nuclear-news

The News That Matters about the Nuclear Industry Fukushima Chernobyl Mayak Three Mile Island Atomic Testing Radiation Isotope

The western way of war – Owning the narrative trumps reality

Take, for example, the NATO-orchestrated and equipped incursion into the symbolically significant Kursk Oblast. In terms of a ‘winning narrative’, its appeal to the West is obvious: Ukraine ‘takes the war to into Russia’.

Alastair Crooke, Strategic Culture Foundation, Mon, 26 Aug 2024

War propaganda and feint are as old as the hills. Nothing new. But what is new is that infowar is no longer the adjunct to wider war objectives – but has become an end in and of itself.

The West has come to view ‘owning’ the winning narrative – and presenting the Other’s as clunky, dissonant, and extremist – as being more important than facing facts-on-the ground. Owning the winning narrative is to win, in this view. Virtual ‘victory’ thus trumps ‘real’ reality.

Had the Ukrainian forces succeeded in capturing the Kursk Nuclear Power Station, they then would have had a significant bargaining chip, and might well have syphoned away Russian forces from the steadily collapsing Ukrainian ‘Line’ in Donbas.

And to top it off, (in infowar terms), the western media was prepped and aligned to show President Putin as “frozen” by the surprise incursion, and “wobbling” with anxiety that the Russian public would turn against him in their anger at the humiliation.

Bill Burns, head of CIA, opined that “Russia would offer no concessions on Ukraine, until Putin’s over-confidence was challenged, and Ukraine could show strength“. Other U.S. officials added that the Kursk incursion – in itself – would not bring Russia to the negotiating table; It would be necessary to build on the Kursk operation with other daring operations (to shake Moscow’s sang froid).

Of course, the overall aim was to show Russia as fragile and vulnerable, in line with the narrative that, at any moment Russia, could crack apart and scatter to the wind, in fragments. Leaving the West as winner, of course.

In fact, the Kursk incursion was a huge NATO gamble: It involved mortgaging Ukraine’s military reserves and armour, as chips on the roulette table, as a bet that an ephemeral success in Kursk would upend the strategic balance. The bet was lost, and the chips forfeit.

So, war becomes rather the setting for imposing ideological alignment across a wide global alliance and enforcing it via compliant media.

This objective enjoys a higher priority than, say, ensuring a manufacturing capacity sufficient to sustain military objectives. Crafting an imagined ‘reality’ has taken precedence over shaping the ground reality.

The point here is that this approach – being a function of whole of society alignment (both at home and abroad) – creates entrapments into false realities, false expectations, from which an exit (when such becomes necessary), turns near impossible, precisely because imposed alignment has ossified public sentiment. The possibility for a State to change course as events unfold becomes curtailed or lost, and the accurate reading of facts on the ground veers toward the politically correct and away from reality.

The cumulative effect of ‘a winning virtual narrative’ holds the risk nonetheless, of sliding incrementally toward inadvertent ‘real war’.

Take, for example, the NATO-orchestrated and equipped incursion into the symbolically significant Kursk Oblast. In terms of a ‘winning narrative’, its appeal to the West is obvious: Ukraine ‘takes the war to into Russia’.

Plainly put, this Kursk affair exemplifies the West’s problem with ‘winning narratives’: Their inherent flaw is that they are grounded in emotivism and eschew argumentation. Inevitably, they are simplistic. They are simply intended to fuel a ‘whole of society’ common alignment. Which is to say that across MSM; business, federal agencies, NGOs and the security sector, all should adhere to opposing all ‘extremisms’ threatening ‘our democracy’.

This aim, of itself, dictates that the narrative be undemanding and relatively uncontentious: ‘Our Democracy, Our Values and Our Consensus’. The Democratic National Convention, for example, embraces ‘Joy’ (repeated endlessly), ‘moving Forward’ and ‘opposing weirdness’ as key statements. They are banal, however, these memes are given their energy and momentum, not by content so much, as by the deliberate Hollywood setting lending them razzamatazz and glamour.

It is not hard to see how this one-dimensional zeitgeist may have contributed to the U.S. and its allies’ misreading the impact of today’s Kursk ‘daring adventure’ on ordinary Russians.

‘Kursk’ has history. In 1943, Germany invaded Russia in Kursk to divert from its own losses, with Germany ultimately defeated at the Battle of Kursk. The return of German military equipment to the environs of Kursk must have left many gaping; the current battlefield around the town of Sudzha is precisely the spot where, in 1943, the Soviet 38th and 40th armies coiled for a counteroffensive against the German 4th Army.

Over the centuries, Russia has been variously attacked on its vulnerable flank from the West. And more recently by Napoleon and Hitler. Unsurprisingly, Russians are acutely sensitive to this bloody history. Did Bill Burns et al think this through? Did they imagine that NATO invading Russia itself would make Putin feel ‘challenged’, and that with one further shove, he would fold, and agree to a ‘frozen’ outcome in Ukraine – with the latter entering NATO? Maybe they did.

Ultimately the message that western services sent was that the West (NATO) is coming for Russia. This is the meaning of deliberately choosing Kursk. Reading the runes of Bill Burns message says prepare for war with NATO.

Just to be clear, this genre of ‘winning narrative’ surrounding Kursk is neither deceit nor feint. The Minsk Accords were examples of deceit, but they were deceits grounded in rational strategy (i.e. they were historically normal). The Minsk deceits were intended to buy the West time to further Ukraine’s militarisation – before attacking the Donbas. The deceit worked, but only at the price of a rupture of trust between Russia and the West. The Minsk deceits however, also accelerated an end to the 200-year era of the westification of Russia.

Kursk rather, is a different ‘fish’. It is grounded in the notions of western exceptionalism. The West perceives itself as tacking to ‘the right side of History’. ‘Winning narratives’ essentially assert – in secular format – the inevitability of the western eschatological Mission for global redemption and convergence. In this new narrative context, facts-on-the-ground become mere irritants, and not realities that must be taken into account.

This their Achilles’ Heel.

The DNC convention in Chicago however, underscored a further concern:………………………………………………………………….

The Kursk ploy no doubt seemed clever and audacious to London and Washington. Yet with what result? It achieved neither objective of taking Kursk NPP, nor of syphoning Russian troops from the Contact Line. The Ukrainian presence in the Kursk Oblast will be eliminated.

What it did do, however, is put an end to all prospects of an eventual negotiated settlement in Ukraine. Distrust of the U.S. in Russia is now absolute. It has made Moscow more determined to prosecute the special operation to conclusion. German equipment visible in Kursk has raised old ghosts, and consolidated awareness of the hostile western intentions toward Russia. ‘Never again’ is the unspoken riposte.  https://www.sott.net/article/494279-The-western-way-of-war-Owning-the-narrative-trumps-reality

August 28, 2024 Posted by | culture and arts, Ukraine, USA | Leave a comment

Ukraine doubles down on Russian reactors in nuclear power push

Politico, August 27, 2024, By Gabriel Gavin

Ukraine will push forward with controversial plans to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on aging Russian-made nuclear reactors despite growing opposition from lawmakers, the country’s energy minister said, amid warnings of a major power crisis this winter.

