Diplomacy Without De-Escalation: The Manila Talks and Ukraine’s Escalation Strategy

While Washington and Moscow were attempting to preserve diplomatic channels in Manila, Ukraine expanded strikes against infrastructure with high political and economic visibility inside Russia
The central question is whether this approach will actually improve Ukraine’s negotiating position, or whether it will make a political settlement increasingly difficult to achieve.
Adrian Korczyński, July 29, 2026, https://journal-neo.su/2026/07/29/diplomacy-without-de-escalation-the-manila-talks-and-ukraine%e2%80%99s-escalation-strategy/
On July 23, 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit.
The meeting lasted thirty-seven minutes, making it the fourth bilateral encounter between the two since September 2025. The United States initiated the contact, and both sides acknowledged the need to end the war in Ukraine. On paper, this was a diplomatic gesture. In practice, it exposed a growing contradiction within the Western approach to the war: diplomatic channels remain open, while military strategies based on continued pressure and escalation are increasingly narrowing the space for compromise.
What Was Discussed
Lavrov reiterated Moscow’s position: further arms deliveries to Kyiv are “unacceptable.” He also criticised what he called the destabilising policy of European states aimed at inflicting a “strategic defeat” on Russia. At the same time, he confirmed Russia’s readiness for a political and diplomatic settlement, reaffirming the proposals put forward by the U.S. side during the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska last August. Rubio, for his part, said Washington remained willing to play a constructive role in ending the conflict, but noted that the war had “impeded the ability of Russia and the United States to find areas of agreement on other topics.”
No breakthrough was announced. No new proposals emerged. The talks confirmed that the fundamental positions of both sides remain unchanged. Russia continues to insist that any settlement must address what it defines as its security concerns and the territorial realities created by the conflict, while Washington continues to support Kyiv and simultaneously seeks a diplomatic outcome that does not amount to a strategic defeat for the West.
The Escalation Beyond the Meeting Room
The Manila talks took place against the backdrop of intensified Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian territory. During the same period, Ukrainian drones repeatedly targeted warehouses operated by Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer. The company, which processes roughly 20 million orders daily, has seen four of its logistics centres hit. At least nine people have been killed. Ukrainian authorities have claimed that these facilities store components for Russian military drones, a claim the Kremlin has denied. Regardless of the competing claims surrounding the facilities’ military role, the strikes represent a broader expansion of Ukraine’s target set beyond conventional military infrastructure.
Simultaneously, Ukraine has continued its campaign against Russian energy infrastructure, striking refineries and fuel depots. The cumulative effect has added further pressure to Russia’s domestic fuel distribution network. Russia, despite being one of the world’s largest oil producers, has faced growing strain on its domestic fuel market, with reports of regional shortages, higher prices and distribution problems. Airports around Moscow have been temporarily closed following mass drone strikes, and explosions have been heard in Crimea, including near Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Yalta.
A Strategy of Escalation
The timing of these strikes is significant. While Washington and Moscow were attempting to preserve diplomatic channels in Manila, Ukraine expanded strikes against infrastructure with high political and economic visibility inside Russia. The choice of targets and the timing of the attacks indicate that the objective extends beyond immediate military effects. Such actions also increase the political costs associated with any future compromise. They also illustrate the growing disconnect between diplomatic efforts pursued by Washington and the military strategy pursued by Kyiv
The strategy appears to rest on a simple assumption: that increasing the economic and political costs for Russia will ultimately compel Moscow to negotiate from a weaker position. Whether such an approach is strategically sound remains highly uncertain. The more politically visible these attacks become, the less room the Kremlin has for compromise without appearing to retreat under pressure. Such strikes reinforce the perception that military pressure, rather than compromise, remains Kyiv’s preferred instrument. This makes any diplomatic opening politically harder to justify.
What This Means
The Manila meeting was a diplomatic gesture, not a turning point. The United States wants to find a way out of a conflict that is draining its resources and attention. Russia wants a settlement that recognises its security concerns and territorial realities created by the conflict. Ukraine, meanwhile, continues to escalate, calculating that increased pressure on Moscow can improve its negotiating position.
Whether such an approach accelerates negotiations or instead hardens Russian resolve remains one of the central strategic questions. The strikes on Wildberries, the attacks on refineries, and the drone operations targeting Moscow’s airports reflect a deliberate strategy of sustained escalation designed to increase the costs of continuing the war for Russia. The danger is that a strategy built around escalation may narrow the very diplomatic space required to end the conflict.
The central question is whether this approach will actually improve Ukraine’s negotiating position, or whether it will make a political settlement increasingly difficult to achieve. Escalation can alter the military balance, but it does not automatically create the political conditions required for a negotiated settlement. The Manila talks produced no breakthrough, because the gap between diplomatic engagement and battlefield escalation remains unresolved. Western policy now appears to operate on two increasingly divergent tracks: diplomatic engagement with Moscow and continued support for Kyiv’s strategy of military escalation. The wider the gap between them becomes, the more difficult it will be to sustain a coherent long-term strategy.
Russia’s Starlink killers showcase new era of electronic battlefield warfare.
from
| Lisa Savage, 30 July 26 |
Russia has ramped-up EW use to detect and jam Elon Musk’s Starlink terminals and satellites, Ukrainian media reports.
Volna Kupol Garant
Russia’s latest electronic warfare system reportedly uses a directed high-frequency radio beam to disrupt Starlink operations. Rather than damaging satellites orbiting roughly 500 kilometers above Earth, the system blinds them – cutting their ability to connect with ground terminals while they remain under attack.
According to reports, Volna is a mobile system built around six trailers. Each carries a pair of steerable satellite dishes mounted on rotating platforms. A single battery is reportedly capable of denying Starlink coverage across an area of up to 20 sq km. Some analysts say the system was previously referenced under the designation Peresvet-M, although this has not been independently confirmed.
