Japanese Nuclear Regulation Authority, the NRA, has put the kibosh on plans by Tokyo Electric Power Co. to start freezing underground soil at the crippled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant–a stunningly expensive project intended to solve the crisis of accumulating radioactive groundwater at the site.
The installation of the equipment required for forming a wall of frozen soil at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant to prevent groundwater entering the reactor buildings has been completed. Approval from the Japanese regulator must be sought before the creation of the wall itself can begin.
Ice wall technology is already widely used in civil engineering projects, such as the construction of tunnels near waterways. Small-scale tests using the technology have already been completed at the Fukushima Daiichi site. However, the full-scale use of the technology at Fukushima will see the largest ground freezing operation in the world.
Installation of the equipment for forming the ice wall began in June 2014 and a test that has circulated the chilling liquid to specific parts of the wall has been under way since April 2015. The north, south and west sides of the facility were completed last September, while the remaining pipes on the east side facing the sea were placed within the ground in November.
Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco) announced yesterday that all the necessary equipment is now in place for the creation of the ice wall. However, the company noted that it must get approval from the Nuclear Regulation Authority before the equipment can be put into operation. The regulator’s approval, Tepco said, would partly depend on the company “showing a method to ensure that the wall (and other groundwater pumping operations) do not invert the water level difference in any way that would cause contaminated water to flow out of the building’s basements”.
Kajima Corporation, the main contractor for the facility, has drilled holes some 30-35 metres into the ground and inserted pipes through which refrigerant will be then be pumped. This cooling will freeze the soil surrounding the pumps creating an impenetrable barrier around the reactor buildings. In total, some 1550 pipes have been placed in the ground to create a 1.5km-long ice wall around units 1 to 4. The wall is designed to remain effective for up to two months in the event of a loss of power. The Japanese government agreed to pay for construction of the ice wall, estimated to cost some JPY32 billion ($278 million).
Reducing the amount of contaminated water that it must deal with is a priority for Tepco. Groundwater naturally seeps from land to sea, but at the Fukushima Daiichi site it must negotiate the basements of reactors buildings. It is thought that more than 400 tonnes of groundwater enters the basements each day through cable and pipe penetrations as well as small cracks, mixing with the heavily contaminated water previously used to cool the damaged reactor cores.
The ice wall is only one part of a multi-layered strategy being employed to manage the flow of groundwater and rainwater at Fukushima Daiichi, Tepco said. Tepco is saying that its strategy to prevent water becoming contaminated has reduced the daily inflow of groundwater into the buildings to 150 tonnes per day. “Successful implementation of the frozen soil water is designed to reduce that inflow further, by keeping water out of the reactor buildings,” the company contends.
TEPCO has maintained that once the soil is frozen, it will form a circular barrier and reduce the flow of groundwater into the reactor buildings; and that, in turn, will prevent water contaminated with radioactive substances from accumulating.
But the Nuclear Regulation Authority contends that contaminated water accumulated in the reactor buildings could leak into the groundwater if the level inside the frozen soil wall drops too much.
TEPCO planned to construct a 1,500-meter-long frozen soil wall around the four reactor buildings by inserting 1,568 pipes to a depth of 30 meters at 1-meter intervals. Each pipe will freeze the soil around it once liquid of minus 30 degrees circulates inside the cylinder.
On Feb. 9, TEPCO completed the last part of the project to install temperature indicators, allowing it to start freezing the soil at a moment’s notice.
Groundwater is continuing to flow into basements of reactor buildings with melted nuclear fuel, adding to the amount of highly contaminated water being produced.
In May 2013, a committee of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry drew up a report on the merits of constructing a frozen soil wall to reduce the volume of contaminated water.
Based on the report, TEPCO started the construction work in June 2014. The government has already spent about 34.5 billion yen ($300 million) on the project.
TEPCO maintained that once the frozen soil wall is completed, it should reduce the flow of groundwater into the reactor buildings from about 400 tons a day to 100 tons in tandem with other measures, including work to pump out groundwater from wells dug around the reactor buildings.
From the outset, the NRA cast doubt on the effectiveness of the frozen soil wall, saying that highly contaminated water accumulated in reactor buildings could leak into the ground if the groundwater level inside the wall drops too much.
The NRA repeatedly asked TEPCO whether the frozen soil wall would prove truly effective in reducing the amount of contaminated water.
“TEPCO is scattering a strange illusion that the problem of contaminated water can be solved completely if a frozen soil wall is constructed,” NRA chairman Shunichi Tanaka said in spring 2015.
In a test operation which started that spring, the reduction of groundwater levels was larger than expected in some places. The speed and direction of the groundwater flow could not be clarified in some locations.
Because it takes two months or so for the soil to thaw out, countermeasures cannot be taken immediately if problems crop up.
TEPCO acknowledges that there are limits to its crystal ball-gazing with regard to the problem of groundwater. However, it contends that it can prevent contaminated water from leaking into the ground by pouring water into the ground through wells if the level drops too much.
In December, the NRA took the rare move of proposing to TEPCO in a written document that the utility operate the frozen soil wall only in places where contaminated water is unlikely to leak into the ground.
However, TEPCO dug in its heels and said it intended to operate the frozen soil wall as a whole. But it also plans to consider the NRA’s proposal.
