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Rubble storage at Fukushima plant shown to media

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The operator of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant has completed a facility to store radioactive rubble from the March 2011 accident.
 
Tokyo Electric Power Company showed the new storage facility in the compound to the media on Thursday.
 
The Number 1 to Number 3 reactors suffered meltdowns and the reactor buildings were badly damaged after a quake-triggered tsunami hit the plant on March 11th, 2011.
 
As part of decommissioning work, rubble scattered after the accident needs to be cleared before spent nuclear fuel can be removed from storage pools in the upper parts of the reactor buildings.
 
At the Number 1 reactor building, work to clear more than 1,500 tons of rubble began in January. Its pool stores 392 fuel units.
 
The newly-completed facility is capable of storing more than 60,000 cubic meters of rubble.
 
Officials say a special vehicle that blocks radiation will take rubble from the Number 1 reactor building to the storage facility, and remote-controlled forklifts will be used to carry the rubble inside it.
 
The storage facility is 2 stories above ground and 2 below. The more radioactive the debris, the deeper underground it will be stored.
 
Officials say the facility can block radiation of levels up to 10 sieverts per hour, as it is covered by concrete walls up to 65 centimeters thick.
 
Kazuteru Ofuchi, a TEPCO official in charge of waste disposal, says the firm will make sure to minimize workers’ exposure to radiation, by working remotely.

February 9, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

Tepco ordered to pay $30,000 each to 318 people of the Minamisoma’s Odaka District class action suit

TEPCO ordered to pay 1.1 billion yen to evacuees in Fukushima
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Junichiro Hironaka, lead lawyer for the plaintiffs, right, speaks at a news conference on Feb. 7 after the Tokyo District Court ordered Tokyo Electric Power Co. to pay 3.3 million yen in damages to each plaintiff in a Fukushima nuclear disaster compensation lawsuit.
Tokyo Electric Power Co. has been ordered to pay 3.3 million yen ($30,000) each to 318 people who were forced to flee their hometown in Fukushima Prefecture after the 2011 nuclear disaster.
However, the plaintiffs are unhappy as they sought 10 times that amount.
“We are stripped of our hometown, livelihood and life, and Odaka will not return to what it used to be,” 76-year-old Isao Enei of Minami-Soma said at a news conference after the Feb. 7 verdict at Tokyo District Court. “I am sorry that the judges did not visit and see the situation of Odaka for themselves.”
The plaintiffs are now considering appealing as they had initially sought 33 million yen each in additional damages in the lawsuit.
“It is significant in a way in recognizing ‘damages for the loss of a hometown,’” said Junichiro Hironaka, the plaintiffs’ lead lawyer. “But the amount of compensation ordered does not correspond to the actual damages they suffered.”
In handing down the ruling, Presiding Judge Yuko Mizuno said that the plaintiffs’ “right to a stable life in a place that was the foundation of their livelihood had been breached.”
TEPCO said it will respond to the court decision after studying it in detail.
The plaintiffs lived in Minami-Soma’s Odaka district before the triple meltdown at TEPCO’s Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant in March 2011.
Odaka was located within the 20-kilometer no-entry zone surrounding the plant from which residents were forced to evacuate.
The plaintiffs contended that TEPCO was liable for causing psychological damage as they were displaced and lost their hometown.
The total that TEPCO must pay to the 318 plaintiffs falls a fraction short of 1.1 billion yen, but the court dismissed claims by three plaintiffs on the grounds that they lived overseas at the time of the accident or for other reasons.
The verdict was the fourth that has been handed down in regard to about 30 similar lawsuits that have been brought across the nation.
In the three other suits, the plaintiffs claimed in the district courts that the government and TEPCO had been negligent, but in the latest case the court was only concerned with the amount of compensation.
The plaintiffs argued for compensation for damages stemming from the evacuation, as well as compensation for a loss of various general benefits that they would have enjoyed if they had continued to reside in their hometown.
The power company rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for additional compensation, citing the payment already made of 8.5 million yen per victim of the nuclear disaster in the district based on the government’s “interim guidelines” for compensation.
It insisted that the plaintiffs’ claim that “Odaka has been lost forever” was not proven.
The evacuation order was lifted for most of the district in July 2016.
But the court stated that even after it became possible for residents to return (to Odaka), it “constitutes a serious violation of the plaintiffs’ life if the foundations of their livelihood were considerably changed.”
TEPCO argued that the government’s interim compensation guidelines were reasonable.
But the court rejected it, saying the district court will not be bound by the government’s guidelines.
Rulings for similar lawsuits are expected in March at the Kyoto District Court and Tokyo District Court.
 
Fukushima operator Tepco ordered to pay US$10 million in new damages
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A Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco) employee working near the reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant on Jan 31, 2018
 
TOKYO (AFP) – A Tokyo court has ordered the operator of the crippled Fukushima nuclear plant to pay US$10 million (S$13.3 million) in fresh damages to residents who fled their homes after the disaster, the plaintiffs’ attorney said Thursday (Feb 8).
Tokyo Electric Power Co (Tepco) was instructed to pay a total of 1.1 billion yen (S$13.3 million) to 318 former residents of the Odaka district in Fukushima, around 20 kilometres from the plant.
The sum is a tenth of what the plaintiffs had demanded, citing the financial hardship and psychological impact they suffered after the March 2011 nuclear disaster in Fukushima that was triggered by a deadly earthquake and tsunami.
Tepco had already agreed to pay each of the plaintiffs 8.5 million yen, but the ruling requires it to pay an additional 3.3 million yen to each of those affected, according to Isamu Oki, one of the lawyers for the plaintiffs.
Residents are technically free to return to Odaka, which the government has certified as decontaminated, but only a few dozen have gone home because of financial and health concerns, Oki told AFP.
“Especially those with small children are worried… while elderly people are unable to come back without any supporting family,” he added.
Junichiro Hironaka, who heads the legal team representing the residents, said Wednesday that the court’s decision showed it recognised “compensation for a lost hometown”.
But he said the additional damages awarded by the court were insufficient, suggesting the plaintiffs might appeal.
Tepco said it was reviewing the ruling before deciding how it would proceed.
Around 12,000 people who fled their homes for fear of radiation have filed dozens of lawsuits against the government and Tepco.
In March 2017, a court in the eastern city of Maebashi ruled that both the government and Tepco were responsible.
A massive undersea earthquake on March 11, 2011 sent a tsunami barrelling into Japan’s northeast coast, leaving more than 18,000 people dead or missing and sparking the Fukushima crisis, the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl in 1986.
In June 2017, three former Tepco executives went on trial, the only people ever to face a criminal court in connection with the disaster. The hearing is continuing.

February 9, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , , | 2 Comments

Tokyo court orders Tepco to pay $10 million in damages over 2011 disaster

30,000$ per person is no much paid for 7 years of misery and a whole life to rebuild…
TOKYO (Reuters) – A Tokyo court on Wednesday ordered Tokyo Electric Power (Tepco) to pay around 1.1 billion yen ($10 million) to a group of Fukushima residents, local media reported, nearly seven years after the company’s reactor meltdowns in northeastern Japan.
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An aerial view shows the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Fukushima Prefecture, from over the Pacific off Minamisoma, in this photo taken by Kyodo September 11, 2012, to mark the one and a half years anniversary of the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami.
 
A group of 321 people residents from Minami-soma in Fukushima prefecture had sought around 11 billion yen in damages in a class action suit, according to the reports.
Minami-soma is a city about 30 km (19 miles) from Tepco’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, where reactors melted down after being hit by a massive tsunami in March 2011. After the disaster, some areas near the plant became no-gone zones, forcing many residents to flee their homes.
A Tepco spokesman said a ruling was made by the Tokyo court today, but declined to comment further.
Tepco has long been criticized for ignoring the threat posed by natural disasters to the Fukushima plant, and the company and government were lambasted for their handling of the crisis.
Last year, a district court in Fukushima ruled in the largest class action lawsuit brought over the 2011 nuclear disaster that the company and the Japanese government were liable for damages totaling about 500 million yen.
A group of about 3,800 people, mostly in Fukushima prefecture, filed the earlier class action suit, the biggest number of plaintiffs out of about 30 similar class action lawsuits filed across the nation.

February 7, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

« Ask anyone who has visited, and they’ll tell you: Tohoku, Northern Japan is easily one of the most stunning places in the world. »

 

Since last weekend, Japan National Tourism Organization is spending big money for this campaign, posting these ads on YouTube, FB and other places, so as to incite tourists to visit Tohoku, conveniently forgetting totally the ongoing Fukushima nuclear disaster, its ambiant radiation and food contamination.
 
 
Special thanks to Shui Theriver.

February 7, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , , , | Leave a comment

