“The Fukushima Disaster, The Hidden Side of the Story,” is a just-released film documentary, a powerful, moving, information-full film that is superbly made. Directed and edited by Philippe Carillo, it is among the strongest ever made on the deadly dangers of nuclear technology.
It begins with the words in 1961 of U.S. President John F. Kennedy: “Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by an accident, or miscalculation or by madness.”
It then goes to the March 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Daichi nuclear power plants in Japan after they were struck by a tsunami. Their back-up diesel generators were kicked in but “did not run for long,” notes the documentary. That led to three of the six plants exploding—and there’s video of this—“releasing an unpreceded amount of nuclear radiation into the air.”
“Fukushima is the world’s largest ever industrial catastrophe,” says Professor John Keane of the University of Sydney in Australia. He says there was no emergency plan and, as to the owner of Fukushima, Tokyo Electric Power Company, with the accident its CEO “for five nights and days…locked himself inside his office.”
Meanwhile, from TEPCO, there was “only good news” with two Japanese government agencies also “involved in the cover-up”—the Nuclear Industry Safety Agency and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
“Japanese media was ordered to censor information. The Japanese government failed to protect its people,” the documentary relates.
Yumi Kikuchi of Fukushima, since a leader of the Fukushima Kids Project, recalls: “On TV, they said that ‘it’s under control’ and they kept saying that for two months. The nuclear power plant had already melted and even exploded but they never admitted the meltdown until May. So, people in Fukushima during that time were severely exposed to radiation.”
Arnie Gundersen, a nuclear engineer and now a principal of Fairewinds Energy Education in Burlington, Vermont, speaks of being told by Naoto Kan, the prime minister of Japan at the time of the accident, that “our existence as a sovereign nation was at stake because of the disaster at Fukushima Daichi.”
Kan then appears in documentary and speaks of “manmade” links to the disaster.
The documentary tells how Kan, following the accident, became “an advocate against nuclear power….ordered all nuclear power plants in Japan to shut down for safety” and for the nation “to move into renewable energy.”
But, subsequently, “a nuclear advocate,” Shinzo Abe, became Japan’s prime minister.
Yoichi Shimatsu, a former Japan Times journalist, appears in the film and speaks of “the cruelty, the cynicism of this government.” He speaks of how in the accident’s aftermath, “nearly every member of Parliament and leaders of the major political parties” along with corporate executives, “moved their relatives out of Japan”
He says “Shanghai is the largest Japanese community outside Japan now…while these same people” had been “telling the people of Fukushima go home, 10 kilometers from Fukushima, go home it’s safe, while their families are overseas in Los Angeles, in Paris, in London and in Shanghai.”
“If it’s safe, why they left?” asks Kikuchi. “They tell us it’s safe to live in Fukushima, and to eat Fukushima food to support Fukushima people. There’s a campaign by Japanese government…and people believe it.”
Gundersen says: “At Fukushima Daichi, the world is already seeing deaths from cancer related to the disaster…There’ll be many more over time.” He adds that there’s been a “huge increase in thyroid cancer in the surrounding population.”
“Unfortunately,” he goes on, “the Japanese government is not telling us al the evidence. There’s a lot of pressure on the scientists and the medical community to distort the evidence so there’s no blowback against nuclear power.”
There is a section in the documentary on the impacts of radioactivity which includes Dr. Helen Caldicott, former president of Physician for Social Responsibility, discussing the impacts of radiation on the body and how it causes cancer. She states: “There is no safe level of radiation. I repeat, there is no safe level of radiation. Each dose of radiation is cumulative and adds to your risk of getting cancer and that’s absolutely documented in the medical literature.”
“The nuclear industry says, well,” Dr. Caldicott, continues, “there are ‘safe doses’ of radiation and even says a little bit of radiation is good for you and that is called the theory of hormesis. They lie and they lie and they lie.”
Maggie Gundersen, who was a reporter and then a public relations representative for the nuclear industry and, like her husband Arnie became an opponent of nuclear power, speaks of how nuclear power derives from the World War II Manhattan Project program to develop atomic weapons and post-war so-called “Atoms for Peace” push.
Gundersen says in becoming a nuclear industry spokesperson, “the things I was taught weren’t true.” The notion, for example, that what is called a containment at a nuclear plant is untrue because radioactivity “escapes every day as a nuclear power plant operates” and in a “calamity” is released massively.
As to economics, she cited the claim decades ago that nuclear power would be “too cheap to meter.” The president of Fairewinds Energy Education, she says: “Atomic power is now the most expensive power there is on the planet. It is not feasible. It never has been.” Regarding the radioactive waste produced by nuclear power, she says “there is literally no technology to do that…It does not exist.”
As to international oversight, the documentary presents the final version of a “Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation” issued in 2014 which finds that the radiation doses from Fukushima “to the general public during the first year and estimated for their lifetimes are generally low or very low….The most important effect is on mental and social well-being.”
Shimatsu says it is not only in Japan but on an international level that the consequences of radioactive exposure have been completely minimized or denied. “We are all seeing a global political agreement centered in the UN organizations, tie IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], the World Health Organization…All the international agencies are whitewashing what is happening in Fukushima. We take dosimeters and Geiger counters in there, we see a much different story,” he says.
In Germany, says Maggie Gunderson, “the politicians chose” to do a study to “substantiate” that no health impacts “happened around nuclear power plants….But what they found was the radiation releases cause significant numbers of childhood leukemia.” A summary of that 2008 study comes on the screen. The U.S. followed up on that research, she says, but recently “the [U.S.] Nuclear Regulatory Commission said it was not going to do that study,” that “it doesn’t have enough funding; it had to shut it down.” She said the real reason was that it was producing “data they don’t want to make public.”
Beyond the airborne releases of radiation after the Fukushima accident, now, says the documentary, there is the growing threat of radioactivity through water that has and still is leaking from the plants as well as more than a million tons of radioactive water stored in a thousand tanks built at the plant site. After the accident, TEPCO released 300,000 tons of radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean. Now there is no land for more tanks, so the Japanese government, the documentary relates, has decided that starting this year to dump massive amounts of radioactive water over a 30-year period into the Pacific.
Arnie Gundersen speaks of the cliché that “the solution to pollution is dilution,” but with the radiation from Fukushima being sent into the Pacific, there will be “bio-accumulation”—with vegetation absorbing radiation, little fish eating that vegetation and intensifying it and bigger fish eating the smaller fish and further bio-accumulating the radioactivity. Already, tuna off California have been found with radiation traced to Fukushima. With this planned further, and yet greater dispersal, thousands of people “in the Pacific basin will die from radiation,” he says.
Andrew Napuat, a member of the Parliament of the nation of Vanuatu, an 83 island archipelago in the Pacific, says in the documentary: “We have the right to say no to the Japan solution. We can’t let them jeopardize our sustenance and livelihood.” Vanuatu along with 13 other countries has signed and ratified the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.
As the documentary nears its end, Arnie Gundersen says that considering the meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania in 1979, the meltdown at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine in 1986, and now the three Fukushima meltdowns in 2011, there has been “a meltdown every seven years roughly.” He says: “Essentially, once every decade the world needs to know that there might be an atomic meltdown somewhere.” And, he adds, the “nuclear industry is saying they want would like to build as many as 5,000 new nuclear power plants.” (There are 440 in the world today.)
Meanwhile, he says, “renewable power is no longer alternative power. It’s on our doorstep. It’s here now and it works and it’s cheaper than nuclear.” The cost of producing energy from wind, he says, is three cents a kilowatt hour, for solar five cents, and for new nuclear power plants 15 cents. Nuclear “makes no nuclear economic sense.”
Maggie Gundersen says, with tears in her eyes: “I’m a woman and I feel it’s inherent for us as women to protect our children our grandchildren, and it’s our job now to raise our voices and have this madness stop.”
Philippe Carillo, from France, who worked for 14 years in Hollywood and who since 2017 has lived in Vanuatu, has worked on several major TV documentary projects for the BBC, 20th Century Fox and French National TV as well as doing independent productions. He says he made “The Fukushima Disaster, The Hidden Side of the Story” to “expose the nuclear industry and its lies.” His previous award-winning documentary, “Inside the Garbage of the World,” has made changes regarding the use of plastic.
The Fukushima Nuclear disaster will continue to affect the people on location and others, as well as our environment for many more years, I will not continue.
I have been following the Fukushima nuclear accident for the past 12 years, spending a lot of time in sharing those news, to the somehow detriment of my own personal life.
Unlike some other people I entered this activity without seeking to make money or gain fame, I am just a simple citizen living on my basic minimum retirement pension. I shared Fukushima news weekly for the past 12 years but on the other hand I was unable to go visit my daughter in Iwaki, Fukushima since June 2011, because my financial situation is very tight, and Japan is way too expensive, overpriced for my meager wallet.
That situation has been tearing apart, on one hand to share Fukushima news and on the other hand to be unable to visit my own daughter in Fukushima.
I cannot take it anymore, so I decided to end this situation, to stop sharing the Fukushima news, to stop my lttle Fukushima blog, to disengage myself from it all, and to finally concentrate only on my little personal life.
That attitude of the Japanese government is nothing new. They have always lack a sense of responsibility, hiding behind hypocritical denials and false excuses, lies and covering-up.
The Japanese government has always faced accusations with duplicity when it comes to various events and issues that have marred their history. Some of these issues include the Nanjing massacre, Korean and Filipina sex slaves during World War II, the Minamata tragedy affecting thousands of lives, whale and dolphin fishing, the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and the dumping of radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean.