On Feb. 9, TEPCO President Naomi Hirose visited the NRA office and told Tanaka, “We will consider your proposal and get back to you in a most sincere manner.”
MITO, IBARAKI PREF. – The Environment Ministry has allowed Ibaraki Prefecture to continue storing waste contaminated with radioactive substances from the March 2011 nuclear disaster in multiple locations for the time being.
The ministry on Thursday supported ongoing use of the multiple-site storage option at a meeting with officials from Ibaraki Prefecture and 14 municipalities in the prefecture that are currently storing such designated waste on a temporary basis.
This is the first time the ministry, which has upheld a policy to construct one designated waste disposal facility in each of the prefectures of Miyagi, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma and Chiba, to give the green light to multiple-site storage within a prefecture.
On Friday, Environment Minister Tamayo Marukawa said at a news conference the ministry will continue coordinating with local municipalities to deal with the issue.
As part of the process, she said, it would consult with the community to move forward with lifting the designation on waste where radiation levels have lowered and consolidate remaining waste.
Designated waste, including incineration ash, sewage sludge and paddy straw, is contaminated with radioactive substances exceeding 8,000 becquerels per kilogram as a result of the triple meltdown at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant caused by a major earthquake and tsunami.
Although the ministry has been pursuing the policy of concentrating such waste in one location in each of the five prefectures for disposal, the construction of disposal facilities has yet to transpire five years after the nuclear accident amid strong opposition from local residents.
The ministry’s decision to tolerate multiple-site storage is apparently intended to overcome the situation.
The ministry plans to have the municipalities in Ibaraki Prefecture continue safely storing designated waste for now, and have them dispose of the waste as general waste after radiation levels fall below 8,000 becquerels per kilogram.
As a result, the ministry forecasts that the amount of designated waste in the prefecture will drop to about 0.6 ton in about 10 years from 3,643 tons at present.
It will examine whether multiple-site storage can be continued in Gunma and Chiba prefectures, where municipalities are storing designated waste indoors just like those in Ibaraki Prefecture.
At Thursday’s meeting, the ministry proposed rules that would require the central and local governments to hold talks in advance if the radioactive waste designation is to be lifted.
The ministry also indicated a plan to consider providing financial support to municipalities that dispose of the waste after removal of the designation as radioactive waste at their existing facilities. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/05/national/government-oks-multiple-site-storage-radioactive-waste/#.VrTSbFLzN_l
On Fukushima Prefecture and Hiroshi Kainuma: How Officials and Popular Academics Have Responded to Disaster Victims in the Wake of Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Nuclear Accident
By Toshinori Shishido
日本語の原文『東京電力福島原子力発電所事故発生前後から現在までの、福島県庁と開沼博氏達による被災者への対応』
1. About the author
I worked as a full-time teacher at a public high school in Fukushima for about twenty-five-and-a-half years, until July 31, 2011. During the first four years of my career, I taught at Futaba High School in Futaba-machi, home to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Naturally, I have heard stories about the harsh working conditions of nuclear workers. For example, in a certain area of the power plant, working for 10 minutes would exceed the legal maximum daily radiation exposure limit. So each shift was officially recorded as 10 minutes even though their actual worked shift was 8 hours. The workers would primarily wipe water leaking from the piping surrounding the nuclear reactor. When workers died of illnesses like cancer, their families received unusually high amounts of cash as lump-sum payments, while actual workmen’s compensation insurance was not provided.
At the time of the 2011 nuclear accident, I was living in a city 53 kilometers (33 miles) away from the power plant with my wife and two children. I was working at a public school 60 kilometers (37 miles) from the plant.
After the accident, on the evening of March 15, 2011, the maximum airborne radioactive levels of 23 microsievert/hour was detected in Fukushima City, where I worked. Outside the school the following day, however, the annual school acceptance announcements were held as scheduled. Several faculty, including myself, met with the principal to insist that usual outdoor announcement be cancelled as to avoid having young students exposed to radiation–but the announcement event was forced outdoors. The principal cited reasons such as, “the Fukushima Prefecture office strongly supports the outdoor plan” and he “had no choice as the school principal.”
From April 2011 on, aside from the prohibition of outdoor gym classes, neither my school nor the Fukushima Board of Education took any measures to prevent further radiation exposure for students. The school had students practice club activities outdoors as usual. Indoor club athletes were made to run outdoors as well, without any protective measure against radiation exposure. Despite the standard practice, measures such as gargling, washing hands, changing clothes, and showering weren’t deemed necessary for students when returning from outdoor activities. Since I had some knowledge about radiation exposure, I advised the students to take caution to remove potential contamination whenever possible. However, in response to my giving the students advice to prevent radioactive materials from entering the building, I had been cautioned by the Fukushima Prefectural Board of Education, in the form of official “guidance” which forbids me to even talk about radiation and nuclear power plants to the students. Given that I was officially barred from protecting students from radiation exposure, I decided to make my move: along with my family, I evacuated my hometown and relocated to Sapporo city in Hokkaido. We were supported by staff and Toru Konno at the Hokkaido Prefectural government who led the way through the interference by Fukushima Prefecture, and Sapporo City, as well as by the support of the people at the NPO Musubiba. Once we evacuated, we found out about a financial system by Fukushima Prefecture which supports voluntary evacuees from the areas outside of the officially restricted zone (though it only approved applications from evacuees pre-December 2012; those who evacuated thereafter would not be financially supported).
