Recommendations on the dangerous plan to renew Cameco’s licence for the Port Hope Conversion Facility

On contact with skin or lungs, HF becomes liquid hydrofluoric acid. It causes deep caustic burns, sometimes right to the bone, severe respiratory damage, and pulmonary edema (whereby fluid builds up in the tiny air sacs of the lungs, making it very hard to breathe). It attacks eyes, destroys corneal tissue and can cause blindness. Acute high-dose exposurecan be fatal, as in the 1986 Sequoyah Fuels incident discussed below. If uranyl fluoride is inhaled, serious cellular damage to the kidneys can occur within 24 to 48 hours. At the same time, radioactive material lodges in the lung, increasing the risk of cancer years later

We Will Not Compromise Safety,

October 2, 2026, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility

Cameco has applied to renew its operating licence for the Port Hope Conversion Facility
(PHCF) for a term of 20 years. The present 10-year licence expires on February 28, 2027.
The applicant is not asking for any changes in the current conditions of the licence, going
forward, other than extending the term from 10 years to 20 years.

Uranium is a naturally occurring radioactive heavy metal. The Port Hope plant produces
two specific chemical compounds of uranium: uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for export and
uranium dioxide (UO2) for domestic use.

Canada is the world’s second largest producer and exporter of uranium. Uranium ore is
mined and milled in Northern Saskatchewan. From the mill, a solid uranium concentrate–
commonly called “yellowcake” – is packed in drums as a fine powder and trucked to the
Blind River refinery in Ontario. Yellowcake is a semi-processed mix of uranium oxides,
mainly U3O8. It does not react readily with air or with water, but it is easily inhaled if spilled.
It is a powerful nephrotoxic heavy metal that can severely damage the kidneys if inhaled.

Uranium mining and milling leaves a long-lived radioactive footprint. Voluminous sand-like
radioactive wastes called “uranium mill tailings” are left behind as an unwanted byproduct
of the milling process. Canada has so far accumulated about 230 million tonnes of
uranium tailings in Ontario, Saskatchewan and the Northwest Territories. These tailings
contain over 70 percent of the total radioactivity present in the original ore. To be precise,
the wastes contain most of the naturally-occurring radioactive byproducts of uranium such
as radium-226, thorium-230, polonium-210, lead-210, and radon-222, all created
spontaneously from the disintegration of uranium atoms over millions of years. . Uranium
mill tailings will remain radiotoxic for hundreds of thousands of years to come.

The Blind River facility, situated on the north shore of Georgian Bay, receives yellowcake
from Canada, the United States and Australia for further processing. It is the largest
uranium refinery in the western world……………………………..

Cameco’s Port Hope facility (PHCF) converts 85 to 90 percent of the refined uranium
trioxide from Blind River to a hazardous and highly reactive chemical compound called
uranium hexafluoride (UF6), while the other 10 to 15 percent is converted into a much more
stable compound called uranium dioxide (UO2). These two conversions are separate
processes taking place within the Port Hope facility. Uranium hexafluoride is slated for
export; it is solely intended for the purpose of uranium enrichment. Uranium dioxide is for
domestic use; it is sent to an Ontario fuel fabrication plant prior to its use in CANDU
nuclear reactors.

The export product, uranium hexafluoride – known in the industry as “hex” – is an extremely
dangerous compound. It has to be handled very carefully. It reacts violently on contact with
water or moist air, releasing toxic and corrosive chemicals. The rapid and energetic
reaction creates a dense white cloud of corrosive gas, posing serious health hazards. The
cloud is made of gaseous hydrogen fluoride (HF) and tiny particulates of solid uranyl fluoride (UO2F2)

On contact with skin or lungs, HF becomes liquid hydrofluoric acid. It causes deep caustic
burns, sometimes right to the bone, severe respiratory damage, and pulmonary edema
(whereby fluid builds up in the tiny air sacs of the lungs, making it very hard to breathe). It
attacks eyes, destroys corneal tissue and can cause blindness. Acute high-dose exposure
can be fatal, as in the 1986 Sequoyah Fuels incident discussed below. If uranyl fluoride is
inhaled, serious cellular damage to the kidneys can occur within 24 to 48 hours. At the
same time, radioactive material lodges in the lung, increasing the risk of cancer years later

The Sequoyah Fuels plant, located in Gore, Oklahoma. was a uranium hexafluoride
conversion facility years ago. It began operations in 1970. The Sequoyah plant suffered a
serious accident in 1986 when an overfilled UF6 cylinder was heated by workers (contrary
to regulations) and internal gas pressure made it burst. Worker James Harrison (25) was
killed; over 100 workers, travelers, and residents required medical evaluation and treatment
for toxic gas exposure due to hydrofluoric acid and uranyl fluoride exposures as well.
Twenty-one of them were hospitalized. Interstate highway 40 and several local areas faced
temporary closures, as the toxic cloud travelled 29 kilometres in a 40 km/hr wind

Bear in mind that the consequences described above resulted from the accidental release
of the UF6 in one transport cylinder only. Evidently a much more severe accident would
have correspondingly more serious consequences. The Sequoyah plant was forced to shut
down in 1992 for safety reasons, after another toxic release occurred.

The immediate chemical hazard from UF6 is entirely due to hydrogen fluoride gas…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Recommendation 1. That CNSC require Cameco to establish and maintain an “exclusion zone” of at least 2 kilometres around the PHCF plant as a prudent margin of safety for the population in case of a large release of uranium hexafluoride or hydrogen fluoride.

Recommendation 2. That CNSC not grant a licence to Cameco for the PHCF for a period of more than two years, so that if recommendation 1 cannot be fulfilled for any reason, the PHCF can be relocated to a site that will be able to accommodate such an exclusion zone………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Recommendation 3. That CNSC not grant a licence to Cameco for the Port Hope
Conversion Facility for a period exceeding two years, during which time Cameco be
required to devise a detailed emergency measures plan with a well-publicized evacuation
plan for the entire downtown area of Port Hope including a full rehearsal of such an
emergency evacuation plan, based on the contingency of a malicious act against the plant. https://www.ccnr.org/CCNR_PHCF_CNSC_2026.pdf