Walt Zlotow – Many top military leaders opposed atomic bombings

2 August 26, Walt Zlotow West Suburban Peace Coalition Glan Ellyn IL
Every year the four day period August 6 – 9 brings to mind the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings. This year marks the 81th anniversary of those horrific acts. We may be closer to nukes fired in anger at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis 64 tears ago. Major wars in Ukraine and Iran could both devolve into nuclear war. U.S. withdrawal from several nuclear treaties and planning to spend a trillion dollars to upgrade our nuclear stockpile add to nuclear anxiety. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved the Doomsday Clock to 85 seconds to midnight in January, the closest it’s been set to nuclear winter in the entire nuclear age.
I learned of the atomic bombings 75 years ago at age 6 and have been haunted by them ever since. For the first decade or so afterward I swallowed whole the US fairytale that the military and political elite were unified in dropping the bombs to prevent a U.S. invasion and its estimate of a million U.S. casualties. A little research disabused me of that false narrative designed to justify the unjustifiable.
Few if any reputable historians buy that version today. They point to a number of top military leaders who opposed the nuclear attacks, for good reasons. Most prominent was U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall who argued not using the Bomb would strengthen America’s prestige and position in post war Asia. He even advocated for inviting the Russians to view our July 16, 1945 test. Navy Secretary and later Defense Secretary James Forrestal argued the bombings would impede our post WWII relations with the Soviet Union. Fleet Admiral William Leahy, senior US military officer on active duty in WWII, called the proposed bombings “barbaric”. Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy told Truman that neither invasion nor atomic bombings were necessary. Japan would surrender if we avoided terminology ‘Unconditional Surrender’ since any surrender would amount to that without saying so. Allowing Hirohito to remain Emperor would bolster that view. McCloy even advocated telling Japanese leaders we had the Bomb as additional incentive to quit the war.
Tho not involved in the Bomb decision process, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower was furious we dropped them, telling Secretary of War Harry Stimson shortly after the attacks “I voiced my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of “face.” Japanese leaders never admitted US atomic bombings motivated their surrender. More likely it was the massive Russian invasion of Manchuria the day of the Nagasaki bombing that more motivated the Japanese surrender.
Ike, McCloy, Leahy, Forristall, Marshall and others were right; Truman and his supporters were wrong. Eighty-one years on America is still the only country to explode nukes in anger. Current senseless wars in Ukraine and Iran, refusal to maintain critically needed nuclear agreements, routinely threatening imagined enemies with “all military options are on the table”, spending a trillion dollars to build bigger and better nukes, all bode ill we’ll make another 81 years nuclear attack free.
Israel’s Ghoulish Settlers Eye Up Gaza, As Netanyahu Kills Trump’s Board of Peace
ANTIWAR.COM by Andy Worthington | Jul 29, 2026
On Sunday evening (July 19), a group of some of the most repulsive, ghoulish people on the face of the earth marched towards the perimeter fence separating the Gaza Strip from the rest of the world to declare their intention to re-colonize Gaza, to re-establish three Israeli settlements that were dismantled in 2005 when, under Ariel Sharon, 21 settlements in total were abandoned, occupied, at the time, by 8,000 Israeli settlers.
These fanatical Israeli settlers, on what was billed as the “March of Thousands”, although only a few hundred people attended, were led by the two far-right ministers in Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition government — Itamar Ben Gvir, the Minister for National Security, who is in charge of Israel’s prisons, which, for Palestinians, have become a gulag of torture facilities since October 7, 2023, and Bezalel Smotrich, the Minister of Finance, and also the minister in charge of settlement affairs within the Defense Ministry, who has played a huge role in the ever-growing, and ever more violent expansion of Israel’s illegal settlements in the West Bank.
Speaking at the rally, Ben Gvir said, “If someone had said three years ago that we would control 70% of the Gaza Strip, no one would have believed it. So today I say: there will be Jewish settlement throughout Gaza. We are returning home. Gaza is ours.”
Smotrich, meanwhile, warned that a change of government in the forthcoming elections in October, could “roll back all the Zionist and national settlement revolution” undertaken over the last four years.
The two men were accompanied by more than two dozen ministers and legislators, as well as the 80-year old settler fanatic Daniella Weiss, who told the crowd, “They ask me, ‘What will happen to the Arabs in Gaza?’ There will be no Arabs in Gaza, unequivocally.”
Netanyahu’s reticence in the face of selective western outrage about the West Bank
Although Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud Party was listed as a sponsor of the rally, Netanyahu was noticeably silent about it. This, undoubtedly, wasn’t because he fundamentally opposes the settlers’ aspirations to re-colonize Gaza, but because, while western countries have been and continue to be largely indifferent to the almost immeasurable military slaughter and destruction in Gaza, they have been far more outspoken about settler activities in the West Bank.
On May 28 this year, the EU imposed sanctions on three individuals and four violent settler movements, including Daniella Weiss and her Nachala Settlement Movement, which, as they described it, “encourages and facilitates coercive acts that lead to the forced displacement of Palestinians”, and whose “outposts obstruct access to Palestinian agricultural and grazing land and have been persistent sources of settler violence.”
Netanyahu is also aware that both Ben-Gvir and Smotrich were sanctioned last June by the governments of the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway “for their repeated incitement of violence against Palestinian civilians” in the West Bank, followed by Slovenia and the Netherlands in July, and Spain in September, even though neither man has yet been issued an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court — for war crimes and crimes against humanity — as is the case with Netanyahu himself, and his former defense minister, Yoav Gallant……………………………..
Psychotic indifference to genocide — from Israel to Jared Kushner
What was particularly sickening about Sunday’s rally was the gleeful indifference of those gathered — as a beautiful sunset incongruously lit up the sky — to the fact that they were overlooking a vast concentration camp, the size of east London, which is littered with the buried corpses of at least 10,000 Palestinians………………………….
Kushner’s vision was also devoid of Palestinians, as, of course, is the settlers’ vision.
Israel strangles Trump’s Board of Peace
When it comes to Jared Kushner’s grandiose, heartless, profit-driven visions of a futuristic “New Gaza”, the realities of dealing with the Israelis seem to have made it evaporate, as Julian Borger reported for the Guardian in an article last week, entitled, “Trump’s Board of Peace drops full Gaza recovery plan in favour of tiny pilot scheme.”…………………………………………………..
As Borger described it, “The Gaza recovery plan being pursued by Donald Trump’s Board of Peace (BoP) has shrunk dramatically from an ambitious blueprint for the reconstruction of the whole territory to a small pilot project in the south of the strip……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Is there a way forward?
Most noticeably, however, what Borger’s discussions with those on the ground in Israel reveal is how the Israeli government itself retains so much control over the Board of Peace’s plans, and can, as it has with the ceasefire deal in general, fail to fulfil its obligations as and when it wishes, and can also provide further obstruction simply by refusing to deal with requests for cooperation………………………………………………………
Will any leaders in the west wake up, and see that, beyond the grim settler violence in the West Bank, which they are so ready to criticize, they have allowed Trump’s largely empty contributions to Gaza’s future to enable them to pretend that something far, far worse isn’t happening right next to the West Bank, in the grotesque, ongoing death camp depravity of the Gaza Strip? https://original.antiwar.com/worthington/2026/07/28/israels-ghoulish-settlers-eye-up-gaza-as-netanyahu-kills-trumps-board-of-peace/
The ‘Underground Nation’ returns: Switzerland’s new war-time shelter strategy
Erkin Oncan, July 30, 2026, https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/07/30/the-underground-nation-returns-switzerlands-new-war-time-shelter-strategy/
The “one shelter per citizen” doctrine returns as Europe militarizes. Civilian infrastructure, stockpiles, and daily life are now being reorganized for war.
When Switzerland is mentioned, images of the Alps, postcard-perfect landscapes, and the famous cartoon character Heidi usually come to mind. Yet beneath the surface lies one of the world’s most complex underground networks. Built upon the Cold War-era principle of “one shelter place for every citizen” (Jeder Einwohnerin und jedem Einwohner ein Schutzplatz) and the Swiss Army’s “National Redoubt” (Réduit) strategy, the country developed a vast underground infrastructure.
