Group protest against Sizewell C ahead of Spending Review
Campaigners gathered to further protest against Sizewell C just days
before the conclusion of the Spending Review. Supporters of Stop Sizewell C
and Together Against Sizewell C (TASC) met for an ‘Outrage’ rally at
Sizewell Beach on Saturday, June 7. The weekend rally also paid tribute to
former TASC chair and campaigner Pete Wilkinson who died in January of this
year. His daughters Emily and Amy spoke at the protest and tied yellow
ribbons onto the fence. The protest came ahead of the conclusion of the
Spending Review on Wednesday, June 11 where it is believed the government
will set out its plans for future investment in Sizewell C.
East Anglian Daily Times 8th June 2025,
https://www.eadt.co.uk/news/25222586.group-protest-sizewell-c-ahead-spending-review/
£127M wasted on failed UK nuclear cleanup plan
Don’t worry, only 100 more years of Sellafield nuclear site cleansing to go
Lindsay Clark, Sat 7 Jun 2025,
https://www.theregister.com/2025/06/07/mps_find_127_million_wasted_sellafield/
The center for the UK’s nuclear industry wasted £127 million ($172 million) during delays and replanning as it scrambled to find alternatives for facilities which treat and repackage plutonium, a Parliamentary report found.
In the face of a 2028 deadline to replace its 70-year-old analytical lab, Sellafield Limited, part of a group of companies and government bodies on the northwest England Sellafield site, has abandoned plans for its Replacement Analytical Project (RAP). Ditching RAP was chalked up to multiple expected delays from 2028 until at least 2034 and a half-a-billion-pounds cost increase to £1.5 billion ($1.93 billion).
A new report from the Parliament’s public spending watchdog says RAP “has been managed very poorly indeed.”
Sellafield, formerly known as Windscale, has been the center of the UK’s nuclear industry since the 1950s. While the site is home to a number of companies, and the government’s Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, Sellafield Limited, is a British nuclear decommissioning Site Licence Company controlled by the NDA.
In October last year, the UK’s public spending watchdog said Sellafield depends on an on-site laboratory that is “over 70 years old, does not meet modern construction standards and is in extremely poor (and deteriorating) condition.”
The National Audit Office said [PDF] the laboratory is “not technically capable of carrying out the analysis required to commission the Sellafield Product and Residue Store Retreatment Plant (SRP)” to treat and repackage plutonium.
Sellafield’s plan in 2016 was to convert a 25-year-old laboratory on the site, which would replace the 70-year-old lab, under the “Replacement Analytical Project.” The outline business case was approved in 2019 with an estimated cost of between £486 million and £1 billion ($626 million – $1.3 billion).
It later emerged that it could take until December 2034 to deliver the full capability, while cost could reach £1.5 billion ($1.93 billion). Sellafield “strategically paused” RAP in February 2024.
In a report this week, the House of Commons’ Public Accounts Committee said: “Sellafield Ltd’s performance in delivering major projects (such as new buildings to store waste or make it safe) has historically been very poor, with large cost increases and delays occurring all too frequently.
“There are signs of improvement – however, given Sellafield’s track record, we are yet to be fully convinced that this is not another false dawn. Another reason to be skeptical is Sellafield’s poor management of the RAP. At the point it paused work, the forecast cost had risen by £820 million, and the project was five years delayed,” the PAC report said.
After abandoning the RAP, Sellafield plans to convert a different building to support a Store Retreatment Plant, which re-treats and repackages existing plutonium material, making it more suitable for durable, long-term storage. It also plans to refurbish the 70-year-old existing building — including replacing the roof — so it can carry on using it until 2040. The alternative plan would provide a service until 2040, whereas the RAP was expected to remain in use until 2070.
However, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority told PMs the new plan would cost between £420 million and £840 million ($570 million – $1.1 billion), much less than the RAP. Although some of the costs from the early projects could be recouped in the new plan, the PAC said £127 million ($172 million) spent on RAP will have been wasted.
The NDA expects the clean-up of the Sellafield site to go on until 2125 and cost £136 billion ($184 billion), an estimate which has increased nearly 19 percent since March 2019. ®
Nuclear power: a dream not worth having
The Government wants more nuclear power stations, but renewable energy is cheaper, safer, and more sustainable.
by Steve Dawe, 7 June 2025, https://westenglandbylines.co.uk/business/energy/nuclear-power-a-dream-not-worth-having/
Labour is committed to building new nuclear power stations on eight coastal sites. Margaret Thatcher was also an enthusiast for nuclear power. She wanted one new nuclear power station built each year in the UK during the 1980s. Only one, Sizewell B, was built. Why? Because it cost too much, as was obvious in 1990:
Mr Illsley: “The Secretary of State must be aware that recent estimates have put the final cost of Sizewell B at about £3.8 bn, taking into account the cost overruns, delays and lack of economies of scale… £2bn can be saved by cancelling the project now. Does the Secretary of State agree that the time to cancel Sizewell B is right now?”
(House of Commons Debates, 25 June 1990).
Renewables are cheaper
Sizewell B did not come online until 1995. The Government admitted in 2020 that renewables can be cheaper than they thought. Given decades of nuclear industry propaganda intended to obscure the deficiencies of this sector, support for nuclear appears less about stating a technology preference than an indirect political statement in favour of nuclear weapons.
We need electricity; we don’t need it to come from nuclear. But successive UK governments have used public money to subsidise the industries involved, instead of using it for things actually sustainable, cost-effective, and with minimal pollution. Keir Starmer has even ignored the nuclear watchdog when he blamed regulations for implementation delays.
The extensive range of reasons to oppose nuclear power
Here is a short list of some of the reasons to oppose new nuclear power stations, and phase out existing ones:
- Nuclear power is too slow to implement to be relevant to the climate emergency. Construction times are an average of 10 years per nuclear power station.
- Nuclear power stations are at risk of terrorist sabotage or attack in war, as has been demonstrated in Ukraine.
There are comprehensive reasons to oppose nuclear power, based partly on the British experience and that of other states recently. These also include:
The radioactive waste that needs storage for at least 100,000 years makes the true costs of nuclear power incalculable.- Part of the reason for this storage is the known health effects of radiation.
- Since major nuclear accidents have continued to occur and spread radioactive material into the environment, preference for other means of generating electricity and for radically improving insulation in buildings to reduce energy needs is unarguable.
- This is especially the case when the water implications are considered: nuclear power stations require water for cooling, on a planet with increasing droughts and extreme weather events. Nuclear power stations using water from watercourses have had to shut down during periods of drought, emphasising the desirability of solar and wind power which do not require water to operate.
- Making it easier to build more nuclear power stations on the eight coastal sites the Government prefers completely ignores the risk of sea level rise discussed below. It is extraordinary that these sites have been chosen.
Hence, to quote from one of the recent critical analyses, new nuclear power is “doomed to fail“. It is certainly prone to extreme weather events such as storms, if the proposed sites are used.
Nuclear power supports nuclear weapons
Most countries in the world do not have nuclear weapons. Today, 120 countries belong to the Non-Aligned Movement, committing themselves not to belong to alliances which perpetuate long-term confrontations between states.