German Galushchenko told POLITICO that the government still intends to pursue the expansion of the Khmelnytskyi nuclear power station in western Ukraine, buying two VVER-1000 reactors currently in storage in Bulgaria. The proposal has drawn criticism from the ruling party’s own MPs, who say there are quicker ways to help prop up the electricity grid, which has been hit hard by Russian bombing…………………..

Last week, Ukrainian MPs told POLITICO that the government had been forced to acknowledge it did not have sufficient support in the parliament to pass a draft law legislating for the purchase of the reactors.

According to Andrii Zhupanyn, a lawmaker from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People Party, such defeats are “extremely rare.”

MPs questioned whether the mothballed reactors, bought by Bulgaria more than a decade ago, would be able to be quickly brought into service, and whether the funds could be better spent on renewable power and other sources of electricity. The costs, they said, would likely balloon and open the door to corruption………………………………………………………………………….  https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-russia-reactor-khmelnytskyi-nuclear-power-station/

August 28, 2024 Posted by | business and costs, Ukraine | Leave a comment

The heroes who saved the world from Chernobyl Two.

they were facing a life-or-death decision – stay or go. The Russians had told them they could leave – but what would happen if there was no one to monitor the radiation and ensure its safety?

the choices they made saved the world from another Chernobyl disaster.

Daily Mail, By Serhii Plokhy, 25 August 2024

Even though he had one of the most challenging jobs in the world as the man in charge of the night-shift at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, nothing fazed Valentyn Heiko. Three-and-a-half decades after the disastrous meltdown in 1986, round-the-clock monitoring of the site in Ukraine continued for deadly radioactive fallout from its defunct reactors and facilities.

On March 1, 2022, Heiko wished staff via loudspeaker ‘peace of the spirit’. It was a brave and apt message in the circumstances – and a defiant one. Because the corridors around the control rooms of the closed – but still lethally contaminated – nuclear compound were being patrolled by machine-gun toting, trigger-happy Russian soldiers.

Following Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine six days previously, they had burst their way in and taken over the plant.

Back in 1986, a massive explosion in one of Chernobyl’s reactors had blasted about 300 tons of radioactive graphite into the air, sparking a worldwide emergency.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union five years later, the area became part of an independent Ukraine, whose nuclear specialists have since been undertaking the monumental task of containing all possible contamination.

The danger was far from over. Indeed, just a year before, engineers had detected worrying signs that fission had restarted in one of the supposedly defunct reactors, threatening another accident.

After Putin’s decision to invade, the quickest route to the capital, Kyiv, was to go through the wasteland of the Chernobyl exclusion zone. One of the Russian leader’s excuses for invading was his claim that Ukraine was secretly building a nuclear bomb there and enriching irradiated materials to turn into weapons of mass destruction.

On February 24, 2022 – the first day of the invasion – a column of armoured vehicles broke through the security perimeter and hauled down the Ukrainian flag.

Inside the administrative building, soldiers of the Ukrainian National Guard unit took up positions, ready to fight. Two Russian officers, general Sergei Burakov and colonel Andrei Frolenkov, announced that they were assuming control of the plant.

Hopelessly outnumbered, the 170 Ukrainian guards put down their weapons and became prisoners of war, while the plant’s 50 engineers and operators and 80 firefighters found themselves under occupation.

Suddenly, they were facing a life-or-death decision – stay or go. The Russians had told them they could leave – but what would happen if there was no one to monitor the radiation and ensure its safety?

They knew they had to stay. So, for weeks, they worked at gunpoint with no change of clothing, medication or hygienic supplies.

In effect, these men and women were hostages, stuck on an endless shift, uncertain if they would ever see their loved ones or their homes again. But the choices they made saved the world from another Chernobyl disaster.

Their foreman, Heiko, had to cooperate with the Russians but was determined to do so on his own terms. He came up with a daring plan – he would use his technical know-how to frighten them.

Calmly, he introduced himself to his captors: ‘I am the shift supervisor and represent the state of Ukraine.’ After Heiko had confirmed the identity of his Russian ‘guests’, Burakov and Frolenkov declared that the Chernobyl plant was now behind Russian lines.

Though a captive, Heiko laid down his ground rules. He told them that no matter how powerful the Russian military, at the nuclear plant they were not in charge.

They didn’t understand how the plant worked and, as such, any interference would risk nuclear disaster – and all their lives.

As one observer noted: ‘He made it clear to the occupiers that either they would behave decently or be up s**t creek. That is why they did not touch any workers.’

They agreed his terms. Operational control would remain in the hands of the staff, who would be free to move around as necessary and without interference.

The Russian soldiers were allowed in the administration building but would stay away from the obsolete reactor and spent nuclear fuel facilities, and arms would be prohibited in operational areas.

The Russians accepted that they had captured a dangerous site and, to survive, they would have to follow Heiko’s recommendations.

He even bamboozled them into believing that three reactors were still operational when, in fact, the last one had shut in 2000.

As the days of occupation continued, Heiko turned the screws even more, particularly after Putin hinted at the use of nuclear weapons. He told his captors that if the Kremlin used nuclear weapons against Ukraine, he would sabotage the plant and unleash Chernobyl radiation to kill the Russians.

‘I promise you,’ he spelt out, ‘that you will slowly and certainly die here, together with me. I have enough knowledge and skill to ensure that you will remain here with us forever.’

Despite Heiko’s master manipulation, his fellow Ukrainian staff were totally unprepared for the situation they found themselves in. They lived and worked in appalling conditions, jammed into tiny spaces, four to a room

The work was unrelenting. Under normal circumstances, they were to take a 24-hour rest after a 12-hour shift, but now a new shift began immediately after the previous one. ‘We worked almost round the clock, resting for just a few hours,’ remembered engineer Liudmyla Kozak. ‘We were walking around like ghosts.’

Exhausted and homesick, they felt hunted as they were continuously under surveillance. Some succumbed to depression or panic, feeling ‘trapped, stressed and desperate for relief’ in the words of an article in the Wall Street Journal.

………………………………………..Troops started searching for those ‘nuclear bomb’ laboratories imagined by Putin. All the plant’s buildings were checked, with no result. Then, Russian officers considered opening up the mounds of earth erected over the sites where radioactive debris had been buried after the meltdown in 1986.

Valerii Semenov, a senior engineer, told them they were mad as exposing radioactive debris would put everyone in danger of contamination. Faced with the prospect of digging their own radioactive graves, the Russians desisted. Instead, they fortified their military position by digging trenches.

When Semenov discovered sandbags used to protect firing positions had been sourced from contaminated earth, he exploded: ‘You’re bringing in radioactive dirt from outside. Are you out of your mind?’ He also found trenches dug in some of the most contaminated areas – including one where, in 1986, radiation had discoloured the pine trees ginger brown.

The fact was that morale among the 1,000 Russian troops occupying the plant was very low. They drank heavily, with up to half of their rubbish consisting of empty bottles. Fights were frequent. So was looting as they combed the offices for alcohol.

Semenov recalled that many of the Russians were not prepared for a long war. They had expected it to be over within days.

What happened next was arguably the most heroic episode of the whole Chernobyl saga. It was increasingly obvious that staff at the plant had had enough. Even the Russian commanders agreed, realising the exhaustion and resentment of the Ukrainian personnel might lead to an accident that would jeopardise the lives of the occupiers.

