The US and Israel have drafted plans for an assault on Iran’s nuclear, energy, and defense infrastructure post-midterm elections in a new bid to force Tehran to negotiate on less favorable terms, the New York Times (NYT) reported on 21 October.
Some US planners contend that a concentrated and intense three-day bombardment would be sufficient to force Tehran into yielding at the negotiating table.
Washington continues to brandish the threat of renewed war as a bargaining chip, seeking to extract concessions on Tehran’s nuclear program and its grip on Hormuz.
Tehran has refused to make any nuclear concessions thus far, insisting the issue be deferred to a later stage of negotiations.
This comes after US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth traveled to Israel this week to confer with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the planned strikes, as US and Israeli warplanes intensify military drills over Iraq to rehearse their attack maneuvers.
US President Donald Trump has repeatedly shelved or abandoned plans to attack Iran ahead of the midterm elections, as his approval rating plunges to record lows, public support for the war erodes, and the fallout from earlier attacks weighs heavily on the US economy.
Tehran is bracing for a war that may stretch on for months, tightening its hold on the Strait of Hormuz, and striking vessels that ignore its designated shipping routes.
Should the fighting resume, Tehran warns, its retaliation will reach beyond merchant vessels and the region’s energy facilities to data centers and the internet cables running along the seabed.
Mahdi Mohammadi, a senior advisor to Iranian negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, dismissed as a “fantasy” the notion that Washington could conclude a fresh wave of strikes within 72 hours, recalling Trump’s February forecast of a two-week war.
“Our attacks will be more fierce, creative, and different,” Mohammadi said.
Washington has dispatched the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group, the USS Makin Island amphibious group, and some 9,000 additional troops to West Asia, US officials revealed on 1 October, reinforcing roughly 50,000 US troops already stationed across the region.
The buildup could see three carriers operating there simultaneously before the end of October, a concentration of force seen only once before since 2003.
Hegseth declared US forces “ready to go” should Trump order renewed attacks.
The Pentagon is weighing the use of the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB), dubbed the “Mother of All Bombs” and Washington’s most powerful conventional weapon, against Iran’s nuclear and energy sites according to a recent CNN report.
US officials doubt the bomb can reach far enough underground to hit Iran’s buried nuclear sites, let alone force Tehran’s surrender.
Instead, they value it for the mass destruction, civilian deaths, and lasting trauma it would inflict on Iranians, a symbolic act of terror that would let Trump withdraw from a failed war while claiming victory.
It is likely that, in the aftermath of this carnage—which has claimed the lives of more than a million people—it will not just be Volodymyr Zelensky who flees the scene, but also various political leaders from the European Union and Canada.
Yet, on October 26, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom signed a joint declaration, underscoring their unwavering commitment to Ukraine and announcing their intention to strengthen their role within NATO
The moment is approaching when the West must accept its defeat in Ukraine. President Trump is determined to bypass Volodymyr Zelensky, who has formed alliances with criminal organizations that oppose the United States. The Russian army continues to advance. Elon Musk, who has prohibited the use of the Starlink network for attacks and killing, has now throttled its bandwidth in Ukraine. Russia is on the verge of achieving its military objective. The question remains: what will the Europeans do to mask their failure?
t took a long time for Russia to fulfill the role assigned to it by UN Security Council Resolution 2202 [1] and to launch its “special military operation” in Ukraine.
It is true that its German and French partners—also designated as guarantor powers for the Minsk Agreements—did absolutely nothing.
President Vladimir Putin even reprimanded the oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, who, in the name of “Holy Russia,” had recruited Cossacks to assist the inhabitants of the Donbas—people who were being massacred by “integral nationalists” with the tacit approval of President Petro Poroshenko. It is worth noting that Malofeev—owner of the Tsargrad media group and a stakeholder in the telecommunications firm Rostelecom—is a monarchist who was acting on behalf of a Grand Duke. The President reminded him that, in this day and age, possessing vast resources does not grant one the right to act in place of the State.
Vladimir Putin only intervened when hardline nationalists planned a large-scale military operation—not just in the Donbas, but also against Crimea, which had joined the Russian Federation [2]. He acted in haste, recognizing the Donbas republics as sovereign states on February 21, 2022—before the Kremlin had even managed to procure flags for the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.
The military objective he set at the time was to liberate the entirety of these regions—a goal expected to be reached in the coming weeks. It was only because Western powers supplied the Ukrainians with weapons, causing the war to drag on, that Vladimir Putin considered liberating Novorossiya as well—a new objective expected to be achieved in the coming months.
In any event, Donald Trump succeeded Joe Biden. Unlike his predecessor, he had no private interests in the conflict. He therefore attempted to bring it to an end, publicly admonishing Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House on February 28, 2025. However, Zelensky—heavily backed by the international press—managed to obscure the fact that he had been nothing more than an impostor for the previous nine months (his term having ended in May 2024) and succeeded in swaying Western public opinion in his favor.
Donald Trump proposed several rounds of negotiations, none of which bore fruit. Zelensky was caught red-handed, yet he deflected blame—first onto his chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, and subsequently onto his replacement, Mariia Vitushok. He managed to hush up corruption scandals involving his team—most notably the “Midas affair”—and even the role played by his own business associate, Timour Minditch, in the Jeffrey Epstein scandal.
However, emboldened by a sense of impunity, Volodymyr Zelensky has gone so far as to form an alliance with Mexican drug cartels—groups that President Trump had designated as “foreign terrorist organizations” and against which he waged a ruthless war [3]. Within a few weeks, in Latin America, these narco-traffickers launched attacks against police forces and agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). They managed to monitor drug shipments crossing the Mexico–U.S. border and even assassinated U.S. officials. Meanwhile, their drugs are readily available throughout the EU, entering the bloc without risk via the Ukrainian border.
Consequently, President Trump decided it was time to put an end to this state of affairs. He dispatched his special representative, Steve Witkoff, to Ukraine, then to Norway for meetings with European representatives, and finally to Russia. His associate, Jared Kushner, followed these contacts via teleconference—though he found himself caught off guard while conducting business elsewhere, just as a book exposing his own shady dealings was published.
At the same time, upon discovering that the Ukrainian military was using its access to Starlink for offensive operations—in violation of its contract—Elon Musk restricted the service’s bandwidth in Ukraine. When criticized for this decision, he reposted a statement from Volodymyr Zelensky in which the latter boasted about using the network to attack Russia [5].
Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president and current secretary of his country’s Security Council, released a list of the problems created for Trump by the “drug addict from Kyiv”
“1. He has always and everywhere openly supported “old man” Biden. 2. He refused to provide Trump with genuine, damaging information about his rival during the previous election. 3. With tiresome persistence—much like a large, buzzing blowfly that has fallen into a pot of honey—and in a crude tone, he demanded money and weaponry from Trump to wage war against Russia. 4. He manipulated European leaders, turning them daily against Trump and his team. 5. On numerous occasions, he rebuffed Trump and his associates when they presented him with various proposals for negotiating an end to the conflict. 6. He disregarded the American side, refusing to halt his attacks on Russian refineries and ignoring Trump’s arguments regarding the impact of these actions on global petroleum prices and the situation within the United States on the eve of the election. 7. Through his reckless behavior, he has brought the United States and NATO to the brink of a global nuclear conflict with Russia.
Together with his cronies—such as the fugitive Minditch or Yermak (who has since fallen from grace)—he shamelessly siphoned off the U.S. funds that “old man” Biden had so generously provided for the war; he continued to dip into the remainder of these sums even under the Trump administration.
He forged ties with Mexican cartels—which Trump detests—who sent their henchmen to Ukraine to learn how to operate drones, paying the “drug addict from Kyiv” with proceeds from the sale of illicit substances in the United States.
Instead of taking Washington’s position into account, he resorted to blackmailing the United States, brandishing the threat of a defeat in Ukraine and conjuring up the specter of disastrous consequences for the entire Western world.
It is clear that, this time, there will be no way out.