I have been teaching part-time in Hokkaido. Since finding out that within the public school system the Fukushima Prefecture Board of Education can intervene to oversee public high school relocation anywhere, I have been teaching at private schools only. Aside from my part-time job, I have been involved in a nuclear power plant damages lawsuit as a plaintiff as well as a member of the refugee organization.
1. Fukushima Prefectural Government and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)’s Fukushima Nuclear Accident
The reactors at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, especially Unit 1 and Unit 2, were delivered and installed from the US after the US manufacturer finished all of their construction. As for Units 3, 4, 5, and 6 the Japanese manufacturer added their own “improvements” to the original structure.
I will try to avoid a lengthy explanation. TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant frequently had accidents immediately after beginning operation and the nuclear workers’ exposure levels amounted to twice to ten times the average exposure dose at other nuclear plants. Furthermore, TEPCO kept a lot of serious accidents hidden from Fukushima Prefecture and the Japanese government. TEPCO proposed using Unit 3 for so-called pluthermal power generation, utilizing fuel which can contain weapons-grade plutonium in order to reduce the plutonium surplus in Japan. Eisaku Sato, then-governor of Fukushima, strongly objected to the proposal.The Japanese government arrested and convicted Governor Sato on bribery charges with the amount of the bribe recognized as “zero yen.” They drove him to resign, then elected Yuhei Sato as the new governor. As described above, neither the Fukushima governor nor the organization called the Fukushima Prefectural Government had power over TEPCO.
2. Nuclear accident and the Fukushima Prefectural Government
March 11, 2011, when a massive earthquake hit a wide area including Fukushima Prefecture, the building of the Fukushima prefectural office (which had been planned to function as a Disaster Response Headquarters) was damaged in the earthquake. The headquarters were set up in a small building next to the main office building to serve temporary functions. The prefectural government has never publicized records of proceedings and documents from over 20 meetings in the beginning. From the 25th meeting, they finally began keeping records of proceedings.
At the time, the temporary disaster response headquarters was believed to have had little to no communication lines, and had reportedly only two satellite mobile phones. Although the communication infrastructure began to be rebuilt gradually, what was happening then still remains largely unknown. There has been no official investigation into the correspondence between the local governments, the central government and TEPCO, and no evacuation orders to the local communities.
As far as public record goes, the only time Fukushima Governor issued an announcement in the first week was on the evening of March 14th. “Follow the instructions and do not panic,””High school entrance announcements will be held as planned on March 16th,”— these two lines were broadcast repeatedly throughout local media.
From another angle, the recordings of the TEPCO video conference shows that Fukushima Prefecture requested TEPCO make a public announcement saying “the explosion in the Unit 3 at Fukushima Daiichi will not cause health damage.” Appalled by the request, thinking they “couldn’t say such an irresponsible thing,” TEPCO decided to “ask the central government to suppress Fukushima Prefecture,”—as evidently recorded during the video conference.
However Fukushima Prefecture repeatedly expressed that in the “Nakadōri” region—which includes the prefectural capitol, Fukushima City, and the commercially and industrially flourishing Koriyama City—there would be zero risk of health damage from radiation.
There has been a use of protective measures like wearing long-sleeves and masks for school children, which may have been a globally familiar sight through media reports. However this was not a recommendation or an order issued by Fukushima Prefecture, but rather a result of demands from local PTAs to boards of education in individual school districts.
Towards the end of March 2011, right before the school year resumed, the Fukushima governor was seen out in local grocery stores saying “Fukushima today is business as usual,” in which he began a campaign to “dispel harmful rumors” about local agricultural produce being contaminated by radiation. The governor also opposed widening the evacuation zone beyond the 20km radius of the nuclear power plant, and has repeatedly made remarks to avoid increasing the number of evacuees from outside the official evacuation zone.
As a result, aside from two local Fukushima newspapers, NHK, and four private television networks in addition to NHK Radio and Radio Fukushima, there was little to no mention of messages from outside Fukushima offering free housings and support networks for voluntary evacuees. Fukushima Prefecture also prohibited the use of not only public conference centers, but private facilities for hosting “counseling room” for evacuation as well. People around me practically had no knowledge of local autonomous support groups offering evacuation support. I have heard numerous times that “there is no evacuation order from outside the prefecture, meaning we have been abandoned.” In fact, it was Fukushima Prefecture who had been interfering with such efforts to reach our community.
Hiroshi Kainuma, “the Sociologist”
In 2011, an author from Fukushima became renowned after publishing the book “Fukushima’ theory–the birth of a nuclear village,” based on a thesis he wrote as a sociology student at the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Information Sciences. His name is Hiroshi Kaiuma, born in Iwaki City, Fukushima, and graduated from the University of Tokyo Literature department at the age of 25 and advanced to the graduate program. I must note that this is difficult to grasp if you are not well-connected within Fukushima. But in short, Iwaki City, where Mr. Kainuma was born and raised, has very little connection to the Futaba district which hosts TEPCO’s power plant. In terms of large-scale trading areas, while the Futaba district is part of the Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture trade area, Iwaki City would be part of Mito City in Ibaraki Prefecture. In any case, Mr. Kainuma did not have strong connections to the Fukushima Prefectural government prior to March 11th, 2011.
