nuclear-news

There’s a Glaring Safety Problem With Nuclear Energy Startups

The reason comes down to profit, essentially: why listen to a bunch of bureaucrats telling you to slow down and play it safe when you could just fire up the uranium?

Move fast, break isotopes.,

By Joe Wilkins,  Apr 12, 2026, https://futurism.com/science-energy/nuclear-startups-safety

The United States approach to nuclear energy is interesting, to say the least. Of all the countries harnessing the power of the atom, the United States is perhaps the most privatized nuclear energy system in the world. Most countries treat nuclear fission as a government affair — China runs its reactors through state-owned enterprises, and France went so far as to fully renationalize its main nuclear company in 2023. The States, meanwhile, leave their reactors almost entirely in the hands of the private sector.

Disciples of the free market will tell you this is exactly how things should be. If you don’t have a financial stake in the nuclear race, however, you might notice this arrangement comes with side effects like chronic understaffing and public subsidies of private profit. It also raises serious safety questions as a rising number of nuclear startups jostle for a piece of the atomic pie.

Case in point, new reporting by Politico‘s energy publication E&E News found that several baby nuclear companies are avoiding requests to join one of the industry’s main safety organizations. The regulatory body, called the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), was formed in the fallout of the partial meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979. While not a government body, the INPO is a nonprofit nuclear watchdog, responsible for conducting plant inspections, sharing operational guidance between nuclear companies, and helping companies train nuclear personnel.

For a nuclear energy company, joining the INPO is completely voluntary, though every operator has — until now. Of the nine nuclear startups which have sprouted up off the back of the tech industry’s data center boom, only one has signed up to join the INPO, E&E reported. These include companies like the “mass-manufactured nuclear” startup Aalo Atomics, and the “microreactor” company Antares Nuclear.

The reason comes down to profit, essentially: why listen to a bunch of bureaucrats telling you to slow down and play it safe when you could just fire up the uranium?

“These entities are businesses, and they’re trying to make money,” Scott Morris, a nuclear consultant and former US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) official, told E&E. “Any infrastructure that you put around that entity that is not directly contributing to its bottom line, it’s going to be questioned.”

Their decision to sidestep the INPO is even more concerning in the wake of Donald Trump’s regulatory cutbacks, which put the industry-led INPO in charge of regulations previously handled by the NRC. In effect, these moves have made certain operational regulations completely optional for nuclear energy companies.

“In fact, the NRC has delegated some of its regulatory authority, so to speak, to [the] INPO, specifically in the realm of operations and maintenance training programs,” Morris said. “The NRC and INPO are not duplicative; they’re complimentary.”

April 18, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | safety | Leave a comment

Nuclear costs of the Iran War

To create a nuclear disaster, it’s not necessary to directly hit the containment building. Damaging on-site and off-site power necessary for cooling can also have severe repercussions.

even reactors in stand-by modes pose radioactive risks in a war zone. 

In spite of all this, Director General of the IAEA Grossi promotes rules of the road to help nuclear energy continue operating in warzones. It is a stark reminder that the IAEA’s major mission is to promote nuclear energy, despite the emerging lessons from two “nuclearized” wars.

April 11, 2026 by beyondnuclearinternational, https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2026/04/11/nuclear-costs-of-the-iran-war/

Trump’s recent threats to end civilization in Iran gave many a nuclear weapons expert the jitters, writes Sharon Squassoni

President Donald J. Trump’s recent threats to end civilization in Iran gave many a nuclear weapons expert the jitters. For them, existential threats mean only one thing: use of nuclear weapons.  Thankfully, Trump’s April 7, 2026 threats were empty and possibly just a ruse to create a dramatic background for the temporary ceasefire in Iran. 

To be clear, the use of nuclear weapons in combat would serve no earthly strategic or tactical purpose, but threats to use them can be potent: even a latent capability in the hands of Iran was regarded as too threatening for the United States to tolerate any longer, which reportedly drove the U.S. and Israeli military actions.

It’s hard to tell who’s winning or losing in this conflict, but already it’s clear that disruption of energy sources (Iran’s blocking the Straits of Hormuz and the U.S. and Israel striking Iran’s oil infrastructure) focuses attention like no other infrastructure attack.  A sudden cutoff that shrinks supplies and distorts prices echoes in economies across the globe. 

This is one reason the world was hesitant to impose sanctions on Iran’s oil some twenty years ago when Iran’s clandestine nuclear program was first unveiled.  Today, the Iran war has underscored just how dependent the world continues to be on foreign sources of oil. 

Would nuclear energy be any different?

Since 2022, there has been a push in Europe and elsewhere to deploy nuclear reactors to reduce dependencies on Russian oil and gas, triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  But such a response is almost laughable to anyone paying attention to what has transpired in Ukraine in the last four years. 

Russia hesitated not at all to hold the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants hostage, in addition to firing upon them.  The only thing that has saved Ukraine from a major nuclear meltdown is the fact that Russia wants to save Ukraine for itself, rather than destroy it utterly.  

