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The Ukrainian Intelligence Committee Is Preparing For The Worst-Case Scenario

ANDREW KORYBKO, FEB 28, 2024, https://korybko.substack.com/p/the-ukrainian-intelligence-committee—

What’s regarded as the worst-case scenario from the perspective of the ruling Ukrainian elite and their Western masters is the best-case scenario for the rest of the world. In the event that Zelensky is deposed and peace talks immediately resume right as Russia breaks through the Line of Contact, then NATO might not feel as pressured by its security dilemma with Russia to conventionally intervene in Ukraine, thus reducing the risk of World War III by miscalculation.

The Ukrainian Intelligence Committee warned in a Telegram post about the worst-case scenario that could happen by June whereby a Russian breakthrough across the Line of Contact (LOC) merges with protests over conscription and Zelensky’s illegitimacy to deal a deathblow to the state. They predictably claimed that those protests, along with claims of growing fatigue inside Western and Ukrainian societies plus civil-military tensions in Kiev, are just “Russian disinformation” even though they all veritably exist.

“Zelensky Is Desperate To Preemptively Discredit Potentially Forthcoming Protests Against Him” and that’s why he claimed in late November that Russia is conspiring to orchestrate a so-called “Maidan 3” against him, which is what the Intelligence Committee explicitly referred to in their post. Their warning also came as Ukrainian media reported that Zelensky plans to ask the Constitutional Court to rule on holding elections during martial law in order to retain legitimacy after his term expires on 20 May.

The preceding hyperlinked report from Turkish media also mentions how “opposition party leaders Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko proposed forming a coalition government to avoid a crisis of legitimacy” but were rebuked by National Security Council chief Danilov. What’s so interesting about this proposal is that it was first tabled by an expert from the powerful Atlantic Council think tank in an article that they published in Politico in mid-December in order to serve that exact same purpose.

This reminder and the subsequent proposal by those two opposition party leaders debunks the notion that questions about Zelensky’s legitimacy are solely the result of “Russian disinformation” just like a top European think tank’s latest poll from January debunks the same about fatigue over this conflict. The European Council on Foreign Relations, which can’t credibly be described as “pro-Russian”, found that only 10% of Europeans think that Ukraine will defeat Russia.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Congressional deadlock over more Ukraine aid proves that such sentiments are shared in the halls of power, and those who hold these views understandably don’t want to continue throwing hard-earn taxpayer funds into a doomed-to-fail proxy war. Western leaders as a whole, however, are clearly panicking over the latest military-strategic dynamics that followed the failure of Kiev’s counteroffensive last summer and Russia’s recent victory in Avdeevka.

That’s why many of them debated whether to conventionally intervene in Ukraine during Monday’s meeting in Paris that was attended by over 20 European leaders. French President Macron said that this can’t be ruled out despite there being no consensus on the issue, which his Polish counterpart confirmed was the most heated part of their discussions that day. This prompted strong denials from all other Western leaders who claimed that they’ll never authorize this, but their words can’t be taken seriously.

After all, the worst-case scenario that the Ukrainian Intelligence Committee warned about and is actively trying to discredit as supposedly being driven solely by “Russian disinformation” could push them to conventionally intervene in order to avert the state’s collapse and an Afghan-like disaster in Europe. NATO is unlikely to sit idly on the sidelines if Russia steamrolls through the ruins after breaking through the LOC by sometime this summer, hence why a conventional intervention truly can’t be ruled out.

It would be very unpopular in the West as proven by the previously mentioned think tank’s latest poll and the ongoing Congressional deadlock over Ukraine aid, but that doesn’t mean that the elite won’t do it since they don’t take public opinion into consideration when formulating foreign and military policy. Even so, the large-scale protests that could follow in Europe are something that the elite want to avoid, but they might still risk them in order for their geopolitical project in Ukraine not to be totally for naught.

Considering the global significance of this conflict, what’s regarded as the worst-case scenario from the perspective of the ruling Ukrainian elite and their Western masters is therefore the best-case scenario for the rest of the world. In the event that Zelensky is deposed and peace talks immediately resume right as Russia breaks through the LOC, then NATO might not feel as pressured by its security dilemma with Russia to conventionally intervene in Ukraine, thus reducing the risk of World War III by miscalculation.

March 5, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

The reawakening of America’s nuclear dinosaurs

“The issue of plutonium pit aging is a Trojan horse for the nuclear weaponeers enriching themselves through a dangerous new arms race,” said Jay Coghlan, executive director of Nuclear Watch New Mexico, an anti-nuclear group based in Santa Fe. “Future pit production is not about maintaining the existing, extensively tested stockpile. Instead, it’s for deploying multiple new warheads on new intercontinental ballistic missiles.”

The risk of a false alarm is enough reason to “do away with the ICBMs altogether,……. “An accidental launch is a major contributor to the overall probability of an all out nuclear war.”

Are America’s plutonium pits too old to perform in the new Cold War? Or are new ones necessary?

by Alicia Inez Guzmán February 28, 2024

Sprinkled across five western states, in silos buried deep underground and protected by reinforced concrete, sit 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Each of those missiles is equipped with a single nuclear warhead. And each of those warheads is itself equipped with one hollow, grapefruit-sized plutonium pit, designed to trigger a string of deadly reactions.

All of those missiles are on “hair-trigger alert,” poised for hundreds of targets in Russia — any one of which could raze all of downtown Moscow and cause hundreds of thousands of casualties.

Except — what if it doesn’t? What if, in a nuclear exchange, the pit fizzles because it’s just too old? In that case, would the weapon be a total dud or simply yield but a fraction of its latent power?

Outwardly, at least, that’s the question driving a whole new era of plutonium pit production at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility in South Carolina.

Plutonium is widely known as one the most exotic elements in the periodic table. Trace amounts of it have been identified in the earth’s crust, though all of what’s now used for America’s nuclear weapons is manmade. For decades, these pits were cast with plutonium and other materials at a breakneck pace, installed in warheads and strapped into missiles that were regularly upgraded and modernized in an escalating arms race with the Soviet Union. Plutonium pits were never intended to grow old and senescent.

“We never worried about aging,” said Siegfried Hecker, former director of LANL and one of the world’s leading plutonium experts. “Because bombs were supposed to be out there for a dozen years or so.”

It’s been almost 40 years since America’s Cold War pit factory at Rocky Flats near Denver was raided by FBI agents and closed due to environmental crimes — among them, releases of radioactive effluent into nearby waterways. In that time, pit production went largely dormant, the USSR collapsed, arms reductions treaties were signed, stockpiles reduced and underground testing ceased.

Now, as the nuclear industrial complex awakens from its long slumber, the resumption of plutonium pit production has emerged as a deeply polarizing and political act. Anti-nuclear activists have accused the federal government of exploiting the uncertainty around aging to jumpstart a nearly $60 billion dollar manufacturing program. They assert that the real reason America has resumed the production of pits is for the purpose of introducing a new generation of warheads for a new generation of missiles — the first of which is the Sentinel, one of the most complex and expensive programs in the history of the U.S. Air Force.

The Sentinel ICBM has the capability to carry three separate warheads, each with its own target. Earlier versions of America’s missiles could and did have such capabilities and the option has remained available, but with post-Cold War weapons reductions, the number of warheads per missile was also reduced — one warhead, one intercontinental ballistic missile. As the U.S., Russia and China barrel toward a new Cold War, the U.S. will likely eschew such a convention in a matter of years.

But to hear Hecker and his colleagues tell it, the question of pit aging is as scientifically vexing as it is political. Plutonium, to its most studied acolytes, borders almost on the mystical, its properties as capricious as the human body. It can be brittle or soft under some circumstances or turn to powder when heated in air. It can disintegrate at room temperature. It can bombard itself with radiation and mar its own internal lattice structure. It can even heal that damage within fractions of a second, if not over the course of several decades.

According to Glenn Seaborg, former chair of the Atomic Energy Commission and the chemist credited with first synthesizing the element for use in weapons, plutonium is “so unusual as to approach the unbelievable.”

