What Canada’s nuclear waste plan means for New Brunswick

by Mayara Gonçalves e Lima, January 20, 2026, https://nbmediacoop.org/2026/01/20/what-canadas-nuclear-waste-plan-means-for-new-brunswick/

Canada is advancing plans for a Deep Geological Repository (DGR) to store the country’s used nuclear fuel. In early 2026, the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) entered the federal regulatory process by submitting its Initial Project Description — a major step in a project with environmental and social implications that will last for generations.

The implications of this project matter deeply to New Brunswickers because the province is already part of Canada’s nuclear legacy through the Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station. The proposed repository in Ontario is intended to become the final destination for used nuclear fuel generated in New Brunswick, currently stored on site at Point Lepreau.

If the project goes ahead, highly radioactive nuclear waste would be transported across New Brunswick. Current NWMO plans envision more than 2,100 transport packages of New Brunswick’s used nuclear fuel travelling approximately 2,900 kilometres, through public roads in the province and across Canada, over a period of 10 to 15 years.

For many residents, the project raises long-standing concerns about safety, accountability, and cost — especially as NB Power continues to invest in nuclear technologies and considers new reactors. Decisions about the DGR will influence how long New Brunswick remains tied to nuclear power, carrying the risks of waste that remains hazardous far beyond any political or economic planning horizon.

This is a critical moment because public input is still possible — but the comment period window is narrow. Environmental organizations and community advocates are calling for extended consultation timelines, full transparency on transport risks, and meaningful consent from affected communities. Several groups have organized a sign-on letter that readers can review and support.

How New Brunswickers respond now will help determine whether these decisions proceed quietly — or with public accountability.

Unproven science and public concerns

Globally, no deep geological repository for high-level nuclear waste has yet operated anywhere on the planet. Finland’s Onkalo facility is often cited as the first of its kind, but it remains in testing, relies on unproven assumptions about geological containment, and will not be fully sealed for decades.

The lack of proven DGR experience matters for Canada because the proposed repository would be among the world’s earliest attempts to isolate high-level radioactive waste “forever,” despite the absence of any real-world proof that such facilities can perform as claimed. Canada’s decision therefore sets not only a national course, but a global precedent built on uncertain science and long-term safety assumptions.

The proposed DGR would be built 650 to 800 metres underground in northwestern Ontario, near the Township of Ignace and Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation (WLON), in Treaty #3 territory. Its purpose is to bury and abandon nearly six million bundles of highly radioactive used nuclear fuel, attempting to isolate them from the biosphere for hundreds of thousands of years.

The Nuclear Waste Management Organization describes the site selection as “consent-based,” but this framing raises difficult questions. Consent in economically marginalized regions — particularly where long-term funding, jobs, and infrastructure are promised — is not the same as free, prior, and informed consent, especially when the risks extend far beyond any western planning horizon.

In 2024, the Assembly of First Nations held dialogue sessions on the transport and storage of used nuclear fuel. Communities raised serious concerns that the proposed DGR could harm land, water, and air — all central to Indigenous culture and way of life.

Guided by ancestral knowledge and a duty to protect future generations, the Assembly warned that the DGR threatens sacred sites, ecosystems, and groundwater, including the Great Lakes. Climate change and natural disasters heighten these risks, exposing the limits of the current monitoring plan and prompting calls for life-cycle oversight.

A token consultation for a monumental project

As anticipated, the Initial Project Description raises serious concerns about the DGR process itself. One of the most serious flaws is the stark mismatch between the project’s scale and the time allowed for public input. Although the DGR is framed as a 160-year project with risks lasting far longer, communities, Indigenous Nations, and civil society groups have been given just 30 days to review the Initial Project Description, with submissions due by February 4.

Thirty days to read dense technical documents, consult communities, seek independent expertise, formulate questions, and respond meaningfully to a proposal that will affect land, water, and people for generations. This is not a generous consultation — it is the bare legal minimum under federal impact assessment rules.

While regulators emphasize that the overall review will take years, this early stage is crucial in shaping what will be examined and questioned later. Rushing public input at the outset risks reducing participation to a procedural checkbox rather than a genuine democratic process, particularly for a decision whose consequences cannot be undone.