Ukrainian sources claim Volna was first deployed during Russia’s offensive in the Kharkov region in 2024. They also say its use has increased significantly in recent months.Tobol
The secretive Russian EW complex is reportedly used to disrupt signals from NATO-linked satellite networks, including GPS, Galileo, and Starlink. Reports claim that Tobol attacks satellite communications on both ends of the link – jamming downlinks from satellites to ground receivers and uplinks from Earth to orbit. Its power and range also allegedly allow it to create an electromagnetic “umbrella.”
Kalinka
The system is designed to hunt down satellite communications signals, including those transmitted by Starlink terminals at distances of up to 15 km. It can reportedly track and lock onto even Starshield – SpaceX’s hardened military variant of Starlink. Western media warns that while Tobol disrupts GPS signals on a broad scale, the Kalinka’s precision-targeting capabilities could pose a more direct threat to specific military operations.
Krasukha
The Krasukha-S4 is designed to neutralize reconnaissance satellites, ground-based radar installations, and airborne surveillance systems. It does so by emitting powerful electronic jamming signals that disrupt key radar bands and other radio-frequency emissions. A standard Krasukha-S4 battery consists of two vehicles and has an operational range exceeding 300 kilometers.
Borshchevik
The light mobile system is designed to detect and geolocate Starlink terminals within a 180-degree sector at ranges of up to 10 km, with a reported accuracy of five meters. Using direction-finding and biangulation algorithms, it can locate a target in less than three minutes at a single scanning position. The Borshchevik-2 airborne system hunts Starlink signals from the sky, with reported accuracy down to 0.4 m.
Zelensky’s Dangerous Gambit To Merge The Iran And Ukraine Wars

Of course this would also appeal to Israel, prolonging the Middle East war and potentially drawing European governments into the theater, too.
Trita Parsi Responsible Statecraft, https://scheerpost.com/2026/07/29/zelenskys-dangerous-gambit-to-merge-the-iran-and-ukraine-wars/
As Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky arrives in Washington, much indicates that he is no longer merely trying to draw greater American support into its war against Russia. Increasingly, it appears to be pursuing something far more consequential: merging the Ukraine war with the U.S.-Iran conflict into a single strategic theater.
The distinction matters. If the two wars become one, Ukraine ceases to be merely a recipient of American military assistance and instead becomes a direct participant in Washington’s war with Tehran. By the same token, the United States would no longer simply be Ukraine’s principal arms supplier. It would become an active belligerent against Russia through a conflict that stretches from the Black Sea to the Caspian.
For Kyiv, this would represent the strategic breakthrough it has sought since Russia’s invasion in 2022.
From the outset of the war, Ukrainian leaders consistently urged NATO to move beyond supplying weapons and intelligence. Zelensky repeatedly appealed for a NATO-enforced no-fly zone, warning that anything less amounted to allowing Russia to bomb Ukrainian cities with impunity. He pressed Western governments to provide increasingly sophisticated weapons systems long before they were politically acceptable in Washington. And he argued that victory required the West to abandon what he viewed as self-imposed escalation timidity.
The Biden administration sympathized with Ukraine’s predicament but consistently refused to cross several red lines. President Joe Biden rejected sending American ground troops, arguing that direct combat between U.S. and Russian forces risked a wider war between nuclear powers. He repeatedly ruled out establishing a no-fly zone because enforcing one would require U.S. pilots to shoot down Russian aircraft. His administration initially declined to provide F-16 fighter jets, long-range ATACMS missiles, and other advanced systems for fear of uncontrolled escalation, only relaxing some of those restrictions gradually after lengthy internal debate.
Throughout those decisions, Washington’s guiding principle remained consistent: help Ukraine defend itself without allowing the United States to become a direct combatant against Russia, while also eschewing diplomacy that could have brought the fighting to an end.
Today, however, the strategic landscape has changed. The Trump administration’s war with Iran has produced exactly the dilemma many critics predicted. Washington possesses overwhelming military superiority, yet it has suffered a strategic defeat at the hand of Tehran. Iran has demonstrated an ability to widen the battlefield horizontally, impose costs across multiple theaters, and force the United States to defend allies and assets far from the original front lines. Iran has escalation dominance; Trump has no good military option and he lacks the patience to pursue the diplomatic ones with discipline.
Trump’s vulnerability creates a historic opening for Kyiv. Instead of appearing as a country dependent on American assistance, Ukraine can now present itself as a strategic asset capable of helping Washington turn a military debacle into a splendid victory. Ukrainian drone warfare has evolved faster than almost any military innovation during the past three years. Its experience integrating inexpensive autonomous systems into conventional warfare has few equals.
Just as important, Ukraine could offer something Washington currently lacks: an opportunity to expand the conflict into an entirely new geographic theater. That is, turn Iran’s horizontal escalation against it.
The Caspian Sea represents such a possibility, in the Ukrainian argument. Opening pressure against Iran from the north would complicate Tehran’s military planning, force it to redistribute scarce resources, and reduce its ability to dictate where the conflict is fought.
From Kyiv’s perspective, offering that capability transforms Ukraine from America’s benefactor to its savior.
But a greater strategic prize for Kyiv would be to fuse the two conflicts into one. Such a merger would fundamentally alter the political logic of both wars. American personnel, intelligence assets, logistics, and operational planning would become increasingly intertwined across the two theaters. Russian and Iranian military cooperation would likewise encourage Washington to treat them as components of a single conflict rather than separate crises.
Once that threshold is crossed, the distinction between supporting Ukraine and fighting Russia becomes progressively harder to sustain.
This dynamic would also appeal to Israel. First, it would give the Iran war another lease on life. Second, it would internationalize the conflict further by drawing European governments into the Iran theater through their deep commitments to Ukraine. And third, perhaps most significantly, it would transform the political narrative. Defeating Iran would no longer be presented as a necessity to defend Israel, but rather, to defend Ukraine.