Yuri Ushakov, former Russian ambassador to Washington and current advisor to Vladimir Putin, indicated that trilateral negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, and the U.S. could take place in Abu Dhabi after November 4. He noted that a previous proposal from Moscow, for talks between September 18 and 20, had been rejected by the Ukrainian side
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov commented on the EU’s search for a negotiator, noting that no concrete action has been taken: “They keep talking, but they aren’t making any decisions.” Regarding the potential appointment of Finnish President Alexander Stubb, he stated: “If there is a negotiator, that’s fine. If it’s a negotiator who will sincerely strive to contribute to a peaceful settlement, that would be even better.” The Kremlin makes no secret of its preference for former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who currently serves on the board of Gazprom.
MP Leonid Slutsky, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (founded by Vladimir Zhirinovsky), declared: “Kyiv is not seeking peace negotiations. Zelensky previously sabotaged a significant trilateral initiative concerning the Ukrainian diaspora by carrying out brutal raids on polling stations during the State Duma elections. He has now chosen to repeat this behavior ahead of the planned meeting in Abu Dhabi. The U.S. side should also draw its own conclusions—and not just ’freeze’ its stance, but also completely halt all military aid to Ukraine. That would be a genuine contribution to the peace process.” Typically, the Kremlin uses this party to voice sentiments that diplomatic decorum otherwise forbids.
The Kremlin curtly dismisses any suggestions for a simple, limited ceasefire. It now insists on a comprehensive peace treaty—in the full sense of the term—which includes the “denazification” of the country.
All the powers that are members of the “Coalition of the willing” are now coming to terms with the consequences of all this.
How will it be acknowledged that, yes, there were “integral nationalists”—”Banderites”—within the Ukrainian government?
How will it be acknowledged that they did not even consider themselves to be Slavs, but rather sought to eradicate all Slavs—Ukrainians and Russians alike—down to the very last child?
How will it be acknowledged that these are the very people who were extensively supported—funded by the heavy burden of taxpayers’ money—in the European Union and Canada?
It is likely that, in the aftermath of this carnage—which has claimed the lives of more than a million people—it will not just be Volodymyr Zelensky who flees the scene, but also various political leaders from the European Union and Canada.
Yet, on October 26, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom signed a joint declaration, underscoring their unwavering commitment to Ukraine and announcing their intention to strengthen their role within NATO
I have been following NATO’s proxy war in Ukraine for several years, and so what is happening now is not a surprise to me. Indeed, it is something that I have been expecting for some time.
First, let’s review what it is that is happening: Russia is bombarding Kiev (Kyiv) on a daily and nightly basis. This is new. Before, Russia’s drones and missiles would arrive in waves, with intermittent periods lasting days or weeks. Now it’s minutes.
Russia is targeting energy infrastructure in a way that they have avoided doing before. They are attacking with an aim to essentially make Kiev uninhabitable this winter, as Ukraine will no longer have the ability to generate and distribute power to its people.
Russia is also destroying Ukraine’s logistics infrastructure: warehouses have been destroyed. The Ukrainian government has said that they have lost 90% of their food logistics.
The battlefields are also looking much more dire for Ukraine. Russia is finally advancing, and the last of the wide belt of so-called “fortress cities” in Donetsk, Slovyansk and Kramotorsk, look set to fall in the coming weeks. After those two cities fall, there is virtually nothing left to stand between the Russians and the Dnieper River, the gateway to Kiev.
This looming disaster was described by pro-Ukraine foreign policy and security analyst Jimmy Rushton, a British journalist for the Kyiv Independent based in Kiev, who explained the danger in September 2025:
“Ukraine has the Donbas line, a network of fortifications stretching across Donetsk…If Ukraine were to abandon these, it would fall back to almost nothing…The ground behind is flat and open, without prepared defenses…”
Indeed, analysts seem to agree that giving up the Donbas defences would amount to “military suicide” for Ukraine.
Nonetheless, after years of “grinding” advances, often described as “glacial” by the Western media, Russia is — slowly but surely — about to claim its prize.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… To Western analysts, it was almost as if Putin didn’t even want to conquer Ukraine.
Well, the shocking truth is that he didn’t. Putin NEVER wanted to “conquer Ukraine”. He only wanted the West to take him seriously when he said “nyet” to Ukraine joining NATO, insisting that Ukraine must stay true to its 1991 Constitution and always remain neutral.
The West’s complete failure to understand what Von Clausewitz called the “nature” of the conflict has rendered them blind to what is actually going on, and will leave them shattered and shocked when this conflict reaches its inevitable conclusion.
“Brotherly peoples”
The reason the Russians have been taking the easy approach to Ukraine lies in the peculiarly Russian concept of literal kinship between slavic nations.
This concept was explained in July 2021, when Vladimir Putin published an essay entitled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”. In it, he explained how Russians and Ukrainians — as well as Belorussians — were “brotherly peoples” — a triune of nations, all stemming from the same root in Kievan Rus.
To Putin, the trinity of the three nations was one based partly or even mostly on a shared religious faith, namely the Russian Orthodox Church:
“Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus, which was the largest state in Europe. Slavic and other tribes across the vast territory…were bound together by one language, economic ties…and — after the baptism of Rus — the Orthodox faith. The spiritual choice made by St. Vladimir, who was both Prince of Novgorod and Grand Prince of Kiev, still largely determines our affinity today.”
Putin also laments the fact that this “affinity” between Russia and Ukraine has been undermined:……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Millions of Russians live in Eastern Ukraine
………. in Ukraine, which accounted for nearly HALF of that dispossessed Russian population (12 million). In fact, 83% of the pre-2014 population of Donbas — including most of the Eastern and Southern Oblasts — were ethnic Russians or spoke Russian. Overall, almost half of Ukrainians spoke Russian. It is also well-known, for example, that Volodymyr Zelensky was a native Russian speaker, who did not learn Ukrainian until he was elected President.
………………………………………………….., it should be noted that fully one third (1 in 3) of all Russians have relatives in Ukraine. Moreover, prior to the 2014 coup that saw a change in Ukraine’s government, 74% of Russians had a favourable attitude towards Ukraine — it seems that Putin was not the only one who saw them as “brotherly people”.
In fact, of the Russians living in Eastern Ukraine— where the fighting is taking place — 75% or more speak Russian, with high percentages using Russian as their “unique mother tongue”.
A true civil war
From these data points, we can conclude that what is unfolding in the Eastern Ukrainian oblasts is a de factocivil war. Like the American Civil War, it is a case where both sides speak the same language, share a common heritage, with many even sharing familial connections. In other words, it is virtually “brother against brother” (a phrase often used to describe the American Civil War)……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Russians have soured on their Ukrainian “brothers”
When the Maidan Coup happened in 2014, things started to change not just in Ukraine, but also in Russia. When the Russian public began to be bombarded by stories and videos and photos of ethnic Russians slaughtered by the Nazi battalions of Western Ukraine, they were outraged. Right wing Ukrainian nationalist groups like the Azov Battalion, Aidar Battalion, Right Sector, and others murdered thousands of innocent citizens of the Donbas region, whose only “crimes” were that they were ethnically Russian and belonged to the Orthodox Russian Church.
But for these Nazis, those Russian speaking Ukrainians were Untermenschen (subhuman). In fact, Yatsenyuk, the Prime Minister who was hand-picked by the U.S. to lead the government after the coup literally called them that in a declaration.
Nonetheless, on the eve of Putin’s incursion into Ukraine to save the beleaguered Russians in the Donbas, almost half of Russians still had a favourable view of Ukraine.
As of 2026, however, only 16% of Russians still feel that way towards their “slavic brothers”.
The Starobelsk drone strike changed everything
On 22 May, 2026, the Ukrainians — with of course help from the CIA — carried out a drone strike on the academic building and dormitory of the Starobelsk Professional College of the Pedagogical University in Starobelsk, Russia, a place for young women (mostly) to study to become teachers.
The strike was carried out in 3 waves, reminiscent of the Mehab school “double tap” strike the U.S. carried out in Iran. Six young women were killed and 40 injured. The Russian public were outraged. How could a “brotherly people” do this?
The Starobelsk terror attack marked a turning point in public opinion — as well as a corresponding change in Putin’s prosecution of the conflict with Ukraine.
“The gloves are off”
Observers of the conflict in Ukraine have all noticed a marked escalation in Russian attacks over the summer. The drone and missile bombardments, which had been intermittent, are now a daily occurrence. Whereas the attacks had previously come only at night, allowing work and commerce to carry on normally during the day, the attacks are now coming around the clock.
