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Report: Small Modular Distractors: Why a European SMR strategy hinders the energy transition

09/12/2025, https://caneurope.org/small-modular-distractors/

Click on image [on original] to download the report

“Our investigation demonstrates why betting on small modular reactors would be a costly mistake for Europe. These projects would be slow to construct, with long delays, over budget, a poor economic fit for our power system needs, and would produce toxic radioactive waste for which we do not have a solution. Many projects would likely not materialise and jeopardise our electricity supply. Distorting funding away from more realistic, lower-cost solutions such as renewables, storage, and demand side solutions risks derailing the energy transition, keeping our emissions and energy prices high.” – Thomas Lewis, Author and Energy Policy Coordinator at CAN Europe

An EU Small Modular Strategy is a distraction

Small modular reactors are not a viable solution to decarbonising our energy system and supporting a transition to net zero. The technology has not been demonstrated at any sort of scale, with great unknowns when it comes to design.

CAN Europe’s latest report details how SMR projects have been shown to be significantly delayed compared to initial estimates, are slower to construct than traditional nuclear, consistently over budget, more expensive than renewables, not economically fit to provide flexibility, not very small, deter funding away from realistic renewable solutions, produce more waste than traditional nuclear, and citizens have little trust in their governments to implement plans fairly. They are also planned under the assumption that the governments would take responsibility and invest in enabling infrastructure such as grids and nuclear storage facilities.

An EU SMR Strategy, as well as national plans to pursue SMRs, risks diverting attention, resources, and political momentum away from the proven solutions needed for a fast, fair, and effective energy transition. While the following recommendations aim to minimise the potential negative impacts of SMR-related initiatives, it is important to underline that only a transition pathway without new nuclear capacity can deliver the speed, cost-effectiveness, and system resilience required for Europe’s decarbonisation.

Diagrams and graphs within the report can be downloaded below: [ on original]

December 10, 2025 Posted by | ENERGY, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment

The UK wants to unlock a ‘golden age of nuclear’ but faces key challenges in reviving historic lead.

  The U.K.’s Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce called for urgent reforms after identifying “systemic failures” in the country’s nuclear framework. It found that fragmented regulation, flawed legislation and weak incentives led the U.K. to fall behind as a nuclear powerhouse.

The government committed to implementing the taskforce’s guidance and is expected to present a plan to do so within three months. There is not, at the moment, a single SMR actively producing electricity under four revenues. They will all come at best in the 30s,” Ludovico Cappelli, portfolio manager of
Listed Infrastructure at Van Lanschot Kempen, told CNBC.

While SMRs are a “game changer” thanks to their ability to power individual factories or small towns, their days of commercial operation are too far away, he said.
From an investment standpoint, “that is still a bit scary,” he added. To secure the large baseloads needed to offset the intermittency of renewables, “we’re still looking at big power stations,” added Paul Jackson, Invesco’s EMEA global market strategist.

 CNBC 6th Dec 2025, https://www.cnbc.com/2025/12/06/the-history-of-nuclear-energy-lies-on-british-soil-does-its-future-.html

December 9, 2025 Posted by | Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, UK | Leave a comment

$400 Million DOE Bailout for “SMRs” at Palisades

Multiple reactors on the tiny 432-acre site also introduce the risk of domino-effect multiple meltdowns

Holtec’s inexperience exacerbates these synergistic old and new reactor risks. Holtec still has no NRC-approved SMR-300 design certification, has never built a reactor, nor operated one, nor repaired and restarted one, let alone a reactor as perpetually problem-plagued as the 60-year old Palisades zombie. 

DECEMBER 3, 2025, by Kevin Kamps

regarding the announcement by the U.S. Department of Energy, Holtec International, and Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer of a $400 million federal bailout for “Small Modular Reactor” deployments at the Palisades nuclear power plant in Covert Township, Van Buren County, southwest Michigan.

Holtec’s uncertified and untested so-called ‘Small Modular Reactor’ design, the SMR-300, is not small. At 300 megawatts-electric (MW-e) each, the additional 600 MW-e would nearly double the nuclear megawattage at Palisades, given the unprecedented zombie restart of the 800 MW-e, six decade old reactor there. The zombie reactor was designed in the mid-1960s, and ground was broken on construction in 1967, with the learn-as-we-go dangerous design and fabrication flaws at the nuclear lemon baked in, still putting us in peril to the present day.