This quality means that even the most knowledgeable experts are reluctant to commit themselves to anything definitive when it comes to a plutonium pit’s long-term prospects. Does it last 50 years? One hundred? Is it comparable to a human body, whose bones weaken and whose mind is vulnerable to dementia? Or is it actually impervious to entropy?

“It is difficult to quantify how much the properties of a plutonium pit will change over time,”…………………………………………………………………………………………..

Too big to fail”

The political machinations actually go back even further — to the 2010 concession that President Barack Obama made to a largely Republican bloc of Senators: arms control in exchange for a revival of the nuclear weapons complex.

………………….

the beginning of a new era, a tectonic modernization of America’s nuclear triad — land, sea and air — now projected to cost close to $2 trillion over the next 30 years. That’s roughly the GDP of Canada.

Plutonium pits, of course, represent only a small fraction of the cost. That mind-boggling figure reflects a total reimagining of the nation’s entire nuclear program, complete with brand new ballistic missile submarines, 400 new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles, tactical aircrafts, underground silos and 800 nuclear warheads.

The Sentinel program alone — cost, $131 billion — is a juggernaut. “I think this program has become too big to fail for an entrenched part of the military-industrial-congressional complex,” said Geoff Wilson, an expert on federal defense spending at the Independent watchdog, Project on Government Oversight.

…………………………………………………………. America’s warheads have also been regularly surveilled since the late 1990s, leading even the most cautious scientists to vouch for their reliability. In 2000, Raymond Jeanloz — a professor of earth and planetary science and astronomy at University of California, Berkeley— found little evidence that defects in those warheads increased significantly with age. His statistical models, based on data culled from LANL and LLNL, showed that such defects, if any, accumulate at the glacial rate of one percent per quarter century…………………….

A new Cold War

In the unthinkable scenario that a Sentinel is deployed, it would propel like a rocket beyond earth’s atmosphere and into space. As it reached its apogee, the missile would shed all its pieces and the warheads would descend toward their intended targets, half a world away.

For now, though, the Sentinel is barely a reality. The program is so complex and vastly over budget that some in the arms control community are calling for its complete cancellation. Experts question such a missile’s ability to deter China without provoking Russia. Other critics consider the plan to build new weapons as a dangerous return to the policies of the Cold War.

As for the plutonium pits, LANL is behind by at least four years; Savannah River by at least six. Indeed, to meet the projected quota demanded for future weapons could take decades.

But even if all the timetables are met, intercontinental ballistic missiles will always be a “danger to the world as long as they are on launch-on-warning alert,” according to Frank N. von Hippel, senior research physicist and professor of public and international affairs emeritus with Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security.

The risk of a false alarm is enough reason to “do away with the ICBMs altogether,” as he and others — presidents, retired commanders, and at least one secretary of defense, alike — have long campaigned to do. “An accidental launch is a major contributor to the overall probability of an all out nuclear war.”…………………………. And once an ICBM is launched, there would be no way to stop it

March 4, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | - plutonium, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Einstein’s Postwar Campaign To Save The World From Nuclear Destruction

By Lawrence S. Wittner, 4 Mar 2024, https://www.eurasiareview.com/04032024-einsteins-postwar-campaign-to-save-the-world-from-nuclear-destruction-oped/

Although the popular new Netflix film, Einstein and the Bomb, purports to tell the story of the great physicist’s relationship to nuclear weapons, it ignores his vital role in rallying the world against nuclear catastrophe.

Aghast at the use of nuclear weapons in August 1945 to obliterate the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Einstein threw himself into efforts to prevent worldwide nuclear annihilation. In September, responding to a letter from Robert Hutchins, Chancellor of the University of Chicago, about nuclear weapons, Einstein contended that, “as long as nations demand unrestricted sovereignty, we shall undoubtedly be faced with still bigger wars, fought with bigger and technologically more advanced weapons.” Thus, “the most important task of intellectuals is to make this clear to the general public and to emphasize over and over again the need to establish a well-organized world government.” Four days later, he made the same point to an interviewer, insisting that “the only salvation for civilization and the human race lies in the creation of a world government, with security of nations founded upon law.”

Determined to prevent nuclear war, Einstein repeatedly hammered away at the need to replace international anarchy with a federation of nations operating under international law. In October 1945, together with other prominent Americans (among them Senator J. William Fulbright, Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, and novelist Thomas Mann), Einstein called for a “Federal Constitution of the World.” That November, he returned to this theme in an interview published in the Atlantic Monthly. “The release of atomic energy has not created a new problem,” he said. “It has merely made more urgent the necessity of solving an existing one…As long as there are sovereign nations possessing great power, war is inevitable.” And war, sooner or later, would become nuclear war.

Einstein promoted these ideas through a burgeoning atomic scientists’ movement in which he played a central role. To bring the full significance of the atomic bomb to the public, the newly-formed Federation of American Scientists put together an inexpensive paperback, One World or None, with individual essays by prominent Americans. In his contribution to the book, Einstein wrote that he was “convinced there is only one way out” and this necessitated creating “a supranational organization” to “make it impossible for any country to wage war.” This hard-hitting book, which first appeared in early 1946, sold more than 100,000 copies.

Given Einstein’s fame and his well-publicized efforts to avert a nuclear holocaust, in May 1946 he became chair of the newly-formed Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, a fundraising and policymaking arm for the atomic scientists’ movement. In the Committee’s first fund appeal, Einstein warned that “the unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

Even so, despite the fact that Einstein, like most members of the early atomic scientists’ movement, saw world government as the best recipe for survival in the nuclear age, there seemed good reason to consider shorter-range objectives. After all, the Cold War was emerging and nations were beginning to formulate nuclear policies. An early Atomic Scientists of Chicago statement, prepared by Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, underscored practical considerations. “Since world government is unlikely to be achieved within the short time available before the atomic armaments race will lead to an acute danger of armed conflict,” it noted, “the establishment of international controls must be considered as a problem of immediate urgency.” Consequently, the movement increasingly worked in support of specific nuclear arms control and disarmament measures.

n the context of the heightening Cold War, however, taking even limited steps forward proved impossible. The Russian government sharply rejected the Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy and, instead, developed its own atomic arsenal. In turn, U.S. President Harry Truman, in February 1950, announced his decision to develop a hydrogen bomb―a weapon a thousand times as powerful as its predecessor. Naturally, the atomic scientists were deeply disturbed by this lurch toward disaster. Appearing on television, Einstein called once more for the creation of a “supra-national” government as the only “way out of the impasse.” Until then, he declared, “annihilation beckons.”

Despite the dashing of his hopes for postwar action to end the nuclear menace, Einstein lent his support over the following years to peace, nuclear disarmament, and world government projects.

The most important of these ventures occurred in 1955, when Bertrand Russell, like Einstein, a proponent of world federation, conceived the idea of issuing a public statement by a small group of the world’s most eminent scientists about the existential peril nuclear weapons brought to modern war. Asked by Russell for his support, Einstein was delighted to sign the statement and did so in one of his last actions before his death that April. In July, Russell presented the statement to a large meeting in London, packed with representatives of the mass communications media. In the shadow of the Bomb, it read, “we have to learn to think in a new way…Shall we…choose death because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.”

This Russell-Einstein Manifesto, as it became known, helped trigger a remarkable worldwide uprising against nuclear weapons in the late 1950s and early 1960s, culminating in the world’s first significant nuclear arms control measures. Furthermore, in later years, it inspired legions of activists and world leaders. Among them was the Soviet Union’s Mikhail Gorbachev, whose “new thinking,” modeled on the Manifesto, brought a dramatic end to the Cold War and fostered substantial nuclear disarmament.

The Manifesto thus provided an appropriate conclusion to Einstein’s unremitting campaign to save the world from nuclear destruction.

March 4, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | media, PERSONAL STORIES, weapons and war | Leave a comment

After Macron touted troops to Ukraine, Putin warns West of nuclear war risk

The Russian president, in a state of the nation address, upped the ante on Thursday. Should the world be worried about his threat?

Aljazeera, By Mansur Mirovalev, 1 Mar 2024

President Vladimir Putin has threatened to use nuclear weapons if Western powers send soldiers to within striking distance of Russia.