The UK Government admits part of its support for existing and new nuclear power stations is to maintain essential supplies to its nuclear weapons programme. What is true for the UK clearly applies to other states with nuclear weapons.
Since nuclear weapons proliferation is against the general interest of all species on the planet, phasing out both nuclear power and nuclear weapons would be rational when alternatives exist, are becoming cheaper, and are expanding in use year after year.
New nuclear is too expensive to consider
Nuclear power is notoriously expensive. The International Energy Agency reported in 2023 that new solar and on-shore wind are cheaper than fossil fuels. Greenpeace has summarised the current situation, comparing renewables to nuclear, as follows:
“The cost of generating solar power ranges from $36 to $44 per megawatt-hour (MWh), the World Nuclear Industry Status Report said, while onshore wind power comes in at $29–$56 per MWh. Nuclear energy costs between $112 and $189 per MWh. Over the past decade, the World Nuclear Industry Status Report estimates levelised costs… for utility-scale solar have dropped by 88% and for wind by 69%. According to the same report, these costs have increased by 23% for nuclear.”
Worse for the British Government, an authoritative report asserts that the new nuclear power in the UK would actually be the world’s most expensive. Support by political parties in the UK for nuclear power is therefore a choice of the most expensive of options under consideration.
Jonathon Porritt, former head of the Government’s Sustainable Development Commission, has indicated that the cost of Hinkley C and Sizewell C are both likely to rise to about £75bn each. Others have argued that nuclear power may simply not be cost-effective in relation to realistic cost assessments including paying for very long-term radioactive waste storage.
The toxic twins: Hinkley C and Sizewell C
“Hinkley C in Somerset will cost the energy bill payer up to £17.6bn in subsidies. The agreed price of £92.50 per MW/hour is over double the current wholesale price at just over £41 per MW/hour.” (People Against Wylfa-B)
The construction costs were already predicted to rise by a third in early 2024, illustrating the general problem of high-cost infrastructure in the UK. Sizewell C costs were also predicted to double in early 2025.
Nuclear is never ‘clean’
The UK is going ‘all out’ to be a clean energy superpower, said Keir Starmer. But nuclear power has never been a ‘clean’ technology. Essentially, many alleged solutions to the problem of radioactive nuclear waste need to rely on perfect storage for 100,000 years.
This is a conception worthy of science fiction. Uranium mining is known to cause health problems in proximate populations, often to indigenous peoples.
Small modular nuclear reactors – why bother?
The nuclear industry has problems with scaling up to reduce costs. Nuclear power construction and related expense means reduced costs do not materialise.
The small modular reactor (SMR) is allegedly going to change this. However, a US Department of Energy report of September 2024 suggested a cost per megawatt more than 50% higher than for large reactors.
There are only three operating SMRs: one in China, with a 300% cost overrun, and two in Russia, with 400% cost overrun. In March, a Financial Times analysis labelled such small reactors “the most expensive energy source.” Others concur that SMRs are very expensive, and slow to construct, with negative environmental implications.
Sea level rise and nuclear sites
All eight of the Government’s preferred sites for new nuclear power development are coastal. There are concerns about the impact of sea-level rises for all the sites. There should also be concerns about storms increasing in power and frequency too as the climate changes.
Hinkley and Sizewell are already in development. Will an island be created to protect the proposed Sizewell C site from the sea? Does the Government privately think this might be necessary for all eight sites?
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) may have under-estimated sea level rise up to 2100. Scientific papers have been predicting higher sea level rises than the IPCC since at least 2012. It has been suggested that: “All energy-related infrastructure is at risk from the impacts of climate change, especially due to the changing frequency and intensity of surface water and coastal flooding.”
And the rate of sea level rise has been increasing. Very low-lying sites like that of Sizewell C should be abandoned. And back in 1981, the Hinkley Point site was flooded, forcing closure of a nuclear power station there for a week.
Communities with nuclear legacies need alternatives
Communities with declining nuclear industry work would need alternative jobs. This is a general need for all localities experiencing employment transitions.
Each district and unitary council should have its own Green New Deal to promote and directly support just transitions. This would involve re-introducing a version of the Community Programme of the 1980s to employ people in projects and programmes, in cooperation with local voluntary bodies where possible. This should both support existing sustainability initiatives and help introduce new ones.
Training on the job should feature, to provide a better range of local skills appropriate to a just transition in areas like construction, forestry and nature, gardening, agriculture, energy efficiency, installing heat pumps in homes and more.
Just transition or another failure to future-proof the UK?
The colossal financial impact of nuclear power in the past and future in the UK is difficult to calculate, especially when radioactive waste storage is considered. The repercussions of public spending on this technology and its aftermath include inadequate spending on sustainable retrofitting of the existing built environment.
We certainly need electricity. We have never needed it to be specifically from nuclear power. The scale and diversity of energy alternatives are more than enough to meet future needs, including by increasing battery storage to address any potential problems in maintaining baseload supply.
Political will is absent. The long shadow of nuclear power remains in place over the major political parties, at public expense and with zero long-term vision.
Defence review dodges Britain’s nuclear blind spot.
THE UK’s nuclear enterprise is in crisis. Not just because of cost
overruns or ageing submarines, but because of the deepening secrecy and
silence that surrounds it. That silence should have been broken by the
Labour Government’s new Strategic Defence Review 2025.
Instead, it was quietly reinforced. Presented as a roadmap to “Make Britain Safer”, the
review promised clarity and accountability, but it fails to confront the
most pressing truths: that the UK’s nuclear programme is financially
unsustainable, strategically unbalanced, increasingly unaccountable and a
real and present danger to us all.
These concerns are not hypothetical. In
the final months of the last Parliament, I raised them on the floor of the
House of Commons, not out of party dogma, but in response to serious and
public allegations from Dominic Cummings, former chief adviser to the then
prime minister, remember him? He described Britain’s nuclear
infrastructure as a “dangerous disaster”, responsible for the secret
“cannibalisation” of other national security budgets and shielded from
meaningful scrutiny. Instead of confronting the truth, the review restates
familiar platitudes and leaves the public and Parliament no wiser about the
scale cost, or consequences of the UK’s nuclear commitment. The Defence
Secretary, who heard these warnings first-hand from the opposition bench,
is now in a position to act – he has chosen not to.
The National 8th June 2025,
https://www.thenational.scot/politics/25222635.defence-review-dodges-britains-nuclear-blind-spot/
Protesters raise environmental fears as wait continues for Sizewell C funding announcement
ITV 8 June 2025
Hundreds of people voiced their concerns over the multi-billion pound Sizewell C nuclear power station on the Suffolk coastline ahead of an expected announcement from the Government.
The rally on Sizewell Beach on Saturday, organised by Stop Sizewell C and Together Against Sizewell C, included speeches from campaigners against the major project including Greenpeace members, and musical performances.
The peaceful protest ended with the 300-strong crowd walking to the Sizewell complex and tying ribbons with messages, emphasising people’s concerns, to the gates.
Plans for Sizewell C were given the go ahead by the then Chancellor in November 2022 but the funding is yet to be approved by the Government, although an announcement on the project is expected in Labour’s Spending Review on Wednesday 11 June.