They proposed a change of shift, allowing those on duty ever since the occupation to go home, to be replaced by a crew from the nearby town of Slavutych. But this depended on finding experienced staff prepared to risk their freedom – and perhaps their lives – by going into Russian captivity.

Amazingly, there was no lack of volunteers. Forty-six men and women came forward, with two senior men, Volodymyr Falshovnyk and Serhii Makliuk, offering to lead the new shift. Makliuk recalled: ‘We were worried because we were going into the unknown. But our anxiety was less about how we would work at the plant and more what would happen to the families we were leaving behind.’

It was a complicated process getting the original shift out and the new one in, not least because it had to be done in stages so there would always be some staff left to monitor the place. On the 26th day of what had begun as a 12-hour shift, 50 workers were on their way home – 16 engineers and mechanics stayed, including Semenov.

The two shifts met on the side of a river and the exchange took place. ‘We had just seconds to embrace and shed tears,’ recalled a woman from Heiko’s shift.

Heiko considered the volunteers true heroes. ‘They were going into the unknown,’ he said later. ‘No one knew how it would end or how long they would be there.’

Heiko and his crew had spent 600 hours on duty at the occupied nuclear power plant. It was anyone’s guess how long the replacement shift would be there………………………………………………………….

the Russians locked Falshovnyk in his office and presented him with a document.

It was titled ‘Act of Acceptance and Transfer of Protection of the Chernobyl Atomic Station’ and stated the troops of the Russian Guard had provided ‘reliable protection and defence’ of the Chernobyl nuclear station, which they were now transferring back to the Ukrainians. Men carrying automatic rifles demanded that he and Makliuk sign the document or they would be arrested.

They were being asked to confirm that the Russians had behaved well but, faced with the threat of arrest, they signed.

And then, the Russians were gone. A security camera captured an image of one soldier leaving with a Russian flag trailing behind him like the low-hanging tail of a defeated dog.

The next day, April 3, those inside the plant were astonished to hear a voice on a loudspeaker coming from beyond the perimeter. ‘Good morning,’ it said. ‘We are the armed forces of Ukraine. Please let us in.’

And then a Ukrainian armoured personnel carrier and two trucks rolled into Chernobyl.

It really was over.

The Chernobyl staff got to work cleaning up. The extent of the Russian troops’ damage and looting was astounding.

Missing were some 1,500 meters for checking radiation levels, 698 computers and 344 vehicles, amounting to a total value of $135million (£102million).

The only thing the retreating Russian soldiers left behind was an increased level of radiation – up more than 40 times, almost certainly the result of digging trenches in the highly contaminated Red Forest.

There were unverified reports from inside Russia that one soldier had died, 26 had been admitted to hospital and 73 sent for treatment after exposure to radiation in the Chernobyl zone.

The Ukrainians believed that one reason they departed in such a hurry was in panic that so many of them were falling sick.

The Russian troops may have left Chernobyl, but there was every chance that Chernobyl would never leave them. And the threat of nuclear disaster remains very real elsewhere in Ukraine.

Zaporizhia, a nuclear plant in southern Ukraine and the largest power facility in Europe, remains under Russian control.

And last Saturday, following a drone strike nearby, the UN’s nuclear watchdog warned that the safety situation at the plant was ‘deteriorating’.

At Chernobyl, the brave actions of the plant workers prevented nuclear disaster, but we cannot always count on individual heroism to produce such endings in the future.

Unless the world acts to protect nuclear reactors from attack during wartime, instead of being a solution to the problem of climate change, nuclear power will solidify its reputation as the destroyer of worlds.

Adapted from Chernobyl Roulette by Serhii Plokhy (Allen Lane, £25), out on September 3. © Serhii Plokhy 2024. To order a copy for £22.50 (offer valid to 06/09/24; UK P&P free on orders over £25) see tomailshop.co.uk/books or call 020 3176 2937

August 27, 2024 Posted by | Reference, Religion and ethics, Ukraine | Leave a comment

The Battle of Kursk probably won’t result in nuclear weapons use against Ukraine. But Russian escalation vis-à-vis NATO can’t be ruled out.

any nuclear use against Ukraine would be self-defeating for Russia.

involvement of the West turned Russia’s so-called “special military operation” (“SVO” in Russia) into a full-scale war. Consequently, nuclear signaling has been addressed to the West.

Russia’s central concern is the possible Western involvement in the war on the side of Ukraine, which can turn the tide at the front line. The most visible cause for such concern is the provision of modern Western arms to Ukraine, including long-range missiles capable of targeting deep into Russian territory.

Bulletin, By Nikolai N. Sokov | August 26, 2024

The successful Ukrainian offensive in the Russian Kursk oblast started in early August has once again triggered speculation about possible Russian nuclear use against Ukraine. The situation resembles the successful Ukrainian offensive in the late summer-fall of 2022 in the Kharkiv oblast, when many worried Russia would resort to battlefield nuclear use to stop advancing Ukrainian forces. On the face of it, there was reason to be concerned: Russian President Vladimir Putin did reference nuclear weapons in September 2022, and it became known more than a year later that the United States was “rigorously” preparing for that contingency.

A closer look reveals, however, that Putin’s 2022 reference to nuclear weapons sounded as an emotional impromptu remark made under stress, whereas the US assessment was reportedly based on an intercept of conversations among Russian generals rather than on tangible signs of preparation or data about discussions among policymakers. We now know that Moscow dealt with that situation in a different way: Partial mobilization helped beef up forces, which stopped the Ukrainian Kharkiv offensive.

Although the Kursk operation caught Russia by surprise once again, its military and civilian leadership are better prepared today to deal with surprise than in 2022.

One has reasons to be skeptical about the prospect of battlefield use of nuclear weapons. It was considered an acceptable option during the Cold War, especially its early years. Both the United States and the Soviet Union held large-scale exercises with live nuclear explosions in the 1950s, and both nuclear powers contemplated large-scale use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Today, however, is different. The “nuclear taboo,” which began to take shape in the 1950s, has grown very strong.

Not that nuclear use is technically impossible. But the political and ethical implications make such a decision daunting—and unlikely. Battlefield nuclear use in Ukraine, for whatever reason, would make Russia a true pariah state in the international system, turning countries—partners and neutrals alike, all critical for breaking the tight sanctions regime, which has been established by the G7 economies and their partners—against Moscow. In other words, any nuclear use against Ukraine would be self-defeating for Russia.

Nuclear signals. Russian nuclear signaling has been persistent, going up and down throughout the war, with high points in the fall of 2022 and the spring of 2024, when Russian official rhetoric was the loudest. (Unofficial and semi-official rhetoric has never really stopped.) This signaling, however, has been exclusively and explicitly directed at the West—the United States and its allies. Even the very first statement of Putin announcing the “special military operation” contained a message to the West: “Do not interfere.”

This is hardly surprising: The war is conceptualized in Russia as a proxy war with NATO. Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, has repeatedly said—most recently in March and June of this year—that involvement of the West turned Russia’s so-called “special military operation” (“SVO” in Russia) into a full-scale war. Consequently, nuclear signaling has been addressed to the West.

The Ukrainian operation in Kursk may carry certain risks, but these risks are different from what is commonly and hastily assumed as nuclear use against Ukraine.