His comments on Thursday, in a state of the nation address, were the kind of remarks usually uttered by Dmitry Medvedev, a Putin ally who served as Russia’s president from 2008-2012 and prime minister until becoming a top security official in 2020………………….

Putin has now upped the ante, responding to French President Emmanuel Macron’s assumption on Monday that a deployment of European troops to Ukraine cannot be “ruled out”………………..

The West has “announced the possibility of sending Western military contingents to Ukraine,” Putin said on Thursday. “The consequences for possible interventionists will be way more tragic.

“They should eventually realise that we also have weapons that can hit targets on their territory. Everything that the West comes up with creates the real threat of a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, and thus the destruction of civilisation,” he said.

Moscow has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal including a new generation of hypersonic missiles and several times more tactical nuclear weapons than the collective West.

“Now it is Putin who clearly draws a red line about using the nukes,” Kushch said, adding that Macron had probed Putin’s reaction on when Moscow would be ready to launch the nukes…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… more https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/1/how-real-is-putins-threat-to-nuke-the-west

March 3, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | weapons and war | 1 Comment

Setting the record straight on Canada’s arms exports to Israel

29 Feb 24, https://www.ploughshares.ca/publications/ploughshares-statement-setting-the-record-straight-on-canadas-arms-exports-to-israel

Canadian officials, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, have recently claimed that Canada does not export weapons to Israel, and instead has only exported “non-lethal” equipment to that country. Moreover, the Prime Minister stated before Parliament on February 14, 2024, that no export permits have been issued for Canadian arms transfers to Israel since October 7, 2023.

The Foreign Minister’s statement is misleading. The Prime Minister’s is patently false.

Documents recently released by Global Affairs Canada show that Canadian officials authorized nearly $30-million in military goods to Israel since October 7, 2023. These recent arms export authorizations are in addition to the more than $140-million (constant CAD) in military goods Canada has transferred to Israel over the last decade.

Under Canada’s export control regime, there exists no category for “non-lethal” arms exports. The relevant question is whether Canada has authorized the export of controlled military goods to Israel – and it has.

Given that the Government of Canada recognizes all these proposed exports as military goods, the claim that Canada only exports “non-lethal” equipment to Israel is misleading. Technology does not need be lethal itself to otherwise enable lethal operations.

We urge the Government of Canada to clarify and rectify its messaging on this matter.

Project Ploughshares also reiterates its call for Canada to end the supply of military goods to Israel, as per its obligations under the Export and Import Permits Act and the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty.

March 3, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Canada, weapons and war | Leave a comment

South Korea (and U.S.) has a permanent war economy.

The only real jobs investment by Washington these days is going toward weapons of war.

South Korea is now being flooded with so-called ‘missile defense’ systems.

Bruce Gagnon – coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space
https://space4peace.blogspot.com/2024/03/south-korea-and-us-has-permanent-war.html

Yesterday was the last day of my space issues speaking tour across South Korea.

I had two meetings in the afternoon before my final talk in the evening in Seoul.

The first was a meeting with two representatives from SPARK (Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea) which was formed to organize for national self-determination, peace and disarmament, and the reunification of the two East Asian Korean nations.

SPARK is now working on holding an ‘International People’s Tribunal to hold the U.S. accountable for dropping Atomic bombs’ in New York City in 2026 (date not yet set). The event aims to highlight the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 from the perspective of Korean A-bomb victims (an oppressed ethnic group) in Japan who are usually the forgotten victims. The goal of the tribunal will be to contribute to the realization of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and world, free from the threat and use of nuclear weapons.

I agreed that the Global Network would help in every way possible to make the event a success. (Let me know if your group would be interested in co-sponsoring this tribunal.)

Next on the schedule was a dinner meeting with Dr. Kang-Ho Song and other members of the organization called The Frontiers. Dr. Song was a major supporting activist in Gangjeong on Jeju Island during the long campaign to oppose the Navy base that was forced upon the 500 year old fishing/farming village by the United States. Dr. Song went to jail three times (the longest sentence was more than a year) for his non-violent protests against the base.

The Frontiers recently has become quite active supporting Japanese controlled islanders who are opposing the deployment of offensive missiles being aimed at China. They have made sailboat trips to the string of islands (including Okinawa and Taiwan) to build inter-island solidarity. In their literature The Frontiers states: ‘We sail with the hope of driving out war, military training, and bases from this sea and creating a sea of co-existence and peace where humanity and all sea creatures can live together.’

Last presentation

My last talk was attended by 55 people. I’m told that even for Seoul that is a good turnout as similar peace talks these days are lucky to draw 30 people.

It was fun to see several old friends show up who I know from my many visits to Jeju Island since 2009. The talk went well (my voice which these days occasionally gets shaky has held up throughout this trip) and there was a healthy question and answer period.

One woman approached me after the talk and said that ‘South Korea’s economy is not good for the people, we are becoming a permanent war economy’. I responded that it is the same in the United States these days as well.

In fact just this morning I received an email that in my home state of Maine Governor Mills, U.S. Senators Susan Collins and Angus King, and U.S. Representative Chellie Pingree will participate in the unveiling of the Maine Defense Industry Alliance (MDIA) at the York County Community College (YCCC) Instructional Site in Sanford. The MDIA is a newly established non-profit coalition of Maine defense companies, state agencies, community colleges and universities, and other vocational training organizations. The partnership was created to attract and train thousands of new employees for critical jobs in Maine’s defense industrial base.
This is a perfect example of what a permanent war economy looks like. The only real jobs investment by Washington these days is going toward weapons of war. In the case of Maine, the so-called leaders want expanded Pentagon funding for more Aegis destroyers at Bath Iron Works shipyard. They also want hypersonics testing at a former US air base in the northern part of the state (Loring). And they want a rocket launch center near Acadia national park that would hoist mini-satellites for the US Space Force to help fill up Lower Earth Orbit (LEO) before China and Russia can put significant numbers of satellites there.

South Korea is now being flooded with so-called ‘missile defense’ systems. They are on-board Navy Aegis destroyers which are consistently ported on Jeju Island. They are the THAAD and PAC-3 systems deployed at several bases throughout the ROK. And the US is deploying these same ‘shields’ in Guam, Japan/Okinawa, Taiwan, Philippines, and other locations in the region.

U.S. bases in the ROK are expanding and held more than 200 days last year of US-ROK war games right along the border of North Korea.

Alternative media

As a result of my talks during this tour there are already articles and interviews by people who came to hear me speak and quickly moved to share what they learned. Here are three examples and I am told there will be more to come.

A woman named Oh Hyun-hwa in Daejeong gave a local radio interview. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJfcAvmL8uo
Anti-War Peace Activist Concerned Jeju seems to be turning into a big South Korea-U.S. military base. Article by Kim Soon-ae. https://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0003004637
Space industry erodes the space, the commons, and destroys the future.Article by Kim Na-hee. https://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0003005816

March 3, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | South Korea, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Did the West Intentionally Incite Putin to War?

by GORDONHAHN, February 27, 2024

Over the last year the US and NATO countries have undertaken no effort to convince Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskiy to begin talks with Putin, despite: the death of more than half a million Ukrainians; the destruction of much of Ukraine’s economy, finances, physical infrastructure, human capital, civil society; and the West’s inability to sustain financial and military support even as Ukraine loses the war when said support was at its height.

The West’s war strategy now seems to be to prolong a ‘long war’ in the hope either that the war begins to affect Russia and Putin’s standing there or that Putin’s health wanes and his system destabilizes. All this and much more written below raises suspicions the West intentionally, maybe even ‘subconsciously’ – the actions of small policy victories won in order to ‘confront Putin’ by competing elements within it, especially inside Washington – drew Russia into the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War. Aside from the background cause and main driver of this decision – NATO expansion – and more immediate precipitants of Putin’s decision in mid- to late February 2022, what efforts, of any, did the West undertake perhaps intentionally to drive this decision?

