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Sellafield Ltd told to improve after hazardous substance breaches

 Sellafield Ltd has been handed two improvement notices after hazardous
substance control breaches. The Office for Nuclear Regulation has served
the notices after breaches of The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health
Regulations 2002.

Enforcement action was taken after Sellafield Ltd failed
to manage the risks of working with nickel nitrate and to prevent or
adequately control exposure of workers to this hazardous substance in one
of its effluent facilities. These shortfalls did not compromise either
nuclear or radiological safety. Used in the treatment of effluent, nickel
nitrate is not radioactive, but is a hazardous substance and could cause
harm to the health of a worker exposed to it.

To mitigate these risks,
operations involving the chemical should be conducted in a glovebox to
protect workers from any harmful health effects. In one facility on site,
contamination was found outside the glovebox area, which resulted in
workers potentially being exposed to the chemical. A poorly designed and
maintained glovebox appeared to have contributed to the contamination.

 Cumbria Crack 27th Aug 2024

Sellafield Ltd told to improve after hazardous substance breaches

August 29, 2024 Posted by | safety, UK | Leave a comment

The western way of war – Owning the narrative trumps reality

Take, for example, the NATO-orchestrated and equipped incursion into the symbolically significant Kursk Oblast. In terms of a ‘winning narrative’, its appeal to the West is obvious: Ukraine ‘takes the war to into Russia’.

Alastair Crooke, Strategic Culture Foundation, Mon, 26 Aug 2024

War propaganda and feint are as old as the hills. Nothing new. But what is new is that infowar is no longer the adjunct to wider war objectives – but has become an end in and of itself.

The West has come to view ‘owning’ the winning narrative – and presenting the Other’s as clunky, dissonant, and extremist – as being more important than facing facts-on-the ground. Owning the winning narrative is to win, in this view. Virtual ‘victory’ thus trumps ‘real’ reality.

Had the Ukrainian forces succeeded in capturing the Kursk Nuclear Power Station, they then would have had a significant bargaining chip, and might well have syphoned away Russian forces from the steadily collapsing Ukrainian ‘Line’ in Donbas.

And to top it off, (in infowar terms), the western media was prepped and aligned to show President Putin as “frozen” by the surprise incursion, and “wobbling” with anxiety that the Russian public would turn against him in their anger at the humiliation.

Bill Burns, head of CIA, opined that “Russia would offer no concessions on Ukraine, until Putin’s over-confidence was challenged, and Ukraine could show strength“. Other U.S. officials added that the Kursk incursion – in itself – would not bring Russia to the negotiating table; It would be necessary to build on the Kursk operation with other daring operations (to shake Moscow’s sang froid).

Of course, the overall aim was to show Russia as fragile and vulnerable, in line with the narrative that, at any moment Russia, could crack apart and scatter to the wind, in fragments. Leaving the West as winner, of course.

In fact, the Kursk incursion was a huge NATO gamble: It involved mortgaging Ukraine’s military reserves and armour, as chips on the roulette table, as a bet that an ephemeral success in Kursk would upend the strategic balance. The bet was lost, and the chips forfeit.

So, war becomes rather the setting for imposing ideological alignment across a wide global alliance and enforcing it via compliant media.

This objective enjoys a higher priority than, say, ensuring a manufacturing capacity sufficient to sustain military objectives. Crafting an imagined ‘reality’ has taken precedence over shaping the ground reality.

The point here is that this approach – being a function of whole of society alignment (both at home and abroad) – creates entrapments into false realities, false expectations, from which an exit (when such becomes necessary), turns near impossible, precisely because imposed alignment has ossified public sentiment. The possibility for a State to change course as events unfold becomes curtailed or lost, and the accurate reading of facts on the ground veers toward the politically correct and away from reality.

The cumulative effect of ‘a winning virtual narrative’ holds the risk nonetheless, of sliding incrementally toward inadvertent ‘real war’.

Take, for example, the NATO-orchestrated and equipped incursion into the symbolically significant Kursk Oblast. In terms of a ‘winning narrative’, its appeal to the West is obvious: Ukraine ‘takes the war to into Russia’.

Plainly put, this Kursk affair exemplifies the West’s problem with ‘winning narratives’: Their inherent flaw is that they are grounded in emotivism and eschew argumentation. Inevitably, they are simplistic. They are simply intended to fuel a ‘whole of society’ common alignment. Which is to say that across MSM; business, federal agencies, NGOs and the security sector, all should adhere to opposing all ‘extremisms’ threatening ‘our democracy’.

This aim, of itself, dictates that the narrative be undemanding and relatively uncontentious: ‘Our Democracy, Our Values and Our Consensus’. The Democratic National Convention, for example, embraces ‘Joy’ (repeated endlessly), ‘moving Forward’ and ‘opposing weirdness’ as key statements. They are banal, however, these memes are given their energy and momentum, not by content so much, as by the deliberate Hollywood setting lending them razzamatazz and glamour.

It is not hard to see how this one-dimensional zeitgeist may have contributed to the U.S. and its allies’ misreading the impact of today’s Kursk ‘daring adventure’ on ordinary Russians.

‘Kursk’ has history. In 1943, Germany invaded Russia in Kursk to divert from its own losses, with Germany ultimately defeated at the Battle of Kursk. The return of German military equipment to the environs of Kursk must have left many gaping; the current battlefield around the town of Sudzha is precisely the spot where, in 1943, the Soviet 38th and 40th armies coiled for a counteroffensive against the German 4th Army.

Over the centuries, Russia has been variously attacked on its vulnerable flank from the West. And more recently by Napoleon and Hitler. Unsurprisingly, Russians are acutely sensitive to this bloody history. Did Bill Burns et al think this through? Did they imagine that NATO invading Russia itself would make Putin feel ‘challenged’, and that with one further shove, he would fold, and agree to a ‘frozen’ outcome in Ukraine – with the latter entering NATO? Maybe they did.

Ultimately the message that western services sent was that the West (NATO) is coming for Russia. This is the meaning of deliberately choosing Kursk. Reading the runes of Bill Burns message says prepare for war with NATO.

Just to be clear, this genre of ‘winning narrative’ surrounding Kursk is neither deceit nor feint. The Minsk Accords were examples of deceit, but they were deceits grounded in rational strategy (i.e. they were historically normal). The Minsk deceits were intended to buy the West time to further Ukraine’s militarisation – before attacking the Donbas. The deceit worked, but only at the price of a rupture of trust between Russia and the West. The Minsk deceits however, also accelerated an end to the 200-year era of the westification of Russia.

Kursk rather, is a different ‘fish’. It is grounded in the notions of western exceptionalism. The West perceives itself as tacking to ‘the right side of History’. ‘Winning narratives’ essentially assert – in secular format – the inevitability of the western eschatological Mission for global redemption and convergence. In this new narrative context, facts-on-the-ground become mere irritants, and not realities that must be taken into account.

This their Achilles’ Heel.

The DNC convention in Chicago however, underscored a further concern:………………………………………………………………….

The Kursk ploy no doubt seemed clever and audacious to London and Washington. Yet with what result? It achieved neither objective of taking Kursk NPP, nor of syphoning Russian troops from the Contact Line. The Ukrainian presence in the Kursk Oblast will be eliminated.

What it did do, however, is put an end to all prospects of an eventual negotiated settlement in Ukraine. Distrust of the U.S. in Russia is now absolute. It has made Moscow more determined to prosecute the special operation to conclusion. German equipment visible in Kursk has raised old ghosts, and consolidated awareness of the hostile western intentions toward Russia. ‘Never again’ is the unspoken riposte.  https://www.sott.net/article/494279-The-western-way-of-war-Owning-the-narrative-trumps-reality

August 28, 2024 Posted by | culture and arts, Ukraine, USA | Leave a comment

Ukraine doubles down on Russian reactors in nuclear power push

Politico, August 27, 2024, By Gabriel Gavin

Ukraine will push forward with controversial plans to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on aging Russian-made nuclear reactors despite growing opposition from lawmakers, the country’s energy minister said, amid warnings of a major power crisis this winter.

German Galushchenko told POLITICO that the government still intends to pursue the expansion of the Khmelnytskyi nuclear power station in western Ukraine, buying two VVER-1000 reactors currently in storage in Bulgaria. The proposal has drawn criticism from the ruling party’s own MPs, who say there are quicker ways to help prop up the electricity grid, which has been hit hard by Russian bombing…………………..

Last week, Ukrainian MPs told POLITICO that the government had been forced to acknowledge it did not have sufficient support in the parliament to pass a draft law legislating for the purchase of the reactors.

According to Andrii Zhupanyn, a lawmaker from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People Party, such defeats are “extremely rare.”

MPs questioned whether the mothballed reactors, bought by Bulgaria more than a decade ago, would be able to be quickly brought into service, and whether the funds could be better spent on renewable power and other sources of electricity. The costs, they said, would likely balloon and open the door to corruption………………………………………………………………………….  https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-russia-reactor-khmelnytskyi-nuclear-power-station/

August 28, 2024 Posted by | business and costs, Ukraine | Leave a comment

The heroes who saved the world from Chernobyl Two.

they were facing a life-or-death decision – stay or go. The Russians had told them they could leave – but what would happen if there was no one to monitor the radiation and ensure its safety?

the choices they made saved the world from another Chernobyl disaster.

Daily Mail, By Serhii Plokhy, 25 August 2024

Even though he had one of the most challenging jobs in the world as the man in charge of the night-shift at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, nothing fazed Valentyn Heiko. Three-and-a-half decades after the disastrous meltdown in 1986, round-the-clock monitoring of the site in Ukraine continued for deadly radioactive fallout from its defunct reactors and facilities.

On March 1, 2022, Heiko wished staff via loudspeaker ‘peace of the spirit’. It was a brave and apt message in the circumstances – and a defiant one. Because the corridors around the control rooms of the closed – but still lethally contaminated – nuclear compound were being patrolled by machine-gun toting, trigger-happy Russian soldiers.

Following Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine six days previously, they had burst their way in and taken over the plant.

Back in 1986, a massive explosion in one of Chernobyl’s reactors had blasted about 300 tons of radioactive graphite into the air, sparking a worldwide emergency.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union five years later, the area became part of an independent Ukraine, whose nuclear specialists have since been undertaking the monumental task of containing all possible contamination.

The danger was far from over. Indeed, just a year before, engineers had detected worrying signs that fission had restarted in one of the supposedly defunct reactors, threatening another accident.

After Putin’s decision to invade, the quickest route to the capital, Kyiv, was to go through the wasteland of the Chernobyl exclusion zone. One of the Russian leader’s excuses for invading was his claim that Ukraine was secretly building a nuclear bomb there and enriching irradiated materials to turn into weapons of mass destruction.

On February 24, 2022 – the first day of the invasion – a column of armoured vehicles broke through the security perimeter and hauled down the Ukrainian flag.

Inside the administrative building, soldiers of the Ukrainian National Guard unit took up positions, ready to fight. Two Russian officers, general Sergei Burakov and colonel Andrei Frolenkov, announced that they were assuming control of the plant.

Hopelessly outnumbered, the 170 Ukrainian guards put down their weapons and became prisoners of war, while the plant’s 50 engineers and operators and 80 firefighters found themselves under occupation.

Suddenly, they were facing a life-or-death decision – stay or go. The Russians had told them they could leave – but what would happen if there was no one to monitor the radiation and ensure its safety?

They knew they had to stay. So, for weeks, they worked at gunpoint with no change of clothing, medication or hygienic supplies.

In effect, these men and women were hostages, stuck on an endless shift, uncertain if they would ever see their loved ones or their homes again. But the choices they made saved the world from another Chernobyl disaster.

Their foreman, Heiko, had to cooperate with the Russians but was determined to do so on his own terms. He came up with a daring plan – he would use his technical know-how to frighten them.

Calmly, he introduced himself to his captors: ‘I am the shift supervisor and represent the state of Ukraine.’ After Heiko had confirmed the identity of his Russian ‘guests’, Burakov and Frolenkov declared that the Chernobyl plant was now behind Russian lines.

Though a captive, Heiko laid down his ground rules. He told them that no matter how powerful the Russian military, at the nuclear plant they were not in charge.

They didn’t understand how the plant worked and, as such, any interference would risk nuclear disaster – and all their lives.

As one observer noted: ‘He made it clear to the occupiers that either they would behave decently or be up s**t creek. That is why they did not touch any workers.’

They agreed his terms. Operational control would remain in the hands of the staff, who would be free to move around as necessary and without interference.

The Russian soldiers were allowed in the administration building but would stay away from the obsolete reactor and spent nuclear fuel facilities, and arms would be prohibited in operational areas.

The Russians accepted that they had captured a dangerous site and, to survive, they would have to follow Heiko’s recommendations.

He even bamboozled them into believing that three reactors were still operational when, in fact, the last one had shut in 2000.

As the days of occupation continued, Heiko turned the screws even more, particularly after Putin hinted at the use of nuclear weapons. He told his captors that if the Kremlin used nuclear weapons against Ukraine, he would sabotage the plant and unleash Chernobyl radiation to kill the Russians.

‘I promise you,’ he spelt out, ‘that you will slowly and certainly die here, together with me. I have enough knowledge and skill to ensure that you will remain here with us forever.’

Despite Heiko’s master manipulation, his fellow Ukrainian staff were totally unprepared for the situation they found themselves in. They lived and worked in appalling conditions, jammed into tiny spaces, four to a room

The work was unrelenting. Under normal circumstances, they were to take a 24-hour rest after a 12-hour shift, but now a new shift began immediately after the previous one. ‘We worked almost round the clock, resting for just a few hours,’ remembered engineer Liudmyla Kozak. ‘We were walking around like ghosts.’

Exhausted and homesick, they felt hunted as they were continuously under surveillance. Some succumbed to depression or panic, feeling ‘trapped, stressed and desperate for relief’ in the words of an article in the Wall Street Journal.

………………………………………..Troops started searching for those ‘nuclear bomb’ laboratories imagined by Putin. All the plant’s buildings were checked, with no result. Then, Russian officers considered opening up the mounds of earth erected over the sites where radioactive debris had been buried after the meltdown in 1986.

Valerii Semenov, a senior engineer, told them they were mad as exposing radioactive debris would put everyone in danger of contamination. Faced with the prospect of digging their own radioactive graves, the Russians desisted. Instead, they fortified their military position by digging trenches.

When Semenov discovered sandbags used to protect firing positions had been sourced from contaminated earth, he exploded: ‘You’re bringing in radioactive dirt from outside. Are you out of your mind?’ He also found trenches dug in some of the most contaminated areas – including one where, in 1986, radiation had discoloured the pine trees ginger brown.

The fact was that morale among the 1,000 Russian troops occupying the plant was very low. They drank heavily, with up to half of their rubbish consisting of empty bottles. Fights were frequent. So was looting as they combed the offices for alcohol.

Semenov recalled that many of the Russians were not prepared for a long war. They had expected it to be over within days.

What happened next was arguably the most heroic episode of the whole Chernobyl saga. It was increasingly obvious that staff at the plant had had enough. Even the Russian commanders agreed, realising the exhaustion and resentment of the Ukrainian personnel might lead to an accident that would jeopardise the lives of the occupiers.

They proposed a change of shift, allowing those on duty ever since the occupation to go home, to be replaced by a crew from the nearby town of Slavutych. But this depended on finding experienced staff prepared to risk their freedom – and perhaps their lives – by going into Russian captivity.

Amazingly, there was no lack of volunteers. Forty-six men and women came forward, with two senior men, Volodymyr Falshovnyk and Serhii Makliuk, offering to lead the new shift. Makliuk recalled: ‘We were worried because we were going into the unknown. But our anxiety was less about how we would work at the plant and more what would happen to the families we were leaving behind.’

It was a complicated process getting the original shift out and the new one in, not least because it had to be done in stages so there would always be some staff left to monitor the place. On the 26th day of what had begun as a 12-hour shift, 50 workers were on their way home – 16 engineers and mechanics stayed, including Semenov.

The two shifts met on the side of a river and the exchange took place. ‘We had just seconds to embrace and shed tears,’ recalled a woman from Heiko’s shift.

Heiko considered the volunteers true heroes. ‘They were going into the unknown,’ he said later. ‘No one knew how it would end or how long they would be there.’

Heiko and his crew had spent 600 hours on duty at the occupied nuclear power plant. It was anyone’s guess how long the replacement shift would be there………………………………………………………….

the Russians locked Falshovnyk in his office and presented him with a document.

It was titled ‘Act of Acceptance and Transfer of Protection of the Chernobyl Atomic Station’ and stated the troops of the Russian Guard had provided ‘reliable protection and defence’ of the Chernobyl nuclear station, which they were now transferring back to the Ukrainians. Men carrying automatic rifles demanded that he and Makliuk sign the document or they would be arrested.

They were being asked to confirm that the Russians had behaved well but, faced with the threat of arrest, they signed.

And then, the Russians were gone. A security camera captured an image of one soldier leaving with a Russian flag trailing behind him like the low-hanging tail of a defeated dog.

The next day, April 3, those inside the plant were astonished to hear a voice on a loudspeaker coming from beyond the perimeter. ‘Good morning,’ it said. ‘We are the armed forces of Ukraine. Please let us in.’

And then a Ukrainian armoured personnel carrier and two trucks rolled into Chernobyl.

It really was over.

The Chernobyl staff got to work cleaning up. The extent of the Russian troops’ damage and looting was astounding.

Missing were some 1,500 meters for checking radiation levels, 698 computers and 344 vehicles, amounting to a total value of $135million (£102million).

The only thing the retreating Russian soldiers left behind was an increased level of radiation – up more than 40 times, almost certainly the result of digging trenches in the highly contaminated Red Forest.

There were unverified reports from inside Russia that one soldier had died, 26 had been admitted to hospital and 73 sent for treatment after exposure to radiation in the Chernobyl zone.

The Ukrainians believed that one reason they departed in such a hurry was in panic that so many of them were falling sick.

The Russian troops may have left Chernobyl, but there was every chance that Chernobyl would never leave them. And the threat of nuclear disaster remains very real elsewhere in Ukraine.

Zaporizhia, a nuclear plant in southern Ukraine and the largest power facility in Europe, remains under Russian control.

And last Saturday, following a drone strike nearby, the UN’s nuclear watchdog warned that the safety situation at the plant was ‘deteriorating’.

At Chernobyl, the brave actions of the plant workers prevented nuclear disaster, but we cannot always count on individual heroism to produce such endings in the future.

Unless the world acts to protect nuclear reactors from attack during wartime, instead of being a solution to the problem of climate change, nuclear power will solidify its reputation as the destroyer of worlds.

Adapted from Chernobyl Roulette by Serhii Plokhy (Allen Lane, £25), out on September 3. © Serhii Plokhy 2024. To order a copy for £22.50 (offer valid to 06/09/24; UK P&P free on orders over £25) see tomailshop.co.uk/books or call 020 3176 2937

August 27, 2024 Posted by | Reference, Religion and ethics, Ukraine | Leave a comment

The Battle of Kursk probably won’t result in nuclear weapons use against Ukraine. But Russian escalation vis-à-vis NATO can’t be ruled out.

any nuclear use against Ukraine would be self-defeating for Russia.

involvement of the West turned Russia’s so-called “special military operation” (“SVO” in Russia) into a full-scale war. Consequently, nuclear signaling has been addressed to the West.

Russia’s central concern is the possible Western involvement in the war on the side of Ukraine, which can turn the tide at the front line. The most visible cause for such concern is the provision of modern Western arms to Ukraine, including long-range missiles capable of targeting deep into Russian territory.

Bulletin, By Nikolai N. Sokov | August 26, 2024

The successful Ukrainian offensive in the Russian Kursk oblast started in early August has once again triggered speculation about possible Russian nuclear use against Ukraine. The situation resembles the successful Ukrainian offensive in the late summer-fall of 2022 in the Kharkiv oblast, when many worried Russia would resort to battlefield nuclear use to stop advancing Ukrainian forces. On the face of it, there was reason to be concerned: Russian President Vladimir Putin did reference nuclear weapons in September 2022, and it became known more than a year later that the United States was “rigorously” preparing for that contingency.

A closer look reveals, however, that Putin’s 2022 reference to nuclear weapons sounded as an emotional impromptu remark made under stress, whereas the US assessment was reportedly based on an intercept of conversations among Russian generals rather than on tangible signs of preparation or data about discussions among policymakers. We now know that Moscow dealt with that situation in a different way: Partial mobilization helped beef up forces, which stopped the Ukrainian Kharkiv offensive.

Although the Kursk operation caught Russia by surprise once again, its military and civilian leadership are better prepared today to deal with surprise than in 2022.

One has reasons to be skeptical about the prospect of battlefield use of nuclear weapons. It was considered an acceptable option during the Cold War, especially its early years. Both the United States and the Soviet Union held large-scale exercises with live nuclear explosions in the 1950s, and both nuclear powers contemplated large-scale use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Today, however, is different. The “nuclear taboo,” which began to take shape in the 1950s, has grown very strong.

Not that nuclear use is technically impossible. But the political and ethical implications make such a decision daunting—and unlikely. Battlefield nuclear use in Ukraine, for whatever reason, would make Russia a true pariah state in the international system, turning countries—partners and neutrals alike, all critical for breaking the tight sanctions regime, which has been established by the G7 economies and their partners—against Moscow. In other words, any nuclear use against Ukraine would be self-defeating for Russia.

Nuclear signals. Russian nuclear signaling has been persistent, going up and down throughout the war, with high points in the fall of 2022 and the spring of 2024, when Russian official rhetoric was the loudest. (Unofficial and semi-official rhetoric has never really stopped.) This signaling, however, has been exclusively and explicitly directed at the West—the United States and its allies. Even the very first statement of Putin announcing the “special military operation” contained a message to the West: “Do not interfere.”

This is hardly surprising: The war is conceptualized in Russia as a proxy war with NATO. Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, has repeatedly said—most recently in March and June of this year—that involvement of the West turned Russia’s so-called “special military operation” (“SVO” in Russia) into a full-scale war. Consequently, nuclear signaling has been addressed to the West.

The Ukrainian operation in Kursk may carry certain risks, but these risks are different from what is commonly and hastily assumed as nuclear use against Ukraine.

Russia’s central concern is the possible Western involvement in the war on the side of Ukraine, which can turn the tide at the front line. The most visible cause for such concern is the provision of modern Western arms to Ukraine, including long-range missiles capable of targeting deep into Russian territory.

At a certain level, Western assistance may create serious, perhaps even insurmountable challenges for the Russian military. Each new step—including the provision of tanks, missile defense systems, tactical ballistic missile systems, and most recently F-16 fighter jets—triggers warnings about possible escalation. So far, Russia has coped with each new level of Ukraine’s military capability, but this may change in the future if Western assistance continues or even intensifies.

Perhaps more consequential for Russia, although less visible, is the provision of intelligence, which has helped Ukraine to select targets and significantly constrains Russia’s ability to clandestinely concentrate and move forces and supplies……………………………….

Russians often repeat that a nuclear state cannot be defeated. This is true only to an extent, but there is realization in the Kremlin and beyond that defeat in the ongoing war cannot be tactical. Not only it will end the political regime—which the Kremlin equates with sovereignty—but consequences will affect the entire country for decades. If Russia considers itself de facto at war with the United States and NATO and believes the West seeks its “strategic defeat,” then nuclear weapons legitimately enter the picture under the existing 2020 Decree on Nuclear Deterrence and the 2014 Military Doctrine.  This is precisely the situation the United States has tried to avoid: ………………………………

Russian nuclear signals to the West can be divided into two categories.

The first is public statements, especially coming from the most authoritative source, Vladimir Putin, which have been relatively rare—namely, the “SVO” announcement and the September 2022 warning referenced above. ………………………. If someone’s actions will threaten our sovereignty and territorial integrity, we consider it allowable to use all means at our disposal.” Putin also declared that ndeclaredew threats may force Russia to change its nuclear doctrine, hinting that the nuclear threshold might be lowered.

The second category of nuclear signals is arguably more tangible: actions that change Russia’s nuclear posture and/or alert level. Such actions notably include nuclear sharing arrangements with Belarus, whose implementation began in the summer of 2022—after it became clear that war with Ukraine would be protracted, and Russia could not prevent the West from providing assistance to Ukraine—and was completed already in mid-2023. Other highly visible examples are exercises with tactical nuclear weapons, which have been held in three stages in May, June, and August of 2024………………….

Fuzzy red lines. Without doubt, publicly playing with the prospect of nuclear war is dangerous—in addition to be morally reprehensible—but one must admit that Moscow has been relatively restrained in its threats so far; it could certainly make more threats and make them more openly. So why has Russia shown such restraint as it conducts a full-fledged war?

……………………………………………………………………………………….The Russian leadership itself may not know what exactly constitutes a red line. So far, it seems to make such judgement after the fact, evaluating each new level of assistance to determine its impact on the course of the war. If and when such impact reaches a level that puts Russia on the brink of a “strategic defeat,” it may be classified as having crossed a red line…………………..

Evaluation of each new step takes time—from weeks to months. The absence of visible reaction may create a false sense of safety, potentially emboldening U.S. and Western officials. Then, if and when a Russian reaction takes place, it may catch Western allies by surprise and be perceived as unjustified and unprovoked, for the precise reason that the red line was unknown.

No doubt that Russia is very reluctant to launch an escalation that could result in nuclear use: The costs to Russia itself would be enormous—probably unbearable for the country and its leadership. ……………………………….

 ………the riskiest circumstances will happen after a red line has been crossed, not before. Each side will balance between caution and the perceived strategic need to act. Worse, a long sequence of moves that did not result in escalation may create a false sense of security and increase propensity for risk-taking on the part of Western military officials and political leaders.

…………………..The crossing of a red line in the war in Ukraine may not result in nuclear use. A more likely contingency is escalation starting with something relatively small, but visibly consequential………………………………………. The threat of nuclear use is expected to force the West to retreat, because its stakes in the conflict are believed to be lower than those of Russia in the war in Ukraine.

……………………………………………………………………..It can be predicted with reasonable confidence that Russia will not threaten, much less use, nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Escalation vis-à-vis NATO, however, is a different matter: That likelihood appears higher, but knowing in advance how high it is may be impossible.

Considering the risks outlined above, one obvious question is whether the West should continue and perhaps increase support of Ukraine. I believe that questions about the Kursk invasion and whether the West should continue aiding Ukraine are essentially unrelated. Regardless of which decision is made in regard to Western aid, the risks of that policy must be known and understood. Nothing good can come out of policy that is consciously blind to possible challenges. To the contrary, full information can enhance chances for success and lessen the likelihood of escalation.  https://thebulletin.org/2024/08/the-battle-of-kursk-probably-wont-result-in-nuclear-weapons-use-against-ukraine-but-russian-escalation-vis-a-vis-nato-cant-be-ruled-out/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=MondayNewsletter08262024&utm_content=NuclearRisk_RussianEscalationVisAVis_08262024

August 27, 2024 Posted by | Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Nuclear power risks rising in Russia-Ukraine war

Dr Philip Webber, SGR, warns that another nuclear power plant is at major risk as the war enters new territory.

Responsible Science blog, 22 August 2024 more https://www.sgr.org.uk/resources/nuclear-power-risks-rising-russia-ukraine-war—

The Russia-Ukraine war has already led to extremely serious risks to nuclear power plants. In a previous article, [1] I described in some detail those related to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) in Ukraine. The situation there has once again deteriorated – as I discuss below – but I want to focus first on the threat to another power station.

Kursk

Due to the Ukraine military incursion into the Kursk region of the Russian Federation, which began on 15 August, [2] there is now a severe risk to the huge Kursk nuclear power plant (KNPP) – which has elements in common with the Chernobyl plant. The KNPP is located some 60 kilometres from the border with Ukraine and is, at the time of writing, close to an area of fierce fighting. As a result, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued further warnings to remind the warring parties to not risk a nuclear disaster in Europe. [3][4]

The KNPP – like the ZNPP – includes six nuclear reactors, and is also one of the three biggest nuclear power stations in Russia. But there are two critical differences. First, two of the KNPP reactors are operating at full power. Second, these two reactors are of the same design – the RBMK – as the Chernobyl nuclear plant, which suffered the world’s worst nuclear accident in 1986. Crucially, these reactors have no protective dome structure [5] making them very vulnerable to a military strike or aircraft impact. With intense fighting only a few tens of kilometres away, both reactors are well within the range of artillery or rocket fire. A military strike on either reactor could initiate a very serious release of radioactive material creating a Europe-wide nuclear disaster.

It is anticipated that the IAEA will soon visit the Kursk NPP to assess the situation on the ground.

Zaporizhzhia

Returning to the situation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, IAEA inspectors stationed there have again reported intense military activity – artillery, rocket and heavy machine-gun fire – very close to the plant, and several instances of explosive drone strikes on the plant itself, as well as on vital electrical substations and surrounding woodland. [6] One of the two ZNPP cooling towers was hit, fires were started beside an electrical sub-station resulting in a loss of power, and the perimeter road was cratered.

The six ZNPP reactors are all in ‘cold shutdown’ but rely on a supply of electricity to power pumps for water cooling of the reactor cores – and a large number of spent fuel storage tanks – to prevent overheating to dangerous levels and a resultant release of radioactive material. The reliable supply of water remains a serious problem and emergency supplies of fuel for emergency diesel generators are also dangerously low.

Drone attacks also continue to be reported near Ukraine’s other nuclear power sites. [7]

The IAEA Director General, Rafael Grossi, has issued a series of warnings reminding both Russia and Ukraine of UN agreements to avoid military activity at or near nuclear plants. [8] However, the only way to remove these risks completely is for a rapid, negotiated end to the war.
 

Dr Philip Webber is Co-chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility. He has written widely on the risks of nuclear weapons and nuclear power – including co-authoring the book, London After the Bomb. He spent part of his career working as an emergency planner in local government.
 

References………………………………………………..

August 27, 2024 Posted by | Russia, safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

Why the big push for nuclear power as “green”?

Why is it so difficult to recognise that – as is normal with technologies – nuclear energy is obsolescing? 

nuclear affections are a military romance. Powerful defence interests – with characteristic secrecy and highly active PR – are mostly driving the dogged persistence. 

     https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2024/08/25/why-the-big-push-for-nuclear-power-as-green/

Heavy lobbying by France and a “military romance” provide some answers, write Andy Stirling and Phil Johnstone

Whatever one’s view of nuclear issues, an open mind is crucial. Massive vested interests and noisy media clamour require efforts to view a bigger picture. A case in point arises around the European Commission’s much criticised proposal – and the European Parliament’s strongly opposed decision – to last year accredit nuclear power as a ‘green’ energy source.   

In a series of legal challenges, the European Commission and NGOs including Greenpeace are tussling over what kind and level of ’sustainability’ nuclear power might be held to offer. 

To understand how an earlier more sceptical EC position on nuclear was overturned, deeper questions are needed about a broader context. Recent moves in Brussels follow years of wrangling. Journalists reported intense lobbying – especially by the EU’s only nuclear-armed nation: France. At stake is whether inclusion of nuclear power in the controversial ‘green taxonomy’ will open the door to major financial support for ‘sustainable’ nuclear power. 

Notions of sustainability were (like climate concerns) pioneered in environmentalism long before being picked up in mainstream policy. And – even when its comparative disadvantages were less evident – criticism of nuclear was always central to green activism. So, it might be understood why current efforts from outside environmentalism to rehabilitate nuclear as ‘sustainable’ are open to accusations of ‘greenwash’ and ‘doublespeak’.

In deciding such questions, the internationally-agreed ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ are a key guide. These address various issues associated with all energy options – including costs and wellbeing, health effects, accident risks, pollution and wastes, landscape impacts and disarmament issues. So, do such comparative pros and cons of nuclear power warrant classification alongside wind, solar and efficiency?   

On some aspects, the picture is relatively open. All energy investments yield employment and development benefits, largely in proportion to funding. On all sides, simply counting jobs or cash flowing through favoured options and forgetting alternatives leads to circular arguments. If (despite being highlighted in the Ukraine War), unique vulnerabilities of nuclear power to attack are set aside, then the otherwise largely ‘domestic’ nature of both nuclear and renewables can be claimed to be comparable.

Orderings are more stark on economics and environment. Despite room for many views, it is difficult to deny that history raises especially grave queries about nuclear power. Nuclear costs have long been acknowledged to be far less competitive than renewables. Multiple nuclear accidents have occurred of kinds initially claimed to have ‘negligible’ likelihood. Nuclear waste “solutions” are still largely undeveloped. New questions continually arise about assumptions underpinning ‘safe levels’ of ionising radiation. Build times far exceeding those promised have helped cause nuclear bankruptcy and fraud. Growth rates of renewables surpass what government officials even quite recently claimed to be physically possible. Associated trends nearly all favour renewables.

But what of climate urgency? Does this not justify nuclear proponents’ calls to “do everything” to “keep the nuclear option open” (as if this were an end in itself)? Again: deeper thought might expose this as special pleading. Precisely because climate action is so imperative, isn’t it more rational to prioritise whatever is most substantial, cost effective and rapid? 

A more reasoned approach might ask about long-neglected kinds of statistical analysis, which show that national carbon emission reductions tend to associate less with nuclear than with renewable uptake. Key reasons here include that nuclear contributions to climate targets are smaller, slower and more expensive than are offered by renewables. So other evidence that nuclear and renewable energy strategies also tend to conflict further queries the ‘sustainable’ status of nuclear power.

What then of claimed needs for ‘baseload’ power – to manage variable outputs from some renewables? Surprisingly given its public profile, this notion is long abandoned by the electricity industry as “outdated”. Nuclear power is itself inflexible in its own way. Myriad system innovations, grid improvements, demand measures and new storage technologies are all available to better address variable renewables over different timescales. Even in relatively pro-nuclear UK, it is authoritatively documented how a 100% renewable system outperforms any level of nuclear contribution. Even the UK Government now admits that adding these costs still leaves renewables outcompeting nuclear. In less nuclear-committed European countries, the picture is even more stark. 

So, as this picture has unfolded, nuclear ‘sustainability’ arguments have retreated through successively undermined claims – that nuclear is “necessary”; brooks “no alternative”; is “more competitive”; uniquely offers to “keep the lights on”; or is just a way to “do everything” (as if this was ever a sensible response to any challenge, especially one as urgent and existential as climate disruption). 

Whatever position one starts from, then, a final question arises: why all the fuss? Why should it be now after all these years (just as its comparative performance becomes so much less favourable) that European efforts become so newly energetic to redefine nuclear as ‘sustainable’? Why is it so difficult to recognise that – as is normal with technologies – nuclear energy is obsolescing? 

Here, the answer is surprisingly obvious. It is officially repeatedly confirmed in countries working hardest to revive nuclear power – atomic weapons states like the US, France, the UK, Russia and China. Oddly neglected in mainstream energy policy and the media, the picture is especially evident on the defence side. Although skewed public debates leave many unaware, nuclear affections are a military romance. Powerful defence interests – with characteristic secrecy and highly active PR – are mostly driving the dogged persistence.

The result is clear. Dubiously justified in climate terms, elevated consumer prices, government funding and public risk underwriting all help maintain a joint civil/military ‘nuclear industrial base’. In nuclear armed countries like the UK and France, this helps fund – outside defence budgets, off the public books and away from due scrutiny – expensive specialist nuclear skills, supply chains, research facilities, navy recruitment, wider infrastructures. In particular, the building and operating of nuclear propelled submarines would be unaffordable without these concealed cross-subsidies. Without nuclear power, it would become much harder to guarantee the later careers that are so essential in recruiting nuclear-trained officers.

As President Macron recently said “without civilian nuclear, no military nuclear, without military nuclear, no civilian nuclear”. This is the main reason why France is pressing so hard for nuclear to be supported by the European Union as ‘sustainable’. This is why non-nuclear-armed Germany has been more open to grasping nuclear realities. This is why France and Germany find themselves at such loggerheads on this issue. This is why the UK Government so opposes this – and is so fixated on support for general nuclear skills. This is why other nuclear-armed states in general, are so resolutely fixated by the slow, small and costly nuclear response to the climate emergency. 

A decision has yet to be reached on whether the inclusion of nuclear by the European Commission in their Green Taxonomy is unlawful. Yet it is clear that nuclear compares poorly to other low carbon technologies when considered in terms of sustainability. What is especially concerning is that the military rationales that are influencing renewed enthusiasm for nuclear are largely unaddressed in policy and wider media coverage. That associated issues are so little discussed, raises grave concerns not just for energy and climate policy, but for European democracy as a whole. 

Andy Stirling is Professor of Science & Technology Policy in the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex. Philip Johnstone is Research Fellow, SPRU, University of Sussex.

August 26, 2024 Posted by | climate change, EUROPE, politics international | Leave a comment

Britain’s Dirtiest Beaches – Don’t Mention the Pu!

The cocktail of radioactive wastes on our beaches is a direct result of the uranium fuel industry whose product is actually nuclear wastes rather than the ephemeral here today gone tomorrow electricity. 

On  By mariannewildart,  https://mariannewildart.wordpress.com/2024/08/23/britains-dirtiest-beaches-dont-mention-the-pu/
Seascale and Haverigg are in the top 10 dirtiest beaches for poo – they also contain Pu (Plutonium) but no-one is looking at the health impacts of long lived radio-toxic pollution on our beaches.

The West Cumbrian coastline cradling the World Heritage Site of the Lake District has two entries in the top 10 dirtiest beaches featured in yesterday’s Express. While much is made quite rightly of the health impacts of sewage pollution no-one is willing to talk about the Pu (Plutonium) on West Cumbrian beaches and in harbours near the worlds riskiest nuclear waste site. Sellafield has a larger workforce 11,000+ than all the surrounding towns and villages put together. According to the Environment Agency “We are working with Sellafield Limited to investigate the potential impact of non-radioactive discharges from the Sellafield site. The primary focus is on sewage originating from the toilet facilities provided on site for the Sellafield workforce. The work is considering whether the level of sewage treatment needs to be enhanced to improve and protect the bathing water quality at Seascale thus protecting public health”.  2024 Bathing Water Profile for Seascale.

The West Cumbrian coastline cradling the World Heritage Site of the Lake District has two entries in the top 10 dirtiest beaches featured in yesterday’s Express. While much is made quite rightly of the health impacts of sewage pollution no-one is willing to talk about the Pu (Plutonium) on West Cumbrian beaches and in harbours near the worlds riskiest nuclear waste site. Sellafield has a larger workforce 11,000+ than all the surrounding towns and villages put together. According to the Environment Agency “We are working with Sellafield Limited to investigate the potential impact of non-radioactive discharges from the Sellafield site. The primary focus is on sewage originating from the toilet facilities provided on site for the Sellafield workforce. The work is considering whether the level of sewage treatment needs to be enhanced to improve and protect the bathing water quality at Seascale thus protecting public health”.  2024 Bathing Water Profile for Seascale.

Nuclear wastes continue to arrive daily and a vicious cocktail of nuclear wastes continues to pour into the Irish Sea daily. Enough was enough decades ago. But this gargantuan radio-toxic turd on the Lake District coastline continues to accept nuclear wastes from existing reactors in the UK while MPs, government and the nuclear industry agitate for ever more nuclear waste from new build next to Sellafeld and elsewhere. 

The cocktail of radioactive wastes on our beaches is a direct result of the uranium fuel industry whose product is actually nuclear wastes rather than the ephemeral here today gone tomorrow electricity. 

So the nuclear waste industry’s message is ‘Don’t mention the Pu.’ In fact the nuclear industry has a vested interest in encouraging youngsters to dig for hours on the beaches – its great PR for the nuclear waste industry and says “look we are great neighbours and we are giving you (tax payers) money for your beach events because the beaches are soooo safe.” 

August 26, 2024 Posted by | UK, wastes | Leave a comment

The UK nuclear lobby’s festival of joyous propaganda.

The Sizewell C team has been raising awareness of the new nuclear power
project at community events across the county this summer. From The Suffolk
Show and the First Light Festival to Sotterley Country Fair, the team have
been engaging with thousands of people across the county as the project
continues to make significant progress.

“We’re really lucky in Suffolk to
have some of the best summer festivals and community events in the
country,” says Marjorie Barnes, Head of Regional External Affairs and
Development, Sizewell C. This week, Sizewell C volunteers attended the
Aldeburgh Carnival, and in September the team will be at the first Leiston
Book Festival.

Sizewell C 23rd Aug 2024

Keeping communities up to date at a summer of Suffolk events

August 26, 2024 Posted by | culture and arts, UK | Leave a comment

Hungary again breaks with West: Ukrainian attack on Kursk is ‘wrong’

Tyler Durden, Zero Hedge , 24 Aug 2024

Hungary has broken with its NATO and EU allies in condemning Ukraine’s Kursk incursion, calling it out as not purely ‘defensive’ but as part of needlessly provocative offensive operations against Russian territory.

Gergely Gulyas, top advisor and spokesman for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said in a Thursday press briefing that Budapest is staunchly “pro-peace” – and when asked about the ongoing Kursk invasion, he said: “Ukraine is not only defending, but also attacking. We want a ceasefire and peace.”

Gulyas went on to explain that Hungary is against anything which thwarts potential diplomatic settlement to the war. He said this is “wrong” given the offensive includes a “spillover of the hostilities into Russian territory.”

………………………………………………………………….. Orban has certainly not shared the same enthusiasm for developments in Kursk as other European leaders. For example, recently the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell “reiterated the EU’s full support to the [Ukrainian] people’s fight.”

…………………………….Interestingly, there’s been similar pushback coming from Italy of late related to the Kursk offensive, akin to Hungary’s criticisms:

Italy’s Defence Minister Guido Crosetto has ignited a political firestorm with comments that appear to question Ukraine’s military operations inside Russian territory, POLITICO reported. In an interview, Crosetto warned that ‘no country should invade another country’ and expressed concerns over the conflict escalating into Russian territory, which could complicate efforts toward peace. His remarks have raised doubts about Italy’s commitment to Ukraine, despite Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s staunch support for Kyiv since the start of Russia’s invasion.

Crosetto emphasized that the weapons provided to Ukraine by Italy are intended strictly for defensive purposes, clarifying that these arms ‘do not have the possibility of being used for an attack on Russian territory’.

On a strategic level, while Ukraine forces have certainly dealt a serious morale blow to Kremlin leadership, Russia is still on the advance in the Donbass, where the front line to the conflict is located. If and when Ukraine’s Kursk operation utterly fails, it will have translated into no actual strategic gains in eastern Ukraine.  https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/hungary-again-breaks-west-ukrainian-attack-kursk-wrong

August 26, 2024 Posted by | EUROPE, politics international | Leave a comment

Fire at Zaporizhzhia elevates meltdown risk

13 Aug 24,  https://cnduk.org/fire-at-zaporizhzhia-elevates-meltdown-risk/

CND scientific advisor, radiation expert Dr Ian Fairlie writes about the elevated risks posed by the recent fire at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. 

The recent fire at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in Ukraine is causing much concern throughout Europe.

Ukraine’s nuclear energy company, Energoatom, which operated the site until Russian forces seized control in the early days of the war, confirmed that flames broke out at the service water supply facility, later engulfing one of the cooling towers. Both Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky have traded blame for the fire. The six nuclear reactors at Zaporizhzhia are in cold shutdown and no nuclear activity was recorded on Sunday August 11, but the overall risk of nuclear meltdown remains elevated. 

In 1986, the huge nuclear accident at the Chornobyl nuclear station in Ukraine resulted in radioactive fallout throughout Europe including all of the UK.

Ideally, the UK government should make arrangements to pre-distribute prophylactic iodide tablets (to protect against thyroid cancer) to all individuals who wish them, as occurs in many countries, but it has resisted previous calls for this. Current UK official advice on iodide tablets merely states “you will be given official advice from government or emergency services on how to get them, when to take them and how much to take”.

In the absence of timely official UK advice, readers may wish to consult official US advice or the WHO’s advice.

August 26, 2024 Posted by | safety, Ukraine | Leave a comment

“Final Investment Decision (FID) ” in Sizewell C nuclear station might never happen

There are media reports that a Final Investment Decision (FID) “risks
dragging into 2025″ over negotiations with investors. See Bloomberg’s
report, also New Civil Engineer and Energy Live News. These articles do not
consider whether a FID might not in fact ever happen, but we are keeping up
the pressure. Interestingly, while Bloomberg mentions four of the known
possible investors (see list below on original), USS and Equitix are absent. It’s
unclear what, if anything, this means but we are attempting to find out. If
you have not yet written to these companies to urge them not to invest, now
would be an excellent time to do so.

 Stop Sizewell C 22nd Aug 2024

https://mailchi.mp/stopsizewellc/fid-delay?e=326ee81c22

August 25, 2024 Posted by | business and costs, UK | Leave a comment

Zelensky’s Misadventures in Kursk

This operation is likely to be working upside-down to what we are reading in corporate media.

Not long prior to the incursion, the Biden regime had given Kiev dispensation to use U.S.–made weapons against Russian targets so long as these were deployed in self-defense and against military targets.

the question remains. What is the point as the Kursk operation continues?

By Patrick Lawrence / Original to ScheerPost, 23 Aug 24

It has been three weeks since ground units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine crossed into the Kursk province in southwestern Russia, surprising — or maybe not surprising — the U.S. and its clients in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Two days later, the AFU began artillery and drone attacks in Belgorod, a province just south of Kursk. It has been a little more than a week since explosions at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, which lies in what is now Russian territory along the Dnipro River, ignited a fire in one of the plant’s two cooling towers. All six reactors are now in cold shutdown. 


In the still-to-be-confirmed file, BelTA, the Belarusian news agency, reported last weekend that Ukraine has amassed significant forces along the Belarus–Ukraine border. Aleksandr Lukashenko, the Belarusian president, put the troop count at an improbable 120,000. Further out in speculative territory, RT International reported at the weekend that the AFU is “preparing a nuclear false flag—an explosion of a dirty atomic bomb,” targeting nuclear-waste storage sites at the Zaporozhye plant. RT cited “intelligence received by Russia” and a military correspondent and documentarian named Marat Khairullin. 

Hmmm. 

When I began my adventures in the great craft at the New York Daily News long years ago, two of the better shards of wisdom I picked up were, “Go with what you’ve got” and “When in doubt, leave it out.” Let us proceed accordingly as we consider Ukraine’s latest doings in the proxy war it wages. I will leave aside the BelTA and RT International reports pending further developments, but with this caveat: Amassing units along the Belarus border would be entirely in keeping with the AFU’s recent forays into Russian territory. As for the imminence of a dangerous false flag op at the Zaporozhye plant, I would not put it past a regime that has acted recklessly and irrationally on numerous occasions in the past. 

Why, we are left to ask of what we know to be so, did the AFU send troops, tanks, artillery, drone units, and assorted matériel into Kursk on Tuesday, Aug. 6? And then the ancillary operation in Belgorod? Everyone wondered this at first—supposedly everyone, anyway. This is our question, and I will shortly get to the “supposedly.” 

On the eve of the incursion, Kiev was losing ground steadily to a new Russian advance in eastern Ukraine. Critically short of troops, the Ukrainian forces are, indeed, about to lose a tactically significant town, Pokrovsk, on their side of the Russian border. The thought that the AFU would sustain and expand its Kursk operation to bring the war to Russian territory in any effective way is prima facie preposterous. What was the point? Where is the strategic gain? 

In his speech Monday evening at the Democratic Party convention in Chicago, Joe Biden defended his proxy war in Ukraine as a just war waged in the name of democracy and liberty. Oh? setting aside the emptiness of this characterization, the question remains. What is the point as the Kursk operation continues? The AFU now holds one Russian town and six villages, according to the latest reports, which also indicate they have set about destroying bridges critical to Russian supply lines. But where to from here? I do not see a sensible answer. 

There is no question the Russians were caught off guard when the AFU crossed into the border village of Sudzha and proceeded with evidently little initial resistance further into Russian territory. Hundreds of thousands of Russians have been evacuated; the governor of Belgorod quickly declared a state of emergency after the drone and artillery strikes of Aug. 14. 

But we cannot count this as any kind of astute strategic move. I do not pretend to have an inside read as to Russia’s apparent intelligence failure or what looks like its flat-footed response. But I do not think we can correctly mark down events to date to the AFU’s superior strength or the Russians’ weakness or incompetence. Western correspondents are having a fine old time reporting that klutzy, clumsy Moscow is once again stumbling, but I buy none of it. In my view this is probably another case of Russian restraint: The AFU is using U.S. — and NATO — supplied weapons, and the Kremlin has all along been acutely sensitive to the risk of escalation against Kiev’s Western sponsors. 

My conclusion: No one’s script has flipped. This operation is likely to be working upside-down to what we are reading in corporate media. The best explanation they have come up with so far is that Kiev’s plan was to draw Russian forces away from the front on the Ukrainian side of the border. That has plainly not happened, however much The Times indulges in denial on this point. “And now Moscow has begun withdrawing some troops from Ukraine in an effort to repel Kyiv’s offensive into western Russia, Constant Méthuet reported Aug. 14 — before adding “according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.” Crapulous journalism. Simply crapulous. There is no evidence of this whatsoever—only of further Russian gains as noted above. 

Inversely, the Kursk adventure required a lot of Ukrainian units to get going and more now to sustain. It is Kiev that is wasting resources on what is bound to end in retreat. The Russian military has not marshaled anything approaching its full force. This is likely to end when Moscow decides it should, and in the meantime the Russians appear to wage the same wearing war of attrition that has reduced the AFU to something close to a desperate force on the home front. 

The initial press reports of the Kursk adventure had it that top officials in Washington were caught entirely by surprise and were as perplexed as the rest of us as to the “Why?” of the thing. I do not accept this at face value, either. The Times ran a lengthy report on the Ukrainians’ preparations, featuring residents in the towns bordering Kursk remarking for weeks about the buildup of AFU units and matériel before the operation began. Russian intelligence took note, The Times also reported. And the Pentagon, the intelligence agencies, and the administration were all taken by surprise? To quote an East European emigre I knew in the old days, “Gimme break.”

Not long prior to the incursion, the Biden regime had given Kiev dispensation to use U.S.–made weapons against Russian targets so long as these were deployed in self-defense and against military targets. And the only reason the U.S. is at all interested in Ukraine, we must remind ourselves—forget about freedom and democracy, for heaven’s sake—is for its use in prosecuting the West’s long, varied campaign to subvert “Putin’s Russia.” This remains the ultimate objective. In the matter of Washington’s hand in directing the Zelensky regime from one adventure to another, Biden’s national security people wear more fig leaves than you find on a tree in Tuscany. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Maybe Zelensky wants some Russian real estate as a bargaining advantage in negotiations with Russia he has come to accept as inevitable. It is possible but does not fit with his adamant insistence that the full restoration of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, is non negotiable — a precondition to any diplomacy. And as in Netanyahu’s case, a settlement would put his political future greatly in doubt. 

In any case, Zelensky chose badly when the AFU crossed into Russian territory at Kursk. The Red Army’s defeat of the Wehrmacht at Kursk, in 1943, was the largest battle in the history of warfare and left roughly 1.7 million Russians dead, wounded, or missing. Along with Stalingrad, it marked a decisive moment in the Allied victory over the Reich.  Russians do not forget this kind of thing, especially when German weapons are part of the AFU’s arsenal. The thought of Ukrainian troops and tanks holding Kursk is another of the miscalculations that litter the story of this war since it began with the U.S.–inspired coup 10 years ago.    https://scheerpost.com/2024/08/22/patrick-lawrence-zelenskys-misadventures-in-kursk/

August 25, 2024 Posted by | Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

A new French fairy tale: “Cheap” nuclear electricity in France is not what it appears.

The French public are paying for their nuclear addiction — and will pay even more when the plants need decommissioning. 

By Axel Mayer, 11 Sept 23,  https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2023/09/11/a-new-french-fairy-tale/—

“Bread and games”(Panem et circenses) were the enforcement strategies in the Roman Empire to maintain power. “Cheap petrol, cheap electricity and football” are popular campaign strategies under a democracy, says Axel Mayer, Vice-President of the Trinational Nuclear Protection Association (TRAS).

In France, the nuclear industry is in decline and the nuclear company EDF is heavily in debt. At the same time, President Macron is once again promising cheap nuclear power and wants to have new small nuclear power plants built. A small part of the French nuclear industry’s financial problems is to be solved with EU money.

In this context, the fairy tale of cheap French nuclear power is happily spread in France and also in Germany and the use of nuclear energy is praised as the miracle weapon in the losing war against nature and the environment. However, the price of electricity in France is only apparently cheap.

According to a report of the supreme audit court in France, the research and development, as well as the construction of the French nuclear power plants, cost a total of 188 billion euros. Since in France the “civilian” and the military use of nuclear power cannot be separated, the sum is probably much higher. Retrofitting France’s outdated reactors will cost over 55 billion euros. Liberation magazine reports retrofitting costs of nearly 100 billion euros by 2030.

People of France are paying for expensive nuclear power with their taxes

According to a report by the French Ministry of Economy, the semi-state-owned EDF had debts of about 41 billion euros at the end of 2019, an amount that is expected to be nearly 57 billion euros by 2028. To avoid domestic political problems, EDF is not allowed to raise the price of electricity for political reasons. EDF liabilities are driving up France’s national debt massively. The people of France (and especially their grandchildren) are paying for the seemingly cheap, but in reality expensive nuclear power with their taxes.

This cost does not include the dismantling of the nuclear power plants or any costs of a severe accident. A serious nuclear accident would have devastating consequences in France. A government study estimates the cost at 430 billion euros.

Demolition costs of over 100 billion euros

In France, EDF operates 56 outdated reactors that are now becoming old and decrepit almost simultaneously, but the company has built up almost no reserves for decommissioning. In Germany, the government is very optimistic about a 47 billion euros cost for decommissioning and final storage. The decommissioning of the large number of French nuclear power plants could cost well over 100 billion euros as costs rise, if no savings are made on safety. There is a distinct possibility that the nuclear industry could bankrupt the French state even without a nuclear accident that could happen at any time.

A “European Pressurized Water Reactor” (EPR) has been under construction on France’s Atlantic coast in Flamanville since 2007. The flagship project was originally scheduled for completion in 2012 at a fixed price of 3.2 billion euros. Since then, the start of operation has been postponed again and again, and the Court of Auditors now puts the cost at over 19 billion euros. Whether the EPR can go online in 2024 is questionable. The model reactor will never work economically.

In countries with a functioning market, no new nuclear power plants are building

Swiss nuclear lobbyist and Axpo CEO Christoph Brand puts the kibosh on dreams of cheap nuclear power from new, small nuclear plants. “The production costs for the electricity supplied by new nuclear power plants are currently about twice as high as those of larger wind and solar plants,” Brand said. “No matter how one assesses the risks of nuclear power, it is simply not economical to rely on new nuclear plants,” he said in the pro-nuclear NZZ on Oct. 21, 2021.

In countries with a functioning market, no new nuclear power plants are being built. When in doubt, it always helps to look at EDF’s share price, which has fallen massively over the long term, to assess the market chances of the nuclear renaissance announced by President Macron.

“Bread and games” with artificially low nuclear electricity prices can work in election campaigns. Low-cost, risk-free electricity is generated today with photovoltaics and wind energy. (AM/hcn)

August 24, 2024 Posted by | business and costs, France, politics, Reference | Leave a comment

Putin says Ukrainian forces tried to strike Kursk nuclear plant

The Russian leader does not offer any evidence for his claim but says the UN nuclear watchdog has been alerted.

Aljazeera, 22 Aug 2024

Russian President Vladimir Putin says Ukrainian forces have tried to attack the Kursk Nuclear Power Station in an overnight raid.

The Russian leader did not offer evidence for the claim but said on Thursday that Moscow has informed the United Nations nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), about the incident.

Ukraine has not responded to Russia’s allegations.

“The enemy tried to strike the nuclear power plant at night. The IAEA has been informed,” Putin said in a televised government meeting.

Putin made the claim as Ukrainian forces continued to fight inside Russia more than two weeks after launching an ambitious cross-border attack, which has become an embarrassing headache for Moscow.

While the strategic aims of Ukraine’s Kursk incursion remain uncertain, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Thursday said the attack is part of an effort to bring the war to an end on terms amenable to Ukraine………………………….  https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/22/putin-says-ukrainian-forces-tried-to-strike-kursk-nuclear-plant

August 24, 2024 Posted by | Russia, weapons and war | Leave a comment

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