Danger in Trump’s decision to keep nuclear weapons data classified
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Decision to keep nuclear weapons data classified hurts US national security, Bulletin if the Atomic Scientists By Heather Wuest, June 11, 2019 The Trump administration’s decision to classify the total number of nuclear weapons that the United States possesses and the number of nuclear warheads dismantled in 2018 marks an abrupt change from the recent norm. Every year since 2010, the United States has chosen to declassify its nuclear stockpile and disarmament figures as part of an effort to encourage nuclear diplomacy and openness. But this year when the Federation of American Scientists asked the Pentagon for the figures to check its work in the Nuclear Notebook (a collection of world nuclear stockpile and disarmament information), the administration chose not to declassify.
Hans Kristensen—the director of the Federation of American Scientists Nuclear Information Project and a longtime author of the authoritative Nuclear Notebook column on world nuclear arsenals the Bulletin has published since 1987—is particularly vocal about the classification setback. The decision not to declassify the stockpile and decommissioned numbers, he says, “surrenders any pressure on other nuclear-armed states to be more transparent about the size of their nuclear weapon stockpiles” and is an “unnecessary and counterproductive reversal of nuclear policy.” This decision to classify comes at a time when the Trump administration says it is looking to ramp up talks with Russia and China on arms control, a negotiation that would be easier for United States diplomats if they could go in backed by the official numbers. In a short conversation with Kristensen, I asked about the future of the Nuclear Notebook and if the Federation of American Scientists would continue to push for declassification. He made it clear how the government’s simple denial of one information request can affect many aspects of an open and honest nuclear debate……….https://thebulletin.org/2019/06/hans-kristensen-on-how-the-tump-administrations-decision-to-keep-nuclear-weapons-data-classified-hurts-us-national-security/ |
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Contentious debate expected as USA House debates annual Defense Bill
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House defense bill sets stage for contentious nuclear debate, The Hill BY REBECCA KHEEL – 06/10/19 The House version of the annual defense policy would require an independent study on the United States adopting a “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons.Nuclear issues are shaping up to be among the most contentious issues as Congress debates this year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), with Republicans already coming out strongly against what’s in the bill.
The bill, a summary of which was released Monday morning, does not go as far as Chairman Adam Smith (D-Wash.) has opined about in the past. But it does seek to “start that debate” about the appropriate size and cost of the nuclear arsenal, staffers told reporters ahead of the bill’s release. “The chairman feels strongly that the nuclear arsenal is too large, that we spend too much money on legacy weapons systems when we have emerging requirements like cyber, like [artificial intelligence], like space, which aren’t getting the kind of focus that’s required, and he wants to reevaluate where we’re spending money, if we’re going to have another money to spend on these emerging things that are coming out,” a staffer said. Smith, who has long lambasted the price tag for nuclear modernization, pledged to make the issue a priority when he took control of the gavel after Democrats won back the House. In hearings and speeches, he has questioned the need for the nuclear triad, said he wants to “kill” the low-yield warhead and blasted Trump for casting aside nuclear treaties. n late January, Smith also reintroduced his No First Use Act that would make it U.S. policy not to use nuclear weapons first. Right now, U.S. policy leaves open the possibility of being the first to use a nuclear weapon in a conflict. Rather than incorporating that bill, the NDAA requires the independent study on the implications of adopting such a policy. Staffers also stressed the bill would not eliminate a leg of the triad, which refers to the three methods of delivering nuclear warheads. …….. Every Republican on the subcommittee voted against the bill last week over the low-yield warhead provision and three other issues. ……. https://thehill.com/policy/defense/447664-house-defense-bill-sets-stage-for-contentious-nuclear-debate |
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Western governments in denial of Chronic Radiation Syndrome affecting nuclear test veterans
The concept of a Chronic Radiation Syndrome was first reported by Japanese doctors who observed survivors of the atomic bombs dropped upon Japan in 1945. There, the name for the syndrome is Bura Bura disease. It is not accepted by the West.
the USA was in possession of the 1971 Soviet description of Chronic Radiation Syndrome in 1973 at the latest.