If we look at the course of events in reverse chronological order it seems to me even more glaringly so that the West sought this war and indeed drew Russia into it intentionally with the the strategy of using the war to weaken Russia’s economic and political stability. The strategic goal is the reinforcement of US hegemony and power maximalization by achieving two long-standing, interrelated sub-goals: (1) NATO expansion and (2) the removal from power of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Let’s reverse engineer the course of events.

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. A final side note. All this has led to NATO and the US being combatants in a war against Russia, which threatens us with world war and nuclear conflagration https://gordonhahn.com/2024/02/27/did-the-west-intentionally-incite-putin-to-war/—

March 3, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Full Transcript of German Top Military Officials’ Leaked Plot to Attack Crimean Bridge

https://sputnikglobe.com/20240301/full-transcript-of-german-top-military-officials-leaked-plot-to-attack-crimean-bridge-1117078481.html

On February 19, 2024, a conversation took place among Grafe (department head for operations and exercises at the Air Force Forces Command of the Bundeswehr), Gerhartz (Bundeswehr Air Force Inspector), Fenske and Frohstedte (employees of the Air Operations Command within the Space Operations Center of the Bundeswehr).

Earlier in the day, Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of RT and Rossiya Segodnya, Sputnik’s parent media group, published the text of a conversation among high-ranking Bundeswehr representatives discussing the attack on the Crimean Bridge with Taurus missiles and other issues. Full audio is here and full transcript is below.

Gerhartz: Greetings, everyone! Grafe, are you currently in Singapore?

Grafe: Yes.

Gerhartz: Good. We need to verify the information. As you’ve probably heard, Defense Minister Pistorius intends to carefully consider the issue of supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine. We have a meeting scheduled with him. We need to discuss everything so that we can start working on it. So far, I don’t see any indication of when these deliveries will start. The Chancellor never told him, “I want the information now, and tomorrow morning we’ll make the decision.” I haven’t heard anything like that. On the contrary, Pistorius is evaluating all this ongoing discussion. Nobody knows why the Federal Chancellor is blocking these deliveries. Of course, the most incredible rumors are going around. For example, yesterday a journalist, who is very close to the Chancellor, called me. She heard somewhere in Munich that the Taurus missiles would not work. I asked her who told her that. She replied that someone in a military uniform did. Of course, this is a low-level source of information, but the journalist clung to these words and now wants to make it into a piece of news with a headline like: “Now we know why the Chancellor refuses to send Taurus missiles – they won’t work.” All this is nonsense. Such topics are only available to a limited circle of people. However, we see what kind of garbage is spreading in the meantime. I want to coordinate this issue with you so that we don’t move in the wrong direction. Firstly, I have some questions for Frohstedte and Fenske. Has anyone spoken to you about this? Did Freyding approach you?

Frohstedte: No. I only spoke to Grafe.

Fenske: Same here, I only spoke to Grafe.

Gerhartz: He might reach out to you later. I might have to participate in budget committee hearings because there are issues related to the escalating costs of upgrading the F-35 in Büchel. I have already passed my recommendations through Frank that we have slides to visualize the material. We showed him a draft presentation where Taurus missiles were mounted on a Tornado carrier or other carrier required by the mission. However, I can hardly imagine that. Remember, it’s a half-hour meeting, so don’t prepare a 30-slide presentation. The report should be brief. We need to show what the missile can do and how it can be used. We need to consider the consequences if we make a political decision to transfer missiles as aid to Ukraine. I would appreciate it if you could inform me not only about the problems we have, but also on how we can solve them. For example, if we’re talking about delivery methods… I know how the English do it. They always transport them on Ridgback armored vehicles. They have several people on-site. The French don’t do it that way. They deliver Q7s to Ukraine with Scalp missiles. Storm Shadows and Scalps have similar technical specifications for their installation. How are we going to solve this problem? Are we going to transfer MBDA missiles to them using Ridgbacks? Will one of our people be posted to MBDA? Grafe, report to us on our position on this issue. Fenske and Frohstedte, Gentlemen, report on how you see the situation.

Grafe: I’ll start with the most sensitive issues, with the existing criticism regarding the deliveries. Discussions are taking place almost everywhere. There are several key aspects here. Firstly, it’s about the delivery timelines. If the Chancellor decides now that we should deliver missiles, they will be transferred from the Bundeswehr. Fine, but they will only be ready for use in eight months. Secondly, we cannot shorten the time. Because if we do, there might be an error in its use, the missile might hit a kindergarten, and there will be civilian casualties again. These aspects need to be considered. It must be noted in the negotiations that without the manufacturer, we cannot do anything. They can equip, rearm, and deliver the initial missiles. We can speed up production a bit, but we shouldn’t wait until 20 units have accumulated. We can deliver them in batches of five. The delivery time of these missiles directly depends on the industry. Who will pay for this? Another question to consider is which weapon systems will these missiles be mounted on? And, how should the interaction between the company and Ukraine be maintained? Is there already some form of integration established?

Gerhartz: I don’t think so. Because the manufacturer, TSG, stated that, they can solve this problem within six months, whether it’s a Sukhoi aircraft or an F-16.

Grafe: If the Federal Chancellor decides to go for this, there must be an understanding that it will take six months just for the production of mounts. Thirdly, theoretically, the question of training may concern us. I’ve already mentioned that we cooperate with the missile manufacturer. They handle the maintenance training, and we handle the tactical application. This takes about three to four months. This part of the training can take place in Germany. When delivering the initial missiles, we need to make quick decisions regarding the mounts and training. We may have to turn to the British for these matters and use their know-how. We can provide them with databases, satellite images, and planning stations. Apart from the delivery of the missiles themselves, which we have, everything else can be provided by the industry or the IABG.

Gerhartz: We need to consider that they can use aircraft with mounts for both Taurus and Storm Shadow missiles. The British have been there and outfitted aircraft. There is not much difference between the systems, they can be used for Taurus as well. I can talk about the experience of using the Patriot system. Our experts initially also tallied up long timeframes, but they managed to do it within a few weeks. They managed to get everything up and running so quickly and in so much quantity that our staff said, “Wow. We didn’t expect that.” We are currently fighting a war that uses much more modern technology than our good old Luftwaffe. This all suggests that when we plan deadlines, we shouldn’t go overboard with them. And now, Fenske and Frohstedte, Gentlemen, I would like to hear your opinion on possible deliveries to Ukraine.

Fenske: I would like to focus on the question of training. We have already looked into this, and if we deal with personnel who already have relevant training and will undergo training concurrently, it would only take approximately three weeks for them to become familiar with the equipment and then proceed directly to Air Force training, which would last about four weeks. Thus, it is much less than 12 weeks. However, this is all under the assumption that the personnel meet the necessary qualifications, training can be conducted without the need for translators, and a few other conditions are met. We have already engaged in discussions with Mrs. Friedberger regarding this matter. If we are talking about combat deployment, then in that case, de facto, we will be advised to support at least the initial group. Planning for this undertaking has proven to be challenging; it took approximately a year to train our personnel initially, and we are now aiming to reduce this timeframe to just ten weeks. Moreover, there is the added concern of ensuring they are capable of handling off-road driving in an F1 car. One possible option is to provide scheduled technical support; theoretically, this can be done from Büchel provided secure communication with Ukraine is established. If this were available, then further planning could be carried out. This is the main scenario at least – to provide full manufacturer support, support through the user support service, which will solve software problems. Basically, it’s the same as we have in Germany.

Gerhartz: Hold on a moment. I understand what you’re saying. Politicians might be concerned about the direct closed connection between Büchel and Ukraine, which could imply direct involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. But in that case, we can say that information exchange is going to take place through MBDA, and we’ll send one or two of our specialists to Schröbenhausen. Of course, this is cunning, but from a political standpoint, it probably looks different. If the information exchange goes through the manufacturer, then it has nothing to do with us.