The overlooked threat of waste transport

Another serious shortcoming in the project proposal is a failure to adequately address the nationwide transport of radioactive waste. Transporting highly radioactive material through communities by road or rail is central to the project and carries significant safety and environmental risks that remain largely unexamined.

By excluding radioactive waste transportation from the Initial Project Description, the Nuclear Waste Management Organization is effectively removing it from the scope of the comprehensive federal Impact Assessment. If transport is not formally included at this stage, it will not receive the same level of environmental review, public scrutiny, or interdepartmental oversight as the repository itself.

Instead, transportation would be left primarily to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and Transport Canada to assess under the existing regulations — an approach that is fragmented and insufficient given the scale, duration, and risks of moving highly radioactive waste through communities.

The transport of radioactive waste is a critical yet often overlooked issue. As Gordon Edwards, president of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility notes, Canada has no regulations specifically governing the transport of radioactive waste — only rules for radioactive materials treated as commercial goods. This gap matters because radioactive waste is more complex, less predictable, and potentially far more dangerous.

Transporting high-level nuclear waste is inherently risky: the material remains hazardous for centuries, and accidents, equipment failures, extreme weather, security breaches, or human error can still occur despite careful planning. Unlike other hazardous materials, radioactive contamination cannot be easily contained or cleaned up, leaving land, water, and ecosystems damaged for generations. Even a single transport incident could have lasting, irreversible consequences for communities along the route.

Radiation risks extend beyond transport workers. People traveling alongside shipments may face prolonged exposure, while those passing in the opposite direction are briefly exposed in much larger numbers. Residents and workers along transport routes can experience repeated exposure, and accidents or unplanned stops could result in localized contamination. Emergency response is further complicated by leaks or hard-to-detect releases, with standard spill or firefighting methods potentially spreading contamination.

These risks are not hypothetical. Last summer, Gentilly-1 used fuel was transported from Bécancour, Quebec, to Chalk River, Ontario, along public roads — without public notice, consultation, Indigenous consent, or clear evidence of regulatory compliance — underscoring the ongoing risks to our communities.

According to the 2024 Assembly of First Nations report, at least 210 First Nations communities could be affected by shipments of radioactive waste traveling from nuclear reactors to the repository via railways and major highways, though the full scope may be even larger when considering watersheds and alternative routes.

Given this reality, it is unacceptable that the DGR Project Description largely ignores waste transport. Any credible assessment must examine how waste will be moved, who will be affected, what rules apply, who is responsible for oversight, and how workers, communities, and the environment will be protected in emergencies. It is the job of the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada to examine these plans in depth.

A high-stakes decision that demands public voice

Canada’s proposed Deep Geological Repository is one of the most ambitious and high-stakes projects in nuclear waste management. Framed as a permanent solution, it remains untested — no country has safely operated a deep repository for used nuclear fuel over the long term. Scientific uncertainty and multi-decade timelines make its risks profound and enduring.

Dr. Gordon Edwards warns: “The Age of Nuclear Waste is just beginning. It’s time to stop and think. […] we must ensure three things: justification, notification, and consultation — before moving any of this dangerous, human-made, cancer-causing material over public roads and bridges.”

Now is the moment for public voices to be heard. Legal Advocates for Nature’s Defence (LAND), an environmental law non-profit, has prepared a sign-on letter and accompanying press release calling for a more precautionary, transparent, and democratic approach to the Deep Geological Repository. This is your chance to have a say in decisions that could expose you, your neighbours, and your communities to serious environmental and health risks.

The letter urges federal regulators to extend public consultation timelines, require that the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada conduct a comprehensive Impact Assessment that includes the transportation of radioactive waste, and uphold meaningful consent and accountability.

New Brunswickers and allies across the country are encouraged to read the letter, add their names, and speak up before decisions are finalized. How Canada handles nuclear waste today will shape risks borne by our communities for generations.