One of the most controversial events in Japan’s history is the Nanjing massacre, which occurred in 1937 when Japanese forces invaded the Chinese city of Nanjing. During the six-week occupation, Japanese soldiers carried out a brutal campaign of murder, rape, and looting, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 300,000 Chinese civilians and prisoners of war. Despite overwhelming evidence of the massacre, the Japanese government has been accused of downplaying its significance and even denying that it occurred.
Another issue that has caused controversy is the use of Korean and Filipina women as sex slaves during World War II. These women, known as “comfort women,” were forced into sexual servitude by the Japanese military, with an estimated 200,000 women being subjected to this treatment. Despite numerous apologies and compensation payments made to some of the victims, the Japanese government has been accused of failing to fully acknowledge and take responsibility for this atrocity.
Minamata disease was first discovered in the city of Minamata, Kumamoto Prefecture, Japan, in 1956, hence its name. It was caused by the release of methylmercury in the industrial wastewater from a chemical factory owned by the Chisso Corporation, which continued from 1932 to 1968. It has also been suggested that some of the mercury sulfate in the wastewater was also metabolized to methylmercury by bacteria in the sediment. This highly toxic chemical bioaccumulated and biomagnified in shellfish and fish in Minamata Bay and the Shiranui Sea, which, when eaten by the local population, resulted in mercury poisoning. The poisoning and resulting deaths of both humans and animals continued for 36 years, while Chisso and the Kumamoto prefectural government did little to prevent the epidemic.
As of March 2001, 2,265 victims had been officially recognized as having Minamata disease and over 10,000 had received financial compensation from Chisso. By 2004, Chisso had paid $86 million in compensation, and in the same year was ordered to clean up its contamination. On March 29, 2010, a settlement was reached to compensate as-yet uncertified victims.
In addition to these human rights abuses, Japan has also faced criticism for its continued practice of whale and dolphin fishing. Despite a global ban on commercial whaling, Japan continues to hunt whales under the guise of “scientific research,” and dolphins are also hunted and captured for use in entertainment parks. Many animal rights activists and conservationists have called for an end to these practices, but the Japanese government has been accused of prioritizing economic interests over environmental concerns.
Another event that has caused significant controversy is the Fukushima nuclear disaster, which occurred in 2011 after a massive earthquake and tsunami struck Japan. The disaster resulted in a meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and the release of radioactive materials into the environment. While the Japanese government initially downplayed the severity of the disaster, it has since been accused of covering up information and failing to adequately respond to the crisis.
Perhaps one of the most recent controversies surrounding Japan involves the planned dumping of radioactive water from the Fukushima plant into the Pacific Ocean. Despite widespread opposition from environmental groups and neighboring countries, the Japanese government has defended the plan, claiming that the water will be treated and diluted before being released. However, many remain skeptical of these claims and fear the potential consequences of this decision.
In conclusion, the Japanese government has been accused of duplicity when it comes to a variety of issues that have marred their history and present-day actions. From human rights abuses to environmental disasters, the Japanese government has been criticized for downplaying or denying the severity of these events and failing to take responsibility for their actions. As such, it is imperative that the government is held accountable for its actions and takes concrete steps towards acknowledging and rectifying these issues.
The Japanese government as learned nothing from this nuclear tragedy, which they have conveniently sweeped under the carpet. Economics in their eyes always more important than people’s lives, PM Kishida promoting as of today the rebirth of nuclear full blast, wheras the consequences of the Fukushima nuclear disater have neither been yet adressed nor solved.
The crippled No. 1 reactor at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant
March 4, 2023
Several mayors of the three prefectures hardest hit by the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami showed a reluctance to voice an opinion about the government’s return to a reliance on nuclear power.
The recent Asahi Shimbun poll showed the sensitivity of the issue particularly in areas that still have not completely recovered from the twin disasters.
In December, the government made a dramatic shift in nuclear energy policy that would allow for construction of new reactors and the extension of the operating life of those already built.
The Asahi Shimbun polled mayors of 37 municipalities along the Pacific coast in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures along with five others in Fukushima where evacuation orders were issued following the triple meltdown at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
In addition, mayors of three municipalities lying within a 30-kilometer radius of the Onagawa plant in Miyagi Prefecture were also asked their views.
Of the 45 mayors, 19 were somewhat or totally opposed to a reversion to nuclear energy, while 14 were somewhat or totally in favor.
But the mayors of six municipalities that either host the Fukushima No. 1 plant or are in close proximity to the plant did not take a clear stand on any of the questions in the survey.
When the mayors were contacted individually, many said with so many residents still living as evacuees away from their municipalities, expressing a clear opinion on nuclear energy would only further divide those with differing views.
One mayor had in the past voiced clear stands on the central government’s reconstruction policy, but that led to letters sent to the municipal government criticizing those comments.
“I always feel internal turmoil about whether criticism directed at me and the municipal government will also not be turned on the evacuees” who live in various parts of Japan, the mayor said.
Another mayor said, “I do not want residents to feel troubled by my comments about the central government’s nuclear energy policy.”
With part of the municipality still designated a “difficult-to-return zone” and the population and infrastructure nowhere close to the levels before the disasters, the mayor said, “Now is the time to put every effort into reconstruction.”
The mayor said taking a clear stand on nuclear energy issues might create division among local residents.
Toshiyuki Kanai, a professor of local public administration at the University of Tokyo, said it was understandable why the mayors were reluctant to take a clear stand because municipalities had to seek the cooperation of the central government for their reconstruction efforts.
“It is important that effects on local governments in such policy areas as reconstruction do not arise because of their opposition to nuclear energy policy,” Kanai said.
Eight Fukushima mayors did say they were either somewhat or totally opposed to returning to a reliance on nuclear energy.
The only Fukushima mayor who was somewhat in favor of nuclear energy was Ikuo Yamamoto of Tomioka.
But in response to questions from The Asahi Shimbun, Yamamoto recalled the difficulties he faced with discussions about a final storage site for low-level radioactive waste from the Fukushima nuclear accident.
“In my heart, I am opposed,” he said.
But Yamamoto added that in general terms he understood that nuclear energy was effective in preventing global warming and was also instrumental at a time when fuel prices for thermal power generation were surging.
The mayors were also asked if they thought the Kishida administration had done an adequate job of explaining to the public why a move back toward nuclear energy was needed.
Thirty-one mayors said they felt either somewhat or totally negative about the government’s efforts. Even nine mayors who favored reverting back to nuclear energy felt the Kishida administration had done a poor job of explaining the reason for doing so.
(This article was written by Wataru Netsu, Shoko Rikimaru, Keitaro Fukuchi and Takemichi Nishibori.)
The new Japanese series is expected to land on June 1st, 2023.
Netflix has released its first teaser for its upcoming drama series on the Fukushima disaster called The Days. We’re hearing the series is set to be released globally in June 2023.
First announced back in September 2022. The series is comparable to HBO and Sky’s groundbreaking limited series Chernobyl which has quickly become one of the most celebrated limited series of all time. If The Days is half as good as Chernobyl then Netflix subscribers will be in for a treat.
Warner Bros Film and Lyonesse are behind the production for Netflix, with Nakata Hideo and Nishiura Masaki sharing directing duties.
A teaser was released by Netflix (exclusively on Netflix Japan’s YouTube channel) on February 16th, 2023. The teaser is sadly only available in Japanese on YouTube, although you can find a subtitled teaser embedded within the Netflix page for the show (you can also set a reminder there).
When is The Days Netflix release date?
Through Netflix’s official channels, it has only been confirmed that The Days will be released sometime in 2023. However, we’re hearing the project is currently set for a June 1st, 2023 global release date.Until confirmed officially by Netflix all release dates are subject to change.
What is the plot of The Days?
The synopsis for The Days is the following:
Depicts the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident that occurred in 2011 over a period of 7 days. From the three perspectives of the government, corporate organizations, and those who put their lives on the line. It will approach what really happened on that day and in that place.
What is The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster?
The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster was a nuclear accident that took place in Ōkuma, Fukushima, Japan on March 11th, 2011. The event was caused by the Tōhoku earthquake and its resulting tsunami.On the afternoon of March 11th, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake rocked Japan, with the epicenter only 45 miles east off the coast of the Tōhoku region. The earthquake triggered an extremely powerful tsunami, with waves recorded as high as 14 meters hitting the Japanese coastline.
These 14-meter waves rolled over the man-made defenses in place to protect the power plant, causing a devasting amount of damage in the process. The flooding of units 1-4 in the lower parts of the reactor buildings caused not only a loss in power, but the emergency generators also failed. Thanks to the loss of power, the pumps used to cool down the reactor cores stopped working.
With the reactors unable to be cooled, three nuclear meltdowns took place, with three hydrogen explosions and shockingly large amounts of radioactive contamination released into three of the four units.
The radiation that was released into the atmosphere forced the Japanese government to increase the evacuation area to a 12-mile radius. Not to mention there was an unapparelled amount of radioactive isotopes that were released into the Pacific Ocean, which in the long term will have a massive and devasting impact upon the world’s largest ocean.
Could the disaster have been prevented?
Had the correct measures taken place, then there was definitely a chance that the damage from the disaster would have been reduced.
Key factors such as the power plants’ height to sea level played a huge role in the disaster. At only 10 meters above sea level, the 14-meter Tsunami waves rolled over the defenses easily, however, in 1967 when it was first being built, the original plan would have seen the plant sit 30 meters above sea level. The reduction in height was a result of TEPCO leveling the sea coast in order to make it easier to bring in the equipment to build the plant.
Over the years the concern over earthquakes was raised several times, in particular after the backup generator of Reactor 1 was flooded in 1991, and tsunamis of 2000 and 2008.
We can’t definitively say for certain that the disaster will have been averted but had concerns been taken more seriously, and stronger measures implemented, at the very least the damage caused by the tsunamis may have been reduced.