Just look at the harm smaller infamous 67 MW-e Michigan reactors have caused in the past. At Fermi Unit 1 on the Lake Erie shore in Monroe County, “we almost lost Detroit” when the plutonium breeder reactor had a partial core meltdown on October 5, 1966. John G. Fuller wrote an iconic book about it by that title in 1975. And Gil Scott-Heron wrote a haunting song about it in 1977, two years before he joined Musicians United for Safe Energy (MUSE) in response to the 1979 Three Mile Island Unit 2 meltdown, the worst reactor disaster in U.S. history — thus far anyway.

And at Big Rock Point — Palisades’ sibling reactor — near Charlevoix on the northwest Lower Peninsula’s Lake Michigan shore, the 67 MW-e experimental reactor shockingly released more than 3 million Curies of hazardous ionizing radioactivity into the environment, from supposedly ‘routine operations’ from 1962 to 1997. In the 1970s, local family practitioner, medical doctor Gerald Drake, and University of Michigan trained statistician Martha Drake, documented statistically significant spina bifida in the immediate area downwind. There is also anecdotal evidence of widespread thyroid pathology as well. This is similar to Palisades, where 50 cases of diagnosed thyroid cancer have been alleged by part-time residents of the small, 120-year old Palisades Park Country Club resort community, where there should not be a single such case of this exceedingly rare disease made infamous by Chornobyl and Fukushima.

Given the damage done by 67 MW-e reactors in Michigan in the past, just imagine what havoc could be wreaked by two 300 MW-e reactors — each 4.5 times larger — at Palisades going forward.

Increased breakdown phase risks at the 60-year old zombie reactor, and break-in phase risks at the two SMR-300 new builds, are a recipe for disaster at Palisades.

Palisades has a long list of breakdown phase risks. From the worst neutron-embrittled reactor pressure vessel in the country or perhaps even the entire world, to severely degraded steam generator tubes, a reactor lid that needed replacement two decades ago, lack of fire protection, calcium silicate containment insulation that would dissolve into sludge with the viscosity of Elmer’s Glue blocking emergency core cooling water flow, the worst operating experience in industry with control rod drive mechanism seal leaks from 1972 to 2022, etc., the Palisades zombie reactor has multiple pathways to reactor core meltdown, which would unleash catastrophic amounts of hazardous ionizing radioactivity into the environment, on the beach of Lake Michigan, drinking water supply for 16 million people along its shores, and more than 40 million people downstream and downwind, up the food chain, and down the generations throughout the Great Lakes region.

Chornobyl in Ukraine in 1986, and Three Mile Island-2 in Pennsylvania in 1979, are examples of brand new reactors causing catastrophes. Through design and construction flaws, and operator inexperience, Holtec’s SMR-300s will introduce increased break-in phase risks at the Palisades nuclear power plant, located on the Great Lakes shoreline. The Great Lakes comprise 21% of the planet’s, 84% of North America’s, and 95% of the United States’ surface fresh water.

Multiple reactors on the tiny 432-acre site also introduce the risk of domino-effect multiple meltdowns, as happened at Fukushima Daiichi, Japan in March 2011.

A 1982 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) study the agency unsuccessfully tried to suppress reported that a Palisades meltdown would cause a thousand acute radiation poisoning deaths, 7,000 radiation injuries, 10,000 latent cancer fatalities, and $52 billion in property damage. Adjusting for inflation alone, property damage would now exceed $168 billion. And since populations have increased around Palisades in the past 43 years, casualty figures would be significantly worse, as more people now live in harm’s way.

Holtec’s inexperience exacerbates these synergistic old and new reactor risks. Holtec still has no NRC-approved SMR-300 design certification, has never built a reactor, nor operated one, nor repaired and restarted one, let alone a reactor as perpetually problem-plagued as the 60-year old Palisades zombie. Holtec’s incompetence and corruption has been on full display in just the past several weeks, including a leak of large amounts of ultra-toxic hydrazine into Lake Michigan, the unprecedented fall by a worker into the radioactive reactor cavity, and evidence of potential alcohol consumption and/or drug impairment, including in the protected area, and by a supervisor. Despite all this, NRC has rubber stamped weakened work hour limitations, meaning overworked employees will be more fatigued, as Holtec races to restart the zombie reactor, in order to hold its announced Initial Public Offering, hoping to raise another $10 billion in private investment, for SMR-300 deployment across the country and around the world, with Palisades as the dangerously dubious prototype to be followed.