Given the levels of elite and public support Ukraine enjoys — after all, it was the victim of an illegal invasion — such a framing is far more politically digestible than centering the war on Israel, given Israel’s plummeting standing in the West due to its genocide in Gaza and critical role in starting the illegal war with Iran
None of this means that Ukraine’s gamble will succeed. But Trump may be susceptible to it given his self-inflicted predicament in the Strait of Hormuz. (However, judging by the decision not to hold a press conference today, this may mean Zelensky’s meeting with Trump earlier at the White House was less than successful.)
Though Biden’s Ukraine policy deserves much criticism, he is resisting this type of escalation because the risk of direct confrontation between NATO and Russia could lead to a much larger and more catastrophic war. Those concerns have not disappeared simply because the White House has changed hands or because Trump has trapped himself in a foolish war.
Attempts to solve one strategic problem by broadening the scope of a conflict have often made both problems harder to resolve. The greatest danger today may not be that Trump chooses to fight two wars simultaneously, but that seemingly small escalatory steps pave the way for a disaster both Biden and Trump have sought to avoid.
Trita Parsi is the co-founder and Executive Vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
Suffolk fire live: Hundreds of firefighters battle ‘unprecedented’ wildfire near nuclear plant
A wildfire is raging in Dunwich Heath, Suffolk where evacuations have been ordered – the blaze is close to three nuclear plant sites, and has burned an area the size of 210 football pitches
Olivia Beeson UK & World News Reporter , Joe Smith News Reporter, Rucsandra Moldoveanu Live News Reporter, Patrick Hill Senior News Reporter and Ethan Davies, 3o July26https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/suffolk-fire-sizewell-weather-b-37492955
Hundreds of firefighters are battling through the night to contain a massive wildfire in Dunwich Heath, Suffolk, that has devasted a huge nature reserve and threatened a nearby nuclear power plant.
Temperatures soared into the mid-30s in southern England on Thursday, burning an area the size of 210 football pitches in a National Trust reserve just a few miles away from Sizewell B – the UK’s largest nuclear power plant.
Some 200 caravans were evacuated this morning, with holidaymakers woken up by banging on their doors. Eighteen fire engines and more than 100 firefighters are now at the scene, with authorities saying they expect crews to be battling the blaze for the next two days.
There is also concern for wildlife in the area, after nature reserve RSPB Minsmere announcing its closure this morning. RSPB Suffolk area manager Adam Rowlands said the land was home to rare wildlife including nightjars – and it could take “more than a decade” for the habitat to recover.
Prime Minister Andy Burnham said the fire service will have “all of the support” they need in tackling the blaze.
On Thursday afternoon, an EDF spokesperson said the fire was “not affecting operations at Sizewell B power station”.
Cernavodă Reactor Shut Down as Drought Lowers Danube Flow

By Romania Journal , Jul 28, 2026
Romania’s Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant shut down Reactor 1 in a controlled manner on Tuesday at 11:00 a.m. due to the exceptionally low level of the Danube River caused by severe drought.
State-owned nuclear energy producer Nuclearelectrica said the measure is preventive and aimed at protecting the plant’s equipment. The company also warned that Reactor 2 could be shut down if water levels continue to decline.
Energy& Utilities
The decision to disconnect Unit 1 was taken in accordance with operational procedures for severe drought conditions, following the latest forecasts issued by Romania’s National Institute of Hydrology and Water Management (INHGA).
According to Nuclearelectrica, Reactor 1 will be reconnected to the National Energy System once operating conditions allow the safe resumption of activities, with the company set to announce the restart date.
However, the company warned that if the Danube’s water level continues to fall and operational parameters approach safety limits, it may also decide to shut down Reactor 2.
“If certain parameters associated with the low Danube water level approach the permitted operating limits, while fully complying with nuclear safety procedures and standards, the plant’s experts will implement the necessary operational measures to maintain safety margins, including the decision to shut down one or even both units if current conditions do not improve. Such measures are preventive and are intended to protect nuclear safety and the reliability of the facilities,” Nuclearelectrica said in a press release………………..
According to the Energy Ministry, the Danube’s flow has dropped to approximately 1,630 cubic meters per second, prompting the shutdown of Reactor 1 to protect the plant’s three cooling pumps……
Authorities estimate that Romania’s peak electricity demand this week will reach around 7,300 MW, while domestic production is expected to range between 4,000 MW and 4,300 MW. The resulting shortfall will be covered through electricity imports………………….
Former Energy Minister calls for caution over Iron Gates III project
Former Energy Minister Virgil Popescu said the shutdown of Reactor 1 due to the Danube’s low water level highlights how vulnerable Romania’s energy system can become in the face of changing hydrological conditions…………………………. https://www.romaniajournal.ro/top_news/cernavoda-reactor-shut-down-as-drought-lowers-danube-flow/
Burnham explains why £8.4bn nuclear submarine investment will boost UK defence, jobs and apprenticeships

The nuclear-armed submarines are set to replace the current Vanguard-class when they enter service and will be capable of launching Trident 2 D5 ballistic missiles
Will Meakin-Durrant & Helen Corbett, Independent, 28 July 26
Andy Burnham is expected to unveil on Thursday an £8.4bn investment for the UK’s next generation of nuclear submarines.
Aimed at preparing Dreadnought-class boats for service by the 2030s, the nuclear-armed vessels are set to replace the current Vanguard-class and will be equipped to launch Trident 2 D5 ballistic missiles.
Powered by a Rolls-Royce nuclear propulsion system, produced in Derby, the submarines will boast an almost unlimited operational range.
HMS Dreadnought is the first of four new submarines.
The funding will primarily support its progress towards readiness, with a portion also allocated to advance the second vessel, HMS Valiant, to its sea trials.
Manufacturers will also be supported to get the third and fourth boats through their construction phases………………………..