Construction has already started for the nuclear site and surrounding infrastructure on the Suffolk coast which will sit next to the Sizewell B plant, and has already been given £250m in local funding……………….
many people fear the environmental impact of Sizewell C and believe it will destroy the area.
Jenny Kirtley, from Together Against Sizewell C, said: “You’ve only got to look around the area and see the devastation that’s happened. I’ve been fighting this for 12 years. We knew it would be bad, but we didn’t know it would be so devastating. A whole area is changing before our very eyes and it’s heartbreaking.
“There are a huge mountains of earth everywhere and of course the wildlife is suffering. The deers don’t know where to go. They’re rambling around everywhere. The birds are leaving their nests.
“It’s all very well saying it’s going to create thousands of jobs but who’s going to work in the supermarkets, the care homes, the restaurants? This is a small area.
“We’ve got 6,000 people living around here so where are people going to live? We know rents are going sky-high so it’s going to get worse. It’s going to be a real problem.”
Alison Downes, from Stop Sizewell C, also believed the project would be a waste of tax-payers money and said there were better options to provide renewable energy.
She said: “We’ve always had people behind us in the local area. I think a lot of new people have woken up and seen the destruction that’s been caused by the project. They are now feeling the same sense of outrage that we do.
“Sizewell C is too slow, risky and expensive to be the solution to our climate emergency. This is the wrong type of reactor. It’s in the wrong place on an eroding coastline so we are here to express our outrage about Sizewell C.”
The outrage rally, which was the third of it’s kind, was also a tribute to Pete Wilkinson – a former chairman of campaign group, Together Against Sizewell C, who died in January 2025
His daughters Emily and Amy Wilkinson were at the event and spoke about their father.
Emily Wilkinson, 29, said: “Dad was such a fantastic human being. He was a passionate and courageous man who spent his entire life fighting whatever he saw is wrong. That’s what drove him in life. He saw the beauty in the planet and fought for it every single time.”…………………………………………………………….. https://www.itv.com/news/anglia/2025-06-07/protesters-take-to-suffolk-beach-against-sizewell-c-plans
The United States and Greenland, Part I: Episodes in Nuclear History 1947-1968
National Security Archive, 4 June 25
Greenland “Green Light”: Danish PM’s Secret Acquiescence Encouraged U.S. Nuclear Deployments
Pentagon Approved Nuclear-Armed B-52 Flights Over Greenland
State Department: U.S. Can Do “Almost Anything, Literally, That We Want to in Greenland”
Danish Officials Worried About Danger of U.S. Nuclear Accidents
Washington, D.C., June 3, 2025 – The Trump administration’s intention to acquire Greenland, including possibly by force, has put a focus on the history of its strategic interest to U.S. policymakers. Today, the National Security Archive publishes the first of a two-part declassified document collection on the U.S. role in Greenland during the middle years of the Cold War, covering the decisions that led to the secret deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in the Danish territory in 1958 to the 1968 crash of a nuclear-armed B-52 bomber near Thule Air Base that left plutonium-laced debris scattered across miles of Arctic sea ice.[1]
The radioactive mess caused by the accident required a major clean-up and caused a serious controversy in U.S.-Denmark relations. The U.S. had never officially told Denmark that it was flying nuclear weapons over Greenland, although Danish officials suspected it; nor had the U.S. informed the Danes that it had once stored nuclear weapons in Greenland, although in 1957 they had received a tacit “green light” to do so from the Danish prime minister, according to documents included in today’s posting. But both the nuclear-armed overflights of Greenland and the storage of nuclear weapons there were in strong contradiction to Denmark’s declared non-nuclear policy. When the bomber crash exposed the overflights, Denmark tried to resolve the conflict by seeking a U.S. pledge that Greenland would be nuclear free.
This new publication revisits the nuclear and strategic history of the United States and Greenland as it emerged during the late 1940s through the crash in 1968, highlighting key declassified documents from the archival record, FOIA releases, the Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), and other sources. The analysis draws on the work of U.S. and Danish scholars who have written about the B-52 crash and the history of the U.S., Denmark, and Greenland during the Cold War, including revelations in the 1990s that prompted Danish experts to revisit the historical record.[2]
Part I, below, looks at U.S. strategic interests in Greenland in the early Cold War period, including Danish government acquiescence to the storage of nuclear weapons there, U.S. nuclear-armed airborne alert flights over Greenland, and the 1968 B-52 crash. Part II will document the aftermath of the accident, including the clean-up of contaminated ice, the U.S.-Denmark government nuclear policy settlement, and the failed search for lost nuclear weapons parts deep in the waters of North Star Bay.
Background
Greenland has been seen as an important strategic interest to United States defense officials and policymakers since World War II. After the fall of France in June 1940, the Nazis seized Denmark, and the Roosevelt administration feared that Germany would occupy Greenland, threatening Canada and the United States. In response, the U.S. insisted that Greenland was part of the Western Hemisphere and thus a territory that had to be “assimilated to the general hemispheric system of continental defense.” The U.S. began talks with Danish Ambassador Henrik Kauffmann, who was acting on his own authority as “leader of the Free Danes” and in defiance of the German occupiers. On 9 April 1941, Kauffmann signed an extraordinary agreement with Washington giving the United States almost unlimited access to build military facilities in Greenland and would remain valid as long as there were “dangers to the American continent,” after which the two parties could modify or terminate it. By the end of World War II, the U.S. had 17 military facilities in Greenland. After the liberation of Denmark from German rule, the Danish Parliament ratified the Kauffmann-U.S. agreement on 23 May 1945, but it assumed its early termination, with Denmark taking over Greenland’s defense.[3]
In 1946, the Truman administration gave brief consideration to buying Greenland because it continued to see it as important for U.S. security.[4] During 1947, with the U.S. beginning to define the Soviet Union as an adversary, defense officials saw Greenland as an important “primary base,” especially because they were unsure about long-term access to Iceland and the Azores.[5] Thus, maintaining U.S. access was an important concern, as exemplified in an early National Security Council report that U.S. bases in Greenland, along with Iceland and the Azores, were of “extreme importance” for any war “in the next 15 or 20 years.” For their part, Danish authorities had no interest in selling Greenland but sought to restore their nation’s sovereignty there; having joined NATO, they dropped their traditional neutrality approach and were more willing to accept a limited U.S. presence. In late 1949, the U.S. and Denmark opened what became drawn out negotiations over Greenland; during 1950, the U.S. even returned some facilities to Denmark, including Sandrestrom air base. But in late 1950, with Cold War tensions deepening, the Pentagon gave the negotiations greater priority, seeking an agreement that would let the U.S. develop a base at Thule as part of an air strategy designed to reach Soviet targets across the Arctic.[6]
In April 1951, the two countries reached an agreement on the “defense of Greenland” that superseded the 1941 treaty, confirmed Danish sovereignty, and delineated three “defense areas” for use by the United States, with additional areas subject to future negotiations. Under the agreement, each signatory would “take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry out expeditiously their respective and joint responsibilities in Greenland, in accordance with NATO plans.” Consistent with that broad guidance, the U.S. would be free to operate its bases as it saw fit, including the movement of “supplies,” and with no restrictions on its access to airspace over Greenland. With this agreement, Washington had achieved its overriding security goals in Greenland. To move the agreement through Parliament, the Danish government emphasized its defensive character, although the negotiators and top officials understood that U.S. objectives went beyond that.[7]
In 1955, a few years after the 1951 agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to revive interest in purchasing Greenland to ensure U.S. control over the strategically important territory and without having to rely on an agreement with another government. But the JCS proposal never found traction in high levels of the Eisenhower administration. The State Department saw no point to it, since the United States was already “permitted to do almost anything, literally, that we want to in Greenland.” The 1951 agreement stayed in place for decades. Denmark and the United States finally modified it in 2004, limiting the “defense area” to Thule Air Base and taking “Greenland Home Rule” more fully into account.