Speaking of money, Holtec has, thus far, been awarded $3.52 billion (with a B!) in public funding at Palisades alone. But it has requested another $12 billion (with a B!) more. These bailouts significantly impact the pocketbooks of hard working Americans — state and federal taxpayers, as well as electric ratepayers. Palisades represents a wealth redistribution scheme, from the American people to Holtec, compliments of Governor Whitmer, the Michigan state legislature, Congress, President Biden, and now President Trump. Abe Lincoln described the ideal of government as “of, by, and for the people.” At Palisades, government seems to be of, by, and for an inexperienced, incompetent, careless, corrupt and greed-driven corporation, playing radioactive Russian roulette, carrying out a large-scale nuclear experiment, with Great Lakes residents as the unwitting Guinea pigs.”

December 6, 2025 Posted by | safety, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, USA | Leave a comment

Could Small Modular Nuclear Reactors add supply-side grid flexibility?

It would make sense in the UK for SMRs to be load
following only if there were vast numbers of SMRs deployed,

13 Nov, 2025 By Tom Pashby New Civil Engineer

Small modular reactors (SMRs) could have the capability of providing the British electricity grid with flexible supplies, the government has said.

Supply-side grid flexibility is the ability of electricity sources to
adjust their output to match fluctuations in power demand in real-time. The
statement came in response to a question from an MP about whether SMRs
could be used as “load-following energy sources”.

Liberal Democrat spokesperson for energy security and net zero Pippa Heylings MP asked what assessment the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) “has made of the potential merits of small modular reactors being made as load-following energy sources”.

Responding, DESNZ minister of state
Michael Shanks said: “The next generation of nuclear, including SMRs,
offers new possibilities, including faster deployment, lower capital costs
and greater flexibility. “Whilst nuclear energy has a unique role to play
in delivering stable, low-carbon baseload energy, SMRs may be able to serve the electricity grid more flexibly than traditional nuclear, as well as
unlock a range of additional applications in energy sectors beyond grid
electricity.”

It would only make sense in the UK for SMRs to be load
following if there were vast numbers of SMRs deployed, representing a
significant proportion of the electricity generation capacity on the
national electricity transmission system of Great Britain, for them to be
load-following.

University of Sussex professor of science and technology
policy Andy Stirling told NCE: “This parliamentary answer repeats a
longstanding malaise in UK energy policy. “For far too long,
eccentrically strong official nuclear attachments have been dominated by
reference to claimed ‘new possibilities’, to what nuclear ‘may be
able’ to do, and to an unsubstantiated ‘unique role’. “

Whichever side of these debates one is on, it is clear that what is needed most is what used to be routine – but has been lacking for more than a decade.
“Questions over cost, security or flexibility claims can only be settled
by detailed comparative analysis that includes balanced attention to
non-nuclear strategies as well as nuclear ‘possibilities’. “

When such a picture is looked at in a fair way, current trends are making it
impossible even for formerly nuclear-enthusiastic bodies (like the Royal
Society) to conclude – even when looking at UK Government data –
anything other than that there is no rational need for any nuclear
contribution.”

 New Civil Engineer 13th Nov 2025,
https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/could-smrs-add-supply-side-grid-flexibility-13-11-2025/

November 17, 2025 Posted by | ENERGY, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, UK | Leave a comment

US ‘disappointed’ that Rolls-Royce will build UK’s first small modular reactors.

Guardian, 13 Nov 25

As Keir Starmer announces SMRs to be built in Wales, US ambassador says Britain should choose ‘a different path.

Keir Starmer has announced that the UK’s first small modular nuclear reactors will be built in north Wales – but immediately faced a backlash from Donald Trump’s administration after it pushed for a US manufacturer to be chosen.

Wylfa on the island of Anglesey, or Ynys Môn, will be home to three small modular reactors (SMRs) to be built by British manufacturer Rolls-Royce SMR. The government said it will invest £2.5bn.