On the Dreadnought-class submarine programme, £5.9bn of the £8.4bn will go to
BAE Systems, with £2.5bn for the wider supply chain.
Mr Burnham faces questions about his defence policies, including how he will pay for a commitment to reach 3.5 per cent of GDP on defence spending by 2035.
Asked at a press conference on Wednesday whether he would meet the commitment, the prime minister pointed to the deadline in the next decade.
“In terms of our Nato commitments, I have been very clear that we will honour those commitments,” he said. “It does mean being prepared to look at challenging issues.”
Mr Burnham’s pick for chancellor, John Healey, resigned as Sir Keir Starmer’s defence secretary last month, warning that the former prime minister was “unable, and the Treasury has been unwilling, to commit the resources that the nation needs to defend the country at this time of rising threats”.
The Defence Investment Plan (Dip) which followed – including a pledge to fund the fitting of four Dreadnought submarines in Barrow – took expected total defence investment over the next four years to £298bn.
Defence spending by the end of the decade will be 2.7 per cent of GDP, according to the document.
It is thought the prime minister will hail Barrow as a case study for how taxpayer investment in major government projects can support opportunities in the long term throughout the UK………………………….. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/burnham-nuclear-submarines-hms-dreadnought-defence-jobs-apprenticeships-b3024190.html
Government withholds cost to taxpayer of restarting nuclear power-critical CO2 factory
Tom Pashby , Jul 30, 2026, https://tompashby.substack.com/?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
The government has declined to reveal the cost of the deal it agreed with Ensus to restart its carbon dioxide (CO2) factory, which is critical to the operation of the UK’s nuclear power stations.
On 26 March 2026, the then Department for Business and Trade (DBT) announced that agreed a deal with Ensus which owns a bioethanol plant at Wilton, Teesside to safeguard domestic CO2 supplies due to disruptions to imports caused by the Iran conflict. The plant had been mothballed in September 2025.
The DBT is in the process of absorbing the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) following the appointment of Andy Burnham as Prime Minister, and will soon become the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade (BIST).
The 26 March announcement described CO2 as “vital” for Britain’s “nuclear, packaged meats, fresh food and healthcare”.The DBT said: “Disruptions to European fertiliser production — combined with difficult market conditions — have significantly reduced the reliability of CO2 imports, and rising gas prices driven by the Iran conflict, plus unplanned maintenance at several European CO2 producing sites, mean that the UK’s market for CO2 risks being undersupplied.
“Given the potential impact of a shortage on essential UK sectors, including healthcare, nuclear and food and drink production, the Government has taken the decision to back the restart of activity at Ensus to safeguard critical national infrastructure and maintain a resilient supply of CO2.”
It was widely reported at the time that the government was spending £100M to restart the factory, however, the government didn’t make public any documents confirming that figure.
The support from the government was intended to cover an initial three month restart, which is now understood to have been extended by a further three months to October 2026.
The International Atomic Energy Agency says the UK is the only operator of advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGRs) and that the gas is CO2.
According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), the UK has eight operable AGRs at four nuclear power plants (NPPs) – named by the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) as Hartlepool, Heysham 1, Heysham 1 and Torness. The WNA and ONR appear to have slightly different naming conventions for the NPPs.
20 Working Days submitted a request under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act on 28 April asking the government to share “any documents showing the formal agreement which was agreed between Ensus and HMG (His Majesty’s Government) regarding the restart of Ensus’s CO2 facility.”
“However, when a ‘qualified’ exemption applies to the information and an accompanying public interest test is engaged, section 10(3) of the Act allows the time for response to be extended, in which case a full response must be provided within such time as is reasonable in all circumstances.
“In the case of this FOI request, we are considering section 43 (Commercial interests). However, this is not yet finalised and will be subject to changes.”
The DBT said it hoped to respond by 26 June
On 18 June, it said: “The Department for Business and Trade (the Department/DBT) can confirm information is held in scope of your request, however this is withheld in full under section 22 (Information intended for future publication), section 40(2)(Personal Information) Section 41(Information provided in confidence) and section 43(2)(commercial interests) under the Act.”
In the DBT’s explanation of its application of “Section 22 – Information intended for future publication”, it said: “The Department acknowledges the public interest in favour of transparency and early sight of the formal agreement which was agreed between Ensus and HMG regarding the restart of the facility.
“It is our view that although there may be an interest in early sight of this information, there is also a strong public interest to ensure that publication of information is in accordance with certain procedures to ensure accuracy and consistency.
“Under Section 16 (duty to provide help and assistance) the expenditure costs will be published in the Department’s Annual Report and Accounts found on gov.uk.”
A written ministerial statement by the UK Government published on 13 April 2026, about the Ensus restart, said: “We will protect taxpayers’ money by operating the plant only for as long as necessary. This is why we have agreed that the plant will operate for an initial period of 3 months but will be subject to regular review.
The Department for Business and Trade (DBT) will closely monitor the associated spend, which will be reported in DBT’s accounts for 2026-27, with 2025-26 spend also disclosed in the annual report and accounts.
“If conditions require it, Government will not hesitate to extend this period and will retain the ability to restart the plant for a longer period as a precautionary measure.”
The DBT’s Annual Report and Accounts 2025-2026 for the period 1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026 was published on 15 July.
It said: “Ensus UK Limited was indicatively classified by HM Treasury to the Departmental Group after the designation process for 2025-26 had concluded. Accordingly, it will be consolidated in the 2026-27 Group accounts.”
On 18 June, 20 Working Days submitted a request for an internal review of DBT’s decision to withhold the information, and on 17 July, the DBT said it had conducted an internal review and that it stood by its decision to withhold the information.
The DBT, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) and Ensus were approached for comment.