Russia’s central concern is the possible Western involvement in the war on the side of Ukraine, which can turn the tide at the front line. The most visible cause for such concern is the provision of modern Western arms to Ukraine, including long-range missiles capable of targeting deep into Russian territory.

At a certain level, Western assistance may create serious, perhaps even insurmountable challenges for the Russian military. Each new step—including the provision of tanks, missile defense systems, tactical ballistic missile systems, and most recently F-16 fighter jets—triggers warnings about possible escalation. So far, Russia has coped with each new level of Ukraine’s military capability, but this may change in the future if Western assistance continues or even intensifies.

Perhaps more consequential for Russia, although less visible, is the provision of intelligence, which has helped Ukraine to select targets and significantly constrains Russia’s ability to clandestinely concentrate and move forces and supplies……………………………….

Russians often repeat that a nuclear state cannot be defeated. This is true only to an extent, but there is realization in the Kremlin and beyond that defeat in the ongoing war cannot be tactical. Not only it will end the political regime—which the Kremlin equates with sovereignty—but consequences will affect the entire country for decades. If Russia considers itself de facto at war with the United States and NATO and believes the West seeks its “strategic defeat,” then nuclear weapons legitimately enter the picture under the existing 2020 Decree on Nuclear Deterrence and the 2014 Military Doctrine.  This is precisely the situation the United States has tried to avoid: ………………………………

Russian nuclear signals to the West can be divided into two categories.

The first is public statements, especially coming from the most authoritative source, Vladimir Putin, which have been relatively rare—namely, the “SVO” announcement and the September 2022 warning referenced above. ………………………. If someone’s actions will threaten our sovereignty and territorial integrity, we consider it allowable to use all means at our disposal.” Putin also declared that ndeclaredew threats may force Russia to change its nuclear doctrine, hinting that the nuclear threshold might be lowered.

The second category of nuclear signals is arguably more tangible: actions that change Russia’s nuclear posture and/or alert level. Such actions notably include nuclear sharing arrangements with Belarus, whose implementation began in the summer of 2022—after it became clear that war with Ukraine would be protracted, and Russia could not prevent the West from providing assistance to Ukraine—and was completed already in mid-2023. Other highly visible examples are exercises with tactical nuclear weapons, which have been held in three stages in May, June, and August of 2024………………….

Fuzzy red lines. Without doubt, publicly playing with the prospect of nuclear war is dangerous—in addition to be morally reprehensible—but one must admit that Moscow has been relatively restrained in its threats so far; it could certainly make more threats and make them more openly. So why has Russia shown such restraint as it conducts a full-fledged war?

……………………………………………………………………………………….The Russian leadership itself may not know what exactly constitutes a red line. So far, it seems to make such judgement after the fact, evaluating each new level of assistance to determine its impact on the course of the war. If and when such impact reaches a level that puts Russia on the brink of a “strategic defeat,” it may be classified as having crossed a red line…………………..

Evaluation of each new step takes time—from weeks to months. The absence of visible reaction may create a false sense of safety, potentially emboldening U.S. and Western officials. Then, if and when a Russian reaction takes place, it may catch Western allies by surprise and be perceived as unjustified and unprovoked, for the precise reason that the red line was unknown.

No doubt that Russia is very reluctant to launch an escalation that could result in nuclear use: The costs to Russia itself would be enormous—probably unbearable for the country and its leadership. ……………………………….

 ………the riskiest circumstances will happen after a red line has been crossed, not before. Each side will balance between caution and the perceived strategic need to act. Worse, a long sequence of moves that did not result in escalation may create a false sense of security and increase propensity for risk-taking on the part of Western military officials and political leaders.

…………………..The crossing of a red line in the war in Ukraine may not result in nuclear use. A more likely contingency is escalation starting with something relatively small, but visibly consequential………………………………………. The threat of nuclear use is expected to force the West to retreat, because its stakes in the conflict are believed to be lower than those of Russia in the war in Ukraine.

……………………………………………………………………..It can be predicted with reasonable confidence that Russia will not threaten, much less use, nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Escalation vis-à-vis NATO, however, is a different matter: That likelihood appears higher, but knowing in advance how high it is may be impossible.

Considering the risks outlined above, one obvious question is whether the West should continue and perhaps increase support of Ukraine. I believe that questions about the Kursk invasion and whether the West should continue aiding Ukraine are essentially unrelated. Regardless of which decision is made in regard to Western aid, the risks of that policy must be known and understood. Nothing good can come out of policy that is consciously blind to possible challenges. To the contrary, full information can enhance chances for success and lessen the likelihood of escalation.  https://thebulletin.org/2024/08/the-battle-of-kursk-probably-wont-result-in-nuclear-weapons-use-against-ukraine-but-russian-escalation-vis-a-vis-nato-cant-be-ruled-out/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=MondayNewsletter08262024&utm_content=NuclearRisk_RussianEscalationVisAVis_08262024

August 27, 2024 Posted by | Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Nuclear power risks rising in Russia-Ukraine war

Dr Philip Webber, SGR, warns that another nuclear power plant is at major risk as the war enters new territory.

Responsible Science blog, 22 August 2024 more https://www.sgr.org.uk/resources/nuclear-power-risks-rising-russia-ukraine-war—

The Russia-Ukraine war has already led to extremely serious risks to nuclear power plants. In a previous article, [1] I described in some detail those related to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) in Ukraine. The situation there has once again deteriorated – as I discuss below – but I want to focus first on the threat to another power station.

Kursk

Due to the Ukraine military incursion into the Kursk region of the Russian Federation, which began on 15 August, [2] there is now a severe risk to the huge Kursk nuclear power plant (KNPP) – which has elements in common with the Chernobyl plant. The KNPP is located some 60 kilometres from the border with Ukraine and is, at the time of writing, close to an area of fierce fighting. As a result, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued further warnings to remind the warring parties to not risk a nuclear disaster in Europe. [3][4]

The KNPP – like the ZNPP – includes six nuclear reactors, and is also one of the three biggest nuclear power stations in Russia. But there are two critical differences. First, two of the KNPP reactors are operating at full power. Second, these two reactors are of the same design – the RBMK – as the Chernobyl nuclear plant, which suffered the world’s worst nuclear accident in 1986. Crucially, these reactors have no protective dome structure [5] making them very vulnerable to a military strike or aircraft impact. With intense fighting only a few tens of kilometres away, both reactors are well within the range of artillery or rocket fire. A military strike on either reactor could initiate a very serious release of radioactive material creating a Europe-wide nuclear disaster.

It is anticipated that the IAEA will soon visit the Kursk NPP to assess the situation on the ground.

Zaporizhzhia

Returning to the situation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, IAEA inspectors stationed there have again reported intense military activity – artillery, rocket and heavy machine-gun fire – very close to the plant, and several instances of explosive drone strikes on the plant itself, as well as on vital electrical substations and surrounding woodland. [6] One of the two ZNPP cooling towers was hit, fires were started beside an electrical sub-station resulting in a loss of power, and the perimeter road was cratered.

The six ZNPP reactors are all in ‘cold shutdown’ but rely on a supply of electricity to power pumps for water cooling of the reactor cores – and a large number of spent fuel storage tanks – to prevent overheating to dangerous levels and a resultant release of radioactive material. The reliable supply of water remains a serious problem and emergency supplies of fuel for emergency diesel generators are also dangerously low.