SMRs are a new – and untested – technology aiming to produce nuclear power stations in factories to drive down costs and speed up installation. Rolls-Royce plans to build reactors, each capable of generating 470 megawatts of power, mainly in Derby.

The government also said that its Great British Energy – Nuclear (GBE-N) will report on potential sites for further larger reactors. They would follow the 3.2GW reactors under construction by French state-owned EDF at Hinkley Point C in Somerset and Sizewell C in Suffolk.

The Labour government under Starmer has embraced nuclear energy in the hope that it can generate electricity without carbon dioxide emissions, while also providing the opportunity for a large new export industry in SMRs.

However, it faced the prospect of a row with the US, piqued that its ally had overlooked the US’s Westinghouse Electric Company when choosing the manufacturer for the Wylfa reactors.

Ahead of the publication of the UK announcement, US ambassador Warren Stephens published a statement saying Britain should choose “a different path” in Wales.

“We are extremely disappointed by this decision, not least because there are cheaper, faster and already-approved options to provide clean, safe energy at this same location,” he said.

The Trump administration last month signed an $80bn (£61bn) deal with Westinghouse, which had been struggling financially, to build several of the same larger reactors proposed at Wylfa. Under the terms of that deal, the Trump administration could end up taking a stake in the company……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/nov/13/us-disappointed-that-rolls-royce-will-build-uks-first-small-modular-reactors

November 15, 2025 Posted by | politics international, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, UK, USA | Leave a comment

The SMR boom will soon go bust

by Ben Kritz, 3 Nov 25, https://www.msn.com/en-ph/technology/general/the-smr-boom-will-soon-go-bust/ar-AA1PJi1U

ONE sign that the excessively hyped concept of small modular reactors (SMRs) is now living on borrowed time is the lack of enthusiasm in the outlook from energy market analysts, whether they are individuals such as Leonard Hyman, William Tilles and Vaclav Smil, or big firms such as JP Morgan and Jones Lang LaSalle. None of them are optimistic that the sector will be productive before the middle of next decade, and the more critical ones are already predicting that it will never be, and that the “SMR bubble” will burst before the end of this one. My frequent readers will already know that I stand firmly with the latter view; basic market logic, in fact, makes any other view impossible.

In a recent commentary for Oil Price.com, one of the rather large number of online energy market news and analysis outlets, Hyman and Tilles predicted that the SMR bubble will burst in 2029. They based this on the reasonable observation that power supply forecasts are typically done on a three- to five-year timeframe. The fleet of SMRs that are currently expected to be in service between 2030 and 2035 simply will not be there, so energy planners will, at a minimum, omit them from the next planning window, and might decide to forget about them entirely. Deals will dry up, investors will dump their stocks or stop putting venture capital into SMR developers, and those developers will find themselves bankrupt.

That is an entirely plausible and perhaps even likely scenario, but the SMR bubble may burst much sooner than that, perhaps even as soon as next year, because of the existence of the other tech bubble, artificial intelligence, or AI, an acronym that in my mind sounds like “as if.” The topic of the AI bubble is an enormous can of worms, too complex to discuss right now, but the basic problem with it that is relevant to the SMR sector is that AI developers need a great deal of energy immediately. It has reached a point where AI-related data centers are described in terms of their energy requirements — in gigawatt increments — rather than their processing capacity. The availability of power determines whether or not a data center can be built; if the power is not already available, it must be within the relatively short time it will take to complete the data center’s construction.

Even if SMRs were readily available, their costs would discourage customers; AI developers are not too concerned with energy costs now, but they will be as their needs to start actually generating a profit become more acute. On a per-unit basis, SMRs are and are likely to always be more expensive than conventional, gigawatt-scale nuclear plants, and for that matter, most other power supply options. Hyman and Tilles estimate that on a per-unit cost basis (e.g., cost per megawatt-hour or gigawatt-hour), SMRs will be about 30 percent higher than the most efficient available gigawatt-scale large nuclear plants. Being smaller, SMRs would — hypothetically, as they do not actually exist yet — certainly cost less up front than large nuclear or conventionally fueled power plants, but their electricity would cost much more in the long run. That might not be an issue in some applications, but it certainly would if SMRs were intended to supply electricity to a national or regional grid.