The Small Modular Nuclear Reactor Hyper spreads to Italy

the government is focusing on small modular reactors, or SMRs
Industry estimates suggest a single 300-megawatt SMR could cost between 3 billion and 6 billion euros before infrastructure and grid expenses. The government hopes much of that financing would come from private capital
“Nuclear power that is being built today in Europe has exorbitant costs,” he said. “On the one hand, costs are extremely high, and on the other, private investors are running away.”
He also questioned whether SMRs would dramatically improve those economics, noting that the technology has yet to be commercially proven at scale.
The biggest political obstacle might be finding locations to build reactors and store the waste.
Four decades after Chernobyl, a generational divide reshapes Italy’s nuclear debate. By ASSOCIATED PRESS, 28 July 2026 , AP reporters Silvia Stellacci and Andrea Rosa in Rome contributed to this report.
ROME (AP) – Four decades after the Chernobyl disaster spewed radiation across Europe and turned Italy off nuclear power, Premier Giorgia Meloni ´s government is laying the groundwork to bring it back as the country seeks to improve its energy security.
The government is counting on a new generation of Italians who see nuclear power as a source of low-carbon electricity, a tool to help fight climate change and a way to strengthen stable energy supplies amid shocks from the Ukraine and Iran wars.
It´s betting that such support will blunt the opinions of Italians who lived through the 1986 nuclear accident, still view atomic energy through the lens of risk and disaster, and twice rejected nuclear power in national referenda, experts say.
Next week, Parliament is expected to approve government-sponsored legislation establishing a legal framework for next-generation nuclear technologies. The government would then have 12 months to draft implementing decrees covering reactor licensing, safety standards, waste management and siting.
“The duty of the government at this moment is to create the conditions so that those who will eventually decide on installations will be able to do so,” Gilberto Pichetto Fratin, minister for the Environment and Energy Security, told The Associated Press in an interview ahead of the vote.
Italy´s debate comes as several European countries, including France and Poland, expand or pursue nuclear power amid concerns about energy security and climate goals. Unlike them, however, Italy is trying to rebuild an industry voters dismantled decades ago.
Italy was once among Europe´s nuclear pioneers. Four reactors operated until a 1987 referendum effectively ended the country´s nuclear program in the aftermath of Chernobyl. Another attempt to revive nuclear power collapsed after Japan´s Fukushima disaster in 2011, when about 94% of voters opposed plans for new reactors.
As a result, Italy’s shift would mark one of Europe´s most ambitious energy reversals…………………………….
Rather than reviving the large plants of the past, the government is focusing on small modular reactors, or SMRs, and other advanced technologies that supporters say could be safer, more flexible and faster to build.
“We are talking about the third advanced generation (of nuclear power), much more workable compared to what are the needs, much safer because it is small in size with very short construction times,” Pichetto Fratin said.
“When people ask me for a timeline, I say 2033, 2034, 2035,” he added, referring to when the first next-generation reactors could realistically begin operating…….
At the sprawling Latina nuclear power plant south of Rome, workers in protective suits and masks are still dismantling the remains of Italy´s first nuclear era even as politicians discuss how to build a second.
The contrast is not lost on Viviana Cruciani, who oversees nuclear decommissioning at the site run by the state-owned company Sogin.
“There is a generation that came right after Chernobyl that still sees nuclear energy in light of the accident at Chernobyl only,” Cruciani told AP.
“But there is another generation, a lot younger, that is enthusiastic about nuclear, and it is even sorry that the country has not yet made any progress towards a comeback to this technology.”
A June 2026 survey by research firm Only Numbers found that about 55% of Italians support next-generation nuclear plants.
Michele Governatori, a senior energy adviser at climate and energy think tank ECCO, said support is more visible among younger Italians.
“There is greater openness, especially among younger generations,” he said, noting that many associate nuclear power with technological progress rather than with the accidents that shaped public opinion in earlier decades.
Not everyone is convinced.
“If we use nuclear as a backup … the average energy costs become devastating. So unfortunately it´s not a good complement to renewables and it´s not cheap,” Governatori said.
Pichetto Fratin acknowledged that nuclear power is not a short-term solution to high electricity prices.
“Nuclear power does not lower consumers´ bills today,” he said. “The nuclear power of tomorrow can help reduce them.”
Industry estimates suggest a single 300-megawatt SMR could cost between 3 billion and 6 billion euros before infrastructure and grid expenses. The government hopes much of that financing would come from private capital, Pichetto Fratin said.
Governatori believes that cost remains the weakest part of the government´s case.
“Nuclear power that is being built today in Europe has exorbitant costs,” he said. “On the one hand, costs are extremely high, and on the other, private investors are running away.”
He also questioned whether SMRs would dramatically improve those economics, noting that the technology has yet to be commercially proven at scale.
Even so, some critics support establishing a regulatory framework that could allow future projects to be evaluated on their merits.
The biggest political obstacle might be finding locations to build reactors and store the waste.
Italy still lacks a national repository for existing nuclear waste, much of which remains stored at temporary facilities across the country. Any future reactor or waste-storage site is likely to face strong local opposition.
Even if Parliament approves the legislation, opponents – including environmental groups and left-wing parties – could seek a new referendum once specific reactor locations and waste-storage plans emerge.
Surveys suggest support for nuclear power drops sharply when people are asked whether they would accept a reactor near where they live. Polls cited by experts indicate that about six in 10 Italians oppose having a reactor in their own province.
“When you have to seriously ask where a plant will be built and how much it will cost, it is likely that public opinion could become negative again,” Governatori said.
“Jobs Jobs Jobs” screams the media again as the nuclear lobby plans to brink Japan’s nuclear wastes to Cumberland

COMMENT Plan to Bring Failed Japanese Fast Breeder Reactor’s Contaminated Sodium to Workington – https://radiationfreelakeland.substack.com/p/plan-to-bring-failed-japanese-fast
Japanese reactor decommissioning to bring jobs to UK
Federica Bedendo 26 July 26, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0kmxl6ydpjo
New “highly skilled jobs” have been promised in the UK as part of plans to clean-up a nuclear reactor in Japan.
Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum are planning to build a facility at the Port of Workington, Cumbria, to support the decommissioning of the Monju Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR), in Fukui Prefecture, Japan.
Cumberland Council, which owns the port, said the plant would support skilled jobs directly and across the supply chain.
Leader Mark Fryer said: “This is fantastic news for the port as this new development, subject to the necessary approvals, will bring good quality jobs to Workington.”
The construction phase is expected to be worth more than £25m and employ about 20 people during its seven-year operation, those behind the plans said.
The FBR was a sodium-cooled reactor that had been designed to burn most of its spent fuel, however it encountered several problems during its lifespan.
The Workington plant would be treating the sodium coolant, turning it into sodium hydroxide, a commercially usable product.
West Cumbria is a well-known area for the nuclear sector, due to the presence of the Sellafield nuclear plant, which is being decommissioned.
The Labour-led council has started work to clear the land at Workington’s Oldside as part of its wider regeneration plans in the town.
The aim is for the area to become a hub for clean energy, manufacturing and logistics, the council said.
A Cavendish Nuclear and Amentum spokesperson said: “We are fully committed to adding real social value to west Cumbia and this new venture will contribute to the regeneration on the Port of Workington and support the local economy.”
EDF exploring sale of stakes in modular reactor subsidiary Nuward



French nuclear rnergy group looking to sell down holding in Nuward to lock in clients and fund development. French nuclear energy group
EDF is seeking investment
partners in Europe to help fund its small reactor venture as it looks to
make up ground against Rolls-Royce and dozens of smaller start-ups
globally. The fundraising effort could also bring in potential buyers of
the small modular reactor technology to lock them in as clients.
The state-owned company, which runs Europe’s biggest fleet of 57 large-scale
reactors in France, is finalising a second SMR design through its Nuward
subsidiary after abandoning a first effort that was too complicated two
years ago.
It now wanted to press ahead with a commercial launch of the
Nuward SMR from 2029, and would seek board approval for those plans on
Thursday, three people familiar with the matter said. EDF was also working
to bring new investors into the subsidiary, two of the people added,
potentially leaving the utility as a minority holder of Nuward. Interested
parties could include countries such as Belgium, Finland and Poland that
already have or are building nuclear plants, and others which do not rely
on the technology, such as Greece or Italy, they added.
FT 30th July 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/34d2542b-8818-4d51-b934-e3baabebf93d
What would happen if the UK’s Faslane nuclear weapons base was hit in a nuclear strike?

As the UK’s only nuclear weapons base, Faslane and the adjacent Coulport warhead storage
depot are among the highest-value military targets in Europe in the case of
a nuclear exchange targeting military facilities.
While many strategic
military facilities are located in highly remote areas to avoid civilian
casualties in the case of an attack, these bases are only roughly 40
kilometres from Glasgow and surrounded by other population centres such as
Greenock and Helensburgh.
In an effort to add to the existing literature
illustrating the risks posed by nuclear weapons facilities, I decided to
draw from my background in aerodynamics research to study the humanitarian
cost that would be incurred by an attack on the nuclear weapons bases in
Scotland. This research uses modelling techniques pioneered by Professor
Sébastien Philippe of the University of Wisconsin-Madison and software
developed by Ivan Stepanov to simulate both the blast and radiological
effects of a nuclear strike on the base.
Both the effect of the initial
blast and the fallout dispersed from two 100-kiloton ground-burst strikes
on Coulport’s storage bunkers were simulated across 100 historical weather
conditions. Both the long and short-term effects were mapped onto
population density data to assess both the immediate casualties in the
blast radius and the long-term casualties due to radiation induced cancers.
A protection factor was also applied to account for those sheltering
indoors.
The total predicted fatalities ranged from 1603 to 138,827 people,
with an average of 22,798 people. This wide variation is due to the strong
influence of wind on the dispersion of fallout. For instance, winds blowing
to the west or north result in far fewer casualties, due to the much
sparser populations in these directions. By contrast, winds blowing to the
east or southeast were found to disperse significant fallout over major
population centres such as Glasgow and Edinburgh.
The National 25th July 2026,
https://www.thenational.scot/news/26409093.happen-faslane-hit-nuclear-strike/
A mad for nuclear world?
July 25, 2026, https://renewextraweekly.blogspot.com/2026/07/a-mad-for-nuclear-world.html
While renewables are being supported in the UK by private sector investment, most recently via the Contracts for Difference market system, with no direct government cash input, over 70% of the UK Department of Energy Security and Net Zero expenditure is now nuclear related. DESNZ’s annual report and accounts says that ‘Great British Energy – Nuclear has remained a key component of the Government’s approach to energy security and decarbonisation, with work continuing to support the delivery of new nuclear projects, providing greater certainty for industry and investors, supporting highly skilled jobs across the supply chain, and contributing to a resilient, low carbon energy mix’.
It notes that through the Spending Review the department secured a capital settlement of £62.8bn from 2025-26 to 2029-30 and a resource settlement of £5.8bn from 2026-27 to 2028-29, including £8.3bn for GBE/GBE-Nuclear including SMRs and £14.2bn for the new Sizewell C European Pressurised-water Reactor.
However, the theory is that this government support will attract private sector investment, for example for new Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). The government has put aside £2.5 bn for its SMR programme, to be led by Rolls Royce, but there are signs of entrepreneurial interests, with SGE, a consortium led by Polish billionaire industrialist Michał Sołowow talking about a £35bn plan to build 14 GE/Hitachi Boiling Water SMRs, on three sites across the UK, possibly including on the former Olbury nuclear plant site.