In 1994 the US Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute Bethesda, Maryland, published “Analysis of Chronic Radiation Sickness Cases in the Population of the Southern Urals”.
From the 1950s, nuclear veterans and civilian Downwinders reported syndromes of ill health similar to Chronic Radiation Syndrome to their governments. This includes the government of the USA and the government of Australia. These reports certainly did not result in Chronic Radiation Syndrome entering the Western medical lexicon.
During the 40-year period of operations at Mayak, all studies on radiation exposure of personnel at the plant and of the off-site population, the doses of exposure, and the possible health effects from radiation exposure were classified for national security reasons”.
anyone who spoke of the reality of disease and disablement suffered by those afflicted by the nuclear weapons tests in Australia were subject to threats of imprisonment by government and to attempts of censorship by the British and Australian authorities (Marsden, cited in Cross). It took 3 decades for the Australian government to release nuclear veterans from the threat of legal action and imprisonment if they spoke.
Chronic Radiation Syndrome, https://nuclearexhaust.wordpress.com/2014/05/01/chronic-radiation-syndrome/ Paul Langley, 9 June 19 The claim that Australian
nuclear veterans suffer enhanced risk of cancer has been confirmed by the Australian Government only as recently as 2006. The official government position is that the enhanced risk suffered by the nuclear test veterans is shown in health survey results. However the Australian government refuses to acknowledge that radiation exposures due to the testing of nuclear weapons as the cause of this increased risk.
Scientists under contract to the Australian government located at Adelaide performed the analysis of the 2006 health survey results. These scientists initially suggested that exposure to petrol fumes in the Australian desert might be the cause of the increased cancer risk suffered by nuclear veterans.
This suggestion, present in the Health Survey draft report, did not make it into the final report. Instead, we are presented with a mystery. Though the scientists claim certainty in their position that the nuclear veterans’ exposure to nuclear weapons detonations was not the cause of their increased cancer risk, the scientists are unable to find any other cause.
It’s a mystery, apparently, to Australian science in the service of the State. Not that this is uniquely Australian. It is universal among the Nuclear Powers. (It is all the more perplexing given Dr. P. Couch’s compassionate and detailed submission to a Senate inquiry examining the impact of the British Nuclear Tests in Australia on the personnel involved. Dr. Couch’s submission described the suffering endured by Commonwealth Police personnel who guarded the Maralinga Nuclear Test Site after military activity had ceased. One would have logically thought that if personnel were affected by service at Maralinga in times after the cessation of weapons testing, then so were the military personnel who actually saw the bombs explode, and who saw the plutonium dust disperse during the “minor trials”. )
The report states:
“The cancer incidence study showed an overall increase in the number of cancers in test participants, similar to that found in the mortality study. The number of cancer cases found among participants was 2456, which was 23% higher than expected. A significant increase in both the number of deaths and the number of cases was found for (figures in
brackets show increase in mortality and incidence):
A mistake for USA to deploy the low-yield Trident nuclear warhead
The Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review called for a low-yield warhead on some Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The plan modifies a W76-1 warhead, which has an explosive yield of 100 kilotons — seven times the size of the weapon used against Hiroshima — to produce the W76-2, reportedly with a yield of “just” five-seven kilotons.
Adding this weapon to the arsenal would risk lowering the nuclear threshold. To be sure, Pentagon officials assert that new low-yield weapons would not lower the threshold.
Yet the Nuclear Posture Review argued for low-yield weapons out of concern that Russia might feel it could use its “small” nuclear weapons free of concern about U.S. retaliation because the United States arsenal consists mainly of large-yield weapons.
So, at a minimum, the goal of new U.S. low-yield nuclear weapons would appear to be to persuade Moscow that the United States is more likely to go nuclear.
It is in the U.S. interest to maintain the highest possible threshold against the use of any nuclear arms. We should avoid steps that might signal, even inadvertently, that the use of “small” nukes is somehow acceptable………
SLBMs on submarines at sea constitute the most important and most survivable leg of the U.S. strategic triad, because the submarines can hide underwater and have lots of ocean in which to roam. Each submarine at sea carries a significant portion of the survivable U.S. nuclear deterrent.
