Welcome to Britain’s biggest building site. There’s a ‘fishdisco’
It’s economy v ecology at Hinkley Point C power station, which
will power a fifth of British homes if it can pull off an audacious plan to
protect wildlife.
Two miles off the Somerset coast, a strange sound is
playing. About 20 metres below the slate-grey surface of the Bristol
Channel, a small device called a ceramic transducer blasts out a
high-pitched acoustic beam at a frequency far higher than can be detected
by the human ear. This machine — once disparaged by the former
environment secretary Michael Gove as a “fish disco” — is being
tested to see if it can scare off the salmon, herring, shad, eel and sea
trout that in six years’ time will start being sucked in their millions
into massive water inlets that have been built near by.
Hinkley Point C nuclear power station is late and over budget. This is the biggest building
site in Britain, possibly Europe: 12,000 staff and 52 cranes (including the
world’s tallest — “Big Carl”, 250 metres high) are working to
complete the project. When the £46 billion station finally switches on in
2031, it will power more than a fifth of the UK’s homes.
To cool the reactors, 120,000 litres of seawater a second — fish and all — will be
sucked into concrete pipes six metres wide. A complex mechanism has been
installed to return as many fish as possible to the sea, but even so,
Hinkley’s owner, EDF, estimates that up to 44 tonnes of marine life —
more than 180 million individual fish — will be killed each year.
Natural England, in consultation with the Environment Agency and Natural Resources
Wales, will advise EDF whether the fish disco machine is sufficient to
comply with its planning permission, or whether the company will need to
revert to its plans for creating salt marshes like the one at Steart.
David Slater, Natural England’s regional director for the southwest, said the
agency is keeping an open mind on the fish deterrents. But if the tests
fail to demonstrate the fish can be kept away, the energy company will be
required to return to its plan for “compensatory habit” — the jargon
for the salt-marsh reserves — as a condition of its planning permission.
Times 18th May 2025, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/environment/article/welcome-to-britains-biggest-building-site-theres-a-fish-disco-c0wqs8lg9
The media, scientific consensus, and toxic nuclear waste

Not to be outdone by more modern means of propaganda, Nuclear Waste Services has continued the tradition of only providing the audience with the information that suits their argument.
The only way to reduce waste is to reduce the activities that cause it.
There is no other logical way.
News media tends to use ‘scientific consensus’ as if it is the end point of the discussion.
The implication that ‘this is the only way’ serves to quash dissenting voices and validate the overall message of the article.
When government agencies are hard to trust, who do we look to? Scientists. But what job is the concept of scientific consensus doing in the marketing of the GDF?
A Quiet Resistance, 8 May 2025
‘Scientific consensus’ carries a lot of weight in news media discussing the proposed Geological Disposal Facilities (GDFs) (nuclear waste dumps) in West Cumbria.
This consensus is also being used as a persuasion tool in the official literature handed out to communities by Nuclear Waste Services (NWS).
Since most of us aren’t scientists in either the nuclear industry or geodisposal, we have to turn to those who are if we’re to understand what’s going to happen to our community. Alongside the regular newsletters and other marketing from NWS, we usually access those people through articles in the news and on the internet.
But it’s important to keep asking questions about what we’re reading.
‘Scientific consensus’ doesn’t mean the science is settled; articles can contain facts and still be biased.
Biases in news media
The news media are paid for by advertisers. If they publish articles that make arguments against their advertisers’ interests, they lose advertising money. Their advertisers’ interests may not be clear. For example, they may be companies that have money invested in hedge funds, which in turn invest in nuclear power.
News media also come up against political pressure, as The Guardian found out a few years ago, to its long-term detriment.
There’s also the question of audience. News media write to a specific audience, one already sold on the ideas they are promoting, or at the very least, suggestible. Most people are aware of ‘climate change’. If someone authoritative tells them it’s important for us to have a GDF because nuclear energy will help us ‘beat climate change’, they are likely to accept that, unless they have some wider knowledge.
Bias can be edited into an article by keeping the facts, but leaving out certain contexts. They can also cherry pick facts, so that the only ones they use are those which suit their argument.
Biases and misinformation across the internet
Misinformation across the web is an endemic problem now, brought on by too little regulatory oversight, too late. A bitter combination of an advertising free-for-all, empty content for the sake of it, and algorithmic twists that feed on themselves has come together to make an internet that doesn’t run the kind of useful searches it did just 12 years ago.
On top of this, a type of information warfare has been raging, hidden in plain sight from the eyes of everyday people, and the proliferation of GenAI has made the situation much worse. Social media, news media, every place we get our information from has been seeded with doubt.
All of this means that when we read information anywhere, from both respectable and dubious sources, we have to take time to process what we’ve read before we lead with our emotions.
Bias and messaging in public information
Not to be outdone by more modern means of propaganda, Nuclear Waste Services has continued the tradition of only providing the audience with the information that suits their argument.
In the case of the Community Partnership newsletter this month, this includes a soothing word salad introduction from the outgoing Community Partnership Chair explaining that he has resigned, and our local Town Council has withdrawn from the group. There are then several pages on how the Community Investment Fund money has been spent recently.
From that messaging, it is clear they’re seeking to reassure the community – talk quietly, you don’t want them to startle – and remind us that we’re getting plenty of money for the deal.
So, what’s the problem with the scientific consensus on the idea of a geological disposal facility (GDF), more prosaically known as a nuclear waste dump?
What is ‘scientific consensus’?
Scientific consensus refers to an agreement amongst scientists in a specific, very narrow field of study.
In the consideration of a GDF, that field would be geology, and most likely a particular area of geology, such as geodisposal.
Why do we need ‘scientific consensus’?
For most of us, despite our education and our wide understanding of the world, we don’t have intensive scientific training. Even if we do, it may not be in the narrow field in question.
Ethan Siegel at Forbes.com explained this really clearly:
… Unlike in most cases, unless you are a scientist working in the particular field in question, you are probably not even capable of discerning between a conclusion that’s scientifically valid and viable and one that isn’t. Even if you’re a scientist in a somewhat related field! Why? This is mostly due to the fact that a non-expert cannot tell the difference between a robust scientific idea and a caricature of that idea.
Why should we believe ‘scientific consensus’?
Although a consensus is an impossible number to quantify, the argument for a consensus is that a lot of related research is borne out by the agreement, so if it isn’t correct – e.g. if a GDF isn’t a safe and complete solution for nuclear waste – then a lot of other research is also wrong.
That sounds reassuring, but there’s more to it.
What do we have to consider behind the messaging of ‘scientific consensus’?
News media tends to use ‘scientific consensus’ as if it is the end point of the discussion.