There have also been some UK government backed moves by US developers for SMR projects in the UK, including from X Energy, Holtec and TerraPower, but not everyone is convinced that any of them will be successful, certainly not soon, or sees the wider UK nuclear programme, including the big Sizewell project, as value for money, especially given that there are security risks. Will anyone want SMRs near them given the safety and security issues? The UK government has been revamping the planning system to make it easier for projects like this to go ahead, but local opposition is still likely. In particular, Labour ministers in London have been slammed for identifying sites in Scotland for nuclear power plants despite the devolved Scottish Government’s ongoing opposition to new nuclear developments. Very provocative, especially given that Scotland often produces more green power than it needs and exports the rest south…
However, the big UK push to nuclear continues, with some odd twists. For example, enriched uranium is to be produced by UK based Urenco for use by Ukraine in its nuclear plants. This at a time when the US is making strenuous efforts to stop Iran from developing and using uranium enrichment technology. But then consistency is often not very apparent in nuclear policy around the world. For example the US is, it seems, keen to allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium. Meanwhile the UK is still importing enriched fuel for Sizewell B derived from Russia. While its claimed that this is only a temporary aberration (the UK is to build its own new specialist enrichment plant), some contrarian outliers see Russia as the EU’s best supplier!

Will any of this help us deal with climate change? Not everyone is convinced that it will -based on past experience, we may need to be wary of nuclear hype. It is interesting then to look at what is happening in China. An Australian review noted that China has been installing ‘record amounts of solar and wind, while scaling back once-ambitious plans for nuclear’. Based on 2024 data, it said that China had installed the wind & solar equivalent of 5 large nuclear plants per week, although, in output terms, that was more like 1 nuclear power equivalent, given the different capacity factors. But the disparity in outputs has grown since 2024, with renewables roaring ahead as the favoured new energy option.
By comparison, the USA is stalling on renewables and trying to push nuclear ahead as fast as possible, with US energy secretary Jennifer Granholm calling for ‘hundreds’ of new large plants by 2050. Not everyone is convinced that this is possible, even with the new US loan scheme, but the Trump government is obviously keen and is pushing for reduced worker and public radiation exposure standards to help, with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) seemingly being compliant on this and other related issues. Clearly some see NRC reg. changes as being vital for the success of multiple SMRs. And, following a court ruling, it seems that NRC may no longer need to take account of climate issues in plant licensing decisions. This at a time when nuclear plants in Europe are having to be shut down due to heat waves…
So, with shifts like that underway, how is it likely to go in the USA? It’s not clear if any big new projects will go ahead, but there are a lot of new SMR players entering the game, and some progress has been made, for example with a go ahead on some micro SMR safety test programmes. However, it is very early days with SMRs and big technical and economic uncertainties remain. That’s true for new nuclear generally, a view that seems to be shared quite widely, as was summed up well in a recent letter in Lancet, which ended by calling for the focus to be on renewables instead. Quite so, along with storage and smart demand management…But then there are evidently people who think differently, for example in Germany and Japan, in relation to reactor restarts, although that risks opening up old issues, not least, where to put the active wastes. Do we really need to face all that again?
* Back in the UK, there has been no word yet on the nuclear issue from the new Labour Cabinet. Andy Burham has been supportive of nuclear in the past. Miatta Fahnbulleh, his new secretary of state for energy security and net-zero, is seen as likely to be a strong supporter of Labours clean energy and decarbonisation strategy. But she was chair of the New Economics Foundation which has been consistently anti-nuclear. So things may yet change. As I argued in my last post, there is certainly a strong case for a rethink on new nuclear.
Approval for VVER uranium/plutonium fuel production in Germany

VVER-440 fuel. A mixture of enriched uranium with RECYCLED URANIUM and PLUTONIUM received from the used nuclear fuel of other VVER reactors is used instead of a standard enriched uranium.
Friday, 24 July 2026,
https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/approval-for-vver-fuel-production-in-germany
The Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection, acting on behalf of the federal government, has approved an application from Framatome subsidiary Advanced Nuclear Fuels to expand its facility in Lingen for the production of fuel for VVER-1000 reactors. The approval is subject to strict conditions.
Framatome subsidiary Advanced Nuclear Fuels (ANF) applied in March 2022 under the Atomic Energy Act for permission to begin producing hexagonal pressurised water fuel elements under licence with TVEL, the fuel arm of Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom. The fuel elements are to be manufactured using Russian licences and Russian technology in a joint venture with TVEL for the Eastern European market. The licence application includes some changes to some manufacturing and testing equipment and the installation of some additional equipment in existing buildings to enable the manufacture of VVER fuel elements.
The federal government had already clarified in a supervisory letter to the state that, given the current assessment by federal security authorities regarding the risk of sabotage or espionage, there was no legal basis for denying the permit.
The Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection has now announced that it has approved ANF’s application, subject to a number of conditions, as “after intensive review and inquiries, [it] had no legal grounds under the Atomic Energy Act to reject or limit the application”. The restrictions it has imposed include a general ban on entry to the facility for employees of TVEL or Rosatom, as well as persons authorised by them. Entry is only permitted in very limited cases and under the supervision of the regulatory authority.
In addition, the ministry said the hardware and software of the TVEL-licensed machines must undergo external security audits, and these machines must be data-integrated with the rest of the fuel element factory’s operational technology and information technology infrastructure. Also, the finished gadolinium fuel rods arriving from Russia must be 100% inspected for potential tampering using active and passive scanners according to the ‘four-eyes’ principle. Furthermore, ANF employees must receive regular training and awareness programmes to protect against espionage and sabotage.
Lower Saxony’s environment ministry said the approval could be revisited “if new risks are identified”, particularly in “national security”, Euractiv reported.
ANF was created in 1975 and currently employs around 400 people in Lingen. ANF fabricates fuel rods and assemblies for pressurised water reactors and boiling water reactors for customers worldwide.