After the end of the Cold War, the underground fortresses (Schweizer Reduit) hidden beneath the Swiss Alps and mountains lost much of their military importance. A large part of these facilities was declassified, opened for civilian use, sold, or transformed into museums. The main reason was the enormous cost of maintaining them.
Similarly, in urban areas, thousands of underground shelters were transferred to private ownership or left unused due to financial considerations.
However, the reactivation of abandoned facilities — including former shelters, ammunition storage caves, military hospitals, aircraft hangars, barracks, and command centers — is now back on the agenda. Accelerating preparations against what it describes as potential threats from Russia, the Swiss Army is considering bringing unused underground facilities back into operation to store ammunition, medicines, and critical military supplies. A comprehensive feasibility study has been launched as part of this effort.
Swiss Army spokesman Mathias Volken told the newspaper Blick that “the reactivation of underground military facilities distributed in a decentralized manner throughout Switzerland is being examined in detail.”
The Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) also stated in comments to the Swiss news agency Keystone-ATS that the need for “protection, resilience, and decentralized deployment” has increased. This, in particular, has created a growing need for secure storage facilities.
According to the Swiss Federal Office for Defence Procurement (armasuisse), the burden of reactivating these facilities will be shared through public tenders. The aim is to find ways to restore military installations in the most cost-effective, practical, and operationally suitable manner.
The government needs to keep costs as low as possible, as it faces another major priority: allocating a significant portion of the defence budget to new weapons systems and fulfilling what it considers its broader European security responsibilities.
The main goal of the plan is to create secure and protected storage areas. These facilities could be used to safely store consumables such as industrial oils, lubricants, seals, spare parts, medicines, electronic equipment, hazardous materials, and, most importantly, ammunition.
The possibility of producing or assembling certain strategically important goods inside protected facilities during wartime or crisis situations is also being considered.
The Swiss Army has not disclosed the number of facilities planned for reactivation. In fact, the exact number of underground military installations owned by Switzerland has never been publicly revealed. The reason for this secrecy is security.
However, according to reports in local media, the army is planning to “redesign” a significant portion of these shelters. The goal is to ensure that these facilities can also be operated by civil defence personnel — in other words, by people without long-term specialised military training.
This indicates a potential personnel shortage regarding the operation of critical infrastructure.
Switzerland’s renewed focus on its vast underground network is closely linked to the “new geopolitical reality” frequently discussed across Europe and the resulting wave of militarisation. Moreover, Switzerland’s move is not merely a matter of national defence strategy.
The hundreds of shelters and defensive structures across the country, the Baltic Defence Line established by Estonia and Latvia with border obstacles known as “dragon’s teeth,” Finland’s renewed shelter systems combined with cyber protection and food stockpiles, Sweden’s distribution of civil preparedness brochures to households, infrastructure projects focused on military mobility, and similar measures across Europe are all part of a broader transformation.
This new model of preparedness is not limited to armed forces alone. Civilian populations, critical infrastructure, and everyday life are increasingly being reorganised around potential war scenarios.
Stillborn Peace Plans: Israel, Hamas and the Question of Disarmament

Another peace plan, celebrated by its proponents yet doomed to a stillborn reality.
5 August 2026 Dr Binoy Kampmark , https://theaimn.net/stillborn-peace-plans-israel-hamas-and-the-question-of-disarmament/
Another trumpeted achievement, another heralded occasion of momentous significance. Or it may be nothing of the sort. US President Donald J. Trump is again on the stage pulling on the strings of history. This time, attention has shifted to whether Hamas and other armed groups in the Gaza Strip will disarm, something conditional on Israel withdrawing its forces from the war-torn enclave. And there, we are presented with the first, insoluble problem.
The latest roadmap published by the US-led Board of Peace is intended to advance the rest of Trump’s 20-point peace plan signed by Hamas and Israel in October 2025. It involves the respective cessation by Israel, Hamas and relevant Palestinian factions of “all military operations in accordance with Sharm Sheikh Protocol and the Peace Plan.” According to Nickolay Mladenov, chief envoy of the Board, “intense efforts” involving Egypt, Türkiye, Qatar and the US had been brought to bear on “the Palestinian factions in Gaza to agree to a Roadmap on the full implementation of President Trump’s plan, to hand over civilian governance and to decommission their weapons.”
Once approved by the parties, a timetable and the implementation phase will be prepared within a fortnight, to be extended as necessary by the International Verification Committee (IVC). On completion, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) is to enter the Strip to assume its responsibilities. According to the plan, Hamas and the other factions are to yield control over civilian governance and security in Gaza to the National Committee in accordance with Trump’s Comprehensive Peace Plan. The NCAG is to “enjoy full independence in carrying out its responsibilities and the factions shall not interfere in NCAG affairs during the transitional period, in accordance with UNS Resolution 2803 (2025).”
The NCAG is also tasked with pursuing “a comprehensive audit of the financial and administrative affairs in Gaza, and protect, recover and administer public assets and resources.” Claims from suppliers, contractors and other parties, up to a total of US$400 million, will be assessed by the Committee, with unresolved financial rights, liabilities or claims addressed “within the context of a wider national process later.”
The Committee will apparently operate “according to the principle of One Authority, One Law, One Weapon,” though the plan, without giving much by way of detail, is clear that “Palestinian laws, relevant international standards and the principles of good governance” shall apply. Police personnel shall be added to “existing police structures” and “undergo a comprehensive vetting.” Those not cutting the mustard can still find themselves in civilian employment “consistent with their earlier experience or retire in accordance with Palestinian law. None of those shall be deprived of their financial rights, particularly due to financial affiliation.”
Once the remaining commitments of the Sharm Sheikh Protocol are completed, along with the entry of NCAG and the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), decommissioning and storing “heavy weapons, military production sites, depots of weapons, and tunnels” will take place, supervised by the authority “in a gradual, sequential and time-bound manner.” The proviso here is that Israel shall withdraw “in phases, from areas under its control in Gaza” as armed militias are decommissioned.
The weapons of the militias are to be decommissioned and stored under NCAG authority in accordance with a timetable. Foolishly, and unrealistically, the deal is weakened by the requirement that no one from those militias is to “be integrated in the security and police services.” Shadows of post-invasion Iraq in 2003, when the US-led forces engaged in an extravagant removal and purging of Baathist personnel, thereby leaving them ripe for future insurrection, are cast.
The ISF is to eventually be deployed in the Strip “to separate the Israeli forces from NCAG-controlled areas.” (At this point, that force will draw upon the reserves of Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Albania.) The force will not be in the business of policing “or missions related to the Palestinian society.” Its role, it would seem, is more one of monitoring compliance with the ceasefire, training the Palestinian police complement, and ensuring the protection and delivery of humanitarian aid and essential supplies into the Strip. NCAG is to be supported, at its request, in other non-policing missions. Israeli forces will then complete a phased withdrawal from the Strip in accordance with Trump’s peace plan, “which includes a commitment not to force anyone to leave the Strip.” From then on, NCAG will handle “internal security incidents.” At that stage, reconstruction of the enclave, to be supervised by the Board of Peace and NCAG, is to take place.
The plan, as with previous iterations on peace regarding Gaza, remains incurably brittle. Since last year’s October ceasefire, Palestinian deaths have risen to 73,000. (The number stood at 67,000 at the commencement of the ceasefire.) The slaughtering approach of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) towards those clinging to the Strip has been only slightly moderated. The IDF has also hungrily extended its control to almost 70% of the territory well beyond the Yellow Line stipulated by the ceasefire and destroyed, according to a BBC verify report published last November, upwards of 1,500 buildings.
On August 3, Mladenov met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in what he described as a “[l]ong day in Jerusalem.” This heralded “the start of the hard phase and I have never pretended otherwise.” From here on, the work would be “slow, grinding and technical.” During the course of conversations Mladenov is said to have requested a halt to attacks by Israel on the Strip, which he had lamented in a post the previous day. The weekend following the announcement of the roadmap saw the killing of 25 Palestinians and given the usual justifications: a strike on Deir-al-Balah which left four dead had targeted two Hamas commanders; the strikes on Gaza City and Jabalia had been against “military operatives.”