Drone attacks also continue to be reported near Ukraine’s other nuclear power sites. [7]

The IAEA Director General, Rafael Grossi, has issued a series of warnings reminding both Russia and Ukraine of UN agreements to avoid military activity at or near nuclear plants. [8] However, the only way to remove these risks completely is for a rapid, negotiated end to the war.
 

Dr Philip Webber is Co-chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility. He has written widely on the risks of nuclear weapons and nuclear power – including co-authoring the book, London After the Bomb. He spent part of his career working as an emergency planner in local government.
 

References………………………………………………..

August 27, 2024 Posted by | Russia, safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Fire at Zaporizhzhia elevates meltdown risk

13 Aug 24,  https://cnduk.org/fire-at-zaporizhzhia-elevates-meltdown-risk/

CND scientific advisor, radiation expert Dr Ian Fairlie writes about the elevated risks posed by the recent fire at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. 

The recent fire at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in Ukraine is causing much concern throughout Europe.

Ukraine’s nuclear energy company, Energoatom, which operated the site until Russian forces seized control in the early days of the war, confirmed that flames broke out at the service water supply facility, later engulfing one of the cooling towers. Both Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky have traded blame for the fire. The six nuclear reactors at Zaporizhzhia are in cold shutdown and no nuclear activity was recorded on Sunday August 11, but the overall risk of nuclear meltdown remains elevated. 

In 1986, the huge nuclear accident at the Chornobyl nuclear station in Ukraine resulted in radioactive fallout throughout Europe including all of the UK.

Ideally, the UK government should make arrangements to pre-distribute prophylactic iodide tablets (to protect against thyroid cancer) to all individuals who wish them, as occurs in many countries, but it has resisted previous calls for this. Current UK official advice on iodide tablets merely states “you will be given official advice from government or emergency services on how to get them, when to take them and how much to take”.

In the absence of timely official UK advice, readers may wish to consult official US advice or the WHO’s advice.

August 26, 2024 Posted by | safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Zelensky’s Misadventures in Kursk

This operation is likely to be working upside-down to what we are reading in corporate media.

Not long prior to the incursion, the Biden regime had given Kiev dispensation to use U.S.–made weapons against Russian targets so long as these were deployed in self-defense and against military targets.

the question remains. What is the point as the Kursk operation continues?

By Patrick Lawrence / Original to ScheerPost, 23 Aug 24

It has been three weeks since ground units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine crossed into the Kursk province in southwestern Russia, surprising — or maybe not surprising — the U.S. and its clients in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Two days later, the AFU began artillery and drone attacks in Belgorod, a province just south of Kursk. It has been a little more than a week since explosions at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, which lies in what is now Russian territory along the Dnipro River, ignited a fire in one of the plant’s two cooling towers. All six reactors are now in cold shutdown. 


In the still-to-be-confirmed file, BelTA, the Belarusian news agency, reported last weekend that Ukraine has amassed significant forces along the Belarus–Ukraine border. Aleksandr Lukashenko, the Belarusian president, put the troop count at an improbable 120,000. Further out in speculative territory, RT International reported at the weekend that the AFU is “preparing a nuclear false flag—an explosion of a dirty atomic bomb,” targeting nuclear-waste storage sites at the Zaporozhye plant. RT cited “intelligence received by Russia” and a military correspondent and documentarian named Marat Khairullin. 

Hmmm. 

When I began my adventures in the great craft at the New York Daily News long years ago, two of the better shards of wisdom I picked up were, “Go with what you’ve got” and “When in doubt, leave it out.” Let us proceed accordingly as we consider Ukraine’s latest doings in the proxy war it wages. I will leave aside the BelTA and RT International reports pending further developments, but with this caveat: Amassing units along the Belarus border would be entirely in keeping with the AFU’s recent forays into Russian territory. As for the imminence of a dangerous false flag op at the Zaporozhye plant, I would not put it past a regime that has acted recklessly and irrationally on numerous occasions in the past. 

Why, we are left to ask of what we know to be so, did the AFU send troops, tanks, artillery, drone units, and assorted matériel into Kursk on Tuesday, Aug. 6? And then the ancillary operation in Belgorod? Everyone wondered this at first—supposedly everyone, anyway. This is our question, and I will shortly get to the “supposedly.” 

On the eve of the incursion, Kiev was losing ground steadily to a new Russian advance in eastern Ukraine. Critically short of troops, the Ukrainian forces are, indeed, about to lose a tactically significant town, Pokrovsk, on their side of the Russian border. The thought that the AFU would sustain and expand its Kursk operation to bring the war to Russian territory in any effective way is prima facie preposterous. What was the point? Where is the strategic gain? 

In his speech Monday evening at the Democratic Party convention in Chicago, Joe Biden defended his proxy war in Ukraine as a just war waged in the name of democracy and liberty. Oh? setting aside the emptiness of this characterization, the question remains. What is the point as the Kursk operation continues? The AFU now holds one Russian town and six villages, according to the latest reports, which also indicate they have set about destroying bridges critical to Russian supply lines. But where to from here? I do not see a sensible answer. 

There is no question the Russians were caught off guard when the AFU crossed into the border village of Sudzha and proceeded with evidently little initial resistance further into Russian territory. Hundreds of thousands of Russians have been evacuated; the governor of Belgorod quickly declared a state of emergency after the drone and artillery strikes of Aug. 14. 

But we cannot count this as any kind of astute strategic move. I do not pretend to have an inside read as to Russia’s apparent intelligence failure or what looks like its flat-footed response. But I do not think we can correctly mark down events to date to the AFU’s superior strength or the Russians’ weakness or incompetence. Western correspondents are having a fine old time reporting that klutzy, clumsy Moscow is once again stumbling, but I buy none of it. In my view this is probably another case of Russian restraint: The AFU is using U.S. — and NATO — supplied weapons, and the Kremlin has all along been acutely sensitive to the risk of escalation against Kiev’s Western sponsors. 

My conclusion: No one’s script has flipped. This operation is likely to be working upside-down to what we are reading in corporate media. The best explanation they have come up with so far is that Kiev’s plan was to draw Russian forces away from the front on the Ukrainian side of the border. That has plainly not happened, however much The Times indulges in denial on this point. “And now Moscow has begun withdrawing some troops from Ukraine in an effort to repel Kyiv’s offensive into western Russia, Constant Méthuet reported Aug. 14 — before adding “according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.” Crapulous journalism. Simply crapulous. There is no evidence of this whatsoever—only of further Russian gains as noted above. 

Inversely, the Kursk adventure required a lot of Ukrainian units to get going and more now to sustain. It is Kiev that is wasting resources on what is bound to end in retreat. The Russian military has not marshaled anything approaching its full force. This is likely to end when Moscow decides it should, and in the meantime the Russians appear to wage the same wearing war of attrition that has reduced the AFU to something close to a desperate force on the home front. 