Radioactive Micro-particles at Fukushima Daiichi

Caesium-rich micro-particles: A window into the meltdown events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
Abstract
The nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) in March 2011 caused partial meltdowns of three reactors. During the meltdowns, a type of condensed particle, a caesium-rich micro-particle (CsMP), formed inside the reactors via unknown processes. Here we report the chemical and physical processes of CsMP formation inside the reactors during the meltdowns based on atomic-resolution electron microscopy of CsMPs discovered near the FDNPP. All of the CsMPs (with sizes of 2.0–3.4 μm) comprise SiO2 glass matrices and ~10-nm-sized Zn–Fe-oxide nanoparticles associated with a wide range of Cs concentrations (1.1–19 wt% Cs as Cs2O). Trace amounts of U are also associated with the Zn–Fe oxides. The nano-texture in the CsMPs records multiple reaction-process steps during meltdown in the severe FDNPP accident: Melted fuel (molten core)-concrete interactions (MCCIs), incorporating various airborne fission product nanoparticles, including CsOH and CsCl, proceeded via SiO2 condensation over aggregates of Zn-Fe oxide nanoparticles originating from the failure of the reactor pressure vessels. Still, CsMPs provide a mechanism by which volatile and low-volatility radionuclides such as U can reach the environment and should be considered in the migration model of Cs and radionuclides in the current environment surrounding the FDNPP.
The nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) in March 2011 caused partial meltdowns of three reactors1,2,3, which caused the second-most serious nuclear accident in history4, resulting in serious environmental threats with the release of ~5.2 × 1017 becquerels (Bq) of radionuclides5 in Fukushima prefecture. Many of the resulting problems, including radioactive caesium contamination of the surface environment, have yet to be resolved6. The most challenging issue remaining is the treatment of the four damaged reactors. Decommissioning of Units #1–4 is currently ongoing7, although the properties of the melted fuels mixed with reactor components, referred to as debris, and the conditions inside the reactors remain unknown because the high-radiation field prevents access7.
Until now, the reactions that occurred in the FDNPP reactors have been only inferred based on indirect evidence3. It is believed that radioactive Cs was liberated from the irradiated fuel when the temperature of the fuel rose above 2,200 K8 after the cooling systems shut down in Units #1–3. Other radionuclides were released in amounts depending on their respective volatilities9 rather than in amounts based on their estimated presence in the nuclear fuel, which was primarily composed of UO28,10. Thus, a large portion of the fission products (FPs), including radioactive Cs still remain in the damaged reactors and in contact with the cooling water11. To carry out an adequate decommissioning process, it is of critical importance to understand the physical and chemical state of the radionuclides inside the reactors12. In particular, most of the irradiated fuels melted in Units #1 and #3, while a lesser amount or none of the fuels underwent melting in Unit #23,13. Melted fuel accumulated at the bottom of the reactor pressure vessels (RPVs), which eventually caused the RPVs to rupture, leading to reactions with the concrete pedestals of the primary-containment vessels (PCVs)14, a process known as molten core concrete interaction (MCCI)15. There remains considerable uncertainty about the extent of the MCCI in the reactors and the state of the melted fuel.
Caesium-rich micro-particles (CsMPs) originating from the FDNPP were first found in atmospheric particles some 170 km southwest of the FDNPP16,17. These particles represent condensed matter that formed within the reactors during meltdown, and they provide important information on the physical and chemical characteristics of the radioactive material inside the reactors. This study unravels the formation process of the CsMPs based on their chemical and structural properties at the atomic scale utilizing a high-resolution transmission electron microscopy (HRTEM) in conjunction with conventional radio-analytical techniques.
Methods
Sample description
The sampling campaign was conducted on 16 March 2012. The Ottozawa soil sample (OTZ) was collected from the top ~1 cm of soil in a paddy located ~4 km west of the FDNPP in Okuma Town, Futaba County, Fukushima. The soil was primarily composed of clay minerals, quartz and feldspars. Because entering the area was still restricted due to the high radiation dose, the locality had not been artificially disturbed. The radiation dose ~1 m above the ground was 84 μSv/h. The gravel sample from Koirino (KOI) was collected under the drainpipe of the assembly house. The house is located 2.9 km southwest of the FDNPP. The radiation dose beneath the drainpipe was extremely high compared with the surroundings, with a sampling area dose as high as 630 μSv/h. The gravel samples were carefully collected from the surface of the ground using a hand shovel, and placed in plastic bags. The aquaculture centre (AQC) soil samples were collected from the side ditch of an aquaculture centre located ~2 km south of the FDNPP.
Separation of CsMPs
The procedure for separating CsMPs from the soil samples is schematically illustrated in Fig. S1. Prior to the procedure, both samples were sieved through a 114 μm mesh. The powder samples were dispersed on grid paper and covered with a plastic sheet, and an imaging plate (Fuji film, BAS-SR 2025) was placed on the samples for 5–25 min. Autoradiograph images with pixel sizes of 50–100 μm were recorded using an imaging-plate reader. After the positions of intensely radioactive spots were identified, droplets of pure water were added to these positions and then drawn using a pipette to produce suspensions with small amounts of soil particles by dilution with pure water (Procedures 3–9 in Fig. S1). This procedure was repeated until the suspension did not contain a significant amount of soil particles. Subsequently, positions containing hot spots were selected using pieces of double-stick carbon tape that were cut as small as possible with a blade. The pieces of tape were checked by autoradiograph imaging so that scanning electron microscopy (SEM) observation could be performed to obtain the CsMPs with maximum efficiency. Prior to SEM analysis, the pieces of tape were placed on an aluminium plate and coated with carbon using a carbon coater (SANYU SC-701C). The CsMPs were found using an SEM (Shimadzu, SS550 and Hitachi, SU6600) equipped with an energy dispersive X-ray spectrometer (EDX, EDAX Genesis) using acceleration voltages of 5–25 kV for imaging details of the surface morphology and 15–25 kV for elemental analysis, including area analysis and elemental mapping.
Preparation of the TEM specimen
A focused ion beam (FIB) instrument (FEI, Quanta 3D FEG 200i Dual Beam) was utilised to prepare a thin foil of individual CsMPs with diameters of a few μm. Gallium was used as an ion source, and W deposition was used to minimise damage from the ion bombardment. Prior to application of the FIB, each SEM specimen was coated with ~40 nm-thick gold. The current and accelerating voltage of the ion beam were adjusted from 100 pA to 30 nA and 5–30 kV, respectively, depending on the progress of the thinning and on sample properties such as hardness and size. Each thinned piece was attached to the semilunar-shaped Cu grid for FIB and further thinned by an ion beam operating at 5 kV.
TEM analysis
HRTEM with EDX and a high-angle annular dark-field scanning transmission electron microscopy (HAADF-STEM) were performed using a JEOL JEM-ARM200F and JEM-ARM200CF with an acceleration voltage of 200 kV. The JEOL Analysis Station software was used to control the STEM-EDX mapping. To minimise the effects of sample drift, a drift-correction mode was used during acquisition of the elemental map. The STEM probe size was ~0.13 nm, generating ~140 pA of current when 40 μm of the condenser lens aperture was inserted. The collection angle of the HAADF detector was ~97–256 mrad.
Gamma spectrometry
The 134Cs and 137Cs radioactivities of the CsMPs were determined using gamma spectrometry. The radioactivity of an additional micro-particle with a size of ~400 μm obtained from the surface soil in Fukushima was precisely determined at the radioisotope centre in Tsukuba University, Japan, and utilised as a standard point specimen for 134Cs and 137Cs. The radioactivity of the point source standard was 23.9 Bq for 134Cs and 94.6 Bq for 137Cs as of 29 September 2015. The measurement of radioactivity was performed on the CsMPs and the point source standard using germanium semi-conductor detectors GMX23, GMX30 and GMX40 (all from SEIKO E&G) at the centre for radioisotopes in Kyushu University, Japan. The acquisition times were: 12,305 s for the KOI sample, using GMX30; 86,414 s for the OTZ sample, using GMX40; and 263,001 s for the AQC sample, using GMX23.
Results
The CsMPs were discovered in three samples within ~4 km of the FDNPP: in gravel soil at the assembly house in Koirino, in soil from a side ditch at an aquaculture centre and in paddy soil in Ottozawa (Fig. 1). The samples are hereafter labelled KOI, AQC and OTZ, respectively. The radioactivity of the CsMPs and the relevant parameters are summarised in Table 1. The 134Cs/137Cs radioactivity ratio of the samples is 0.97–1.1, with an average of 1.04, which approximately corresponds to ~26 GWd/tU according to OrigenArp calculations18. Because of the heterogeneity within even the irradiated fuels in a single reactor, the source reactor unit could not be determined based only on the isotopic or radioactivity ratios. The radioactivity per unit mass of the CsMPs calculated assuming that the radioactivity for SiO2 glass19 with a density of 2.6 g/cm3 varies from 9.5 × 1010 to 4.4 × 1011 (Bq/g), which is comparable with values reported for CsMPs from Tokyo20.
1
Figure 1
Locations of the samples used in this study.
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Table 1
Summary of the radioactivity and the associated parameters of three CsMPs in the present study.
 
The KOI CsMP was mainly composed of Si, Fe, Zn and Cs (Fig. 2 and Table S1). A HAADF-STEM image of the cross section shows two large pores of approximately 500 nm and numerous small pores in sizes ranging from 10–200 nm, indicating that some gases (such as H2, H2O, CO and CO2) were trapped through sparging during the MCCI (Fig. 3a). Selected area electron diffraction (SAED) patterns revealed diffuse diffraction maxima that correspond to an amorphous structure (Fig. 3b). Trace elements, including K, Cl, Sn, Rb, Pb and Mn, were detected by STEM energy dispersive X-ray (EDX) area analysis (Table S1).
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Figure 2
Secondary electron images of three CsMPs; KOI, OTZ, and AQC, associated with the energy dispersive X-ray spectrum (EDX) maps of the major constituents.
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Figure 3
(a) HAADF-STEM image of the focussed ion beam (FIB)-prepared specimen of the KOI Cs-rich micro-particle, with its original shape traced by a white dotted line. The yellow and orange open triangles indicate rod-like nanoparticles consisting primarily of Cs. (b) SAED pattern of the area indicated in (a). (c) A HAADF-STEM image associated with elemental maps of the major constituents. (d) HAADF-STEM image with the elemental maps of the CsMP at high resolution, showing the heterogeneous occurrence of Fe–Zn-oxide nanoparticles associated with Sn and Cs. (e) HRTEM image of the Fe–Zn oxide and the fast Fourier transformed (FFT) image. (f) A HRTEM image of a rod-shaped Cs nanoparticle present in a pore indicated by the yellow arrow in (a).
 
An elemental map of the CsMP constituents shows the synchronised distribution of Si, O, Fe and Zn, although only Cs is concentrated in the particle cores (Fig. 3c). Although the SAED exhibits diffuse diffraction maxima (Fig. 3b), a magnified image reveals that Zn, Fe, Sn and Cs are associated with nanoparticles as small as <10 nm distributed within the SiO2 matrix (Fig. 3d) that were identified to be franklinite structures (ZnFe2O4, Fd3m, Z = 8)21 (Fig. 3e). Several rod-like nanoparticles, indicated by yellow arrows, are present (Fig. 3a). An HRTEM image of the rod-shaped nanoparticle reveals a mostly amorphous contrast, with a small portion that is still crystalline (Fig. 3f). Based on the d-spacing in the HRTEM image (Fig. 3g) and the composition of primarily Cs and O (Fig. 4a–c), these rod-shaped particles were identified as Cs hydroxides, CsOH•H2O22. Nano-sized inclusions of ZnCl2 and CsCl were also identified (Fig. 4d,e).
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Figure 4
(a) The STEM-EDX spectrum of a rod-like nanoparticle shown in Fig. 3a. (b) HAADF-STEM image of the core region in the KOI obtained in the second session, showing that the rod-like Cs nanoparticle in the large pore degraded. (c) EDX spectrum of the area indicated by the red square in the left image. The composition of the degraded particle also revealed the Cs as the major constituent. (d) HAADF-STEM image of nano-sized inclusion of ZnCl2. (e) HAADF-STEM image of nano-sized inclusion of CsCl.
 
In the OTZ CsMP, there are no pores, and the particle appears to have a homogeneous composition except for an Fe-oxide inclusion (Fig. 5a,b). However, like the KOI CsMP, the OTZ CsMP is composed of an amorphous SiO2 glass matrix along with Fe–Zn-oxide nanoparticles of <10 nm in size (Fig. 5c); these nanoparticles were identified as franklinite, based on the FFT image and SAED pattern (Fig. 5d,e). Franklinite was the only nanomaterial for which the structure was convincingly characterized. Caesium, Cl and Sn were associated with the franklinite for the most part; however, an inclusion of CsCl associated with ZnCl is also present (Fig. 5f). Remarkably, the area indicated by the yellow square in Fig. 5a contains nanoparticles with peaks of U Mα, Lα and Lβ in the EDX spectrum (Fig. 5g). Point analyses of the particles (edx1 and 2) exhibited further distinctive U peaks without interference from Rb (red line in the spectrum). The HAADF-STEM image resolved no UO2 crystal, only franklinite associated with a small amount of U.
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Figure 5
(a) HAADF-STEM image of the FIB-prepared OTZ CsMP. The inset is the SAED pattern obtained from the top thin area. White dotted curves represent the original shape of the particle before FIB thinning. (b) Elemental maps of the CsMP showing the distribution of major constituents. (c) Enlarged HAADF-STEM image with the elemental maps of major constituents, showing numerous Fe–Zn nanoparticles associated with Sn, Cs and Cl in the Si matrix. (d) Fe–Zn-oxide nanoparticle identified as franklinite. (e) SAED pattern exhibiting faint diffraction rings in diffuse halo, which are confirmed to be caused by franklinite. (f) HAADF-STEM image with elemental maps revealing the presence of CsCl domains. (g) HAADF-STEM image of the area indicated by the yellow square in (a) showing aggregation of franklinite nanoparticles. Comparison of edx spectra (edx1 and 2 in red line) of the point analysis with the spectrum obtained by the area analysis (black line) reveals the presence of U peaks.
 
