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Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs) in Canada

While civil society opposition to SMRs is broad and substantial in Canada, ultimately the exorbitant cost of SMRs will be their undoing. Conclusive analysis shows that SMRs cannot compete economically with wind, solar and storage systems.

SMRs will last as long as governments are willing to pour public funds into them, and SMRs will start to disappear after the money tap is turned off. Already the nuclear hype in Canada is turning back to big reactors.

 WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor, August 29, 2024 | Issue #918, By Brennain Lloyd and Susan O’Donnell

Introduction: CANDUs versus SMRs

Canada developed the CANDU reactor, fueled with natural uranium mined in Canada and cooled and moderated with heavy water. All 19 operating power reactors in Canada – 18 in Ontario on the Great Lakes and one in New Brunswick on the Bay of Fundy – are CANDU designs with outputs ranging from about 500 to 900 MWe.

It’s been more than 30 years since the last CANDU was completed and connected to the grid in Canada. Attempts to build new ones were halted over high projected costs, and CANDU exports have dried up. To keep itself alive, in 2018 the nuclear industry launched a “roadmap” to develop smaller reactors and kick-start new nuclear export opportunities.

From 2020 to 2023, the Canadian government funded six so-called “Small Modular Nuclear Reactor” (SMR) designs. Only one – Terrestrial Energy’s Integral Molten Salt Reactor (IMSR) design – is Canadian.

The six designs are not only unlike the CANDU but also different from each other. The fuels range from low-enriched uranium, TRISO particles and HALEU (High-Assay, Low-Enriched Uranium) to plutonium-based fuel, and the different cooling systems include high-temperature gas, molten salt, liquid sodium metal and heat pipes. One design – Moltex – requires a separate reprocessing unit to extract plutonium from used CANDU fuel to make fuel for its proposed SMR.

Only one of the grid-scale SMR designs seems plausible to be built – the GE Hitachi 300 MWe boiling water reactor (BWRX-300) being developed at the Darlington nuclear site on Lake Ontario. This design uses low-enriched uranium fuel and is cooled by ordinary water. The Darlington site owner, the public utility Ontario Power Generation (OPG), is planning to build four of them.

Canada gave OPG a $970 million “low-interest” loan to help develop the BWRX-300 design. The other five SMR designs received considerably less federal funding, from $7 million to $50.5 million each, and most SMR proponents have been struggling to source matching funds. One design, Westinghouse’s off-grid eVinci micro-reactor, had early development costs funded by the U.S. military and now seems to have independent funding.

The Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) at Chalk River received more than $1.2 billion in 2023. CNL is operated by a private-sector consortium with two U.S. companies involved in the nuclear weapons industry and the Canadian firm Atkins-Réalis (formerly SNC Lavalin) which is also involved in almost every SMR project in Canada. CNL and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited are building an “Advanced Nuclear Materials Research Centre” at Chalk River, one of the largest nuclear facilities ever built in Canada, that will conduct research on SMRs.

Canada recently released a report suggesting that SMRs will be in almost all provinces by 2035, although most provincial electrical utilities have expressed no interest, and only Ontario, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and Alberta are promoting SMRs. Alberta says it wants SMRs to reduce the GHG emissions generated in tar sands extraction.

SMR “project creep”

Proponents of most of the SMR designs keep changing the description of their projects. This is not unique to Canada, but is certainly apparent in Canada, and the regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), aids and abets that practise for those SMRs in the review stream.

In the case of the BWRX-300 proposed for the Darlington site, the CNSC not only accepted a 2009 environmental assessment for very different reactors as a stand-in for the BWRX-300 but also is carrying out the current review as if for a single reactor. The nuclear regulator made this decision despite Ontario Power Generation very publicly stating its intent to construct four reactors in rapid succession at the Darlington site.

The proposed “Micro Modular Reactor” (MMR) for the Chalk River site in Ontario is another example of “project creep” and demonstrates just how flexible “scope of project” is in the domain of the CNSC.