Nuclear Issues
When the U.S. negotiated the 1951 agreement, nuclear deployments were not an active consideration in official thinking about a role for U.S. bases for Greenland. Yet by 1957, when U.S. government agencies, including the State Department, became interested in deploying nuclear bombs at Thule, they used the agreement’s open-ended language to justify such actions. According to an August 1957 letter signed by Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy, the Agreement was “sufficiently broad to permit the use of facilities in Greenland for the introduction and storage of [nuclear] weapons.” The problem was to determine whether Danish leaders would see it that way.
without consulting the Danish Government, Murphy thought it best to seek the advice of the U.S. ambassador, former Nebraska Governor Val Peterson. Peterson recommended bringing the question to Danish authorities and, having received the Department’s approval, in mid-November 1957 he asked Prime Minister Hans Christian Hansen if he wished to be informed about nuclear deployments. By way of reply, Hansen handed Peterson a “vague and indefinite” paper that U.S. and Danish officials interpreted as a virtual “green light” for the deployments. Hansen raised no objections, asked for no information, and tacitly accepted the U.S. government’s loose interpretation of the 1951 agreement. He insisted, however, that the U.S. treat his response as secret because he recognized how dangerous it was for domestic politics, where anti-nuclear sentiment was strong, and for Denmark’s relations with the Soviet Union, which would have strongly objected.[8]
When Prime Minister Hansen tacitly approved the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland, he was initiating what Danish scholar Thorsten Borring Olesen has characterized as a “double standard” nuclear policy. On the one hand, in a May 1957 address, Hansen had stated that the government would not receive nuclear weapons “under the present conditions.” Thus, Denmark abstained from NATO nuclear storage and sharing plans as they developed in the following years. On the other hand, the Danish leadership treated Greenland differently with respect to nuclear weapons even though, as of 1953, it was no longer a colony but a county represented in Parliament. This double standard was not necessarily a preference for Denmark’s leaders but they felt constrained by the need to accommodate U.S. policy goals in Greenland. Thus, by keeping their Greenland policy secret, Hansen and his successors kept relations with Washington on an even keel while avoiding domestic political crises and pressure from the Soviet Union.[9]
In 1958, the Strategic Air Command deployed nuclear weapons in Greenland, the details of which were disclosed in a declassified SAC history requested by Hans Kristensen, then with the Nautilus Institute. According to Kristensen’s research and the Danish study of “Greenland During the Cold War,” during 1958 the U.S. deployed four nuclear weapons in Greenland—two Mark 6 atomic bombs and two MK 36 thermonuclear bombs as well as 15 non-nuclear components. That SAC kept bombs there for less than a year suggests that it did not have a clear reason to continue storing them in Greenland. Nevertheless, the U.S. kept nuclear air defense weapons at Thule: 48 nuclear weapons were available for Nike-Hercules air missiles through mid-1965. There may also have been a deployment of nuclear weapons for Falcon air-to-air missiles through 1965, but their numbers are unknown.[10]
Airborne Alert and the January 1968 Crash
If it had only been an issue of the U.S. storing nuclear weapons on the ground in Greenland for a few years, the matter might have been kept under wraps for years. But the crash of a U.S. Air Force B-52 on 21 January 1968 near Thule Air Base exposed another nuclear secret and caused serious difficulties in U.S.-Denmark relations…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
The Documents………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2025-06-03/united-states-and-greenland-part-i-episodes-nuclear-history?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=1b16b82b-2b4e-4a93-9ceb-91f5cda9b942
Opposition to Sizewell C Nuclear Power Station sea defence plans lodged
Campaign group Together Against Sizewell C (TASC) has filed a legal claim
over plans for additional coastal flood defences at Sizewell C Nuclear
Power Station, which were omitted from the original planning application
and which the group says could negatively impact local wildlife. The claim
comes after it emerged that developer Sizewell C Ltd had committed to
potentially building additional flood barriers which weren’t included in
the power station’s development consent order. TASC has raised concerns
that the construction of the additional barriers could disrupt nearby
protected areas of wildlife and says other less invasive flood defence
options were not pursued.
Leigh Day 5th June 2025, https://www.leighday.co.uk/news/news/2025-news/opposition-to-sizewell-c-nuclear-power-station-sea-defence-plans-lodged/
Will Russia’s Retaliation To Ukraine’s Strategic Drone Strikes Decisively End The Conflict?
Andrew Korybko, Jun 02, 2025, https://korybko.substack.com/p/will-russias-retaliation-to-ukraines
Tonight will be fateful for the conflict’s future.
Ukraine carried out strategic drone strikes on Sunday against several bases all across Russia that are known to house elements of its nuclear triad. This came a day before the second round of the newly resumed Russian-Ukrainian talks in Istanbul and less than a week after Trump warned Putin that “bad things..REALLY BAD” might soon happen to Russia. It therefore can’t be ruled out that he knew about this and might have even discreetly signaled his approval in order to “force Russia into peace”.
Of course, it’s also possible that he was bluffing and the Biden-era CIA helped orchestrate this attack in advance without him every finding out so that Ukraine could either sabotage peace talks if he won and pressured Zelensky into them or coerce maximum concessions from Russia, but his ominous words still look bad. Whatever the extent of Trump’s knowledge may or may not be, Putin might once again climb the escalation ladder by dropping more Oreshniks on Ukraine, which could risk a rupture in their ties.
Seeing as how Trump is being left in the dark about the conflict by his closest advisors (not counting Witkoff) as proven by him misportraying Russia’s retaliatory strikes against Ukraine over the past week as unprovoked, he might react the same way to Russia’s inevitable retaliation. His ally Lindsey Graham already prepared legislation for imposing 500% tariffs on all Russian energy clients, which Trump might approve in response, and this could pair with ramping up armed aid to Ukraine in a major escalation.
Everything therefore depends on the form of Russia’s retaliation; the US’ response; and – if they’re not canceled as a result – the outcome of tomorrow’s talks in Istanbul. If the first two phases of this scenario sequence don’t spiral out of control, then it’ll all depend on whether Ukraine makes concessions to Russia after its retaliation; Russia makes concessions to Ukraine after the US’ response to Russia’s retaliation; or their talks are once again inconclusive. The first is by far the best outcome for Russia.
The second would suggest that Ukraine’s strategic drone strikes on Russia’s nuclear triad and the US’ response to its retaliation pressured Putin to compromise on his stated goals. These are Ukraine’s withdrawal from the entirety of the disputed regions, its demilitarization, denazification, and restoring its constitutional neutrality. Freezing the Line of Contact (LOC), even perhaps in exchange for some US sanctions relief and a resource-centric strategic partnership with it, could cede Russia’s strategic edge.