The AQC CsMP exhibits a spherical shape (Fig. 6a) containing a spherical W oxide core as large as ~1 μm in diameter (Fig. 6b), which indicates that W oxide initially melted to form a droplet that served as a nucleation centre for CsMP formation. Otherwise, the AQC CsMP has a composition similar to that of the KOI and OTZ CsMPs, that is, Zn–Fe-oxide nanoparticles embedded in an SiO2 glass matrix (Fig. 6c–e). Some fission-product nanoparticles consisting of Ag and Sb were characterized in the CsMP as well (Fig. 6f).
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Figure 6
(a) A HAADF-STEM image of the cross-section of AQC CsMP prepared by FIB. (b) The STEM-EDX elemental maps of the major constituents. (c) SAED pattern of top thin area of FIB specimen shown in (a). (d) Magnified HAADF-STEM image of the thin area of FIB specimen associated with STEM-EDX elemental maps. (e) HRTEM image of a Zn–Fe oxide and the FFT image of the area outlined by the white square. (f) HAADF-STEM image of a fission product nanoparticle consisting of Ag and Sb.
 
The STEM-EDX area analysis (~100 × 100 μm) and point analyses of individual Zn–Fe oxides revealed that the Si concentrations are linearly correlated with the Zn + Fe content (Fig. 7a,b), indicating that the CsMPs are essentially composed of SiO2 glass and Fe–Zn-oxide nanoparticles, with the number of nanoparticles directly reflecting the concentrations of Fe and Zn. The Cs concentration derived from the area analysis also has a linear correlation with the Si content (Fig. 7c), whereas the Cs concentrations in the individual Fe–Zn oxide particles are scattered without correlation to the Si content (Fig. 7d). Such differences can be attributed to either variations in the concentration of Cs associated with Fe–Zn-oxide nanoparticles and/or intrinsic Cs species such as Cs(OH) and CsCl. Indeed, some area analyses of the KOI CsMP tended toward high Cs content (yellow circles) because of the presence of intrinsic Cs particles trapped inside the CsMP. The Zn concentration is positively correlated with Fe concentration towards the ideal Zn/Fe ratio of franklinite, as indicated by the solid line (Fig. 7e). The deviation toward a higher amount of Zn is a result of the presence of ZnCl2 inclusions.
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Figure 7
(a–d) Diagrams showing compositional relationship between Si and Fe + Zn (a,b), and between Si and Cs (c,d). (a,c): results of area analysis. (b,d): results of point analysis. (e) Correlation between Zn and Fe contents with a line of ideal composition of franklinite (ZnFe2O4). Correlations between all other elements measured in the CsMPs are given in Figs S2 and S3. *The TKY data are from Imoto et al. (2017)20.
 
Discussion
As was shown in previous experiments15,23,24, the occurrence of Cs and other FP nanoparticles strongly suggests that volatile FPs (Cs, I, Xe, Te, Ag and Rb)9, which accumulated in the gap between the fuel and the cladding during reactor operation, were released either immediately after cladding failure or during the melting of the fuel rods in the FDNPP prior to MCCI. Thus, the atmosphere inside the RPVs must have been filled with aerosol particles associated with Cs, gaseous Cs species, water vapour and hydrogen gas. Interactions between the melted core and Fe in the structural materials of the reactor during vessel failure then produced large amounts of Fe–Zn-oxide nanoparticles.
As recent results20,25 showed, the major and trace elements of the CsMPs were derived from elements inside the reactor during the meltdowns; however, the compositions are markedly different from those in the debris12, which consists of a mixture of melted core, reactor materials and concrete. Possible sources of the constituent elements are as the follows: Sn was part of a Zr–Sn alloy; Fe and Mn were constituents of the reactor pressure vessel; Si was derived from siliceous concrete released during the molten-core–concrete interaction3,23; Cs, Rb, Pb and Sn were fission products contained in the irradiated fuels; Cl was from seawater and Zn was routinely added to the reactor water to prevent radioactive corrosion of steel by formation of a protective oxide layer. Tungsten is present as an impurity in zircaloy and most stainless steels26. Although W is a promising element with extremely high heat resistance (a melting temperature of 3687 K), the oxidized form can be easily melted at relatively low temperature of ~1746 K19. It is plausible that the presence of water vapour dramatically enhanced the oxidation of the stainless steel26.
As reported in the MCCI experimental study22,23, when the melted cores hit the siliceous concrete pedestal, SiO(g) was generated as a consequence of Zr oxidation at a temperature >2,143 K. In this study, it was found that SiO(g) eventually condensed to SiO2 glass rather than forming Si metal or SiC, indicating that there was some oxygen within the reactor PCVs at the FDNPP. The presence of oxygen affects the volatilization temperature of radionuclides in the fuel such as U27. The oxidised form of U oxide fuel can volatilise at ~1,900 K by 10% of the total UO2, whereas for non-oxidized form of UO2 the figure is nearly 0% at 2,700 K28. Thus, it is plausible that the trace amounts of U associated with franklinite are evidence of the volatilisation of slightly oxidised UO2. The absence of UO2 fragments in the CsMPs suggest that fuel fragments were not directly incorporated into the CsMPs during the MCCI.
The airborne CsOH nanoparticles that formed in the PCVs prior to MCCI were trapped during the MCCI events. Considering that CsOH is stable as a solid at temperatures <615 K19, which is much lower than the temperature of SiO2 solidification, ~1995 K19, it is likely that the CsMP rapidly cooled and solidified without degrading the CsOH particles, which is consistent with the glassy structure of the SiO2 matrix. The CsOH particles might have decomposed if they were trapped in pores that contained water vapour and then recrystallized while the CsMP cooled down.
In addition, at the time of MCCI, the other gases (H2, H2O, CO and CO2) are typically sparged from the molten corium pool and must have been trapped in the micro-particles during the condensation of SiO(g). The trapped gases created the porous texture, and the SiO2(l) rapidly solidified into glassy SiO2, thus retaining numerous pores. Thus, the pore found within the KOI CsMPs was probably filled with CO2 and water vapour, in addition to possible gaseous decay daughters, due to the oxidizing conditions. The difference in the micro-texture with (KOI) or without (OTZ and AQC) pores possibly represents a local variation in the amount of vapours trapped during condensation of the SiO(g).
The formation process of CsMPs in the FDNPP was clearly different from that of the micro-particles reported in the previous MCCI experiments23,29,30. The nanoscale textures of the CsMPs revealed several processes during meltdown: (i) FPs, such as Cs, were released to form nanoparticles or were present in mist droplets during the meltdown; (ii) many Zn–Fe-oxide nanoparticles formed during the failure of the RPVs, and Cs dissolved in mist droplets attached to the surfaces of airborne Zn–Fe-oxide nanoparticles; (iii) the molten fuels that melted through the RPVs hit the concrete pedestal and generated SiO gas at >2,000 K, which immediately condensed as SiO2 over the Zn–Fe-oxide nanoparticles and incorporated the FP nanoparticles.
A recent study reported interesting phenomena during a laboratory experiment involving CsOH adsorption onto a stainless-steel surface at an elevated temperature31. The authors found that CsOH can easily adsorb onto an Fe-oxide surface. Their results are consistent with our results revealing a close association of CsOH with Fe–Zn-oxide nanoparticles. However, the resulting product of chemisorption, CsFeSiO4, which was characterized in their study, was not observed in the present study; Si occurs as pure SiO2. The difference strongly suggests that the CsMP did not form in the process where the melted fuel encountered the material of the RPV, but instead formed via another reaction process, most likely interaction with the concrete pedestal, as suggested in the present study.
As a recent study reported that ~90% of the Cs radioactivity derived from CsMPs during the initial fallout of radioactive Cs in Tokyo20, CsMPs with FP nanoparticles are significant sources of radioactive Cs and FPs for the surface environment in Fukushima. Although the contribution of the CsMPs to the total inventory of radioactivity in the contaminated area in Fukushima remains to be determined, the nanoscale physical and chemical properties of the CsMPs provide clues for understanding the mechanisms of Cs release and the stability of Cs after dispersal to the environment. Although their total activity is low, CsMPs are yet another vector for the dispersion of low-volatility radionuclides, such as U, in addition to volatile radionuclides, to the surrounding environment. Thus, the migration of CsMPs in the environment should be taken into account in the Cs transport model of the Fukushima environment in order to gain a better understanding of the impact and dynamics of radionuclide contamination.
Conclusions
The sequence of chemical and physical processes inside the reactors during the meltdowns in the FDNPP have been unravelled based on state-of-the-art atomic-resolution electron microscopy of CsMPs. The CsMPs are as small as a few microns and comprise SiO2 glass matrices and ~10 nm-sized Zn–Fe-oxide nanoparticles associated with up to ~20 wt% of Cs, occasionally accompanied by trace amounts of U. The micro-texture of the CsMPs reveals that various airborne fission-product nanoparticles were first released from the fuels before and during meltdowns. Subsequently, RPV failure occurred and a large number of Zn–Fe-oxide nanoparticles were produced. Finally, the melted core interacted with concrete and the MCCI proceeded via SiO2 condensation encompassing the Zn–Fe-oxide nanoparticles, incorporating the fission-product nanoparticles. The present study demonstrates that the CsMPs provide an important clue for understanding the reactions and conditions inside the reactors. On the other hand, because of the extremely high radioactivity per unit mass, ~1011 Bq/g, CsMPs can be a significant source of the radiation dose in the ambient environment in Fukushima. In addition, CsMPs are an important carrier by which volatile and low-volatility radionuclides such as U reach the environment.
 
Acknowledgments
This study is partially supported by JST Initiatives for Atomic Energy Basic and Generic Strategic Research and by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (16K12585, 16H04634, No. JP26257402). SU is also supported by ESPEC Foundation for Global Environment Research and Technology (Charitable Trust) (ESPEC Prize for the Encouragement of Environmental Studies). The authors are grateful to Dr. Watanabe for her assistance on SEM analyses at the Centre of Advanced Instrumental Analysis, Kyushu University. The findings and conclusions of the authors of this paper do not necessarily state or reflect those of the JST.
Footnotes
The authors declare no competing financial interests.
Author Contributions S.U. conceived the idea, designed all experiments, and wrote the manuscript. G.F. and J.I. performed measurements and data analysis. A.O. conducted TEM analysis. T.O. and K.N. provided navigation during field research in Fukushima. S.Y. performed gamma spectroscopy at Tsukuba University. B.G. and R.C.E. provided constructive comments and thorough editing on the manuscript.
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Articles from Scientific Reports are provided here courtesy of Nature Publishing Group
 

February 5, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , | Leave a comment

The penultimate storage of contaminated waste

From Pierre Fetet Fukushima Blog, translation Hervé Courtois
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Contaminated waste storage in Minamisoma in 2012 next to a primary school
 
 
On 28 October, nuclear waste was temporarily stockpiled at a site that is expected to be the penultimate (perhaps the last and perpetual) site in the cities of Ōkuma and Futaba, where the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is located.
 
The bottom of a large storage basin was lined with waterproof canvas to prevent groundwater pollution. The rainwater collected at the bottom will be purified by a machine and released into the rivers. This storage area covers an area of 16,000 hectares, but constitutes only 39% of the planned land. It is difficult to get the agreement of the landowners.
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On this land, an incinerator will be built for the uprooted plants and felled trees, and a storage area for highly radioactive ashes. According to the law, the government has promised that after 30 years (before 2045) this storage will have to be moved out of the Fukushima Prefecture, but nobody of course believes it, because no one will accept these dangerous installations near his house.
 
In Fukushima, 15.2 million cubic meters of contaminated soil are temporarily stored on sports fields, in car parks and even in private gardens. According to the plan, most of this contaminated land will be transported to the new storage site by 2020.
 