Who are the cast members of The Days?
None of the following cast members have been given named roles, however, we can confirm their involvement in the series.
Yakusho Koji has been cast in the main role. He has yet to star in a leading role for Netflix but is most famous for his work on the Japanese NHK drama Tokugawa Ieyasu in the role of Oda Nobunaga.
Takenouchi Yutaka has been cast in a supporting role. He has yet to star in a Netflix Original, but some may recognize him for his role as Akasaka Hideki in Shin Godzilla.
Kohinata Fumiyo has also been confirmed for a supporting role, but like his fellow co-star has yet to star in a Netflix original movie or drama.
Kobayashi Kaoru, Musaka Naomasa, and Satoi Kenta have also been cast in supporting roles.
Designated waste by prefecture (as of September 30, 2011, Ministry of the Environment data)
February 11, 2023 Designated wastes” were generated as a result of the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011, which caused radioactive materials to spread over a wide area in eastern Japan. Progress has been slow in disposing of the 20,000 tons or so that continue to be stored outside of Fukushima Prefecture. Local governments are opposed to the national government’s policy of consolidating the waste in each prefecture and storing it for the long term. The waste continues to be dispersed and stored at farmers’ properties and municipal facilities. Some point out the risk of leakage in the event of a disaster.
Radioactive materials released into the atmosphere during the nuclear power plant accident were spread by the wind. Designated wastes include incinerator ash and rice straw contaminated with radioactive materials and whose radioactivity level exceeds 8,000 becquerels per kilogram. After the nuclear power plant accident, the Ministry of the Environment set the standard value of 8,000 becquerels as “a value that can ensure the safety of workers during normal landfill disposal. The government decided that the disposal of designated waste is the responsibility of the government, and its basic policy is to construct a long-term management facility (final disposal site) at the expense of the government and dispose of the waste within the metropolitan prefecture where it was generated.
According to the ministry, as of the end of September 2010, there was a total of 407,000 tons of designated waste in 10 prefectures, mainly in the Tohoku and Kanto regions. About 25,000 tons of this was stored in nine prefectures other than Fukushima Prefecture, with Miyagi, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, and Chiba prefectures accounting for about 22,000 tons. https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASR2C64JKR21UTIL023.html?iref=pc_photo_gallery_bottom
The new graphic novel relates how Naoto Matsumura risked his life to save abandoned animals in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster
February 9, 2023
The French duo of Fabien Grolleau (Audubon, On the Wings of the World) and Ewen Blain have collaborated on a new graphic novel that explores one resident’s experience in the aftermath of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan and the ensuing nuclear disaster at Fukushima. Guardian of Fukushima is the second book in TOKYOPOP’s Comics That Matter initiative (the first was Victory for Ukraine). The initiative seeks to raise awareness of import issues using the graphic novel medium. Guardian of Fukushima will be released ahead of its March 11th anniversary.
Guardian of Fukushima is told from the point of view of Naoto Matsumura. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant suffered a meltdown after the tsunami and spread radiation throughout the region. The Japanese government evacuated residents from the area as a preventative measure, but Matsumura the farmer risked his life to return home and care for the abandoned animals.
Grolleau and Blein blend European art style with Japanese aesthetics. Soft expressive art complements the impactful story and characters. This original French graphic novel alludes to timeless Japanese legends as an ode to Mother Nature and human resilience.
Grolleau recalls what brought him to the project:
“When I discovered Matsumura-san’s life in the forbidden zone of Fukushima, I immediately was in awe of this man’s courage, modesty, and nobility. His story is full of hope and resonated with themes I was keen to explore as an author, such as ecology and nature, and with the vision I had of Japanese myths that I wanted to share through comics.”
Tokyo-based writer and scholar Roland Kelts provides the forward to the book. The TOKYOPOP edition also includes bonus materials by Fukushima-resident and acclaimed photographer Ko Sasaki, who provides photographs of the disaster and its aftermath. TOKYOPOP founder Stu Levy contributes photography and background information about the tragedy.
Levy speaks about his passion in bringing the book to publication:
“I will never forget my experiences in Tohoku immediately after the tsunami, especially the resilience and determination of the local people. Naoto Matsumura exemplifies this spirit – and this will to not only survive but also to ensure the survival of the creatures he loves. I am proud we can bring readers Fabien and Ewen’s extraordinary work as part of our Comics That Matter initiative, and I invite readers of all ages to discover his mission and become inspired to find ways to make a difference in their own communities.”
Guardian of Fukushima (MSRP $19.99, ISBN 9781427871367) goes on sale in bookstores on February 28, 2023 and in comics shops on March 1, 2023.
And now, here are the first 10 pages of Guardian of Fukushima. Enjoy!
January 24, 2023 On January 24, a designated attorney acting as a prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court against the decision of the second trial court, which handed down an acquittal following the first trial, in the trial of three former TEPCO executives who were forcibly indicted on charges of manslaughter over the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident.
Tsunehisa Katsumata, 82, then chairman of TEPCO, and Ichiro Takekuro, 76, and Sakae Mutoh, 72, then vice presidents of TEPCO, were forcibly indicted on charges of manslaughter by the prosecutors’ panel for causing the deaths of 44 people, including hospital patients in Fukushima Prefecture, during evacuation from the nuclear accident.
The first trial court acquitted the three, and the Tokyo High Court, the court of second instance, in a ruling on the 18th of this month, followed the first trial court in acquitting all three, ruling that “it was impossible to predict the arrival of a huge tsunami and that there was not enough duty to stop the operation of the plant to avoid the accident.
Dissatisfied with this decision, the designated lawyer acting as the prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court on March 24.
At a press conference held after the High Court ruling, the designated attorneys criticized the ruling, saying, “The ruling is tantamount to saying that there is no need to take measures against unknown earthquakes and tsunamis that have not been scientifically elucidated.
Nearly 12 years after the nuclear accident, the trial will now move to the Supreme Court.
High court in Japan agreed defendants could not have predicted the massive tsunami that crippled the power plant and triggered a nuclear meltdown
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Okuma. Three Tepco executives have had their acquittals on negligence charges upheld by a court in Japan.
January 18, 2023
Three former executives from the company that operates the wrecked Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant have had their not-guilty verdicts upheld by a court in Japan, dealing a blow to campaigners demanding the firm take legal responsibility for the disaster in March 2011.
The Tokyo high court on Wednesday cleared Tsunehisa Katsumata, the former chairman of Tokyo Electric Power (Tepco), along with former vice-presidents Ichiro Takekuro and Sakae Muto, of professional negligence resulting in death.
The court said the defendants could not have predicted the massive tsunami that crippled the power plant and triggered the world’s worst nuclear accident since Chornobyl in 1986.
The three men were indicted in 2016 for allegedly failing to take measures to defend the plant against tsunamis, resulting in the deaths of 44 people, including elderly patients at a hospital, who had to be evacuated after the disaster.
The Fukushima Daiichi plant, on Japan’s north-eastern coast, was hit by a massive tsunami caused by a 9.0-magnitude earthquake, the strongest in Japan’s recorded history.
More than 18,000 people died in the tsunami, but no one was recorded as having been directly killed by the nuclear meltdowns, which caused massive radiation leaks and forced the evacuation of more than 150,000 people living nearby – some of whom have only recently been given permission to return to their homes.
Wednesday’s ruling affirmed a similar verdict delivered by the Tokyo district court in September 2019.
The trial focused on whether the former executives should have foreseen the massive tsunami and taken extra precautions, such as constructing a bigger seawall, to prevent a catastrophe.
A government evaluation of earthquake risks published in 2002 estimated that tsunami waves of up to 15.7 metres (51ft) in height could strike Fukushima Daiichi. The findings were passed on to Tepco in 2008 – three years before the disaster when a 14-metre wave struck, the Kyodo news agency said.
Tepco has argued it was powerless to take precautions against a tsunami of the size that struck the plant almost 12 years ago, and that it had done everything possible to protect it.
The original district court ruling, however, cast doubt on the credibility of the government’s evaluation, saying the defendants “could not have logically predicted tsunami waves over 10 metres in height”, Kyodo reported.
Although they have twice been acquitted in the only criminal case against Tepco executives arising from the disaster, a separate verdict in July in a civil case against the same three men and Tepco’s former president, Masataka Shimizu, ordered them to pay ¥13.32tn (£80bn at the time) for failing to prevent the disaster.
In contrast to Wednesday’s decision, the court said the government’s assessment had been reliable enough to oblige Tepco to take preventive measures.
While that ruling – the first to find Tepco executives liable for damage resulting from the disaster – carries symbolic significance, lawyers have said the defendants do not have the means to pay the sum, believed to be the largest ever awarded in a civil lawsuit in Japan.
Media reports said they would be expected to pay as much as their assets allowed.
If you read this, you can understand that yesterday’s decision by the Tokyo High Court considers nuclear power safety measures inadequate and prepare for the next brutal accident.
At the beginning of the attorney general’s statement published yesterday, we said: Regarding the long-term evaluation of the projection, the verdict said, “as a country, it is debated and placed weight that cannot be overlooked,” but in this view, it denied the necessity for tsunami measures based on the research findings to base this, and the reliability based on the “real possibility” of stopping nuclear power plants from running.
Seeking “realistic possibilities” about scientific opinion based on accident measures is clearly a mistake, given the current state of geology. I believe such a judgement exonerates not taking necessary accident measures and dangerous logic to prepare for the next nuclear accident. “
I think the conclusion is clear which of these two decisions will withstand the criticism of history by Judge Hosoda, who refused the local inspection, flipped the empty arguments on the desk and wrote an empty verdict, will stand up to the criticism of history.