Since the meltdown, however, he has somehow become “the Fukushima spokesperson who speaks about Fukushima on TV and radio.”
Additionally, I have written several critiques of his writings, one of which can be found on the following link (in Japanese): “Personal note on “‘Fukushima’ theory–the birth of a nuclear village’” http://togetter.com/li/815862
4. Hiroshi Kainuma and the Fukushima Prefectural Government
After 3.11, his master’s thesis was published in books and he began to be featured in various media, including an appearance as a commentator on the popular evening program “Hodo Station (News Station).” We must note that the content of his remarks have been consistent—such as, “The acceptance of nuclear power plant by local communities was necessary for the regions’ survival”; “Those outside of Fukushima protesting against nuclear energy do not understand the reality of nuclear-hosting communities.” His views and comments on the anti-nuclear movement have been antagonistic from the beginning, for example, “People who oppose nuclear energy are rubbing local communities the wrong way.”
Mr. Kainuma currently holds the title of Junior Researcher of the Fukushima Future Center for Regional Revitalization, but at the same time he is a PhD student at the University of Tokyo. While it would be appropriate to call him a sociology researcher, I feel it’s an overestimation to refer to him as a sociologist.
Currently the gist of Mr. Kainuma’s speech is towards the “recovery of Fukushima in visible forms” and its target audience is outside Fukushima Prefecture. While many others have in fact been referring to “bags” jammed with contaminated waste—seen everywhere and impossible to be ignored upon entering Fukushima—Mr. Kainuma continues to emphasize the “ordinary Fukushima” without mentioning the bags.
I see the previous governor of Fukushima, Yuhei Sato, in Mr. Kainuma in many ways, like in his seeming lack of experience interacting with people in temporary housings immediately following the meltdowns, or with shelter residents still living with much confusion and inconveniences as a result of the disaster.
Even the current Fukushima governor does not seem to have made too many visits to temporary shelters during or after elections.
To those who evacuated Fukushima to outer prefectures like myself, the Prefecture kept even more distance. By principle, they never made any official inspection visits to meet the evacuees. There is a notable lack of inspection visits not only in remote areas such as Hokkaido, but also in places like Yamagata and Niigata which are adjacent to Fukushima Prefecture.
In the wake of the disaster, though there was housing support for those who evacuated the areas outside of Fukushima as well, such efforts have gradually died down—as of March 2016, state subsidies for housing would be available only for evacuees who are from Fukushima. In addition, the housing subsidy program for those who evacuated the non-restricted zone will end in March 2017. However, there is no housing program for returning residents to Fukushima even if they decide to move back there.
Starting March 2017, voluntary evacuees still living in outer prefectures need to choose one of the three following choices:
1) Return home to Fukushima while paying out-of-pocket for most of the expenses associated with the move and your life thereafter. 2) Continue living outside Fukushima while relinquishing your rights to access resources as a disaster victim 3) Upon proving your need for financial assistance, receive housing subsidies for up to 2 years to live in privately-owned housing.
The reason for this policy change was credited to correspondence between the Minister of Environment and the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, a non-governmental agency to provide scientific grounds for nuclear policy. The Minister of Envirnoment asked the NRA if “it is considered desirable to evacuate the areas that don’t have restrictions” to which the NRA answered, ”these areas are no longer fit to be evacuated.” It should be noted that there was no legal ground for this correspondence to be treated as official; how this exchange was reviewed and by whom is unknown.
Based on this document issued by the NRA, the Japanese government made a Cabinet decision to largely reduce support for evacuees through the Nuclear Accident Child Victim’s Support Law.
Following this decision, Fukushima Prefecture also determined its policy would end support for the voluntary evacuees from non-restricted areas.
Hiroshi Kainuma is working from an assumed role to justify such policy of Fukushima Prefecture, utilizing his position as a so-called sociologist. Even if he has ideas and views that differ from Fukushima Prefecture’s policy, he does not speak about them on media or at talk events.
For instance, when Mr. Kainuma was relatively unknown before 3.11, he had reportedly interviewed local anti-nuclear activists. Another instance tells us that although he had met and interviewed several people who have moved voluntarily out of the non-restricted areas, he proceeds to ignore the voices and opinions of them as though they had never existed.
Last year, nuclear reactors in Japan started resuming operation. Mr. Kainuma has not been seen or heard expressing opposition to it. Neither Fukushima Prefecture nor the Prefectural Assembly expresses any intentions to oppose nuclear restorations.
5. The current presence of “Hiroshi Kainuma”
Through the circumstances described above, Hiroshi Kainuma is working so as to be portrayed by the media as a Fukushima Prefecture spokesperson, intent on selling “business-as-usual” appeal and depicting a Fukushima that “overcame a nuclear disaster.”
Meanwhile, and quite unfortunately, many Fukushima residents agree with his words and actions. Just as there are many people hoping to forget the scars from the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, there are many who explicitly “do not evacuate,” comprising an overwhelming majority of the Fukushima population and wishing to forget and move past the disaster and nuclear crisis.
Here we have an academic scholar who speaks for us and to those who are outside Fukushima as well, saying to leave the nuclear disaster in the past.