Earlier this year, CNSC staff released a document outlining communications from the MMR proponent, Global First Power, describing significant project changes. The proponent wants to triple power output, and to operate with fuel enrichment levels from 9.75% (LEU+) up to 19.75%.

Global First Power also wants a shift from no need to refuel in a 20-year operating life to provision for on-site refueling and defueling with periods varying from three to 13.5 years. They also want to double their facility design life from 20 years to 40 years.

Despite all these significant changes to key elements of the design, the CNSC staff concluded that the Global First Power MMR project remained within scope of its initial (very different) description.

Another example of SMR project creep is in New Brunswick. In June 2023, the provincial utility NB Power applied to the CNSC for a licence to clear a site for the ARC-100 design at the Point Lepreau nuclear site on the Bay of Fundy. The design for the sodium-cooled reactor requires HALEU fuel, which is scarce because of sanctions imposed on Russia, the sole supplier.

News reports have suggested the ARC-100 design might need to change because changing the fuel means changing the design. Meanwhile the ARC company CEO left suddenly, and staff received layoff notices. Despite these obvious problems, the application under CNSC review and a provincial environmental assessment underway with the CNSC are continuing with the original design.

SMRs complicate radioactive waste management

One of the (many) false promises floated about SMRs is that they will alleviate the significant challenges of managing radioactive wastes. This is patently false. Some of this misleading rhetoric stems from the notion of “recycling” and claims by some SMR promoters that their particular design of reactor will use high-level radioactive wastes as “fuel” for their reactor.

But the reality is that the introduction of so-called “next generation” designs of reactors in Canada will only complicate the already complex set of problems related to the caretaking of these extremely hazardous materials.

……………………………………………..The shift from natural uranium to enriched uranium in commercial power reactors in Canada will fundamentally change the nature and characteristics of the spent fuel waste and will take away one of the nuclear industry’s favourite pitch points for the CANDU design: that there is no potential for criticality after the fuel is removed from the reactor.

The new potential for the irradiated enriched fuel wastes to “go critical” is only one of the many problems being overlooked by both government and industry.

Another very obvious shift is in the dimensions of the fuel, from the relatively uniform dimensions of CANDU fuel to the widely divergent shapes and sizes of fuel being depicted for the various small modular reactor designs.

The CANDU fuel bundles are approximately 50 cm long and 10 cm in diameter. In contrast, the fuel waste dimensions are significantly different for SMRs. For example, the BWRX-300 fuel bundles are much larger, the casks much heavier, and the reactor will generate higher level activity wastes. These differences will require different approaches and designs for interim and long-term dry storage of used fuel.

SMR wastes not considered in Canada’s repository design

As a fleet, small modular reactors will generate more waste per energy unit than the larger conventional reactors that preceded them. But in Canada they will also require redesign of the “concept” plan currently being promoted for the long-term dispositioning of the used fuel to a deep geological repository (DGR).

Since 2002 an association of the nuclear power companies, operating as the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO), have been pursuing a single site to bury and then abandon all of Canada’s high-level nuclear waste.

Their siting process, launched in 2010, caught the interest of 22 municipalities that allowed themselves to be studied for the “$16-24 billion national infrastructure project.” Hundreds of millions of dollars later – with tens of millions going directly into the coffers of the participating municipalities – the NWMO is now down to two candidate sites in Ontario.

The NWMO say they will make their final selection by the end of 2024. But even at this late date they have produced only “conceptual” descriptions of their repository project, including for key components such as the packaging plant where the fuel waste would be transferred into that final container, and the DGR itself. But all of the conceptual work is premised on the characteristics and dimensions of the CANDU fuel bundle.

The process lines of the used fuel packaging plant, the final container, and the spacing requirements for the repository will all need to be redone for different SMR wastes with their very different dimensions and characteristics.

