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Ruthenium 106 investigation update 12 Dec 2017. Who is lying and why?

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Europe blames Russia and Russia blames Europe but could the release have come from somewhere else?

The story behind Ru 106 that is given little attention is the fact that it is quite an aggressive isotope that is used mainly in the manufacture of medical isotopes. Its nature is to become very volatile when heated and exposed to air. Then Ru 106 becomes both oxidized which deposits on surfaces and also is lofted into the air in a pure gaseous version. The deposited oxidized version then over time becomes gaseous (which might explain the weeks that the Ru 106 was being sampled in the air.

The main areas of interest to most people is where did it come from? What is a likely source?

After some research I was drawn to the Hungarian nuclear Ruthenium 106 experiments which have run since 2002 (and possibly before) that were supported by the EU commission to find out how damaged fuel rods might react in different situations. In Hungary I discovered at least two possible sources for where this isotope may be created.

These test reports mention Fukushima and may be useful to the cleanup there. Also, High Burn up fuel rods (fuel rods used for longer)  and MOX fuel rods (As used in unit 3 Daichi in Fukushima)  hold much more Ruthenium than normal nuclear fuel rods. There is another possibility that a Spent fuel pool from a reactor/waste site that had a slow leak and that conditions created the Ru 106 isotope but this is not as likely as a research created source.

Source for image; https://stresa.jrc.ec.europa.eu/facilities/ruset

Source for image; https://stresa.jrc.ec.europa.eu/facilities/e110dbaeki

Presuming that it was from Hungary, why would both the EU and Russia want to cover it up? well the UN based IAEA nuclear regulator has been known to cover up contamination incidents from Hungary in the past. Read on for more!

September 2011 nuclear releases from Hungary, Fukushima or Pakistan?

The Pakistan nuclear industry was blamed by Poland and the IAEA either ignored the data from Europes radiation monitoring system EURDEP, or were lied to by the Hungarians (links below). However, by the 17th WNN had released a statement on the matter and linked the Hungary reactor to the incident with the caveat that the levels were too low for any health issues in Europe which was untrue. CRIIRAD and independent nuclear advisory group, set up after Chernobyl, actually went to Budapest and recommended locals to not eat leafy vegetables and avoid dairy products sourced locally because of the levels of Iodine 125 (which would not degrade from the environment for 2 years).

A recurring theme is to delay the announcement of the releases of radiation so that it would be hard to find the source of the pollution as isotopes breakdown and dissipate with weathering. Even though radiation is very easy to find (especially the isotopes reported), The nuclear industry and the IAEA put peoples lives at risk and this has been mentioned by  CRIIRAD.org here concerning the February 2017 report of radioactive pollution and then in March 2017 a more robust critique of this nuclear industry delay strategy here . My personal feeling is that the February 2017 release was from Hungary.

So why would the nuclear industry be so protective of the Hungarian nuclear industries excess pollution problems?

Firstly a lot of money goes into research, secondly it is much easier to hide a pollution incident in a country that is very corrupt and autocratic and thirdly the pressures to manufacture high profit medical isotopes that are in short supply.

Russia works closely with all countries concerning nuclear issues, including covering up the health effects in Fukushima and Chernobyl. Russia also helps finance the Norways ancient Halden research reactor that had an accident in October 2016 and was blamed (unfairly) for a release in March 2017.

So there is some speculation on my part and it is possible that Mayak still might be the source as the Russians are not letting international reporters onto the site for another 2 months (to allow the cleanup of the contamination?) whilst allowing local reporters on site (who are less likely to turn up with sophisticated testing devices perhaps?). I am sure that the IAEA will not tell us nor will any nuclear industry groups, so much for the new “transparency” post Fukushima, just business as usual!

Posted by Shaun McGee on 12 Dec 2017

SOURCE NOTES FOR REPORT

Prevarication by the nuclear industry on the 2011 release of iodine 125

17 November 2011 – The cause of trace detection of radioactive iodine-131 in Europe has been identified as ‘most probably’ a release from a Hungarian factory making medical isotopes….. The Izotop facility is near to the Budapest Research Reactor. As well as iodine-131 it supplies radioisotopes for pharmaceutical, scientific and industrial use including yttrium-90, technetium-99m, iodine-125, samarium-153, holmium-166 and lutetium-177.