 
 

February 5, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , , | Leave a comment

Fukushima 49.17% thyroid deficiency in the 295 000 young people under 18 years examined between 2011 and 2014 …

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Findings of thyroid ultrasound examination within three years after the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident: The Fukushima Health Management Survey
 
Abstract
Context
Childhood thyroid cancer is of great concern after the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident. The baseline analytical data on thyroid ultrasound examination in children is quite important for future examination.
Objective
We analyzed the age and sex distribution of findings from the thyroid ultrasound examinations of children and adolescents in the Fukushima Health Management Survey (FHMS).
Design, Setting, and Participants
From October 2011 through March 2014, 294,905 participants aged 18 years or younger at the earthquake voluntarily had thyroid ultrasound examinations in the first round of the FHMS. A secondary confirmatory examination was performed in 2,032 subjects. Age- and sex-dependent prevalence and size of thyroid cysts, nodules, and caners were analyzed.
Main Outcome Measures
Age, sex, and size distribution of findings were analyzed.
Results
Thyroid cysts, nodules, and cytologically suspected cancers were detected in 68,009, 1,415, and 38 subjects in males and 73,014, 2455, and 74 subjects in females, respectively. There was an age-dependent increase in the detection rate of thyroid nodules and cancer, but that of cysts reached a peak at 11–12 years. Sex affected the prevalence of thyroid nodules and cancers after the onset of puberty, but only a small difference was exhibited in that of cysts.
Findings of thyroid ultrasound examination within three years after the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident: The Fukushima Health Management Survey
Hiroki Shimura Tomotaka Sobue Hideto Takahashi Seiji Yasumura Tetsuya Ohira Akira Ohtsuru Sanae Midorikawa Satoru Suzuki Toshihiko Fukushima Shinichi Suzuki

February 5, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , | Leave a comment

‘Global Consequences’ of Lethal Radiation Leak at Destroyed Japan Nuclear Plant

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Lethal levels of radiation have been observed inside Japan’s damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant. And they are arguably way higher than you suspect.
According to Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco), radiation levels of eight Sieverts per hour (Sv/h) have been discovered within the Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was destroyed after a massive earthquake and a tsunami in March 2011.
Tepco, the company that operated the plant and is now tasked with decommissioning it, reported the discovery after making observations in a reactor containment vessel last month.
Eight Sv/h of radiation, if absorbed at once, mean certain death, even with quick treatment. One Sv/h is likely to cause sickness and 5.5 Sv/h will result in a high chance of developing cancer.
While 8 Sv/h is deadly, outside of Fukushima’s Reactor Number 2 foundations of a much higher level of 42 Sv/h was detected.
A strange occurrence, and experts are still arguing what caused the discrepancy. One possible explanation is that cooling water washed radioactive material off debris, taking it somewhere else.
But here’s a truly terrifying catch: according to the report, Tepco highly doubts the new readings, because, as was discovered later, a cover was not removed from the robot-mounted measurement device at the time of the inspection, NHK World reports.
Exactly one year ago, Sputnik reported that Tepco engineers discovered absolutely insane levels of radiation of about 530 Sv/h within the reactor. Such levels of radiation would kill a human within seconds. By comparison, the Chernobyl reactor reads 34 Sv/h radiation level, enough to kill a human after 20 minutes of exposure.
The levels of radiation within Fukushima reactor number 2 were so high that Tepco’s toughest robot, designed to withstand 1000 Sv/h of radiation, had to be pulled out, as it started glitching due to high radiation levels. Nuclear experts called the radiation levels “unimaginable” at the time.
On November 2017, the New York Times and other news outlets reported a much smaller figure of 70 Sv/h of radiation, more or less on par with a 74 Sv/h reading gathered before an anomalous 530 Sv/h spike.
While that radiation dosimeter cover negligence prevents precise calculations, the actual picture inside Unit 2 is thought to be much worse.
Japanese state broadcaster NHK World quoted experts saying that if the cleaning of the stricken power plant is not properly addressed, it will result in major leak of radioactivity with “global” consequences.
Richard Black, director of the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, says that while the readings are not reliable, they still “demonstrate that, seven years after the disaster, cleaning up the Fukushima site remains a massive challenge — and one that we’re going to be reading about for decades, never mind years.”
Mycle Schneider, independent energy consultant and lead author of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report, criticized Tepco, saying the power company has “no clue” what it is doing.
“I find it symptomatic of the past seven years, in that they don’t know what they’re doing, Tepco, these energy companies, haven’t a clue what they’re doing, so to me it’s been going wrong from the beginning. It’s a disaster of unseen proportions.”
In observing the poor maintenance of plant radiation leaks, Schneider also pointed out that the company stores nuclear waste at the site in an inappropriate way.
“This is an area of the planet that gets hit by tornadoes and all kinds of heavy weather patterns, which is a problem. When you have waste stored above ground in inappropriate ways, it can get washed out and you can get contamination all over the place.”

 

February 5, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , | Leave a comment

Fukushima operator aims to double visitors by Tokyo Olympics

A lot of minimizing PR propaganda in this article, only one line states the real situation though:
“However, levels of radiation in areas around the three melted-down reactors remain extremely high, hampering the plant’s decommissioning process, which is expected to take decades.”
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The reactor number 2 building at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power plant in Okuma, Fukushima, Japan, on Jan 31, 2018.
FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR PLANT, JAPAN (AFP) – Fukushima’s nuclear power operator is hoping to double the number of visitors to its tsunami-ravaged facilities by 2020, seeking to use the Olympic spotlight to clean up the region’s image.
A massive undersea earthquake on March 11, 2011 sent a tsunami barrelling into Japan’s northeast coast, leaving more than 18,000 people dead or missing and sparking the Fukushima crisis, the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl in 1986.
Initially, visitors to Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power plant were strictly limited to a handful of nuclear experts, lawmakers, government officials and selected media.
Visitor numbers have gradually increased as levels of radiation in most of the compound have dropped low enough to allow workers to operate without special protective equipment.
Tokyo Electric Power Co. (Tepco), which runs the plant, is now accepting requests for tours from groups of local residents, embassy officials and school students, although it has yet to accept individual applications.
The number of visitors for the fiscal year to March last year rose to around 10,000 – a figure the operator aims to double to 20,000 in 2020 when Tokyo hosts the Summer Games, said Takahiro Kimoto, a Tepco official.
“Our objective is not to send a message saying ‘It’s safe. It’s secure’,” Kimoto told AFP.
“It is more important for us to have people watch what’s really going on… without a prejudiced eye,” he said.
“The inspections will help revitalise the region and reduce reputational damage,” Kimoto said, adding that the company would be happy to show around International Olympic Committee officials.
Next era
Fukushima is expected to be in the spotlight during the Games as it will stage Olympic baseball and softball matches as part of Japan’s effort to regenerate the area.
Tepco also hopes that a football training centre used as a base for the plant’s workers after the disaster will host teams competing in the 2019 Rugby World Cup.
Kimoto stressed that the company is responsible for not only reviving the region but also conveying bitter lessons to future generations.
Decontamination work is under way inside the plant, with thousands of workers enjoying hot meals, taking showers and buying sweets at a convenience store.
However, levels of radiation in areas around the three melted-down reactors remain extremely high, hampering the plant’s decommissioning process, which is expected to take decades.
The scars of the catastrophe remain visible – steel frames are gnarled and walls are missing, ripped off by the tsunami and hydrogen explosions.
‘Strictly controlled’
With the seventh anniversary of the disaster looming, AFP journalists given exclusive access to the roof of the plant’s No. 3 reactor saw stagnant water stored inside a deep pool under which lay more than 560 fuel rods.
Each worker is required to wear a protective suit, three sets of gloves and a heavy-duty mask and carry a dosimeter, used to measure exposure to radiation.
Workers only stay a maximum of two hours per day on the roof where electric gauges showing current radiation levels hang on every corner.
A gigantic steel dome is now being built on the roof to prevent radiation leaking when the fuel rods are transferred from the pool to remote storage later this year.
As the initial stages of decommissioning the plant draw to a close, the biggest challenge is a protracted battle against high radiation, said Daisuke Hirose, a plant official.
“We have to lower radiation exposure to workers, but this prevents them from working for a long time up there,” Hirose said.
“We want them to work under strictly controlled exposure plans. That’s the big difference from working conditions at ordinary sites,” he said.
The total costs for decommissioning, decontamination and compensation are estimated to reach 21.5 trillion yen (US$255 billion) and Tepco aims to dismantle the plant in three to four decades.

February 5, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | | Leave a comment

Fukushima nuclear disaster: Lethal levels of radiation detected in leak seven years after plant meltdown in Japan

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Workers of theTokyo Electric Power Co, which is tasked with the job to decommission the nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima
 
Lethal levels of radiation have been detected at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, seven years after it was destroyed by an earthquake and tsunami. 
The Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco), which operated the complex and is now responsible for its clean up, made the discovery in a reactor containment vessel last month. 
The energy firm found eight sieverts per hour of radiation, while  42 units were also detected outside its foundations. 
A sievert is defined as the probability of cancer induction and genetic damage from exposure to a dose of radiation, by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). One sievert is thought to carry with it a 5.5 per cent chance of eventually developing cancer. 
Experts told Japanese state broadcaster NHK World that exposure to that volume of radiation for just an hour could kill, while another warned the leaks could lead to a “global” catastrophe if not tackled properly.
It came as Tepco said the problem of contaminated water pooled around the plants three reactors that is seeping into the ground has caused a major headache in its efforts to decommission the plant.
Thousands of workers have been hired by the company to as it attempts to secure the plant, which was the scene of the most serious nuclear accident since Chernobyl in 1986. 
Three of its reactors went into a meltdown after the earthquake and tsunami which killed at least 15,000 people.
Tepco has admitted that it could be until 2020 until the contamination issue is resolved. Only then can it move onto the second stage of removing nuclear debris at the site, including the damaged reactors.
Richard Black, director of the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, said the high levels of radiation found in and around the reactor last month were “expected” and unlikely to pose a danger. 
He told The Independent: “Although the radiation levels identified are high, a threat to human health is very unlikely because apart from workers at the site, no-one goes there.
“The high readings from fuel debris would be expected – the higher reading from the foundations, if confirmed, would be more of a concern as the cause is at present unclear. But as officials indicate, it might not be a genuine reading anyway.
“What this does demonstrate is that, seven years after the disaster, cleaning up the Fukushima site remains a massive challenge – and one that we’re going to be reading about for decades, never mind years.”
But Mycle Schneider, an independent energy consultant and lead author of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report, said that Tepco “hasn’t a clue what it is doing” in its job to decommission the plant.
He added that the contaminated water that is leaking at the site could end up in the ocean if the  ongoing treatment project fails and cause a “global” disaster, he told The Independent. 
“Finding high readings in the reactor is normal, it’s where the molten fuel is, it would be bizarre if it wasn’t,” he said. 
“I find it symptomatic of the past seven years, in that they don’t know what they’re doing, Tepco, these energy companies haven’t a clue what they’re doing, so to me it’s been going wrong from the beginning. It’s a disaster of unseen proportions.”
Mr Schneider added that the radiation leaks coupled with the waste from the plant stored in an “inappropriate” way in tanks could have global consequences.
“This is an area of the planet that gets hit by tornadoes and all kinds of heavy weather patterns, which is a problem. When you have waste stored above ground in inappropriate ways, it can get washed out and you can get contamination all over the place.
“This can get problematic anytime, if it contaminates the ocean there is no local contamination, the ocean is global, so anything that goes into the ocean goes to everyone.”
He added: “It needs to be clear that this problem is not gone, this is not just a local problem. It’s a very major thing.”
The Independent contacted Tepco for comment, but the energy giant had not responded at the time of publication.