The Israeli attitude to the latest plans is one of profound and sabotaging scepticism. Doron Spielman, spokesperson for Netanyahu’s office, stated the position on August 2: “Our assessment is that if we redeploy before Hamas is truly disarmed, it will quickly expand its presence throughout Gaza, rebuild its terrorist infrastructure, once again threaten Israeli communities, and seek to carry another October 7-style attack.” In a statement from the same office released on July 30 is clear: the onus is entirely on Hamas to effectively will itself into impotence and subservience through disarming, “including the removal of the weaponry from Gaza and the complete demilitarization of the Strip as a condition for any process.”
Members of the Israeli cabinet are also pre-empting any move on the part of the ISF to move into Gaza. An August 3 letter from the patriotically rabid Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Settlements Minister Orit Strock demanded that Netanyahu convene the security cabinet to bar the entry of ISF troops. The roadmap from the Board of Peace was “dangerous to Israel and completely contradicts the disarming of Hamas and the demilitarization of Gaza.” The plan should be blocked, and the outline amended by the Peace Council “so that it aligns with the goals of the war and the commitments made to Israel.” Another peace plan, celebrated by its proponents yet doomed to a stillborn reality.
Kamikaze Drone Slams Into Crowded Russian Black Sea Beach, Killing 3
by Tyler Durden, Monday, Aug 03, 2026 – https://www.zerohedge.com/military/kamikaze-drone-slams-crowded-russian-black-sea-beach-killing-3
The Russia-Ukraine war has dangerously spilled over into the Black Sea, with cargo ships, tankers, and oil and gas infrastructure being targeted by both sides. The sharp escalation in fighting across the region has also come at a cost to civilians.
Shocking video circulating on X Monday morning appears to show a Ukrainian suicide drone striking a crowded beach in the Russian Black Sea resort city of Gelendzhik.
Russian media outlet Interfax reports that three people were killed and more than a dozen injured “when a drone crashed in the village of Arkhipo-Osipovka near Gelendzhik.”
The outlet continued:
“A tragedy has occurred in Gelendzhik. Three people were killed in the village of Arkhipo-Osipovka due to falling UAV debris, according to preliminary information. (…) Another 13 people, including children, were injured. They are receiving necessary medical care,” Kondratyev wrote on his Max channel.
He noted that the attack targeted civilian infrastructure. Emergency and special services are working at the drone wreckage sites.
Audio from the footage appears to capture Russian air-defense forces firing on the incoming drone moments before it struck the crowded beach. It remains unclear whether civilians were deliberately targeted or whether the drone was damaged by automatic fire, causing it to deviate from its intended flight path.
AUKUS: Its single point of obsolescence

A multi-decade submarine programme passing through that many hands is its own kind of risk. It helps that Burnham voted for Trident renewal in 2016 when Jeremy Corbyn voted against. This is not a man who wandered into submarine policy for a photograph.
By Vince Hooper | 1 August 2026, https://independentaustralia.net/politics/politics-display/tba-hooper-for-midday-saturday,21376
A timeline is not a delivery date, and a single shipyard carrying the weight of both a national deterrent and a trilateral alliance remains exactly what the title suggests: a single point of obsolescence, writes Professor Vince Hooper.
ANDY BURNHAM HAS BEEN PRIME MINISTER for ten days and has already discovered the one town in England that Whitehall cannot ignore.
On Thursday he travelled to Barrow-in-Furness, a Cumbrian settlement of fewer than 70,000 people that happens to be the only place in Britain capable of building a nuclear submarine. He announced £8.4 billion for the Dreadnought program.
He spoke of reindustrialisation, apprenticeships, and the dignity of skilled work. He told the shipyard workers that security is about who builds it, not only what we build. It was a sentence that could have been lifted from a mayoral stump speech in Salford, which is more or less where it came from.
Australian readers may be forgiven for assuming this has nothing to do with them. It does. The money is for Dreadnought, Britain’s nuclear deterrent, but the sheds it flows into are the same sheds that must deliver SSN-AUKUS, the attack submarines on which Australia’s undersea future has been staked.
Every Dreadnought hull and every SSN-AUKUS hull must pass through the same facility, fitted by the same workforce, in a town that cannot currently house the workers it already has.
The UK Defence Committee warned in April that investment in upgrading Barrow had already slipped and that any further failure could delay SSN-AUKUS with serious consequences for credibility with AUKUS partners.
Lord Case, chairing the cross-government Team Barrow effort, conceded that the broader ecosystem, from housing and schools to transport and healthcare, was not keeping pace. The ambition is one boat every eighteen months. The most recent Astute-class boats have each taken more than a decade from keel to commissioning. One trusts the PowerPoint is more optimistic than the precedent.
The £8.4 billion covers Delivery Phase 4: sea trials for HMS Dreadnought and construction milestones for HMS Valiant. It preserves the possibility of SSN-AUKUS steel being cut in 2027 without the yard falling into the kind of gap that turned the Astute programme into a thirteen-year crawl from keel to operational status.
BAE has achieved a forty per cent productivity increase at the yard over three years, which is impressive until you remember that two submarine programmes are now competing for the same finite pool of welders, engineers and shed space.
The productivity gains occurred inside what economists would politely call a monopoly supplier. Apply a Herfindahl-Hirschman index to British submarine construction and you arrive at 10,000, the theoretical maximum. In any other sector that number would trigger an antitrust inquiry. In Barrow it triggers a prime ministerial visit. There is no second yard.
For Canberra, the risk compounds across the Atlantic. A July 2026 GAO report found that at least thirty-seven per cent of the U.S. Navy’s fast-attack submarine fleet is in maintenance at any given time. American Virginia-class production runs at 1.1 to 1.2 hulls per year; the AUKUS plan requires 2.33.
The U.S. Navy has told Congress it will not reach even two hulls annually before 2032. Under the National Defence Authorisation Act, the President cannot legally sell a nuclear-powered submarine to a foreign partner unless he certifies to Congress that the transaction will not degrade domestic undersea capabilities.
Australia is counting on three to five Virginia-class boats from the early 2030s as a bridge while it waits for SSN-AUKUS to arrive. If Washington cannot build enough hulls to satisfy its own fleet, the certification becomes politically impossible and the bridge collapses before it carries a single boat south.
On the British side, the Defence Committee heard in December that four of six commissioned Astute-class hulls were at low readiness; by late June, Navy Lookout reported that none was at sea. None.
The capability gap between Collins-class retirement and SSN-AUKUS delivery is not a scheduling inconvenience. It is a window in which Australia could find itself without a credible undersea force, which is an unusual position for a country that has just committed the largest defence expenditure in its history to acquiring one.
The political choreography is worth reading as closely as the engineering. Burnham has installed John Healey, the defence secretary who resigned in June over Starmer’s failure to fund the department, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, placing the man who quit over the defence budget in charge of the national finances, which is either poetic justice or an exceptionally dry joke.
He has given Defence to Wes Streeting, a right-flank Labourite who has affirmed the inherited commitment to three per cent of GDP on defence by the next parliament, and made Ed Miliband, until last month the energy secretary, his Foreign Secretary, the post from which Britain’s end of the AUKUS relationship is diplomatically managed.
Miliband’s previous experience of trilateral partnerships was largely confined to climate summits. The £8.4 billion itself was already committed under the Defence Investment Plan, and sits above a £4.7 billion shortfall in the broader £298 billion spending envelope that Burnham must find in his first budget.
Today’s announcement repackaged existing commitments inside a jobs narrative tailored for a prime minister whose political capital is northern, industrial, and built on a decade of telling Westminster it does not understand the provinces.
Burnham is Britain’s sixth prime minister in a decade, as he himself acknowledged in his first speech from Downing Street. A multi-decade submarine programme passing through that many hands is its own kind of risk. It helps that Burnham voted for Trident renewal in 2016 when Jeremy Corbyn voted against. This is not a man who wandered into submarine policy for a photograph.