Thus, this concludes the significance of Hiroshi Kainuma’s existence today.
Researchers in Japan found new materials they described as tiny spherical glass particle that was highly radioactive. Researchers found that the radioactivity was highest in the center of the particle, indicating the cesium was incorporated into the glass particle during the molten phase of the meltdown. The glass particle also contains materials that indicate it includes either concrete from the containment vessel or seawater that was injected.
Microparticles containing substantial amounts of radiocesium collected from the ground in Fukushima were investigated mainly by transmission electron microscopy (TEM) and X-ray microanalysis with scanning TEM (STEM). Particles of around 2 μm in diameter are basically silicate glass containing Fe and Zn as transition metals, Cs, Rb and K as alkali ions, and Sn as substantial elements. Nano-sized crystallites such as copper- zinc- and molybdenum sulfide, and silver telluride were found inside the microparticles, which probably resulted from the segregation of the silicate and sulfide (telluride) during molten-stage. 0.2 μm thick exists at the outer side of the particle collected from cedar leaves 8 months after the nuclear accident, suggesting gradual leaching of radiocesium from the microparticles in the natural environment.
Cross section of the NWC-1 glass sphere from Nihonmatsu, photo credit Yamaguchi et al.
Although almost five years have passed since the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP), radioactive contamination in the surrounding area is still a serious problem in Japan. Wet deposition was a major source of radiocesium contamination of terrestrial environment1, while contribution of dry deposition was larger near the FDNPP2. Deposition of radiocesium as insoluble particles has also been pointed out. On the aerosol filter collected from March 14–15, 2011 in Tsukuba, 170 km south-southwest of FDNPP, Adachi et al.7 discovered spherical particulate radiocesium of 2.0–2.6 μm in diameter, with particles insoluble in water having a glass-like structure8. These microparticles contain several fission products of U-235 other than radiocesium, and Fe and Zn which are also used in nuclear reactors8. Hence, they were considered to be released directly from nuclear reactors.
Kaneyasu et al.9 suggested that vaporized radiocesium was transported with sulfate aerosol in the air, dissolved to cloud droplets and fell as rain. On the aerosol filter collected on March 20–21, 2011, rainy days in Tsukuba, the majority of radiocesium was in water-soluble form7. Such water-soluble radiocesium that reached the ground surface as a solute was fixed to soils, especially to clay minerals10. In the terrestrial environment, the majority of radiocesium is present in solid form regardless of the initial form of deposition. However, compared to clay minerals originally contaminated by soluble radiocesium in soil, the solid radiocesium, which was initially deposited as radioactive microparticles, had stronger radioactivity. Although the contribution or percentage of such radioactive microparticles in the contamination level of Fukushima has not been evaluated, its influence on human health may be serious in terms of its intense radioactivity. Moreover, the structural detail of the microparticles may give insights into the state of the broken reactor and fuel debris.
In the present study, we investigated radioactive microparticles, similar to those reported by Adachi et al.7, but collected from the ground, by observing their internal structure with transmission electron microscopic (TEM) techniques.
Structure and composition of Cesium-bearing radioactive microparticles
Cesium-bearing radioactive microparticles that had been deposited on non-woven fabric cloth (NWC-1) and on a needle of Japanese cedar (Cryptomeria japonica) (CB-8) were investigated. Scanning electron microscope (SEM) images of NWC-1 of the whole microparticle before preparing thin sections for TEM analyses; and elemental composition of the whole particle determined by synchrotron radiation microbeam X-ray fluorescence (SXRF) are shown in Supplementary Figs S1 and S2 online, respectively. The activities of 137Cs for the NWC-1 and CB-8 were 5.04 ± 0.472 and 3.14 ± 0.178 Bq, respectively.
Photo credit Yamaguchi et al.
Our most significant finding is that the matrix of the Cs-bearing microparticles is silicate glass, based on the TEM-EDS analysis with FIB sample preparation. Previous studies suggested that Fe, Mo, Sn and Zn in the Cs-bearing microparticles had a similar X-ray absorption near-edge structure to those composed of glass8, however the presence of Si in the microparticles has not been verified7,8. It is probable that the high-temperature melt-down fuel from the reactor came into contact with and melted the concrete, and then splashed microparticles of silicate melt, which were solidified by cooling to form silicate glass in the atmosphere. For instance, Ca which is one of the major elements in concrete, was almost absent in the microparticles of NWC-1. Since TEM observed only a small portion of the microparticles, by making them thin using FIB, there may have been other elements in the microparticles, for instance, as a form of chalcogenide nanoparticle.
Photo credit Yamaguchi et al.
The next important finding is the alkali-depleted crust in CB-8 microparticle. This is probably the result of elution of alkali ions by contact with acidic solution in the field, commonly observed in silicate glass13. This may be attributed to the different environments of the two microparticles after release from the nuclear plant. It is well-known that silicate glass elutes alkali components from their surface by ion-exchange with proton or hydronium ions to form an alkali-leaching layer on the surface if pH of reacting solution is low, whereas the silicate framework of the glass itself is dissolved with high-pH solution13,14. The finding of the alkali-depleting crust on the surface of the Cs-bearing radioactive microparticle indicates that radiocesium in the particles can be released by “weathering” of the glass in natural environments, and considering its small size, duration for the total release of the radioactive cesium from the particles is probably not long, from several years to a few decades, though it will strongly depends on the environment.