While it could be said that the NWMO design progress has been surprisingly slow given their target of selecting a site this year and beginning the regulatory and licensing process next year, it will be back to square one if their proposed DGR is to accommodate SMR wastes.

There is, however, a strong possibility that the regulator, the CNSC, will allow the NWMO to skate through at least the first license phase with large information gaps, as the CNSC is doing with the plan to construct four BWRX-300s at the Darlington site.

As mentioned in the example of “project creep,” earlier this year the CNSC announced it would accept an environmental assessment approval of a generic 2009 reactor proposal instead of requiring that the BWRX-300 be subject to an impact assessment. This was despite the marked differences between the technologies assessed in 2009 and the BWRX-300 technology.

These differences will impact the management of the project’s radioactive waste. For example, the BWRX-300 public dose rates are estimated to be 10 x higher for one accident scenario (pool fire) and 54% higher in a dry storage container accident, the waste contains different proportions of radionuclides than the waste that was assessed in 2009, radio-iodine and carbon-14 emissions will be higher, alpha and beta-gamma activity per cubic metre of waste will be higher and the BWRX-300 will generate higher activity spent fuel.

Despite the NWMO having successfully wooed two small municipalities, there is broad opposition to the transportation, burial and abandonment of all of Canada’s high-level radioactive wastes in a single location, either in the headwaters of two major watersheds in northern Ontario or the rich farm lands of southwestern Ontario.

This opposition is amplified by concerns about SMR wastes and the NWMO’s open ticket to add other operations to their DGR site. Of particular concern are the potential for the NWMO to add an SMR to power their repository site or even to add a reprocessing plant at the site to extract plutonium from the used fuel. The Canadian government’s refusal to include an explicit ban on commercial reprocessing in the 2022 review of the national radioactive waste policy heightened the latter concern.

Who/what is behind the SMR push in Canada?

Although proponents claim that SMRs will contribute to climate action, critics are sceptical. It is doubtful that any SMR will be built in time to contribute to Canada’s target to decarbonize the electricity grid by 2035, and independent research found that SMRs will cost substantially more than alternative sources of grid energy.

The high cost and lengthy development timelines of SMRs, the questionable claims of climate action, as well as the significant challenges related to SMR wastes, raises an obvious question: who is pushing SMRs and why?

A central reason is a political imperative to keep the Canadian nuclear industry alive. The industry is small in Canada, but nuclear power looms large in the political imagination. Canada sees itself as a global leader in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Without a nuclear weapons industry, Canada needs nuclear exports to keep its domestic industry alive and ensure Canada’s membership in the international nuclear club. Earlier this year, Canada released an action plan to get nuclear projects built faster and ensure that “’nuclear energy remains a strategic asset to Canada now and into the future.”

Since the start of the nuclear age, Canada has spent a disproportionate amount of research funding on nuclear reactor development. Politicians see the CANDU design as a success, despite its costly legacy and lackluster exports. The CANDU reactors in Canada have all required significant public subsidies, and the CANDUs sold for export have been heavily subsidized by Canada as well.

Selling more CANDUs outside Canada is unlikely in the foreseeable future. But Canada wants a nuclear industry, and that requires choosing and aggressively marketing at least one nuclear reactor design. Despite being a U.S. design, the G.E. Hitachi BWRX-300 is the chosen favourite in Canada. The reactor, in early development at the Darlington site, is being promoted globally by Ontario Power Generation as part of an international collaboration with GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and Synthos Green Energy.

What’s the future for SMRs in Canada?

Since the nuclear industry and its government partner Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) launched their SMR roadmap in 2018, the political and business hype for SMRs has been intense. The SMR buzz is meant to attract private sector investment, but so far that strategy is failing.

Almost everyone understands now that SMRs, like the CANDUs, are expensive projects that will need continuous massive public subsidies. To date, taxpayers have provided just over $1.2 billion in direct subsidies to SMR proponents in Canada, not nearly as much as the industry will need to develop an SMR fleet in the country.