The DGR is more than a technical project; it is a test of democratic process, scientific caution, and intergenerational responsibility. Canadians deserve a transparent, thorough, and precautionary approach to ensure that decisions made today do not compromise the safety of future generations.

Mayara Gonçalves e Lima works with the Passamaquoddy Recognition Group Inc., focusing on nuclear energy. Their work combines environmental advocacy with efforts to ensure that the voice of the Passamaquoddy Nation is heard and respected in decisions that impact their land, waters, and future.

January 23, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Canada, wastes | Leave a comment

Summary comments on the Deep Geologic Repository (DGR) Project for Canada’s Used Nuclear Fuel.

The nuclear waste will be radioactive for, say, a period of time that is close to eternity, whereas the project covers a period of 160 years.  The solution is therefore very far from permanent.

We are swimming here in the middle of a pro-nuclear religion.

by Miguel Deschênes, 20 Jan 26

a translation of comments submitted in French to the  Impact Assessment Agency of Canada (IAAC) by Miguel Deschêne on this subject. 

Seven major objections stand out:

1- Developers are not trustworthy

On page v of the document, it states that “Canada’s nuclear power plants have been providing clean energy for decades,… ». Then, on page vii, it is explained that the project itself “would contain and isolate approximately 5.9 million spent fuel assemblies,” representing approximately 112,750 tonnes of irradiated and highly radioactive heavy metals. This waste contains a wide variety of radioactive substances that are dangerous to living beings. One of the most famous isotopes found in these spent fuel bundles is plutonium-239. Need we remind you that Canadian plutonium was used in the bomb that destroyed the city of Nagasaki in 1945? To say on page v of the document that nuclear energy is clean and to specify on page vii that it will generate 112,750 tonnes of highly radioactive (and potentially destructive) heavy metals in Canada is staggering incoherent.

On page iv of the document, there is a list of twelve specialists and managers who prepared, reviewed, approved and accepted this document, which includes this glaring logical error. This leads to the conclusion that the developers seem willing to present all possible arguments, however incongruous, to defend this project, while concealing the negative aspects that could overshadow it. They therefore have neither the capacity for reflection nor the objectivity required to manage this project, when it would be essential to protect the safety of the public and the environment in complete transparency.

2- The objective(s) are unattainable

The document presents the objective of the project in two places, but they are two different objectives. These objectives look strangely like advertising slogans or the creeds of a pro-nuclear cult. Neither is attainable in practice, but they make it easy to project yourself into a world of unicorns:

a- On page viii, it is stated that: “The objective of the Project is to ensure the safe long-term management of used nuclear fuel so that it does not pose a risk to human health or the environment.”

We are talking about guaranteeing, for 160 years. A great Quebec poet would say “it’s better to laugh than to cry.” A car, which is one of the most advanced technological objects on the planet, is guaranteed for 3 or 5 years. How can we believe that we can guarantee a new landfill technology for a period of 160 years? It’s simply delusional.

In addition, even a simple plastic bottle carries risks to human health or the environment. And they want us to believe that this project will make it possible to store 112,750 tonnes of radioactive nuclear waste so that it does not pose any risk to human health or the environment? What sensible person can believe such a statement?

b- On page 20, it states that: “The objective of the Project is to provide a permanent, safe and environmentally responsible solution for the management of all of Canada’s used nuclear fuel.”

The nuclear waste will be radioactive for, say, a period of time that is close to eternity, whereas the project covers a period of 160 years; The solution is therefore very far from permanent. The solution is also presented as safe and environmentally friendly: based on what? The solution is safe as long as it is sold by convinced developers, but everyone knows that it involves enormous risks. And environmentally friendly? How can we say that burying 112,750 tonnes of radioactive nuclear waste is an environmentally friendly solution? We are swimming here in the middle of a pro-nuclear religion.

Obviously, neither of these two objectives is achievable in practice.

What is the real objective of the project? Indirectly extract as much money as possible from the public treasury and taxpayers? Putting hundreds of highly paid employees to work unnecessarily for decades? Shovel the problem of nuclear waste to our descendants?