As signalling, the visit works. As reassurance that AUKUS remains on track, it falls rather short.
The Defence Investment Plan reconfirmed up to twelve SSN-AUKUS boats inside a £63.6 billion nuclear ring-fence, but attached no programme cost. That omission speaks volumes in a language Canberra understands fluently.
Pillar 2 of the partnership (hypersonics, AI-enabled undersea surveillance, autonomous undersea vehicles) is advancing more quietly and with less industrial risk, but it is Pillar 1’s submarines that define whether AUKUS is a programme or a slogan. There is an uncomfortable irony in that division. Australia’s first SSN-AUKUS boat is not expected until the early 2040s, a platform being designed today for a battlespace nearly two decades away.
The very Pillar 2 technologies the partnership is developing (autonomous detection, seabed sensor networks, AI-enabled surveillance) could reshape undersea warfare before the first hull enters service, making crewed submarines less decisive than the programme assumes.
The UK Government plans to cut steel on its first SSN-AUKUS boat at Barrow next year, a timeline that will reassure some in Canberra if it holds.
But a timeline is not a delivery date, and a single shipyard carrying the weight of both a national deterrent and a trilateral alliance, while the ocean it is building for changes around it, remains exactly what the title suggests: a single point of obsolescence.
The War of Perception: The West’s infowarfare and cognitive warfare against Russia

The West has constructed a dense framework ofperceptual projections: Russia crippled by sanctions, Putin lacking popular support, weapons on the front lines running out, soldiers defeated and in retreat, the people in revolt, the collapse of institutions now imminent. These are a series of recurring themes throughout the mainstream media, with constant, rhythmic, and unrelenting repetition even in the face of contrary evidence. Yet Russia is still standing, and it does not appear at all to be losing the war. Quite the contrary.
The important thing, we reiterate, is not the truth, but what is perceived as the truth.
Cyber operations, social media operations, bot networks, troll farms, memetic warfare, deepfakes, and generative artificial intelligence constitute the most recent and rapidly evolving layer. Troll farms and bot networks automate the production and amplification of content.
to win today, bullets and bombs alone are not enough: people must be convinced that they have won or lost. The rest will follow.
Lorenzo Maria Pacini, August 2, 2026, https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/08/02/war-perception-west-infowarfare-and-cognitive-warfare-against-russia/
The Center of Gravity of the Conflict and the Western Paradigm
In the conflicts of the last quarter-century, the information dimension has ceased to be merely an adjunct to military action and has become a theater of its own. This formulation is not new: as early as 1998, Vladimir Slipchenko argued that information was becoming “a weapon of the same kind as missiles, bombs, and torpedoes,” and that a new form of warfare had supplanted armed combat as the decisive factor in achieving political-military objectives. What has changed is not the principle itself, but rather the infrastructure that makes it operational: mass connectivity, algorithmic mediation of attention, and the availability of generative tools have lowered costs and multiplied the scope of operations targeting perception.
Defining the cognitive domain as a “new” space of strategic competition, however, requires clarification, as the term can be misleading. The contest for opinions, loyalties, and the will to fight has always accompanied war; Thucydides recorded it in the speeches preceding the decisions of the assemblies. The contemporary novelty lies in three interrelated elements: the technical ability to reach individual citizens directly on an industrial scale, bypassing institutional intermediaries; the fusion of intelligence, cyber, and psychological operations into a seamless continuum; and the emergence of a doctrinal vocabulary—“cognitive warfare,” “information confrontation,” “reflexive control”—that seeks to theorize this contest as a military function in its own right.
Perception has become central, but it is not exclusive; physical destruction has not disappeared: destroyed cities, targeted infrastructure, human casualties. Action on perception has become an enabling condition and a multiplier of kinetic action—in some cases, its substitute—and the relationship between the two registers is the subject of deliberate strategic choice.
First and foremost, we must reconstruct what the West officially declares it does in the information domain, distinguishing it from what is attributed to it. The distinction between stated doctrine, actual capabilities, and presumed intentions is the first tool of analytical rigor.
Joint Publication 3-13 (Information Operations, 2012 edition with subsequent updates) defines IO as the integrated use of information capabilities during military operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the adversary’s decision-making process, while protecting one’s own. The key point is that U.S. doctrine explicitly limits such operations to the context of hostilities or their immediate preparation: it does not contemplate, at least on the stated level, a “permanent information confrontation” in peacetime. It is precisely this temporal limitation, as we shall see, that constitutes the main conceptual asymmetry with Russian doctrine, and it is documented by Russian analysts themselves when they distinguish their own “broad” definition from the Western “narrow” one.
Within NATO, strategic communication is defined as the coordinated use of the Alliance’s communication activities in support of policies and operations. The NATO StratCom Center of Excellence in Riga, established in 2014, and the work of Allied Command Transformation on cognitive warfare represent the most recent developments. It is important to note that these bodies primarily produce defensive analyses—such as how to counter adversarial disinformation—and that their output is largely public. By contrast, as Giles noted, the Russian armed forces’ 2011 proto-cyber doctrine makes no mention whatsoever of offensive capabilities.
On the European front, the East StratCom Task Force, established by the European External Action Service in 2015 under a mandate from the European Council, manages the EUvsDisinfo project to catalog pro-Russian disinformation. Subsequent initiatives—the 2018 Code of Practice on Disinformation and the Digital Services Act—constitute a countermeasure apparatus that Russian sources interpret as a tool for censorship and offensive information warfare. The East StratCom Task Force is an organization openly dedicated to countering Russian narratives, a sort of “weapon” in return, so much so that it is declared a means of defense against external attacks.
The EISI document repeatedly mentions think tanks, NGOs, and research institutes as components of the Western information apparatus. Organizations such as the RAND Corporation, Chatham House, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) do indeed produce influential analyses on Russia. RAND, in particular, published a 2016 study by Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews on the “firehose of falsehood” model of Russian propaganda, and in 2019, a report on measures to “counter and deter” Russia. This coordinated cognitive warfare, directed by a strategic center, has set a precedent and inspired many other similar centers.
Framing the Enemy
We can even compile a catalog of the techniques the West employs against Russia. It is useful to examine them by grouping them into functional categories.
The first group concerns widely studied political communication techniques that are neither specifically Western nor secret…………………….
The second group concerns the portrayal of Russian leadership. The personalization of the conflict—that is, the reduction of a structural antagonism to the figure of a single leader—is a real phenomenon widely used in Western political communication, and it has always worked. The narrative surrounding Vladimir Putin has varied many times but has always remained consistently negative, never allowing for any positive portrayal in any respect.
Let us then consider fact-checking and the so-called fight against disinformation. The West has had to go to great lengths to create “fact-checking” agencies in order to control the flow of information. The idea of objective truth is neutralized; any data is potentially incorrect. Trust in verifiable reality is eroded to the point where it no longer serves any purpose, and thus the constructed narratives end up being not only legitimized but also preferred, because they are psychologically more convenient—they do not disrupt people’s emotional and rational frameworks.
Danilin lists a catalog of Western organizations created, in his view, to counter Russia: the EU’s East StratCom Task Force, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre, the Counter Disinformation Unit, VIGINUM in France, and others, including defensive cybersecurity agencies, disinformation analysis units, and intelligence services. Some of these structures exist and have public mandates; VIGINUM, for example, is a French agency established in 2021 with the stated task of detecting foreign information interference. Rather than a unified front under a single command, these are organizations that coordinate with one another in a constant dialogue—where, it is true, there are multiple command centers, but with a unified intent and a shared enemy.
In the Mind
If cognitive warfare targets the thought process rather than its content, its analysis requires the use of the cognitive sciences. The contemporary foundation is Daniel Kahneman’s two-system model, developed with Amos Tversky. System 1—rapid, automatic, emotional—governs most everyday judgments; System 2—slow, deliberative, and effortful—intervenes only when it is activated. Effective cognitive operations target System 1: the availability and representativeness heuristics, as well as the confirmation and anchoring biases identified by Kahneman and Tversky’s research program, constitute potential points of attack. Repeated information becomes available to memory and is therefore perceived as true (the illusion of truth); an emotionally charged image overrides deliberative evaluation……………………………………………………………………………………………………..
