The end of the Polish-Ukrainian love story

Behind Poland and Ukraine’s symbolic feud lies a brutal fight over EU cash, borders, and regional dominance.

23 Jun, 2026, By Ksenia Smertina, Senior lecturer at the HSE Institute for Media, expert at the Russian International Affairs Council on Eastern and Central Europe

At the heart of Polish historical literature, brilliantly adapted for the screen by film director Andrzej Wajda, is a timeless, almost archetypal Slavic narrative. Take Adam Mickiewicz’s poem, ‘Pan Tadeusz’, or Aleksander Fredro’s comedy, ‘The Revenge’. In both cases, we see two noble clans trapped in a shared space – whether within a city or castle walls – selflessly and relentlessly destroying each other over long-held historical grievances, ambitions, and boundary disputes, while the entire ‘security architecture’ around them crumbles.

The stories have different endings, but the historical circumstances are similar, which undoubtedly provides grounds for reflection on the complex fate of the Polish people. Comparing the recent ‘war of the orders’ between Warsaw and Kiev with the above-mentioned historical narratives, it becomes clear that June 2026 will go down in the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations and diplomacy as the political version of a scene from an old Polish comedy about squabbling neighbors. However, this incident demonstrates several important aspects that define Poland’s current condition and foreign policy which are worth reflecting on.

On June 19, Polish President Karol Nawrocki decided to strip Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky of the Order of the White Eagle because a Ukrainian unit was named after the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA). He also stated that Poland would not allow those who do not understand the need to renounce the “cult of totalitarianism and violence” to join the EU.

What the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was, and why Poland was offended by it?

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was a nationalist group that collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II. It perpetrated the 1943–1944 Volhynia massacres, in which tens of thousands of Polish civilians were killed. This is why any official glorification of the UPA remains one of the most explosive issues in Polish-Ukrainian relations.

Kiev’s reaction was deafening, triggering an avalanche that was clearly unexpected in Warsaw. Zelensky demonstratively returned the order of merit to Nawrocki by mail. But the most surprising thing was the complete solidarity shown by Ukraine’s former presidents: Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko, and Pyotr Poroshenko all simultaneously announced that they would also renounce their Orders of the White Eagle and return them to Warsaw. Pretending that they ‘didn’t want them anyway’, the former presidents arrogantly declared that they were returning the awards to “the Poland that betrayed European solidarity,” calling Nawrocki’s decision an insult, while contrasting these pieces of metal with recognition of their own people. Following their lead, Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Kirill Budanov, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrey Sibiga also renounced their Polish orders of merit, turning one of Europe’s highest and oldest awards into a devalued bargaining chip.

To better understand what’s really behind all the commotion, we will examine two important factors: domestic political developments in Poland, and the state of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the context of Poland’s Eastern policy and its relations with its allies.

Domestic politics

Poland’s domestic political agenda is best characterized by the term ‘Polish-Polish war’, which has become widespread in Polish national discourse. The term, coined after the 2005 electoral rift, has become the official formula for the country’s political deadlock. Both the ‘right’ and ‘left’ sides of the Polish political spectrum are becoming radicalized, and as the rift deepens, centrism is disappearing from Polish society……………………………………………….

the current scandal in Ukrainian-Polish relations has, in part, been provoked by the escalation of tensions in Poland’s own domestic politics. ………………………………………………….

Polish-Ukrainian relations and Poland’s Eastern policy

Polish domestic politics is unstable, but despite all its ups and downs, there is a consensus on the enduring principles of the country’s foreign policy. Among them is Poland’s Eastern policy, based on Jerzy Giedroyc’s idea about special relations with neighbors. Warsaw saw itself as the exclusive advocate, curator, and ‘big brother’ of Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, striving to create a controlled cordon sanitaire against Russia………………………….

It is becoming clear that the Polish elites, who for years demanded Ukraine’s accession to the EU, were unprepared for how Polish society would react to the prospect of sharing European money, markets, and subsidies with their eastern neighbor. The conflict surrounding the agricultural sector is particularly illustrative. Poland has been the main beneficiary of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for 20 years, receiving billions in subsidies for its farms. Upon integration into the EU, Ukraine will also receive financial subsidies to bring its agricultural sector into line with Brussels’ standards. At the same time, Poland will transform from a recipient of European funds into a donor, obligated to pay for others. And that’s not a role that Polish society is prepared to fulfill.

Warsaw’s harsh economic blockade of Kiev should be seen in this light. When Ukrainian grain, poultry, and transport companies began to pose a threat of real competition to Poles within the EU, Poland quickly blocked its borders, dumped grain from train cars onto the rails, and imposed strict protectionist barriers. For Kiev, this was a painful revelation:…………………………………………………………………………………………………….https://www.rt.com/news/642019-end-of-polish-ukrainian-love/