The implication that ‘this is the only way’ serves to quash dissenting voices and validate the overall message of the article.
This is also how Nuclear Waste Services is using ‘scientific consensus’. The inference is that there is only one solution, and a GDF is it.
But scientific consensus is not the end position of the science. It’s the starting position from which further investigation can arise.
While that future studying may not set out to prove early scientific reasoning wrong, it should seek to improve or refine our understanding of the science.
And the main problem with scientific investigation?
Take a look at this quote. It’s from the article Development in Progress, from the Consilience Project.
It is also important to consider how existing biases and values ‘prime’ us towards certain starting points when we seek to understand the world through science. Before we formulate questions of design experiments, we often have preconceived notions as to what we imagine as likely to be important to the question at hand.
You’ve got to ask what their starting point is, before you can evaluate the idea.
Or, to put it another way: if you ask a geodisposal specialist what the best way is to deal with a higher activity nuclear waste problem, they’re going to tell you to bury it underground.
What’s the motivation for a GDF? Why the bias? Where’s the starting point of the plan?
Waste is a massive issue for modern Western societies. Everything we do, everything we buy creates waste. The only way to reduce waste is to reduce the activities that cause it.
There is no other logical way.
Government and the nuclear industry are motivated towards using a geological disposal facility to store higher activity nuclear waste because:
- There’s almost seventy years’ worth of higher activity nuclear waste to store
- Nuclear appears to offer a solution to the legal requirements of Net Zero.
The more we use nuclear technology, the more toxic waste we will produce. It’s inevitable without social, political, and industrial change.
The nuclear industry
The nuclear industry’s back is against the wall. It urgently has to put the accruing waste somewhere permanently safe.
Nuclear waste is produced in solid, aqueous, and gaseous forms. If the industry reduces some of the gaseous waste, that means that it increases it in another form, e.g. aqueous. There is no escaping the waste issue without stopping the industry.
There’s a lot of money in nuclear.
The UK Government
The government has to enable the production of electricity, but having effectively phased out coal-fired power stations, it has brought in gas-fuelled hydrogen plants which are arguably just as greenhouse-gas-intensive as coal. Natural gas is still a fossil fuel, it still causes huge emissions, and it still presents supply problems.
For the government, nuclear represents a lower carbon option, with political expediencies, such as being free of Russian fossil fuel pressures (Russian uranium is still unsanctioned and likely part of the ‘diversified’ fuel mixes used in the UK).
There is also a disturbing link between civil nuclear skills and military nuclear skills which doesn’t get much media time:
Other countries tend to be more open about it, with the interdependence acknowledged at presidential level in the US for instance. French president Emmanuel Macron summarises: “without civil nuclear power, no military nuclear power, without military nuclear, no civil nuclear”.
This is largely why nuclear-armed France is pressing the European Union to support nuclear power. This is why non-nuclear-armed Germany has phased out the nuclear technologies it once lead the world in. This is why other nuclear-armed states are so disproportionately fixated by nuclear power.
In 2022, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) published a Radioactivity Waste Inventory with a timeline for the phasing out of nuclear power by 2136. But in early 2025, the Labour government announced it was keen to rapidly start up the building of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) across the UK. Going forward from this year, nuclear waste will continue to be produced in the UK beyond the 100-year lifetime of the current GDF project. Waste is inevitable.
Waste isn’t the only issue for nuclear power, either. There is the question of what happens to nuclear power plants in the face of climate catastrophe. Fukushima wasn’t an anomaly, and it wasn’t avoidable. It could be seen as a foreshadowing of future possibilities.
Back to scientific consensus
So, when Nuclear Waste Services and other media proponents talk about scientific consensus being in agreement that a GDF is the best solution available for toxic nuclear waste, what they mean is:
- there is an inexorable accumulation of nuclear waste, both historical and into the future
- there are going to be more GDFs in the future
- they aren’t looking for other methods of storage
- they absolutely will not consider a non-nuclear future
- and they don’t want to argue about it.
And, for some reason, despite a GDF apparently being the safest possible housing for nuclear waste – and despite there being many geologically suitable locations – they don’t want to locate it under Westminster.
Ultimately, despite the focus given to the science, this isn’t about the science.
It’s about burying a waste product that they have no other solution for. Sweeping it under the carpet. And calling it common sense!
Common sense as a message, in an area of study called Semiotics, is a problematic idea. Although it is dressed up as the common, standard, everyday way of thinking, it is often used in marketing and media to promote the ideas of those in power.
As the future beckons, common sense should be saying no to nuclear. Just like with plastic, nuclear has no end and no sure way of getting rid of its byproducts.
For communities that ‘host’ a nuclear waste dump, the GDF solution represents a forever risk with inter-generational risks and costs along the way.
Somehow, West Cumbria always seems to be saddled with nuclear detritus.
The potential collateral damage, seen already across the United States and South America, is similar to that experienced around mining and climate solution industries.
It starts with
- environmental destruction,
- contamination of water sources and land,
- loss of biodiversity,
- loss of human rights,
- loss of health, and
- upheaval of established communities.
These may be experienced just in the construction of a GDF.
Who knows where it ends?
Further information on the proposed GDFs in West Cumbria:
Britain left out in the cold by Trump on Ukraine peace talks
How Starmer found himself on the road to nowhere
Ian Proud, May 20, 2025
Russia Ukraine peace talks are to restart immediately, but when Trump debriefed European leaders, Starmer was not on the call. Starmer has rendered himself completely irrelevant by sticking to the same tired approaches and blocking efforts at peace in Ukraine.
After Presidents Trump and Putin spoke for two hours today, 19 May, new impetus was injected in Russia-Ukraine negotiations towards a ceasefire. The Russian and Ukrainian delegations are now in contact and will start immediately preparations towards a second round of talks. After Vice President JD Vance’s meeting with Pope Leo, the Vatican is being touted as a possible venue. Clearly, direct engagement by the two Presidents is key to any progress being made to end the war. But when Trump phoned Zelensky and European leaders after the call, Prime Minister Keir Starmer was not included.
That may be because Trump has realised that Starmer has brought nothing new to the Ukraine peace process and, rather, is acting as a major brake on progress.
After a helpful, if tentative, first meeting for three years between Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Istanbul on Friday 16 May, it was clear that neither side was in a hurry to schedule further talks. For his part, Zelensky had spent most of the day on 15 May trying his best to find a way out of sending a delegation to Istanbul and blaming Russia for it. Following the standard script, British and European leaders indulged him, blaming Russia whose bemused delegation waited patiently in Istanbul for someone to show up. It was only after direct intervention from President Erdogan and the USA, that Zelensky finally relented allowing for talks on Friday.