The project is therefore, even before it has begun, doomed to failure, since it is impossible for it to achieve its totally utopian objectives. To believe in the success of this project, it is absolutely necessary to be overwhelmed by the pro-nuclear faith.

3- The budget is not presented

On page 52, it states that “Federal authorities are not providing any financial support to the Project.”

On page 65, it states that: “In addition, although the NWMO is a regulated entity by the CNSC, it is not a federal agency or authority. Rather, it is a question of a not-for-profit organization mandated by the federal government under the NFCA to managing Canada’s nuclear waste. The NWMO is fully funded by industry nuclear power. »

However, the Government of Canada and some provincial governments subsidize and financially encourage the nuclear industry.

So, in a nutshell, taxpayers are giving money to governments, which in turn subsidizes the nuclear industry, and which in turn funds the NWMO. The present project is therefore indirectly financed by taxpayers and by the federal authorities, which is not revealed by the sentence on page 52. Could we conclude that it is not necessary to call on an accountant if you have a good conjurer?

A detailed budget is one of the essential elements of project planning and monitoring. Where is the budget? How is it cut? And how much will it indirectly cost taxpayers? It would be reasonable to describe the sums required as potentially pharaonic and to require a project plan that includes a complete financial plan.

The absence of a budget in the presentation of a project is an unacceptable shortcoming. 

4- The project’s time scale is doubly absurd

On page v, it states that “The Project is expected to span approximately 160 years, including site preparation, construction, operation (approximately 50 years), decommissioning and closure, and post-closure monitoring.”

This duration is both too short and too long:

a- Too short: the half-life of plutonium-239 is about 24,130 years. It is calculated that after a duration of approximately seven times the half-life of an isotope, less than 1% (more precisely, 1/128) of the initial radioactive atoms remain. In the case of plutonium-239, it would therefore be necessary to wait about 168,000 years to reach this target. Obviously, this calculation would have to be done for all the isotopes found in the original waste and for all the isotopes created during subsequent decays in order to properly assess the hazardousness of the waste as a function of time, which is very complex. But we can see right away that the 160-year period is far too short to ensure the safety of the public and the environment.

b- too long: if we go back 160 years in time, we find ourselves in 1866, when the Canadian federation did not even exist. Since that time, humanity has experienced various epidemics (plague, cholera, Spanish flu, covid, etc.), two world wars and a multitude of other wars, major geopolitical reorganizations and major economic crises. It is perfectly utopian to think that a human project that has no other objective than to bury waste will be able to be carried out without hindrance for 160 years. What happens if there is a major epidemic, a world war, a coup d’état by an outsized geographic neighbour, a split in Canada, an unforeseen IT upheaval? How can we seriously believe that all the governments and political parties that will succeed each other will have at heart, for 160 years (if each party remains in power for 4 years, we are talking about 40 different governments), to adequately supervise this project?

In general, the longer a project lasts, the greater the likelihood of not achieving objectives, exceeding costs and exceeding the originally planned schedule. It is therefore quite reasonable and prudent to predict that the 160-year deep geological repository project is likely to be a complete failure: it will not achieve its objectives, while exceeding the planned deadlines and costs.

5- The responsibility for the project in the medium and long term cannot be assumed

What will be the responsibility for the project in the medium and long term, i.e. in 10, 20, 50 or 100 years? What if there is a design problem, a technical problem, a supplier problem, a funding problem, a nuclear incident or whatever? Who will be responsible when most of us are dead? To whom can our descendants turn to ask for accountability and rectification if necessary? No one can imagine or predict it, and it is likely that any assumption today about it will prove wrong tomorrow.

6- The risks associated with transportation are far too high

No means of transportation is perfectly safe. Regularly, planes crash, trains derail (the Lac-Mégantic rail accident in 2013 is a sad example) and trucks are involved in pile-ups. Sometimes, a space shuttle explodes in mid-flight.

On page vii, it states that “The Project does not include: the transportation of used fuel from the reactor sites to the Project beyond the primary and secondary access roads to the Project site, as the Project site is regulated separately under CNSC certification and uses existing transportation infrastructure.”