Sensitive command and control units housing NATO advisors and Western personnel, which had mostly been spared in the early years of the conflict, are now being obliterated; bridges, railways and locomotives are also finally on the target list.Logistics centres, warehouses and even data centres are being hit.
Most critically, energy infrastructure, electric and gas systems, which Russia had attacked earlier but never completely destroyed before, is now being completely demolished, leaving cities like Kiev unable to provide heating to its citizens over the coming winter. In previous years, Russia had always allowed Ukraine to keep some of its vital energy systems during the winter — now, Russia is content to let the Ukrainians, their “fraternal people”, freeze in the dark of winter.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Four years of such ferocious attrition has resulted in the almost complete destruction of Ukraine’s ability to fight. While Kiev refuses to provide casualty figures, independent analysts estimate that Ukraine has suffered up to 3 MILLION casualties.
Military Watch Magazine, based in South Korea, explained in 2025 that Ukraine had already lost 1.7 million troops, and that the rate of losses was accelerating:
“The information indicates that 118,500 personnel were killed or went missing in 2022, 405,400 in 2023, 595,000 in 2024 and 621,000 so far in 2025, which corroborates with a growing body of evidence which has emerged over more than three years that attrition rates have increased tremendously and unsustainably.”…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
What happens next — and when?
Informed observers of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are now debating as to what will trigger the ultimate collapse of the Nazi regime in Kiev. Will it be the devastating air war that is destroying Kiev’s infrastructure and its ability to sustain human life? Or will it be the ultimate destruction of Ukraine’s armed forces, the death of the infamous “last Ukrainian” — the point to which Ukraine’s Western sponsors have vowed to sponsor Kiev’s fight.
Either way, the endgame in Ukraine is already upon us. The front is collapsing, the troops demoralised, under-supplied, under-fed, and under constant pressure all along the 1200-kilometre front, while thousands have been deserting or surrendering. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have simply deserted. Ukraine’s cities are under 24-hour bombardment, the country is losing its ability to generate power and even to feed its population: the shelves in the shops are empty.
SpaceX’s plans to retire its most popular rocket could jeopardize the United States’ ability to launch military satellites — a plight compounded by the Pentagon’s dependence on Elon Musk’s company.
SpaceX is by far the dominant player in the rocket business and indispensable to the military, dwarfing competitors and accounting for 85% of U.S. launches in 2025. The company is phasing out its Falcon 9 rocket to make way for Starship, a massive new vehicle that SpaceX says will be more efficient and profitable, but which many military satellites aren’t designed to fit.
The situation leaves the Space Force in a launch crunch that could affect the military’s ability to put its advanced satellites in orbit — and on time. The Pentagon has few alternatives to ferry its equipment, and SpaceX’s competitors are likely years away from being able to offer comparable services.
“Everybody’s having problems, so the Space Force is freaking out a little bit about launch,” said one former Space Force official, who, like others, was granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive issue.
It also highlights the scale of Musk’s company’s footprint and the way its business decisions can affect the security of countries including the United States. From the battlefield in Ukraine, where Kyiv is dependent on his Starlink satellite internet service, to cutting-edge artificial intelligence and SpaceX’s stranglehold over the pathways to orbit, the world’s first trillionaire has a direct hand in the technology that will shape the future.
The Space Force recently tried to book rides for three future satellite missions, but SpaceX declined to offer its services, according to two people familiar with the missions. No other rocket companies offered to take them either, the people said.
A top official at the Space Force downplayed the problem about finding rockets to launch military satellites.
“I wouldn’t say there [are] missions I’m worried about being able to fly; I would say we’re working through the right way to support those customers,” said Brig. Gen. Eric Zarybnisky, the Space Force’s acting portfolio acquisition executive for space access.
But Zarybnisky acknowledged growing pains for the government and space industry as demand for rockets increases. “Temporarily, there are some things we’ll need to work through, again, as we get new providers flying,” he said.
SpaceX did not respond to a request for comment.
The three Space Force missions that didn’t find a ride were listed through the National Security Space Launch initiative, or NSSL — the program the service uses to buy rocket launches for its satellites.
Two of the missions were for the Space Development Agency, according to the people. The agency is a branch of the Space Force that’s building a network of hundreds of military satellites in low-Earth orbit to provide expanded data services, and missile warning and tracking capabilities.
Details about the third Space Force mission or the precise date for when the Space Force hoped to launch the missions are unclear.
The Space Force has set up a two-lane system for buying its launches, one for less demanding efforts and another for more challenging missions. The hope was that new competitors, such as Rocket Lab, Stoke Space and Relativity, would have an easier time winning contracts for the lower-risk missions. But SpaceX has dominated both lanes with its Falcon rocket, and other providers have been slow to scale up
The Space Force hopes to use two large rockets from SpaceX competitors to ferry key military satellites into orbit: United Launch Alliance’s Vulcan and Blue Origin’s New Glenn.
But the Vulcan rocket has struggled to launch consistently and was grounded earlier this year after problems with its solid rocket boosters. Space Force officials have been frustrated by ULA’s delays and have moved missions slated for a Vulcan to a SpaceX Falcon.
Meanwhile, Blue Origin’s New Glenn program had a devastating setback in May when a rocket exploded on the company’s only launchpad in Florida — putting the rocket out of commission likely until next year.
The Space Force has said it’s open to eventually using SpaceX’s Starship. But there are engineering challenges to overcome because Starship is designed for “flat stack” satellites such as Starlink, while most military satellites are designed for a larger cargo bay. And it’s unclear when SpaceX will have the capacity to meet the Pentagon’s needs, given its plans to use Starship to build out orbital data-centers and other company priorities.
Other newer companies may have some solutions. Stoke Space, Relativity and Rocket Lab are all working on medium-lift rockets that could help meet the military’s needs. But none of those companies has flown successful test flights of their new vehicles, meaning it could take years for them to start launching reliably and frequently.
Zarybnisky remained optimistic that Blue Origin and ULA will work through their technical problems and that new competitors will get up and running in time.
“We’re excited to see where those new providers come on board and are able to support the national security base launches that we need,” he said.
It’s not just the Pentagon feeling the pinch. The move to decommission the Falcon 9 rocket and focus on Starship has sent the entire space industry into panic — especially commercial satellite builders. Some of those firms have been unable to secure Falcon 9 flights after 2028.
The Space Force didn’t disclose a set date for when it will fly its last Falcon mission, but Zarybnisky said the service is “actively talking to SpaceX and understanding where the spacecraft programs are, where they are in their build and test cycle. The end date will really be driven by the spacecraft customers that we have launch service contracts for already.”
It’s unclear what happens after the Space Force runs through that batch of missions. An industry representative warned that the service is unprepared to deal with the crisis coming its way as demand for rockets increases across the space industry.
New rocket companies can’t bid on a Space Force launch until they’ve demonstrated the ability to successfully fly, part of an effort to keep vaporware companies from winning government business. But commercial satellite companies are not restricted in the same way and have been buying up early launches on rockets that haven’t even flown yet. This puts more pressure on the Space Force to find future launches.
The launch crunch “probably requires the Space Force to get creative and figure out a way to start buying capacity now before it’s too late,” the representative said.
Another person familiar with the issue said that Space Force officials need to work with Congress to “fundamentally rethink” how the military acquires launch.
“The Space Force needs to be allowed to reserve multiple launches at a time, much further out into the 2030s, for vehicles that have yet to fly,” the person said. “Yes, it’s taking on more risk … [but] if it waits for new rockets to prove themselves, it may find they’re already sold out.”
As the National Nuclear Security Administration pushes to dramatically accelerate plutonium pit production, it is cutting safety corners, bypassing fiscal oversight, and risking nuclear instability—all to fix a problem that elite scientists say doesn’t exist.
This summer, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) reversed its initial decision to withhold an unclassified summary of a study on the aging of plutonium in US nuclear weapons by JASON, a group of elite scientists advising the Pentagon. Far from revelatory, the brief JASON study is more notable for its consistency with earlier assessments that found the US stockpile’s plutonium is aging slowly, but not at a level that calls into question present weapons performance.