A broad coalition of groups – from climate activists to Indigenous organizations and other groups protecting lands and waters from radioactive waste – have been pushing back against public funding for SMRs. A 2020 statement signed by 130 groups called SMRs “dirty, dangerous distractions” from real climate action. In March this year, 130 groups in Canada also signed the international declaration against new nuclear energy development launched in Brussels at the Nuclear Summit organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

While civil society opposition to SMRs is broad and substantial in Canada, ultimately the exorbitant cost of SMRs will be their undoing. Conclusive analysis shows that SMRs cannot compete economically with wind, solar and storage systems.

SMRs will last as long as governments are willing to pour public funds into them, and SMRs will start to disappear after the money tap is turned off. Already the nuclear hype in Canada is turning back to big reactors.

The Bruce Nuclear Generating Station on Lake Huron in Ontario, with eight CANDU reactors, is already the largest operating nuclear plant in the world. Bruce Power recently began the formal process to develop four new big reactors at the site, to generate another 4,800 megawatts of electricity. It remains to be seen if the sticker shock for the proposed big nuclear reactors will, like it has for SMRs, scare off investors.

Although more than six years of SMR promotion in Canada has produced almost no private investor interest, the SMR buzz remains strong. The SMR star may be fading but the SMR story is far from over.

Brennain Lloyd is the coordinator of Northwatch in Ontario. Susan O’Donnell is the lead researcher for the CEDAR project at St. Thomas University in New Brunswick and a spokesperson for CRED-NB.  https://crednb.ca/small-modular-nuclear-reactors-smrs-in-canada/

September 6, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Canada, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment

Second review of ARC’s Small Modular Nuclear Reactor not complete, despite layoffs

That’s after ARC Clean Technology Canada said it downsized with that review now over

Telegraph Journal, Adam Huras, Jul 04, 2024 

A second design review of a New Brunswick-based company’s proposed small modular nuclear reactor is not yet complete, according to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

That’s after ARC Clean Technology Canada said it downsized with that review now over.

Brunswick News reported last month that ARC, one of two companies pursuing SMR technology in the province, had handed out layoff notices to some of its employees, citing its latest design phase coming to an end.

That’s as its CEO also departed.

But the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission says it’s “months” away from completing its review, and may need more information from the company.

“We have received all of ARC’s major submissions as part of the vendor design review process and our experts are carefully reviewing them,” commission spokesperson Braeson Holland told Brunswick News.

“It is possible that staff will have additional questions for the vendor. In that case, additional information may be requested, and the company will be expected to provide it for the vendor design review to proceed.

“Provided that any additional information requested is submitted in a timely manner and that the company remains in compliance with its service agreement with the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, we anticipate that the review will be complete within several months.”

A vendor design review is an optional service that the commission provides for the assessment of a vendor’s reactor design.

The objective is to verify, at a high level, that Canadian nuclear regulatory requirements and expectations, as well as Canadian codes and standards, will be met.

The company did complete a Phase 1 review of its ARC-100 sodium-cooled fast reactor in October 2019.

An executive summary of that review, made public by the commission, noted that there were requests for additional information, as well as technical discussions through letters, emails, meetings and teleconferences, after an initial submission.

The result of that first review found that “additional work is required by ARC” to address findings raised in the review, specifically around the reactor’s management system.

It then lists a series of technical concerns, but concludes that “these issues are foreseen to be resolvable.”

A Phase 2 design review, which ARC is undergoing right now, goes into further detail, and focuses on identifying fundamental barriers to licensing for a new design in Canada, according to the commission.

That review started in February 2022, and was expected to be completed in January of this year.

It’s unclear why it has yet to be completed.

At a New Brunswick Energy and Utilities Board hearing last month into a recent power rate hike, NB Power vice president Brad Coady testified he doesn’t expect SMRs will be ready by an original target date of 2030.