Fenske: The question will arise as to where the information goes. If we’re talking about information on target engagement, ideally including satellite images providing maximum accuracy of up to three meters, then we must first process them in Büchel. I think regardless of this, we can somehow organize an information exchange between Büchel and Schröbenhausen, or we can explore the possibility of transmitting information to Poland, doing it where it’s accessible by car. This matter needs to be examined more closely; options will surely emerge If we are supported, in the worst case scenario we can even travel by car, which will reduce the reaction time. Of course, we won’t be able to react within an hour because we’ll need to give our consent. In the very best case, only six hours after receiving the information will the planes be able to execute an order. For hitting specific targets, an accuracy of more than three meters is sufficient, but if target refinement is necessary, we’ll need to work with satellite images that allow for modeling. And then the reaction time can be up to 12 hours. It all depends on the target. I haven’t studied this issue in detail, but I believe such an option is possible. We just need to figure out how to organize information transmission.

Gerhartz: Do you think we can hope that Ukraine will be able to do everything on its own? After all, it’s known that there are numerous people there in civilian attire who speak with an American accent. So it’s quite possible that soon they’ll be able to use everything themselves, right? After all, they have all the satellite images.

Fenske: Yes, they get them from us. I would also like to touch on air defense issues briefly. We need to seriously consider having equipment in Kiev to receive information from IABG and NDK. We must ensure this is provided to them, which is why I have to fly there on February 21. It is crucial that we plan everything meticulously, unlike what happened with the Storm Shadows where we failed to plan out checkpoints properly. We need to think about how to fly around or fly below the radar coverage sector. If everything is prepared, the training will be more effective. And then we can revisit the question of the number of missiles. If we give them 50, they will be used up very quickly.

Gerhartz: Exactly, it won’t change the course of military actions. That’s why we don’t want to hand them all over. And not all at once. Perhaps 50 in the first batch, then maybe another batch of 50 missiles. It’s perfectly clear, but that’s all big politics. I suppose that’s what it’s really about. I’ve learned from my French and British colleagues that in reality, with these Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles, it’s the same as with the Winchester rifles—they might ask, “Why should we supply the next batch of missiles when we’ve already supplied them? Let Germany do it now.” Perhaps, Mr. Frohstedte wants to say something on this matter?

Frohstedte: Allow me to add a bit of pragmatism. I want to share my thoughts on the Storm Shadow’s characteristics. Regarding air defense, flight time, flight altitude, and so on, I’ve come to the conclusion that there are two interesting targets—the bridge to the east and the ammunition depots, which are higher up. The [Crimean] bridge to the east is difficult to reach, it’s a relatively small target, but the Taurus can do it, and it can also strike the ammunition depots. Considering all this and comparing it with how much the Storm Shadows and HIMARS have been used, I have a question: “Is our target the bridge or the military depots?” Is it achievable with the current shortcomings that the REDs and Patriots have? And I’ve come to the conclusion that the limiting factor is that they usually only have 24 shells…

Gerhartz: That’s clear.

Frohstedte: It makes sense to involve Ukraine in the process. It’ll take a week. I think it’s advisable to consider task planning and centralized planning. Task planning in our unit takes two weeks, but if there’s interest, it can be done faster. If we’re considering the bridge, then I believe Taurus is insufficient, and we need to have an understanding of how it can work, and for that, we need satellite data. I don’t know if we can prepare the Ukrainians for such a task in a short time, in a month, for instance. What would a Taurus attack on the bridge look like? From an operational perspective, I can’t assess how quickly the Ukrainians will learn to plan such actions and how quickly integration will occur. But since we’re talking about the bridge and military bases, I understand they want to seize them as soon as possible.

Fenske: I would like to add something regarding the destruction of the bridge. We’ve been intensely studying this issue, and unfortunately, we’ve come to the conclusion that due to its size, the bridge is akin to a runway. Therefore, it may require more than 10, or even 20 missiles.

Gerhartz: There’s an opinion that the Taurus can achieve this if the French Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft is used.

Fenske: They would only be able to create a hole and damage the bridge. And before making important statements, we ourselves…

Frohstedte: I’m not advocating for the idea of targeting the bridge; I pragmatically want to understand what they want. And what we need to teach them, so it turns out that when planning these operations, we will need to indicate the main points on the images. They will have targets, but it’s important to consider that when working on smaller targets, planning needs to be more meticulous, rather than just analyzing pictures on the computer. When targets are confirmed, it’s simpler, and less time will be spent on planning.

Gerhartz: We all know they want to destroy the bridge, which ultimately signifies how it’s guarded—not only because of its military-strategic importance but also its political significance. Even though they have a ground corridor now. There are certain concerns if we have direct communication with the Ukrainian armed forces. So the question arises: can we use such a ruse and assign our people to MBDA? Thus, direct communication with Ukraine will only be through MBDA, which is much better than if such communication exists with our Air Force.

Grefe: Gerhartz, it doesn’t matter. We have to make sure that from the very beginning there is no language that makes us a party to the conflict. I’m exaggerating a bit, of course, but if we tell the minister now that we are going to plan meetings and travel by car from Poland so that no one notices, that’s already participation, and we won’t do that. If we’re talking about the manufacturer, the first thing to ask is whether MBDA can do it. It doesn’t matter if our people will then deal with it in Büchel or in Schröbenhausen—it still means involvement. And I don’t think we should do that. From the very beginning, we defined this as a key element of the “red line,” so we’ll participate in the training. Let’s say we’ll prepare a “roadmap.” The training process needs to be divided into parts. The long track will take four months, where we’ll thoroughly train them, including practicing scenarios with the bridge. The short track will be two weeks so that they can use the missiles as soon as possible. If they are already trained, then we’ll ask the British if they are ready to take over at this stage. I believe these actions will be the right ones—just imagine if the press finds out that our people are in Schröbenhausen or that we’re driving somewhere in Poland! I find such an option to be unacceptable.

Gerhartz: If such a political decision is made, we must say that the Ukrainians should come to us. First and foremost, we need to know whether such a political decision constitutes direct involvement in task planning. In that case, the training will take a bit longer, and they will be able to tackle more complex tasks, possibly with some experience and high-tech equipment already in use. If there’s a possibility to avoid direct involvement, we can’t participate in task planning, do it in Büchel, and then forward it to them—that’s a “red line” for Germany. We can train them for two months; they won’t learn everything, but they’ll learn something. We just need to ensure they can process all the information and work with all the parameters.

Grefe: Zeppel said we can create both an extended and a brief “roadmap.” The goal is to get a quick result. And if the initial task is to hit ammunition depots rather than complex objects like bridges, then we can proceed with an abbreviated program and get results quickly. As for information from IABG, I don’t see this as a critical issue since they are not tied down to a specific location; they must conduct reconnaissance themselves. It’s clear that efficiency depends on this. This is what we discussed regarding missile delivery. It’s not decided yet, but that’s the plan for now.

Gerhartz: And this will be the main point. There are ammunition depots where short-term preparation won’t be possible due to very active air defense. We’ll need to seriously look into it. I believe that our people will find a solution. We just need to be allowed to try first so that we can provide better political advice. We need to prepare better so as not to fail because, for example, the KSA may not have an accurate idea of where the air defense systems actually are. The Ukrainians have this information, and we have data from the radars. But if we’re talking about precise planning, we need to know where the radars are installed and where the stationary installations are, and how to bypass them. This will allow us to develop a more accurate plan. We have a superb means, and if we have precise coordinates, we can apply it accurately. But there’s no basis to say we can’t do this. There’s a certain threshold where the “red line” politically passes, there’s a “long” and “short” path, and there are differences in terms of utilizing the full potential, which the Ukrainians will be able to utilize better over time as they practice and continually work on it. Personally, I don’t think I need to be present at the meeting. It’s important for us to give a clear-headed assessment and not add fuel to the fire like others do by supplying Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles.

Grefe: The longer they take to make a decision, the longer it will take us to implement it. We need to break everything down into stages. Start with the simple first, and then move on to the complex. Or we can ask the British if they can support us at the initial stage, and have them take on the planning issues? We should facilitate whatever falls within our area of responsibility. Developing mounts for missiles is not our task; Ukraine should resolve this with the manufacturers on their own.

Gerhartz: Right now, we wouldn’t want to encounter problems with the budget committee. It could make it impossible to start construction work at the airbase in Büchel in 2024. Right now, every day counts when it comes to the program.

