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Dialogue Over Deterrence

The theory of nuclear deterrence is one of these root causes of tension and conflict that must be addressed……………….. the violent potential of nuclear deterrence policies means that everyone in the world is at risk all of the time.

the profits of the new nuclear arms race have superceded all sense of logic or reason in international relations and domestic budgets.

The theory of nuclear deterrence is one of these root causes of tension and conflict that must be addressed……………….. the violent potential of nuclear deterrence policies means that everyone in the world is at risk all of the time.

the profits of the new nuclear arms race have superceded all sense of logic or reason in international relations and domestic budgets.
Ray Acheson, 24 July 2024

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People at this NPT Preparatory Committee are worried. Really worried. Delegations delivering general debate statements, activists holding meetings with each other and with diplomats, anyone paying attention, is worried about nuclear war. Words like abyss, doomsday, annihilation, and other cheery phrases were on everyone’s lips, in official statements and by the coffee bar. The fear is justified—the nuclear-armed states are building up their arsenals, modernising their weapon systems, and coming up with new deployment strategies—and they are not talking to each other. The interactions between Russia and the United States are so tense that a Dr. Strangelove moment of “You can’t fight in here. This is the war room!” seems possible at any moment.

Mozambique very astutely called out the worrying trend of “deterrence diplomacy,” which is a pretty good term for what seems to be happening. Perhaps it’s a strategy of confrontation in the conference room to deter a nuclear confrontation outside; or maybe it’s just the use of diplomatic spaces like NPT meetings to bolster one’s claims. But just like deterrence doesn’t work, as evidenced by the many conflicts fought by nuclear-armed states throughout the nuclear age, deterrence diplomacy doesn’t work either. It only leads to the collapse of international law, which most of the rest of us are relying upon to constrain massive nuclear violence.

This may sound awfully gloomy. It is. But as always, hope is found in the determination and creativity of those who do not see their strength or security coming from bombs and bombastic quarrels. Calls for dialogue, (real) diplomacy, and disarmament resounded during the general debate. Delegations highlighted the work that has been done to prohibit nuclear weapons, to study the harms of nuclear production and testing, to address nuclear injustice, and to reduce the dangerous risks of nuclear war. The vast majority of this work is being carried out by non-nuclear-armed states, activists, and international organisations. It’s time the nuclear-armed states put down their swords, picked up their pens, and got to work, too. They can start by acknowledging the reality of the situation they have created, in which they have weaponised international law and created a culture of defiance of rules and norms that are meant to protect us all.

The invisibilised genocide

Part of the dangerous situation the nuclear-armed states have created is their refusal to implement the laws to which they have previously bound themselves. It was striking that mid-way through the first week of the PrepCom, you’d barely know there was genocide going on in the world. During the general debate, many states reiterated their condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, especially in relation to its threats to use nuclear weapons, deployment of nuclear bombs to Belarus, and its attacks against the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. But there were very few comments about Israel’s slaughter of Palestinians over the past ten months, even in the wake of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s finding of plausible genocide in January 2024 and its ruling in July 2024 that Israel is guilty of apartheid and that its occupation of Palestine is illegal, and the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s application for an arrest warrant for the Israeli Prime Minster for war crimes in May 2024. Algeria, Egypt, Finland, Lebanon, Indonesia, Kuwait, Mozambique, Oman, Peru, Slovakia, Syria, Tunisia, Türkiye, and Venezuela criticised Israel’s “war on Gaza” to various extents, or condemned Israel’s nuclear threats in that context. But most delegations said absolutely nothing.

Why this comparative silence? Some might claim Israel’s genocide of Palestinians is not an NPT issue. But for whom should hundreds of thousands of deaths, mass displacement and injury, starvation, disease, and the destruction of an entire strip of land where more than two million people live under conditions of apartheid and “open-air” incarceration not be an issue? Especially when nuclear weapons, and the aura of impunity and lawless violence these weapons perpetuate, are the heart of it all.

Beyond the moral imperative of caring about humans living and dying through such suffering, Israel’s genocide is an NPT issue. Israel is a nuclear-armed state. It is not an NPT state party, but that is only because it is allowed to remain outside the treaty by its protectorates. Israel is also only able to wage genocide because NPT states parties are providing it with weapons and other military equipment, including the United States, Germany, Canada, Italy, Australia, the United Kingdom, and others. Again, in contrast to the situation in Ukraine, it was very striking that during the PrepCom’s general debate, some delegations condemned arms transfers to Russia from China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and/or Iran in support Russia’s war effort, while saying nothing about the billions of dollars of weapons being transferred to Israel to commit atrocities and facilitate the destruction of Palestine.

Weaponisation of international law

The selective defiance of international law, lack of accountability, and granting of impunity are all NPT issues. They are features of the way the Treaty has been implemented since 1970. This is not simply a matter of double standards. This is about the inequality that the nuclear-armed states have intentionally built up and baked into international law over decades. The UK’s claim to be “a government that believes in the rule of law at home and internationally” would be laughable if it was not so offensive as it expands its nuclear arsenal and ships bombs to the Middle East to be dropped on civilians.