February 5, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , | Leave a comment

Lethal radiation detected at Fukushima plant reactor 2

 

 
 
The operator of the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant has released the results of its latest probe of the site.
 
A remote-controlled inspection of the Unit 2 reactor containment vessel last month detected a maximum of 8 sieverts per hour of radiation.
 
Experts say exposure to such radiation for about an hour would be fatal.
 
Officials from Tokyo Electric Power Company, or TEPCO, released the results on Thursday.
 
They said the radiation reading was taken near what appeared to be fuel debris, the term used to describe a mixture of molten fuel and broken interior parts.
 
The finding shows that nearly 7 years after the meltdowns, radiation levels remain so high that they present a major challenge to decommissioning work.
 
During the probe, 42 sieverts per hour of radiation was also detected outside the foundations of the reactor.
 
But officials said they have doubts about the accuracy of the reading because a cover had not been removed from the measuring instrument at the time.
 
They added that they don’t know why radiation levels were lower near the suspected fuel debris than around the foundations.
 
They gave a number of possible reasons, such as that cooling water may have washed radioactive materials off the debris.
 
TEPCO’s Chief Decommissioning Officer, Naohiro Masuda, says the company will develop debris-removal technology based on the outcome of the investigation.
 
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February 1, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

“Save the Town”: Insolvable Dilemmas of Fukushima’s “Return Policy”

Namie Mayor Baba Tamotsu interviewed by Katsuya Hirano with Yoshihiro Amaya and Yoh Kawano at Namie town hall, July 4th, 2017. Introduction by Katsuya Hirano, Transcription and translation by Akiko Anson

 

1.jpgBaba Tamotsu. Photo by Yoh Kawano

 

Introduction

The town of Namie is the largest in both area and population among eight towns and villages within Futaba Country in Fukushima Prefecture. At the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011 that precipitated the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, the town’s population was 18,464.1 Although Namie is located just 11.2 km from the nuclear power plants, it took four days from the explosion of the power plants before Tokyo issued an evacuation order. The government’s belated order was consonant with its decision to withhold information on radiation levels provided by SPEEDI (System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information) in order to avoid “public panic.” Consequently, many residents of Namie as well as other neighboring villages and towns were exposed to high radiation. On April 15 2012, the town of Namie asked the Japanese government to provide free heath care for its residents, including regular medical check-ups to monitor the internal radiation exposure and thyroid examinations. The evacuated government of Namie obtained a monitoring device and installed it in temporary housing in Nihonmatsu City, Fukushima where many evacuees were relocated. On April 1, 2017, the central government lifted one set of restrictions on one zone—areas in which people were permitted to enter freely but were not allowed to stay overnight—and another on a second zone—where access was limited to short visits—based on its judgment that decontamination work had successfully removed radioactive contaminants from the areas. Since the termination of the evacuation order, the government has been encouraging residents to return to those areas although only 1-2% of the residents, mostly senior citizens, have returned so far and a recent poll indicates that less than a quarter of the population intends to return in the future. In this regard, Namie is no different from other towns and villages in that the so-called return policy remains a de facto failure and the former residents simply do not trust or refuse to follow the central government’s “reconstruction” programs. At the same time, local governments have been thrown into extremely difficult situations where they have no choice but to go along with the “return policy.”

Baba Tamotsu (69), a native of Namie and mayor of the town since 2007, has been in charge of dealing with the nuclear crisis. Since the disaster, Mr. Baba has worked with the prefectural government and Tokyo to ensure that the residents are provided health care, housing, food and compensation. However, his slogan, “Save the Town,” has invited criticism as it seems oblivious to the fact that most residents have no intention to return and, moreover, encouraging people to do so is likely to risk their health and livelihood. On July 14th 2017, my colleagues, Yoshihiro Amaya and Yoh Kawano and I visited the town hall of Namie to interview Mr. Baba on issues related to “save the town” and “return policy” as well as his views on nuclear energy policy. The interview suggests an insoluble tension between Mr. Baba’s urge to save his beloved hometown and his awareness of the risks entailed – the “save the town” policy’s potential danger of prioritizing the welfare of the community over individuals’ health and lives.

 

2 The evacuation order was lifted for the zones in green on April 1, 2017The evacuation order was lifted for the zones in green on April 1, 2017

 

Hirano: Thank you for agreeing to this interview. Let me start with the following question. In 2013, you expressed concern about the situation in Namie, saying “I feel as if the hands of the clock have completely stopped since the nuclear disaster of 2011” because decontamination has been so delayed that “restoration has not progressed at all.”

According to a survey conducted in 2011, 60% of Namie residents indicated their “intention to return” to their hometown; however, a poll from August 2016 shows that the “intention to return” number has dropped to 18%, and 48% of residents “have decided not to return.”

In addition, a survey conducted by the Reconstruction Agency last September on household intent to return shows 17.5% “wishing to return soon or at some future time,” 28.2% “undecided,” and 52.6% decided against returning.

I also heard that fewer than 10% of Namie residents are expected to return and that the situation is likely to remain the same for the foreseeable future. Some people even suggest that the town of Namie will disappear in 15 to 20 years. What do you think about such observations? And what are your thoughts about residents returning?

Baba: I did feel in 2013 that time had stopped completely. Since then, I have been at a total loss as to what was going to happen to this town. In these conditions, the more time goes by, the more people end up deciding not to return. It’s such a shame.

But I can say that the 21,000 Namie residents, every single one of them, have affection for their hometown. It’s why I feel that no matter how few people are actually returning, we need to save this town and keep it alive. I need to do it for our residents wishing to come back, although it might not actually happen for another generation or the generation after that. Regardless, I would like those who can to come back to Namie.

So, I think it is the responsibility of adults to pass on knowledge about this land, which our ancestors worked tirelessly to cultivate and establish over a long period of time, to the next generations. “Save the town”(町残し)is the goal I set for greeting the lifting of the evacuation order on March 31, 2017.

 

3A Part of Downtown of Namie in July 2017. Photo by Yoh Kawano

 

Hirano: How many people or households have actually returned since then?

Baba: As of May 31st, 2017 165 households–234 people–have come back.2 This is only 1% of the former residents, which is very disappointing. But I have a feeling that as time passes, more people will return, since I’ve started seeing some residents beginning to repair their homes or beginning to build new ones here and there.

Hirano: I heard that evacuees from Fukushima Prefecture, particularly young married couples or families with children, tend not to return because of the risks associated with radiation exposure. Do you see the same tendency in Namie?

Baba: I think so. In fact, most of the returnees are elderly people. I am aware that the young people have children. Some people have found employment at the place they’ve evacuated to, so it would be hard for them to come back. I am still optimistic, however, that as time passes, living conditions here will improve enough that people can return more easily.

Hirano: As mayor, do you have any concerns that bringing people back might increase the risk of internal radiation exposure, especially among children and young people? For example, in Chernobyl, the 30 km exclusion zone is still in place to this day, but in Fukushima, residents’ return is being promoted even in areas within 20 km of the nuclear plant. Since there is a limit to what can be achieved through decontamination, I would be concerned that the increased possibility of internal exposure poses a serious problem to residents.

Baba: I cannot say there is no risk, but a personal dosimeter has been distributed to everyone, and we closely monitor the residents’ health. The town officials also have been taking responsibility for measuring the radiation in food.

Hirano: As mayor, do you have any plans for providing former residents wishing to return with some kind of specific incentives?

Baba: Yes. Firstly, in order to bring people back home, I would like to create job opportunities for them, especially for young people. Some of the residents who used to own businesses here before the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident are interested in coming back to restart their businesses.

Also, in order to attract young people, I hope to recruit new tech industries, robotics in particular, in collaboration with our neighboring city, Minami-soma.3 We can attract robotics firms, as well as their research facilities and test fields to the area.

Another plan is to build a hydrogen production plant. We have a vision to rebuild our town centered on renewable energy. Since the Japanese government seeks to build the world’s best hydrogen production base in our country, I would like to meet those expectations by building such a facility here.

As a result of our efforts to attract businesses, there are now four companies interested in doing business in Namie, so I would like to work with them to create future employment opportunities for our young people.

Kawano: Let me ask about senior citizens. There is an 86-year-old woman living alone in temporary housing in Nihonmatsu. We began interviewing her one or two years ago, and we visited her the day before yesterday. She told us that she decided not to return to Namie in April, shortly after the evacuation order was lifted. One reason was that the town has not been equipped with necessary facilities for daily life, such as a supermarket. Even if there were one, it is not realistic for an 86-year-old to drive to get there. So please tell us what kind of services and support systems– such as transportation to a grocery store – you plan to offer to the elderly.

Baba: Well, first I would like to set up some welfare facilities for senior citizens. But right now we don’t have enough workers, for example nursing care staff, so I hope to get things started with a so-called public-private collaboration so that people in the private sector will be willing to cooperate in public welfare projects. I would like to set up the conditions for that to happen.

As for supermarkets, it is true that we do not have any stores here. But I am in negotiation with some stores, and I would like to bring one to town as soon as possible. Then you need a transportation system, so I would like to establish a system of on-demand taxis or shuttle buses, so that people won’t be inconvenienced.

Hirano: Even after lifting of the evacuation order, there are still so many people, including the elderly, staying away. What kind of support have you been maintaining for them?

Baba: We provide services for evacuees such as on-demand transportation, and our staff are making door-to-door calls on evacuees. This is to keep them from becoming isolated, and, if any problems arise, our staff can provide some help as they make the rounds. We also put a lot of effort into holding events to promote interactions among evacuees.

It isn’t possible to visit every day, since it takes time to visit everyone, but I would like to keep monitoring the conditions of our residents and provide the support they need.

Hirano: I’d like to ask about the risks and concerns about contaminated soil and radioactive waste disposal. The government has been taking the lead in decontamination efforts. However, there are still areas where the air dose rate has not gone down to previous levels or where we still detect radioactive hot spots.4 How have you been communicating with the central government about these problems? For example, asking to speed up the decontamination operations, or to work more efficiently?

Baba: First of all, at the time the government let this accident happen, they declared that the radiation dose in the air would be reduced to under 1mSv annually, so we have been asking them to continue with decontamination work until it goes down to that number. So there is continuing decontamination work in areas with higher doses, and we have been strongly urging the government to make every effort to lower the dose below 1mSv.

Amaya: So you have been asking the government to do their job, but do you think the decontamination efforts have actually been making adequate progress in Namie?

Baba: Well, we have to realize there are many acres of land to cover, so although it has not progressed as we hoped, no matter how long it takes, there will be no change of plan. I will continue to urge the government to keep decontaminating until the radiation level goes down to 1mSv or less, as they promised.

Amaya: Difficult-to-return zones still take up a fairly large part of Namie. Have you discussed in detail with the government the timeline and how to proceed with decontamination in such areas?

Baba: Yes, the Act on Special Measures for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Fukushima was recently revised and it includes a plan to establish special reconstruction hubs in difficult-to-return zones. What that means is that intensive cleanup will begin in the hub zone, which is a relatively less polluted area and could be made habitable in the near future first, making it a recovery base. We would then set up another hub and move on with decontamination operations and the restoration of infrastructure in that area.

We plan to gradually expand the decontaminated areas by connecting these hubs. The central government has not put out a concrete timeline for this project, but we were told that they plan to create special hubs with the hope of eventually lifting the evacuation order for the entire hub zone in the next five years. Of course I hope the government will carry that out as planned.

Amaya: Have you presented any requests regarding where to designate the recovery hubs in Namie?