Some analyses point out that some early adopters of SMRs, that is, customers who have put down money or otherwise promised to order one or more SMR units if and when they become available, may not be particularly price-sensitive; for example, military customers, governments taking responsibility for supplying electricity to remote areas, or some industrial customers. However, they would still be tripped up by the fragmented nature of the SMR sector, which was caused by the “tech bro” mindset of ignoring almost 70 years of experience in nuclear development and trying to reinvent the wheel.

JP Morgan’s 2025 energy report noted that there are only three SMRs in existence, with one additional one under construction; there is one in China, two in Russia, and the one not yet completed is in Argentina. All of them had construction timelines of three to four years, but took 12 years to complete; or in Argentina’s case, 12 years and counting. Argentina’s project has had cost overruns of 700 percent so far, while China and Russia’s projects were 300 percent and 400 percent over budget, respectively.

These are all essentially one-off, first-of-a-kind units, so some of these problems are to be expected, such as regulatory delays, design and manufacturing inefficiencies, and challenges from building supply chains from scratch. These problems would be resolved over time, except that there are literally hundreds of different SMR designs all competing for the same finite, niche-application market.

If the SMR developers listened to the engineers and policymakers who built up nuclear energy sectors that took advantage of economies of scale by standardizing a few designs and distributing the workload, they might get somewhere. That is not happening; potential customers, whether they have power cost concerns or not, are reluctant to jump in because it is not at all certain which SMRs will survive the competition. They might be willing to experiment to see if one design or another actually works — that is why the Chinese and Russian SMRs exist — but the fragmented SMR sector prevents them from trying more than one and making comparisons, at least not in a timely or financially rational manner.

I think the bubble begins to burst this coming year. The timeframe for construction to startup in most SMR pitches is four years. That’s entirely too optimistic, of course, but even if it is taken at face value, once we get a few months into 2026 without any tangible development happening, everyone will catch on that there won’t be any SMRs by 2030, and interest will turn elsewhere. It already is, among the data center sector, as was explained above.

November 6, 2025 Posted by | business and costs, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment

The Risky Movement to Make America Nuclear Again

As the licensing team dug in, Oklo couldn’t provide the supporting analysis for many of its basic safety assumptions

As the licensing team dug in, Oklo couldn’t provide the supporting analysis for many of its basic safety assumptions

A Silicon Valley startup called Oklo is leading the charge to bring nuclear power back to the US with small reactors. Its backers have wealth and political connections that could undermine nuclear safety.

Bloomberg, By Michael Riley,

When Oklo Inc., a nuclear power startup, applied in 2020 to operate its first reactor, the company rested largely on outsize ambition. Its MIT-educated co-founders, a married couple named Jacob and Caroline DeWitte, lived in a mobile home park in Mountain View, California, in space 38. Oklo, which had only 20 full-time employees, wanted to build small reactors across the country, transforming the way towns and industries are powered. To realize that dream, it needed the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to say the company’s design was safe.

Two years later, Oklo had failed to pass even the first step of the approval process. In 2022, after months of frustrating back and forth, the NRC concluded that the company didn’t provide verifiable answers to the most basic safety questions. The regulator denied the application. A former senior agency official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, says Oklo “is probably the worst applicant the NRC has ever had.”

For Jake DeWitte, the denial was maddening. He still grows visibly agitated when recounting the moment. “They completely screwed up,” he says. By the end, Caroline says, the agency “became kind of malicious, frankly.”

In 2025, Oklo’s reactor design is still unlicensed. But, in a sign of how radically the safety landscape has changed for nuclear power, the company’s business promise seems bright. Oklo went public last year and now has a market value hovering around $20 billion. In May, Jake was in the White House when President Donald Trump signed four executive orders designed to herald a nuclear renaissance. “It’s a brilliant industry,” Trump said, DeWitte at his side.

The startup’s backers long had a Plan B: If Oklo couldn’t win approval from the agency charged with protecting the public from nuclear accidents, they would, essentially, go after the regulator, in much the way Uber Technologies Inc. and other Silicon Valley startups have obliterated regulatory roadblocks. One of the architects of Oklo’s attack-the-regulator strategy is a law professor-turned-venture capitalist with ties to the Koch empire. He says the public shouldn’t be worried.