The nuclear-armed states weaponise international law by shirking from their own obligations and accountability while enforcing it, sometimes violently, upon others. The nuclear-armed states see themselves as being above the law and act accordingly. Their modernisation of nuclear weapons and nuclear arms racing, their refusal to comply with their legal obligation to disarm, their attempts to reinterpret NPT provisions and commitments, their trashing of arms control agreements and NPT outcome documents, are all part of their collective contempt for international law.

This contempt is shared among all nuclear-armed states. They could work together to eliminate their nuclear arsenals in compliance with international law; instead, they work together to perpetuate patriarchal myths about nuclear deterrence and strategic stability and undiminished security for all—buzzwords that mean the indefinite possession and manufacture and possible use of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear deterrence theory is a protection racket of apocalyptic proportions, leading to vast profits for a few and terror for most. Deterrence diplomacy leads away from, not toward, nuclear disarmament.

It might be hard to identify anything the nuclear-armed states do as a collective project, of course. During the general debate (and side events), the Russian and US delegations predictably accused each of being obstructionist to reviving nuclear arms control talks or reducing the risk of use of nuclear weapons. Neither will accept their mutual responsibility for creating the profoundly dangerous environment within which everyone on this planet is forced to live. But this situation of grave peril is a joint project, manufactured by governments and war profiteers seeking power through violence in supremacy in a world that is already burning from climate change, colonialism, and conflict.

Dismantling deterrence to build back better

“Never has it been more important to commence the process of rebuilding trust, of prioritizing dialogue over deterrence and of getting the world back on to the path of the verifiable, irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons,” said the UN High-Representative for Disarmament Affairs during the general debate. Most delegates attending the PrepCom clearly share this sentiment. From working papers about reducing nuclear risk to interventions about the importance of rebuilding trust and relationships, non-nuclear-armed states emphasised again and again the unacceptability of the fraught and fragile nature of the current moment.

Brazil noted that real security “does not derive from the number or quality of weapons of mass destruction” but in “our ability to build trust, foster cooperation, and address the root causes of tension and conflict.” The theory of nuclear deterrence is one of these root causes of tension and conflict that must be addressed. As long as a handful of nuclear-armed states and heavily militarised allies claim protection from nuclear weapons, invest billions of dollars into maintaining and modernising their arsenals, and engage in nuclear war planning in preparation for using these weapons, diling back the tensions and finding avenues for dialogue will remain elusive.

As the states parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) said in a joint statement to the PrepCom, “The perpetuation and implementation of nuclear deterrence in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies not only erode and contradict non-proliferation but also obstruct progress towards nuclear disarmament.” Rather than preventing conflict or preserving “strategic stability,” the violent potential of nuclear deterrence policies means that everyone in the world is at risk all of the time. When there are people actively planning for nuclear war—building the bombs, testing the missiles, targeting the systems, and making threats of use—the possibility of dialogue becomes increasingly marginalised. We have seen this happen over the last decades, where the profits of the new nuclear arms race have superceded all sense of logic or reason in international relations and domestic budgets.

Nuclear deterrence is the opposite of dialogue. And dialogue is essential to overturning deterrence. Many nuclear-armed allies, like the NATO members, of course call for dialogue, but it’s usually only among the nuclear-armed states. The nuclear-armed states are failing miserably at that task, though, so we need much more than that. We need concrete action, not endless discussions. We need disarmament, without any more delay.

Determining disarmament

Disarmament is a strategic imperative. Our survival depends upon it. The only way out of this mess is through demilitarisation; is through the abolition of nuclear weapons and the structures of war profiteering and military supremacy that are used to justify them. But disarmament is also a moral imperative. The end of nuclear weapon programmes is owed to those who have suffered from nuclear violence for generations, without their consent and often without their knowledge. As decribed in the powerful Joint Statement on Legacy of Nuclear Weapons and reiterated throughout several civil society presentations, Indigenous Peoples and other marginalised groups have long suffered the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons from uranium mining to nuclear testing and use to radioactive waste. The dismantlement of the entire nuclear fuel chain, the end of the nuclear industry, and the elimination of nuclear weapons is essential to nuclear justice, as are reparations and remediation for harms caused already.

As Austria said, the existential risk inherent in nuclear deterrence and the nuclear status quo is intergenerational injustice. The only way to change the current and future reality being imposed upon the world is to end nuclear weapons and the violent structural thinking in which genocide, perpetual war, and nuclear annihltion can ever again be considered “reasonable” responses to disagreements that manifest in the global system.

As a group of civil society organisations said in a statement from WILPF to the PrepCom, as the so-called leaders of the most heavily militarised states in the world are “thumping their chests at each other as if they’re a group of drunk men in a bar, ready to burn the place down just to prove that they are the manliest,” it should be clear now is the time for a different approach to disarmament diplomacy.