For those who still believe in international laws, there are rules to prevent attacks on nuclear plants — specifically the Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, a key document in international humanitarian law adopted in 1979 — that 175 countries follow. 

Unfortunately, Russia withdrew in 2019 and the US has never ratified Protocol I (along with Israel, India, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran).  The Protocol protects “works and installations containing dangerous forces,” prohibiting attacks on nuclear power plants that generate civilian electricity, among other things.  It concedes that some nuclear power plants that regularly support military purposes may be attacked. 

For those paying attention to nuclear development trends, this should be worrisome because both China and the United States have programs to develop nuclear reactors for specific military uses. Not content to learn from past experience, the United States plans to deploy a military microreactor by July 4th of this year. Leaving aside questions of cost, safety and peacetime security, such deployments will widen the base of deadly targets in war.  Civilians won’t care whether international law deems these “legitimate” targets of attack.

Attacks on nuclear facilities themselves are not new. The United States, Russia, Israel, Iran and Iraq have all, at times, targeted nuclear research and power reactors under various stages of construction and operation in the past.  Sometimes these attacks tried to slow nuclear weapons proliferation programs and sometimes, as in the Iran-Iraq war, they were targeted for less specific purposes. 

After the June 2025 attacks on uranium enrichment-related facilities by the United States, touted as “obliterating” Iran’s nuclear program, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi warned that a strike on the Bushehr power plant could cause a regional catastrophe.   

Recently, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has claimed that the Bushehr plant, which generates close to 1000 Megawatts of electricity, has been struck four times since February this year.  The closest hit has been 75 meters from the plant on April 4, killing a security guard and damaging a building. Russia, which has 128 Rosatom personnel at the plant, is considering further evacuations, which sounds eerily similar to what happened to the Zaporizhzhia plant in March 2022. 

To create a nuclear disaster, it’s not necessary to directly hit the containment building. Damaging on-site and off-site power necessary for cooling can also have severe repercussions. In the case of Zaporizhzhia, operators shut down reactors to minimize some of the risks. But even reactors in stand-by modes pose radioactive risks in a war zone. 

The Bushehr power plant is still operating and has spent nuclear fuel on-site in spent fuel pools. Who can forget the video footage of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in 2011 when crews attempted to spray seawater from helicopters on spent fuel pools damaged by the earthquake and tsunami that devastated Japan?  More than a decade later, the site is still undergoing remediation.

In spite of all this, Director General of the IAEA Grossi promotes rules of the road to help nuclear energy continue operating in warzones.  It is a stark reminder that the IAEA’s major mission is to promote nuclear energy, despite the emerging lessons from two “nuclearized” wars.

In fact, learning the wrong lessons from this conflict could carry the seeds of unimaginable future disruption.  A world that fears reliance on foreign energy could rely even more on nuclear energy for not just electricity, but transportation and data processing, the new currency of power.  The greater the reliance, the keener officials will be to keep it up and running.  More and more widely distributed nuclear targets will not be protected by Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, or by the International Atomic Energy Agency.  There is no International Nuclear Red Cross or Emergency Management Agency.  

Many Americans find it hard to contemplate attacks on U.S. soil, with good reason.  This is why the 9/11 attacks affected the population so deeply.  Those attacks sparked significant improvements in security at nuclear power plants that are now being unraveled by a push to deploy nuclear reactors in the United States as quickly as possible.  

In fact, learning the wrong lessons from this conflict could carry the seeds of unimaginable future disruption.  A world that fears reliance on foreign energy could rely even more on nuclear energy for not just electricity, but transportation and data processing, the new currency of power.  The greater the reliance, the keener officials will be to keep it up and running.  More and more widely distributed nuclear targets will not be protected by Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, or by the International Atomic Energy Agency.  There is no International Nuclear Red Cross or Emergency Management Agency.  

Many Americans find it hard to contemplate attacks on U.S. soil, with good reason.  This is why the 9/11 attacks affected the population so deeply.  Those attacks sparked significant improvements in security at nuclear power plants that are now being unraveled by a push to deploy nuclear reactors in the United States as quickly as possible.  

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently voted to discontinue force-on-force commando drills designed to reveal weaknesses in site vulnerabilities. A victim of the DOGE process, the NRC has been stripped of its independence and will now overhaul the entire licensing process, even as the Trump administration seeks to end-run the NRC by deploying new reactors on government sites owned by the Departments of Energy and Defense. 

If anything, the Iran war demonstrates Gulliver’s dilemma. Both Ukraine and Iran have used drones successfully to compensate for conventional force inferiority.  Are we truly prepared to counter cheaper and more plentiful attacks that are more difficult to detect and defend against?  

Iran’s nuclear program was feared for its potential to provide the basis for nuclear weapons. Now it is generating fear for its potential to provoke a more imminent regional catastrophe, whether intended or accidental. These security risks, perhaps not widely appreciated now, will only grow in a more nuclearized future.

April 15, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | safety | 1 Comment

UN nuclear agency chief ‘deeply concerned’ by reports of latest attack on Iran power plant.