In order to investigate the dissolution rate and detailed Cs-leaching properties of the Cs-bearing radioactive microparticles, a leaching experiment should be conducted as a function of temperature and pH. However, collecting and isolating the Cs-bearing microparticles is time-consuming and it is difficult to obtain a large enough number of Cs-bearing microparticles to investigate dissolution properties. Alternatively, synthesized silicate glass with the same composition as the microparticles presented in this study may help to obtain information on the fate of Cs-bearing radioactive microparticles. that fixed to clay minerals in the soil via wet deposition and that contained in the microparticles of silicate glass flown directly from the nuclear reactors. On the other hand, contribution of the microparticles to the air radiation is most likely not significant, but their radiation density is very high, which is particularly problematic for organisms including humans if the microparticles are inhaled or ingested. The plant availability of radiocesium in the microparticles should depend on its solubility.
Photo credit Yamaguchi et al.
Photo of black sand substances found in Namie, from research paper by Marco Kaltofan. Photo credit Marco Kaltofan.
An underground ice wall designed to curb the buildup of radioactive water at the Fukushima Daiichi plant will see near completion on Friday. But it’s not yet clear when it can be put into service as the nuclear regulator has not yet given a green light to its use.
The barrier will almost be finished Friday. Only the last procedure, which involves filling underground pipes with coolant, remains.
The wall made of frozen soil stretches about 1.5 kilometers around 4 reactor buildings.
Tokyo Electric Power Company aims to cut the amount of groundwater that seeps into the buildings and then becomes contaminated. The utility expects the barrier to reduce the inflow to 10 tons a day. That’s less than one tenth the current level.
The project to build the wall began in June 2014 at a cost of about 290 million dollars from the national coffers. The plan is to start operation by the end of March.
But the Nuclear Regulation Authority has not given its approval. It fears radioactive water could leak from the reactor buildings if the wall makes the level of groundwater lower than that of contaminated water.
TEPCO says it will closely monitor groundwater levels and inject water if the levels fall too far.
WASHINGTON – Former Prime Minister Naoto Kan said Tuesday the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima No. 1 power plant is not over five years since a massive earthquake and tsunami triggered the meltdowns.
“There is no doubt” radioactive materials have been seeping into the sea after mixing with groundwater, Kan, who has been a vocal critic of nuclear energy since the crisis started, told the National Press Club in Washington.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has repeatedly said the issue of water contaminated with radioactive substances at the Fukushima plant is “under control,” including when he was making a pitch for Tokyo as host of the 2020 Olympic Games.
Kan disputes this. “The accident is still unfolding,” he said.
Kan was prime minister when the world’s worst nuclear crisis since Chernobyl occurred following the massive earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011.
Kan, a lawmaker of the Democratic Party of Japan, also criticized Abe’s decision to raise the ratio of electricity produced by atomic energy to 20-22 percent of the nation’s total output by 2030.
“The goal is not achievable” unless Japan extends the maximum legal period of reactor operations or builds a new nuclear plant, Kan said.
Most nuclear reactors remain off line in Japan, but various operators are seeking restarts.
Kansai Electric Power Co. is set to reactivate a reactor at its Takahama plant in Fukui Prefecture on Friday, in what would be the third restart since new safety standards were put in place.
FUKUSHIMA – Fishermen in Fukushima Prefecture said Wednesday they plan to scale down their self-imposed fishing ban in waters off the damaged nuclear power plant due mainly to a substantial decline in radioactive cesium levels.
The Fukushima Prefectural Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations is considering narrowing the area subject to the ban to a 10-kilometer radius from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant from the current 20-kilometer radius.
The move comes as plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Co. last autumn completed the construction of a shielding wall to prevent leaks of contaminated groundwater into the sea. Since the completion, radiation levels in sea waters at the plant’s port have been declining.
In addition, prefectural research shows the radioactive cesium levels of marine products caught in coastal areas have dropped substantially.
The proportion of marine products with cesium levels exceeding the state standards of 100 becquerels per kilogram fell to less than 0.1 percent last year from some 40 percent between April and December 2011, soon after the nuclear accident at the plant in March that year. No products have surpassed the level in checks since last April.
The federation is scheduled to make a final decision late next month. “The environment of the seas of Fukushima has improved, and conditions for reviving fisheries are being laid out,” federation leader Tetsu Nozaki told reporters.
After the tsunami-triggered triple meltdown at the nuclear plant, the federation voluntarily halted all of its coastal fishing. In June 2012, it started trial operations in a limited area, which has since expanded in steps. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/01/27/national/fukushima-fishermen-to-expand-operations-off-crippled-nuclear-plant/#.VqmtzVLzN_m
Government agencies are discussing the plan as a ‘long-term solution’ while environmentalists have dismissed it as an expensive ‘pipe dream’.
A team of experts from Japan’s Nuclear Waste Management Organisation is examining the possibility of storing thousands of tonnes of highly radioactive nuclear waste in tunnels deep beneath the Pacific Ocean.
Japan already has a stockpile of some 40,000 units of vitrified nuclear waste, with each of the stainless steel containers containing around 500kg of radioactive material, with more waste being produced.