The initial press reports of the Kursk adventure had it that top officials in Washington were caught entirely by surprise and were as perplexed as the rest of us as to the “Why?” of the thing. I do not accept this at face value, either. The Times ran a lengthy report on the Ukrainians’ preparations, featuring residents in the towns bordering Kursk remarking for weeks about the buildup of AFU units and matériel before the operation began. Russian intelligence took note, The Times also reported. And the Pentagon, the intelligence agencies, and the administration were all taken by surprise? To quote an East European emigre I knew in the old days, “Gimme break.”

Not long prior to the incursion, the Biden regime had given Kiev dispensation to use U.S.–made weapons against Russian targets so long as these were deployed in self-defense and against military targets. And the only reason the U.S. is at all interested in Ukraine, we must remind ourselves—forget about freedom and democracy, for heaven’s sake—is for its use in prosecuting the West’s long, varied campaign to subvert “Putin’s Russia.” This remains the ultimate objective. In the matter of Washington’s hand in directing the Zelensky regime from one adventure to another, Biden’s national security people wear more fig leaves than you find on a tree in Tuscany. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Maybe Zelensky wants some Russian real estate as a bargaining advantage in negotiations with Russia he has come to accept as inevitable. It is possible but does not fit with his adamant insistence that the full restoration of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, is non negotiable — a precondition to any diplomacy. And as in Netanyahu’s case, a settlement would put his political future greatly in doubt. 

In any case, Zelensky chose badly when the AFU crossed into Russian territory at Kursk. The Red Army’s defeat of the Wehrmacht at Kursk, in 1943, was the largest battle in the history of warfare and left roughly 1.7 million Russians dead, wounded, or missing. Along with Stalingrad, it marked a decisive moment in the Allied victory over the Reich.  Russians do not forget this kind of thing, especially when German weapons are part of the AFU’s arsenal. The thought of Ukrainian troops and tanks holding Kursk is another of the miscalculations that litter the story of this war since it began with the U.S.–inspired coup 10 years ago.    https://scheerpost.com/2024/08/22/patrick-lawrence-zelenskys-misadventures-in-kursk/

August 25, 2024 Posted by | Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

‘Very serious’ nuclear situation could happen ‘at any moment’ in Ukraine, says IAEA chief

Cathy Newman, Presenter 4 News 20 Aug 24

We spoke to Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Cathy Newman: Let’s start with Zaporizhzhia, because earlier you said that safety was deteriorating there after this drone strike. How critical would you say it is?

Rafael Grossi: Well, we could have a very serious situation any moment. Because when you see the amount of military activity surrounding the plant………………………….The physical integrity of the facility is being challenged. So, this is why we say that what we see is a deterioration. The condition of the plant, I should say, is that it’s not producing energy at the moment, is in jargon what we call shut down. But there’s a lot of material there, a lot of nuclear material there. There’s a lot of spent fuel there. Fresh fuel. So, things that if impact could trigger the release of radioactivity.

Cathy Newman: So the risk has been minimised, but it hasn’t been removed, clearly. I mean, in theory, another Chernobyl is possible?

Rafael Grossi: ………………………………………… I would say, as I was just mentioning, you have all of this material around and you could have a situation theoretically where because of the loss of external power, which has occurred, we had nine episodes of complete blackouts of the plant. So no cooling function. So if you lose all that, you could eventually have a meltdown.

Cathy Newman: So it’s perilous, clearly. I wonder whether you think the risk of the Kursk plant, ……………. Russia is now fortifying around that plant. I mean, is that potentially more risky because it’s a much more volatile situation.

Rafael Grossi: It is certainly serious and we should take it very, very seriously. We are taking it, the agency at the IAEA, very, very seriously. This nuclear power plant is, I would say, within artillery range already. You have just informed that the incursion of the Ukrainian troops, is a few miles, a couple dozen kilometres into Russian territory and just a few miles, in kilometres is about between 20 and 30 km from the plant itself. And there is a technical aspect here. You were just mentioning Chernobyl. The reactors here, you have six reactors in Kursk. You have two reactors that are being decommissioned. You have two reactors that are operating. No shutdown, operating when you have hot reactors. Anything that could happen there could be maximised in this sense.

And then two other units being built. The two reactors that are operating are of a type called RBMK, which is exactly the type of reactors, an old model type of reactor was the one, like the ones that were in Chernobyl. These reactors have a particularity. Normally when you look at a nuclear reactor is a dome. There is a concrete and metal protection. These two reactors don’t have that, don’t have any of that. The core of these reactors is open. Is like, as if you were here and you could see the fuel elements there. So, God forbid, was there an impact on the plant, we could have a very serious situation…………………………………………………………………………………. https://www.channel4.com/news/very-serious-nuclear-situation-could-happen-at-any-moment-in-ukraine-says-iaea-chief

August 23, 2024 Posted by | Russia, safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Ukraine could trigger ‘another Chernobyl’ – ex-US Army officer.

A meltdown at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant would make the region uninhabitable, Stanislav Krapivnik has warned

 https://www.rt.com/russia/602744-ukraine-may-trigger-another-chernobyl/ 21 Aug 24

Ukraine’s armed forces could cause a nuclear disaster that would affect most of Europe if they strike the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, former US Army officer Stanislav Krapivnik has warned.

In an interview with RT on Saturday, Krapivnik discussed the difference between a dirty bomb and a nuclear bomb, explaining that while a dirty bomb does not have the critical mass or enriched material, it could cause large scale contamination if it hits nuclear waste. 

If the coolant system in an active plant is targeted, it would cause a “nuclear meltdown” which could lead to an incident similar to Fukushima or Chernobyl, he added. Such an event would impact most of Europe, especially at this time of the year “when the wind blows northwest.”

Krapivnik predicted that “if there is enough evidence” of the threat, it would “force a very large reaction” from the Russian government, as a meltdown at the Kursk plant would make the region uninhabitable.

“And the fallout is going to go straight to the northwest into Europe,” he said, adding: “It’s going to hit the Poles, the Germans, the Danes, the Scandinavian countries,” right into the UK. “But apparently the leadership of those nations really doesn’t give a damn.”

On Friday, Russian military journalist Marat Khairullin reported, citing sources, that Kiev is preparing to detonate a dirty atomic bomb targeting nuclear waste at either Russia’s Zaporozhye NPP or the Kursk NPP.

While the nuclear plant in Zaporozhye, the largest such facility in Europe, has been shut down, the plant in Kursk Region is operational.

The Russian Defense Ministry responded to the reports by saying that any attempts to create a “man-made disaster in the European part of the continent” would be met with “tough military and military-technical countermeasures.” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called on the international community “to immediately condemn the provocative actions prepared by the Kiev regime.”

Kiev has denied the allegations. Neither the UN nor the International Atomic Energy Agency have addressed the threat.

August 23, 2024 Posted by | Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

What Happens if Ukraine Seizes the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant?

Moscow Times, By Dmitry Gorchakov, Aug. 16, 2024

From the very beginning of Ukraine’s offensive into Russia’s Kursk region on Aug. 6, there has been much discussion about the possible objectives of this operation. Simply glancing at the map begs the question of whether one objective of the Ukrainian incursion might be the seizure of the Kursk nuclear plant, located just 60 kilometers from the border. 

It is a scenario the Russian side is taking seriously. Already Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, had begun withdrawing staff from the plant and Russian troops are hastily digging trenches around it. 