In the Conflict
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has undoubtedly served as a prime testing ground for experimenting with and putting strategies to the test in hybrid domains.
Read more: The War of Perception: The West’s infowarfare and cognitive warfare against RussiaThe West has constructed a dense framework ofperceptual projections: Russia crippled by sanctions, Putin lacking popular support, weapons on the front lines running out, soldiers defeated and in retreat, the people in revolt, the collapse of institutions now imminent. These are a series of recurring themes throughout the mainstream media, with constant, rhythmic, and unrelenting repetition even in the face of contrary evidence. Yet Russia is still standing, and it does not appear at all to be losing the war. Quite the contrary.
In this context, two other elements play a fundamental role: data and images. Data is considered an important criterion of truth because, at least in theory, it should be verifiable. However, data comes from sources that collect and process it. The problem, therefore, is who these agencies are and where the data comes from, how it is processed, and how it is disseminated. Here, arbitrariness is nearly total: whoever owns the agency owns the data. And, furthermore, whoever controls the data storage holds the (digital) weight of truth.
As for images, the issue is very similar. Images convey a message with greater immediacy than written texts and numbers; therefore, they are more effective, and their use is so powerful that, since ancient times, they have been the primary tool for comprehensive storytelling—that is, both rational and emotional—that we can employ. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is a textbook example: from day one, the web has been flooded with photos and videos of the situation at the front, within the respective countries, and of what was happening in the surrounding areas. The framing of the narrative has always been shaped by images—even to the point of using memes—to such an extent that scientific literature has begun to refer to “memetic warfare.”
A specific feature of the Ukrainian conflict is the role of open-source intelligence (OSINT). Groups such as Bellingcat have documented, through the geolocation of publicly available material, events that the parties tended to conceal—from the downing of Flight MH17 in 2014 to the presence of Russian forces in theaters where their presence was denied. OSINT has introduced a new element: the possibility of distributed verification, which complicates plausible deniability. Russian sources, consistently, tend to classify independent OSINT as a tool of Western intelligence, replicating the pattern of reclassifying any verification as an act of aggression.
Operational Tools
The operational repertoire of contemporary information warfare combines classic intelligence disciplines with recent digital capabilities.
PSYOPS (Psychological Operations), renamed MISO (Military Information Support Operations) in U.S. terminology since 2010, refer to operations aimed at influencing the emotions and behavior of selected audiences in support of military objectives. Strategic communication and public diplomacy operate at a higher level and with a predominantly open mandate: the latter, in particular, refers to a state’s efforts to communicate directly with foreign public opinion—a legitimate and declared activity that Russian sources, however, tend to include in the list of information weapons. Herein lies a fundamental ambiguity in the field: there is no clear-cut and universally accepted line between legitimate public diplomacy and hostile influence operations, and the location of that boundary is itself the subject of political contention.
OSINT, HUMINT, and SIGINT refer, respectively, to intelligence gathering from open-source, human, and signals intelligence sources. Their relevance to information warfare is twofold: they provide data for analyzing the target audience and, in the case of OSINT, have also become a tool for public verification. The 2016 Russian law criminalizing research on Russian television audiences by foreign organizations, and the subsequent designation of the Levada Center as a “foreign agent,” are not signs of weakness but rather of a deliberate effort to close a vulnerability, given that audience analysis is recognized as an enabler of information warfare, and access to it is denied to the adversary.
Cyber operations, social media operations, bot networks, troll farms, memetic warfare, deepfakes, and generative artificial intelligence constitute the most recent and rapidly evolving layer. Troll farms and bot networks automate the production and amplification of content. Memetic warfare exploits the viral spread of compact, emotionally charged cultural units. Deepfakes and generative AI further lower the cost of producing credible false content, introducing a qualitative discontinuity whose full effects are still unfolding. It should be emphasized that these capabilities are available to multiple actors, both state and non-state
Despite everything, the war on the front lines
The collective Western response against Russia is very powerful and detailed, as explained so far. In the case of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, despite the significant role of hybrid warfare, it is still on the front lines that the actual outcome of the conflict is decided. Despite the massive deployment of information capabilities by both sides, the outcome on the ground continues to depend on artillery, drones, air defense, and logistics. Cognitive warfare has not replaced kinetic warfare; rather, it has altered their relationship and sequence. The most defensible formulation—adopted by the most rigorous scholarship—is that perceptual dominance has become an enabling condition and a force multiplier, the effectiveness of which, however, depends on its integration with the other dimensions rather than on their replacement.
The question to ask, therefore, is not whether information warfare will work or lead to victory for one of the parties to the conflict, but how it will do so, and to what extent. Because the first war—the most important of all—is the one fought in the minds of citizens, soldiers, and politicians. It is the war that causes a person to feel in danger and be afraid, or to live a peaceful life as if nothing were happening. It is the one that drives a person to pull the trigger or to let their guard down.
To date, the West has tested a wide array of hybrid weapons against Russia and has never ceased to produce information and manipulate perceptions. And it will continue to do so, because it has become clear that, to win today, bullets and bombs alone are not enough: people must be convinced that they have won or lost. The rest will follow.
Common Sense & the Pentagon Budget

time and reason strongly suggest that the U.S. “defense” budget is out of control, unsustainable and absent of accountability.
Eisenhower said the following:
“Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed“
By Dennis Laich
Eisenhower Media Network, July 31, 2026, https://consortiumnews.com/2026/07/31/common-sense-the-pentagon-budget/
For Americans, the courage required today is not to defeat an empire abroad, but to confront one at home — the Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex, writes Dennis Laich.
The first sentence of Thomas Paine’s classic 1776 essay, Common Sense, urged the American people to challenge the legitimacy of the English Crown, something that had never been challenged before.
He wrote:
“Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages are not yet sufficiently fashionable to procure them a great favor; a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong gives it a superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defence of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time makes more converts than reason.”
Two hundred and fifty years later, time and reason strongly suggest that the U.S. “defense” budget is out of control, unsustainable and absent of accountability.
Only the American people can rein it in
The “defense of custom” in this case will come from the Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex (MICC) of which President Eisenhower warned us in 1961 in his farewell address, and drove home the consequences of in his famous “Cross of Iron” speech in 1953. In his address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Eisenhower said the following:
“Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some fifty miles of concrete pavement. We pay for a single fighter with a half-million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people… This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.”
All of these forces benefit by exaggerating threats to our national security which justify a huge U.S. “defense” budget, larger than the next eight nations (most of whom are allies) in the world combined, while American citizens lack health care, childcare and other basic needs.
The defense industry’s lobbyists team up with U.S. politicians, who receive campaign financing from the industry, to draft the annual National Defense Authorization Act, which sets military policy, the expensive weaponry to be purchased and the overall military budget
The industry takes the ensuing windfall and puts it toward stock buybacks, which increase the share price, making the rich richer; dividend payments for shareholders; eight-figure annual compensation packages for corporate executives; and the continual political graft (campaign contributions and lobbyists) that keeps the wheel spinning. Incredibly, some contracts stipulate that only the contractor may repair and maintain equipment.
The most embarrassing example of this practice is the F-35 Stealth Fighter, which is grossly over budget, behind schedule and is only 25 percent fully mission capable.
The principal beneficiaries of the MICC’s practice of vastly overstating foreign threats are the Pentagon and the invertebrate senior uniformed bureaucrats who occupy it and secure lucrative post-retirement employment with the MICC.
The massive Pentagon budget provides the Pentagon with a premier position within both the government and society. Money talks in America, but few members of Congress choose to talk about the $39 trillion national debt to which military spending is a major contributor.
Unfortunately, the uniformed bureaucrats lack the courage to stand up against a draft dodger and a Rambo-wannabe in order to protect their profession or the institution of the military.
Government employees, including military officials, are fired for specious reasons and no one, not even those who were fired, dare speak up regarding the negative impact on morale, discipline and readiness. Nor do they speak up when the U.S. supports genocide in Gaza, extrajudicial murders in the Caribbean, or attacks the Uniformed Code of Military Justice.