This seems to be, once again, a tactic to make the authorities and citizens swallow the pill of the project. The risks associated with a possible incident during the transportation of 112,750 tonnes of high-level radioactive waste on Canada’s roads, over a period of about fifty years (according to the projected schedule on page 31), are obviously far too high. It is therefore easy to understand why the developer prefers not to include this aspect in his project.

The excessive risk associated with transporting radioactive waste is an argument used by the Nuclear Waste Management Organization itself on its information page about Canada’s used nuclear fuel (https://www.nwmo.ca/fr/Canadas-used-nuclear-fuel): “Related questions: Couldn’t spent nuclear fuel be sent into space? No. In a three-year dialogue with experts and the public on possible long-term management options, the disposal of used nuclear fuel into space was one of the options of limited interest that we eliminated. Space-based evacuation has been ruled out as a solution because it is an unproven concept, not implemented anywhere in the world and not part of any national research and development plan. Concerns about the risk of accidents and the risks to human health and the environment have been amplified in particular by the accidents of the American space shuttles Challenger and Columbia. »

Why should the risk of an accident not be a consistent factor in the Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s reasoning? There have certainly been more train derailments and truck accidents than space shuttle incidents in human history. By what form of logic can we conclude that it is too risky to send used nuclear fuel into space, but that it is safe to transport it by train or truck? The only plausible explanation may be that we must have pro-nuclear faith.

7- Governments do not have a strategy to exit the nuclear industry

On page vii of the document, it states that: “The Project would contain and isolate approximately 5.9 million used fuel assemblies, which is the total anticipated inventory of used nuclear fuel that is expected to be produced in Canada by the current fleet of reactors until the end of their lifetime, as outlined in the NWMO’s 2024 Nuclear Fuel Waste Projections Report (NWMO,   2024). This projection is based on published plans for the refurbishment and life extension of the Darlington and Bruce reactors, as well as the continued operation of the Pickering A (until the end of 2024) and Pickering B (until the end of 2026) reactors, and the assumptions used by the NWMO for planning purposes. »

However, in October 2025, Ottawa and Ontario announced the construction of 4 new nuclear reactors (https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/2201625/darlington-nucleaire-reacteur-opg-ontario). What about the waste that will be generated by these plants, which is not part of the inventory considered by the project? And what about those generated by other hypothetical power plants to come? Or those that the government could import from other countries?

Successive governments are constantly creating, recreating and amplifying the problem of nuclear waste, with no intention of ending this mess. The only decision that would limit this ecological disaster would be to abandon the nuclear industry, which would include stopping uranium mining, no longer building new nuclear power plants and never importing nuclear waste from other countries. Unfortunately, no decision-maker seems to have the foresight to move in this direction.

Even before the project begins, we already understand that the planned landfill will not be able to store all of Canada’s nuclear waste. Without a clear direction on the denuclearization of the country, the problem of radioactive waste is far from being solved.

In any case, a deep geological repository will never be a good solution for nuclear waste; This far too risky avenue is really only used to shovel the problems created by today’s decision-makers until a time when they will all be dead and will not have to assume the disastrous consequences.

Conclusion :

In my view, these arguments are more than enough to justify never authorizing the Deep Geologic Repository (DGR) Project for Canada’s used nuclear fuel. It seems that the “original project description” seeks to conceal the real issues related to nuclear waste management, in order to obtain the required authorizations, spend obscure (but potentially staggering) amounts of money, and perpetuate nuclear madness, with no regard for public safety and the environment. Unfortunately, this is a typical project of the nuclear industry, which relies on the blind complacency of the authorities and on daydreams rather than on transparency and objective arguments.

January 22, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Canada, wastes | Leave a comment

Ontario’s proposed nuclear waste repository poses millennia-long ethical questions

Maxime Polleri, Assistant Professor, Université Laval, January 16, 2026 , https://theconversation.com/ontarios-proposed-nuclear-waste-repository-poses-millennia-long-ethical-questions-273181

The heat produced by the radioactive waste strikes you when you enter the storage site of Ontario Power Generation at the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station, near the shore of Lake Huron in Ontario.