The revival of nuclear power in the US has been predicted countless times since President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program rose from the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This version, though, is something never before seen. Rather than huge power stations built by engineering companies for giant utilities, a new breed of nuclear startup wants to commercialize reactors, some so small they could be carried on semitrucks, so mighty they could power the hungriest of artificial intelligence data centers. Not one of these so-called advanced reactors has yet to be built in the US, but their promise has touched off a dealmaking frenzy, with backing from tech giants including Amazon.com, Google, Meta Platforms and Microsoft. The US Department of Energy has announced a goal of having at least three of these reactors switched on by July 4 of next year.

Oklo’s power and influence in the MAGA era have let it seize the political moment

Oklo isn’t the most obvious company of the two dozen or so newcomers to have broken through as a front-runner. Bill Gates’ TerraPower LLC has been trying to develop an advanced reactor for almost two decades. Kairos Power LLC, backed by Google, has made quick progress through the government’s licensing process.

But Oklo’s power and influence in the MAGA era have let it seize the political moment. The company is backed by some of Silicon Valley’s most important leaders, including Sam Altman, co-founder of OpenAI. A former board member is now Trump’s secretary of energy. Critically, Oklo has capitalized on the deregulatory fever gripping Washington. The NRC, which became a target of Trump’s Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, has lost at least 195 staff since January, and efforts to strip the agency of key powers are underway.

For a half-century, the NRC has been the watchdog of an industry built on some of the most dangerous technologies ever known. Yet Oklo and its backers say that its reactors will be so small and safe, little NRC oversight is needed.

Even a year ago, this proposition would have been absurd. Experts say advanced reactors are indeed safer in some respects: Because they’re a third or less the size of traditional reactors and aren’t cooled by water circulating under immense pressure, a serious accident is less likely to spread radioactive debris across a major populace. But for anyone nearby—workers operating the plant, say, or soldiers on a military base powered by one—the dangers could be substantial.

“All these nuke bros who know nothing about operating a reactor, they just want a free pass,” says Allison Macfarlane, former chairman of the NRC. “They can have their free pass, but then they will have an accident.”…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Transatomic’s collapse left venture capital’s tech titans looking for a new standard bearer in their drive to disrupt nuclear power.

In January 2018, some of the country’s richest and most powerful descended on the desert resort town of Indian Wells, California, for three days of hobnobbing over canapés and golf. They had come for the annual donor retreat established by the chemicals-and-refining billionaires Charles and David Koch; before the weekend was out, they had pledged to spend more than $400 million to support the Kochs’ political influence operation, which counted governors, senators and state legislative leaders as foot soldiers.

Among those attending was a law professor-turned-venture capitalist named Salen Churi. Co-founder of a new Koch-backed VC firm called Trust Ventures, Churi explained the firm’s novel strategy as he worked the target-rich room for potential investors: identify startups facing steep regulatory challenges; solve them through litigation, advocacy and political influence; and then watch the profits roll in.

“Imagine a startup able to tap into the know-how of Koch from Day 1,” Churi said, according to news coverage of his presentation. The company’s first big investment, in mid-2018, was in Oklo. (Another investor in 2018 was Rothrock; he invested in Oklo around the same time that Transatomic folded.)……………………………………………..

…………………………………………………….. Eighty feet high and fashioned from 1-inch-thick steel plating, the shiny silver dome of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II rises from the eastern Idaho sagebrush like a lost artifact of the Atomic Age. At one point, 52 test reactors of various types operated on this stretch of high desert. It’s the home of the Idaho National Laboratory, formerly known as Argonne-West, where nuclear power was born.

Nowadays, scientists, government officials, tourists and others have turned this site into a pilgrimage. (The filmmaker Oliver Stone paid a visit not long ago.) Some of them come to see or learn from the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II, or EBR-II, a sodium fast reactor that is considered by many to be the lab’s most successful attempt to revolutionize the way nuclear energy is created.

There’s a renewed belief that this long-forgotten technology—EBR-II was built six decades ago and decommissioned in the mid-1990s—holds the keys to a safer, more efficient nuclear industry. Adherents argue that the technology, unlike other reactors, is “passively safe”—so safe that in even some of the worst accident scenarios, a sodium fast reactor would shut down without human intervention.

Not far from the massive silver dome is a patch of government land where the DeWittes have staked their future. Little more than a sign and a couple of porta potties stashed amid the juniper bushes, this is where the two are planning to build Oklo’s reactor, Aurora, which they’ve described as a more modern version of the EBR-II. They have vowed that their reactor will share the same inherent safety characteristics.