Two of Japan’s 55 nuclear reactors resumed operations last year, after their operations were subjected to detailed scrutiny as a result of the disaster at the Fukushima nuclear plant, caused by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami.
A number of additional reactors have applied to restart operations, while dozens of the older plants will now have to be decommissioned as they have reached the end of their operational lives. Japan has never before decommissioned a reactor and does not have a dedicated storage facility for high-level nuclear waste.
“We are presently looking for a site and one of the options being considered is for tunnels beneath the seabed,” Kenichi Kaku, a spokesman for the agency, told the South China Morning Post.
“We are looking for a long-term solution to the issue that also meets the terms of the law on the storage of high-level waste,” Kaku explained.
A preliminary report suggests that tunnels could be excavated from the land to a distance of several kilometres offshore. The final disposal chamber would need to be in bed rock at a depth of at least 300 metres below the seabed.
The tunnels would need to be within 20km of a port, which would be required to transport vitrified waste over long distances, and the containers would be taken to the sub-seabed storage chamber by remote-controlled vehicle.
As well as being more secure from human interference, storage chambers beneath the seabed are less affected by the movement of groundwater and fluctuation in sea levels.
The experts, appointed to complete a full study by the ministry of industry, will now carry out a study of the technical issues that will need to be overcome. They will start by examining geographical features to identify possible seismic fault zones.
Kaku admitted that one result of the 2011 disaster at Fukushima is that “the Japanese public has lost confidence in science and we need to rebuild our credibility”.
Key considerations will be ensuring security in the transportation phase of highly radioactive waste, he said, while a great deal of work needs to be done to ensure that the storage chamber cannot be breached after the tunnel has been closed off.
“We need to identify active faults and volcanic regions so the waste is not affected in any way and we are looking to the experience of other countries for our plans,” Kaku said.
Environmental organisations have been quick to condemn the plan, however, with Aileen Mioko-Smith, an activist with Kyoto-based Green Action Japan, telling the Post that the proposal is “a pipe dream”.
“They talked about an ‘ice wall’ that was meant to stop ground water at the Fukushima plant becoming contaminated with radiation, but that was a pipe dream,” she said. “This is another one. It may look good on paper but how could it ever be achieved at a reasonable cost?
“And that’s before we even consider the safety of putting high-level nuclear waste beneath the seismically active seabed off Japan. It just doesn’t make sense.” http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/1906306/japan-considering-building-network-tunnels-beneath-seabed-store
According to NRA (Nuclear Regulation Authority), Cs-134/137 density in Tokyo tap water is 24% higher than Fukushima.
The report was released on 10/30/2015, titled as “Readings of radioactivity level in drinking water by prefecture” to cover from July to September in 2015.
From this report, only 0.0015 Bq/Kg of Cs-137 was detected in Fukushima drinking water. Cs-134 was not supposed to be detected. On the other hand, 0.00036 Bq/Kg of Cs-134 and 0.0015 of Bq/Kg were detected from Tokyo drinking water.
The measurement of Cs-134 is due to Fukushima accident.
NRA comments each data is based on the reports from prefectures.
It is not mentioned by Fukushima prefectural government why Cs-134 was not detected in their drinking water.
From left, Ruiko Muto, Kazuyoshi Sato and Takashi Soeda hold a news conference in Fukushima on Jan. 19 to announce a planned group that will monitor the trial of three former executives of Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Lawyers, journalists and scientists will form a group to help expose the truth and spread details about the Fukushima nuclear disaster during the criminal trial of three former executives of Tokyo Electric Power Co.
“We will encourage the court to hold a fair trial while transmitting information regarding the trial across the nation,” said an official of the planned organization, whose name is translated as “support group for the criminal procedure on the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.”
Tsunehisa Katsumata, former chairman of TEPCO, the operator of the crippled plant, and two former vice presidents, Sakae Muto and Ichiro Takekuro, face mandatory charges of professional negligence resulting in death and injury.
Although the trial is still months away, 33 people are now setting up the group, including Ruiko Muto, who heads an organization pursuing the criminal responsibility of TEPCO and government officials for the Fukushima nuclear disaster.
Tetsuji Imanaka, an assistant professor of nuclear engineering at the Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute, and Norma Field, a professor emeritus of East Asian Studies at the University of Chicago, have also joined.
Three reactors melted down at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant after the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami struck on March 11, 2011. A number of hospital patients died in the chaotic evacuation.
About 14,000 residents of Fukushima Prefecture filed a criminal complaint against TEPCO executives, government officials and scientists in 2012, saying they were aware of the dangers to the Fukushima nuclear plant from a tsunami, but they failed in their responsibility to take proper countermeasures.
Tokyo prosecutors twice decided not to indict the three former TEPCO executives. However, the Tokyo No. 5 Committee for the Inquest of Prosecution, a panel of citizens, decided to forcibly indict the three in July last year.
“It has been almost five years since the disaster, but many details, including their foreseeability of the tsunami, remain unclear,” said science writer Takashi Soeda, one of the group’s co-founders. “As TEPCO has not unveiled a sufficient amount of information even in inquiries conducted by the Diet and the government or in civil lawsuits, the truth must be uncovered through the legal force of a criminal trial.”
Five lawyers appointed by the Tokyo District Court will act as prosecutors in the trial.