March 2, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Germany, Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Conscious and Unconscionable: The Starving of Gaza

March 1, 2024, Dr Binoy Kampmark, https://theaimn.com/conscious-and-unconscionable-the-starving-of-gaza/

The starvation regime continues unabated as Israel continues its campaign in the Gaza Strip. One of the six provisional measures ordered by the International Court Justice entailed taking “immediate and effective measures” to protect the Palestinian populace in the Gaza Strip from risk of genocide by ensuring the supply of humanitarian assistance and basic services.

In its case against Israel, South Africa argued, citing various grounds, that Israel’s purposeful denial of humanitarian aid to Palestinians could fall within the UN Genocide Convention as “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”

A month has elapsed since the ICJ order, after which Israel was meant to report back on compliance. But, as Amnesty International reports, Israel continues “to disregard its obligation as the occupying power to ensure the basic needs of Palestinians in Gaza are met.”

The organisation’s regional director for the Middle East and North Africa, Heba Morayef, gives a lashing summary of that conduct. “Not only has Israel created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, but it is also displaying callous indifference to the fate of Gaza’s population by creating conditions which the ICJ has said placed them at imminent risk of genocide.” Israel, Morayef continues to state, had “woefully failed to provide for Gazans’ basic needs” and had “been blocking and impeding the passage of sufficient aid into the Gaza strip, in particular to the north which is virtually inaccessible, in a clear show of contempt for the ICJ ruling and in flagrant violation of its obligation to prevent genocide.”

The humanitarian accounting on this score is grim. Since the ICJ order, the number of aid trucks entering Gaza has precipitously declined. Within three weeks, it had fallen by a third: an average of 146 a day were coming in three weeks prior; afterwards, the numbers had fallen to about 105. Prior to the October 7 assault by Hamas, approximately 500 trucks were entering the strip on a daily basis.

The criminally paltry aid to the besieged Palestinians is even too much for some Israeli protest groups which have formed with one single issue in mind: preventing any aid from being sent into Gaza. As a result, closures have taken place at Kerem Shalom due to protests and clashes with security forces.

Their support base may seem to be small and peppered by affiliates from the Israeli Religious Zionism party of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, but an Israeli Democracy Institute poll conducted in February found that 68% of Jewish respondents opposed the transfer of humanitarian aid to the residents of Gaza. Rachel Touitou of Tzav 9, a group formed in December with that express purpose in mind, stated her reasoning as such: “You cannot expect the country to fight its enemy and feed it at the same time.”

Hardly subtle, but usefully illustrative of the attitude best reflected by the blood curdling words of Israeli Defence Minister, Yoav Gallant, who declared during the campaign that his country’s armed forces were “fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly” in depriving them of electricity, food and fuel.

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In December 2023, the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding, among other things, that the warring parties “allow and facilitate the use of all available routes to and throughout the entire Gaza Strip, including border crossings.” Direct routes were also to be prioritised. To date, Israel has refused to permit aid through other crossings.

In February, the Global Nutrition Cluster reported that “the nutrition situation of women and children in Gaza is worsening everywhere, but especially in Northern Gaza where 1 in 6 children are acutely malnourished and an estimated 3% face the most severe form of wasting and require immediate treatment.”

The organisation’s report makes ugly reading. Over 90% of children between 6 to 23 months along with pregnant and breastfeeding women face “severe food poverty”, with the food supplied being “of the lowest nutritional value and from two or fewer food groups.” At least 90% of children under the age of 5 are burdened with one or more infectious diseases, while 70% have suffered from diarrhoea over the previous two weeks. Safe and clean water, already a problem during the 16-year blockade, is now in even shorter supply, with 81% of households having access to less than one litre per person per day.

Reduced to such conditions of monumental and raw desperation, hellish scenes of Palestinians swarming around aid convoys were bound to manifest. On February 29, Gaza City witnessed one such instance, along with a lethal response from Israeli troops. In the ensuing violence, some 112 people were killed, adding to a Palestinian death toll that has already passed 30,000. While admitting to opening fire on the crowd, the IDF did not miss a chance to paint their victims as disorderly savages, with “dozens” being “killed and injured from pushing, trampling and being run over by the trucks.” The acting director of Al-Awda Hospital, Dr. Mohammed Salha, in noting the admission of some 161 wounded patients, suggested that gun fire had played its relevant role, given that most of those admitted suffered from gunshot wounds.

If Israel’s intention had been to demonstrate some good will in averting any insinuation that genocide was taking place, let alone a systematic policy of collective punishment against the Palestinian population, little evidence of it has been shown. If anything, the suspicions voiced by South Africa and other critics aghast at the sheer ferocity of the campaign are starting to seem utter plausible in their horror.

March 2, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Israel, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Nuclear space-based ASAT weapons – A brief international legal perspective

Charlie JP Bennett, 27 Feb 24, https://www.ejiltalk.org/nuclear-space-based-asat-weapons-a-brief-international-legal-perspective/

On 14th February 2024, US and UK media reported the emergence of serious national security concerns by senior American officials and lawmakers that the Russian state was pursuing the deployment of a nuclear-based weapon designed to eliminate (enemy) satellites. It was added that such a weapon had not yet been deployed, but had reached some stage of development.

The exact severity of the development remains hotly contested (also here) and presently unknown, but was described as a ‘destabilising foreign military capability’ to the US and its allies. There is speculation that it may be a political ploy to further pressure the US house to authorise further aid to Ukraine in its conflict against Russia. There has also been speculation regarding a critically-important ambiguity in the information released – is it a nuclear weapon, or merely a nuclear-powered weapon? The latter is far less destructive.

Yet, the White House NSC strategic communications coordinator, John Kerby, stated on February 15th, without any hesitation whatsoever, that the weapon, if deployed, would be ‘space based, and a violation of the Outer Space Treaty’. Assuming this is true, and though not definitive evidence, the fact that no other weapons are prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty except for nuclear weapons/WMDs (see below) means that we have to consider the nuclear weapon scenario. The scenario for a weapon to be so definitively contrary to the treaty, and not nuclear, is small. Even if true in part, it would mark a frightening turning point in the decades-long consensus regarding nuclear-based weapons in space; and yet another compounding issue for an international legal order stretched to its limits.

How such weapons may work

It seems highly likely that the intent of such a space-based nuclear explosion would be to knock out satellites through the emission of a powerful Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) as a consequence of the explosion: rendering all electronics caught in the (potentially enormous) area – and thus also any satellites – damaged or outright inoperable. These effects can linger for years, forming an artificial radiation belt around earth.

One of the last nuclear tests in outer space, the American ‘starfish prime’, produced an EMP so (unexpectedly) powerful that it damaged all electronics within a ~900 mile / ~1450 kilometre radius – including on the ground in Hawaii. That explosion had a large yield of approximately 1.4 megatons. Its resulting electromagnetic effects carried by the planet’s magnetic field, flattening them into a radioactive belt, almost immediately rendered three satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) inoperable, and ultimately destroyed eight in the months that followed due to lingering radiation in orbit. Not many in absolute terms – but roughly a third of those deployed in 1962; at time of writing, there are approximately 8,300. This was not even a weapon designed to produce as large an EMP as possible, or to target specific orbits – both things a new weapon might do. There is little doubt that deployment of such an EMP through a nuclear medium would be a highly destructive weapon.

Some observers have pointed out that use of such a weapon would damage Russia’s (or any nuclear-ASAT deploying nation’s) own interests; its own space-based infrastructure – with the implication being that they would thus never actually use it. Given the events of the past several years, however, can we really rely on the assumption that a state will not – even severely – damage itself to prevent another state from achieving/acquiring/joining something? No. Absolutely not.

Tearing up the nuclear-space consensus

It is pertinent to distinguish between the use/deployment of a nuclear weapon in space, and the mere placing of such a weapon into outer space. Both are prohibited through different instruments.

Use of such a weapon in space is, flatly, prohibited. The most obvious legal violation would be against the “1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water” (otherwise known as the ‘Partial test-ban treaty’), to which Russia is (and for now remains) a founding party. It is a short treaty with one operable article, created immediately after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It simply states the following:

Article 1

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

a. in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space […]

The provision includes no further qualification. For now Russia remains a party to this treaty, though has pulled out of similar cold-war era treaties in recent years given the restrictions they place on military operations.