That first Istanbul meeting, however brief, and however accompanied by the normal Ukrainian briefing out that ‘Russia doesn’t want peace’, was nonetheless a vital first step forward. But, and as Vice President JD Vance said today, we had reached an impasse, and Trump appears determined to keep the pressure up to secure an elusive ceasefire.
UK’s Geological Disposal Facility Community Partnership operates under restrictive government guidance and the management of Nuclear Waste Services
An interesting article recently sent to the NFLAs prompted a reply by our
Secretary identifying the limitations placed upon members of the Geological
Disposal Facility Community Partnerships wishing to source independent
information or commission bespoke research.
Such Community Partnerships operate under restrictive government guidance and the management of Nuclear Waste Services.
The Author and Article: A Quiet Resistance is run by a
writer, author, and marketing copywriter, living with her small family near
Millom. Understanding how language is used to persuade, convince, and
influence the decisions of mass populations, she set out to unpack the
messaging around the unfolding climate catastrophe, to help others decode
truth from fiction for themselves, and to open up critical thinking
pathways through the consumerism.
A Quiet Resistance documents this journey of discovery. AQuietResistance.co.uk –
https://aquietresistance.co.uk/the-media-scientific-consensus-toxic-nuclear-waste
23 April 2025. The media, scientific consensus, and toxic nuclear waste
When government agencies are hard to trust, who do we look to? Scientists. But
what job is the concept of scientific consensus doing in the marketing of
the GDF? ‘Scientific consensus’ carries a lot of weight in news media
discussing the proposed Geological Disposal Facilities (GDFs) (nuclear
waste dumps) in West Cumbria.
This consensus is also being used as a
persuasion tool in the official literature handed out to communities by
Nuclear Waste Services (NWS). Since most of us aren’t scientists in either
the nuclear industry or geodisposal, we have to turn to those who are if
we’re to understand what’s going to happen to our community. Alongside the
regular newsletters and other marketing from NWS, we usually access those
people through articles in the news and on the internet. But it’s important
to keep asking questions about what we’re reading. ‘Scientific consensus’
doesn’t mean the science is settled; articles can contain facts and still
be biased.
NFLA 16th May 2025, https://www.nuclearpolicy.info/wp/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/A431-NB317-The-media-scientific-consensus-and-toxic-nuclear-waste-May-2025.pdf
Trump should not threaten sanctions when he talks to Putin

It is clear to me that further US sanctions on Russia would kill stone dead any chance of a ceasefire in Ukraine at a time when Russia still has the upper hand.
Europe has neither the political capital nor the funds to maintain a losing war in Ukraine at enormous expense without massive domestic political blowback in their own countries.
Russia will keep fighting, Ukraine will lose all of the Donbass and Europe will pay the price
Ian Proud, May 18, 2025, https://thepeacemonger.substack.com/p/trump-should-not-threaten-sanctions?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=3221990&post_id=163841246&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
Trump should not threaten Putin with sanctions during their planned phone call on Monday 19 May. This would only lock in the fighting for the rest of the year and leave Europe on the hook for a massive bill and political disruption that it cannot afford.
In the run up to the Russia-Ukraine bilateral peace talks which finally took place in Istanbul last week, both the EU and the UK imposed new sanctions on Russia. On 9 May, as Russian commemorated victory Day, Britain imposed sanctions on Russia’s shadow fleet and the EU followed suit with its 17th package of Russia sanctions on 14 May, the day before the Istanbul talks were due to start. Both the UK and EU have threatened further sanctions should Russia not agree a full and unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine and, with Zelensky, have actively urged the US to follow suit, which it has not done, so far. However, the Americans have spoken increasingly about the possibility of massive new sanctions against Russia: this would be a huge mistake.
Sanctioning a country before peace talks have already started, or while they are still going on, is already a bad look. Very clearly, the Ukrainians, Europeans and British hope that new sanctions will apply such pressure on Russia that it agrees to terms that are more favourable to the Ukrainian side. I.e. that Ukraine does not have to go back to the Istanbul 1 commitment to adopt permanently neutral status. The western mainstream press has been carpet bombing their intellectually degraded readers with the latest press line that Ukraine should not have to go back to the Istanbul 1 text as a starting point for talks. This is unrealistic.
But, in any case, there’s a problem. For this strategy to be effective, the sanctions have to work.
As I’ve pointed out before, sanctions against Russian have had limited impact, not just since 2022, but since 2014. Nothing about the glidepath of sanctions since February 2014 suggests that new sanctions will work now.
This latest round of UK and EU sanctions aimed to apply more pressure on enforcement of the G7 oil price cap of $60 which was first imposed in December 2022. Since the war started, that policy has failed.
Between 2021 and 2024, total volumes of Russian oil exported fell by just 0.2 million barrels per day, or 2.6%. After a bumper year for tax receipts in 2022 caused by Russian tumbling rouble and skyrocketing energy prices, Russia pulled in current account surpluses of $49.4bn and $62.3bn in 2023 and 2024. This was on the back of still strong goods exports of $425bn and $433bn respectively.
There are several reasons why the oil price cap didn’t work, the biggest being that Russia diverted 3 million barrels per day, around 39.5% of total oil exports to India (1.9 mbd), Türkiye (0.6 mbd) and China (0.5 mbd). Türkiye and India boosted exports of refined fuels to Europe providing a backdoor route for Russian oil to Europe. The second reason the oil price cap didn’t work is the near ten month time lag between war starting and the limit being imposed, which gave Russia space to readjust before punitive measure had been imposed. During this period, oil prices also dropped sharply from the high of $120 in the summer of 2022, to around $80 when the measure was imposed: the G7 missed the boat to impose maximum damage; this reinforces the point I make all the time that coalitions cannot act with speed and decisiveness.
Today, the Russian Urals oil price is below the $60 G7 cap meaning that any registered shipping company can transport it without penalty, which renders the British and European sanctions as pointless in any case.
Let’s be clear, western nations imposing sanctions against Russia that don’t work is not a new phenomena. As I have pointed out many times before, the vast majority (92%) of people that the UK has imposed assets freezes and travel bans upon have never held assets in the UK nor travelled here. For companies, the figure is just 23. The same, I am sure, is true of EU and US sanctions, which cover largely the same cast list of characters and companies, as we all share and compare the same lists of possible designations. Financial sector sanctions prompted a massive readjustment of Russia’s financial sector. Energy and dual use sanctions drove self-sufficiency in technology production, through Rosnet, Gazprom and RosTec: i.e. these companies invested more in R&D on component production while sourcing components from alternative markets, in particular China.
At well over 20,000 sanctions imposed so far, Russia’s economy has proved remarkably robust and its key export sectors still find ways to deliver similar volumes across the world. At some point, I hope policy makers in London, Brussels and Washington will start to ask whether this policy is working. We long ago passed the point of diminishing marginal returns. I fear, however, they have their heads in the sand or, possibly another, darker, place.