Edwin Lyman, a physicist and director of nuclear power safety with the Union of Concerned Scientists, says the assumption that reactors like EBR-II are “passively safe” is misguided. “It’s gaslighting,” he says. Sodium fast reactors are notoriously difficult to operate, which accounts for the technology’s long history of accidents and meltdowns. Sodium leaks can create fires that spray a toxic sodium-oxide aerosol into the air. If the coolant comes into contact with water, hydrogen explosions can result in both the reactor itself and the power generation plant. And compared with light-water reactors, fast reactors leak neutrons that need extensive shielding to make them safe. “If something goes wrong, the potential for a Chernobyl-like escalating event is actually much higher than it is with light-water reactors,” Lyman says.

When Oklo submitted its first application to the NRC in 2020, the agency was under pressure from Congress and the industry to show it could license new reactors more efficiently. The agency’s licensing team was eager to begin what it called a Phase 1 review—essentially checking that the application is complete enough to move to a more rigorous scientific and safety evaluation. With an experienced company, Phase 1 usually takes about two months. “We thought we could get Oklo to that point in about six months,” says a former agency official familiar with the company’s application, who asked for anonymity to talk openly about the company’s application.

Major sticking points soon emerged. The company declared that, based on its extensive calculations, Aurora was one of the safest nuclear reactors in the world and there was no plausible accident that would result in a release of radiation into the environment. Yet the NRC staff identified important scenarios that Oklo didn’t appear to consider: What if undulating pipes from a sudden leak wrecked key systems? What if the seals of the reactor capsule failed, creating a pathway for radiation to reach the outside? The regulators also asked about the risk of flooding inside the reactor capsule, which the NRC said “may represent a potential criticality issue.” Nuclear experts say that’s a technical way of saying that the agency was worried about the possibility of an uncontrolled fission  uncontrolled fission event, which could result in a dangerous steam explosion inside the reactor vessel.

As the licensing team dug in, Oklo couldn’t provide the supporting analysis for many of its basic safety assumptions, according to four officials who spoke to Businessweek about the application, as well as public NRC documents. In some cases, supporting files the company claimed to have were not available when the NRC tried to examine them, one official says.

“We needed the evidence that this reactor could be built and operated safely, and it just wasn’t forthcoming,” says one of the four officials.

Finally, in January 2022, the NRC denied Oklo’s application. By that point, the company had raised more than $25 million, and its dream of mass producing small nuclear reactors had seemed in reach. But at the NRC, the company never made it beyond Phase 1.

In a flashy video posted on YouTube last year, the DeWittes, clad in jeans, stroll across the high prairie near the Idaho National Laboratory. They’re introduced by a narrator whose tone mixes soothing and serious. “Meet the husband-and-wife engineering duo that discovered a game-changing technology buried in a government lab in Idaho,” the narrator says.

The six-and-a-half-minute video was published on the YouTube channel of a Utah-based organization called the Abundance Institute, identified on its website as “a mission-driven nonprofit focused on creating a space for emerging technologies.” In contrast to other pro-nuclear outfits including Third Way and the Breakthrough Institute, the Abundance Institute has been ferocious in its criticism of the NRC. In January its CEO penned an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal that labeled the regulator “lawless,” then followed up with social media posts declaring that it was time to abolish the agency.

What the videos and op-eds don’t disclose is that the Abundance Institute is Churi’s brainchild. He’s a co-founder and is listed as the institute’s treasurer in papers filed with the Utah secretary of state’s office. The same papers list, as an institute director, Derek Johnson. He’s a central player on the Kochs’ national political team and executive vice president at the Kochs’ umbrella group, Stand Together, which also published the Oklo video……………….

“The people who get one-cent electricity from nuclear don’t exist yet because we can’t give it to them yet,” Churi says. “We wanted to be the lobbyist for companies that don’t exist yet and for consumers who haven’t gotten the benefit of those technologies yet.”

The institute is so intertwined with the Koch family’s famed influence network that it’s hard to distinguish between the two. Many of its key employees, including the CEO, come from the Center for Growth and Opportunity at Utah State University, sometimes called “Koch U of the West,” a reference to a similar Koch-funded outfit at George Mason University in Virginia. Churi listed CGO’s offices as his address in papers that the Abundance Institute filed with the state. (Christopher Koopman, the institute’s CEO, called that a “clerical error.”)