Baba: Yes, we have three areas in mind: Obori district, the Tsushima district and part of the Karino district. We have requested that the program begin with special hubs in these three areas and also asked the central government to honor the requests from our local government.

Amaya: So in effect you are planning to designate the recovery hubs in areas that used to be rather populated, with the hope that the former residents will eventually return?

Baba: That’s right. The idea is that we designate hubs in areas where people would gather, such as public facilities, like a community hall, or shrines and temples.

Amaya: So the plan is to choose some facilities as a base first and then start decontaminating surrounding areas to bring back as many residents as possible.

Baba: Yes, that’s right. Since that is what the local people are also hoping for, I would like to pursue the plan. In order to make it happen, however, it is necessary to reduce the radiation level through decontamination work. The central government has set 3.8 microSv/h as the standard.

Hirano: Actually that standard is 20 times higher than what was originally determined by law, isn’t it? In fact, it is a standard that is applied only to Fukushima in entire Japan. Some experts claim that there is no such thing as an absolutely safe standard – that the best thing is to avoid radiation exposure as much as possible, especially internal exposure. What do you think about those views?5

Baba: It would be a lie if I said that I am not concerned about it. But as long as the central government responsibly asserts that it is safe, we have no choice but to believe what they say and proceed with reconstruction.

Hirano: I’d like you to tell us about the reactor decommissioning. It is said that it would probably take at least 30 to 40 years to complete the decommissioning. First, what are your thoughts on that?

And second, there is a potential risk that a nuclear accident could occur during the decommissioning work. I expect it would cause tremendous anxiety to the residents of the town if that should happen. Also, this potential risk might affect the decision of some former residents to return. Do you have any specific plans or measures to handle the situation in the event of an accident?

Baba: Alright. Well, to put it simply, they have set a goal to complete the decommissioning work in 30 or 40 years. However, judging from the current situation, I have to say it is an open question whether that goal can be met. I believe that TEPCO and the central government should set forth a policy that puts safety and security first.

It’s already been six years since the accident, but they haven’t figured out how to remove the debris. Not only that, also they haven’t decided on where to store the debris and what to do with it afterwards. So there is a serious question about bringing residents back to town.

On the other hand, is it all right to just leave things as they are? That’s related to the question of whether people can come back to such a dangerous place. Decommissioning has to be done right so that we can provide residents with a safe place to live in the future. Simply put, we want the central government and TEPCO to restore our land to its original condition. That is the direction I am pursuing.

Actually I sometimes have a nightmare that during the decommissioning work, something accidentally collides with the debris and radiation gets released outside again. When I think about how to evacuate the residents, I am terrified.

Therefore, we really need to review the nuclear disaster readiness plans to make sure that residents who already came back and those who will return, will be able to evacuate safely in the event of an accident. We need to plan ahead about how to proceed with the evacuation and how to provide adequate care at evacuation sites, things like supplies of food and clothing, including how and where to get these items. In addition, in order to protect ourselves in the event of an unexpected radiation accident, we need to have a shelter made of concrete in Namie, so I would like to prepare that as well.

Amaya: Speaking of dealing with radioactive waste, Chernobyl built a concrete shield, the so-called sarcophagus, to cover the destroyed reactor, which locks in radioactive material safely for a relatively long period of time. If it is determined that the removal of waste is too risky and that shielding is the only way to handle the situation, would you as mayor accept the decision?

 

4.jpgOld Sarcophagus in Chernobyl

 

5A “New Safe Confinement” structure was completed in 2016. It covers the old sarcophagus whose deterioration resulted in near-collapse in recent years.

 

Baba: Well, constructing a sarcophagus means locking the radioactive material inside, but I am not sure if that’s actually possible. That would turn this town into a final disposal site. In that case, I wonder if people would actually be able to live here, to lead a normal, human life in such an environment. So I think we have to get the dangerous material removed, that this is necessary for humans to go about the business of being human.

If I were to accept the construction of sarcophagi, I would have to ask the central government to relocate our entire town just as occurred in Chernobyl. It means that no one would be allowed to live within 30 kilometers anymore and that were told to live somewhere else.

If that had been the plan from the beginning, I think it might have worked out, but I’d have to say, don’t come to me now with such a request.

Amaya: After six years have passed.

Baba: That’s right. It’s too late now.

Amaya: It would be hard to have people coming back and then say, sorry, it’s not going to work.

Baba: Exactly. I have a hard time accepting it. But in fact, however, I know some people who want to return are still questioning whether it’s possible to come back to such a dangerous place, so in that sense I might be contradicting myself a little.

The bottom line is that I want to borrow wisdom and skill from around the world and have the danger removed. But the technology is just not advanced enough for that job, so I know it won’t be easy. All I can do is trust what they’re doing. The decontamination workers here have been working so hard for us.

Hirano: A TEPCO top executive said he felt extremely sorry about the communities being completely destroyed by the nuclear disaster. He said TEPCO also admits its responsibilities. On the other hand, however, he said he is not convinced that we should stop the operation of nuclear power plants right now when it comes to future energy needs in Japan. He believes people still need nuclear energy. I think this is still the dominant opinion within TEPCO. What are your thoughts on this?

Baba: I don’t believe we need nuclear power plants any more. We learned the lesson from this disaster that what matters most is the safety and security of our people, not things like energy policy.

The people of Fukushima also agree that nuclear reactors must be shut down, that the No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant should be decommissioned. The Fukushima Prefectural Government and all municipal assemblies have submitted a request to decommission all reactors in the prefecture.

I believe we will be fine without nuclear power. I can say that because if you followed the energy situation in March of 2011 right after the accident when all the reactors were shut down, it even looked like we had an energy surplus. It’s not all about nuclear. I believe we’ll be fine using renewables.

Hirano: Even among people who promote renewable energy, some argue that local governments, nuclear power plants and electric companies can coexist as long as they can prevent that mistake from ever happening again. What do you think about this assumption?

Baba: That is based on the principle of expecting the unexpected. We just had the first trial of the Criminal Prosecution of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster.6 We just had the opening session of the criminal proceedings on the Fukushima Nucelar Disaster. We know, from the materials filed for the complaint, that it was possible for TEPCO to anticipate a giant tsunami. Seismologists brought in by TEPCO had already warned them of such a possibility in 2008 or 2009.

Did they or did they not know this sort of thing? It’s their criminal liability that will be examined in this trial. I’m not sure if they simply ignored the warning or how they dealt with it, but I think more internal documents will be revealed in the course of the trial.7

So, they obviously didn’t do anything about it, even though such predictions had been made. You can’t call this an example of expecting the unexpected, since a giant tsunami had in fact been anticipated. I believe there were various methods they could have taken to prevent the disaster. For instance, they could have made a backup system to avoid a tsunami-induced station blackout; they could have moved the power facility to a higher location; or they could have raised the height of the seawall a bit.

They did none of that, then later they claimed that it was simply a natural disaster and that it was not their fault. This is unacceptable. There are people among the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) who say it was a human-made disaster. I also believe that it was a human-made disaster.

 

6On June 30, 2017, members of the Complainants for Criminal Prosecution of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster gathered in front of the Tokyo District Court where the first session of the hearing was held.

 

In fact, I can say human error was clearly involved. One reason is that there were other places where these human errors didn’t occur. The Fukushima No. 2 nuclear plant managed to escape the disaster through manual venting, despite the fact that the plant suffered severe damage. But the thing is that the No. 2 Plant is located at a higher elevation than the No. 1 Plant, which sits almost at sea level. Therefore, TEPCO should have moved the power supply of the No. 1 Plant to somewhere higher to avoid damage from a tsunami. Or they should have thought of ways to protect the backup power supply and the reactors’ cooling systems in case of tsunami-induced flooding.

Another reason why I believe it was human error is that we learned from a NAIIC report that the piping of the cooling system had already been cracked and damaged by the earthquake before the tsunami hit. If so, the reactors would have been heating up even before the tsunami arrived, because cooling water had not been getting to the reactor core through the damaged pipes. And this situation eventually led to the hydrogen explosion. This was definitely human error, there is no doubt about it.

Kawano: Did you have any opportunities to learn about or discuss the risks that nuclear power plants might pose at the local level before 3.11? In other words, were Namie residents, including town officials, informed about what kind of impact a nuclear accident could bring before the accident?

Baba: No. Unfortunately, I used to be an advocate of nuclear power. I regret it deeply. I used to believe that it made sense to generate electricity by nuclear power. The reason is that all explanations I received from the central government and TEPCO were biased by the safety myth that Japan’s nuclear power plants were absolutely safe. The core of the safety myth is its redundant failsafe system. We were told how their dual system would work to prevent a serious accident. For example, if X occurs, then Y will work, and if Y doesn’t work, then Z will kick in. They explained it to us very believably, and I took their words on trust. In fact, that is what the central government and TEPCO have been doing in order to build nuclear power plants.

I was completely immersed in the safety myth. So I remember my mind going completely blank when the accident occurred. I was facing something that I had never imagined. What?! Nuclear power lets this kind of thing happen? I thought. It had never occurred to me that such an accident could occur.

Hirano: I understand that TEPCO will be changing the compensation payments. They used to give the same amount to each victim, but going forward they will switch to a system based on each individual’s circumstances. Do you as mayor have any specific ideas on how you would like TEPCO to compensate victims?

Baba: Well, I believe that victims should be compensated adequately and equitably by TEPCO, but different people have different opinions about this, so the company is now thinking about discontinuing the compensation for mental anguish, the so-called compensation for damages arising from the incapacity to work, by March of 2018.

I would like TEPCO to honor what the Dispute Reconciliation Committee (Dispute Reconciliation Committee Over Compensation for Nuclear Accidents) calls a “reasonable period.” What that means is facing up to the reality and circumstances the victims of the disaster have suffered, and make a decision about compensation for them. I think it’s wrong in the first place for them to be setting a deadline no matter what. They should really examine the situation of the victims and then decide.

They have been providing compensation in various ways, but they have a very clever way of talking about it, using the phrase “individual circumstance.” This is an expression that makes you feel like you’re being tricked, regretable as it is to say so. I really think it is necessary for TEPCO to put themselves on the side of the victims.

Hirano: They can interpret “individual circumstance” anyway they want, can’t they? That is the same idea as “voluntary evacuation.” For example, residents outside the evacuation zone of 20 km radius of the nuclear plant are all regarded as “voluntary” rather than as “mandatory” evacuees. As a result, they were not eligible for compensation even though some of the residents’ houses were located in so-called hot spots (where the radiation exceeds even the exceptional reference value of 20 μSv, the standard that applied only to Fukushima after 3.11.) That created a lot of problems and I think this “individual circumstance” talk might be the same.

Baba: Exactly. They can interpret it anyway they want.

Hirano: You have been in touch with the victims and former residents. Is there something concrete you would single out for compensation or assistance from your observation of their lives?

Baba: Well, I’d have to say first, all their livelihoods are gone. Also, their neighbors are gone. It’s now been three months since I came back to Namie, after six years of evacuation, but I don’t have any neighbors, so I have no one to talk to. So that kind of communication has been lost. I can’t assign monetary value to what we’ve lost, but I never thought that I would end up having such a miserable life.

When it comes to expressing it in monetary terms, I definitely think that compensation should match our mental anguish. That is what the people in Namie think these days.

Everyone, even those still staying in the place where they were evacuated to, has been put into a similar situation. We don’t have neighbors, and whatever you might have wanted to do at the place you were relocated to, you find that you can’t do it.