So, coming back to Trump’s phone call with Putin on Monday 19 May you might ask yourself, ‘so what if he imposes a few more sanctions if they won’t work anyway?’
Putin would see the imposition of new US sanctions as a complete 180, destroying any emerging trust he had in Trump or any belief in America’s stated intentions to end the war in Ukraine.
It is clear to me that further US sanctions on Russia would kill stone dead any chance of a ceasefire in Ukraine at a time when Russia still has the upper hand. Russia has increased the pace of its advance since the Victory Day ceasefire and seems to be adding new blocks of red to the battle map each day. At the current rate of advance, even without a catastrophic Ukrainian collapse, it seems realistic to expect that Russia would paint out the remaining territory in Donetsk and Luhansk during the remainder of this year. In the process they would need to overcome the heavily fortified towns of Pokrovsk, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, in what would likely be brutal and attritional battles killing many thousands more on both sides.
Moreover, dragging out the war for longer would simply add to Europe’s contingent liability to fund Ukraine’s war effort at a time when it is only ever going to lose. Ukraine is spending over 26% of GDP on defence in 2025 and 67.5% of its budget expenditure is on defence and security, leaving a budget black hotel of $42bn that has to be filled. America under Trump isn’t going to fill this hole. And, as Ukraine is cut off from international lending markets, that black hole is being filled by Europe.
There is no money for this.
Europe has neither the political capital nor the funds to maintain a losing war in Ukraine at enormous expense without massive domestic political blowback in their own countries.
Notwithstanding the possibly understandable fear among European leaders of failing and being seen to fail in Ukraine, keeping the war going is at best, a gesture in cynical self-preservation, pushing their eventual political demise further down the track.
Unfortunately, we have been here so many times before. Right back to the Minsk II agreement, Ukraine has been pushing for ever more sanctions against Russia that only ever served to ramp up resentment and exacerbate the conflict. European leaders have invested too much in Zelensky and his self-serving demands aimed primarily at staying in power. He is quickly becoming the gun that shoots European elites in the head.
If Trump really wants to be seen as a peacemaker, he should avoid doing what every other western leader before him including Sleepy Joe did and resist the temptation to impose more sanctions. Instead, he should continue to press the President Putin to continue to engage with bilateral peace talks that finally recommences in Istanbul last week. He must also tell the Eurocrats and Zelensky that they must make compromises rather than plugging the same old failed prescriptions.
A home guard to protect British nuclear power plants against enemy attacks
A home guard will be established to protect British power plants and
airports against attack from enemy states and terrorists, under plans put
forward in the government’s strategic defence review (SDR).
It will be modelled on the citizens’ militia created in 1940, when Britain faced the
prospect of invasion by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. It would
be made up of several thousand volunteers, who would be deployed to
safeguard assets such as nuclear power plants, telecommunications sites and
the coastal hubs where internet cables connecting Britain to the rest of
the world come onto land. Guards could also be deployed to other sensitive
sites, such as energy stations providing power to major airports, with
senior sources pointing to the recent fire that shut down Heathrow as
evidence more resources are needed to guard them.
The home guard plan is a central part of the review, which focuses heavily on homeland security, national resilience and the need for the public to realise that Britain has
entered a pre-war era, as tensions heighten with an axis of Russia, Iran
and North Korea.
Times 17th May 2025 https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/home-guard-to-protect-uk-from-attack-lg2wf0slx
Why SNP national council must pass this motion on nuclear weapons.
Bill Ramsay: I’M puzzled as to why any proponent of Scottish nationalism
would be daft enough to tamper with a key tenet of SNP policy, the removal
of Broken Britain’s broken Vanguard fleet from Scotland.
The four Vanguard submarines carry the Trident nuclear missiles Britain rents at the
pleasure of President Trump. It’s been an axiom of Scottish politics that
although the SNP’s anti-nuclear policy is not in the SNP constitution,
it’s in the party’s DNA.
In recent weeks, though, there’s been a rash
of reports that some people who were once important in the SNP want to back
a British bomb. The timing of this has an air of panic. Those who wish to
hold fast to the crumbling totem of a British bomb are normally motivated
not by real security threats or concerns but by a delusional iteration of
British greatness. Bear in mind this off-stage pining for retention of the
British bomb (they dare not reveal themselves) is taking place at precisely
the same time as a central tenet of UK nuclear strategy is disintegrating
before our eyes.
The National 17th May 2025, https://www.thenational.scot/politics/25170582.snp-national-council-must-pass-motion-nuclear-weapons/
China and Russia plan to build nuclear power station on moon

China and Russia plan to build a nuclear reactor on the moon by 2035 to
power a permanent lunar base. The International Lunar Research Station
(ILRS) will rely on the power plant for its scientific research. The IRLS
involves over a dozen international partners and is seen as a rival program
to NASA’s Artemis Program.
Deutsche Welle 16th May 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/china-and-russia-plan-to-build-nuclear-power-station-on-moon/a-72565465
Nuclear in decline: EDF accumulates excesses, the State takes the hit and the French pay the bill without flinching.

The Hinkley Point EPR project, a symbol of budgetary excesses and opaque management, raises crucial questions about the future of French nuclear energy and the State’s financial commitment
IN BRIEF
The Hinkley Point EPR project has become a financial disaster, with a budget that has ballooned to €54 billion.
EDF, now entirely state-owned, bears 85% of the costs , effectively committing public money without sufficient parliamentary control.
The Hinkley Point construction site is a logistical disaster , with working conditions criticized and significant delays to the schedule.
This project raises questions about French
energy policy and the future of nuclear power, calling for a thorough democratic debate.
This project raises questions about French
energy policy and the future of nuclear power, calling for a thorough democratic debate.
The National Assembly recently witnessed a heated debate surrounding the Hinkley Point EPR project, a project that has crystallized tensions surrounding the French nuclear industry. This project, initially presented as a technological showcase, has turned into a financial drain for EDF, and by extension, for French taxpayers. As the bill continues to mount, MPs are questioning budgetary overhangs and the lack of parliamentary oversight. Far from being a simple isolated incident, Hinkley Point raises crucial questions about the management of nuclear projects internationally.
When the bill explodes
The European Pressurized Power Plant (EPR) at Hinkley Point was supposed to be the flagship of the French nuclear industry. However, over the years, the project has accumulated delays, technical complications, and cost overruns. Initially estimated at £18 billion in 2016, the budget has now reached €54 billion. This cost explosion is symptomatic of poor management and an underestimation of risks from the outset. Aurélie Trouvé, a member of parliament for La France Insoumise, described the project as a “financial abyss” during a speech in the National Assembly .