The utility now believes they’ll be ready by 2032 or 2033……………….
https://tj.news/new-brunswick/second-review-of-arcs-smr-not-complete-despite-layoffs

July 7, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Canada, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment

Unable to effectively operate its lone existing nuclear reactor, New Brunswick is betting on advanced options.

The International Panel found that sodium-cooled reactors proved expensive to build, complex to operate, prone to malfunctions, and difficult and expensive to repair. Sodium reacts violently with water and burns if exposed to air. Major sodium fires have occurred in previous reactors, often leading to lengthy shutdowns.

If NB Power needs outside assistance with a conventional reactor it has owned and operated for more than 40 years, one might question the wisdom of building two more featuring untested designs. Mr. Holland’s replacement as energy minister, Hugh Flemming, must now decide how comfortable he is with the province’s SMR ambitions.

Perhaps the most fundamental risk to New Brunswick’s SMR push is that the province can’t afford it.

MATTHEW MCCLEARN,  JULY 2, 2024 https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-new-brunswick-nuclear-reactor-technology-arc-clean-moltex-energy/

Mike Holland was among Canada’s leading evangelists for small modular nuclear reactors. During his tenure as New Brunswick’s energy minister, from 2018 to when he stepped down on June 20, he vigorously supported plans by the province’s Crown utility, NB Power, to construct two different small reactor designs from startup companies: U.S.-based ARC Clean Technology and Britain’s Moltex Energy. This represents Canada’s most ambitious – and perhaps riskiest – foray into bleeding-edge nuclear technology.

In an interview shortly before he resigned to pursue an opportunity in the private sector, Mr. Holland recalled how SMRs arrived on his agenda soon after he assumed office. He began exploring what advanced reactors could mean for decarbonizing the province’s electricity sector and growing its economy, and concluded New Brunswick could become a hub for nuclear design and manufacturing, and export reactors around the world.

“I saw the opportunity for New Brunswick to not just participate, but be a leader in this,” he said. “I am someone that loves to be on the cutting edge.”

His enthusiasm and risk tolerance proved a boon for ARC and Moltex, two tiny startups that have neither licensed nor constructed a commercial reactor. Under Mr. Holland’s leadership, New Brunswick became an incubator and helped the companies attract government funds to continue their work.

But NB Power is already struggling with persistent problems at its lone existing reactor at Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station. It has been negotiating a partnership with Ontario Power Generation that could see the latter assume partial ownership and help fix the ailing plant.

If NB Power needs outside assistance with a conventional reactor it has owned and operated for more than 40 years, one might question the wisdom of building two more featuring untested designs. Mr. Holland’s replacement as energy minister, Hugh Flemming, must now decide how comfortable he is with the province’s SMR ambitions.

Unconventional thinking

Nearly all of the more than 400 nuclear reactors operating today use water to cool their highly radioactive cores. Water also acts as a “moderator,” slowing down the high-energy neutrons produced by nuclear fission. Though water-cooled reactors have dominated for decades, they cost huge sums to build and produce waste that remains hazardous for countless human lifetimes. They’re vulnerable to severe (albeit rare) accidents that can render surrounding areas uninhabitable.

Virtually every SMR is marketed as addressing these and other shortcomings – and most have ditched water as coolant and moderator.

According to documents released by New Brunswick’s energy ministry through the province’s freedom of information legislation to researcher Susan O’Donnell, and provided to The Globe and Mail, in 2017 NB Power reviewed dozens of SMRs it read about in nuclear industry publications. It came up with a short list of five, which it later narrowed to ARC and Moltex, and enticed both companies to set up headquarters in Saint John.

ARC and Moltex are pursuing what the industry calls “fast” neutron reactors, so named because they lack a moderator. The ARC-100 reactor would be cooled using liquid sodium metal and consume enriched uranium metal fuel. Moltex’s Stable Salt Reactor-Wasteburner (SSR-W), meanwhile, would use molten salt fuel placed in fuel assemblies similar to those in conventional reactors.