Not only might Ukraine rearm and reposition ahead of reinitiating hostilities on comparatively better terms, but uniformed Western troops might also flood into Ukraine, where they could then function as tripwires for manipulating Trump into “escalating to de-escalate” if they’re attacked by Russia. As for the third possibility, inconclusive talks, Trump might soon lose patience with Russia and thus “escalate to de-escalate” anyhow. He could always just walk away, however, but his recent posts suggest that he won’t.
Overall, Ukraine’s unprecedented provocation will escalate the conflict, but it’s unclear what will follow Russia’s inevitable retaliation. Russia will either coerce the concessions from Ukraine that Putin demands for peace; the US’ response to its retaliation will coerce concessions from Russia to Ukraine instead; or both will remain manageable and tomorrow’s talks will be inconclusive, thus likely only delaying the US’ seemingly inevitable escalated involvement. Tonight will therefore be fateful for the conflict’s future.
RAY McGOVERN: Putin Would Not Rise to the Bait
June 4, 2025, https://consortiumnews.com/2025/06/04/ray-mcgovern-putin-would-not-rise-to-the-bait/
The black-eye given Russian security services will eventually heal while the artful destruction of a handful of bombers – like earlier high-profile, but misguided operations – will have zero effect on the war in Ukraine.
By Ray McGovern, Consortium News
Ukraine’s drone attacks on air bases deep inside Russia on Sunday were timed to provoke Russia into shunning the Russia-Ukraine talks set for the next day in Istanbul. Volodymyr Zelensky and his European puppeteers also may have thought they could provoke Vladimir Putin to escalate attacks on Ukraine to such a degree that the U.S. could not “walk away” from Ukraine without appearing cowardly.
The PR benefits of destroying Russian aircraft far from Ukraine was part of Kyiv’s calculus. It was a huge embarrassment and a tactical victory in a short-lived, narrow sense.
But the black-eye given Russian security services will eventually heal. Most important, the artful destruction of a handful of bombers – like earlier high-profile, but misguided operations – will have zero effect on the war in Ukraine.
Doing Diplomacy For Once
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio immediately after the drone attacks on the Russian air bases and the sabotage/destruction of two rail bridges in Russia earlier that day.
The Russian readout said that Secretary Rubio “conveyed sincere condolences on the civilian casualties from the rail infrastructure blasts in Russia’s Bryansk and Kursk regions.” This is a sign that Lavrov did not come in with accusatory guns blazing, so to speak.
It does seem certain that Lavrov asked Rubio whether he knew of the drone attacks beforehand. And what did President Trump know?
In my view, it is conceivable that neither had prior knowledge. When the drone operation was planned the geniuses working for Joe Biden were in charge of such things – the ones who destroyed the Nord Stream pipelines.
Most likely the U.S. was kept informed, but the operation itself bears the earmarks of the sabotage the British are so fond of carrying out – with particular lust after bridges.
They did so famously during World War II and they are quite good at it. Then, as now, such sabotage had little-to-no effect on the war – merely a transitory strengthening of their proverbial upper lip.
The Talks Went On, and Will Continue
Putin and Donald Trump wanted the negotiations in Istanbul to proceed, and those were their instructions to Lavrov and Rubio. They did, and with some tangible progress on small, but significant matters like the exchange of bodies. There was a highly important exchange of papers on the terms sought by each side, and a pledge to study them before the next meeting.
Bottom Line
The driving issue is bigger than Ukraine. Both Trump and Putin want improved U.S.-Russia relations. Other matters, including Ukraine, are secondary. As of now, at least, both sides seek a negotiated settlement to the war as the primary option.
And each side will do its best to avoid escalation and show a measured flexibility – and even patience – until such time as Ukraine’s army disintegrates.
It appears that this will happen soon. I believe that, at that point, Putin will be happy to supply as much lipstick as may be needed to conceal the pig of defeat for Ukraine-and-the-West.
Ray McGovern’s first portfolio as a C.I.A. analyst was Sino-Soviet relations. In 1963, their total trade was $220 MILLION; in 2023, $227 BILLION. Do the math.
Nuclear Power will ruin France
Nuclear power will ruin France , by Laure Nouahlat, published by Seuil , May 16, 2025, 224 p., 13.50 euros.
Neither the French population, nor any parliamentarian or senator had their say, as if nuclear power were democratically held above ground.
Reporterre 16th May 2025,
https://reporterre.net/Le-nucleaire-va-ruiner-la-France
Despite the staggering cost of all-nuclear power, France is stuck in this impasse. Here are the excerpts from the investigative book ”
Nuclear Power Will Ruin France
.” Laure Noualhat dissects the mechanisms of this waste.
Is nuclear revival reasonable ? According to Emmanuel Macron and many others, the nuclear ” holy grail “ would be the only solution to slow climate change and preserve our comfort. While the government is making savings at every turn, the sector seems to benefit from an unlimited budget.
It was announced Monday that the Cigéo nuclear waste disposal facility in Bure will cost up to €37.5 billion. To revive the industry, the bill will climb to at least €80 billion. As delays mount, these amounts are continually revised upwards. All this while EDF is already heavily in debt.
Where will the tens of billions of euros for these new EPRs be found ? And the necessary investments in the existing fleet ? It will be the State, that is, the taxpayer, who will pay.
This is what journalist Laure Noualhat demonstrates in her relentless investigative book, Nuclear Power Will Ruin France . The result of six months of investigation, it is published today in the Seuil- Reporterre collection and will be accompanied by a documentary broadcast on YouTube in early June. Through this extensive work, Reporterre is tackling a crucial issue for the future of the country, largely absent from public debate. Because these choices are made in total secrecy, Reporterre is shedding light on a subject that concerns us all.
Here are the previews of “ Nuclear Power Will Ruin France ”:
What were you doing on February 10, 2022 ? For the small world of energy, it was a memorable day. On that day, presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron stood behind a lectern under the immense tin roof of the General Electric plant in Belfort. His voice echoed like a cathedral. Behind him, GE teams had positioned a gigantic Arabelle turbine, 300 tons of gleaming steel lit as if it were an industrial museum piece.
A group of masked employees, all wearing the same electric blue construction jackets, listens learnedly to the president. Four years earlier, these women and men were part of Alstom’s energy division, the industrial flagship that former Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron had conscientiously dismantled during his time at the Ministry of Finance.
No matter, on this Thursday, February 10, the now President has just announced the ” rebirth “ of French nuclear power, boasted of national ” sovereignty “ and praised the merits of ” planning “ to address the challenges of the moment: reducing our CO2 emissions by 55 % by 2050, ensuring France’s industrial development, and controlling the French people’s energy bill.
No law regulates presidential will
Regardless of the background—environmental, energy, nuclear, activist, industrial, or political—this speech hit the mark and is historic. With its delivery, President-candidate Macron has just rescued France from decades of uncertainty by relaunching the mass construction of nuclear reactors. Since its approval in 2003 by the National Assembly, the Flamanville EPR project has been mired in endless setbacks. In 2012, President Hollande chose a contrary path by enshrining in law the reduction of nuclear power’s share to 50 % of the electricity mix by 2025 (compared to 65-70 %) and to 30 % by 2030. In short, the socialist planned a slow phase-out of nuclear power, allowing for the preparation of the decommissioning of the oldest reactors, the ramp-up of renewables, and an unprecedented effort toward energy efficiency.