The consequences of this financial drift are serious for EDF, a company now entirely owned by the State.
With 85% of the costs at its own expense, EDF is effectively committing public money without any real parliamentary safeguards . This situation is all the more worrying as it reveals a democratic anomaly: Bercy, the Ministry of Finance, does not have the construction contract, thus depriving MPs of a key element of control. The debate surrounding Hinkley Point is thus going beyond the technical sphere to become a major political issue.
EDF and the taxpayer’s hostage
The full nationalization of EDF in 2023 has redefined the stakes surrounding Hinkley Point. As the sole shareholder, the French state finds itself on the front line when it comes to the project’s budgetary implications. Aurélie Trouvé pointed out that the state was already an 85% shareholder during the initial negotiations in 2015 , making the lack of oversight over such a binding contract incomprehensible.
The withdrawal of Chinese partner CGN, initially planned to co-finance the project, left EDF alone to face the additional costs. In April 2025, Energy Minister Marc Ferracci called on the United Kingdom to assume its financial responsibilities. However, the British silence leaves uncertainty surrounding the future of the financing. This situation calls into question the role of the state in managing major industrial projects and the relevance of committing public money to such risky undertakings.
Symbol of an industrial shipwreck
Beyond the financial issues, Hinkley Point is also the scene of numerous logistical and human setbacks. The construction site, which was initially scheduled to be operational in 2025, has now seen its commissioning postponed to 2029, or even 2031. Working conditions on the site have also been singled out, with workers denouncing appalling conditions , as reported by the Guardian in a Guardian investigation.
The impact on EDF is significant. In 2024, the company had to record a €12.9 billion impairment charge due to the project’s difficulties. Moody’s has also downgraded EDF’s credit profile, highlighting the growing financial pressures on the company . These challenges illustrate the complexity of nuclear investments and the need for rigorous and transparent management.
A turning point for French nuclear energy
The management of Hinkley Point raises questions about the future of nuclear energy in France. As the country prepares to define its energy roadmap for the next ten years, the failure of this international project could influence future choices. Members of Parliament, such as Charles de Courson, are calling for a broader democratic debate on these issues, emphasizing that decisions made today will have lasting consequences for public finances and national energy policy.
This complex picture of Hinkley Point’s challenges and failures calls for a broader reflection on the state’s role in the nuclear sector. How can technological ambitions be reconciled with financial responsibilities? What lessons can be learned to prevent such projects from becoming financial disasters in the future? These essential questions must be answered to ensure a sustainable and responsible energy transition.
The Balance of Power in the Russo-Ukraine War- Russia is in the driving seat.

NATO WATCH, By Steven Jermy, 12 May 2025.
Political passion for the cause, never strong in ethnically Russian areas, appears now to be eroding amongst the war weary and the victims of Ukrainian Army press gangs.
On this analysis, the balance-of power – on the battlefield and at the negotiating table – overwhelmingly favours Russia. Despite this, European leaders – with reducing support amongst Americans – appear to believe that the losers should dictate the terms of ceasefire or surrender.
Our continued calls for Russia to accept terms that the West is unable to impose will need to cease. We will need to shift our position on the negotiation fundamentals. Russia too has legitimate security interests. Pushing NATO to Russia’s borders whilst wilfully ignoring their interests was always likely to lead to conflict.
Theodore Roosevelt said: “Speak softly but carry a large stick.” European leaders are doing the opposite yet offended when not invited to Russo-Ukraine negotiations. Instead, and from the side lines, Europeans have been insisting that Russia accepts ceasefire conditions that neither they nor the Americans have the political or the military means to impose. So, it’s no surprise that Russians continue patiently to insist on their own conditions, nor that Americans may be slowly coming round to Russia’s position. Yet European leaders are affronted. Why?
At the most fundamental level, I fear they lack the ability to calculate the balance-of-power, a skill so critical in war. If we Europeans are to play an intelligent part in bringing the Russo-Ukraine war to a close, we must get back to the basics of strategy formulation and calculate the relative balance of power in the Russo-Ukraine War, to in turn allow us to understand the West’s true leverage – or lack of it – over Russia.
An excellent starting point is the work of Professor John Mearsheimer, particularly given his unusual Russo-Ukraine prescience – that stands in stark contrast to the forecasts of conventional Western commentators. Mearsheimer emphasises economic wealth and population size as fundamental determinants of national power. All other things being equal, larger populations are more powerful than smaller populations, richer ones more powerful than poorer ones.But economic wealth is routinely – and lazily – assessed using GDP figures, a particularly poor way to calculate national military power. The service economy counts for little on the battlefield – in military affairs it is industrial capacity, not economic output, that matters.
There is another equally fundamental factor to add to Mearsheimer’s list – energy. Industrial capacity is critically dependent on reliable supplies of cheap, high quality and plentiful energy – as Europeans have found to their self-inflicted cost – as do military operations. Indeed, in war and operations, combat and logistics are both extremely energy intensive.
[Ed note – Here the author explains the importance of energy, and of geography – the distance from home involves not only the relative passion, determination of the people, but also the burden and cost of transporting munitions over long distances.]
………………………………………………………………………………..Foundationally, Ukraine started the war in a weak position. With NATO’s sustained support from 2014, it had formed a large army, but its industrial capacity was constrained, and it depended on external energy supplies, including Russian oil. Its foundational position is now much worse, after Russia’s deliberate targeting of its industrial and energy infrastructures.
The geopolitical utility of Ukraine’s power is also dissipating. Political passion for the cause, never strong in ethnically Russian areas, appears now to be eroding amongst the war weary and the victims of Ukrainian Army press gangs. Ultranationalists will no doubt stay true to their cause, perhaps to an apocalyptic end, but otherwise it’s easy to envisage a failed popular consensus as the Russian Army rolls westward.
A few may say it is self-evident that power’s foundations and utility be framed in this way. But “Clearly not!”: at least to American and European leaders engaged in the Ukraine War, who are demonstrating – with words and actions – not a scintilla of such understanding.
Bellicosity aside, Europe is foundationally weak. To get anywhere near Cold War industrial capacity levels, Europeans will need to double defence spending to higher than 5% of GDP – in 1986, at the culmination of the Cold War, Britain was spending 6% on defence.
Furthermore, as the world’s largest regional hydrocarbon importer, at 12.8 million barrels 3 per day of oil, Europe’s situation is one of acute energy vulnerability. The geopolitical utility of Europe’s limited military power is also questionable. Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Serbia have always been sceptics, neutral Austria’s position has remained nuanced, but political support amongst others, such as Italy and Spain is weakening. As national resources are redirected, away from constructive capital expenditure or societal goods toward an unwinnable arms race to support a lost war, it’s difficult to imagine matters improving.