These recent developments will serve to accelerate a decline in the U.S. military’s performance. Since WWII, the U.S. has won one war (the first Gulf War), lost four (Viet Nam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran) and tied one (Korea). Iran may be as much an embarrassment as a loss.
The United States has failed to achieve its stated objectives in any recent war, despite having a military budget larger than the next eight countries combined and being easily the most defensible of any peer nation (with two friendly, stable nations to its north and south and oceans on its east and west). What football coach could keep his job with a 1-4-1 record?
Additionally, the Pentagon cannot tell the American taxpayer where the money went, since it is unable to pass a financial audit as required by law — something every other department of the federal government is able to do.
Now, they are requesting a 50 percent increase in the defense budget to S1.5 trillion. This is equivalent to your child asking for more money a day after receiving his/her allowance. When you ask what happened to the money he/she received yesterday, the child can’t answer the question, but you give him/her more money regardless.
This represents a level of arrogance and incompetence that the American people should not be asked to tolerate.
Thomas Paine understood something that seemed impossible in 1776. On paper, the American colonies had no chance against the greatest empire on Earth. Britain possessed the world’s most powerful military, immense wealth, and overwhelming resources.
The colonies had none of those advantages. What Paine recognized as “common sense” was that wars are not won by budgets alone. They are won by legitimacy, purpose, and the willingness of a free people to defend their own liberty.
The $1.5 trillion Pentagon budget request represents more than S9,000 per individual taxpayer.
If we Americans are tired of seeing our tax dollars spent on endless wars, bombing campaigns, and military excess while our own communities struggle with the costs of health care, child care, education, and infrastructure, then the time has come to do what Thomas Paine asked Americans to do 250 years ago: challenge the assumptions that have become accepted simply because they are old. The courage required today is not to defeat an empire abroad, but to confront one at home — the Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex — and reclaim a government that serves the American people rather than the interests of perpetual war.
Major General Dennis Laich, U.S, Army, retired, is executive director of the Eisenhower Media Network, an organization of expert former military, intelligence and civilian national security officials who have an independent, alternative story to tell.
This startup just raised nearly $500 million to build nuclear reactors for the US military.

By Rahim Amir, 30 July 26, https://www.techradar.com/pro/this-startup-just-raised-nearly-usd500-million-to-build-nuclear-reactors-for-the-us-military
Antares lookt to supply small reactors by 2028
- Antares closes $470 million Series C, $370 million in equity and $100 million in debt, co-led by Paradigm and Caffeinated Capital
- The move follows the Mark-0 reaching criticality at Idaho National Laboratory and helps fund an electricity-producing Mark-1 in 2027 and military deployments in 2028
- Antares’ military-first strategy targets a price-insensitive customer bound by an executive order requiring a reactor on a US base September 30 2028
Nuclear fission startup Antares has announced it has raised a total of $470 million in funding as it looks to supply a single client with a looming deadline: the US Military.
The Torrance, California company closed a Series C co-led by Paradigm and Caffeinated Capital, with Point72 Ventures, Shine Capital and Industrious Ventures among the participants, according to TechCrunch‘s look at its PitchBook data.
Antares’ raise comes seven weeks after its Mark-0 microreactor reached criticality at Idaho National Laboratory under the Department of Energy’s authorization in a demonstration run with the DOE, the lab, and BWX Technologies, with the US Army observing.
A direct beneficiary of the White House
Antares calls it the “first privately developed non-light-water reactor to achieve criticality in the United States in more than four decades,” underscoring how important the test was for both Antares and the US military.
The US military’s presence is not by chance; It is mandated by an executive order (“Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security”) signed by US President Donald Trump to ensure that it has an operating army-regulated nuclear reactor on a domestic military site by September 30, 2028
Antares happens to be one of three finalists in the Pentagon’s Advanced Nuclear Power for Installations program that aims to test-deploy a small module reactor (SMR) on two different air force bases.
With Antares being the first private company to go through that gate under the DOE’s Reactor Pilot Program, it plans to build an electricity-producing Mark-1 reactor in 2027, followed by initial deployments to defense customers by 2028.
UK’s £8.4bn nuclear submarine investment

£8.4bn nuclear submarine investment “breathes new life into Barrow’s
historic traditions”. The £8.4bn investment into next generation nuclear
deterrent submarines “breathes new life into Barrow’s historic traditions”,
the UK Government has said.
Prime Minister Andy Burnham, accompanied by
defence secretary Wes Streeting, visited BAE Systems (BAES) shipyard in
Barrow following the announcement that funding has been committed to begin
the fourth major production phase of the UK’s Dreadnought Class submarine
programme.
A contract worth £5.9bn has been agreed by the government and
BAES, the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE) industry partner responsible for
submarine production from its shipyard in Barrow, the home of UK submarine
building.
Further investments are set to be committed to Rolls-Royce
Submarines in Derby and the wider supply chain across the UK. The DNE
supports more than 6,000 UK companies in the supply chain and backs about
47,000 UK jobs.
Insider Media 31st July 2026 , https://www.insidermedia.com/news/north-west/8.4bn-nuclear-submarine-investment-breathes-new-life-into-barrows-historic-traditions
Ukraine continues its use of mine terrorism against civilians
In 2022, I widely documented Ukraine’s deployment of PFM-1 “Petal” mines in Donbass cities. Ukraine has been since also using boobytrapped explosives and now a new version of a”Petal” mine.
Eva Karene Bartlett, Jul 31, 2026, https://evakarenebartlett.substack.com/p/ukraine-continues-its-use-of-mine?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=3046064&post_id=209116807&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
When Ukraine fired missiles containing insidious, difficult to see, and dangerous mines dubbed “Petal” mines onto Donetsk and nearby cities in July 2022, I was in Donetsk and went on to document the mines in city streets, parks, apartment courtyards and even an orphanage in nearby Makeevka.
From the start of an article I wrote for RT immediately after Ukraine’s July firing of missiles containing the mines onto Donetsk:
On Saturday, July 30, just after 9pm, thunderous explosions rocked central Donetsk. Shortly after, there were announcements that air defense had shot down Ukrainian-fired missiles containing ‘petal‘ mines. Given that over 300 of these explosives are packed into each of the Ukrainian-fired rockets, central Donetsk could literally become a minefield if they successfully landed.
Social media and Telegram warnings urged residents to stay inside and wait for Emergency Services to clear the streets and sidewalks – which they began doing during the night. But come daylight, untold numbers of these tiny devices still remained. More warnings were issued to stay at home – better to be late for work than lose a leg. Residents that absolutely have to go out are advised to keep their eyes down to watch where they step, avoid grassy areas, and walk extremely carefully.
…According to DPR Emergency services, Ukraine is using Hurricane MLRS-fired rockets to spread the mines. Each contains 12 cluster munitions, each cluster has 26 mines inside. So each bomb has 312. The cluster explodes in the air, disseminating them widely, scattering in different directions. Their butterfly-like design enables them to glide and land without exploding, usually. Then they lie in wait for someone with bad luck to step on them.
Some of these anti-personnel mines have a self-destruct timer. Others, including the ones Ukraine is firing, have a years-long shelf life. They do pretty much no damage to military vehicles, and therefore their use in Donbass is insidious – deliberately targeting civilians, to leave them maimed….”
[Article continues, more photos on my blog]
US Navy’s nuclear battleship plan raises questions for carriers, submarines and AUKUS
The same reactor vendor, dockyards and specialist workforce that sustain the Virginia boats promised to Australia under the trilateral AUKUS partnership are already working at their limit
Navy Lookout 30 July 26, https://www.navylookout.com/us-navys-nuclear-battleship-plan-raises-questions-for-carriers-submarines-and-aukus/
The US Navy has confirmed that its planned Trump-class guided-missile battleship, whose lead ship would be USS Defiant, will be nuclear-powered. The propulsion decision could have consequences extending beyond the BB(X) programme (now redesignated BBGN), placing additional pressure on US aircraft-carrier construction and the naval nuclear industrial base, with potential second-order implications for AUKUS and the submarine programmes of Australia and Britain.