In February 2017, candidate Macron – a former minister under Hollande – took up this promise.
”
I will maintain the framework of the energy transition law. I am therefore maintaining the 50
% target,
“ he confided to the
WWF during a Facebook Live broadcast watched by 170,000 people and interviewed by… Pascal Canfin, who will join the President’s list for the 2019 European elections.
Five years later, facing General Electric employees, the Jupiterian president performed an about-face. Six
EPR2s will emerge, he promises, built in pairs on three sites: in Penly in Normandy, in Gravelines in the North, and in Bugey in the Ain. And eight more will be under consideration. Neither the French population, nor any parliamentarian or senator had their say, as if nuclear power were democratically held above ground. Since this announcement, the program of the six EPR2s
has still not been validated by any legal decision, much less by an ”
energy and climate programming law
” (
PPE ), which should have been revised for the occasion.
To date, in 2025, no law governs the presidential will shaped by long years of lobbying (by associations such as Xavier Moreno’s Cérémé or Bernard Accoyer’s Nuclear Heritage & Climate, but also Voies du nucléaire or the French Nuclear Energy Society) since his arrival in power.
A colossal cost
Knocking down walls or hiding the misery, insulating here or repainting there, moving the pipes, changing the door… it’s difficult to ask a tradesman for a quote for work if you don’t know what you’re going to do. It’s the same with nuclear reactors.
As these lines are being written, in March 2025, three years after the Belfort speech, no one knows how much the EPR2 will cost . This is normal: their detailed design has not been completed despite the 10.5 million hours of engineering already devoted to the project.
In February 2022, the government had put forward a construction cost of 51.7 billion (2020 euros). In 2023,
EDF made two updates to the costing, noted by the Court of Auditors in its report on the
EPR sector in January 2025:
”
The overnight construction cost [as if the reactor were completed in a single night] of three pairs of
EPR2s rose from 51.7 to 67.4 billion euros [2020 euros], an increase of 30
% under unchanged economic conditions and excluding the effect of inflation.
“ In 2023 euros, the bill reaches 80 billion. For comparison, this figure of 80 billion already represents four times the annual deficit of the Social Security…
Ukrainian attack on Russian bombers shows how cheap drones could upset global security
The June 1 Spider Web operation likely marks the largest attack on a nuclear-armed state’s nuclear assets to date, one that was executed using laptop-sized drones.
While this represents an operational success for Ukraine, it is still unclear whether and how the drone attack will impact Russia’s conduct of the war. Some fear this operation could lead to a nuclear escalation
By Julien de Troullioud de Lanversin | June 5, 2025, https://thebulletin.org/2025/06/ukrainian-attack-on-russian-bombers-shows-how-cheap-drones-could-upset-global-security/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Drones%20attack%20on%20Russian%20bombers%20upset%20global%20security&utm_campaign=20250605%20Thursday%20Newsletter
On Sunday, social media started broadcasting videos of airfields shrouded with columns of smoke and parked airplanes on fire. These were not common airplanes but Russian strategic bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons virtually anywhere on the globe. Behind these attacks were small drones, like those used to capture scenic social media videos, remotely operated by Ukrainian pilots.
The day after, some Russian media and influential figures called for retaliation with nuclear strikes. On Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly said in a phone call with President Donald Trump that he planned to retaliate against Ukraine for its surprise attack. According to a reading of the Russian nuclear doctrine, the Ukrainian attacks could technically prompt a nuclear retaliation by Russia.
This military operation is the latest illustration of how cheap, accessible drones are changing modern warfare. It also exposed another reality: Drones will wreak havoc on global stability if nobody controls their proliferation.
A turning point. Last week’s drone operation, which the Ukrainian military called “Operation Spider’s Web” and which was 18 months in the making, looked like it came straight out of a James Bond movie: More than a hundred first-person view drones were secretly shipped inside containers on commercial trucks sent toward locations deep inside Russian territory, nearby highly sensitive military airfields. With just a click from operators based in Ukraine, all containers’ roofs simultaneously opened, and drones navigated to their targets to unleash destruction. The number of aircraft damaged or destroyed is still unclear. (Ukrainian authorities claim 41 aircraft were destroyed.) What is certain, however, is that several of Russia’s most critical and advanced strategic nuclear-capable bombers were damaged.
The drones were likely “Osa” quadcopters, 13-15 inches in length and developed and assembled in Ukraine at a cost of around $600 to $1000 each, according to an early analysis of the attack by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Each drone likely carried an explosive payload of about 3.2 kilograms and detonated on impact with the targeted airplanes. To communicate with the drones, Ukrainian operators are believed to have used Russian mobile telecommunication networks, such as 4G and LTE connections. It is also likely that the drones were supported by artificial intelligence systems to give them autonomy in case the telecommunication with the operators would break, and to assist in precisely targeting identified weak spots on the airplanes.The drones were likely “Osa” quadcopters, 13-15 inches in length and developed and assembled in Ukraine at a cost of around $600 to $1000 each, according to an early analysis of the attack by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Each drone likely carried an explosive payload of about 3.2 kilograms and detonated on impact with the targeted airplanes. To communicate with the drones, Ukrainian operators are believed to have used Russian mobile telecommunication networks, such as 4G and LTE connections. It is also likely that the drones were supported by artificial intelligence systems to give them autonomy in case the telecommunication with the operators would break, and to assist in precisely targeting identified weak spots on the airplanes.
The June 1 Spider Web operation likely marks the largest attack on a nuclear-armed state’s nuclear assets to date, one that was executed using laptop-sized drones. It also stands as the most significant demonstration of drones’ ability to penetrate deeply into heavily defended territory with significant strategic impact. While this represents an operational success for Ukraine, it is still unclear whether and how the drone attack will impact Russia’s conduct of the war. Some fear this operation could lead to a nuclear escalation.
For decades, major powers have pursued so-called strategic stability, a situation in which nuclear adversaries are deterred from launching direct military attacks against one another due to their mutually destructive nuclear capabilities. States also realized that continuing to develop more weapons in a never-ending arms race was costly and increased the risks of conflicts. This is why they agreed to engage in arms control and arms reduction, while making sure to maintain strategic stability.
But this fragile balance between great powers has always been vulnerable to new and disruptive technologies such as microchips, precision-guided missiles, or cybertechnology. Drones, especially small and cheap ones, represent a unique challenge to this balance, one that often evades the grasp of major powers.
‘Cheap drone’ warfare. Drone technology is not new. It was already used during the Cold War and has been a hallmark of the war in Iraq, with its precision strikes in the middle of the desert. Military powers such as the United States, Russia, and China have long invested in and developed expensive, highly advanced drones for various missions. Enhanced by artificial intelligence and increasing autonomy, modern drones have already promised to transform warfare by enabling operations without risking human pilots and possibly transforming the decision-making of those using them.
Things took another turn in the 2010s.