In recent years, especially since the war with Ukraine began, nuclear power operators in European Union countries who had previously relied on Russian-supplied fuel have sought alternative suppliers. Nineteen VVER reactors – developed during the time of the Soviet Union and historically reliant on Russian fuel supplies – are currently in operation in the EU, including four VVER-1000 reactors in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, and 15 VVER-440 reactors in the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary and Slovakia.
Framatome has “a dual-track approach” to supplying fuel to VVER reactors in operation in the EU. In the short term, it will fabricate fuel identical to the proven design currently used by the reactors. In parallel, Framatome is developing and qualifying European sovereign fuels of its own design for VVER-440 and VVER-1000 reactors. The qualification of a new design requires several years within the framework of regulatory and usual certification practices, Framatome notes.
Framatome had planned to produce both VVER-1000 and VVER-440 fuel under licence from and as part of a joint venture with Rosatom at its subsidiary Advanced Nuclear Fuels in Lingen. However, it was recently reported that Framatome has now decided to produce the VVER-440 fuel at its Romans-sur-Isere fuel production site in south-east France. The company expects to submit a request to the French nuclear regulator, the Autorite de Surete Nucleaire et de Radioprotection, by the end of 2026 for approval of the changes needed at the French plant for the production of VVER-440 fuel.
‘Fire cloud’ over Bordeaux as France braces for new heatwave

A rare “fire cloud” has formed in Bordeaux as wildfires continue to
ravage France forcing British tourists to flee. The “apocalyptic”
fires, which have so far forced the evacuation of 360,000 people across
France and Spain, have created a “pyrocumulonimbus”, a fire cloud never
seen before in France. The giant cloud, normally caused during volcanic
eruptions, creates its own winds and lightning that can worsen fires.
Telegraph 27th July 2026,
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/07/27/fire-cloud-over-bordeaux-as-france-braces-for-new-heatwave/
As Trump boosts nuclear power, regulators seek to eliminate a longstanding radiation safety practice

Count On News 2. by: JENNIFER McDERMOTT, Associated Press, Jul 26, 2026
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is proposing to eliminate a foundational safety principle that has for 50 years minimized the radiation people in the United States are exposed to and that has been adopted around the world.
Currently, facilities such as nuclear plants, hospitals or academic institutions that use radioactive materials must ensure radiation exposures are kept “as low as reasonably achievable” — the ALARA principle. The NRC proposal would abandon that philosophy while keeping a separate standard on maximum radiation exposure.
The two standards have worked together in radiation safety. Dose limits set the maximum amount of radiation the public and radiation workers can be exposed to, while ALARA kept radiation exposure as low as practical under those limits. Research shows radiation exposure increases a person’s chance of getting cancer, a risk that increases as the dose increases.
The dose limits are not changing. But the NRC, which regulates civilian nuclear energy technologies and radioactive materials, now wants to replace ALARA with a “graded approach” that includes several actions facilities must take depending on the potential dose of radiation to workers. More rigorous radiation protection measures would be required when approaching dose limits to ensure they aren’t exceeded.
This comes as President Donald Trump attempts to quadruple domestic nuclear energy production because of surging electricity demand amid a data center and artificial intelligence boom. Reforming the NRC is one way Trump is trying to speed up nuclear reactor development. He instructed the federal agency in an executive order last year to “ adopt science-based radiation limits.”
The Energy Department, which oversees national energy policies, has already stopped using ALARA. The NRC expects to finalize its radiation protection regulations in the coming months………………………………………………………………………………………….
Without ALARA, could radiation doses creep closer to the limits?…………………………………………………………….
Some experts question the wisdom of eliminating ALARA
Edwin Lyman, director of nuclear power safety at the Union of Concerned Scientists, cautions that some parts of the NRC proposal could raise permissible radiation doses in certain cases, while still staying below the cap. Lyman highlighted a proposed revision to radionuclide emissions standards, in particular.
Radiation exposure to the general public is limited to 100 millirem per year. A typical dose of radiation from a chest X-ray is 10 millirem.
The NRC wants to increase its radionuclide emissions standards from a conservative 10 millirem per year dose to 25 millirem per year, based on a hypothetical person living in a house at the property line for a nuclear plant.
The NRC should improve, rather than eliminate, ALARA, Lyman said, to protect the public and workers. ALARA has become a political target because some people mistakenly believe radiation exposures have to be as low as possible no matter the cost, Lyman said. In reality, it allows tradeoffs………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… https://www.counton2.com/news/national-news/ap-as-trump-boosts-nuclear-power-regulators-seek-to-eliminate-a-longstanding-radiation-safety-rule/
-
Archives
- September 2026 (184)
- August 2026 (330)
- July 2026 (355)
- June 2026 (287)
- May 2026 (306)
- April 2026 (356)
- March 2026 (251)
- February 2026 (267)
- January 2026 (308)
- December 2025 (358)
- November 2025 (359)
- October 2025 (375)
-
Categories
- 1
- 1 NUCLEAR ISSUES
- business and costs
- climate change
- culture and arts
- ENERGY
- environment
- health
- history
- indigenous issues
- Legal
- marketing of nuclear
- media
- opposition to nuclear
- PERSONAL STORIES
- politics
- politics international
- Religion and ethics
- safety
- secrets,lies and civil liberties
- spinbuster
- technology
- Uranium
- wastes
- weapons and war
- Women
- 2 WORLD
- ACTION
- AFRICA
- Atrocities
- AUSTRALIA
- Christina's notes
- Christina's themes
- culture and arts
- Events
- Fuk 2022
- Fuk 2023
- Fukushima 2017
- Fukushima 2018
- fukushima 2019
- Fukushima 2020
- Fukushima 2021
- general
- global warming
- Humour (God we need it)
- Nuclear
- RARE EARTHS
- Reference
- resources – print
- Resources -audiovicual
- Weekly Newsletter
- World
- World Nuclear
- YouTube
-
RSS
Entries RSS
Comments RSS