Going nuclear
When BBG(X) was unveiled at the end of 2025, the Navy’s initial concept depicted conventional integrated electric propulsion using gas turbines and diesel generators. The FY2027 thirty-year shipbuilding plan subsequently confirmed that the battleship would be nuclear-powered, while Navy officials told Congress that it was expected to use the A1B reactor type fitted to the Ford-class carriers.
There is an operational logic to the decision. A large combatant intended to carry extensive missile batteries, high-output lasers, powerful sensors, electronic-warfare equipment and future energy-intensive weapons will require considerable generating capacity. Nuclear power also removes the fuel constraint that would otherwise limit a ship expected to operate across the distances of the Indo-Pacific, and it would make the Defiant-class the first American nuclear-powered surface combatant since the last of the Virginia-class cruisers paid off in the 1990s.
Industrial chokepoint
The difficulty is not the nuclear technology itself, which is proven in service and is a design that could be adapted for the battleships. The issue is the increased pressure on the supply chain. Nuclear-powered surface ship construction in the United States is dependent on one yard, HII Newport News. This facility is already experiencing delays and cost growth delivering the Ford-class aircraft carriers. The GD Electric Boat in Groton is the only other yard certified for naval nuclear work but only builds submarines, which are the Navy’s top priority. The most significant industrial bottleneck is the naval reactor supply chain centred on BWX Technologies, the sole supplier of US naval reactor cores and key reactor components. BWX are simultaneously supplying the CVN programme (each ship has 2 reactors) as well as two major submarine programmes. Adding the nuclear requirement to the battleship programme when there is no spare industrial capacity to draw upon means it must compete directly for nuclear-certified labour, drydock time and reactor components already committed years ahead.
The House Armed Services Committee has backed a requirement for the Navy to explain how the programme would avoid disrupting Ford-class carrier construction and the wider naval nuclear industrial base. The concern is grounded in the sequencing of the work, since naval reactors are ordered two to three years before the hulls they power, so any diversion of components or skilled staff is felt long before a battleship takes shape. The Columbia-class SSBN programme, which replaces the sea-based leg of the American nuclear deterrent, is already running late, while Virginia-class SSN construction is below the rate the fleet requires. Adding a third demand to that base without expanding it invites exactly the outcome Congress is trying to avoid.
The AUKUS dimension
The same reactor vendor, dockyards and specialist workforce that sustain the Virginia boats promised to Australia under the trilateral AUKUS partnership are already working at their limit. Nuclear surface ship construction is concentrated at HII Newport News alone. The GD Electric Boat in Groton is the only other yard certified for naval nuclear work but only builds submarines, which are the Navy’s top priority. Reactor components come from a single supplier, BWX Technologies, that is also supplying the Columbia and Virginia submarine lines. The clearest direct risk is to the Ford-class carrier programme, but submarine output would probably be indirectly impacted, through competition for reactor components, nuclear-qualified personnel and investment across the wider supplier base.
For UK reactor production, the exposure is less significant. British naval reactors are designed and manufactured through the UK Defence Nuclear Enterprise, centred on Rolls-Royce Submarines at Raynesway. Reactors for the Dreadnought and SSN-AUKUS boats are made in Britain and complement rather than compete with US capacity. What the UK relies on from the States is the design pedigree of the PWR3, which, to an unknown extent, is modelled on the S9G reactor that powers the Virginia-class and was developed with USN engineering support.
The last public figure put the UK’s Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) stockpile at 21.86 tonnes in 2002, but its present size, composition and availability for future naval fuel are not publicly known. Over half of that stockpile was of US origin and none of it is immediately replenishable since domestic weapons-grade enrichment ended in 1962. It is unclear if there is enough for the 4 Dreadnoughts, up to 12 RN SSN-As planned in the medium-term. (Provision of HEU for the 8 Australian SSN-As also has to be considered, although the source for this has not been publicly established). The genuinely usable reserve is smaller than the headline figure once spent cores, warhead reservation and material form are accounted for, and the stock must also serve every future class indefinitely. Building sovereign enrichment capability takes 15-20 years; the UK has committed £1.7bn to a Nuclear Fuels Programme to explore re-establishing a domestic enrichment to reduce dependence on the US in the long run.
Political and industrial reality
The propulsion decision has also exposed the BBGN programme to an even greater extent politically. Before the decision was finalised, then-Navy Secretary John Phelan said the service was still examining the trade-offs. Admiral Daryl Caudle had earlier warned that nuclear propulsion would add a construction ‘tail’ that could push the ship beyond the timeframe of the operational requirement, although he subsequently endorsed the nuclear design. The ambition for 15 battleships sits awkwardly against a fleet that the same plan does not expect to reach 355 ships until FY2040, and then only if industry achieves a dramatic improvement in delivery performance.
There are plenty who believe that BBGN is essentially a vanity project that will be axed as soon as Trump leaves office. Congress has strongly supported the USN’s continued development of the large, but less demanding, conventionally-powered DDG(X) project, although this is officially a replacement for the Ticonderoga cruisers an
Russia’s Starlink killers showcase new era of electronic battlefield warfare.
from
| Lisa Savage, 30 July 26 |
Russia has ramped-up EW use to detect and jam Elon Musk’s Starlink terminals and satellites, Ukrainian media reports.
Volna Kupol Garant
Russia’s latest electronic warfare system reportedly uses a directed high-frequency radio beam to disrupt Starlink operations. Rather than damaging satellites orbiting roughly 500 kilometers above Earth, the system blinds them – cutting their ability to connect with ground terminals while they remain under attack.
According to reports, Volna is a mobile system built around six trailers. Each carries a pair of steerable satellite dishes mounted on rotating platforms. A single battery is reportedly capable of denying Starlink coverage across an area of up to 20 sq km. Some analysts say the system was previously referenced under the designation Peresvet-M, although this has not been independently confirmed.
Ukrainian sources claim Volna was first deployed during Russia’s offensive in the Kharkov region in 2024. They also say its use has increased significantly in recent months.Tobol
The secretive Russian EW complex is reportedly used to disrupt signals from NATO-linked satellite networks, including GPS, Galileo, and Starlink. Reports claim that Tobol attacks satellite communications on both ends of the link – jamming downlinks from satellites to ground receivers and uplinks from Earth to orbit. Its power and range also allegedly allow it to create an electromagnetic “umbrella.”
Kalinka
The system is designed to hunt down satellite communications signals, including those transmitted by Starlink terminals at distances of up to 15 km. It can reportedly track and lock onto even Starshield – SpaceX’s hardened military variant of Starlink. Western media warns that while Tobol disrupts GPS signals on a broad scale, the Kalinka’s precision-targeting capabilities could pose a more direct threat to specific military operations.
Krasukha
The Krasukha-S4 is designed to neutralize reconnaissance satellites, ground-based radar installations, and airborne surveillance systems. It does so by emitting powerful electronic jamming signals that disrupt key radar bands and other radio-frequency emissions. A standard Krasukha-S4 battery consists of two vehicles and has an operational range exceeding 300 kilometers.
Borshchevik
The light mobile system is designed to detect and geolocate Starlink terminals within a 180-degree sector at ranges of up to 10 km, with a reported accuracy of five meters. Using direction-finding and biangulation algorithms, it can locate a target in less than three minutes at a single scanning position. The Borshchevik-2 airborne system hunts Starlink signals from the sky, with reported accuracy down to 0.4 m.
Zelensky’s Dangerous Gambit To Merge The Iran And Ukraine Wars

Of course this would also appeal to Israel, prolonging the Middle East war and potentially drawing European governments into the theater, too.
Trita Parsi Responsible Statecraft, https://scheerpost.com/2026/07/29/zelenskys-dangerous-gambit-to-merge-the-iran-and-ukraine-wars/
As Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky arrives in Washington, much indicates that he is no longer merely trying to draw greater American support into its war against Russia. Increasingly, it appears to be pursuing something far more consequential: merging the Ukraine war with the U.S.-Iran conflict into a single strategic theater.
