 report by TEPCO titled, ‘Integrity Inspection of Dry Storage Casks and Spent Fuel at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,’ as of March 2010 the Daini site held 1,060 tons of spent uranium fuel. The total spent uranium fuel inventory at Daiichi in March 2010 was reported as 1,760 tons. The 2010 report asserts that approximately 700 spent fuel assemblies are generated every year. The report specifies that Daiichi’s 3,450 assemblies are stored in each of the six reactor’s spent fuel pools. The common spent fuel pool contains 6291 assemblies.

Unit 2 has been in the news. Last February, Akio Matsumura described a potential catastrophe at Unit 2:

Akio Matsumura (2017, February 11). The Potential Catastrophe of Reactor 2 at Fukushima Daiichi: What Effect for the Pacific and the US? Finding the Missing Link, http://akiomatsumura.com/2017/02/the-potential-catastrophe-of-reactor-2-at-fukushima-daiichi.html, accessed November 20, 2017

It can hardly be said that the Fukushima accident is heading toward a solution. The problem of Unit 2, where a large volume of nuclear fuels remain, is particularly crucial. Reactor Unit 2 started its commercial operation in July 1974. It held out severe circumstances of high temperature and high pressure emanating from the March 11, 2011, accident without being destroyed. However, years long use of the pressure vessel must have brought about its weakening due to irradiation. If it should encounter a big earth tremor, it will be destroyed and scatter the remaining nuclear fuel and its debris, making the Tokyo metropolitan area uninhabitable.

Unit 2 has been in the news because of persistent high radiation levels. In Feb 2017, TEPCO reported measuring radiation levels of 530 SIEVERTS AN HOUR (10 will kill you) and described a 2-meter hole in the grating beneath unit 2’s reactor pressure vessel (1 meter-square hole found in grating):

Radiation level at Fukushima reactor highest since 2011 disaster; grating hole found. The Mainichi, February 2, 2017, http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170202/p2g/00m/0dm/087000c

TOKYO (Kyodo) — The radiation level inside the containment vessel of the No. 2 reactor at the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex stood at 530 sieverts per hour at a maximum, the highest since the 2011 disaster, the plant operator said Thursday.

Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc. also announced that based on image analysis, a hole measuring 2 meters in diameter has been found on a metal grating beneath the pressure vessel inside the containment vessel and a portion of the grating was distorted.

…The hole could have been caused by nuclear fuel that penetrated the reactor vessel as it overheated and melted due to the loss of reactor cooling functions in the days after a powerful earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011 hit northeastern Japan.

According to the image analysis, about 1 square meter of the grating was missing. 

This extraordinarily high radiation in unit 2 was reported by the Japanese media in January 2017 as presenting a barrier to the decommissioning timeline:

MASANOBU HIGASHIYAMA (January 31, 2017) Images indicate bigger challenge for TEPCO at Fukushima plant. The Asahi Shimbun, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201701310073.html

If confirmed, the first images of melted nuclear fuel at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant show that Tokyo Electric Power Co. will have a much more difficult time decommissioning the battered facility.

The condition of what is believed to be melted fuel inside the No. 2 reactor at the plant appears far worse than previously thought.

…High radiation levels have prevented workers from entering the No. 2 reactor, as well as the No. 1 and No. 3 reactors at the plant.

UNIT 2 HISTORY

Looking back at testimony by Masao Yoshida, Fukushima’s plant manager, and media coverage of that testimony, I see that unit 2 was identified as posing the greatest immediate risk, although the explosion at unit 3 was clearly larger (this discrepancy is perplexing).  Here is an excerpt of the testimony published by the Asahi Shimbun:

Yoshida feared nuclear ‘annihilation’ of eastern Japan, testimony shows. (September 12, 2014) THE ASAHI SHIMBUN http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201409120034

Plant manager Masao Yoshida envisioned catastrophe for eastern Japan in the days following the outbreak of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, according to his testimony, one of 19 released by the government on Sept. 11. . . .

. . . In his testimony, Yoshida described the condition of the No. 2 reactor at the Fukushima plant between the evening of March 14, 2011, and the next morning: “Despite the nuclear fuel being completely exposed, we’re unable to reduce pressure. Water can’t get in either.”

Yoshida recalled the severity of the situation. “If we continue to be unable to get water in, all of the nuclear fuel will melt and escape from the containment vessel, and radioactive substances from the fuel will spread to the outside,” he said. Fearing a worst-case scenario at the time, Yoshida said, “What we envisioned was that the entire eastern part of Japan would be annihilated.”

You can read more excerpts from the 400-pages of testimony published by the Asahi Shimbun, which both applauds and critiques the panel investigation of the disaster that produced the testimonies:

The Yoshida Testimony: The Fukushima Nuclear Accident as Told by Plant Manager Masao Yoshida The Asahi Shimbun http://www.asahi.com/special/yoshida_report/en/

Although the panel interviewed as many as 772 individuals involved, it failed to dig deep into essential aspects of the disaster because it made it a stated policy that it would not pursue the responsibility of individuals.