This latest assessment stands in contrast to the NNSA’s ambitions for accelerating US efforts to revive plutonium pit production—the cores of thermonuclear weapons. Recent developments indicate that the NNSA is pursuing a variety of means to speed up the program and demonstrate ambitious production capabilities. These calls come amid a lack of transparent requirements, before the project has demonstrated mature performance, and without integrated cost and schedule estimates. At the same time, congressional and independent oversight show troubling signs of erosion.
Accelerating a program that was already facing steep challenges comes with immense risks that must be weighed against actual national security needs. Rushing toward production threatens worker and community safety and increases costs. It is also likely to prove strategically destabilizing. The United States doesn’t need to build new warheads to maintain its land-based nuclear force, unless it dangerously seeks to load more warheads into its ballistic missiles.
If plutonium aging is not an imminent threat to the present stockpile—and by extension to US nuclear deterrence—accelerated pit production therefore signals that the United States is dangerously hurtling toward renewed nuclear competition in contravention of its legal obligations as a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
It doesn’t have to be that way: Viable alternatives exist that would reduce strain on the US nuclear complex and reduce the risks and costs of the program itself. These alternatives would be more conducive to future arms control and nonproliferation efforts. But they have only one potentially elusive requirement: Restraint.
When no news is good news. The most recent JASON study on plutonium aging is the group’s third such assessment. In their first 2006 study, they concluded that most pits “have credible minimum lifetimes in excess of 100 years.” Pits in the current stockpile are roughly 37 to 48 years old. An updated summary in 2019 found that “in general, studies on [plutonium] aging and its impacts on the performance of nuclear-weapon primaries have not been sufficiently prioritized over the past decade.” The group then recommended further experimentation to quantify the effect of aging on weapons performance, along with establishing pit production capabilities “as expeditiously as possible.” The latter comment undoubtedly cast a sense of urgency over the issue, especially on Capitol Hill. But it could also be interpreted as a rebuke of Los Alamos National Laboratory’s insufficient investment in the science of plutonium aging and in its lack of commitment to maintaining previously authorized capabilities following the forced closure of Rocky Flats after an FBI raid in 1989. More recently, in 2011, a nuclear near-miss—involving mishandled rods of plutonium for a photo shoot—also resulted in a multi-year shutdown of Los Alamos’s plutonium facility and the resignation of criticality safety officers, raising further concern.
The latest JASON study conducted in 2025—of which only a three-page executive summary was released in August—reaffirms that plutonium is aging slowly, posing no imminent risk to the viability of the existing stockpile. The study repeats the recommendation that pit production capacity be re-established, but it does so without the urgency of the 2019 report. Instead, it makes clear that new production “may be needed to provide options to mitigate any future age-related issues,” noting that the NNSA has faced delays in executing key experiments that will help inform aging effects……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
Samuel Rafanell-Williams: Scottish CND: AS the SNP meet for their annual conference, there can be little doubt the British government sees Scotland as a key frontier in its plans to militarise the nation.
Scotland already faces the world with an Anglo-American nuclear weapons system based on the Clyde, so whose interests are served by going further in turning our country into a bunker-state and launchpad for war?
That this is the direction of travel is continually evidenced in headlines – £15 billion (14 times Scotland’s annual housing budget) to upgrade Faslane in preparation for a new generation of nuclear weapons; construction of bomb shelters at the base and new docks so it can host more British, US and French nuclear submarines. Plans to build a new munitions factory at Mossmorran where a civilian industry will soon be closed; the return of the US Air Force (USAF) to Lossiemouth for the first time since the Cold War.
Well, it looks like they’re going to attack Iran again. Might be after the US midterms. Might be sooner.
President Trump is telling the press that he is done negotiating with the Iranians and that something will be happening “fairly soon”, while America’s other president, Benjamin Netanyahu, proclaims that the time has come to topple Tehran once and for all.
Haaretz reports that Netanyahu is calling for “preemptive strikes” on Iran, which is empire-speak for “attack completely out of the blue without any provocation or justification whatsoever”.
The New York Times reports that the US and Israel are preparing for an attack after the midterms, with sources claiming that “targets would likely include Iran’s energy infrastructure, nuclear facilities, and missile and drone arsenal” inflicted with the goal of collapsing the Iranian economy.
All this could perhaps be dismissed as empty bluster, except that NBC News is reporting that US troops are being evacuated from their posts in the middle east — exactly what happened in the lead-up to the US-Israeli attack on Iran last February.
Iran is warning that it will hit new targets and expand its strikes geographically in the event of a US/Israeli attack, saying “cables, data centers, artificial intelligence facilities, and numerous other sites will be destroyed” in order to damage US economic interests.
So I guess this is happening. Another brazen assault in an evil war of aggression that makes life harder for people all around the world.
The US empire must end.
Another choice quote from the Bell review on “antisemitism” in British schools which I missed in my write-up yesterday:
“British attitudes relating to Jewish people and Israel show two broad trends. AntiJewish attitudes are typically less prevalent and have remained more stable, whereas anti-Israel sentiments are more prevalent and have been increasing.”
The report explicitly acknowledges that hatred toward Jews is not on the rise, and that only anti-Israel sentiments are increasing. And yet they still published a 107-page review claiming that “antisemitism” is a major problem in British schools.
This tells you everything you need to know about what the word “antisemitism” actually refers to in today’s world. It just means criticism of Israel.
Double Down News has a great report out explaining that the “antisemitism” review was based on heavily manipulated data, ultimately citing the claims of just 29 individuals to justify its outlandish claim that anti-Jewish discrimination is running rampant throughout the British school system.
Anyone who talks about “left wing antisemitism” like it’s a real thing should be immediately and permanently labeled a bad faith actor and an ideological enemy without any further discussion.
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Zionism is not a religion, it’s a political ideology which indisputably gives rise to apartheid and ethnic cleansing. You can tell me that your personal religious beliefs compel you to be a Zionist, but then I’ll say your religious beliefs are bad and you should change them. Your religion does not magically exempt you from the basic requirements of human decency.
It should not be taboo to say this. If your religious tolerance prohibits you from telling someone they shouldn’t espouse a racist political ideology which inflicts endless war, genocide, ethnic cleansing, apartheid and abuse upon your fellow human beings, then you have too much religious tolerance.
Work begins on Coulport building for Dreadnought submarines, 19th October, By Donald Erskine
WORK has started on a building which will arm the Royal Navy’s new multi-billion-pound nuclear submarines.
Naval Base Commander Clyde Commodore Andy Bray recently broke ground on a new facility at Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) Coulport to support future classes of submarines.
Building 300 at the site will house the Vertical Embarkation System, or VES, a new facility used to load tactical weapons onto future Dreadnought-class deterrent submarines.
The House of Commons approved replacing the current submarines in 2016, despite opposition from anti-nuclear groups and campaigners concerned about the cost.
Built at a cost of £7.75bn per unit, four Dreadnought submarines will replace the current Vanguard ships, which constantly patrol the seas carrying ballistic missiles equipped with thermonuclear warheads.
The Trident system is designed to act as a deterrent to other nations with nuclear capability, as a first strike on the UK would not eliminate the ability to strike back, given some of the country’s weapons are continuously at sea.
Ukraine’s expanding Black Sea attacks are disrupting shipping, raising insurance costs, and threatening global food and energy trade. As “wild-card” Zelensky raises the stakes (angering the US), the risk of a wider confrontation grows.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Black Sea shipping is in crisis, adding pressure to a global economy already absorbing Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz disruptions. Commercial vessels face rising risks, insurance costs have climbed, and tanker freight rates have surged.
Ukraine has stepped up attacks on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, ports, oil facilities, and vessels associated with Russian trade, expanding the conflict’s geographical scope. Grain, oil, fertilizers, and other commodities move through these waters, including shipments for non-belligerent countries.
S&P Global reported on October 9 that tanker freight rates rose sharply amid attacks, sanctions, and security concerns disrupting Russian energy exports. According to maritime security consultancy Ambrey, Kyiv expanded its campaign beyond naval assets and oil infrastructure to merchant ships trading with Russian ports.
In November 2025, attacks had already expanded to commercial vessels, particularly oil tankers, in the open sea. In May 2026, Ambrey attributed strikes on three Russia-linked tankers inside Turkey’s exclusive economic zone to Ukrainian naval drones.