The problem with launching an SLBM with a W76-2 is that it would reveal the submarine’s location. The submarine could maneuver away from the launch point, but it still would have compromised its general position, putting at risk the boat and the other 80-90 warheads it carried. Would the U.S. military run that risk, particularly given the availability of other low-yield options?
A bigger problem is discrimination. The Russians could not tell whether a launched SLBM carried a W76-2 or a W76-1 (100 kilotons) or, for that matter, a W88 (450 kilotons) until the weapon (or weapons) detonated………
The problem is that a launch from many parts of the Atlantic toward the Baltics would also appear, at least initially, to be a launch against Moscow.
Would the U.S. leadership launch a W76-2 — and run the risk that the Russians misread it as larger warhead intended to flatten Moscow in a decapitation strike — when F-35s and B61-12 bombs are available in Europe (as they will be in the early 2020s)?
The W76-2 makes little strategic sense, could inadvertently lower the nuclear threshold and likely would never be used, even in the most dire circumstances.
The Trump administration made a mistake by deciding to produce it. Congress should use the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act to correct that mistake and prohibit its deployment.
Steven Pifer is a William Perry fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/447514-stop-the-low-yield-trident-nuclear-warhead
A ‘P5+4’ summit could break the nuclear deadlock
A ‘P5+4’ summit could break the nuclear deadlock, The Strategist B1, 7 Jun 2019, |Ramesh Thakur In April, US President Donald Trump directed White House officials to identify pathways to new arms control agreements with Russia and China. If he’s looking for a big and bold new idea, here’s one: a ‘P5+4’ nuclear summit of the leaders of the nine countries that have the bomb.
The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the ‘P5’) are the only countries recognised by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as lawful possessors of nuclear weapons: China, France, Russia, the UK and the US. The ‘+4’ are the non-NPT nuclear-armed countries—India, Israel and Pakistan—and North Korea, the world’s only NPT defector state.
The existing architecture of nuclear arms control has served us well but is now crumbling. It was weakened first by the US exit from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and then the indefinite delay of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. More recently, the deterioration has accelerated with the Trump administration’s abandonmentof the nuclear deal with Iran, the US and Russian suspensions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the failure thus far to discuss extending New START beyond its expiry date of 2021.
There is a related problem. The NPT-centric architecture cannot accommodate the reality of four non-NPT possessor states. The architecture deficit is exacerbated by the fact that the agenda of nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament has stalled. The Korean denuclearisation-cum-peace-process has run out of steam. Last month’s meeting of the preparatory committee for the 2020 NPT review conference could not reach agreement on a common statement………..
Nuclear arms control satisfies all the key criteria for a summit. Like pandemics, climate change and biodiversity, nuclear threats spill across national boundaries and defy unilateral solutions. A summit of the nine political leaders, but only them, that is appropriately structured and has been adequately prepared can focus them to do what they alone can do—make tough choices from among competing interests and priorities. Cabinet ministers have single portfolio responsibilities. Heads of state and government have to oversee the entire agenda. With broad, overarching responsibilities, leaders can weigh priorities and balance interests across competing goals, sectors, and national and international objectives. ………
The first thing a nuclear summit should do is reaffirm the famous 1987 declaration by US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev: ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. If all nine leaders sign such a statement, it can be adopted as a resolution also by the UN Security Council and General Assembly. That would reverse the recent trend to normalise the discourse of possible nuclear-weapon use and, by hardening the normative boundary between nuclear and other weapons, perhaps also help to stop mission creep with respect to the roles and functions of nuclear weapons………
A summit-level agreement on a few important items would be a powerful stimulus to restarting stalled talks on other outstanding items like bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force and commencing negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty. Even a modestly successful summit would tell the world that the nine powers take seriously their responsibility for preserving nuclear peace………https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-p54-summit-could-break-the-nuclear-deadlock/
Putin warns New START nuclear arms treaty at risk
Russia: Putin warns New START nuclear arms treaty at risk, Aljazeera, 7 June 19,
Russian president accuses US of shunning talks on extending the nuclear arms reduction treaty, which expires in 2021. President Vladimir Putin has said Russia was prepared to drop a nuclear weapons agreement treaty with the United States and warned of “global catastrophe” if Washington keeps dismantling a global arms control regime.