It is especially true for young people. They used to live pretty naturally and make a living without worrying about much, but they have lost all that with the accident. What I am talking about is that damage. If you ask me, how much is that worth, it’s difficult to come up with a figure. I’d like the government and TEPCO to put themselves in our shoes and think about how they would feel and what they would do if they became victims. That’s the basis on which I’d like them to evaluate the need for compensation.

People in Namie often tell officials from TEPCO and the central government at residents’ briefing sessions, “You people are from the outside. Why don’t you try living in evacuation shelters! You might live in Tokyo now, but how would you feel if you were forced to live in, say, Nihonmatsu where Namie residents were forced to relocate. And for six years.”

 

7This map, made in 2015, shows the number of radioactive mushrooms detected. Namie has the highest number, and Nihonmatsu has the second. Evacuation to Nihonmatsu didn’t necessarily guarantee safety. See here.

 

Families have already been broken up. Young people have found jobs in cities or towns and stay where they have been evacuated. Some of them have moved to Tokyo. Families have broken up. Maybe it’s just the elderly who’ve stayed in Nihonmatsu. I want the officials to think about how they’d feel under these circumstances.

Are such things reflected in the amount of compensation? That’s the issue. I think they are not, considering the current amount of money being received. On the other hand if you asked me how much would be appropriate, I don’t think I could answer. But, all the situations we’ve been forced into should be fairly and appropriately taken into consideration.

When I attended a Dispute Reconciliation Committee meeting for the first time, I asked what standard they were going to apply to determine the amount of compensation.8 It was even before the amount for mental anguish compensation had been decided, which later resulted in a payment of 100,000 yen (less than $1,000). The evacuees had lost everything. Communication with family, friends and neighbors had been cut off. Schools and workplaces were gone. Everything was destroyed. I asked the committee, “Can you put yourselves in the situations the evacuees have been forced into and think about this?”

Not surprisingly, the committee dug out court precedents of compensation amounts based on third-party evaluations. I got angry because the cases they showed us were compensations for car accident injury claims, which happened to be 100,000 yen. The thing is that in the case of a car accident, even though you get injured, your body will heal after a certain period of time. So compensation is determined based on how long it would take to complete the treatment. That is how they came up with the payment of 100,000 yen.

I argued that that didn’t apply to our case. What a nuclear accident does is to release radioactive substances into the environment, and it was so dangerous that the residents around the plant were forced to leave their hometowns. We were told that radioactive materials were falling and that it was life-threatening to stay in places with high doses of radiation. That was the basis for the evacuation order. Even after six years, the order has not been lifted except for a small part of the town of Namie.

As I said, in the case of a car accident, the injury will heal after a certain period of time, but in the case of a nuclear power reactor accident, look at how the current situation stands, even after six years. And they came up with the payment of 100,000 yen for compensation. I was furious, wondering what the hell they were talking about.

No matter what, the way they decided on the compensation is unacceptable. You need third-party assessment, you need some sort of reasonable-sounding figure. That’s why they came up with that amount. But that shows they weren’t making the slightest effort to put themselves in the victims’ shoes.

Hirano: Listening to you, I really feel your dilemma as a mayor. Now that the community has been torn apart and human relationships have been severed, you are not sure if the situation can be fixed even with the return policy. You think realistically, it might be impossible, but it’s your position as mayor to keep Namie going for people who are coming back. You are in a contradictory position, which definitely brings you anguish. That’s the sense I get.

Right after the accident, you could have made the decision, we can’t live here any more, let’s move the town somewhere else. A least you would have preserved the ties between people and the community could go on existing elsewhere. But even that choice has been taken away. Since the only option left is for residents to return, you have been working hard to fix even one part of the divided community, despite knowing it will never be the same as before. Would it be right to say this is the position you have been put into, and have chosen, as mayor?

Baba: Yes, you can say that. Another important thing is the identity we have as Namie residents. I would really like to respect and value the feelings they have toward Namie.

We have our ancestors’ graves here in town, and everyone visits their family graves. If the town is gone, they cannot even pay their ancestors a visit. Even though they might live somewhere else, I would like to restore the town to an environment where they can pay their ancestors a visit.

Let me tell you, there was in fact an unofficial government plan at the time of the accident to relocate the entire town to another place. This town isn’t habitable any more. Please look for another place and move the town. There was that kind of thinking. However, after considering various factors, the government changed their policy from relocation to reconstruction.

And so at first, we did look into this option. Thinking we wouldn’t be able to live here anymore, we looked around for a large area somewhere in Fukushima and making it Namie. But after various heated discussions, I think the central government settled on the policy of restoration and reconstruction instead, and that’s how it was settled. In fact, we have a history of relocation. At the end of the Edo period, the Tokugawa Shogunate was overthrown by the anti-shogunate forces, which sought to establish a new government by restoring imperial power. Fukushima’s Aizu feudal clan, which had supported the shogunate, was regarded as an enemy of the emperor by the new Meiji government and was ordered to relocate to Iwate and Aomori prefectures or to Hokkaido.

But that was possible because it was only the Aizu region. This time, we’re talking about Hirono, Naraha and all together eight cities and towns in Futaba district. If we include neighboring areas, such as Iwaki, Minami-Soma and Tamura, we’re talking about twelve cities, towns and villages. There’s no way you can relocate all twelve of these municipalities.

About one year after the accident, the central government began to lift the evacuation order in some areas, such as Kawauchi and Hirono, since the radiation monitoring results showed that the levels were not that high, being about the same as the natural standard, although there were some spots with higher levels. The government encouraged residents in those areas to go back to their towns and villages.

Hirano: Did the central government ever explain why it gave up the idea of relocating the entire town of Namie?

Baba: No, because it was not an official plan, there was no explanation given to us.

Hirano: You mentioned identity earlier. From what I heard from you, I’m given a powerful impression that you have great affection for your hometown, not necessarily as a mayor but rather as a person who grew up in this place called Namie. Could you tell us more about the special feelings you have for your hometown as a resident of Namie and where you think that affection and attachment are coming from?

Baba: Sure. After all, this is the scenery that I was born into and grew up with. Well…(chokes up and tears) for example, the elementary school… the elementary school I went to with my friends. Also… junior high school. I don’t know how to put it, but looking back at my childhood brings back the scent of life in Namie that’s been ingrained in my body. It’s the air, the wind in Namie.

I think this is true for everyone who grew up in Namie. Since the accident, they have been living somewhere else as evacuees, where the environment feels different, even the air feels different. They’ve been away from Namie for such a long time, and they’ve been feeling that difference all these years.9

I came back here three months ago, but the thing I noticed the most was the air in Namie. The air brought back a lot of memories. Of course, it’s deserted here now with nobody around, but still I can feel and smell something I was born into and I grew up with. It’s ingrained in this town. It’s hard to explain in words, but there is something wafting in the air.

You know, there used be about 600 houses and buildings along the ocean, but they were all swept away by the tsunami. When I saw the aftermath, I knew something incredibly awful had happened. Actually I couldn’t even look at the ocean for about a year and a half after the tsunami. I was just so scared I did drive through Hama-dori (the shoreline area) and walked a bit.

 

8Ukedo in Namie, 10 kilometers from the Fukushima Daiichi plant, after the 3.11 disaster. The tsunami took 125 lives and destroyed 350 buildings in this coastal area.

 

I would say I am getting used to the ocean again little by little, so some memories like “oh, I used to swim here” are coming back to me. “Oh, I used to ride my bike around here, or I went to this street and the old guy in that house yelled at me.” A lot of childhood memories are coming back now.

So, I don’t know how to say this, but… (chokes up with tears in his eyes), these are the places you were used to and got attached to.

Hirano: You feel that there’s a lot you won’t be able to experience unless you are here in Namie – soaking in this air, your childhood memories, senses, feelings.

Baba: That’s right. Things you can’t experience anywhere else. There is a poem, “Hometown is a place you leave behind and then long for.” (translation by Arthur Binard) I was evacuated to Nihonmatsu for six years, and I really understood what this poem meant. You won’t be able to appreciate your hometown fully until you leave. That’s how I feel.

We all grew up in this town, surrounded by nature and supported by caring adults and neighbors. When I was a kid, not only my family but also my neighbors would pay attention to you and tell you, “Don’t do this, don’t do that.” But all of that is gone now. It’s hard to put all of that into words.

 

9.jpgTōka-ichi, an autumn market held annually in Namie since 1873. It used to attract over 10,000 visitors. Over 300 vendors would gather and children played a central role in creating the festive atmosphere. The photo was taken in November 2010.

 

10Hadaka-mairi, a winter festival held annually in Namie since 1859. It started as a way to pray for a new year without misfortunes such as fire and epidemics. The photo was taken in February, 2011.

 

Hirano: In spite of all the contradictions, do you think it’s these feelings and emotions that keep you moving forward with your vision of protecting Namie, of reconstructing it?

Baba: Yes, you could say that. At first I could not even stand seeing people in jackets with the TEPCO logo on it. I didn’t want to greet them and I didn’t feel like talking with them, either. I’ve been getting better at dealing with them recently, though. (laughs)

But we will never really be on the same page since they will never understand what we’ve been going through.

Hirano, Amaya and Kawano: Thank you so much for sharing your valuable time and opinions with us today.

I would like to thank Baba Tamotsu for sparing time for this interview in the midst of his busy schedule. My colleagues, Yoshihiro Amaya and Yoh Kawano, made the interview possible through their thoughtfulness and friendship. My thanks also extend to Mark Selden and Norma Field for their comments and feedback. And, as always, Akiko Anson willingly offered her professional skill as a translator. I am grateful to her.

 

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Notes

Other interviews on the Fukushima nuclear disaster by Hirano can be found here.

Notes

1

The tsunami caused by a magnitude 9 earthquake killed almost 19,000 people along the northeast coast of Japan, and triggered meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants. The accident forced more than 150,000 people living near the plant to evacuate in order to avoid radiation exposure. On April 1 2017, the government of Prime Minster Abe Shinzo lifted the evacuation order, enacting the “return policy” based on the claim that decontamination had successfully removed radioactive contaminants from major areas that had been designated as evacuation zones. The measure used to make this claim is 3.8 microSv/h or 20 microSv/y, which is 20 times higher than the international standard, which still applies to the rest of Japan. Despite the government’s push for its “return policy,” the majority of former residents of the affected areas have no intention to return. For details see my interview with Suzuki Yūichi.

2

According to the homepage of Namie township website, as of August 2017, 254 households – 362 people – have returned. Two gas stations, two convenience stores, and two local banks have (re)-opened. How such a small population could sustain them is unclear. Suzuki Yūichi in the aforementioned interview expresses his skepticism.

3

Minami Soma City and its neighboring towns including Namie have been working with universities and companies that manufacture robotics as part of their plans to revitalize Fukushima’s industries. The area was known as a hub for innovation in robotics prior to the disaster, and now they are trying to restore its central role in robotics initiatives.

4

See my interview with Yūichi Suzuki.

5

See Hiroaki Koide’s point in my interview with him. Koide makes it clear that there is no absolute standard that guarantees “safe” exposure to radiation. Any radioactive exposure, especially internal exposure, poses some risk. It is best to minimize exposure. It is also clear that infants, young people, and pregnant women are particularly vulnerable to radioactive exposure. The Japanese government’s evacuation plans never took this factor into consideration. It is worth noting that in Chernobyl 20mSv would still constitute a “no-go zone. ” The Japanese government has never rescinded the Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency Situation (原子力緊急事態宣言), part of a law enacted in 1999. This law reflected ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection) “post-accident” period standards and took the upper end of that and seemingly made it applicable indefinitely. I thank Norma Field for providing this important perspective on ICRP.