Massive white containers encase spent nuclear fuel, protecting me from the deadly radiation that emanates from them. The number of containers is impressive, and my guide explained this waste is stored on an interim basis, as they wait for a more permanent solution.

I visited the site in August 2023 as part of my research into the social acceptability of nuclear waste disposal and governance. The situation in Ontario is not unique, as radioactive waste from nuclear power plants poses management problems worldwide. It’s too dangerous to dispose of spent nuclear fuel in traditional landfills, as its radioactive emissions remain lethal for thousands of years.

To get rid of this waste, organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency believe that spent fuel could be buried in deep geological repositories. The Canadian government has plans for such a repository, and has delegated the task of building one to the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) that’s funded by Canadian nuclear energy producers.

In 2024, NWMO selected an area in northwestern Ontario near the Township of Ignace and the Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation as a potential site for a deep geological repository. Now, a federal review has begun bringing the project closer to potential reality.

Such repositories raise complex ethical questions around public safety, particularly given the millennia-long timescales of nuclear waste: How to address intergenerational issues for citizens who did not produce this waste but will inherit it? How to manage the potential dangers of these facilities amid short-term political cycles and changing public expectations?

While NWMO describes the deep geological repository as the safest way to protect the population and the environment, its current management plan does not extend beyond 160 years, a relatively short time frame in comparison with the lifespan of nuclear waste. This gap creates long-term public safety challenges, particularly regarding intergenerational ethics. There are specific issues that should be considered during the federal review.

NWMO argues that the deep geological repository will bring a wide range of benefits to Canadians through job creation and local investment. Based on this narrative, risk is assessed through a cost-benefit calculus that evaluates benefits over potential costs.

Academics working in nuclear contexts have, however, criticized the imbalance of this calculus, as it prioritizes semi-immediate economic benefits, like job creation, over the long-term potential impacts to future generations.

In many official documents, a disproportionate emphasis on short-term economic benefits is present over the potential dangers of long-term burial. When risks are discussed, they’re framed in optimistic language and argue that nuclear waste burial is safe, low risk, technically sound and consistent with best practices accepted around the world.

This doesn’t take into account the fact that the feasibility of a deep geological repository has not been proven empirically. For the federal review, discussions surrounding risks should receive an equal amount of independent coverage as those pertaining to benefits.

Intergenerational responsibilities and risks

After 160 years, the deep geological repository will be decommissioned and NWMO will submit an Abandonment License application, meaning the site will cease being looked after.

Yet nuclear waste can remain dangerous for thousands of years. The long lifespan of nuclear waste complicates social, economic and legal responsibility. While the communities of Ignace and Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation have accepted the potential risks associated with a repository, future generations will not be able to decide what constitutes an acceptable risk.

Social scientists argue that an “acceptable” risk is not something universally shared, but a political process that evolves over time. The reasons communities cite to decide what risks are acceptable will change dramatically as they face new challenges. The same goes for the legal or financial responsibility surrounding the project over the centuries.

In the space of a few decades, northwestern Ontario has undergone significant municipal mergers that altered its governance. Present municipal boundaries might not be guarantees of accountability when millennia-old nuclear waste is buried underground. The very meaning of “responsibility” may also undergo significant changes.

NWMO is highly confident about the technical isolation of nuclear waste, while also stating that there’s a low risk for human intrusion. Scientists that I’ve spoken with supported this point, stating that a deep geological repository should not be located in an area where people might want to dig.

The area proposed for the Ontario repository was considered suitable because it does not contain significant raw materials, such as diamonds or oil. Still, there are many uncertainties regarding the types of resources people will seek in the future. It’s difficult to make plausible assumptions about what people might do centuries from now.

Communicating long-term hazards

When the repository is completed, NWMO anticipates a prolonged monitoring phase and decades of surveillance. But in the post-operation phase, there is no plan for communicating risks to generations of people centuries into the future. The long time frame of nuclear materials complicates the challenges of communicating hazards. To date, several attempts have surrounded the semiotics of nuclear risk; that is, the use of symbols and modes of communication to inform future generations.