By July, targeting expanded to dry-bulk carriers, general cargo, container ships, and roll-on/roll-off vessels. In September, insurers widened the high-risk zone. Ambrey data shows 45 merchant vessels struck outside the previous war-risk area in 12 months, 31 after July 1, 2026.
Ambrey’s finding is that Ukraine-attributed strikes (on Russia-linked shipping far offshore) helped drive insurers’ growing risk perception across the Black Sea.
Russia has responded by also conducting strikes in the Black Sea. As Modern Diplomacy puts it, Moscow has made any Black Sea truce conditional on Kyiv ceasing attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.
This is, after all, a proxy war of attrition, marked as it is by considerable military asymmetry. Russia possesses a larger population, defense-industrial base, strategic arsenal, air force, and navy, as well as greater resources for prolonged warfare.
Ukraine, despite developing formidable drone capabilities and long-range strike capacity, remains heavily dependent on Western assistance.
Global Firepower’s 2026 ranking places Russia second and Ukraine twentieth. The military asymmetry is therefore considerable.
The hard truth is that, notwithstanding any legitimate criticism one may have of Moscow’s campaign, Russia has refrained from employing its full destructive capabilities.
Such restraint, particularly in the war’s early stages, may have reflected not only humanitarian and military calculations but also (on Moscow’s end) awareness of historical and cultural ties between the two countries – which may have a psychological effect on decision-makers.
Kyiv, in contrast, since the 2014 ultra-nationalist revolution, has launched an anti-Russian campaign to distance the nation from Moscow. Even so, 42.6% of Ukrainians still regularly spoke Russian in December 2022, despite the war and media censorship restrictions.
Former US diplomat Chas Freeman and retired US Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor have both argued that Moscow exercised restraint.
Poland’s Centre for Eastern Studies likewise noted in June 2022 that Russia had refrained from systematically destroying key infrastructure – while the US Congressional Research Service observed that the initial bombardment was more limited than expected.
For comparison, Bono Vox performed in Kyiv on May 8, 2022, less than three months after Moscow launched its campaign. One could hardly imagine Bono performing in Baghdad shortly after the US invasion! Or in 2011 Libya, for that matter.
The broader point here is that the Russian Federation retains substantial military advantages, despite Ukrainian advances, but Western support has enabled Kyiv to sustain a prolonged war of attrition – increasingly targeting Russian energy.
In August, Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian and Iranian-linked vessels in the Caspian Sea risked expanding the conflict into a vital Russia-Iran logistics corridor.
The attacks risked further “proxifying” the conflict by aligning Kyiv with US and Israeli interests against Tehran, potentially merging the European and Middle Eastern theaters – a scenario that never materialized.
In any case, Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure continue amid mounting political pressure, with Trump even saying it is “time for Ukraine to get new President.” I’ve commented before on Zelensky’s resilience, despite several reported plots against him.
The Ukrainian leader has shown a habit of acting unpredictably, sometimes behind his Western patrons’ backs. In 2023, leaked documents revealed wild Ukrainian plans that risked widening the conflict. More recently, attacks on Russian refineries drew attention amid rising diesel prices and reports of moves angering Washington.
This “wild-card” tendency risks triggering a dangerous spiral, with potentially disastrous consequences for Ukraine – and the global economy. Repercussions for food, energy, and fertilizer trade are already visible, while the danger of crossing red lines has arguably never been greater.
Under these conditions, there is a growing admission within the US and international media that NATO and Russia are entering a “world war.” In one of the foremost examples, the Financial Times published Saturday a column titled, “Are we sleepwalking into World War III?”
The old imperialist powers retain a military superiority they no longer possess economically.
Ukraine attacked Russia with more than 1,000 drones overnight Saturday, in the largest bombardment of St. Petersburg since the Second World War. The attack, in which Russia’s Defense Ministry counted 1,015 drones across 15 regions, Crimea and the Black Sea, was one of the heaviest bombardments of Russian territory since the war began.
These strikes are directly funded by the NATO powers, which have provided Ukraine with over $100 billion in weapons, and are carried out on the basis of targeting data provided directly by their militaries.
The latest attack is a response by the NATO powers to the warning Russia gave European governments on September 30, that threats to Russia’s territorial integrity would be met with “the entire arsenal of forces and capabilities at its disposal, including nuclear weapons.”
Faced with this blunt warning that their actions risk triggering a nuclear war, the NATO powers are escalating. On October 12, General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s top commander in Europe, threatened to “break” the enemy’s “warfighting system,” including “anything and everything that supports, sustains, or controls that force.”
Under these conditions, there is a growing admission within the US and international media that NATO and Russia are entering a “world war.” In one of the foremost examples, the Financial Times published Saturday a column titled, “Are we sleepwalking into World War III?” by its chief foreign affairs commentator, Gideon Rachman. The title of his essay is taken from a 2012 book by Australian historian Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, which provided an apologetic explanation for the policies of German and European imperialism.
According to Clark, the war was the unforeseen outcome of mistaken judgments. The governments of the time and their leaders were not guilty of planning and starting war to achieve geopolitical and economic objectives. This benign interpretation of the war was especially welcomed by the German government and media, which praised Clark’s work and turned him into an intellectual celebrity.
Building upon Clark’s metaphor, Rachman depicts the imperialist powers as similarly clueless about the consequences of their actions. He writes, “Regions and countries that have for decades taken peace for granted—western Europe, east Asia, the Gulf states—now have to wrestle with the prospect, or the reality, of war.” It has become “commonplace,” he notes, “for world leaders to speculate publicly about the outbreak of a third world war.”
Rachman, citing a quote attributed to Leon Trotsky, declares, “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”
But the US and European leaders are not political somnambulists who are “sleepwalking” into World War III. They have been marching toward it with eyes open since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The first President Bush proclaimed a “new world order” on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War. That war was followed by the intervention in Somalia, the bombing of Bosnia and the 1999 war against Serbia, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the destruction of Libya, the proxy war in Syria and the US-backed Saudi war in Yemen.
Since 2022, these wars have merged into a single global conflagration. It includes the US-NATO war against Russia in Ukraine; the Israeli genocide in Gaza, armed and defended by Washington; the bombing of Iran in June 2025; and the war against Iran launched on February 28 of this year.
The objective is the redivision of the world among the old imperialist powers. This violent and ongoing project includes the breakup of the existing Russian state, which will open up the vast Eurasian landmass to unfettered capitalist exploitation. For the oligarchs of finance capital, the loss of a few hundred million lives would be a small price to pay for this rich prize.
In Rachman’s telling, however, the danger of world war proceeds entirely from the actions of Russia and China. In this narrative, the threat of “world war” began with the decision Putin made in February 2022, with no antecedent history. Rachman asserts that an inflection point was reached when “Putin launched his ‘special military operation.’ In that time, the global political atmosphere has been transformed.”
The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not come out of nowhere. It was a reactionary and desperate response by the Russian capitalist oligarchy to years of provocations by NATO. NATO’s own leadership has said as much. In an interview published by the Washington Post in May 2023, then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared that the war “didn’t start in 2022. The war started in 2014.”
Stoltenberg continued, “And since then, NATO has implemented the biggest reinforcement of our collective defense since the end of the Cold War … Until 2014, NATO allies were reducing defense budgets. Since 2014, all allies across Europe and Canada have significantly increased their defense spending … this is a huge transformation of NATO that started in 2014.”
The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not come out of nowhere. It was a reactionary and desperate response by the Russian capitalist oligarchy to years of provocations by NATO. NATO’s own leadership has said as much. In an interview published by the Washington Post in May 2023, then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared that the war “didn’t start in 2022. The war started in 2014.”
Stoltenberg continued, “And since then, NATO has implemented the biggest reinforcement of our collective defense since the end of the Cold War … Until 2014, NATO allies were reducing defense budgets. Since 2014, all allies across Europe and Canada have significantly increased their defense spending … this is a huge transformation of NATO that started in 2014.”
But the Maidan coup was itself an outcome of decades of imperialist policy that had pushed the boundaries of the NATO alliance to Russia’s doorstep.
Rachman correctly centers the driving force of the eruption of global war in “a shift in the global balance of power.” He notes that, “In 1989, the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the G7 nations—the US, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Canada and Japan—accounted for around two-thirds of global economic output … By 2022, the G7 represented about 43 percent of global GDP.”