Speaking at an economic forum in St Petersburg, Putin said Washington showed no genuine interest in conducting talks on extending the New START treaty which caps the number of nuclear warheads well below Cold War limits.
“If no one feels like extending the agreement – New START – well, we won’t do it then,” Putin said.
“We have said a hundred times that we are ready [to extend it], but no one is holding any talks with us. The negotiations process hasn’t been arranged at all.”
The treaty was signed by US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev in Prague in 2010.
The accord, which expires in 2021, limits each country to no more than 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers.
Together with another agreement known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, New START is considered a centrepiece of superpower arms control.
The US pulled out of the INF in February, accusing Russia of violating its terms. Moscow, which has denied any breaches, followed suit,
Nuclear arms race
Putin said the potential implications of letting the New START treaty expire would be huge, suggesting its demise could fuel a nuclear arms race.
“If we don’t keep this ‘fiery dragon’ under control, if we let it out of the bottle – God forbid – this could lead to global catastrophe,” Putin said.
“There won’t be any instruments at all limiting an arms race, for example, the deployment of weapons in space.”
“This means that nuclear weapons will be hanging over every one of us all the time.”
Putin said he was puzzled by the absence of a global discussion…….https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/russia-putin-warns-start-nuclear-arms-treaty-risk-190606163914989.html
Donald Trump, guided by John Bolton, could wreck the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Think of what the world would be like if Russia, the United States, China, India and Pakistan were testing nuclear weapons. They are not because of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which is responsible for shutting down nuclear testing by major and regional powers for more than two decades. Walking away from the CTBT would be extraordinarily dumb and dangerous, but the Trump administration has taken a step in this direction.
The CTBT was negotiated in 1996, but it isn’t solidly in place. While Russia has signed and ratified it, Senate Republicans rejected it in 1999. China, like the United States, has signed but not ratified.
How long this can this situation last? The answer is in doubt now that the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley, Jr., has declared at a public forum that the “United States believes that Russia probably is not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium.” The Treaty sets a “zero yield” obligation: states aren’t supposed to test even with the slightest yields. The State Department defines this as any explosion “that produce a self-sustaining, supercritical chain reaction.” In other words, you can conduct experiments, but the experiments should not produce any seismic activity.
Now let’s consider details.
It’s unknown whether John Bolton had any involvement with the DIA intelligence assessment, but another reason for investigation is the National Security Adviser’s record of “fixing” intelligence to make the case for a second war against Saddam Hussein, a war predicated on weapons of mass destruction that did not exist. Bolton is on record opposing U.S. ratification and entry into force of the CTBT. Is he once again “fixing the facts” to suit his policy preferences? Is the Defense Intelligence Agency once again guilty of reaching conclusions beyond available evidence, and misrepresenting the evidence it has? Or is there strong evidence of Russian violations of the CTBT’s prohibition on testing?
Hiroshima and Nagasaki protest U.S. subcritical nuclear test
The United States conducted a subcritical nuclear test in Nevada on Feb. 13, according to a May 24 announcement by the U.S. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Yuzaki called the test “extremely regrettable.”
He said, “It destroys the hopes of Hiroshima residents who strongly wish the abolition of nuclear weapons.”
Trump arrived in Japan as state guest on May 25. He will wind up his visit on May 28.
Nagasaki Governor Hodo Nakamura, along with prefectural assembly chairman Mitsuyuki Segawa, also denounced the subcritical nuclear test.
They sent protest letters to U.S. Ambassador William Hagerty on May 26.