The distinction matters. If the two wars become one, Ukraine ceases to be merely a recipient of American military assistance and instead becomes a direct participant in Washington’s war with Tehran. By the same token, the United States would no longer simply be Ukraine’s principal arms supplier. It would become an active belligerent against Russia through a conflict that stretches from the Black Sea to the Caspian.
For Kyiv, this would represent the strategic breakthrough it has sought since Russia’s invasion in 2022.
From the outset of the war, Ukrainian leaders consistently urged NATO to move beyond supplying weapons and intelligence. Zelensky repeatedly appealed for a NATO-enforced no-fly zone, warning that anything less amounted to allowing Russia to bomb Ukrainian cities with impunity. He pressed Western governments to provide increasingly sophisticated weapons systems long before they were politically acceptable in Washington. And he argued that victory required the West to abandon what he viewed as self-imposed escalation timidity.
The Biden administration sympathized with Ukraine’s predicament but consistently refused to cross several red lines. President Joe Biden rejected sending American ground troops, arguing that direct combat between U.S. and Russian forces risked a wider war between nuclear powers. He repeatedly ruled out establishing a no-fly zone because enforcing one would require U.S. pilots to shoot down Russian aircraft. His administration initially declined to provide F-16 fighter jets, long-range ATACMS missiles, and other advanced systems for fear of uncontrolled escalation, only relaxing some of those restrictions gradually after lengthy internal debate.
Throughout those decisions, Washington’s guiding principle remained consistent: help Ukraine defend itself without allowing the United States to become a direct combatant against Russia, while also eschewing diplomacy that could have brought the fighting to an end.
Today, however, the strategic landscape has changed. The Trump administration’s war with Iran has produced exactly the dilemma many critics predicted. Washington possesses overwhelming military superiority, yet it has suffered a strategic defeat at the hand of Tehran. Iran has demonstrated an ability to widen the battlefield horizontally, impose costs across multiple theaters, and force the United States to defend allies and assets far from the original front lines. Iran has escalation dominance; Trump has no good military option and he lacks the patience to pursue the diplomatic ones with discipline.
Trump’s vulnerability creates a historic opening for Kyiv. Instead of appearing as a country dependent on American assistance, Ukraine can now present itself as a strategic asset capable of helping Washington turn a military debacle into a splendid victory. Ukrainian drone warfare has evolved faster than almost any military innovation during the past three years. Its experience integrating inexpensive autonomous systems into conventional warfare has few equals.
Just as important, Ukraine could offer something Washington currently lacks: an opportunity to expand the conflict into an entirely new geographic theater. That is, turn Iran’s horizontal escalation against it.
The Caspian Sea represents such a possibility, in the Ukrainian argument. Opening pressure against Iran from the north would complicate Tehran’s military planning, force it to redistribute scarce resources, and reduce its ability to dictate where the conflict is fought.
From Kyiv’s perspective, offering that capability transforms Ukraine from America’s benefactor to its savior.
But a greater strategic prize for Kyiv would be to fuse the two conflicts into one. Such a merger would fundamentally alter the political logic of both wars. American personnel, intelligence assets, logistics, and operational planning would become increasingly intertwined across the two theaters. Russian and Iranian military cooperation would likewise encourage Washington to treat them as components of a single conflict rather than separate crises.
Once that threshold is crossed, the distinction between supporting Ukraine and fighting Russia becomes progressively harder to sustain.
This dynamic would also appeal to Israel. First, it would give the Iran war another lease on life. Second, it would internationalize the conflict further by drawing European governments into the Iran theater through their deep commitments to Ukraine. And third, perhaps most significantly, it would transform the political narrative. Defeating Iran would no longer be presented as a necessity to defend Israel, but rather, to defend Ukraine.
Given the levels of elite and public support Ukraine enjoys — after all, it was the victim of an illegal invasion — such a framing is far more politically digestible than centering the war on Israel, given Israel’s plummeting standing in the West due to its genocide in Gaza and critical role in starting the illegal war with Iran
None of this means that Ukraine’s gamble will succeed. But Trump may be susceptible to it given his self-inflicted predicament in the Strait of Hormuz. (However, judging by the decision not to hold a press conference today, this may mean Zelensky’s meeting with Trump earlier at the White House was less than successful.)
Though Biden’s Ukraine policy deserves much criticism, he is resisting this type of escalation because the risk of direct confrontation between NATO and Russia could lead to a much larger and more catastrophic war. Those concerns have not disappeared simply because the White House has changed hands or because Trump has trapped himself in a foolish war.
Attempts to solve one strategic problem by broadening the scope of a conflict have often made both problems harder to resolve. The greatest danger today may not be that Trump chooses to fight two wars simultaneously, but that seemingly small escalatory steps pave the way for a disaster both Biden and Trump have sought to avoid.
Trita Parsi is the co-founder and Executive Vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
Colonel Doug Macgregor: Sleepwalking into World War III
07/21/2026• Claudio Grass, https://mises.org/power-market/colonel-doug-macgregor-sleepwalking-world-war-iii
[Part of the upcoming “World War III” documentary]
Excerpts from this interview with Colonel Douglas Macgregor offers a most necessary and timely opportunity for self-reflection that the US and Europe so desperately need at this critical moment. Colonel Douglas Macgregor holds up a mirror to the West and uses his deep historical knowledge and personal experience of previous conflicts to clearly demonstrate the parallels, the motivations and the dynamics that are still in place and dictate policy to this day.
On the Ukraine war, he offers a scathing critique of Western leadership and “strategy,” specifically targeting the political elite in London, Paris, and Washington for operating under the assumption that prolonged conflict will somehow trigger an internal rebellion against President Putin that the West could then take advantage of.
“That’s all nonsense,” he argues.
Russian society is cohesive and durable. It’s the West that has a society, or societies, that are not cohesive, that are not durable. So you would have to say that the people that are pushing this are certifiable. They all belong in Bedlam somewhere. It’s a combination of ignorance, arrogance, and wishful thinking. You put the three together, and you get Starmer, you get Macron, you get Merz, at least at this point, in Berlin. These people are living in a fantasy world. They don’t understand how close they are to a confrontation that could cost millions of lives.
On the Israel-Gaza conflict, his assessment is even more devastating. He points out that the Israeli aggression and brutality displayed in the genocidal war has made the nation a pariah in the international community and that their push for a wider conflict will prove catastrophic both for Israel and for the US. In fact, he saw the current war coming and, quite prophetically, he anticipated that,
The Iranians have an enormous arsenal now that allows it to strike back with great power against Israel and, for that matter, against any US installation. So the point is that what seems to people in Washington as something that is limited and narrow could very quickly move just beyond the region and involve major powers around the world.
He also answered the question that countless observers have been asking: Israel has been trying to instigate a war with Iran for decades, using the same narratives and threats over and over, so why did it happen now? According to Macgregor,
. . .the aggressive posture of Israel is not sustainable over the long term. And I think that Netanyahu and his supporters know that. That’s why there’s enormous pressure to do things now, because they have control of the United States, its armed forces, its population, its government, in ways they’ve never had before, and it’s not going to last.
However, he reserved his most surgical criticism for his own country, its conduct in the majority of wars it has waged, including the ongoing one, and, most importantly, the impact that it all had on the nation’s own economy and on its own people. Drawing a direct historical parallel to the Vietnam War and how it was a catalyst for abandoning the gold standard, Macgregor argues that the US has a habit of “spending itself into oblivion” and hollowing out its industrial base to serve the military-industrial-congressional complex. This fiscal decay is now colliding with a profound crisis of trust within the American public.
Macgregor sees the covid pandemic as a turning point, where citizens realized they were being lied to by institutions ranging from the NIH and the WHO to the Department of Defense. He concludes that, while Americans are increasingly suspicious of the institutional media and the political class on the Hill, the nation remains largely ill-prepared for the transition from a condition of abundance to one of scarcity and potential civil unrest.
(Watch the full interview with Colonel Doug Macgregor here and help us spread the crucial message behind the “World War III” documentary.)
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