The SSR-W would require its own fuel reprocessing plant called WATSS (short for Waste to Stable Salt), which would convert Point Lepreau’s spent fuel into new fuel. For NB Power, that’s a major attraction: As of last summer, Point Lepreau had more than 170,000 Candu spent fuel bundles. Moltex says that’s enough to power its reactor for 60 years.

In May, 2019, NB Power sent a letter to Mr. Holland and Premier Blaine Higgs urging them to support fast reactors. The utility told its government masters that there was enough room at Point Lepreau for both reactors and that they could be up and running by 2030.

“These two technologies have different market applications and there is no downside to letting both of them work through the process,” the letter stated.

New Brunswick’s latest energy plan suggests electricity consumption will nearly double in the next few decades. NB Power’s challenge is to satisfy that demand while simultaneously reducing greenhouse gas emissions; Lori Clark, its chief executive, has cast SMRs as playing an important role in the utility’s efforts to reach net zero by 2035.

What New Brunswick covets most, however, is a shot of economic adrenalin.

Even optimists expect that SMR demonstration units will be too expensive to be economically attractive. Multiple units must be built to exploit economies of scale and reduce costs.

NB Power is counting on that. According to documents released under the federal Access to Information Act, the utility expects the first ARC-100 would be followed by 11 more units by mid-century. By then, up to 24 would be built in Canada, and the same number in other countries. And the first SSR-W would lead to 11 more built across Canada and two dozen more in the United States, Britain and Eastern Europe. If that happened, they’d be among the most successful models in history.

NB Power thought more than half of the components would be manufactured in New Brunswick. It also enthused about royalty payments on reactor sales, “potentially worth billions of dollars.”

Technical risks

But to realize any of that, New Brunswick’s SMR program must overcome technical challenges that have plagued the nuclear industry from its earliest days.

Edwin Lyman, a physicist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, has warned policy makers about the pitfalls of betting on “advanced” reactor designs, which he has studied over many years. “Developing new designs that are clearly superior to light water reactors overall is a formidable challenge, as improvements in one respect can create or exacerbate problems in another,” he wrote in a 2021 report.

Fast reactors, which originated in the earliest years of the nuclear age, bear this out. The U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Germany, Japan and India all pursued so-called “fast breeder” reactors that could produce more plutonium fuel than they consumed. A report that examined the history of those reactors, produced in 2010 by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, a group of arms control and non-proliferation experts, found member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development collectively invested about US$50-billion researching breeder reactors. Outside the OECD, Russia and India also spent heavily.

They didn’t have much to show for it. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, there are only two fast reactors currently generating electricity – both in Russia. The International Panel found that sodium-cooled reactors proved expensive to build, complex to operate, prone to malfunctions, and difficult and expensive to repair. Sodium reacts violently with water and burns if exposed to air. Major sodium fires have occurred in previous reactors, often leading to lengthy shutdowns.

As for molten salt reactors, there have only been two experimental exemplars, the most recent of which operated in the 1960s. Mr. Lyman’s 2021 report said molten salts were highly corrosive to many materials typically used in reactor construction. Moreover, “liquid nuclear fuels introduce numerous additional safety, environmental and proliferation risks.” Molten salt reactors likely couldn’t be built before the 2040s at the earliest, he concluded.

In addition to confronting such technical challenges, New Brunswick’s strategy also presupposes that reprocessing of spent fuel will be permitted and affordable. But a report published last year by the Nuclear Waste Management Organization, the industry-controlled organization tasked with disposing of Canada’s reactor waste, was skeptical on both counts.