USA’s “Doomsday plane” – the pilots might survive, anyway
This ‘Doomsday Plane’ Can Survive a Nuclear Attack https://www.livescience.com/65603-doomsday-plane-can-survive-nuclear-attack.htmlm By | May 31, 2019
Investigation by IAEA finds no evidence that Russia is violating nuclear test ban
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Nuclear watchdog chief: no evidence that Russia is violating test ban, US general said Moscow had ‘probably’ violated moratorium, Guardian, Julian Borger 31 May 19
Lassina Zerbo contradicts claims of testing at remote island The head of the international watchdog that monitors signs of nuclear testing has said there is no evidence to support a US allegation that Russiahas conducted low-yield tests in violation of an international ban.Lassina Zerbo, the executive secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), said the agency had already investigated the claim made on Wednesday by the head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt Gen Robert Ashley, that Russia had “probably” violated the moratorium on tests of any yield. In a public appearance in Washington, Ashley did not give details, and in response to follow-up questions, he said only that Russia had the “capability” to carry out such tests. The US has long voiced suspicions that Russia could be carrying out low-yield testing at a remote Arctic island base, Novaya Zemlya. Zerbo said the agency had conducted a test of its global network of sensors on Wednesday to estimate what size of nuclear blast it would be able to detect at Novaya Zemlya. The test found that its monitoring system would have picked up a blast of 3.1 on the Richter scale, which would be roughly equivalent, in that area, to a nuclear detonation of 100 tons – tiny in comparison to the yield of most nuclear warheads, which are normally measured in thousands of tons. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 15 and 20 kilotons, respectively……… It is unclear why Ashley chose to revive the allegation about Russian low-yield testing now, in the apparent absence of any new evidence. Some observers pointed to the fact that Ashley made the claim that testing had “probably” taken place only in his prepared remarks, but did not repeat the claim in a question and answer session, leading to speculation the claim could have been inserted into Ashley’s speech by the White House. The national security adviser, John Bolton, has a long record of hostility to arms control agreements. On his watch, the US has pulled out of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement with Russia. He is believed to be opposed to the extension of the New Start agreement, signed in 2010 with Russia, limiting deployed strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery systems on both sides. It is due to expire in 2021. Sarah Bidgood, Eurasia programme director at the Centre for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, suggested the issue had been rehashed “in order to support the narrative that Russia is an unreliable partner in arms control, with whom verification does not work”. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/30/nuclear-watchdog-no-evidence-russia-violating-test-ban |
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Nuclear weapons even more risky in this age of Artificial Intelligence, Cyberattacks
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Artificial Intelligence, Cyberattacks and Nuclear Weapons: A Dangerous Combination, Stratfor, By Pavel Sharikov, for the EastWest Institute 31 May 19, Artificial intelligence (AI) — defined by John McCarthy, one of the doyens of AI, as “the science and engineering of making intelligent machines” — is slowly gaining relevance in the military domain. While commercial use of AI is widening, there are only three countries that are reported to be developing serious military AI technologies: the United States, China and Russia. AI promises a significant military advantage to a nation’s offensive and defensive military capabilities.
AI now has the capacity to be merged with sophisticated but untried, new weaponry, such as offensive cyber capabilities. This is an alarming development, as it has the potential to destabilize the balance of military power among the leading industrial nations. Notably, with the advent of machine learning and AI, more targets have become available for computer hacking, meaning that critical infrastructure — banking systems, airport flight tracking, hospital records, the programs that run the nation’s nuclear power reactors — are vulnerable to attacks. One of the most pressing problems, however, lies in the destabilizing effects of sophisticated cyber weaponry, enhanced by AI technology, on the balance of nuclear power. There is no definite proof that nuclear command and control systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks, but these systems are digital, hence the vulnerability exists. The destabilizing effect of sophisticated AI cyber weaponry is of special concern for U.S.-Russia relations. Indeed, defending against such weapons and protecting a nation’s hardware, software and data against attack, has become an important issue in bilateral relations — on par with nuclear arms control and accidental conventional military escalation. Today, the owners of the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons — Russia and the United States — are locked in, arguably, a new Cold War. Many of the traditional communication channels, including military ones, are compromised or broken, destabilizing nuclear diplomacy between the two countries. Along with the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the arms control regime created during the Cold War can no longer guarantee strategic stability. The existence of new technologies, such as cyber capabilities paired with AI, will only amplify this destabilizing trend. In fact, a new technological, rather than nuclear, AI cyber arms race may have already begun……… A Way ForwardEven though it is impossible to reverse the advances of AI development, it is still possible to work out the rules of an arms race involving this technology. In this regard, it is worth thinking about the experience of Soviet-American agreements when anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technologies were introduced in the 1970s. Instead of getting into an arms race centered around this new technology, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to accept mutual vulnerabilities and, for the sake of strategic stability, abandoned plans to field more advanced anti-ballistic missile technologies as evidenced by the ABM treaty, which remained in force until 2002. The ABM treaty could serve as the basis for a similar agreement on AI cyber weapons……. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/artificial-intelligence-cyberattacks-and-nuclear-weapons-dangerous-combination |
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U.S, official claims that Russia is ‘probably’ conducting banned nuclear tests
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Russia ‘probably’ conducting banned nuclear tests, US official says, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48454680 29 May 19, Russia may be violating a ban on the testing of low-yield nuclear weapons capabilities at a site in the Arctic, a top US intelligence official said.Lt Gen Robert Ashley, the director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, said Moscow was “probably not adhering to” the rules of a recognised treaty.