For example, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plan in New Mexico tried to use various messages to communicate the risk of burying nuclear waste. However, the lifespan of nuclear waste vastly exceeds the typical lifespan of any known human languages.

Some scientists even proposed a “ray cat solution.” The project proposed genetically engineering cats that could change color near radiation sources, and creating a culture that taught people to move away from an area if their cat changed colour. Such projects may seem outlandish, but they demonstrate the difficulties of developing pragmatic long-term ways of communicating risk.

Current governing plans around nuclear waste disposal have limited time frames that don’t fully consider intergenerational public safety. As the Canadian federal review for a repository goes forward, we should seriously consider these shortcomings and their potential impacts on our society. It is crucial to foster thinking about the long-term issues posed by highly toxic waste and the way it is stored, be it nuclear or not.

January 17, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Canada, wastes | Leave a comment

Is a deep geological repository (DGR) for IGNACE a good idea?

I would say that the most important issue – and one that is totally disregarded by NWMO – is the inordinate extra cost (of about $500 million) of shipping used fuel to Ignace rather than Teeswater or some more southerly location. The mass transfer of used fuel from locations such as Bruce, Pickering and Darlington to the township of Ignace will involve dozens of 50-ton trucks travelling up and down major roads, such as Highways 401, 400, 69 and 17, a total of 25,000 times between 2043 and 2068. This protracted activity adds up to a total highway travel time of over 200 years!

Questioning  the wisdom of NWMO’s plan for a used fuel DGR to be constructed near Ignace in Northern Ontario, in view of the issues presented below:

From the Project description document AMP-REP-05000-0211-R000

11. ESTIMATED MAXIMUM PRODUCTION CAPACITY OF THE PROJECT

An estimated 5.9 million bundles of used fuel will be processed in the UFPP over its operational lifetime of approximately 50 years (about 120,000 used fuel bundles per year). On average, per the current conceptual reference design, 10 used fuel containers (UFCs) are planned to be processed and placed in the repository each workday, or approximately 2,500 UFCs each year.

To achieve this throughput, the UFPP is likely to incorporate multiple processing lines. Based on annual shipping (receipt) assumptions, the maximum number of certified transportation packages received at the UFPP in any given year is estimated to be approximately 885, holding between 120 and 192 used fuel bundles in each certified transportation package. The UFPP is designed to receive and process up to five certified transportation packages each day.

I would say that the most important issue – and one that is totally disregarded by NWMO – is the inordinate extra cost (of about $500 million) of shipping used fuel to Ignace rather than Teeswater or some more southerly location. The mass transfer of used fuel from locations such as Bruce, Pickering and Darlington to the township of Ignace will involve dozens of 50-ton trucks travelling up and down major roads, such as Highways 401, 400, 69 and 17, a total of 25,000 times between 2043 and 2068. This protracted activity adds up to a total highway travel time of over 200 years!

Closely related to the issue of shipping costs, is the additional problem of the high probability of inclement weather along Highway 17 from November to March each year. It appears that NWMO’s approach to dealing with this issue is simply to limit used fuel shipments to Ignace to just 9 months per year. However, this is barely adequate, given the common occurrence of snow storms along Highway 17 from as early as October to as late as April each year. Indeed, the Ontario Ministry of the Environment states in reference to winter driving on Highway 17: “Expect snowfall amounts of 10 –15 cm; reduced visibility due to snow and blowing snow; icy and slippery surfaces, and quickly changing and deteriorating travel conditions”.

This clearly shows the severity of the winter weather for the township of Ignace, with heavy snowfall dominating the months from November to March. Interestingly, NWMO has stated – See NWMO Report APM-REP-00440-0209-R001, issued September 2021 – that moving used nuclear fuel by truck to Ignace would mean “two to three shipments a day for approximately nine months of the year”. It is not clear why NWMO stipulates shipments being made for only 9 months per year, but this is presumably to allow for three months of inclement weather.

