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China’s Uranium Enrichment Expansion: Worrisomely Large

October 5, 2026  Dr. Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate at Harvard’s Belfer Center, Occasional Paper 2603

China recently significantly expanded its uranium enrichment capacity. The predominant view of experts and respected non-governmental organizations is that this expansion is needed to supply China’s growing civilian nuclear energy sector.

As of September 2026, China had 64 power reactors (64 GWe) in operation and another 38 units (40 GWe) under construction, making it the world leader in new reactor construction. Its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) calls for installed nuclear capacity of 110 GWe by 2030, and some authoritative Chinese studies recommend reaching roughly 200 GWe by 2040. China’s nuclear power program is therefore expected to grow steadily over the coming decade, and with it the country’s demand for enriched uranium.

To meet this anticipated demand, China has significantly expanded its indigenous enrichment capacity since 2020. Over the same period, however, China has also rapidly enlarged its nuclear arsenal, raising the question of whether its enrichment buildup serves civilian needs alone. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) estimates that China possessed about 620 warheads in 2026. The US Department of Defense (DoD) assesses that the stockpile remained “in the low 600s” through 2024—roughly triple its 2020 level—and, while noting “a slower rate of production compared to previous years,” projects that China remains on track to field more than 1,000 warheads by 2030. Much of the Western debate has focused on whether China needs additional plutonium to sustain this buildup. Much less attention has been paid to highly enriched uranium (HEU), which China may also need for new warheads, at least for the secondaries of its modern designs.

Assessing these questions is difficult because China does not officially release information on its enrichment capacity. This paper therefore draws on satellite imagery, Chinese publications, and discussions with Chinese experts to reconstruct the scale and trajectory of China’s enrichment program. Building on the author’s earlier estimates, it incorporates several significant developments, including the commissioning of new centrifuge facilities. By the end of 2026, China’s commercial enrichment capacity is estimated to reach about 15.4 million separative work units (SWU) per year—roughly 2.1 times its 2020 capacity of about 7.4 million SWU/year, or more than a doubling in six years.

This growth has not been steady. After an initial construction boom between 2010 and 2015, undertaken to meet the anticipated growth in demand from nuclear power, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) slowed its expansion between 2016 and 2019, suspending or postponing several planned or partially built projects, largely in response to slower reactor construction. Since around 2020, China has launched a new construction boom. Whereas the earlier expansion was driven primarily by civilian nuclear power, this paper argues that the current wave serves not only civilian needs but also, and importantly, China’s ongoing nuclear weapons buildup.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the development of China’s enrichment industry and technology. Section 3 presents the current status of each of China’s enrichment plants and new capacity estimates. Section 4 compares enrichment supply with civilian demand, estimates how much HEU China would need for an arsenal of 1,000 warheads, and examines whether the timing of the enrichment expansion is consistent with China’s nuclear buildup. Section 5 concludes……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. https://npolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Chinas-Uranium-Enrichment-Expansion-Worrisomely-Large.pdf

October 14, 2026 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | China, Uranium