Foundationally, the United States is much more powerful than Europe or Ukraine, but this is not a high bar. Industrially, the whole world knows there is a problem – a primary logic for tariffs is reindustrialisation. Energy is a much better, albeit far from perfect, story. Although an exporter of refined hydrocarbons, the United States is a net oil importer, to the tune of nearly 3 million barrels per day.
More immediately pertinent, Ukraine is a long way from the American home, Trump’s electoral base is generally against the war and the prospects of Congressional funding beyond June are uncertain. Inter-administration politics play their part too. Primary responsibility for the United States initial support for the war lies with the Biden administration. But the longer the American hand is kept in the Ukraine mangle, the more likely the Trump administration will take over the blame.
Russia, meanwhile, is demonstrating on the battlefield the analytic value of balance-of power calculation. Industrially mobilised for its ‘special military operation’, Russia’s production of 155mm shells is larger than the US, Europeans and Ukrainians combined. The country is also a hydrocarbons superpower, wholly energy independent and watching on – bemusedly? – as Europeans accelerate their industrial suicide with more boomerang energy sanctions. The geopolitical utility of Russia’s power is also clear. A major land power, it is operating on interior logistics lines that play to its strengths. Politically, Russians believe they are fighting an existential war against an expansionist West. As far back as 2008, Bill Burns’ Nyet means Nyet diplomatic telegram described NATO expansion as a ‘neuralgic’ issue for all Russians, not just Putin. Their cause is Russia’s existence and Putin’s 85% political approval figures reflect the commitment of his people to win.
Implications: Russia is in the driving seat.
So what?
On this analysis, the balance-of power – on the battlefield and at the negotiating table – overwhelmingly favours Russia. Despite this, European leaders – with reducing support amongst Americans – appear to believe that the losers should dictate the terms of ceasefire or surrender. Then protest loudly when neither history nor Putin agree. In war, it is the winners who dictate terms, and this war will largely end on Russia’s terms. Although the spin-doctors will no doubt try, it will be no good trying politically to present this as anything other than a NATO defeat, because that is what it is.
Much better to acknowledge and accept this strategic inevitability, show some European political humility, and begin – finally – to work constructively with Americans and Russians. So that we can, in turn, address the more important immediate question for us all. Whether the war is concluded more slowly, brutally and expensively, on the battlefield? Or more quickly, humanely and cheaply at the negotiating table?
If we recognise the West’s relative lack of power and accept the geopolitical realities on the ground, we Europeans can start to make a positive difference, rather than seeking to cling to our failed political narrative and delay the inevitable.
Our continued calls for Russia to accept terms that the West is unable to impose will need to cease. We will need to shift our position on the negotiation fundamentals. Russia too has legitimate security interests. Pushing NATO to Russia’s borders whilst wilfully ignoring their interests was always likely to lead to conflict. Wars are brought to a close by diplomacy – which means European leaders starting to talk personally to Putin, and foreign ministers Lavrov, and trying better to understand firsthand what they and all Russians want.
This latter question ought not be too difficult – because the Russians have been telling us what they want for at least three years. Fundamentally, they are seeking a security solution that removes the war’s primary cause and leads to long-term peace on the European continent. When there is broad agreement on how this can be achieved, then – and only then – will they be ready to talk about a ceasefire. And start to bring an end to Ukraine’s catastrophic infrastructure destruction, the loss of yet more Russian and Ukrainian lives, and the expenditure of good European monies to follow the bad already squandered.
In 1965, General Andres Beaufre said: ‘In war, the loser deserves to lose because his defeat must be due to failures in thinking either before or during the campaign.’ I agree. It may go against conventional European thinking, but history will soon show that, with Americans, we Europeans bear substantial responsibility for this war and for NATO’s defeat. With competent strategic thinking, we could have avoided the war in the first place. With competent balance-of-power thinking, we could – and should – now help bring it more rapidly to a humane close. https://natowatch.org/default/2025/balance-power-russo-ukraine-war?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
The stakes are high for these important Ukraine-Russia-US talks.

Istanbul 2.0: Know when to hold ’em, know when to fold ’em.
Here’s hoping no one walks away — or runs — as the stakes today are high for these important Ukraine-Russia-US talks.
Ian Proud, May 15, 2025, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-russia-istanbul-talks/?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
The biggest achievement of today’s Istanbul talks is that they are even taking place. U.S. engagement will remain vital to getting a peace deal over the line. Russia’s desire for a reset with Washingtonmay keep them on track.
I have a sense of déjà vu as I contemplate these long-overdue peace talks between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul. In April 2022, Ukraine and Russia were close to agreeing a peace treaty, less than two months after war started. However, this came crashing down amid claims that western governments, in particular the United States and the United Kingdom encouraged Ukraine to keep fighting.It’s worth recapping very briefly what was close to having been agreed. By far the best summary of negotiations between both sides was produced by the New York Times in June 2024. Those negotiations ran for almost two months. The talks started with Ukrainian officials being spirited over the border into Belarus on February 29, 2022 while the fighting raged around Kyiv, and eventually led to the now famous talks in Istanbul in March and April.
What has changed since then?
Ukraine will enter the Istanbul talks in a weaker position than it held in 2022.
Western support for Ukraine financially and economically is not as sound as it was then. No big ticket economic aid and assistance has been made available since the G7 agreement of a $50 billion package of loans, in June 2024. While European states scratched together new economic aid to Ukraine in April, this cannot make up for the reduction in US support.
In territorial terms, Russia withdrew from Kyiv as a concession to the first Istanbul talks and lost ground in Kharkiv and in Kherson in late 2022. However, Russia has gone on steadily to gain further territory in the Donbas since the end of 2023. So while both sides have scores on the board, Russia now maintains the military upper hand on the battlefield and that seems unlikely to change. These two factors in particular were behind President Trump’s February assertion that Ukraine has no cards to play.
What has stayed the same?
NATO membership is still off the table
The verified documents shared by the New York Times last June confirmed that Ukraine’s neutrality and non-membership of NATO was the central issue agreed upon in 2022. Ukraine was ready to become a “permanently neutral state” that would never join NATO or allow foreign forces to be based on its soil.
There seems no route for Ukraine to resile from that given its currently weakened negotiating position and President Trump’s stated view that NATO membership for Ukraine is not practical. Although Germany’s new foreign Minister, Johann Wadephul recently repeated the line that Ukraine’s path to NATO is irreversible, most have agreed, privately and publicly, that Ukraine’s path to NATO is a fraught if not impossible one.