This shift, according to Rachman, is “encouraging revisionist powers to challenge the global dominance of the US and its allies.” China’s share of world output rose from under 2 percent in 1989 to about 17 percent in 2024, according to World Bank figures.
However, by 2022, Rachman notes, the G7 still accounted for “about half of global military spending.” The old imperialist powers retain a military superiority they no longer possess economically. It is they, not China, that have spent the past 35 years at war, seeking to reverse by force what they are losing in the world economy.
The most bizarre element of Rachman’s column is his effort to blame the reemergence of global war on the public’s opposition to it. He writes that “the growth of anti-war sentiment in the US” has “created an opening for revisionist powers,” that US President Donald Trump “is clearly attracted to the idea that the US should retreat from its security commitments to its allies” and that “the greatest risk of a third world war may lie in that very uncertainty.”
Beset by an all-pervasive capitalist crisis and the growth of working class opposition, the imperialist powers seek through war a way out of their problems. The global eruption of imperialist war is only intensifying the class struggle and the capitalist crisis. It is driving workers and youth into struggle around the world, from the United States to France—where students and workers filled the streets this week against a government that has billions for rearmament and nothing for social needs.
The working class and youth must reject and oppose the insane imperialist militarism that is inciting global conflict and threatening humanity with a nuclear conflagration.
Questions over West Berkshire Council’s ability to scrutinise forthcoming planning applications into a multi-billion pound upgrade to AWE Aldermaston have been raised.
The plans are likely to cost the authority tens of thousands of pounds in specialist consultants to evaluate the proposal to upgrade the nuclear weapons facility into a state-of-the-art science park.
The council will have to handle the massive application in the coming weeks, and has said it will need specialist help to deal with it.
The Government’s £15bn defence investment is dedicated specifically to the UK’s nuclear warhead programme as a whole – which encompasses both the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston and its sister site at Burghfield.
Security-cleared consultants working on defence or submarine programmes command a notable market premium.
A Google search puts them upwards of £1,000 per day.
The nuclear weapons factory is soon to submit plans described as ‘being on the scale of London 2012 in complexity’ to the authority, which must then figure out whether they pass planning policies.
The person leading the project from the AWE side is Andrew McNaughton CBE – a prominent British civil engineer.
He led on delivering key components for the London 2012 Olympics and is on record as saying the Future Materials Campus is on the same scale.
The matter came up before West Berkshire Council last night (Thursday).
“Government-funded plans for the multi-billion pound Future Materials Campus (FMC) at AWE’s Aldermaston site will see planning applications coming forward soon,” said Dominic Boeck (Con, Aldermaston).
“How will the council support and engage constructively with residents, local councils and businesses on this enormous development?
“AWE have compared the scale and complexity of the proposed FMC development with London 2012
“What specific assurance can the lead member give that council has sufficient planning, emergency planning and other relevant technical resources and expertise to undertake a thorough and independent assessment of the application, including its implications for residential safety, emergency preparedness and amenity within and around the Aldermaston DEPZ?”
Deputy council leader Denise Gaines (Lib Dem, Hungerford and Kintbury) said: “We take the safety of residents and people at AWE very seriously.
“The anticipated planning application is going through the process.
“At this stage of the proposal it is a pre application.
“This is a confidential part of the process between council officers and the applicant.
“This sets out a clear timetable for a major and complex application.
“As with any planning application it will be assessed by a team of qualified professionals to ensure that all relvant technical and environmental matters are considered and evaluated either in house or by specialist external consultants.”
There is a statement of community involvement.
And the consultation will involve talks with the council’s emergency planning service and the Office for Nuclear Regulation.
“My concern and my community’s concern is the scale of this project,” added Mr Boeck.
“Of course we understand it is a matter of national security, but there are concerns about how this multi-billion pound project will impact us here.
“I appreciate much will be done behind the wire, but the trucks have got to roll.”
When local authorities deal with ‘enormous’ or hyper-scale planning applications like the London 2012 Olympic Games or major urban regenerations, the standard local planning mechanisms are usually adapted, bypassed, or heavily augmented.
Because these applications are far too large, complex, and politically sensitive for a standard local authority planning department to process normally, they are managed through a combination of special purpose vehicles, and strategic planning frameworks
If an increasingly vulnerable Kaliningrad holds strategic value for Russia and can only be defended by nuclear weapons, then perhaps Western leaders shouldn’t threaten it—and perhaps Western analysts should take more seriously Moscow’s repeated warnings that such threats could meet a nuclear response.
Russia experts shed light on the Kremlin’s calculations.
If the world blows up in a conflict over Kaliningrad—the diminutive Russian exclave sandwiched between Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Sea—at least there would be a silver lining for survivors to appreciate: It would be darkly humorous and ironic.
Kaliningrad—or Koenigsberg, as the formerly German city was called before its capture in 1945 by the Soviet Union—was the birthplace of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, whose most enduring contribution to political theory was a long essay on international relations, Toward Perpetual Peace. In it, Kant outlines some big-brained ideas that governments should implement to not only end active hostilities but create the political conditions for, well, perpetual peace.
Old Kant published that hopeful essay 231 years ago and would certainly be disturbed and disappointed by this week’s headlines. The most riveting came from the New York Post: “Moscow threatens nuclear response over tiny fortress wedged between US allies as clash fears grow.” (The Post really has a knack for this kind of thing, doesn’t it?)
The one from the Associated Press more aptly, if less dramatically, described the latest development. “Russia warns NATO of a possible nuclear response if Kaliningrad is cut off,” it blared.
So, what’s got the Russians so worked up? Top Russia experts told The American Conservative that Moscow assigns profound strategic significance to the exclave and perceives a Western threat against it.
“Kaliningrad gives Russia another warm water port on the Baltic Sea,” said Thomas Graham, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former White House expert under President George W. Bush. “It also holds major military assets to defend Russia’s interest in the region, including access routes to St. Petersburg.”
Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute noted an even more straightforward Russian interest than that. “Russia cares about this because it is internationally-recognized Russian national territory,” Lieven said. “Any attack on it or blockade is therefore legally an act of war against the Russian Federation, to which the Russian government would have to respond or face deep humiliation.”
Those are important points with which few experts would quibble. But what really distinguishes Graham and Lieven is their ability to discern—from Russia’s point of view—a Western threat against Kaliningrad, and to take it seriously. Judging by the comments both men provided, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin didn’t issue the nuclear threats lightly.
“In some NATO countries there has been talk of blockading Kaliningrad, that is, isolating the region from the rest of Russia by land and sea,” Graham said. “Putin would see a blockade as an act of war against Russia. So he is making sure that Europe understands that he will defend Russian land with all necessary means, which could include nuclear weapons.”
Moscow had already been inclined, even before the latest tensions exploded between Russia and the West, to view Kaliningrad as exposed to NATO’s predations. “NATO expansion to Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, and Finland means that Kaliningrad is now surrounded by NATO countries both by land and sea,” Lieven noted.
Sadly, not all Western experts perform such acts of perspective taking. Consider a recent article in The Hill, which, in the view of this editor-cum-columnist at least, actually brought the week’s most disturbing headline: “Kaliningrad is just Putin’s red herring.”
The coauthors—Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet—write that the Kremlin is engaged in “nuclear bluffing” designed to intimidate the West and distract from its own military failures in Ukraine. Early in the piece, the only context they provide for Moscow’s warnings is a new British television miniseries called The Wargame, in which the UK launches retaliatory strikes on Kaliningrad after a Russian attack.
A casual reader of their article could be left with the impression that this TV show was the main thing, perhaps the only thing, motivating Putin’s threatening rhetoric. But a careful reader would learn otherwise, for the authors inadvertently illuminate the kinds of Western behavior that prompted Putin’s warnings.
“Kaliningrad is a hollowed-out shell of what it was before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” they write. “As Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski pointed out earlier this month, ‘There are hardly any [Russian] troops [in the Kaliningrad exclave].’”