Further, the mere placement of such a weapon into space is clearly prohibited by international space law. The Outer Space Treaty is sometimes known as the ‘Space Constitution’, and is the most fundamental treaty governing outer space activities. All major space powers, including the US, Russia, China, Japan, and leading European states, are party to it. It plainly states:

Article IV

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

[…]

These provisions are rather simple as international legal provisions go. They reflect an agreement between the Soviet Union and the US established after repeated nuclear crises in the 1960s that the use of nuclear weapons must be limited as far as possible – including in outer space.

Desecration of the space environment

In addition to the above, there is also (as is so common when talking about space-based issues) the issue of the debris it will cause. Dead, inoperable satellites-turned-debris cannot manoeuvre to avoid orbital collisions with debris. They will remain in orbit, as debris, for potentially indefinitely depending on their altitude. While there is no binding international law or custom (yet) that prohibits the production of space debris, it could certainly be argued that the desecration of the space environment in this manner violates the Outer Space Treaty, Article IX of which prohibits the ‘contamination’ of the space environment and its celestial bodies.

We also know from the long-lasting consequences of Starfish Prime that, depending on the size and calibration of the weapon, entire regions of Low Earth Orbit could be rendered (near-)uninhabitable zones for satellites – or indeed any electronic systems – for potentially several years. This is strikingly similar, in terms of severity and also duration, with a Kessler Syndrome/Cascade; the worst case scenario following the continuous build-up of conventional space debris multiple decades from now. Entire regions of LEO could be rendered inoperable for satellites post-deployment of such a weapon, without considering the more immediate damage it would cause.

The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, though inconclusive in its final determination of the legality of a nuclear weapon’s use, does make clear that the long-term, and widespread nature of nuclear effects may well be in violation of international humanitarian law. The Court did not apply its reasoning to the realm of space specifically. However, it is worth noting that the effects of rendering regions of space uninhabitable is notably far more widespread than the effects of a typical nuclear weapon detonated on the ground (actually a little above) – whereas the latter may affect an area of hundreds of square kilometres, the former may affect an area of hundreds of thousands of cubic kilometres. Whether this changes the proportionality equation (preserved by the Court in relation to an extreme circumstance of self-defence) is perhaps worth further thought.

Further consequences

There has not been a known nuclear deployment in space since the 60s. Since then, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban and Outer Space Treaties have held firm, albeit with a couple of allegations of relatively minor primarily procedural breaches by various parties, from which no consequence followed. The mere deployment of such weapons may therefore tear up over 55 years of legal and geopolitical consensus, and throw astropolitics into a new era of threat – one where, as is increasingly common in many areas, international rules give way to military and strategic interests.

It is far from clear whether or not the US or its allies have capabilities to stop such a weapon from being deployed should it reach space. In theory, conventional ASAT weapons (also heavily restricted) might be able to take them out before deployment, but this would of course amount to direct military engagement at a time where military intervention could have explosive consequences. Thus, once there, such a weapon would hang in orbit like a Sword of Damocles ready to swing – potentially crippling parts of civil (or even military) infrastructure at least for a time if used – and causing significant military, economic and societal damage. Given that a nation could send a nuclear weapon into space atop a ballistic missile if it wanted to, the insecurity and fear of having a nuclear weapon orbiting above a country at any point might even be its primary destructive power. They could also be extremely difficult to detect/verify as there – unlike a ballistic launch.

Concluding remarks

If Russia, or any nation, were to do this, there is no doubt that the placement, or detonation, of nuclear-based weapons in outer space would amount to a flagrant violation of several enduring international treaties. A great deal remains unknown, and seemingly contradictory. It is nonetheless important (also for international lawyers) to prepare for all scenarios – including purportedly stupid, self-harming ones. Russia has already harmed its (and all of our) space environment via conventional ASAT testing.

This further raises the question about whether Russia may withdraw from further nuclear-restricting treaties to do this, as has been hypothesised. It already has with several. The departure of one of the most prominent space-faring nations from the Outer Space Treaty would be legally monumental at a critical juncture in the development of international space law. It would further reflect yet more dismantling of the most basic rules of the ‘rules-based international order’.

Finally, this threat – the ambiguity of its imminence and its true existence aside – highlights the importance of the defence of space-based infrastructure upon which so much of the modern world – and modern military – relies. The vulnerability of these systems is now plain for all to see, and may perhaps induce concrete action to mitigate their risks. The threat of an outer-space arms race remains firmly on the table as a result of these developments, to the detriment of global safety, and especially to outer-space activities.

March 1, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | space travel, weapons and war | Leave a comment

China urges largest nuclear states to negotiate a ‘no-first-use’ treaty

https://www.reuters.com/world/china-urges-un-define-roadmap-exempt-non-nuclear-states-nuclear-threat-state-2024-02-28/ –

States with the largest nuclear arsenals should negotiate a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other or make a political statement in this regard, the Chinese foreign ministry’s arms control department said.

Director general of the department, Sun Xiaobo, called on nuclear states to fulfil their “special and priority responsibilities” on nuclear disarmament according to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament, which seeks to prevent nuclear war, official news agency Xinhua said on Wednesday.

During the forum’s weekly meeting in Geneva on Monday, Sun said the body should define a roadmap or timetable for an international legal instrument that would protect non-nuclear-weapon states from the threat of nuclear weapons.

“Nuclear-weapon states should negotiate and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other or make a political statement in this regard,” Sun said.

China and India are currently the only two nuclear powers to formally maintain a no first use policy. Russia and the United States have the world’s biggest nuclear arsenals.

Sun also called for a universal, non-discriminatory, non-proliferation, export control order to address global security challenges, and promote more compliance in the field of biochemistry to maintain the authority of the arms control treaty system.

The U.N. disarmament forum should also respond to emerging scientific and technological challenges such as artificial intelligence, outer space and cyber, he said.

Sun described the international strategic security situation as facing new challenges, and that countries with the strongest military power have repeatedly “broken treaties” in order to “seek their own absolute superiority”.

March 1, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | China, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Atlantic Council report lays out options and possible first use of nuclear weapons against China over Taiwan.

The United States might also find itself in a situation in which it could not stop a Chinese invasion force from reaching Taiwan with conventional forces, but it could do so with nuclear weapons.

In this instance, the United States should be prepared to consider nuclear first use as well.

The Atlantic Council: Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security has produced for us their report entitled: “DELIBERATE NUCLEAR USE IN A WAR OVER TAIWAN: Scenarios and Considerations for the United States” by Matthew Kroenig
Here below is the Conclusion of their 20 page report:

As US planners grow increasingly focused on the risk of a US-China war over Taiwan, they should be sure to pay attention to the nuclear dimension of such a possible conflict. Either side might rationally choose to gamble on nuclear escalation rather than risk defeat in such a high-stakes conflict.

To respond to possible Chinese nuclear use, the United States should identify a variety of targets on and off the Chinese mainland that would pose a setback to China’s war progress without making Chinese leadership fear for its own survival or for its nuclear force. These targets could include PLA Navy vessels; Chinese beachheads on Taiwan; or mainland ports, air bases, or headquarters supporting the invasion.

The United States might also find itself in a situation in which it could not stop a Chinese invasion force from reaching Taiwan with conventional forces, but it could do so with nuclear weapons. In this instance, the United States should be prepared to consider nuclear first use as well.

The United States should prepare for the possibility of nuclear use in a Taiwan Strait contingency by developing the strategies, alliance and partnership coordination mechanisms, and forces required to optimally deter Chinese nuclear use in these scenarios or to employ nuclear weapons if necessary. This report has set out some of those items for consideration.”