What is true about unit 2? Yoshida provides this account from the article cited immediately above:

At around 6:15 a.m. on March 15, 2011, four days after the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami, a round table presided by Yoshida in an emergency response room on the second floor of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant’s quake-proof control center building heard two important reports, almost simultaneously, from front-line workers.

One said that pressure in the suppression chamber, or the lower part of the containment vessel for the No. 2 reactor, had vanished. The other said an explosive sound had been heard.

Question: Well, this is not necessarily in the No. 2 reactor, but sometime around 6 a.m. or 6:10 a.m. on March 15, pressure in the No. 2 reactor’s suppression chamber, for one thing, fell suddenly to zero. And around the same time, something …

Yoshida: An explosive sound.

http://majiasblog.blogspot.fr/2018/01/fukushima-unit-2-in-news-again.html

January 27, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

South Koreans still distrustful of Japanese fish products after nuclear meltdown

AEN20180126000900320_01_i.jpg
SEOUL, Jan. 26 (Yonhap) — A majority of South Koreans favor banning the import of Japanese fishery products, a survey showed Friday, underscoring lingering safety concerns about possible radioactive contamination.
Radioactive water leaked following the meltdown at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant in 2011.
The Consumers Union of Korea polled 1,023 adults across the country last year, and the results showed 55.3 percent want stronger import restrictions. Another 37.2 percent said the restrictions should be “very heavy.”
 
   The results of the survey were released by opposition lawmaker Choi Do-ja, who obtained them from the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety.
South Korea prohibited imports of agricultural and fish products from Fukushima and its adjacent areas after radioactive leaks following the 2011 tsunami disaster in Japan.
In 2013, Seoul took a stronger measure to ban imports from fisheries in eight other Japanese prefectures near Fukushima.
Japan took the case to the World Trade Organization, accusing South Korea of discriminating against its exports. The ruling is scheduled in the first half of this year.
According to the survey, 45.5 percent want a complete import ban on all Japanese foods, while 39.6 percent said they want at least a full ban on select products from certain prefectures.
Results showed that 55.3 percent of South Koreans are not buying fish products from Japan. Other shunned items included agricultural products (56.3 percent), dairy products (52.8 percent), cosmetics and processed foods (37.5 percent) and other manufactured goods (35.3 percent).
Among people who said they either do not buy Japanese fishery products or have cut back on such purchases, 79.2 percent said the reason was because they do not feel safe. In addition, 59.2 percent said they will not buy fish from Japan even when there is no trace of radioactive contamination.
The biggest concerns from radioactive exposure included cancer (42.4 percent), newborns with deformities (30.4 percent) and hereditary disease (13.4 percent).
“It has been seven years since the Fukushima accident, but people are still worried about fishery products from Japan,” Rep. Choi said. “There has to be more effort to allay these concerns through imports limits and thorough inspection of radioactive traces in foods.”
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2018/01/26/0200000000AEN20180126000900320.html

January 26, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , , , | Leave a comment

FUKUSHIMA: Where are the People? – Arnie Gundersen on the Ongoing Human Toll of the Nuclear Disaster

IMG_2217-702x336.jpg
Please go listen his week’s feature on Nuclear Hotseat podcast:
 
Arnie Gundersen, Chief Engineer at Fairewinds Energy Education, focuses on the human toll inflicted by the nuclear disaster at Fukushima Daiichi. Recorded December 2, 2017, at DePaul University, at an event sponsored by Chicago’s Nuclear Energy Information Service, or NEIS.
 
http://nuclearhotseat.com/2018/01/24/fukushima-where-are-the-people-arnie-gundersen-on-the-ongoing-human-toll-of-the-nuclear-disaster-nh-344/

January 24, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

Japan’s Reconstruction Agency to Fold in 2021

Japan studies how to support 2011 disaster areas after Reconstruction Agency folds in 2021
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Staff are seen at the Reconstruction Agency in Tokyo in February 2017.
The government has started work to determine how to support rebuilding efforts in areas of northeastern Japan hit by the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster after the Reconstruction Agency is abolished in March 2021, sources said Tuesday.
The government has started by gathering views from 12 municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture, where a number of residents were forced to evacuate following the triple meltdown at Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc.’s crippled Fukushima No. 1 power plant. The goal is to find out what support the municipalities expect from the central government, according to officials familiar with the matter.
The government aims to establish a basic assistance policy by the end of March 2020, chiefly by determining the roles of an organization that will succeed the agency, the officials said.
The agency was set up in February 2012 to take control of support for reconstruction efforts — particularly in severely damaged areas in the three Tohoku prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima.
It now has some 520 staff to support those affected and back business revitalization. It is also helping with the return of evacuees to their homes in Fukushima.
Legally, the agency cannot exist beyond March 2021, when the government-set reconstruction period for the disaster expires. But affected areas are still struggling. In Fukushima, evacuation advisories remain intact in some areas, prolonging recovery work even further.
The basic support policy and a blueprint for the successor organization will be finalized based on the results of the Fukushima survey, as well as talks with the Iwate and Miyagi prefectural governments and the ruling camp, the officials said.
The government hopes to see necessary legislation pass the Diet in 2020, they added.
One likely scenario regarding the successor body is setting up a department at the Cabinet Office to mainly support reconstruction efforts. But there are calls for creating a government agency to take charge of disaster prevention and reconstruction across the country, critics have said.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/01/23/national/japan-studies-support-2011-disaster-areas-reconstruction-agency-folds-2021/#.Wmd-QfaDPrc

January 24, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

FUKU B.S.

Are we stupid enough to forget that Tepco has always been lying since day one and that for now 7 years ?
1453379_10204102201235204_4168344898288719528_n
Yesterday I was amazed to see a website which has been covering the Fukushima disaster for the past 7 years, suddenly for the first time complaining that Tepco is withholding some of the meltdown data collected during Tepco’s recent probe inside Fukushima reactor 2.
Amazed because that particular website has been posting now for the past 7 years only reposts of Tepco’s official reports as if those were the holy truth, never before questioning Tepco’s data to be reliable or not…
Come on where have you been ? All the serious Fukushima watchers who followed closely this ongoing disaster since its beginning know one sure fact:
Tepco has always been lying, that since day one. Lying twisting the facts and numbers, lying by omission, sometimes photoshopping their released photos and editing their video footages.
Those Tepco’s released reports have always been just the sweetened B.S. version that Tepco feeds us, wants us to swallow hook and sinker.
Their damage control, hired advertising and P.R. company, Dentsu corporation, coaching them to write and schedule those B.S. reports to cover-up the hard facts and numbers and to cushion the unsettled ongoing disaster facts to the eyes of the general public, locally, nationwide and internationally.
The nuclear industry has always been a lying business, covering up the hard facts and lying to the public. In that Tepco is no different than the other corporations involved in that harmful business. But since Tepco has been lying abundantly non-stop for now 7 years, it has developed it to an art form level, and for that Tepco rightly deserves the Pinocchio award of the nuclear industry.
A reminder, there is no independent commission on location, all the data coming out of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant site are what they agree to feed us, after being properly vetoed by Tepco, the IAEA, the Japanese government, and Dentsu. So all the main stream media articles have the same one and unique source : Tepco.
So any information released by Tepco should be considered tainted and biased.
Tepco cannot successfully filter the accumulated radioactive water on site but it does efficiently filter all informations coming out from there, diluting the truth with lies so as  to cover up the real gravity of the situation on location.
Right from the beginning Tepco always lied, and still does, and I believe that Tepco will not change its modus operandi.
Only a fool would fully believe those Tepco’s B.S. reports to be true, as if they were Holy Bible, and keep reposting them helping thus to build Tepco’s credibility.
That website has been wasting 7 years helping Tepco to spread its B.S.
Such time would have been more usefully spent if used to spread the voices of the Fukushima victims on location and of the Tohoku residents organizing themselves to measure the radiation that they have now to live with.
It took that blogger on that website 7 years to finally notice that Tepco was witholding data ? Come on, stop being a moron !

January 24, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

Selective abortion and radioactive contamination in Japan

From November 2, 2015
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The Great East Japan Earthquake occurred on March 11th 2011. The tsunami reached shore 49 minutes later. Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant was hit and 7 minutes later lost all power and control over the reactors. We know now that 4 hours later, the nuclear meltdown had already started. The first explosion occurred one day after the loss of power.
Tragic environments that a thousands of children with disabilities and sicknesses live with as the result of the mega earthquake and the Tsunami followed by the nuke accident in Fukushima continues.  Fukushima Prefecture Health Management Survey reported the results of Thyroid Ultrasound Examination on 7 February 2014. 75 suspicious or malignant cases were found including 34surgical cases, one of benign nodules, 32 papillay adenocarcinoma, one suspicious for poorly differentiated cartinoma. Whenever Japanese parents fume over Fukushima radiation, they stressed their baby’s abnormality as the results of tragedy. And it has been long time debating the parental dilemma whether or not to have a baby from the fear of radiation after 311 in Fukushima.
From April 2013, government approved 26 flagship hospitals to conduct the noninvasive prenatal genetic testing (NIPT) which will results of increasing number of selective abortion of babies with disabilities, as same as phenomenological dilemma people in US were already faced.  Many people with disabilities have felt and do feel real threat to life. Violence against people with disability in Japan continues, or accelerates after 311.

January 24, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

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