NB Power is also counting on circumstances that are beyond its control. According to a letter signed by former CEO Keith Cronkhite in 2020 and released under the Access to Information Act, New Brunswick’s plan hinges on Ontario and other provinces building multiple BWRX-300s. (The letter was sent to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.) If they do not, “SMR companies based in New Brunswick will not be able to attract private investment necessary to ever deploy a new reactor,” Mr. Cronkhite’s letter predicted.

The SMR plan is already falling behind schedule. At a rate hearing in June before the New Brunswick Energy and Utilities Board, Brad Coady, vice-president of strategic partnerships and business development, said NB Power believes it is no longer possible to have SMRs operating by 2030; the earliest date for the first unit has been pushed back to 2032 or 2033.

Delays will have consequences, because NB Power needs options to replace its coal-fired generation while at the same time satisfying growing demand for electricity. The utility, he said, has been studying alternative scenarios “if we don’t have them in time.”

Paying for it

Perhaps the most fundamental risk to New Brunswick’s SMR push is that the province can’t afford it.

Last year, ARC and Moltex each estimated that developing their reactors would cost around $500-million per company. NB Power is Canada’s most heavily indebted utility, and its budgets must be approved by the province’s Energy and Utilities Board. It has limited ability to pay for crucial early steps such as studies necessary to establish what the environmental consequences of the SMRs might be. In published reports, NB Power has acknowledged that its research and development efforts might have to be sacrificed to meet debt-reduction targets.

David Coon, leader of New Brunswick’s Green Party, said NB Power faces huge capital spending to retire its Belledune coal-fired generating plant and refurbish its Mactaquac hydroelectric dam and transmission lines.

“That is why they’re really not putting much into this,” he said. “Their approach has been, well, if we get a new nuclear plant out of this that that doesn’t really cost us much of anything, then bonus!”

ARC and Moltex also don’t have the money. In late June, ARC parted ways with CEO William Labbe and laid off an undisclosed number of staff – a move some observers said was likely due to a shortage of funds. Mr. Chronkite’s 2020 letter warned that the two SMR developers were small startups that couldn’t afford to do work using their own resources, and were at immediate risk of insolvency.

“Without federal support this year to the SMR developers in New Brunswick, one or both companies are expected to close their offices in the next year,” Mr. Cronkhite’s letter stated.

Indeed, New Brunswick officials have counted on continuing and generous support from Canadian taxpayers. In his letter, Mr. Cronkhite called on the federal government to provide $70.5-million that year to ARC and Moltex – and more than $100-million the following year – to “keep the SMR development option in New Brunswick viable.” In 2022, the two companies would need another $91-million.

Ottawa obliged, but only partly. It gave Moltex $50.5-million in 2021. The federal government also provided ARC $7-million last year. The lobbying efforts continue: When NB Power board vice-chair Andrew MacGillivray received his mandate letter in May, 2023, it instructed him to “support efforts to acquire federal funding” for the SMRs.

New Brunswick’s own history suggests the risks inherent in counting on boundless federal support.

Andrew Secord, an economics professor at St. Thomas University in Fredericton, has studied decision-making in the 1970s that led to the construction of the original Point Lepreau reactor. In a 2020 paper, he detailed how Point Lepreau arose in part from an export-led strategy under which multiple large reactors would be built and their electricity exported to New England. NB Power (then known as the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, or NBEPC) first focused on building interconnections with New England and then pivoted to building reactors.

This strategy failed by 1972, but by that point NBEPC was unwilling to change course. Over the next three years, it assumed ever greater risks as potential partners failed to materialize.

“NBEPC managers continued along the nuclear path, exhibiting higher risk behaviour in the process,” Mr. Secord wrote. “As NBEPC executives spent more time and resources on the nuclear option, their personal attachment and the associated institutional commitment increased.”

Mr. Coon said New Brunswick’s SMR plan so far has cost the provincial and federal governments only around $100-million. But it could start costing taxpayers and ratepayers “much more money” if things progress further.

“It seems like we haven’t learned our lesson in New Brunswick,” he said.

July 4, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Canada, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment