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Landmark nuclear treaty can still benefit US, NATO and Russia security. They should delay action for six months and negotiate ways to show compliance. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty — a key part of the post cold war nuclear system of controls and restraint — is on life support. President Donald Trump announced his desire to withdraw from the 1987 INF pact in October, citing Russian cheating and a desire to deploy missiles against China as motives. German Chancellor Angela Merkel reportedly convinced Trump this month to hold off on withdrawal for at least two months so the NATO alliance could act in a more united fashion to either bring Russia back into compliance or show it was trying.

As officials who helped negotiate the last two major strategic arms control agreements, we believe there is a deal to save the treaty and ensure its benefits can continue. This will require creative, serious and genuine negotiations by Washington and Moscow. We know firsthand, however, that negotiating with Russia can lead to surprising and positive results. Such engagement is desperately needed now, and could save a critical part of the post-Cold War arms control system that benefits American security

There’s no doubt that Russia violated INF Treaty  The INF Treaty signed by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev bans the US and Russia from having land-based missiles with ranges from 500-5500 kilometers. The Treaty helped end the cold war and paved the way for reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Banning these weapons gave leaders in Russia, Europe and America more time to make decisions in a crisis, and the treaty is worth saving if all sides can show there are fully complying with the deal.

There is no real question that Russia has violated the INF treaty. The United States has been sure of this since 2013 and has been increasingly clear about how Russia has violated the deal. Russia tested its 9M729 cruise missiles from a mobile fixed launcher to a distance of over 500 KM — something allowed by the treaty — and then later tested the same system from a ground-mobile launcher, making the missile a ground-launched system under the terms of INF.

Russia denies the 9M729 missile violates INF and instead accuses the United States of violating the INF by deploying the Mark-41 missile launcher as part of NATO missile defenses in Europe. The Mk-41 on shore is used to launch missile defense interceptors, but is used by the U.S. Navy on ships to launch offensive missiles. Russia claims this violates INF. Washington says the Mk-41 launcher for NATO’s defense is physically capable of holding canisters to launch offensive missiles like the Tomahawk cruise missile, but the land-based variant deployed in NATO is not equipped with firing software. Washington claims this makes the launcher legal, but this explanation gives Moscow little comfort.

For five years, the two countries have tried to get the other to admit their violation. That approach has failed and the treaty is now at risk of disappearing. The only way to save it — something both countries say they want — is for both to go beyond what the treaty requires to assure the other that it is in compliance.

Over the last year, former officials and experts from Russia and the United States have met privately to explore what an extra transparency regime might look like. Russian former military officials have said that the 9M729 should be made available for both inspection and even taken apart for American inspectors to determine if it can travel over 500km. While not an official Russia government offer, it seems unlikely that former officials would suggest such a thing without a sense that it might be possible.

The INF Treaty is beneficial and worth saving

Former American officials, for their part, have said NATO missile defense sites could be made available for visits by Russian officials to show no offensive missiles deployed on site. Other more extreme steps might be to modify the Mk-41 launcher so that it cannot physically hold or launch offensive missiles.

This deal is worth official exploration. Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin should pledge not to take any unilateral steps on the INF Treaty — including withdrawal — for at least six months. They should send senior officials from their militaries, the State and Defense departments, and the White House and Kremlin to negotiate on a continual basis to see if such a deal is technically feasible. The teams should be directed to produce a draft deal for both presidents and for NATO — whose security is most at risk and whose members will need to agree to steps providing transparency over NATO missile defense sites — in three months for official consideration.

Trying to save the INF treaty can have important benefits for the United States and its NATO allies. Now that the US has publicly released details of Russia violations, European NATO states may be able to bring more pressure on Russia to come back into compliance. If in the end, Russia’s violations cannot be reversed, making these efforts will show it is a lack of political will, and not technical problems, that led to the treaty’s demise. This will in itself help NATO allies as they wrestle with how to manage security and stability in a post-INF world.

Treaties should only remain in force if they benefit American and allied security, and sometimes treaties outlive their usefulness. But the INF still can protect these interests, and Russian security as well, if all sides are prepared to show that they remain in compliance.

Richard Burt is for the former ambassador to Germany and led the 1991 START Agreement talks. Ellen Tauscher is the former undersecretary of state for arms control and international security and oversaw negotiation of the New START Treaty. Both are members of the Nuclear Crisis Group based in Washington.