The mere possibility of a nuclear plant being seized during a war is a nightmare scenario for any nuclear and radiation safety specialist. But after the almost two-and-a-half-year-long Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and the seizures (again, by Russia) of the Chernobyl exclusion zone and the research reactor in Sevastopol during the occupation of Crimea in 2014, such scenarios have become more possible. The longer Russia’s aggression against Ukraine continues, the more common the threat of an accident will become.

While we do not know how events will unfold, our analysis at Bellona and recommendations from the IAEA make clear that should nuclear plants be enveloped by war, every effort should be made to avoid a direct assault on them with heavy weapons. The defending side should not deploy troops at nuclear plants, which would turn them into military targets. Should a nuclear plant be surrounded, it is better to surrender it through negotiations rather than have the facility be attacked or used as a staging ground for attacks. 

Having considered these principles, there are a few hypothetical plans that Ukraine could have for the Kursk nuclear plant as its incursion into Russia continues. These scenarios have repeatedly surfaced in the media, and it makes sense to address them in detail.

One theory is that Ukraine may connect the Kursk nuclear plant to its own energy system. I think this is the least likely objective. Should the plant be seized, the safest course of action for its operators would be to put all of its reactors into cold shutdown mode, which stops electricity generation……………………………………………………………..

Some have also speculated that Ukraine is trying to deprive Russia of a vital energy source — hopefully by shutting it down safely rather than a nuclear accident. But the numbers do not support this. 

One would like to believe that if such a plan exists, it does not involve the loss of the facility due to a nuclear accident, but rather involves its shutdown through standard procedures…………………………………………….

The most rational objective for seizing the Kursk nuclear plant would be to use it in exchange for the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in any upcoming negotiations. 

When we consider that Ukraine’s army is not only advancing in the Kursk region, but is also fortifying its position by bringing in reserves and other defenses, it appears that Kyiv intends to hold its gains — possibly until the end of the war and the start of negotiations. The presence of a nuclear power plant within the captured territory would significantly increase its leverage and would confirm the strategic nature of this operation.

Nevertheless, as a representative of an environmental organization, I sincerely hope that we do not see any attack or attempt to seize the Kursk nuclear plant. There is simply no safe way to do it. Any attempt to do so carries risks of a nuclear or radiation accident, to say nothing of damaging the political support Ukraine enjoys from its Western allies.  ………………….

 if ending this war on terms acceptable to Ukraine involves fighting around nuclear plants on both sides of the front, such a process must proceed with minimal risk of a nuclear disaster.  https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/08/16/what-happens-if-ukraine-seizes-the-kursk-nuclear-power-plant-a86045

August 20, 2024 Posted by | Russia, safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Moscow Says Ukraine Destroyed Russian Bridge With Western-Provided Missiles

The Russian Foreign Ministry says the bridge was likely destroyed by US-provided HIMARS

by Dave DeCamp August 18, 2024 , https://news.antiwar.com/2024/08/18/moscow-says-ukraine-destroyed-russian-bridge-with-western-provided-missiles/

The Russian Foreign Ministry said Friday that Ukrainian forces used Western-provided missiles to destroy a bridge in the Glushkovsky district of Russia’s Kursk Oblast.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said the missiles were likely launched using the US-provided HIMARS rocket systems, which the US has been supplying to Ukraine since 2022.

“For the first time, the Kursk region was hit by Western-made rocket launchers, probably American HIMARS,” Zakharova wrote on Telegram. “As a result of the attack on the bridge … it was completely destroyed, and volunteers who were assisting the evacuated civilian population were killed.”

Another bridge in Kursk was reported to be hit by Ukrainian forces on Sunday. According to the Russian news site Mash, both bridges were targeted with US-provided HIMARS.

The ground incursion into Kursk came a few months after the Biden administration gave Ukraine the greenlight to use US-provided missiles in strikes inside Russia in border regions. The US says it won’t support “long-range” strikes in Russia but hasn’t defined what the limit is.

The Times reported on Friday that the US is effectively blocking Ukraine from using British-provided Storm Shadow missiles inside Russia, which have a range of about 155 miles. Ukrainian forces are using other types of British weapons in Kursk, including Challenger 2 tanks.

The US and its NATO allies insist they were unaware of Ukraine’s plans to invade Kursk, but Russian officials are pinning the blame for the incursion on Kyiv’s Western backers.

“The operation in the Kursk region was also planned with the participation of NATO and Western special services,” Nikolai Patrushev, an aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin, said on Friday. “Without their participation and direct support, Kyiv would not have ventured into Russian territory.”

August 20, 2024 Posted by | Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Safety at Ukraine nuclear power plant deteriorating after blast, watchdog warns

The International Atomic Energy Agency said the blast was close to Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant’s cooling water sprinkler ponds and its only remaining power line

By Brendan McFadden, iNews 17th Aug 2024

Safety at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is deteriorating following a drone strike that hit an access road on its perimeter, according to an atomic energy watchdog,

Russia has been in control of the Zaporizhzhia site, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, since soon after it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said the impact site was close to the essential cooling water sprinkler ponds and about 100 m from the Dniprovska power line, the only remaining 750 kilovolt line providing a power supply to the plant.

It comes after Russia earlier claimed a Ukrainian drone dropped an explosive charge on a road used by staff.

The plant is dormant as Moscow and Kyiv have repeatedly accused each other of trying to sabotage its operations and of endangering safety around it.

The IAEA director general Rafael Mariano Grossi, said “Yet again we see an escalation of the nuclear safety and security dangers facing the power plant.

“I remain extremely concerned and reiterate my call for maximum restraint from all sides and for strict observance of the five concrete principles established for the protection of the plant.”

An IAEA team visited the area on Saturday and reported that the damage seemed to have been caused by a drone equipped with an explosive payload.

The report said there were no casualties and no impact on any nuclear power plant equipment. However, the road between the two main gates of the plant was impacted.

Moscow wants to discuss the attack on the Zaporizhzhia plant with the IAEA, Russia’s RIA news agency reported, citing Roman Ustinov, the acting Russian representative in Vienna.

The attack comes as Ukraine continues an incursion into the Kursk region of Russia.

Kyiv claims to have taken control of 82 settlements over an area of 1,150 square kilometres (444 square miles) in the region since 6 August when its advance began.

Today Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said his troops are “strengthening” positions in the captured territory in Russia and expanding further.

Russian troops also hit the Ukrainian city of Sumy with an Iskander-K cruise missile, causing extensive damage to buildings.

It was claimed Germany, Ukraine’s second biggest donor, has frozen its military aid to Kyiv because it cannot afford to any longer supply equipment due to a national budget crisis.

Meanwhile, Ukraine denied claims by Russia that it is planning to attack a nuclear plant in Kursk and use ‘dirty bombs’ to attack Russian territory,

Moscow’s defence ministry made the claim and warned there would be a harsh response to any attack on the Kursk power plant, which remains under its control, according to Russian news agency Interfax.

The ministry gave no evidence for its claim, but said the surrounding area could be contaminated by an attack on the plant………………….. https://inews.co.uk/news/world/safety-at-ukraine-nuclear-power-plant-deteriorating-after-blast-watchdog-warns-3232978

August 19, 2024 Posted by | Russia, safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Top US Military Officials Won’t Say Whether the US had Advance Knowledge of Ukraine’s Invasion of Russia

All the rage these days among “strategic thinkers” is how to “deter” both China and Russia by preparing to wage simultaneous nuclear war against them.