But that’s not all that Sikorski said. Toth and Sweet link to an article in Defense News, the first sentence of which is this:
NATO allies could hold drills in proximity of Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave in an attempt to push Moscow to weaken its military posture in Ukraine and withdraw some of its troops there, said Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister
Clearly, Sikorski went far beyond merely commenting on Russia’s force posture in the region. The article emphasizes that he didn’t recommend “offensive” actions against Kaliningrad, but you could hardly blame Putin for failing to appreciate the distinction. Indeed, in the relevant quotes, Sikorski recommends that NATO “aggressively” exercise around Kaliningrad and start treating the exclave as a front in the confrontation between Russia and the West.
Toth and Sweet’s article continues: “Although Kaliningrad is still the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the Baltic Sea itself has effectively become a NATO-controlled lake, after the accession of Sweden and Finland as the newest members of NATO.” Kaliningrad, they write, “is highly vulnerable,” and these days it merely hosts nuclear missiles, its conventional forces having been deployed to Ukraine.
Thus, “Moscow’s nuclear Armageddon bluffing is simply the latest attempt by Putin and his Kremlin cronies to paper over this problem.”
Here the premises lead to the conclusion only in the sense that they crash violently into it. If an increasingly vulnerable Kaliningrad holds strategic value for Russia and can only be defended by nuclear weapons, then perhaps Western leaders shouldn’t threaten it—and perhaps Western analysts should take more seriously Moscow’s repeated warnings that such threats could meet a nuclear response.
And those analysts should understand that the Russian political establishment in general—not just Putin—perceives a Western threat against Kaliningrad that, if acted upon, could precipitate a devastating Russia–NATO conflict. Referring to Sikorski’s apparent suggestion that NATO might isolate the exclave, forcing its surrender, Lieven said, “If this did happen, every Russian with whom I have spoken has said that Russia would have credibly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, followed by their actual use if NATO failed to back down.”
Tensions between Russia and the West are worse than they’ve been since the Cold War, and mutual understanding perhaps worse than even then. In our age, Kant’s dreams of perpetual peace may seem naive if not delusional, but surely our leaders have enough wisdom not to let inexcusable miscalculations over his homeland on the Baltic lead to nuclear war. Right?
Nuclear deterrence rests on a paradox. The purpose of nuclear weapons is to prevent their use.
Britain maintains its Trident system on the assumption that the credible threat of devastating retaliation will deter an adversary from attacking. The logic of mutually assured destruction is that neither side can launch a nuclear strike without risking its own destruction. The weapons preserve peace because the consequences of using them would be catastrophic.
But deterrence is a theory about behaviour, not a guarantee of safety.………………….
Does nuclear deterrence really make us safer? As Britain doubles down on military preparedness, we must question whether the logic of deterrence is undermining the pursuit of lasting peace, and whether Scotland could offer a different vision of security.
We are being told to prepare for war. The language of escalation, deterrence and national resilience has returned to British politics, accompanied by warnings that Europe must be ready for a major conflict by 2030. Scotland is now expected to contribute to renewed UK-wide contingency planning, including a modern version of the Cold War-era War Book. These preparations may be prudent. But there is a danger in allowing the possibility of war to become the organising principle of our politics, rather than a danger we should be working to prevent.
Neil Mackay’s argument that Scotland’s opposition to nuclear weapons undermines European security raises an important question: what does it mean to take the threat of war seriously? The answer cannot simply be to prepare to fight one. We must also ask whether the security arrangements we maintain are making conflict less likely, and whether we have become so accustomed to the logic of deterrence that we struggle to imagine security beyond it.
Nuclear deterrence rests on a paradox. The purpose of nuclear weapons is to prevent their use. Britain maintains its Trident system on the assumption that the credible threat of devastating retaliation will deter an adversary from attacking. The logic of mutually assured destruction is that neither side can launch a nuclear strike without risking its own destruction. The weapons preserve peace because the consequences of using them would be catastrophic.
But deterrence is a theory about behaviour, not a guarantee of safety. It depends on leaders making rational calculations, correctly interpreting their adversaries’ intentions and maintaining control during moments of extreme pressure. It cannot eliminate the possibility of miscalculation, accident or escalation. Nor can it ensure that every crisis will unfold according to the assumptions on which the system depends.
There is a fundamental tension here. To deter an attack, the threat of retaliation must be credible. Yet the credibility of that threat depends on maintaining the possibility of an act whose consequences could be irreversible. We are asked to trust that nuclear weapons will preserve peace while accepting that their continued effectiveness depends on the willingness to use them.
This does not prove that deterrence has never prevented conflict. It may have contributed to restraining direct military confrontation between nuclear-armed powers. Nor does it follow that abandoning nuclear weapons would automatically produce a more peaceful world. But the fact that deterrence may have prevented certain attacks does not settle the question of whether our present dependence on it is sustainable, or whether it creates risks of its own.
International relations offers a useful way of understanding this problem: the security dilemma. When one state increases its military capabilities to protect itself, another may interpret that expansion as a threat and respond in kind. The first state then sees the response as confirmation of its original fears. Each side’s attempt to become more secure can leave both feeling less safe.
This does not mean that all states are equally responsible for conflict, or that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can be excused as a misunderstanding. Russia chose to invade, and Ukraine has every right to defend itself. The security dilemma is not a device for erasing responsibility. It helps explain how military competition can become self-reinforcing, even as individual states claim to be acting defensively.
The question, then, is not whether Britain should ignore Russian aggression. It is whether responding to insecurity through military expansion alone can provide a durable solution. If every increase in capability prompts another increase in response, the result may be a more heavily armed continent without a corresponding increase in trust or stability.
That is important as the UK prepares for the possibility of a major European conflict. Contingency planning is not evidence that war is inevitable, and governments have a responsibility to prepare for emergencies. But warnings about a possible conflict by 2030 should be scrutinised, not treated as predictions that settle the debate. We should ask what evidence supports these assessments, what kinds of conflict are being anticipated, and what is being done alongside military preparation to reduce the likelihood of them occurring.
We should also recognise the interests that shape defence policy. Military institutions have legitimate responsibilities to identify threats and secure the capabilities they need. Defence companies, meanwhile, stand to benefit from government contracts and long-term procurement programmes. The existence of those interests does not demonstrate that warnings about war are manufactured. It does mean that decisions involving enormous public expenditure should be open to scrutiny, particularly when urgency risks narrowing the range of policies considered politically acceptable.
There is a further problem with treating nuclear deterrence as synonymous with national security: it can obscure the other vulnerabilities that governments must address. Scotland’s dependence on undersea cables and other critical infrastructure is a case in point. The disruption of communications infrastructure could have serious consequences for economic and social life, particularly for island communities. The UK Government has recognised the need for stronger coordination and resilience in protecting subsea cables. Nuclear weapons cannot, by themselves, solve these practical problems of national security.
“Preparation is not prevention, and the capacity to destroy an adversary is not the same as the capacity to build a more secure world.”
A country can possess the capacity to inflict catastrophic destruction and remain vulnerable to disruption of the systems on which its population depends. A serious defence policy must consider both. This is not an argument for replacing one form of defence with another, but for asking whether our priorities reflect the full range of threats we face.
It is also why diplomacy cannot be treated as a secondary consideration, something to return to once military preparations are complete. Negotiation is not a guarantee of peace. States can negotiate in bad faith, agreements can be broken, and dialogue cannot substitute for the capacity to resist aggression. Yet military strength cannot resolve every political dispute, and the ability to retaliate is not the same as the ability to prevent a crisis from escalating.
In his discussion of negotiation, George Friedman argues that the outcome of a war depends not only on military capability but also on resources, public support and the political survival of leaders. When neither side can achieve its objectives outright, the possibility of a settlement becomes increasingly important. The implication is not that negotiation will always succeed, but that wars ultimately confront political limits that military power alone cannot overcome.
That is a useful corrective to a political culture in which strength is increasingly measured through weapons, spending and readiness. Security requires the capacity to defend against aggression, but it also requires channels of communication, arms-control agreements and diplomatic relationships that reduce the risks of miscalculation. These mechanisms do not eliminate conflict. They can help prevent disputes from becoming catastrophic.
The distinction between deterrence and peacebuilding is crucial here. Preventing an attack is not the same as creating the conditions for lasting peace. A nuclear deterrent may be intended to discourage a particular form of aggression, but it cannot resolve territorial disputes, rebuild diplomatic relationships or establish the limits necessary to manage military competition. Nor would unilateral disarmament automatically accomplish those things.