Enabled by advances in microelectronics and battery technologies, smaller and cheaper drones started to be mass-produced for commercial purposes by companies like DJI and others. It did not take long for the military to adapt these drones for warfare purposes. Combined with cutting-edge telecommunication technology, these smaller drones could form intelligent swarms and offer real-time video feeds to their operators.
This time, the nuclear powers were not the only ones to engage in the arms race. Unlike other delivery systems, such as missiles or jet fighters that have significantly higher entry costs, smaller states and even non-state actors could acquire inexpensive drones and transform them into rudimentary but effective “air force” and delivery systems.
The simplicity of their acquisition, use, and diffusion into the hands of actors of various sizes around the globe is what makes cheap drones such a game-changer for modern warfare—and now also for global security.
These inexpensive drones enable smaller states to conduct effective asymmetric warfare against more powerful opponents. It is in great part thanks to its drone force that Ukraine has stood its ground against the world’s second-largest military since 2022. Reports indicate that small drones may have contributed to up to 70 percent of Russian equipment losses so far in the conflict—and this number is likely to become higher if the war continues, given Ukraine’s rapidly growing drone production capacity.
More crucially, cheap drones can be used to sabotage well-defended strategic assets. In what is often described as terrorist acts, Yemen’s Houthis have used drones to attack commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, thereby disrupting about 12 percent of global trade in 2024. Houthis’ drones also destroyed Saudi Arabia’s critical oil infrastructure, disrupting 5 percent of global oil supply in 2019.
But the most striking instance of their strategic reach remains the Ukrainian operation of June 1. This operation also foreshadows a dangerous shift in global stability.
Risk of escalation. Historically, only major nuclear powers had effective means to inflict damage on the nuclear capabilities of other major powers. And for most nuclear-armed states, an attack on their nuclear capabilities, even a conventional one, called for nuclear retaliation. To avoid nuclear escalation, nuclear powers have carefully crafted doctrines, strategies, and agreements between themselves to create predictability and increase strategic stability. But to a certain extent, this system of balance was not designed with the expectation that smaller actors could threaten critical nuclear assets of the nuclear-armed states.
Smaller states with no nuclear capabilities and less familiar with the game of strategic stability, like Ukraine, might not fully realize the direct or indirect risk of nuclear escalation that their drone operations could entail. More alarming, non-state actors could also potentially actively seek to initiate a nuclear escalation between nuclear adversaries with drone-enabled false flag operations.
Discussions around drone regulation in war often center around their ethical uses and their level of AI-powered autonomy, which are certainly crucial issues to tackle. But states must also recognize the highly disruptive impact that cheap and widely accessible drones can have not only on warfare but on global security and stability.
One way forward is to implement strict export control and purchase regulations on small drones, such as those implemented for small firearms. Such policies will inevitably collide with the booming industry and market of small, cheap drones that are increasingly popular for commercial purposes and leisure activities. But states will need to work on some form of control of drone export and weaponization, lest they are willing to risk more nuclear crises.
Let’s not pretend nuclear works
Funding the Future, Richard Murphy, June 6 2025, https://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2025/06/06/lets-not-pretend-nuclear-works/
As the Public Accounts Committee has reported this week:
The retrieval of waste from ageing buildings at the most hazardous nuclear site in the UK is not happening quickly enough.
In its report on decommissioning Sellafield, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) warns that the estimated £136bn cost of the project would rise even more if work is further delayed, while expressing scepticism as to whether or not recent signs of improvement in performance could represent another false dawn.
The PAC found in 2018 that government needed a firmer grip on Sellafield’s nuclear challenges, and now warns that not enough progress has been made in addressing its most significant hazards.
One building, the Magnox Swarf Storage Silo (MSSS), has been leaking radioactive water into the ground since 2018 – the PAC calculates, at current rates, enough to fill an Olympic swimming pool roughly every three years. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) accepts this leak is its “single biggest environmental issue”, but that the radioactive particles are “contained” in the soil and do not pose a risk to the public.
The PAC’s report finds that Sellafield Ltd has missed most of its annual targets for retrieving waste from several buildings on the site, including the MSSS. The PAC’s inquiry heard that the MSSS is the most hazardous building in the UK, and as a result of Sellafield Ltd’s underperformance will likely remain extremely hazardous for longer. The report seeks answers from Government on how it will hold the NDA and Sellafield Ltd to account in ameliorating the site’s greatest hazards.
Nuclear power created the most hazardous building in the UK.
The cost of nuclear cleanups is staggering.
And still, we pretend that nuclear power is a cost-effective way of generating power.
Who do those making this claim think are fooled by it?
Ukraine’s dangerous new ‘gift’ to Washington
Striking Russia’s nuclear assets, Ukraine’s audacious operation newly imperils arms control and ensures that the war will drag on.
Aaron Maté, Jun 07, 2025
An audacious Ukrainian drone attack on four military bases across Russia, dubbed Operation Spider’s Web, handed Moscow one of its worst humiliations of the war. With a fleet of inexpensive drones hidden inside cargo trucks, Ukrainian intelligence penetrated deep inside Russian territory and caused significant damage to military aircraft, including long-range, nuclear-capable bombers. “The strike was a serious blow, and to suggest otherwise is self-delusion verging on sabotage,” wrote Rybar, a popular pro-Kremlin social media channel.
For Ukraine and its Western backers, the strikes reinforce their ability to inflict significant costs on Russia more than three years into an invasion that Kyiv was expected to lose within days — and bolster the case for continued US support. For Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, the images of smoldering Russian aircraft “help change the rhetoric in the US,” where it can no longer be said, as Donald Trump argued in their Oval Office showdown, that “Ukrainians are losing this war, and don’t have the cards.” Added former senior Zelensky aide Oleg Ustenko: “Trump said we don’t have the cards — this shows we do have the cards, and we can play them.”
Powerful elements in Washington would undoubtedly agree. By targeting part of Russia’s nuclear triad, “[s]ome officials said Ukraine’s drone attacks could be viewed as a gift to the United States,” the New York Times reported. Days after visiting Kyiv to promote his push for harsh sanctions on Russia’s trading partners, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham hailed Ukraine’s “ever-resourceful” effort “to successfully attack Russian bombers and military assets.”
As grateful proxy war sponsors like Graham illustrate, Ukraine had ample grounds to believe that it was handing the US a “gift.”…………………………………………………………………………..https://www.aaronmate.net/p/ukraines-dangerous-new-gift-to-washington?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=100118&post_id=165354982&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=ln98x&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
Ukraine “Stinks Of Authoritarianism” – Kiev Mayor Klitschko Hits Out At Zelensky
Meanwhile, after earlier in the week calling for three way meetings between himself, President Trump and Putin, Zelensky has now declared that it would be “meaningless” and instead wants more military aid.
by Tyler Durden, Tuesday, Jun 03, 2025
Authored by Steve Watson via Modernity.news,
The former mayor of Kiev, Vitali Klitschko has blasted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and bluntly stated that the country is plagued by authoritarianism.
The former world heavyweight champion boxer told the Times of London that Kiev City Council essentially cannot operate because of “raids, interrogations and threats of fabricated criminal proceedings.”