Legal experts expect the lawyers will indict the former TEPCO executives and release a statement naming the victims around March 11, the fifth anniversary of the triple disaster that still haunts the Tohoku region. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201601270055
NARAHA, Fukushima Prefecture–A life-size model of a section of the crippled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant that will be used in developing decommissioning technology is almost complete.
The mockup of the lower part of a reactor containment vessel will be used to develop remote-control technology used to locate the section from where radioactive water is leaking in order to repair damage, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency said.
A group of reporters from the Japan National Press Club were allowed to enter the test building of the JAEA’s Naraha Remote Technology Development Center in the town of Naraha.
The model is being built at the center by a consortium comprised of electric utilities and nuclear plant manufacturers. It is scheduled to be completed in mid-March.
Radiation levels near the reactors that went in meltdown in the aftermath of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami disaster remain too high for workers to approach. The development of remote-control technology is key to smoothly conducting the decommissioning work, which is estimated to take 30 to 40 years.
The government has used taxpayer money to provide over ¥16.2 billion in subsidies to local governments for promoting so-called pluthermal power generation using mixed oxide fuel (MOX), a survey has shown.
The subsidies, financed with revenue from a tax for power-resources development imposed on electricity users, have been distributed to local governments that accepted pluthermal power generation at facilities in their regions.
The Jiji Press survey released Saturday illustrates that a large amount of taxpayers’ money has been spent on the pluthermal project in order to win support from local governments.
The project, a key part of the country’s nuclear fuel cycle policy, uses MOX fuel, a mixture of uranium and plutonium extracted from spent nuclear fuel.
So far, just four reactors in Japan have used MOX fuel, including reactor 2 at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant. The reactor, set to be decommissioned, experienced a core meltdown after the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.
The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan hopes to eventually raise the nation’s total number of reactors carrying out pluthermal generation to somewhere between 16 and 18.
However, pluthermal projects have failed to progress as expected, prompting critics to urge the central government to conduct an immediate review of its policy.
The other three reactors that have run on MOX fuel are the No. 3 reactor at Kyushu Electric Power Co.’s Genkai plant in Saga Prefecture, the No. 3 reactor at Shikoku Electric Power Co.’s Ikata plant in Ehime Prefecture and the No. 3 reactor at Kansai Electric Power Co.’s Takahama plant in Fukui Prefecture. The Takahama plant reactor is set to be rebooted later this month using MOX fuel.
The survey found that seven of the nine prefectural governments and all of the 10 other municipalities entitled to the subsidies — one to promote the fuel-cycle policy and the other to support host municipalities — have actually received the payments.
The exceptions, Hokkaido and Shizuoka prefecture, have refrained from applying for the subsidies. While the Fukushima disaster has spurred safety concerns among citizens, a series of scandals — including attempts to influence public opinion — in favor of pluthermal projects — have eroded trust in the plan, sources said.
In Hokkaido, the No. 3 reactor at Hokkaido Electric Co.’s Tomari plant has been designated for pluthermal power generation. In Shizuoka Prefecture, the No. 4 reactor at Chubu Electric Power Co.’s Hamaoka plant has also been tapped for the pluthermal project.
Of the four prefectures where pluthermal generation has been carried out, Saga received ¥6.097 billion in state subsidies and Ehime was given a total of ¥6.059 billion by the end of fiscal 2014.
Fukui, meanwhile, has received ¥2.486 billion as of the end of 2013 and is expected to get more subsidies through fiscal 2015.
A Japanese organization called “declaration of safety in Fukushima” (福島 安全 宣言) or something like that launched a campaign for the “decontamination of minds” (心 の 除 染) to convince that radioactivity is safe.
In a video taken in the twenty kilometers zone, sill evacuated, a person takes radiation readings and states that it is safe as it is well below 100 mSv. But the video avoids the most contaminated areas and confuses microsieverts and microsieverts / hour. When the Japanese authorities say there is no risk below 100 mSv, it is on the whole life span. To compare that value to microsieverts per hour or millisieverts per year is meaningless.
There are also videos of pseudo-scientific conferences to affirm that radiation in Fukushima is safe. The audience seems very small.
The group calls for the lifting of the evacuation orders and the return of inhabitants, and also for the restart of the declared safe nuclear reactors.
Another similar initiative, already presented by the Blog of Fukushima, has been to make children to pick up garbage along the highway 6 that passes thru the forbidden zone. This time, it was an organization called “Happy Road Net” which was the organizer. http://happyroad.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Image150915145225.pdf
Let us remember that it is internationally recognized that there is no safe limit for radiation and that each radiation dose has an impact that is proportional to it. In such a context, it is recommended that the radiation exposure should be justified by a benefit. What was the benefit for these children?
An example of bio-accumulation of radioactive material in Fukushima:
According to the following post, wild monkey poops from Namie-city, Fukushima had more than 150,000Bq/kg in terms of radioactive Cs137 & Cs134.
Cs137: 133987 Bq/kg
Cs134: 25186 Bq/kg
K40: 225 Bq/kg
The surrounding ground surface was about 500～600cpm.
Sources :
NARAHA, Fukushima Prefecture–A life-size model of a section of the crippled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant that will be used in developing decommissioning technology is almost complete.
nuclear-news 