However, as previously noted, meteorological data for Ignace indicate that heavy snow is possible for this region from November to March, which is five months, not three! In addition, one is left wondering what happens at the DGR site for the three months when there are no used fuel shipments. Indeed, this lack of shipments is inconsistent with NWMO’s assertion, previously noted in this email, that “10 used fuel containers (UFCs) are planned to be processed and placed in the repository each workday.  I would like someone to explain how this will happen over winter, when NWMO admits there will be no used fuel shipments for at least three months each year, (December, January and February?). What will workers at the used fuel packaging plant do when there are no UFC’s to process?

Highway 17 in Northern Ontario has earned a reputation for frequent accidents, particularly involving heavy trucks. In 2022, the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) reported over 9,100 collisions involving large trucks across the province, with 71 fatalities — many occurring on routes like Highway 17.  Addressing the issues plaguing Highway 17 requires more than incremental fixes—it demands a transformative overhaul. Experts and residents alike stress the need for substantial investments to bring this critical corridor up to modern standards. Proposals extend far beyond doubling lanes or adding passing areas, emphasizing winter-specific design improvements, enhanced lane visibility, and the permanent operation of weigh stations with robust enforcement to eliminate unsafe vehicles. Rest stops must be expanded and maintained year-round to provide safe havens for drivers, particularly during extreme weather. Furthermore, the integration of advanced monitoring systems, including traffic cameras and real-time condition updates, is essential for proactive safety management of this Highway. Only through a comprehensive and bold approach can Highway 17 meet the safety, accessibility, and efficiency needs of the communities and industries it serves. Without such improvements to Highway 17, NWMO’s plan to build a DGR near Ignace is both reckless and potentially very dangerous!

NWMO’s nonchalant approach to the selection of a site for a used fuel DGR is deeply concerning. Just because the residents of a small northern Ontario town are willing to host a DGR does NOT make it the best possible option for Canada. And let’s remember that, once the site selection is made, it’s not just for a while, but in perpetuity! 

January 17, 2026 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Canada, wastes | Leave a comment

73 Organizations Send Joint Letter Calling on the Federal Government to Improve Nuclear Waste Oversight

https://wawa-news.com/index.php/2025/12/17/73-organizations-send-joint-letter-calling-on-the-federal-government-to-improve-nuclear-waste-oversight/

73 organizations representing a broad segment of Canadian society have sent a joint letter to the federal government urging more oversight of the nuclear industry and of nuclear waste projects.

In the letter, the groups urged the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Environment and Climate Change and of Energy and Natural Resources to exercise oversight of the Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s “Adaptive Phased Management Project” to transport, process, bury and eventually abandon all of Canada’s nuclear fuel waste at the NWMO’s selected site in the heart of Treaty 3 Territory in northwestern Ontario and its upcoming impact assessment process.

The groups expressed an overarching concern about the lack of federal oversight of this project since its inception in 2002.

More recently, the NWMO has made it known that they are seeking to have transportation of the radioactive wastes excluded from the project’s impact assessment process. But for 20 years the NWMO has been describing transportation as part of their project, and the Impact Assessment Act requires activities that are integral to – or, in the language of the Act “incidental” to – the project be included in the assessment.

The joint letter requests that the federal government provide immediate oversight and direction in four areas:

73 organizations representing a broad segment of Canadian society have sent a joint letter to the federal government urging more oversight of the nuclear industry and of nuclear waste projects.

In the letter, the groups urged the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Environment and Climate Change and of Energy and Natural Resources to exercise oversight of the Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s “Adaptive Phased Management Project” to transport, process, bury and eventually abandon all of Canada’s nuclear fuel waste at the NWMO’s selected site in the heart of Treaty 3 Territory in northwestern Ontario and its upcoming impact assessment process.

The groups expressed an overarching concern about the lack of federal oversight of this project since its inception in 2002.

More recently, the NWMO has made it known that they are seeking to have transportation of the radioactive wastes excluded from the project’s impact assessment process. But for 20 years the NWMO has been describing transportation as part of their project, and the Impact Assessment Act requires activities that are integral to – or, in the language of the Act “incidental” to – the project be included in the assessment.

The joint letter requests that the federal government provide immediate oversight and direction in four areas:

December 22, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Canada, wastes | Leave a comment