No KANUPP linkage to Radioactivity in Europe, PAEC clarifies, AP of Pakistan, Nov. 12, 2011 – The entire news item is based upon the statement attributed to the spokesman of the Polish atomic energy agency who only said: “Unconfirmed reports suggest there may have been an incident at a nuclear power station in Pakistan but this requires further confirmation”

11 November 2011 – THE IAEA PRESS RELEASE – “11 November 2011 | Vienna, Austria – The IAEA has received information from the State Office for Nuclear Safety of the Czech Republic that very low levels of iodine-131 have been measured in the atmosphere over the Czech Republic in recent days.
The IAEA has learned about similar measurements in other locations across Europe.
The IAEA believes the current trace levels of iodine-131 that have been measured do not pose a public health risk and are not caused by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in Japan.
Iodine-131 is a short-lived radioisotope that has a radioactive decay half-life of about eight days.
The IAEA is working with its counterparts to determine the cause and origin of the iodine-131.
The IAEA will provide further information via its website as it becomes available.

Sources for the technical aspects concerning Ru 106 mentioned in my report;

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) carried out some tests which consisted of heating pieces of irradiated fuel pellets, under different atmospheres. The fuel BU of the test called H02 was 10 GWd/tU. This test was performed under Ar/H 2 atmosphere, and next in air. The maximum temperature reached was 2163 K. Figure 2 shows that, as soon as an oxidizing atmosphere is present (transition from Ar/H 2 mixture to air atmosphere), ruthenium release increases drastically to reach a value close to that of 133 Xe, which is a very volatile compound, released at nearly 100%. It is worth noticing the presence of an induction time (approximately 5000 seconds) assumed to correspond to time necessary for oxidation of the UO 2 matrix by air, next Ru release is extremely quick [12]. 5In the frame of the PHEBUS–RUSET programme, in 2002 the Hungarian research organization (AEKI) studied the ruthenium release at high temperature in oxidising environment. These tests confirmed the presence of a gaseous type of ruthenium [13].

https://hal-irsn.archives-ouvertes.fr/irsn-00177621/document

Air ingress and its contact with fuel can result in significant releases of some fission products. This is especially the case for ruthenium which has the same radiotoxicity as iodine in short term through caesium in medium term through 103 Ru isotope and as 106 Ru isotope. Globally, the ruthenium release from the core may be 10 to 50 times higher than with steam only and the ruthenium tetra-oxide might represent a problem comparable with that of iodine. The safety impacts of such air ingress was analysed in an AECL test [18] and most recently in an AEKI RUSET test [19] and also discussed at the PHEBUS Air Ingress Working Group.

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3.3.2 FUEL DEGRADATION PROCESS IN SPENT FUEL POOLS

At first sight, it seems reasonable to assume that air could be present when melting occurs in the open spent fuel pool, in contrast to the closed RPV where no air access is possible. The presence of air instead of steam would, in particular, change the chemistry of the degradation process: Zr would be oxidized by Oxygen from air instead of by Oxygen from water. The thermal output of Zr-air oxidation is higher, but on the other hand less or no hydrogen would be produced. Volatile Ruthenium oxide could be produced by air impact, which is very relevant in terms of radiological effect. However, analyses performed (see appendix 10.1) with MELCOR under various conditions show that the previous evaporation of the large amount of water from the SFP would almost
completely generate a steam atmosphere with little air having access to the degrading fuel. There are only two potential scenarios which may lead to significant oxidation by air: A rather fast loss of coolant from the SFP can be practically excluded in some SFP designs), or an extremely low evaporation from the SFP with most of the steam being condensed before fuel degradation. However, the latter sequence may last for weeks, and have such a low energetic level that even without water the SFP may not heat up to the threshold for chemical reaction.
During fuel degradation in the SFP (before Molten Corium Concrete Interaction (MCCI) begins) the temperatures in some of the sequences are lower than in RPV accidents during normal operation. Therefore less radionuclides are released from fuel. However, after MCCI has started the release fractions from fuel reach levels which are known from accidents in the RPV.

http://asampsa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ASAMPSA_E-WP40-D40-6_L2PSA-SFP-shutdow-PSA-research-review.pdf

December 12, 2017 - Posted by arclight2011part2 | Uncategorized