4 April 2026 , https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/04/1167250

Reports of yet another projectile strike near the Bushehr nuclear power plant prompted Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to register his deep concern on Saturday.

The IAEA was informed of the strike – the fourth such incident in recent weeks – by Iranian officials. Iran also informed the agency that a member of the site’s physical protection staff members was killed by a projectile fragment and that a building on site was affected by shockwaves and fragments.  

Mr. Grossi emphasised that nuclear power plant sites or nearby areas must never be attacked, noting that auxiliary site buildings may contain vital safety equipment. No increase in radiation levels was reported, following the latest incident.

Reiterating call for maximum military restraint to avoid risk of a nuclear accident, Mr. Grossi again stressed the paramount importance of adhering to the IAEA’s seven pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during a conflict (see below).

The previous strike on Bushehr took place on 18 March, when a structure about 350 metres from the reactor was hit and destroyed. No damage to the reactor or injuries were reported, but the agency warned that any attack near nuclear facilities risks violating key safety principles.

Earlier in the month, in an address to the IAEA Board at the agency’s headquarters in Vienna, Austria, Mr. Grossi underscored the risk of a nuclear incident from the military escalation since Iran “and many other countries in the region that have been subjected to military attacks have operational nuclear power plants and nuclear research reactors”.

The seven pillars for nuclear safety and security in armed conflict

The Seven Indispensable Pillars were introduced by the IAEA Director General in March 2022 to address the unprecedented challenge of maintaining nuclear safety and security when facilities are in a warzone.

1. The physical integrity of facilities – whether it is the reactors, fuel ponds or radioactive waste stores – must be maintained.
2. All safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times.
3. The operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure.
4. There must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites.
5. There must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites.
6. There must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems, and emergency preparedness and response measures.
7. There must be reliable communication with the regulator and others.

April 9, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | safety | 1 Comment

IAEA Database: About 55% of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Thefts Since 1993 Occurred During Transport 

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 23 March 2026, Vienna, Austria

More than half of all thefts of nuclear and other radioactive material reported to the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) since 1993 occurred during authorized transport, with the share rising to nearly 70% in the past decade. The new data released today by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) underlines the need for continued vigilance in transport security.

Of the 4626 reported incidents in the ITDB from 1993 to 2025, 730 were thefts of radioactive material, including attempted thefts. Almost 55% of those thefts occurred during transport, and in more than 59% of those transport-related cases – about 400 incidents – the stolen radioactive material has not been recovered.

Nuclear and other radioactive material remains vulnerable to security threats during transport, and data from the ITDB underscores the continued need to strengthen security,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. “The IAEA assists countries, upon request, in enhancing their national nuclear security regimes to ensure that such materials are securely managed and fully protected against criminal or intentional unauthorized acts during their transport.”

The ITDB is the IAEA’s information system on incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. While most incidents are not linked to trafficking or malicious intent, their occurrence reflects persistent challenges in transport security, regulatory control, disposal practices and detection. 

In 2025, 236 incidents were reported by 34 of the 145 ITDB participating States. This number is higher than in 2024 – 147 incidents – however, the increase is attributed to retrospective reporting.

All types of nuclear material – including uranium, plutonium and thorium
 – as well as naturally occurring and artificially produced radioisotopes, and radioactively contaminated material found in scrap metal are included in the ITDB’s scope. Incidents at metal recycling sites involving manufactured goods contaminated with radioactive material continue to be reported to ITDB, indicating an ongoing challenge for some countries in securing disused radioactive sources and detecting their unauthorized disposal. 

The release of the ITDB factsheet coincides with this week’s International Conference on the Safe and Secure Transport of Nuclear and Radioactive Material. The IAEA estimates that millions of shipments of nuclear and other radioactive material are transported annually for peaceful applications in energy, medicine, education, agriculture and industry. 

The conference provides the international transport community with a platform to discuss opportunities, challenges and key enablers for the safe and secure transport of nuclear and other radioactive material. The conference will cover legal and regulatory aspects, transport package design, operations, commercial and supply chain considerations, and innovative technologies that have the potential to impact transport safety and security.

About the ITDB

The ITDB fosters global information exchange about incidents that involve nuclear and other radioactive material falling out of regulatory control because they were lost, stolen, improperly disposed of or otherwise neglected
. The database also includes reports about material returning under regulatory control through various means, for example, through the detection of orphan radioactive sources in metal recycling facilities. The ITDB data is voluntarily reported, and only participating States can fully access it,
 while international organizations, such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Customs Organization (WCO), have limited access.

The ITDB covers incidents involving nuclear material, radioisotopes and radioactively contaminated material. By reporting lost or stolen material to the ITDB, countries increase the chances of its recovery and reduce the opportunities for it to be used in criminal activities
. States can also report scams or hoaxes where the material is purported to be nuclear or otherwise radioactive.

States wishing to join the ITDB need to submit the request to the IAEA through the official channels (i.e. Permanent Mission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs or a national competent authority for nuclear security matters).

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March 27, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | safety | Leave a comment