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The degree of credibility required by knowledge
Since operators who install (and operate nuclear power plants have a duty above all to prevent brutal accidents, the safety of nuclear power plants is impaired by the expected tsunami (predictable tsunami) based on the latest scientific and technical findings, the safety of the nuclear power plant plants is impaired, and if brutal accidents occur, they are obliged to take necessary measures to prevent this, and the director recognizes the risk, or can take action. As explained in No. 2 (The defendants’ duty of good governance as the director of Tokyo Electric Power).
Conversely, at nuclear power plant, the risk of accidents occurring in case of an event that exceeds the expected is greatly different between earthquakes and tsunami, and if you use only a dry site concept like the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant as a measure against tsunami, it is absolutely safe as long as the tsunami does not exceed the expected height, but if it exceeds the expected height, there will be a cliff edge incident that causes sudden damage to the core and reaches the core, due to a severe accident caused by loss of all power. Therefore, if our predictions are credible for scientifically predicted tsunami, it will be extremely important to avoid the presumed tsunami measures.
Therefore, considering whether a certain degree of credibility is required in order to have scientific opinion on predictions of tsunami, which is required for the director of the company that sets up and runs nuclear power plants to avoid measures
(1) If safety measures are taken as a prerequisite for tsunami in the world, and the company that operates and operates nuclear power plants, and safety is the first priority, while in reality, resources are limited, etc., etc., and if safety measures are a priority, as a prelude to all the predictions of tsunami of all the contents that exist in the world, (there is a risk of lack of resources (without resources and resources) that should be allocated for the truly necessary measures, or there is a surplus.
There is a risk of incalculable risk of bodily safety. It is therefore believed that in nuclear engineering, zero risk is not required, and safety measures should be taken that do not create undue risks ( 生155).
On the other hand, scientific findings, often earthquakes and tsunami. Opinions on natural phenomena are constantly advancing and developing that natural phenomena, such as earthquakes and tsunami, are essentially a matter of the galaxy, and since it is principle impossible to make complete predictions. Since it is impossible to experiment on them, we can only learn from past events, but there is a limit that there is little data from the past. Therefore, with regard to findings widely considered established, i.e. not the latest scientific findings, not necessarily all researchers agree, the latest scientific opinion, where clarification and understanding are currently progressing, there will essentially be researchers who disagree. Therefore, for example, if you ask for excessive reliability of scientific findings in the pretext of tsunami, such as the absence of disagreement among researchers, or the attached data is complete, the tsunami that is waiting to happen will not be sufficient, and the safety of nuclear power plants will not be shaken (severe accidents caused by the loss of all power).
Therefore, when considering these collectively, in order to have scientific findings on tsunami predictions that are required by the directors of companies that establish and operate nuclear power plants to avoid measures, the findings expressed in the papers of certain researchers and so on are not enough, for example, in public institutions and councils that consider tsunami forecasts, serious scrutiny has been made among researchers and experts who have a considerable amount of research practice in that field, You have to understand that there is and enough. And in the case of such findings, it can be said that unless there are specific circumstances such as collected despite being scientifically and strictly unreasonable, the director of the company that installs and operates the nuclear power plant can be obliged to follow the tsunami measures based on that findings.
(2)a In this regard, the defendants and Tokyo Electric Power Corporation are required to quote the opinion of Professor Imamura ( 、156) regarding the scientific findings of the predictions of tsunami, where the CEO of the company that operates and operates nuclear power plants are required to take measures, and to be able to justify the need for measures, using a scientific basis, specifically, the tsunami, or at least the scientific consensus has been obtained that it is always tsunami, in which there is a scientific consensus that it is always a tsunami or at least a scientific basis. Insisting on needing and etc.
の However, if interpreted as the above assertion, many researchers and experts with relevant practice recognize that it is reasonable to assume that there is a chance of large-scale tsunami earthquake occurring in a certain area, when the location of wave sources cannot be calculated on a specific basis and the interval of occurrence over a certain period of time, the director of the company operating nuclear power plant is a measure to prevent severe accidents from tsunami (Opinion of Prof. Imamura According to this thinking, if an unexpected tsunami occurs at a nuclear power plant, the Cliff Edge event is likely to cause extremely severe damage due to loss of total power. If the prediction is credible, it would be necessary to avoid tsunami measures, but not to take measures except certain things, i.e. the severity of total power loss due to a tsunami, if the prediction is reliable. It is clear that it is unreasonable, given the importance of ensuring the high safety of nuclear power plants, which is hidden in standards related to the standard of safety etc.
考 Also, views like the above claim require that, in addition to the credibility of scientific findings, the information for nuclear companies to take easy measures is clear, but since there are some uncertainties in the findings, it is possible to take measures with the appropriate room taken into account on the safety side (this opinion indicates that it is dangerous, but it is unreasonable that measures cannot be mandatory if it is not indicated what extent to take. ), overstating the convenience of measures by nuclear power operators rather than ensuring safety is not acceptable.
According to the construction industry (I have to say that the allegations made by the defendants and Tokyo Electric Power Corporation are difficult to accept.
Support group members of plaintiffs show off banners reading “All innocent. Wrongful judgment” after the The Tokyo High Court upheld a not guilty verdict for former Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) executives of negligence over the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power station disaster, in front of the court in Tokyo, Japan, January 18, 2023
TOKYO, Jan 18 (Reuters) – The Tokyo High Court on Wednesday upheld a not guilty criminal verdict by a lower court that cleared former Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco) (9501.T) executives of negligence over the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power station disaster.
Former Tepco Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata, 82, and one-time executives Sakae Muto, 72, and Ichiro Takekuro, 77, were all found not guilty by the Tokyo District Court in 2019, in the only criminal case to arise out of the world’s worst nuclear crisis since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.
The ruling on Wednesday to uphold the not guilty verdict sits at odds with a separate civil case brought to the Tokyo court by Tepco shareholders, which found four former executives responsible for the 2011 nuclear disaster.
Judges ordered the former executives to pay 13 trillion yen ($99.14 billion) in damages in the civil lawsuit. The court judged that the executives could have prevented the disaster if they had exercised due care. Criminal lawsuits in Japan are broadly interpreted to have a higher standard of proof than civil cases.
“I’m really surprised. Most other lawsuits have found that Tepco is guilty, so I can’t understand why the criminal court is the odd one out,” said Masako Sawai, who is part of a civil group accusing the former executives of negligence.
The trial, which started in June 2017, was conducted by state-appointed lawyers after prosecutors decided not to bring charges against the Tepco executives.
“We are aware that there is an ongoing lawsuit over the criminal responsibility of three former executives regarding the nuclear disaster, but we will refrain from commenting on the case,” a spokesperson for Tepco said.
The Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear station, located about 220 kilometres (130 miles) northeast of Tokyo, was rocked by a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami in March 2011, sparking three reactor meltdowns and prompting Japan to shut down its entire fleet of nuclear reactors.
From left: Tsunehisa Katsumata, Ichiro Takekuro and Sakae Muto
January 16, 2023
Could the meltdown at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant have been prevented? The Tokyo High Court is looking into a criminal case and will soon rule on whether the unprecedented accident could have been prevented by expecting such a massive tsunami. Civil court rulings on the same issue have been split, so all eyes are on the high court to see how it will rule.
The Tokyo High Court will on Wednesday hand down its ruling on whether three former executives of what was then Tokyo Electric Power Co. are responsible for the accident in 2011. The three had been acquitted by the Tokyo District Court of charges of professional negligence resulting in death.
The lower court’s ruling in September 2019 acquitted former TEPCO Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata and former Executive Vice Presidents Ichiro Takekuro and Sakae Muto, who were in charge of the nuclear power plant.
During closing arguments of the appeal at the Tokyo High Court on June 6, 2022, court-appointed lawyers for the prosecution criticized the lower court decision.
“Denying that the defendants had responsibility is unjust,” one said, demanding the district court ruling be overturned.
The three defendants were handed mandatory indictment on charges related to causing the nuclear accident by failing to take measures even though they could expect such a huge tsunami, resulting in the deaths of 44 people who were evacuated from Futaba Hospital in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture.
The two main points of contention in the trial of the three men are whether the massive tsunami could have been expected and whether the accident could have been prevented by taking measures.
In the district court, the judges ruled that “the only way to prevent the accident was to stop the operation of the plant.”
As for expectations of a natural disaster, the government had released in 2002 a long-term assessment that presents the possibility of a massive earthquake and tsunami hitting off places such as Fukushima Prefecture. The district court ruled that such an assessment was unreliable and deemed that the defendants could not be held criminally liable because they “could not expect a massive tsunami in concrete terms and were under no legal obligation to stop the operation of the plant.”
The district court limited the possible measures to prevent the accident to the “shutdown of the plant,” a measure that is not readily practiced.
During the appeal, the appointed lawyers for the prosecution emphasized that a shutdown of a plant is the last resort, and the accident could have been prevented through basic measures such as building higher seawalls and making the plant facilities watertight. The defense reiterated that there were no errors in the judgment of the lower court.
Split decisions
The appeal began in November 2021 and concluded after three hearings at the Tokyo High Court. The appointed lawyers requested the examination of witnesses, including former Japan Meteorological Agency officials who participated in the compilation of the assessment, as well as an on-site inspection by judges. But these requests were turned down.
During a civil trial at the Tokyo High Court in February 2021, however, the ruling adopted the long-term assessment as “reliable” evidence.
At the Supreme Court, an appeal of this civil suit was heard and ruled upon in June 2022. The top court did not clearly express the reliability of the assessment nor the predictability of a massive tsunami, but ruled that the central government, the defendant, was not responsible for the accident.
“The size of the tsunami was larger than expected, and the accident could not have been prevented,” the Supreme Court said.
Shortly after this trial, however, the Tokyo District Court in July recognized the reliability of the assessment in a shareholder derivative lawsuit filed by shareholders of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings. The court, in saying that “the tsunami was predictable and the accident could have been prevented,” ordered the abovenamed former TEPCO executives and former TEPCO President Masataka Shimizu to pay about ¥13 trillion in compensation. This case adopted almost the same evidence as the current criminal trial, but the conclusion was the opposite of the one reached by the same court in the criminal trial.
Chuo University Assistant Prof. Satoshi Tanii, who specializes in the theory of criminal negligence, said that the hurdle for finding liability in a criminal trial where an individual faces punishment can be higher than that for a civil trial.
“In addition to the reliability of the long-term assessment, whether the measures to prevent accidents are limited to a shutdown or include more practical moves such as watertight measures will become one of the points that will determine the guilt or innocence of the defendants,” he said.
Dec 19, 2022 What happens to the damaged reactors? The territories evacuated by 160 000 people? What are the new conditions for their return to the contaminated area since the lifting of the governmental aid procedures? Are lessons still being learned by our national operator for its own nuclear plants? We must not forget that a disaster is still unfolding in Japan and that EDF was supposed to upgrade its fleet on the basis of this feedback, which has still not been finalized.
Almost twelve years after the Fukushima disaster, Japan is still in the process of dismantling and ‘decontaminating’ the nuclear power plant, probably for the next thirty to forty years as well. In the very short term, the challenges are posed by the management of contaminated water.
All the contaminated water will be evacuated into the sea, by dilution over decades
Each intervention in the accident reactors brings out new elements
This has an impact on the schedule and the efficiency of the means used
At the same time, the Japanese government’s objective is to rehabilitate the contaminated areas at any cost
None of the French reactors is up to date with its safety level according to the post-Fukushima measures promulgated
Japan will resume its nuclear policy, time having done its work on memories
The great water cycle
Although Japanese politicians claim that they have finally mastered the monster, the colossal task of cleaning up the site is still far from being completed to allow for the ultimate dismantling, with the length of time competing with the endless financing.
After so many years of effort, from decontamination to the management of radioactive materials and maneuvers within the dismantled plant, the actions on site require more and more exceptional means, exclusive procedures, and unprecedented engineering feats (such as robotic probes), while the nuclear fuel inside continues to be cooled permanently by water (not without generating, to repeat, millions of liters of radioactive water).
But the hardest part is yet to come: containing the corium, an estimated 880 tons of molten radioactive waste created during this meltdown of the reactor cores, and managing the thousands of fuel rods. So much so that the complete cleanup and dismantling of the plant could take a generation or more for a total estimated cost of more than 200 billion dollars (according to an assessment published by the German insurer Munich Re, Japan is 150 billion euros), a low range since other estimates raise the bill between 470 and 660 billion dollars, which is not in contradiction with the costs of an accident projected by the IRSN in France.
The removal of this corium will remain the most essential unresolved issue for a long time. Without it, the contamination of this area will continue. In February 2022, the operator Tepco (Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc.) tried again to approach the molten fuel in the containment of a reactor after a few more or less unsuccessful attempts, the radioactivity of 2 sieverts/hour being the end of everything, including electronic robots. This withdrawal seems quite hypothetical, even the Chernobyl reactor has never been removed and remains contained in a sarcophagus.
(source: Fukushima blog and Japan’s Nuclear Safety Authority NRA)
Until that distant prospect arrives, the 1.37 million tons of water will have filled the maximum storage capacity. This water was used to cool the molten fuel in the reactor and then mixed with rainwater and groundwater. The treatment via an Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) is touted as efficient, but does not remove tritium. Relative performance: Tepco has been repeatedly criticized for concealing and belatedly disclosing problems with filters designed to prevent particles from escaping into the air from the contaminated water treatment system: 24 of the 25 filters attached to the water treatment equipment were found to be damaged in 2021, an already known defect that resulted in no investigation of the cause of the problem and no preventive measures after the filters were replaced.
The management of this type of liquid waste is a problem shared by the Americans. On site, experts say that the tanks would present flooding and radiation hazards and would hamper the plant’s decontamination efforts. So much so that nuclear scientists, including members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Japanese Nuclear Regulatory Authority, have recommended controlled release of the water into the sea as the only scientifically and financially realistic option.
In the end, contaminated water would have to be released into the sea through an underwater tunnel about a kilometer offshore, after diluting it to bring the concentration of tritium well below the percentage allowed by regulation (the concentration would be below the maximum limit of tritium recommended by the World Health Organization for drinking water). Scientists say that the effects of long-term, low-dose exposure to tritium on the environment and humans are still unknown, but that tritium would affect humans more when consumed in fish. The health impact will therefore be monitored, which the government already assures us it is anticipating by analyzing 90,000 samples of treated water each year.
Assessment studies on the potential impact that the release of stored contaminated water into the ocean could have therefore seem insufficient. For tritium, in the form of tritiated water or bound to organic matter, in addition to its diverse behavior according to these configurations, is only part of the problem. Some data show great variability in the concentrations of contaminants between the thousand reservoirs, as well as differences in their relative quantities: some reservoirs that are poor in tritium are rich in strontium 90 and vice versa, suggesting a high variability in the concentrations of other radionuclides and a dilution rate that is not so constant. All the ignorance currently resides on the still unknown interactions of the long-lived radioactive isotopes contained in the contaminated water with the marine biology. It is in order to remove all questions that a complete and independent evaluation of the sixty or so radioisotopes is required by many organizations.
As it stands, with the support of the IAEA so that dilution meets expectations, depending on currents, flows …, the release of contaminated materials would take at least forty years. Opponents of such releases persist in proposing an alternative solution of storage in earthquake-resistant tanks in and around the Fukushima facility. For them, “given the 12.3-year half-life of tritium for radioactive decay, in 40 to 60 years, more than 90% of the tritium will have disappeared and the risks will be considerably reduced,” reducing the direct nuisance that could affect the marine environment and even the food chain.
Modelling of marine movements could lead the waste to Korea, then to China, and finally to the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau. As such, each of the impacted countries could bring an action against Japan before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to demand an injunction or provisional measures under international law.
Faced with these unresolved health issues, China, South Korea, Taiwan, local fishing communities continue to oppose this management plan, but the work is far from being completed and the problem of storage remains. Just like the ice wall built into the floor of the power plant, the release of contaminated water requires huge new works: the underwater pipe starts at about 16 meters underground and is drilled at a rate of five to six meters per day.
Time is of the essence. The tanks should reach their maximum capacity by the fall of 2023 (the volume of radioactive water is growing at a rate of about 130 to 140 tons per day). But above all, it is necessary to act quickly because the area is likely to suffer another earthquake, a fear noted by all stakeholders. With the major concern of managing the uranium fuel rods stored in the reactors, the risks that radioactivity will be less contained increase with the years.In France, releases to the sea are not as much of a problem: the La Hague waste reprocessing site in France releases more than 11,000 terabecquerels per year, whereas here we are talking about 22 terabecquerels that would be released each year, which is much less than most of the power plants in the world. But we will come back to this atypical French case…
Giant Mikado
The operator Tepco has successfully removed more than 1500 fuel bundles from the reactor No. 4 of the plant since late 2014, but the hundreds still in place in the other three units must undergo the same type of sensitive operation. To do this, again and again, undertake in detail the clearing of rubble, the installation of shields, the dismantling of the roofs of buildings and the installation of platforms and special equipment to remove the rods… And ultimately decide where all the fuel and other solid radioactive debris will have to be stored or disposed of in the long term. A challenge.
The fuel is the biggest obstacle to dismantling. The solution could lie, according to some engineers, in the construction of a huge water-filled concrete tank around one of the damaged reactors and to carry out the dismantling work in an underwater manner. Objectives and benefits? To prevent radiation from proliferating in the environment and exposing workers (water is a radiation insulator, we use this technique in our cooling pools in France) and to maximize the space to operate the heavy dismantling equipment being made. An immersion solution made illusory for the moment: the steel structure enveloping the building before being filled with water is not feasible as long as radiation levels are so high in the reactor building, preventing access by human teams. In short, all this requires a multitude of refinements, the complexity of the reactors adding to the situations made difficult by the disaster.
Experience, which is exceptional in this field, is in any case lacking. What would guarantee the resistance of the concrete of the tanks over such long periods of time, under such hydraulic pressures? The stability of the soils supporting such structures? How can the concrete be made the least vulnerable possible to future earthquakes? How to replace them in the future?
All these difficulties begin to explain largely the delays of 30 to 40 to dismantle. The reactors are indeed severely damaged. And lethal radiation levels equivalent to melted nuclear fuel have been detected near one of the reactor covers, beyond simulations and well above previously assumed levels. Each of the reactors consists of three 150-ton covers, 12 meters in diameter and 60 centimeters thick: the radiation of 1.2 sieverts per hour is prohibitive, especially in this highly technical context. There is also no doubt that other hotspots will be revealed as investigations are carried out at the respective sites. The Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF), created in 2014, has the very objective of trying to formulate strategic and technical plans in order to proceed with the dismantling of said reactors. Given the physical and radiological conditions, the technical and logistical high-wire act.
Also, each plan is revised as information is discovered, as investigations are conducted when they are operable. For example, the reinforcing bars of the pedestal, which are normally covered with concrete, are exposed inside Reactor No. 1. The concrete support foundation of a reactor whose core has melted has deteriorated so badly that rebar is now exposed.
The cylindrical base, whose wall is 1.2 meters thick, is 6 meters in diameter. It supports the 440-ton reactor pressure vessel. The reinforcing rods normally covered with concrete are now bare and the upper parts are covered with sediment that could be nuclear fuel debris. The concrete probably melted under the high temperature of the debris. The strength of the pedestal is a major concern, as any defect could prove critical in terms of earthquake resistance.
Nothing is simple. The management of human material appears less complex.
Bringing back to life, whatever it takes
In the mountains of eastern Fukushima Prefecture, one of the main traditional shiitake mushroom industries is now almost always shut down. The reason? Radioactive caesium exceeding the government’s maximum of 50 becquerels per kilogram, largely absorbed by the trees during their growth. More than ten years after the nuclear disaster, tests have revealed caesium levels between 100 and 540 becquerels per kilogram. While cesium C134 has a radioactive half-life of about two years and has almost disappeared by now, the half-life of cesium C137 is about 30 years and thus retains 30% of its radioactivity 50 years after the disaster, and 10% after a century.
As more than two thirds of Fukushima prefecture is covered by forests, nothing seems favorable in the short term to get rid of all or part of the deposited radioactivity, as forests are not part of the areas eligible for ‘decontamination’, unlike residential areas and their immediate surroundings.
On the side of the contaminated residential and agricultural areas, ‘decontamination’ measures have been undertaken. But soil erosion and the transfer of contaminants into waterways, frequent due to typhoons and other intense rain events, are causing the radioactive elements to return, moving them incessantly. Scientists are trying to track radioactive substances to better anticipate geographical fluctuations in doses, but nothing is simple: the phenomena of redistribution of the initial contamination deposits from the mountains to the inhabited low-lying areas are eternal.
The Ministry of the Environment is considering the reuse of decontaminated soils (official threshold of 8,000 becquerels per kilogram), with tests to be conducted. For now, a law requires the final disposal of contaminated soil outside Fukushima Prefecture by 2045, which represents about 14 million cubic meters (excluding areas where radiation levels remain high). This reuse would reduce the total volume before legal disposal.
More generally, Japan has for some years now opted for the strategy of holding radiological contamination as zero and/or harmless. This is illustrated by the representative example of the financial compensation given to farmers, designed so that the difference between pre- and post-accident sales is paid to them as compensation for “image damage”, verbatim.
Finally, in the midst of these piles of scrap metal and debris, it is necessary to make what can be made invisible. Concerning radioactive waste for example, it must be stored in time. On the west coast of the island of Hokkaidō, the villages of Suttsu and Kamoenai have been selected for a burial project. Stainless steel containers would be stored in a vitrified state. But consultation with the residents has not yet been carried out. This is not insignificant, because no less than 19,000 tons of waste are accumulating in the accidental, saturated power plants, and must find a place to rest for hundreds of years to come.
In this sparsely populated and isolated rural area, as in other designated sites, to help with acceptance, 15 million euros are being paid to each of the two municipalities to start the studies from 2020. 53 million are planned for the second phase, and much more in the final stages. This burial solution seems inevitable for Japan, as the waste cannot remain at the level of the surface power plants and is subject at all times to the earthquakes that are bound to occur over such long periods (strong earthquakes have struck off the prefecture in 2021 and 2022). The degrees of dangerousness thus allow the government to impose a default choice, for lack of anything better.
On December 6, 2022, the Director General of the IRSN met with the President of Fukushima University and with a manager of the Institute of Environmental Radioactivity (IER). What was the objective? To show the willingness of both parties to continue ongoing projects on the effects of radioactive contamination on biodiversity and environmental resilience.
But France will not have waited for the health results of a disaster to learn and commit itself to take into account any improvement likely to improve the nuclear safety of its reactors. No ?
Experience feedback
After a few reactor restarts that marked a major change in its nuclear energy policy (ten nuclear reactors from six plants out of a total of fifty-four were restarted by June 2022), the Japanese government is nonetheless planning to build new generation nuclear power plants to support its carbon emission reduction targets. (A memorandum of understanding was signed by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi FBR Systems with the American start-up TerraPower to share data for the Natrium fast neutron reactor project; the American company NuScale Power presented its modular reactor technology). But above all, the government is considering extending the maximum service life of existing nuclear reactors beyond 60 years. Following the disaster, Japan had introduced stricter safety standards limiting the operation of nuclear reactors to 40 years, but there is now talk of modernizing the reactors with safety features presented as “the strictest in the world”, necessarily, to meet safety expectations. Their program is worthy of a major refurbishment (GK).
But in France, where are we with our supplementary safety assessments?
The steps taken after the Fukushima disaster to reassess the safety of French nuclear facilities were designed to integrate this feedback in ten years. More than ten years after the start of this process of carrying out complementary safety assessments (CSA), this integration remains limited and the program has been largely delayed in its implementation.
Apparently, ten years to learn all the lessons of this unthinkable accident was not enough. Fear of the probable occurrence of the impossible was not the best motivation to protect the French nuclear fleet from this type of catastrophic scenario, based solely on these new standards. Concerning in detail the reality of the 23 measures identified to be implemented (reinforcement of resistance to earthquake and flooding, automatic shutdown in the event of an earthquake, ultimate water top-up for the reactor and cooling pool, detection of corium in the reactor vessel, etc.), the observation is even distressing: not a single reactor in operation is completely up to standard.
According to NegaWatt’s calculations, at the current rate of progress and assuming that funding and skills are never lacking, it would take until 2040 for the post-Fukushima standards to be finally respected in all French reactors. And even then, some of the measures reported as being in place are not the most efficient and functional (we will come back to the Diesels d’ultime secours, the DUS of such a sensitive model).
Even for the ASN, the reception of the public in the context of post-accident management could appear more important than the effectiveness of the implementation of the measures urgently imposed.
Then, let us complete by confirming that France and Japan have a great and long common history which does not stop in nuclear matters. Among this history, let us recall that Japan lacks facilities to treat the waste from its own nuclear reactors and sends most of it abroad, especially to France. The previous transport of highly radioactive Mox (a mixture of highly toxic plutonium oxide and reprocessed uranium oxide) to Japan dates back to September 2021, not without risk even for the British company specialized in this field, a subsidiary of Orano. The final request for approval for the completion of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, an important partnership and technology transfer project, is expected in December 2022, although the last shipments to Japan suffered from defective products from Orano’s Melox plant, a frequent occurrence because of a lack of good technical homogenization of the products.
No one is immortal
In the meantime, the ex-managers of the nuclear power plant have been sentenced to pay 95 billion euros for having caused the disaster of the entire eastern region of Japan. They were found guilty, above all, of not having sufficiently taken into account the risk of a tsunami at the Fukushima-Daiichi site, despite studies showing that waves of up to 15 meters could hit the reactor cores. Precisely the scenario that took place.
Worse, Tepco will be able to regret for a long time to have made plan the cliff which, naturally high of 35 meters, formed a natural dam against the ocean and the relatively frequent tsunamis in this seismic zone. This action was validated by the Japanese nuclear safety authorities, no less culpable, on the basis of the work of seismologists and according to economic considerations that once again prevailed (among other things, it was a question of minimizing the costs of cooling the reactors, which would have been operated with seawater pumps).
The world’s fourth largest public utility, familiar with scandals in the sector for half a century, Tepco must take charge of all the work of nuclear dismantling and treatment of contaminated water. With confidence. The final total estimates are constantly being revised upwards, from 11,000 billion to 21,500 billion yen, future budgets that are borrowed from financial institutions, among others, with the commitments to be repaid via the future revenues of the electricity companies. A whole financial package that will rely on which final payer?
Because Tepco’s financial situation and technical difficulties are deteriorating to such an extent that such forty-year timetable projections remain very hypothetical, and the intervention of the State as a last resort is becoming more and more obvious. For example, the Japanese government has stated that the repayment of more than $68 billion in government funding (interest-free loans, currently financed by government bonds) for cleanup and compensation for the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster, owed by Tepco, has been delayed. Tepco’s mandatory repayments have been reduced to $270 million per year from the previous $470 million per year. It is as much to say that the envisaged repayment periods are as spread out as the Japanese debt is abysmal.
Despite this chaotic long-term management, the Japanese government has stated that it is considering the construction of the next generation of nuclear power plants, given the international energy supply environment and Japan’s dependence on imported natural resources. Once the shock is over, business and realpolitik resume.
Gillian Haas, former chairperson of the UN Scientific Committee, speaks to the press after meeting with Governor Masao Uchibori at Fukushima Prefectural Government on July 20, 2022.
Former UN Scientific Committee Chair Gillian Haas (right) and Governor Masao Uchibori hold the report in their hands at Fukushima Prefectural Government on July 20, 2022.
Former UN Scientific Committee Chair Gillian Haas (left) and lead author Mikhail Baronov speak to the press after meeting with Governor Masao Uchibori at Fukushima Prefectural Government on July 20, 2022.
Gillian Haas (back left), former chair of the UN Scientific Committee, and others answered questions at a July meeting with citizens in Iwaki, Fukushima, Japan.
October 6, 2022 Last March, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, a group of scientists from Europe, the United States, Japan, and other countries, released a report stating that the high incidence of thyroid cancer among young people in Fukushima Prefecture was not caused by exposure to radiation from the nuclear accident, but by highly sensitive testing. Researchers in Japan disagree with this report. They say that the report, which is supposed to be scientific, is based on “unscientific” analysis. What are the contents of the report?
In July, the Scientific Committee held a dialogue meeting in Iwaki City, Fukushima Prefecture, regarding the “2020/21 Report,” which was released last March. Gillian Haas, former chairperson of the committee, proudly stated, “This report is a reliable, independent, and up-to-date assessment.
The report aims to “provide a more realistic assessment of radiation doses” than the 13th edition, which was released in 2002. The report took into account Japan’s unique dietary habits and other factors, and revised the estimates of radiation doses from eating contaminated food and other factors.
For example, the coefficient for estimating radiation doses has been reduced to half that used in the 2001 edition, based on the assumption that kelp, which is traditionally consumed by Japanese people, contains high levels of stable iodine and is therefore unlikely to contain radioactive iodine, which can cause thyroid cancer. The radiation dose from food during the evacuation was revised to be “negligible,” and the effect of the evacuation of people indoors on reducing radiation exposure was estimated to be higher than in the 13th edition.
As a result, the average radiation doses to the thyroid gland during the first year after the accident ranged from 1.2 to 30 millisieverts for one-year-olds in the prefecture and from 1 to 22 millisieverts for ten-year-olds, with the lowest values being about one-tenth of those in the 13th edition. Mr. Haas said at the dialogue meeting, “Overall, the radiation doses are extremely low. The possibility of an increase in cancer incidence in susceptible infants and children is not discernible,” he stressed.
Since the nuclear accident, more than 300 people in the prefecture have been diagnosed with thyroid cancer or suspected cancer. This is a high incidence compared to the usual rate of 1 to 2 per million people. The report concluded that it is highly likely that the thyroid cancer was detected by highly sensitive ultrasound screening.
◇ ◇A group of researchers in Japan
A group of researchers in Japan has voiced doubts about the contents of the report.
At an online press conference held at the end of August, Tadashi Motoyuki, professor emeritus of radiobiology at Osaka University, criticized the report, saying that it “drastically underestimates [radiation doses] by using the minimum or lower values that can be estimated for various factors related to radiation exposure.
Motoyuki first pointed out the problem of the “kelp effect,” which led to the lowering of radiation doses in the 2008/21 edition.
The report cited as supporting data a study of only 15 people 55 years ago, which “is not helpful at all,” Motoyuki said. Due to changes in dietary habits, the most recent iodine intake of Japanese people cannot be said to be higher than the world standard, and the assessment is not based on facts, he said.
As for exposure to radiation from food during the evacuation, it is clear that contaminated vegetables and other products were on the market immediately after the accident, and Motoyuki points out that this goes against the precautionary principle of adopting maximum values for uncertain items.
The overdiagnosis theory, which was cited in the report as the cause of the high incidence of cancer, is also viewed with suspicion, as it “has not been scientifically verified at all” (Professor Toshihide Tsuda of Okayama University).
At a press conference in early August, Dr. Yasuyuki Taneichi, a physician, explained that in Fukushima Prefecture, the size of thyroid cancer tumors is inspected based on strict standards to prevent overdiagnosis. In particular, he said that nodules smaller than 5 mm are not scrutinized closely, and that this does not constitute overdiagnosis, which he said detects small, non-life-threatening cancers.
He also introduced a report that the use of highly sensitive equipment has reduced the number of cases that lead to surgery, as the detailed morphology of the cancer can now be determined. The report criticized the use of highly sensitive instruments, saying that they prevent overdiagnosis and that the report says the opposite.
The Scientific Committee refrained from giving a detailed response to these points. Former Chairman Haas said during the interactive meeting that the report is a robust document and that its findings will not change in the future. (Tetsuya Kasai, Keitaro Fukuchi)
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The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) was established in 1955, and as of June of this year, 31 countries, including Europe, the United States, and Japan, are members. UNSCEAR’s role is to review papers and other information and compile scientific evidence on the effects of radiation exposure on human health. After the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the Japanese government supported the preparation of the report to “dispel excessive anxiety about the effects of radiation,” contributing 71 million yen in FY13 and 70 million yen in FY17. The government has also used the report and other documents to deny any health damage caused by exposure to radiation in Fukushima. https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASQB57VYKQ9GUGTB005.html?fbclid=IwAR3BN6Y8JaPJNlyIUPGeOub7OwQvaW9kPy6evxYvVV2ZX58fweZpoabGVZ4
By Kaido Yuichi (Attorney representing TEPCO Shareholders)
Attorneys and supporters celebrate their victory outside the Tokyo District Court (Kaido Yuichi, the author, is pictured in the blue jacket)
A Nuclear Accident that Could Have Led to Collapse of the Nation Itself
We succeeded in winning a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on July 13 in the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) shareholders’ derivative lawsuit* that I began working on immediately after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) accident. During the 10 years since we filed this lawsuit in March 2012, 62 sessions were held in Tokyo District Court. Judge Asakura Yoshihide of Tokyo District Court Commercial Division, who presided over the trial, took about 40 minutes to read the summary, with joyful applause filling the courtroom.
The ruling recognized damages in excess of the amounts paid for decommissioning, compensation for damages to the victims, and the costs of interim storage measures for decontamination resulting from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, which had occurred due to breach of duties by the four TEPCO executives (Katsumata Tsunehisa (former Chairman), Shimizu Masataka (former President), Takekuro Ichiro and Muto Sakae (both former Vice-Presidents)).
The ruling thus ordered the four defendants to pay damages of 13.321 trillion yen ($97 billion) to TEPCO.
The ruling says first, that a nuclear power plant (NPP) operator has the obligation to prevent any chance of a serious accident, and that it was the executives’ responsibility to order the company to take measures to prevent a serious accident from occurring as a result of a tsunami. It also says that serious accidents at NPPs, such as reactor core damage, result not only in broken communities, but “could lead the nation itself to collapse.” The ruling determined that there was a duty to society in the public interest to prevent even the remote chance of such serious accidents from occurring. Here, the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision on Ikata NPP was cited.**
I think this ruling, in mentioning “collapse of the nation itself,” strongly reflects the judge’s experience in visiting a “difficult-to-return zone” and entering one of the reactors involved in the accident for on-site consultation.
Long-term Assessment by Suihon Reliable as Basis for Tsunami Countermeasures
In addition, this ruling recognized the reliability of the long-term assessment published in July 2002 by the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion (a government agency abbreviated as Suihon) as a basis for implementing tsunami countermeasures. The assessment in question had indicated that tsunami-generating earthquakes had occurred offshore along Japan’s Pacific coast along the Sanriku (northernmost Honshu) area down to the Boso (Chiba) area three times in the past 400 years, and that there was a 6 percent chance of such a tsunami-generating earthquake occurring during the subsequent 30 years off the coast of Fukushima.
In particular, the long-term assessment was judged as having high reliability that was recognized as follows:
“In light of the facts that Suihon is an institution established as a state organ for the purpose of centralized earthquake evaluation; that the nature of long-term assessment is the objective evaluation of seismic activity, mainly through scientific knowledge, for the purpose of promoting earthquake disaster countermeasures; that the long-term assessment was compiled over the course of three stages of discussions by the Subduction Zone Subcommittee, the Long-term Assessment Committee, and the Earthquake Investigation Committee; and that many of our nation’s top-level earthquake and tsunami researchers were brought together to produce it, it is clear that the views in this long-term assessment cannot be regarded as if they were merely a prediction presented in one researcher’s paper or such. These points by themselves provide the scientific reliability that corresponds to definitive authority.”
Various views had been expressed, including that there were differences between localities from north to south, such as the presence of accretionary complexes (wedges) along the Japan Trench, but none of them had amounted to anything more than hypothetical conjecture and could not form a basis for tsunami countermeasures. Regarding the tsunami evaluation technology employed by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers in 2002, on which TEPCO’s executives based their assertion that there were no wave-generating sources located off the coast of Fukushima, it was judged as having been put together without actual consideration of such wave-generating sources.
The initial decision by Tokyo District Court on September 19, 2019 in the TEPCO criminal trial held that the Suihon’s long-term assessment lacked reliability as a basis for halting nuclear reactors. It found the defendants innocent while making no judgement regarding measures aside from halting reactors for avoiding that outcome. Thus the current ruling is the exact opposite.
Whether the national government bears any responsibility with regard to the Fukushima nuclear accident is disputed. The majority opinion expressed in the Supreme Court’s ruling last June 16 mysteriously evaded a decision on this burning issue. Furthermore, in the elaborate Miura minority opinion included in that ruling for appearances’ sake, the reliability of basing tsunami countermeasures on the long-term assessment was recognized, just as it has been in the current ruling.
The clear judgement indicated in the current ruling is likely the result of influence from testimonies during the criminal trial from Long-term Assessment Committee Chairman Shimazaki Kunihiko, Maeda Kenji of the Suihon Secretariat and Tsuji Yoshinobu, a leading expert in earthquake research, who were adopted as witnesses along with Hamada Nobuo, director of Japan Meteorological Agency’s seismology and volcano division, who was also a subcommittee member. Not one of these experts challenged the conclusion of the long-term assessment; rather, they testified that the opinions summarized in the consensus should have been respected by both the national government and the electric power industry.
Moreover, this ruling held that reliability as a basis for tsunami countermeasures was recognized even for the knowledge revealed in Satake Kenji’s thesis, in which he modeled the wave source that produced the tsunami in the 869 Jogan earthquake based on a survey of tsunami sediments. This ruling did not limit its judgement to the reliability of public institutions’ views only.
Defendants’ Liability Owing to Unsatisfactory Professional Conduct
In addition, regarding the fact that defendant Muto Sakae rejected proposals from TEPCO’s civil engineering group, who suggested taking tsunami countermeasures in June and July 2008, and took no countermeasures whatsoever over a period of several years until their assessment was compiled (inaction in this case), Muto was suspected of delaying countermeasures. However, even if the rationality of his actions could be acknowledged somehow, the inaction by the civil engineering group resulted in continuation of conditions under which the nuclear reactors would have been unable to handle a natural disaster, and he was found guilty because there was no latitude for allowing that.
Regarding the plaintiff’s claim that postponement of the measures could be seen as unreasonable, the ruling recognized that, “Given facts such as that in his consultations with other NPS operators, Sakai Toshiaki of TEPCO’s civil engineering group said that, regarding the policies behind Muto’s decisions, it was a matter of how TEPCO would manage if the Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini reactors were shut down while those at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa were idled; the fact that after giving his opinion on the long-term assessment in an e-mail to Takao Makoto and Kaneto Toshimichi of the same engineering group, Sakai also pointed out regarding the Jogan tsunami that the Electric Technology Research Association was asking if it would be too much trouble to ask for more time, and he took it to mean that with regard to Muto’s decision he should play for time and not implement tsunami countermeasures; and that there were critical reactions to Muto’s decision policies among councils within Japan’s nuclear power industry, such as ‘Are such delays okay? and ‘Why has such a decision been made?’ Suspicions that Muto’s decision may have been a deliberate ploy to put off measures for the sake of TEPCO’s management cannot be dispelled. However, even based on these points, a certain rationality to Muto’s decision has been deemed as undeniable, but I think this is because the ruling has been written in such a way that it will not be overturned by the high court.
First, with this kind of judgement assumed, this ruling acknowledges facts such as that TEPCO’s civil engineering group had established a policy of taking tsunami countermeasures, explained this to others in the company including the president at a “Gozen Kaigi” (literally “Imperial Council”) in February 2008, and also explained its policy for taking tsunami countermeasures in response to Suihon’s long-term assessment in a Q&A it compiled for handling inquiries at the time of the interim quake-resistance back-check in March. In the Q&A, it states that Muto’s decision in itself was “Not based on the engineering group’s explanations and opinions, but his own judgement in opposition to those.”
The first ruling by the criminal court mentioned above held that the information revealed at the ‘Imperial Council’ with the president was unacceptable, misinterpreting the evidence, but it did recognize the reliability of the prosecutor’s statement from Yamashita Kazuhiko, director of the Countermeasure Center for the Niigata Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake, who testified on this point.
Also, given that consideration by the civil engineering group would take at least several years and construction of seawalls would take at least several years more, in the event of a tsunami, there was a high likelihood of it resulting directly in a serious accident with enormous damage, and thus the current ruling holds that these countermeasures had a high priority, that it was an urgently important issue and that it indicates problems regarding the very basis of TEPCO’s management. Moreover, if this way of thinking is “hindsight” after the accident, it notes, “In the final analysis, there was a common perception at TEPCO that such a tsunami would not be brought up until measures such as a seawall could be completed” and “It shows a lack of ability to envisage severe accidents, a lack of awareness regarding safety, and laxity in perceptions, which should have been considered fundamental for TEPCO as an NPS operator to have had prior to the accident. This is unacceptable.” Thus the defendants were found guilty.
Defendant Takekuro, who was the executive in charge of nuclear power, also heard defendant Muto’s explanation in a similar way in August of that year, so his responsibility was recognized in the same way as Muto’s.
Also, even regarding then President Shimizu and then Chairman Katsumata, at the February 2009 Imperial Council, views were recognized from persons with reasonable credibility that took a large-scale tsunami into account, so indeed it was affirmed that they had the duty of due care because they could have made an appropriate decision by investigating and discussing tsunami countermeasures. The defendants claimed that the Imperial Council served simply as a venue for sharing information, but the ruling did not recognize the defendants’ excuse, because “An Imperial Council should be considered an important meeting regarding the conduct of affairs at TEPCO, and that the president, chairman and other executives attend it and express their opinions means that these are not just private words and deeds, but actions in the execution of business by the directors.”
A Fundamental Lack of Safety Awareness and Sense of Responsibility Required from NPS Operators
In the section of the ruling summing up judgments that recognized unsatisfactory professional conduct by the defendants, the ruling pointed out the responsibility of TEPCO’s executives in the following harsh terms.
“Looking at the circumstances of this case, TEPCO did not take action based on safety awareness, which is a matter of course and very rigorously demanded from a nuclear power plant operator, with consideration of all possible countermeasures before accidents happen, and in accordance with the degree of risk, how such countermeasures may be implemented quickly based on the latest scientific knowledge so that even unlikely severe accidents do not have a chance to occur. Instead, almost consistently, they failed to reveal information they had obtained themselves in their relations with NISA (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency) and other regulating authorities…and what stands out is that they took great pains to figure how they could use the most convenient parts of experts’ opinions while ignoring inconvenient parts and keeping them from coming to light so that they could maintain the status quo to the utmost.
“Even when the division in charge of tsunami countermeasures, which was negotiating with NISA and others, found the situation no longer sustainable and declared that they would take genuine measures against tsunamis, the defendants did not accept the opinions of that division. To the contrary, they decided to continue examining matters such as wave sources using external organizations (citation note: this refers to the Japan Society of Civil Engineers) through which they could effectively involve themselves in discussions. Moreover, during that time, they implemented no tsunami countermeasures whatsoever.
“Within TEPCO at that time, the judgement and responses of the defendants may have been actions that could have been viewed as reasonable and a matter of course, so to speak, but it must be said that the safety awareness and sense of responsibility required from nuclear power plant operators and their executives whether before or after the accident in this case were fundamentally lacking.”
The above words can be viewed in the context of comprehensive recognition of facts on such matters as results of tsunami height calculations and behind-the-scenes negotiations with experts, which TEPCO could not bring itself to submit even to NISA, or if it did, it presented them in a misleading way.
Then, what the defendants chose as their tsunami countermeasures were items like large-scale seawalls, which were expected to take a certain amount of time to implement—measured in multiple years—while continuing to operate the reactors as these countermeasures were being completed, but it would have been possible for them to have thought of and implemented emergency measures against tsunamis such as waterproofing the main buildings and rooms with important equipment. Those countermeasures could have been completed before the accident, and in fact, examples of those are acknowledged to have been implemented at the Hamaoka NPS, Tokai Daini NPS and JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency) prior to the time the accident occurred. Judge Asakura Yoshihide and his team conducted an on-site investigation of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS in October 2021 and confirmed conditions at the site and specific places where waterproofing work should have been implemented.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court mentioned above, which denied the government’s liability, overlooked this point, but the Miura minority opinion in the Supreme Court’s ruling indicated a similar judgement as in the current ruling.
Against the Denial of Responsibility and Disavowal of Damage by TEPCO and the Government
The only trials looking into the individual responsibility of former management figures in the nuclear accident and TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS have been the TEPCO criminal trial and the current shareholder derivative lawsuit.
The excellent ruling we achieved this time made it clear to the entire nation that the Fukushima nuclear accident occurred due to a fundamental lack of safety awareness and sense of responsibility among TEPCO’s executives. We can say that we have gained an extremely valuable bridgehead against the denial of responsibility and disavowal of damage by TEPCO and the Japanese government. Requests were made at the hearing of immediate appeal of the TEPCO criminal trial by the designated lawyers and plaintiffs’ representatives to look into the evidence for the ruling and to reopen the case. If we are able to reopen that case and have the documented facts associated with this ruling examined as evidence, there is a tremendously strong possibility of having the verdict of innocent reconsidered.
The four defendants have appealed the ruling. The plaintiffs are appealing former Managing Executive Officer Komori Akio’s exclusion from the demand for compensation on the grounds that his term as an executive at TEPCO had been too short. The stage for the case will move on to Tokyo High Court, and I invite you to keep an interested eye on it in the future.
*A shareholders’ derivative lawsuit can be launched by shareholders against company executives whose actions have caused the company damages. If the plaintiffs win the lawsuit, damages are paid by the executives to the company, not to the shareholders.
**The Supreme Court’s judgement on the annulment of the Ikata NPP Unit 1 operating license, even though it rejected the annulment, stated that it was the duty of NPP operators to ensure that the safety of their NPPs was based on the most recent information available.
Mr. Seiichi Nakate (right) handed a written request to the Reconstruction Agency at the House of Representatives building in Chiyoda Ward, Tokyo, on March 23.
August 23, 2022 On August 23, three groups of evacuees from Fukushima Prefecture requested the Reconstruction Agency not to exclude approximately 6,600 people from the number of evacuees from outside of Fukushima Prefecture due to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, because their whereabouts cannot be confirmed. The reduction in the number of evacuees in the statistics may lead to a trivialization of the damage caused by the nuclear power plant accident. The Reconstruction Agency compiles the number of evacuees based on the information that evacuees have reported to the municipalities where they have taken refuge. In some cases, such as when evacuees move away without notifying the local government, their whereabouts are lost. As a result of the survey conducted since last September, approximately 2,900 people’s whereabouts are unknown, and approximately 2,480 people have moved without notifying the municipality. In addition, a total of 6,604 people will be excluded from the evacuee statistics, including approximately 1,110 people who answered “will not return” in the survey. As of April, the number of out-of-prefecture evacuees was approximately 23,000, a decrease of more than 3,300 from January, as reports continue to follow this policy. The number is expected to continue to decrease as each municipality works to correct the situation. The request was made on this day by the National Association of Evacuees for the “Right to Evacuation” and others. Seiichi Nakate, 61, co-chairman of the association and an evacuee from Fukushima City to Sapporo City, said, “Even though I no longer have the intention to return, I am aware that I am an ‘evacuee. I cannot allow myself to be excluded by the government.” He handed the written request to a Reconstruction Agency official. The official explained that the exclusion would be made in order to match the actual situation of the evacuees, but that it would not affect the support measures. At the press conference, Nakate said, “Eleven years have passed since the accident, and the number of official support measures at the evacuation sites is decreasing every year. The evacuee statistics are the basis for all support measures, and I am concerned that they may lead to further reductions in support in the future. (Kenta Onozawa) https://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/197673?fbclid=IwAR1Om2iDjG_pTgRouOTIf-Ji0p18kJC6R9bkXkJxDBKx66RYKjZkt14L3_Q
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