Michael Tracey, Aug 18, 2024

So… there’s a US-backed invasion of Russia currently underway. You’d think this would rise to the level of urgent national political concern, such that every American elected official with some purview in US foreign policy would be expected — and demanded — to articulate a position on what’s transpiring. After all, as everyone should be well aware, Ukraine only exists as a state right now due to the largesse of the US, and thus anything Ukraine does on the battlefield necessarily implicates the US — whatever the precise foreknowledge or involvement the US might have had in this particular operation.

Two years ago, if you had suggested that Ukraine and the US might be conducting a literal invasion of Russia, you would’ve been ferociously denounced as a bed-wetting alarmist who’s probably just trying to cynically boost Russia’s side of the propaganda wars by irrationally fretting about extreme escalatory outcomes, so as to discourage US or European “aid” for Ukraine. And yet here we are, with the escalation ladder having been steadily climbed, step by step, but generating less and less intense of a political reaction as time goes on and the acute psychological impact of the war wears off. To a degree, this is only natural; you can’t expect everyone to be on constant hair-trigger alert about something that’s been going on continuously for two and a half years. But that’s exactly how these escalatory leaps get smuggled in without much notice or debate.

Hence, we’re now in a political climate where the fact of an ongoing US-backed invasion of Russia is treated as little more than an ancillary concern, maybe something warranting semi-interested speculation and commentary, but certainly nothing that should occasion any large-scale political controversy — at least in the US. Neither major party presidential candidate has directly commented on it, as far as I know, and neither has there been any kind of appreciable clamor within the media for the candidates to do their public duty and set out some sort of articulable position on what, by any objective measure, is a massive escalation in the conduct of the war — which had initially been sold to the public as only necessitating US “support” that would be carefully circumscribed.

So while it’s just a drop in the bucket, I’ve attempted to at least provide a minor corrective. This past week was the annual symposium of STRATCOM, or the US Strategic Command, which is the branch of the military that controls the nuclear arsenal. If you weren’t aware, the word “strategic” is a euphemism for “nuclear” in military parlance — a long-running triumph of jargonistic obfuscation. You also gotta love that the slogan for the US nuclear arsenal is “Peace is Our Profession”…

All the rage these days among “strategic thinkers” is how to “deter” both China and Russia by preparing to wage simultaneous nuclear war against them. Another triumph of euphemistic jargon is the word “deterrence” itself — nominally the whole impetus for the Symposium, with “deterrence” really just being synonymous with “projection of American military, economic, and political power,” but presented as gravely necessary in order to “deter” the scary foreign adversaries who are always allegedly threatening that power.

The Symposium is a strange affair in that it’s tucked into a nondescript venue in Omaha, Nebraska, near where the STRATCOM headquarters is located. I overheard one fellow talking about how back in the Cold War days, Air Force members who had to go guard the nuclear silos in the vast expanses of the American Interior were told that if South Dakota ever seceded from the Union, it would automatically be the world’s third largest nuclear state. Today, the Cold War era is looked back on with nostalgic fondness by attendees of these Symposiums, with calls for action routinely issued that the US nuclear arsenal needs to be aggressively reinvigorated, and even the half-hearted efforts to scale it down after the collapse of the Soviet Union were a terrible mistake.

So it was fortuitous that this year’s Symposium should have fallen on a week in which an ongoing US-backed invasion of Russia would have been underway, not to mention another cataclysm being forecast to break out in the Middle East at any moment, with Iran and Hezbollah suggesting for weeks that a large-scale strike on Israel could be imminent.

I therefore asked Gen. Anthony Cotton, the STRATCOM commander, about the Russia/Ukraine developments, which are being touted as the most serious foreign attack on Russian territory since World War II, as if that’s supposed to inspire optimism for a happy outcome. You can find the audio here, which I played on an episode of “System Update” Friday — I guest-hosted again for the absent Glenn Greenwald. Here’s a transcript of the exchange:…………………………………………………………………..

https://www.mtracey.net/p/top-us-military-officials-wont-say?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=303188&post_id=147853327&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=ln98x&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email

August 19, 2024 Posted by | Ukraine, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

German ministers told there’s no more money for Ukraine – media

 https://www.rt.com/news/602719-germany-no-money-ukraine-aid/ 17 Aug 24

Berlin could halve its military assistance to Kiev in 2025, the newspaper claims

German Finance Minister Christian Lindner has issued a request to the country’s defense ministry calling for a limit to military assistance to Ukraine, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) reported on Saturday. According to Lindner, the country’s current budget plan is not capable of allocating funds to Kiev.

The request was made in a letter addressed to German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, and specified that only military aid that has already been approved can be delivered to Kiev. Additional applications from the defense ministry will no longer be accepted, even if issued at the behest of Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

FAZ noted that the block on newly approvals is already in effect and that Berlin would halve its military aid to Ukraine next year. In 2027, the assistance is expected to decline to less than one tenth of its current volume.

Up to €8 billion in aid to Ukraine has been scheduled for 2024, and the planned maximum of €4 billion for 2025 already exceeds available funds, the media outlet noted, adding that only €3 billion is planned for 2026, and €500 million each for 2027 and 2028.

“End of the event. The pot is empty,” an unnamed source in the federal government told FAZ, stressing that Berlin has “reached a point where Germany can no longer make any promises to Ukraine.”

The newspaper noted that the urge comes amid Lindner’s push for harsh austerity measures; these have already been imposed on all German ministries except defense. The finance minister has been resisting intense pressure from Scholz and Economy Minister Robert Habeck to suspend the country’s constitutional limit on debt to allow for the cost of providing military aid to Kiev amid the Ukrainian conflict.

Germany is the second biggest backer of Ukraine after the US. Berlin has provided and committed military aid of at least €28 billion ($30.3 billion) to Kiev in current and future pledges. This includes advanced military equipment such as Leopard 2 tanks, Marder infantry fighting vehicles, and US-made Patriot air-defense systems.

Lindner reportedly doesn’t expect the country’s assistance to Ukraine to drop, as the minister hopes to cover the expenses not with federal budget funds, but through the use of Russian central bank assets that were frozen by Kiev’s Western allies shortly after the conflict escalated.

Nearly $300 billion belonging to Russia’s central bank has been immobilized by the EU and G7 nations as part of Ukraine-related sanctions. In May, Brussels approved a plan to use the interest earned on the frozen assets to support Ukraine’s recovery and defense. Under the agreement, 90% of the proceeds are expected to go into an EU-run fund for Ukrainian military aid, with the other 10% allocated to supporting Kiev in other ways.

August 19, 2024 Posted by | business and costs, Germany, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

IAEA says safety at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant deteriorates

By Reuters, August 18, 2024 https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/iaea-says-safety-ukraines-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-deteriorates-2024-08-17/

Aug 17 (Reuters) – Safety at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is deteriorating following a drone strike that hit the road around the perimeter on Saturday, according to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director general Rafael Grossi.

The Russian management of the plant said a Ukrainian drone dropped an explosive charge on a road outside, endangering its staff who use the highway, the TASS state news agency reported.

August 19, 2024 Posted by | safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

« Previous Entries     Next Entries »