The international movement behind the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons represents an attempt to challenge the assumption that nuclear weapons must remain a permanent feature of international security. As of October 2026, 75 states are parties to the treaty, which prohibits its members from developing, possessing or using nuclear weapons. The nuclear-armed states have not joined, limiting its immediate reach. Nevertheless, its existence demonstrates that the international community is not unanimous in accepting nuclear deterrence as the only credible foundation for security.
For Scotland, this opens a question larger than whether Trident should remain on the Clyde. Britain maintains a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent, but the Trident missile system depends on American technology and a leased stock of missiles, while the UK retains its own warheads and operational responsibility. This is a close strategic partnership, not a simple arrangement in which Washington controls every British nuclear decision. Yet it raises legitimate questions about dependence, sovereignty and the relationship between Britain’s nuclear ambitions and its actual security needs.
An independent Scotland could choose a different role in international affairs: one that combines conventional defence and cooperation with European partners with a stronger commitment to nuclear disarmament. The current suggestion of a Celtic peace alliance offers a possible starting point. Scotland, Wales and Ireland have different constitutional positions and security arrangements, and shared opposition to nuclear weapons would not automatically make them a coherent geopolitical bloc. But cooperation on arms control, disarmament and conflict prevention could give that idea substance.
Such a role would require more than removing nuclear weapons from Scottish territory. It would mean investing in diplomacy, supporting international agreements and developing a credible approach to the practical defence of Scotland. It would also require acknowledging that peace cannot be secured by good intentions alone. A peace-promoting foreign policy must be capable of confronting aggression without accepting permanent escalation as inevitable.
The choice is not between preparing for war and pretending war cannot happen. It is between treating military preparedness as the entirety of security and recognising that preventing conflict is also a strategic responsibility.
Nuclear weapons may be defended as instruments of peace, but that claim deserves the same scrutiny as any other defence policy. If our security depends on the permanent threat of catastrophic retaliation, we should ask what happens when deterrence fails, when leaders miscalculate or when a crisis escapes their control. And we should ask whether sufficient political effort is being devoted to reducing those risks in the first place.
Preparing for war may sometimes be necessary. But preparation is not prevention, and the capacity to destroy an adversary is not the same as the capacity to build a more secure world. If Scotland is to have a meaningful debate about Trident, it must be about more than whether nuclear weapons are necessary. It must also be about what kind of security we want, what risks we are willing to accept, and whether we are prepared to invest as seriously in preventing catastrophe as we are in preparing for it.
In this wide-ranging discussion, I am joined by two of Britain’s most experienced and independent voices on the Ukraine war and European security: Mary Dejevsky, former Moscow correspondent for The Times and long-time foreign affairs commentator, and Commodore Steve Jermy RN (Rtd), a decorated naval officer with combat experience dating back to the Falklands War and the author of Strategy for Action.
Prompted by Mary’s powerful Substack essay J’Accuse – Boris Johnson, we examine Boris Johnson’s role in the early phase of the war, the collapse of the April 2022 Istanbul talks, the broader strategic failures of Western policy, the gap between political narrative and military reality, and what a realistic security architecture for Europe might look like once the fighting ends. We also discuss Steve’s support for a petition calling for a pause in UK military aid and a proper public debate (and possible referendum) on Britain’s involvement.
In this conversation we discuss: – Mary Dejevsky’s case for holding Boris Johnson to account after the war – The Istanbul negotiations of April 2022 and why the draft agreement collapsed – Johnson’s Churchillian framing of Zelensky and the early Western response – Military analysis of Russia’s initial operation and the West’s strategic misjudgements – The role of other key figures (Liz Truss, Ben Wallace, Tony Radakin) – Why the West continues to rely on one-sided information and propaganda – Russia’s actual security objectives versus the “restore the empire” narrative – Neutrality for Ukraine and the case for reforming or replacing NATO – A possible future European security architecture centred on the OSCE – The petition to pause UK support and open a national debate on aid spending – What a post-war reckoning in Britain might look like.
I bumped into Dmitri Trenin for the first time in eight years at the Valdai Discussion Club in Moscow. He was sat behind me during a session and we renewed our acquaintances. When I was based at the British Embassy in Moscow, Dmitri was Director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. He was one of the most valued interlocutors for the Embassy, and seen as a person who always offered a balanced Russian perspective on world events. He is now the President of the Russian International Affairs Council, and I was pleased that he agreed to talk to me on my Peacemonger channel.
Trenin offered a clear-eyed view from Moscow of why the Ukraine war has lasted so long and why a diplomatic settlement remains so difficult. He framed the conflict as existential for Russia. From the Kremlin’s perspective, this is not a limited dispute with Ukraine but a proxy war waged by the West, which has invested hundreds of billions of dollars into the war effort.
Russia, he said, cannot afford to end the fighting without achieving the core objectives it set out with: securing the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, upholding its constitutional obligations after the 2022 referenda in those oblasts, and establishing a security arrangement that prevents Ukraine from becoming a permanent platform for pressure against Russia.
Trenin stressed that Russia does not aim to conquer the whole of Ukraine or invade Europe. Indeed, in an article published early in the war he made the case for Russia not seeking to conquer all of Ukraine and so tie itself into a costly insurgency in the west, while permanently damaging prospects for normalisation with Europe.
He pointed to the years before 2014, when Moscow largely accepted a sovereign Ukraine within its Soviet-era borders, and to the early 2022 talks in which Russia was prepared to accept Ukrainian neutrality and discuss the status of the Donbas, along the lines earlier set out in the Minsk Agreements.
In his telling, Russia’s position hardened in response to Western and Ukrainian actions, not because of a pre-existing plan to absorb more territory in Ukraine.
Security concerns, particularly over NATO expansion and the treatment of Russian speakers and Russian culture in Ukraine, remain central to Putin’s calculus.
The interview also highlighted the very different stakes for the other parties. For the Biden administration the war was cast in ideological terms—democracy versus authoritarianism. For Donald Trump, Trenin argued, it is one piece of a broader effort to rebalance U.S. power and reduce commitments to allies. For Europe, however, the conflict has become existential in a different way.
Trenin said European elites are using the image of a Russian threat to hold the European Union together, justify remilitarization, and brand political opponents as pro-Russian. He described talk of an imminent Russian invasion of Europe as hollow propaganda that serves domestic political purposes more than it reflects actual Russian intentions.
On the question of NATO, Trenin returned to the proposals Russia made in late 2021: permanent Ukrainian neutrality, written into the Ukrainian constitution and international agreements, with no NATO bases, exercises, or military cooperation. He also noted Russia’s earlier call for NATO military infrastructure to be pulled back to 1997 lines.
Any lasting European security arrangement, he suggested, would eventually require some form of military-technical equilibrium and mutual assurances, but that discussion remains secondary to the outcome of the current war.
Looking further ahead, Trenin was cautious but not wholly pessimistic about relations with individual European countries. He said the ball is largely in Europe’s court. If political changes in Germany, France, Britain, and elsewhere weaken the current supranational approach and restore a greater role for national interests, a basic transactional or “neighborly” relationship could become possible.
He does not expect a return to the Greater Europe ideas of the 1990s and 2000s; too much has changed. But he argued that nationalism and the interests of individual states will eventually reassert themselves across Europe, as they have elsewhere in the world.
The conversation reinforced an assessment I’ve held for some time that the war in Ukraine will ultimately be decided by the inescapable mathematics of attrition and whether Europe’s political direction shifts back towards the sovereignty of its members.
Trenin’s account makes plain why Russia will not walk away from the war in Ukraine and why it expects the confrontation with Europe to outlast the fighting itself. As Trenin said to me when we met in Moscow, ‘the relationship with Europe is over’. It was clear during the conversation that that split was as regrettable to him, as it is to me.
Tell Congress: Prevent Nuclear Catastrophe in Iran
Read the Public Inquiry Report, the Commissioners’ report, Surrendering Australia: The AUKUS Deception is available to download for free at aukuspublicinquiry.com. Or just watch the replay of the National Press Club Luncheon.
19 November – Webinar – The Reality of Reprocessing
Time: 11:00 AM Pacific Time (US & Canada) / 2:00 PM Eastern / 7:00 PM UK / 8:00 PM CET