Right now, just having the talks is a huge breakthrough
The Istanbul talks would not be happening had the Trump administration not pushed for it so hard. We don’t need to rehash the “did they or didn’t they” debate around why Ukraine abandoned the Istanbul agreement in April 2022. What is clear, is that Ukraine became entrenched, not only in not negotiating with Russia, but in excluding Russia from all discussions on peace in Ukraine from then onward.
Having agreed in principle for Ukraine to accept neutral status Zelensky was soon pushing his own ten point peace plan. This included, among other things, Russia withdrawing its troops to the pre-2014 border, i.e. giving up Crimea and the Donbass and creating a Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture, by which he meant Ukraine joining NATO. Peace summits were organized in various countries that explicitly excluded Russia, culminating in the Switzerland event on June 15, 2024.
At this event, President Zelensky was dug in deeper on resisting any engagement with Russia until a full withdrawal of its troops from Ukraine, which was a completely unrealistic proposal. “Russia can start negotiations with us even tomorrow without waiting for anything – if they leave our legal territories,” he said.
Even after President Trump was elected, European leaders clung to the line that “only Ukraine can decide what peace means.”’ I see no circumstances in which a Kamala Harris presidency would have cajoled President Zelensky to enter into negotiations. The talks wouldn’t be happening unless the Trump administration broke a whole load of Ukrainian and European eggshells to get to this point.
The biggest issue now is territory
Even though he was wrongly derided at the time by mainstream media, Steve Witkoff correctly pointed out in his March interview with Tucker Carlson that the territorial issues in Ukraine will be most intractable. Russia’s decision in October 2022 to formally annex the four oblasts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk changed the calculus. However, Russia does not have full territorial control of any of those oblasts, which are cut through the middle by a hotly contested front line.
Resolving the line of control when the war ends is, by some margin, the most problematic challenge. This will be a hugely sensitive topic, and European allies will shoot down any major concessions to Russia, as they did when the idea surfaced that the U.S.might de jure recognise Russia’s occupation of Crimea.
The most obvious settlement is a de facto recognition of occupation, a Cyprus-style scenario, that does not stand in the way of Ukraine’s future membership of the European Union. Even that will require detailed agreement on issues around demilitarization of the line of control and enforcing any ceasefire.
Sanctions are probably tricky, but also tractable
As I have said before, there is enormous scope to a plan that allows for the immediate lifting of the bulk of zero-impact measures, phasing out the remainder at points agreed to by both sides. The toughest issue remains the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets, mostly held in Belgium. Russia has shown a willingness to concede this funding to support reconstruction in Ukraine, including those parts that Russia occupies.
But there is texture here. Freeing up those funds for reconstruction would immediately remove the source of interest payments that are meeting Ukraine’s obligations on its $50 billion in debt to the G7, agreed to in June 2024. But the more general policy question arises, how much of the freed up funding would be spent in Ukraine itself and how much in Russian-occupied Ukraine, where most of the war damage has occurred? The U.S. must keep the pressure on to ensure the talks stay on track.
A U.S. presence in Istanbul will be vital, to prevent, in particular, Ukraine from bailing on the talks. That’s why sending Steve Witkoff and Keith Kellogg makes sense. The former is trusted by the Russian side while the latter has built relationships in Ukraine. Their presence serves to keep the process moving forward until a deal can be pushed over the line and the fighting can stop.
Bear in mind that the 2022 talks ran for a month and a half and the circumstances have materially changed as I have indicated above. While there has been speculation that President Trump might drop into Istanbul, I am not sure that this is necessary if President Putin doesn’t himself attend. Knowing the Russians, I assess that Putin will want his own “‘meeting moment” with the U.S. President on terms that the Russian side can better choreograph. Indeed, that may be a prize for Russia’s engagement in the process, given its desire for a more comprehensive reset of relations with the U.S.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) secures contribution from France to help restore site safety at Chornobyl
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has secured a
€10 million contribution to the International Chernobyl Cooperation
Account (ICCA) from France, reaffirming its unwavering support for
international decommissioning and nuclear remediation efforts at the
Chornobyl nuclear power plant and across Ukraine.
EBRD 14th May 2025,
https://www.ebrd.com/home/news-and-events/news/2025/chornobyl-france.html
Let’s give Trump credit where credit is due
18 May 25 https://theaimn.net/president-trump-on-ukraine-in-pursuit-of-peace-or-glory/
Yes, he’s a narcissist, yes he’s racist, misogynist, crooked in business, and with no regard for civil institutions and laws. AND he’s just been sucking up to the nastiest most murderous Arabian Gulf regime, in order to make $billions for American business interests, including, notably his own.
BUT even Trump can do some good things. And in the case of the Ukraine war, this is apparent.
In early 2022, Ukraine’s President Zelensky was on the brink of signing a peace agreement with Russia. There’d be no loss of Ukraine territory, and no Ukraine NATO membership. Key Western leaders opposed this negotiation. On April 9, 2022, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson arrived unannounced in Kiev and told the Ukrainian president that the West was not ready to end the war. Then in April, in Kiev, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said the U.S. wants to use the opportunity to permanently weaken Russia militarily and economically. He went on , at a meeting of Western leaders in Germany, to declare a Ukrainian victory over Russia as a strategic goal for Europe and the USA.
Zelensky promptly switched policy, and this turned into his peripatetic jaunts to the USA and Europe, to drum up weaponry for this determination to defeat Russia. In this, he had the mindless, and never flinching, support from Joe Biden, and NATO. All of which was most acceptable to America’s warhawks, and manna from Heaven to Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Boeing and General Dynamics.
The West then launched a propaganda campaign about Ukrainian forces defeating Russian forces. English language media continued to show only the Ukrainian perspective. Media scholars have studies this, but I can be sure just from my own experience of the Australian media.
I’ve noticed not only a constant theme that Ukraine can militarily defeat Russia, but that Ukraine IS winning the war. This has been accompanied by copious emotional stories about the Ukrainian civilian victims of Russia’s war. Terrible atrocities done by the Russians. And some atrocity reports are faked. In reality, atrocities have been committed also by Ukrainians, but these are rarely reported on.
With that unflinching support from the West, Russia’s steady progress in the war has been disregarded and downplayed. Now Russia now has the military upper hand on the battlefield and that seems unlikely to change.
From 2022 until 2025, Biden and NATO would not countenance any serious suggestion of a negotiated end, such was their hatred of Russia. Near the end of his office, President Biden signed off on a huge number of weapons to Ukraine.
Donald Trump promised to end the war. In March this year, he stopped all military aid to Ukraine, including weapons already in transit. He’s against NATO membership for Ukraine – as just “not practical”, and does not expect that Ukraine will get back all of its land.