July 29, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, weapons and war | Leave a comment

AUKUS – Australia-United Kingdom-United States nuclear pact endangers us all.

Agreement is proliferation nightmare

 By Jemila Rushton July 21, 2024   https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2024/07/21/agreement-is-proliferation-nightmare/—

Australia arms up with UK and US help

The following is a statement to be delivered on July 23 at the 2024 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee event in Geneva by Jemila Rushton, Acting Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Australia. It was endorsed by a number of groups, including Beyond Nuclear. It has been adapted slightly for style as a written piece rather than oral delivery.

We gather in uncertain and dangerous times. All nine nuclear armed states are investing in modernizing their arsenals, none are winding back policies for their use. The number of available deployed nuclear weapons is increasing. We do not have the luxuries of time or inaction.  

Against this background where the proliferation of nuclear weapons is an ongoing concern, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America continue to further develop  AUKUS, an expanded trilateral security partnership between these three governments. 

AUKUS has two pillars. Pillar One was first announced in September 2021 and relates to information, training and technologies being shared by the US and UK to Australia to deliver eight nuclear powered submarines to Australia. Vessels which, if they eventuate, will utilize significant quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU). It also allows Australia to purchase existing US nuclear submarines. Currently, Australia is committing billions of dollars to both US and UK submarine industry facilities as part of the AUKUS agreement, potentially enabling the further development of nuclear armed capability in these programs. 

Two years ago, during the 2022 NPT Review Conference, many governments expressed concern that the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal would undermine the NPT, increase regional tensions, lead to proliferation, and threaten nuclear accidents in the ocean. There remains an urgent need to critique the nuclear proliferation risks posed by AUKUS.

The Australian decision to enter into agreements around nuclear powered submarines was made on the assumption that it would be permitted to divert nuclear material for a non-prescribed military purpose, by utilizing Paragraph 14 of the International Atomic Agency’s (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). The ‘loophole’ of Paragraph 14 potentially allows non-nuclear armed states to acquire nuclear material, which would be removed from IAEA safeguards.

Australia’s proposed acquisition of large quantities of HEU outside of usual IAEA safeguards and scrutiny jeopardizes nonproliferation efforts and fissile material security.  This conference has the mandate to prepare recommendations for the upcoming Review Conference to strengthen rather than weaken the global nonproliferation regime by moving to close the Paragraph 14 loophole. States represented here should negotiate the closure of the Paragraph 14 loophole in the NPT, as it permits Australia and other non-nuclear armed states to obtain nuclear-powered submarines and potentially weapons-grade HEU. 

To eliminate the risk of non nuclear weapons states acquiring nuclear weapons grade HEU,  all states, including AUKUS members, should refrain from sharing the technology and materials that will be transferred if Australia and others acquire nuclear-powered submarines. The paragraph 14 loophole undermines the NPT and needs to be closed.

Pillar Two of AUKUS plans to enhance the joint capabilities and interoperability between the partners, and may draw in other countries to AUKUS. This move is vastly out of step with a strong sense of Pacific regionalism and the long-standing commitment to a Nuclear Free Pacific. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) is being put under strain in this agreement. It is of grave concern that currently Japan, Canada and Aotearoa/New Zealand are actively considering their engagement with AUKUS Pillar 2.

We are concerned that the AUKUS trilateral partnership, and any further expansions will exacerbate regional tensions, fuel an arms race and increase risks of war in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly involving China and the United States, and will increase the danger of nuclear escalation in any such conflict. 

Within Australia, First Nations communities have expressed deep concern about the imposition of new military and radioactive waste facilities on their lands. First Nations and broader communities across Australia and throughout the Pacific have noted that AUKUS is part of a rapid militarization of the region, and raises the ever-present threat of nuclear conflict. Recognizing the disproportionate impacts of previous nuclear activities on First Nations or Indigenous Peoples, and the on-going legacies of nuclear weapons testing and activities in the region, there is deep concern for what AUKUS will mean for sovereignty of Small Island States and its impacts on Indigenous lands and Peoples.

The fuel for HEU naval propulsion reactors is weapons-grade, and the spent fuel is weapons-usable.  HEU is the most suitable material for ready and rapid conversion into a nuclear bomb. While removing HEU from a submarine would not be an easy process, the possibility of diverting such material for weapons purposes cannot be ruled out. Meaningful safeguards are extremely limited when the material is on a stealth platform that can disappear for six months at a time.

With the entry into force of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), there is a mandate to strengthen existing non-proliferation mechanisms. By joining the TPNW, governments can legally confirm that they will not acquire or host nuclear weapons, nor assist with their use or threat of use. We affirm that AUKUS members should make firm their commitments to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by joining the TPNW as a matter of urgency. 

Jemila Rushton is the Acting Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Australia

July 23, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, weapons and war | Leave a comment