6

Apparently, Mr. Baba was confusing the Inquest with the actual criminal trial: only the opening session of the trial had taken place (June 30) at the time of the interview (July 4).

7

The first session of the trial of ex-Tepco chairman Katsumata Tsunehisa, 77, and former Vice Presidents Muto Sakae, 67, and Takekuro Ichiro, 71, who are charged with professional negligence resulting in death and injury, was held in June 2017. The prosecutors charged that the TEPCO executives had been cognizant of the data and reports that a tsunami more than 10 meters high could cause a power outage and other serious consequences, yet they took no actions to remedy the situation. For example, the prosecutors argued, the 2002 estimate by the government’s Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion indicated that there was a 20 percent chance of a magnitude 8 earthquake striking off Fukushima within 30 years. The Complainants for the Criminal Prosecution of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, the citizen’s group consisting mainly of victims of the triple meltdown in 2011, had been working hard to have prosecutors accept their criminal complaints sine June 2012, but it was not until July 2015 that indictment of the three former executives was filed. Residents of Fukushima and people of other prefectures have filed criminal complains against more than 50 policymakers and TEPCO officials since 2012. See more details in my interview with Mutō Ruiko, Norma Field’s essay, the website of the Complainants, and Tomomi Yamaguchi and Mutō Ruiko.

8

Joel Rheuben and Luke Nottage write: “As early as April 2011 TEPCO began to make provisional compensation payments of up to JPY 1 million (just over USD 10,000) to evacuees, to be supplemented by full payments once the company’s compensation scheme was in place. At the same time, the national government began making provisional payments to affected small and medium-sized businesses in the region, particularly in the tourism sector. In accordance with the Nuclear Damage Compensation Law, the government also established an expert “Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation” (the “Dispute Reconciliation Committee”) under MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology) to create a set of non-binding guidelines to inform payment amounts. The Dispute Reconciliation Committee issued interim guidelines in August 2011.” For more information about the Dispute Reconciliation Committee and its subsidiary the Dispute Resolution Center, see here.

9

For the economic impact that TEPCO brought to Namie through the nuclear plants and how that was linked to the creation of nuclear “safety myth,” see my interview with Suzuki.

Source : http://apjjf.org/2018/03/Katsuya.html

 

February 1, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | 1 Comment

Installation of a dome-shaped rooftop cover near completion at Unit 3 reactor

31 jan 2018 reactor 3.jpg
Japan Fukushima Cleanup
In this Thursday, Jan. 25, 2018 photo, an installation of a dome-shaped rooftop cover housing key equipment is near completion at Unit 3 reactor of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant ahead of a fuel removal from its storage pool in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, northeast Japan, during an exclusive visit by The Associated Press. The hardest-hit reactor at the Fukushima plant in the March 2011 disaster is moving ahead of the other two melted reactors seven years later in what will be a decades-long cleanup. (AP Photo/Mari Yamaguchi)

 

January 31, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

Government to test safety of burying radioactive soil

Government to test safety of burying radioactive soil this spring
31 jan2018.jpg
Bags of debris contaminated with radiation are seen stored in a field in the town of Okuma, near the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant, in this August 2015 photo.
 
The government plans to conduct a demonstration project sometime this spring to test the safety of burying waste generated by decontamination work following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, the Environment Ministry said Wednesday.
In the project, soil waste from eastern and northeastern areas of the country other than Fukushima Prefecture will be covered with uncontaminated soil at sites in the village of Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, and the town of Nasu, Tochigi Prefecture, with radioactivity levels around the locations being measured.
The government plans to determine its disposal policy for contaminated soil in the fall or later depending on the outcome of the experiment, according to the ministry.
A total of 56 municipalities in seven prefectures — Iwate, Miyagi, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama and Chiba — have completed cleanup work with financial support from the central government.
But some 330,000 cubic meters of soil waste has been temporarily kept at around 28,000 locations — including public spaces such as schools and parks — in 53 municipalities, prompting local residents to call for disposal of the waste at the earliest opportunity.
The project will be carried out on the premises of the Tokai Research and Development Center’s Nuclear Science Research Institute in Tokai and at a public space in Nasu.
Some 2,500 cubic meters of soil waste temporarily kept at two locations in Tokai and about 350 cubic meters of soil waste kept at the public space in Nasu will be used in the project.
After the waste is buried, workers’ exposure levels to radiation will also be measured.
“Households in storage locations continue shouldering the burden. I hope (the project) will prove the safety of burying it (soil waste) and lead to the disposal (of contaminated soil),” a Nasu town official said.
“It took time to conduct (the project) but it’s good,” said an official in Tokai, adding that more and more local residents have been asking for the removal of soil waste from a park.
After being asked by municipalities to demonstrate a way to dispose of soil waste, the ministry had been searching for proper locations to carry out the demonstration project.
 
Radioactive soil disposal method to be tested
Japan’s Environment Ministry will carry out tests at 2 sites where soil generated in decontamination work following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident is buried.
Outside Fukushima Prefecture, where the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant is located, some 330,000 cubic meters of soil are stored in 53 cities, towns and villages in 7 prefectures in eastern Japan.
The soil is currently kept at some 28,000 locations, including schoolyards and parks.
Local residents have called on the government to safely dispose of the soil as quickly as possible. The environment ministry will start testing soil disposal methods in the spring.
The sites chosen are a nuclear research institute in Ibaraki Prefecture and a sports ground in Tochigi Prefecture.
Ministry officials say the stored soil will be buried in the ground and then covered over again with clean new earth. They will then measure radiation levels at areas surrounding the sites and the amount of radiation that workers were exposed to.
The ministry will start negotiating with local governments regarding a full-scale disposal after verifying the test method’s safety and drawing up an appropriate disposal plan.
 
Landfilling of Radiation-Tainted Soil to Start outside Fukushima
Tokyo, Jan. 31 (Jiji Press)–The Environment Ministry said Wednesday that landfill work for soil tainted with radioactive materials released from the disaster-stricken Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power station will start outside Fukushima Prefecture, northeastern Japan.
The work will be carried out in the village of Tokai, Ibaraki Prefecture, and the town of Nasu, Tochigi Prefecture, on a trial basis from this spring. Both prefectures are south of and adjacent to Fukushima.
In Fukushima, work has already started to store such soil at interim facilities for up to 30 years before its final disposal.
The work in Tokai and Nasu will involve about 2,500 and 350 cubic meters, respectively, of soil removed from ground during decontamination work following the accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc. <9501> plant, which was heavily damaged in the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.
The soil will be buried underground, with the land surface to be covered with a layer of clean soil more than 30 centimeters thick.

January 31, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | Leave a comment

Worst-hit reactor at Fukushima may be easiest to clean up

By MARI YAMAGUCHI
jan 25 2018 reactor 3 dome.jpg
In this Thursday, Jan. 25, 2018, photo, an installation of a dome-shaped rooftop cover housing key equipment is near completion at Unit 3 reactor of the Fukushima Dai-ich nuclear power plant ahead of a fuel removal from… (AP Photo/Mari Yamaguchi)
OKUMA, Japan (AP) — High atop Fukushima’s most damaged nuclear reactor, the final pieces of a jelly-roll shaped cover are being put in place to seal in highly radioactive dust.
Blown apart by a hydrogen explosion in 2011 after an earthquake and tsunami hit Japan’s Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, reactor Unit 3 is undergoing painstaking construction ahead of a milestone that is the first step toward dismantling the plant.
 
The operating floor — from where new fuel rods used to be lowered into the core — has been rebuilt and if all goes as planned, huge cranes will begin removing 566 sets of still-radioactive fuel rods from a storage pool just below it later this year.
 
It has taken seven years just to get this far, but now the real work of cleaning up the Tokyo Electric Power Co. plant can begin.
“If you compare it with mountain climbing, we’ve only been preparing to climb. Now, we finally get to actually start climbing,” said Daisuke Hirose, an official at the plant’s decommissioning and decontamination unit.
Cleaning up the plant’s three reactors that had at least partial meltdowns after the earthquake and tsunami is a monumental task expected to take three to four decades. Taking out the stored fuel rods is only a preliminary step and just removing the ones in Unit 3 is expected to take a year.
Still ahead is the uncharted challenge of removing an estimated 800 tons of melted fuel and debris inside the cracked containment chambers — six times that of the 1979 Three Mile Island accident.
The area in and outside of Unit 3 is part construction site and part disaster zone still requiring protection from radiation. A makeshift elevator, then a wind-swept outdoor staircase, takes visitors to the operating floor, more than 30 meters (100 feet) above ground.
Daylight streams in through the unfinished section of the new cover, a tunnel-like structure sealed at both ends to contain radiation. An overhead crane that moves on rails stands at the side of the storage pool, the maker’s name, “Toshiba,” emblazoned in large red letters.
The explosion left major chunks of debris that have been removed from the storage pool, a painstaking operation done using remote-controlled machinery and with utmost care to avoid damaging the fuel rods. Smaller rubble lines the pool’s edge. The water’s surface is obscured by a blue netting to prevent more debris from accidentally tumbling in.
The severe damage to Unit 3 has, in the end, made it easier to clean up than the other two reactors.
Under the latest government roadmap approved last September, removal of the fuel rods from units 1 and 2 was delayed by three years until 2023, a second postponement from the original 2015, because further decontamination and additional safety measures are needed.
Unit 1 fell behind because of a delay in removing debris and repairing key components on the operating floor. The Unit 2 building remained intact, keeping high radiation and humidity inside, which makes it more difficult for workers to approach and decontaminate.
Radioactivity on the Unit 3 operating floor has fallen to a level that allows workers in hazmat suits and filter-masks to stay up to two hours at a time, though most work still needs to be done remotely.
The segments of the new cover were pre-assembled and are being installed one by one by remote-controlled cranes. With two pieces left, the plant operator says the cover will be completed in February.
Removing the fuel rods in Unit 3 will be done with a fuel-handling crane. It will move the rods out of their storage racks and pack them in a protective canister underwater. A second Toshiba crane, a 10-meter (33-foot) -high yellow structure across the operating floor, will lift the canister out of the pool and load it onto a vehicle for transport to another storage pool at the plant.
Crane operators and others assigned to the project, which requires caution and skill, have been rehearsing the procedures.
The 1,573 sets of fuel rods stored in spent fuel pools at the three reactors are considered among the highest risks in the event of another major earthquake. Loss of water from sloshing, structural damage or a power outage could cause meltdowns and massive radiation leaks because the pools are uncovered.
Hirose said that starting fuel removal at Unit 3 would be “a major turning point.”
Still, after the intact fuel rods are gone comes by far the most difficult part of decommissioning the plant: removing the melted fuel and debris from inside the reactors. Obtaining exact locations and other details of the melted fuel are crucial to determining the retrieval methods and developing the right kind of technology and robots. With most melted fuel believed to have fallen to the bottom, experts are proposing that it be accessed from the side of the containment vessel, not from the top as originally had been planned, based on the cleanup after an accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in the United States.
Computer simulations and limited internal probes have shown that the melted fuel presumably poured out of the core, falling to the bottom of the primary containment vessels. Robotic probes at the Unit 3 and 2 reactors have captured images of large amounts of melted fuel, but attempts so far at Unit 1 have been unsuccessful.
Despite scarce data from inside the reactors, the roadmap says the methods for melted fuel removal are to be finalized in 2019, with actual retrieval at one of the three reactors in 2021. Hirose says it is premature to say whether Unit 3 will be the first.

January 31, 2018 Posted by | Fukushima 2018 | , , | 1 Comment