“This is a purge of democratic principles and institutions under the guise of war,” Klitschko declared, adding “I once said that it smells of authoritarianism in our country. Now it stinks of it.”
The Times describes Zelensky and Klitschko as being in a “de facto state of war.”
The report notes that the Ukrainian government has arrested seven Kiev city officials as part of ongoing investigations targeting an alleged criminal network involved in corruption cases related to urban development.
“Many mayors are intimidated, but my celebrity status is a protection,” Klitschko stated, adding “You can dismiss the mayor of Chernihiv, but it is very difficult to dismiss the mayor of the capital, whom the whole world knows.”
“That is why everything is being done to discredit and destroy my reputation,” he further urged.
Zelensky has reportedly been considering arresting Klitscho after he called for the President to consider ceeding Crimea to Russia as part of a peace deal.
This fued has been ongoing for sometime. A year and a half ago, Klitschko urged that Zelensky failed to prepare Ukraine properly for the war with Russia and will “pay for his mistakes.”
Meanwhile, after earlier in the week calling for three way meetings between himself, President Trump and Putin, Zelensky has now declared that it would be “meaningless” and instead wants more military aid.
A major escalation is expected after Ukraine launched a massive drone attack on Russian airbases Sunday, which many are equating with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
The true cost of the nuclear weapons industry
The CND responds to Starmer’s growing militarism with a ‘Tour of the bases’ protest. TONY STAUNTON reports from Plymouth
Morning Star 6th June 2025 https://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/article/true-cost-nuclear-weapons-industry
NE of the most outrageous elements of Starmer’s offensive Strategic Defence Review is the suggestion of a “Defence Dividend.” Our demand for “Welfare not Warfare” is acutely illustrated by the reality of life for working-class communities surrounding military nuclear sites.
Plymouth Devonport, with the Trident nuclear submarine base situated at its heart, is one of the poorest electoral wards in southern England.
The Devonport nuclear naval base is managed by Babcock International plc, the arms manufacturer with an annual turnover of £4.5 billion, profits mostly contrived out of taxpayers’ hefty payments.
That the nuclear weapons are in the hands of private corporations for profit surely undermines the concept of national security — Babcock is the main benefactor of the local freeport, deregulating its secret nuclear enterprise.
Plymouth’s Establishment constantly reminds the population that the nuclear facility is responsible for 10 per cent of the city’s economy. This alone is a fabrication. The highly paid nuclear engineers and scientists at the base live outside the infrastructure-poor city and take their incomes with them.
It’s been like this for 40 years. There has been no “Plymouth dividend.” One in three children in Devonport and neighbouring wards live in poverty, surely impossible were the dockyard to really be a “jobs magnet.”
In fact, a total of 5,500 people work there, half as naval service personnel with little local connection. The wages of many of the rest are nothing to shout about.
Meanwhile Devonport’s local index of social deprivation according to the Public Health Service is 44, twice the annual average. Nuclear weaponry does not produce social wealth and prosperity.
Investment in arms industries take the money away from social infrastructure. Plymouth has the huge regional hospital, Derriford, now in a financial meltdown, making cuts to the 11,000 staff and standards of service.
The hospital is reliant upon the addition of medical staff from the Royal Navy, offering a false-propaganda device for Babcock as the city’s benefactor.
Plymouth University is in financial crisis, with over 5,000 staff easily competing with the dockyard as an income generator for the city (students live in the city centre), now making 200 redundancies.
Babcock funds nuclear research and training at the Uni and FE College, making them beholden, uncritical, and pro-nuclear across the curriculum.
Plymouth’s Labour Council, combating potential bankruptcy and absurd debt levels, has always supported the nuclear dockyard, championing the military nuclear cause, the status of nuclear weaponry, and the nationalism it projects.
The council has half the workforce of 20 years ago. Our schools are crumbling, all “academised’ with the continuous shedding of staff.
Meanwhile, there have been at least 10 serious accidents at the dockyard including spills of radioactive waste in the past 30 years, Babcock was fined over £600,000 in 2022 for breaches in health and safety regulations (H&S). Human-made toxic radioactive elements are identifiable in our sea, rivers, soil and air.
Plymouth is the decommissioning centre for nuclear vessels, 15 rotting nuclear submarines bobbing at anchor and costing £30 million a year to “keep safe,” their nuclear cores needing constant cooling and the rusting hulks routinely patched to prevent leaks.
The subs are the subject of stalled decommissioning, the authorities not sure what to do with these hulks of radioactive waste. Were the UK’s nuclear weapons to be cancelled tomorrow, there is at least 100 years of work here, just to decommission and clean up the contamination.
Yet now they’re going to build more. Plymouth Devonport nuclear dockyard is receiving £1 billion to refit the dry docks in order to service the Dreadnought super-submarines carrying nuclear warheads up to 300 times the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. The contract will suck-up 600 construction workers much needed for house building and home-retrofitting, the city is littered with half-finished buildings lost to skill shortages.
We all can list what £1 billion could do for the city if invested in social infrastructure and climate jobs.
Plymouth, our coastline dramatic and beautiful, could long have been a centre for construction of wind and wave electricity generators, our geography predisposed, but those industries are not nearly as profitable as the tax-funded nuclear blank-cheque cash cow.
Nuclear weapons are not just illegal weapons of mass destruction, they represent the impoverishment of working-class lives.
Join us on Saturday to send a powerful message to the government to shift its disastrous direction and invest in Peace not Nukes! March and rally. Meet at 12 noon at the Guildhall Square, Armada Way, Plymouth and from 2pm at Devonport MoD Naval Base, Camels Head.
Tony Staunton is CND vice-chair and Plymouth resident.
1 This Month
of the week– Nuclear Reactor Information Task Force
14 May – online event From Bombs to Data Centres: the Face of Nuclear Colonialism
To see nuclear-related stories in greater depth and intensity – go to https://nuclearinformation.wordpress.com
-
Archives
- May 2026 (102)
- April 2026 (356)
- March 2026 (251)
- February 2026 (268)
- January 2026 (308)
- December 2025 (358)
- November 2025 (359)
- October 2025 (376)
- September 2025 (257)
- August 2025 (319)
- July 2025 (230)
- June 2025 (348)
-
Categories
- 1
- 1 NUCLEAR ISSUES
- business and costs
- climate change
- culture and arts
- ENERGY
- environment
- health
- history
- indigenous issues
- Legal
- marketing of nuclear
- media
- opposition to nuclear
- PERSONAL STORIES
- politics
- politics international
- Religion and ethics
- safety
- secrets,lies and civil liberties
- spinbuster
- technology
- Uranium
- wastes
- weapons and war
- Women
- 2 WORLD
- ACTION
- AFRICA
- Atrocities
- AUSTRALIA
- Christina's notes
- Christina's themes
- culture and arts
- Events
- Fuk 2022
- Fuk 2023
- Fukushima 2017
- Fukushima 2018
- fukushima 2019
- Fukushima 2020
- Fukushima 2021
- general
- global warming
- Humour (God we need it)
- Nuclear
- RARE EARTHS
- Reference
- resources – print
- Resources -audiovicual
- Weekly Newsletter
- World
- World Nuclear
- YouTube
-
RSS
Entries RSS
Comments RSS
nuclear-news 