Ukraine has extended martial law until 6 August following Zelensky’s request This will prevent elections from being held before then, and enable Zelensky to stay in power. However, Zelensky could use fraudulent voter lists as a means of gaining re-election.
Critics , (including myself) have stressed Trump’s aim to make money for American companies out of a peace agreement. Well, so what? American weapons companies have been making $billions out of the war.
The thing is, despite all Trump’s negative aspects, he really does not like war. And with the Trump presidency, there is at last the opportunity to end this pointless slaughter, and avoid a wider war – something that was not possible under a Democrat administration.
As to Trump “not liking war” – that is another story to be explored. He likes to bully people with the threat of war. And that may turn out to be a dangerous way to go.
Zelensky’s plan for peace involves Ukraine getting back all the Russian-occupied land, including Crimea, (formally part of Russia since 2014) , and Ukraine headed to become a NATO member.
Europe, and all Westerners who buy into the Joe Biden view of Ukraine seem now still holding onto the idea of a military victory by Ukraine, over Russia. Zelensky’s unrealistic plan for a ceasefire can be disregarded. At least Trump offers a realistic way towards peace. And for that, he deserves acknowledgment.
Zelensky now needs to shut up and let his negotiating team get to work

Zelensky has actively sought to prevent any possibility of dialogue with Russia on the ending of the war since the first Istanbul talks collapsed in April 2022.
there will be massive pressure from the enormous pro-war lobby in Ukraine and in the west to call off the talks at the first opportunity.
there will be massive pressure from the enormous pro-war lobby in Ukraine and in the west to call off the talks at the first opportunity.
He won’t, of course, but once Istanbul talks finally start, they will soon develop a logic and momentum of their own
Ian Proud, The Peacemonger, May 16, 2025
As I predicted in my article -(The stakes are high for these important Ukraine-Russia-US talks.) there would be no breakthroughs on day 1 or, perhaps, as it should now be called, day -1. Not surprisingly, Zelensky spent his time in Ankara claiming the Russians didn’t want peace, blaming Putin, searching desperately for a reason to call off talks that hadn’t started, while the Russian delegation waited patiently in Istanbul for a Ukrainian team that didn’t show up. Predictably, western leaders including Keir Starmer, did their part, alleging that Putin wasn’t serious about peace talks, while the Russian delegation was still waiting patiently in Istanbul.
My article points out, correctly, that the biggest achievement is that the talks are even taking place if, in fact, they do start today. Zelensky has actively sought to prevent any possibility of dialogue with Russia on the ending of the war since the first Istanbul talks collapsed in April 2022.
Trump has changed the game by insisting direct negotiations are the only way to bring the bloodshed to an end. Indeed, it seems clear that, in the end, Zelensky was pressed by both Trump and President Erdogan to name his delegation and dispatch them to Istanbul which he finally agreed to do late last night.
Let’s be clear, there will be massive pressure from the enormous pro-war lobby in Ukraine and in the west to call off the talks at the first opportunity. The fact that the US has sent Rubio, Witkoff and Kellogg to Istanbul suggests the Americans aren’t going to let up the pressure on Zelensky to cut a deal, even if that means the beginning of the end of his political career.
Expect maximum Zelensky showboating over the next day or so, and minimal progress at the negotiating table. But once the talks start, they may start to build a logic and momentum of their own, grinding us slowly towards the cessation of gunfire. There will be no Victoria Nuland or Boris Johnson to tell Zelensky not to sign the agreement this time. Even Starmer isn’t stupid enough to undermine a deal that Trump has slogged to line up, at a time when Britain is trying to maximize its transatlantic trade and investment relationship.
Foreign policy, after all, always begins and ends with domestic policy, whatever the true believers tell you.
The biggest achievement of today’s Istanbul talks is that they are even taking place. U.S. engagement will remain vital to getting a peace deal over the line. Russia’s desire for a reset with Washington may keep them on track.
I have a sense of déjà vu as I contemplate these long-overdue peace talks between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul. In April 2022, Ukraine and Russia were close to agreeing a peace treaty, less than two months after war started. However, this came crashing down amid claims that western governments, in particular the United States and the United Kingdom encouraged Ukraine to keep fighting.
It’s worth recapping very briefly what was close to having been agreed. By far the best summary of negotiations between both sides was produced by the New York Times in June 2024. Those negotiations ran for almost two months. The talks started with Ukrainian officials being spirited over the border into Belarus on February 29, 2022 while the fighting raged around Kyiv, and eventually led to the now famous talks in Istanbul in March and April………………………………. https://thepeacemonger.substack.com/p/zelensky-now-needs-to-shut-up-and?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=3221990&post_id=163688883&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
Safety failures reported at Hinkley Point C days before environmental trial begins
PBC Today 14th May 2025,
https://www.pbctoday.co.uk/news/health-safety-news/safety-failures-hinkley-point-crane/151164/
An improvement notice has been served to the Nuclear New Build Generation Company (NNB GenCo) regarding the safety of a damaged tower crane at Hinkley Point C
The enforcement was issued by the Office for Nuclear Regulation after a crane was found to have evidence of cracking in one of the mast sections, and a pin connecting two mast sections was found to have failed.
The issues were discovered by an operator during pre-use checks on site in February. They were subsequently reported to HSE under Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR).
A failure by NBB to plan, manage and monitor
NNB GenCo are the site licensee and principal contractor for the Hinkley Point C project, and as such is responsible for the faults. The enforcement determines a failure by NNB to plan, manage, and monitor the construction phase as well as health and safety requirements in relation to the maintenance and condition of the tower cranes.
This violates Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015, Regulation 13 (1).
Due to the early detection of the issue, no major incidents occurred, and no injuries were caused.
“Served to ensure that action is taken”
Principal inspector at the Office for Nuclear Regulation John McKenniff said: “While the observed damage did not result in any crane failure or collapse, this improvement notice was served to ensure that action is taken to prevent any similar occurrences in the future.
“We will monitor the actions of NNB GenCo and will consider taking further action if additional shortfalls are identified.”
It has been a busy year for HSE so far, having served fines and warnings for Network Rail as well, among various other health and safety concerns.
Hinkley Point domestic environmental information law trial begins today
A case has been opened against NNB GenCo by Fish Legal, due to NNB changing the plans for fish deterrents on site. The plans originally featured an acoustic fish deterrent, but switched to a saltmarsh in the plan.
The plans have since been reverted to an acoustic deterrent due to a new “safe and effective” method of implementation, but the case is still going ahead due to Fish Legal believing that foreign-owned companies who construct and operate a nuclear power plant in the UK must comply with domestic environmental information laws, providing details on environmental plans when asked – something that NNB has failed to do to date when Fish Legal have asked for details.
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