COMMENT from David Cooley: This Atlantic Council report lays out options and possible first use of nuclear weapons against China over Taiwan. This report, these folks think they can fight a nuclear war and “manage” it. This is slim possibility to outright fallacy to believe this possible. For survivability nuke control is dispersed, and there in lies human fallibility, and the best laid plans go out the window at first detonation. Escalation likely to follow based on simple use it or lose it for all sides. No where is it acknowledged that this is pure hubris, attempt to maintain world domination, they like to delude themselves with niceties like RBWO. This thinking outdoes Bibi and then some, crazy.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Kroenig-Deliberate-Nuclear-Use-in-a-War-over-Taiwan.pdf

March 1, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

France creates coalition to arm Ukraine with long-range weapons

28 Feb 24 https://www.rt.com/news/593253-france-macron-coalition-long-range-weapons-ukraine/

The aim is to enable Kiev to “carry out deep strikes” amid flagging US support, President Emmanuel Macron has said

France is leading a new coalition that aims to provide Ukraine with “medium and long-range missiles and bombs,” President Emmanuel Macron has announced. He has also not ruled out deploying ground forces to support Kiev in future.

Macron made the remarks following a summit of Ukraine’s backers on Monday, intended to demonstrate unwavering support for Kiev amid the suspension of American aid.

According to the French leader, the newly established coalition seeks to enable Ukraine to “carry out deep strikes.” There is a “broad consensus to do even more and faster together” to support Kiev, Macron added.

The move comes as continued US aid to Ukraine remains in doubt. President Joe Biden’s latest package, which envisages an additional $60 billion for Kiev, has been in limbo for months due to opposition from Republicans in the House of Representatives. Lawmakers have made clear they will only relent if the White House agrees to tighten US border controls and stems the flow of illegal migrants from Mexico.

Speaking on Monday, Macron also claimed that the deployment of Western troops to Ukraine cannot be ruled out, insisting that Paris will “do everything necessary to ensure that Russia cannot win this war.” His remarks were echoed by French Prime Minister Gabriel Attal in comments to the RTL broadcaster on Tuesday.

In response, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warned that “in this case, we have to talk not about the probability, but rather the inevitability” of a direct conflict between NATO and Russia, should Western military personnel be deployed to Ukraine.

Earlier this month, Paris and Kiev signed a bilateral security pact under which France pledged €3 billion ($3.26 billion) worth of defense aid by the end of the year.

In January, Macron revealed plans to provide Ukraine with 40 more SCALP-EG long-range cruise missiles and “hundreds of bombs.”

Paris agreed to ship the rockets, which have a range of over 250km (155 miles), last July, months after the UK agreed a similar move.

Russia has consistently condemned Western deliveries of long-range weaponry, saying it will only serve to prolong the hostilities unnecessarily without changing the final outcome.

March 1, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | France, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Victoria Nuland accidentally reveals the true aim of the West in Ukraine

“And by the way, we have to remember that the bulk of this money is going right back into the US to make those weapons,” Nuland said, pleading in favor of the latest Ukraine aid package “

Ukrainians are a convenient pretext to keep the tax cash flowing in the direction of the US military industrial complex

SOTT, Rachel Marsden, Tue, 27 Feb 2024

US State Department fixture and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Victoria Nuland, aka “Regime Change Karen,” apparently woke up one day recently, took the safety off her nuclear-grade mouth, and inadvertently blew up the West’s Ukraine narrative.

Until now, Americans have been told that all the US taxpayer cash being earmarked for Ukrainian aid is to help actual Ukrainians. Anyone notice that the $75 billion American contribution isn’t getting the job done on the battlefield? Victory in military conflict isn’t supposed to look like defeat. Winning also isn’t defined as, “Well, on a long enough time axis, like infinity, our chance of defeat will eventually approach zero.” And the $178 billion in total from all allies combined doesn’t seem to be doing the trick, either. Short of starting a global war with weapons capable of extending the conflict beyond a regional one, it’s not like they’ve been holding back. The West is breaking the bank. All for some vague, future Ukrainian “victory” that they don’t seem to want to clearly define. We keep hearing that the support will last “as long as it takes.” For what exactly? By not clearly defining it, they can keep moving the goal posts.

But now here comes Regime Change Karen, dropping some truth bombs on CNN about Ukrainian aid. She started off with the usual talking point of doing “what we have always done, which is defend democracy and freedom around the world.” Conveniently, in places where they have controlling interests and want to keep them – or knock them out of a global competitor’s roster and into their own. “And by the way, we have to remember that the bulk of this money is going right back into the US to make those weapons,” Nuland said, pleading in favor of the latest Ukraine aid package that’s been getting the side eye from Republicans in Congress.

So there you have it, folks. Ukrainians are a convenient pretext to keep the tax cash flowing in the direction of the US military industrial complex. This gives a whole new perspective on “as long as it takes.” It’s just the usual endless war and profits repackaged as benevolence. But we’ve seen this before. It explains why war in Afghanistan was little more than a gateway to Iraq. And why the Global War on Terrorism never seems to end, and only ever mutates. Arguably the best one they’ve come up with so far is the need for military-grade panopticon-style surveillance, so the state can shadow-box permanently with ghosts while bamboozling the general public with murky cyber concepts that it can’t understand or conceptualize. When one conflict or threat dials down, another ramps up, boosted by fearmongering rhetoric couched in white-knighting. There’s never any endgame or exit ramp to any of these conflicts. And there clearly isn’t one for Ukraine, either.

Still, there’s a sense that the realities on the ground in Ukraine, which favor Russia, now likely mean that the conflict is closer to its end than to its beginning. Acknowledgements abound in the Western press. And that means there isn’t much time left for Europe to get aboard the tax cash laundering bandwagon and stuff its own military industrial complexes’ coffers like Washington has been doing from the get-go.

Which would explain why a bunch of countries now seem to be rushing to give Ukraine years-long bilateral security “guarantees,” requiring more weapons for everyone. France, Germany, Canada, and Italy have all made the pledge. Plus Denmark, which also flat-out said that it would send all its artillery to Ukraine………………………………………………

Thanks to Nuland’s nuking of any plausible deniability on Ukrainian “aid” not going to Washington, it’s now clear that Ukrainians continue to die so poor weapons makers don’t end up shaking tin cans on street corners.………………………………………………………………………….. more https://www.sott.net/article/489314-Nuland-accidentally-reveals-the-true-aim-of-the-West-in-Ukraine

March 1, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | business and costs, politics, Ukraine, USA, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Leaked Russian military files reveal its nuclear strike rules

A doctrine for tactical nuclear weapons is outlined in training scenarios, including for a possible invasion by China.

Max Seddon and Chris Cook, Feb 29, 2024

ladimir Putin’s forces have rehearsed using tactical nuclear weapons at an early stage of conflict with a major world power, according to leaked Russian military files that include training scenarios for an invasion by China.

The classified papers, seen by the Financial Times, describe a threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons that is lower than Russia has publicly admitted, according to experts who reviewed and verified the documents.

The cache consists of 29 secret Russian military files drawn up between 2008 and 2014, including scenarios for war-gaming and presentations for naval officers, which discuss operating principles for the use of nuclear weapons.

Criteria for a potential nuclear response range from an enemy incursion on Russian territory to more specific triggers, such as the destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines.

“This is the first time that we have seen documents like this reported in the public domain,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre in Berlin. “They show that the operational threshold for using nuclear weapons is pretty low if the desired result can’t be achieved through conventional means.”

Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, which can be delivered by land or sea-launched missiles or from aircraft, are designed for limited battlefield use in Europe and Asia, as opposed to the larger “strategic” weapons intended to target the US. Modern tactical warheads can still release significantly more energy than the weapons dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945.

Deep suspicions of China

Although the files date back 10 years and more, experts say they remain relevant to current Russian military doctrine. The documents were shown to the FT by Western sources.

The defensive plans expose deeply held suspicions of China among Moscow’s security elite even as Putin began forging an alliance with Beijing, which as early as 2001 included a nuclear no-first-strike agreement.

In the years since, Russia and China have deepened their partnership, particularly since Xi Jinping took power in Beijing in 2012……………………………………………………………………………………………..

more https://www.afr.com/world/europe/leaked-russian-files-reveal-nuclear-strike-rules-20240229-p5f8mz—

February 29, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Russia, weapons and war | Leave a comment

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