He was referring to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a multilateral agreement prohibiting nuclear testing. Russia, which ratified the treaty in 2008, says it complies with the CTBT. The US has signed but has not yet ratified the treaty. Our understanding of nuclear weapon development leads us to believe that Russia’s testing activities would help it improve its nuclear weapons capabilities,” Lt Gen Ashley said on Wednesday. He added that the US expected Russia, which he said was likely testing weapons in the Novaya Zemlya islands, to increase its nuclear arsenal “significantly” over the next decade. But analysts received the statement with scepticism. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) said in a statement that it had not detected any unusual activity. “The CTBTO has full confidence in the ability of the IMS [its monitoring system] to detect nuclear test explosions,”, the organisation said in a statement. The CTBT, which bans nuclear weapons testing anywhere in the world, was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996. It sets out nuclear disarmament as a principle but diplomatically avoids the politics of the issue. |
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USA held a nuclear explosion test in February
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A US government laboratory says the country held a subcritical nuclear test in the state of Nevada on February 13.
The Department of Energy’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory made the announcement on Friday. The test was the first of its kind since December 2017, and the second under the administration of President Donald Trump. It was the 29th in the United States. The laboratory says the experiment, dubbed “Ediza,” used high explosives to implode plutonium and captured “numerous, detailed scientific measurements.” …… The latest test was conducted just before the second US-North Korea summit in February, meaning the Trump administration was demanding Pyongyang abolish its nuclear weapons while it was trying to enhance its own.
The revelation is expected to prompt criticism from anti-nuclear groups. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20190525_13/ |
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Swiss authorities intervene to halt exports of nuclear weapons material
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Swiss authorities intervene to halt exports of nuclear weapons material, Swissinfo.ch MAY 26, 2019 Federal authorities are stepping up efforts to prevent the sale of Swiss machinery that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. The latest interventions concern direct sales to the US and France.According to reportsexternal link by the German-language newspaper NZZ am Sonntag, the federal export group halted the export of suspicious machinery to the US two times last year. Livia Willi, spokesperson for the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), told the paper, “There was reason to believe that the goods would be used for the development of nuclear weapons”.
In the past six months, the US has ordered three laser markers worth a total of almost CHF 250,000 from Swiss companies. There have been other interventions as well including in October 2017, when Swiss authorities intervened to stop the export of machine spindles to France. The NZZ am Sonntag writes that halting deliveries to Western nuclear powers is a highly unusual measure. According to the paper, there are no comparable cases like this in Swiss export history. The decisions were based on the Goods Control Act external linkand theexternal linkOrdinanceexternal link, which clearly prohibits the export of goods used for the construction of weapons of mass destruction. The challenge is that many of the goods are dual use in that they can be used for civilian and military purposes…….. https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/dual-use-goods_swiss-authorities-intervene-to-halt-exports-of-nuclear-weapons-material/44990204 |
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