Emails and other documents obtained through public records requests show that the Abundance Institute effectively serves as a front for Churi’s attack-the-regulator mission. As his team dissected federal regulations, Churi spotted language that might offer an opening. In 1956 the Atomic Energy Commission determined that because any apparatus designed to carry out a nuclear fission chain reaction can affect the health and safety of the public, it needs a federal license. Nuclear startups could argue that their reactors are so small and safe that they don’t present any risk to the public—and therefore fall outside federal jurisdiction. It was a long-shot position on the science, but the right court might just buy it. Churi and the team went to work.

They began looking for a nuclear startup willing to be the public face of the challenge. And, because a major goal of the lawsuit was to shift oversight of small nuclear reactors from the NRC to the states, they recruited state attorneys general as lead plaintiffs.

For the first, they linked up with Bret Kugelmass, founder and CEO of Last Energy Inc., which boasts a reactor design using off-the-shelf components. Kugelmass has little to no experience in nuclear engineering—his last company used drones to map farmland—but he has a popular energy podcast and is close to the MAGA movement. One Oklo investor called him “like Elon in his take-no-prisoners approach to getting stuff done.”

For the second, Churi and the Abundance Institute targeted officials in Texas and Utah, two states where Churi spends much of his time and knows, he says, “a lot of folks who work in both politics and the AG offices.” In Utah, the Abundance Institute served as a conduit to those officials, leveraging the Koch family’s political clout as well.

According to emails obtained by Businessweek through a public records request, Utah Senate President J. Stuart Adams and an aide met with Abundance Institute staff in the fall of 2024. Afterward, the aide wrote Utah Chief Deputy Attorney General Dan Burton, saying the institute was “gathering clients for a nationwide lawsuit against the NRC.” Then he added, “We think it would be worth you/the AG’s time to explore their proposal and determine whether it makes sense for Utah to join.”…………………………………………………..

As the team prepared to file its federal lawsuit, a second and potentially more direct path to gutting the NRC opened up. The country had just voted to send Donald Trump back to the White House.

In February 2023, Jake DeWitte flew spur of the moment to Denver in hopes of buying a Kia Telluride he’d found online. His trip changed the future of the company.

Denver happened to be the home base for Chris Wright, founder and CEO of the second-largest fracking company in North America, Liberty Energy Inc. …………………………….

The timing was propitious, and not only for Oklo. The buy-in—structured as a $10 million strategic investment by Liberty—was finalized just weeks before an announcement in June that one of Altman’s companies, a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC), would take Oklo public. Jake says Oklo extended its last VC round to allow Liberty to get in under the wire, making Liberty one of the last early investors before Oklo began trading on the New York Stock Exchange the following year, with an initial valuation of $850 million……………………………………………..

In his first departmental directive, issued in early February, Wright declared that “the long-awaited American nuclear renaissance must launch during President Trump’s administration.” The directive said that the Energy Department would work to enable the “rapid deployment” of next-generation nuclear technology.

Meanwhile, Trump began a slash-and-burn campaign to hollow out federal regulators, including nominally independent agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Board. By April, drafts of four executive orders targeting the regulation of nuclear energy began circulating…………………………………………………………………..

One person who did get input on the orders, by her own account, was Isabelle Boemeke, a Brazilian model and self-described nuclear energy influencer who goes by the moniker Isodope. Author of a book on nuclear power titled Rad Future, Boemeke is famous for mobilizing her social media followers in a successful drive to keep the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant north of Los Angeles operating beyond its scheduled retirement. She’s also the spouse of Joe Gebbia, one of the founders of Airbnb and a prominent DOGE figure………………………………………….

……………………………………….. The federal lawsuit against the NRC was filed in December, with Texas and Utah as lead plaintiffs. By March the NRC had responded with a strongly worded motion asking the court to dismiss the lawsuit.

Behind the scenes, something very different was happening. At the end of April, the plaintiffs’ lead lawyer, a partner at the boutique firm Boyden Gray named Michael Buschbacher, emailed his colleagues with good news. The NRC was ready to discuss a settlement and potentially agree to the plaintiffs’ biggest demand: the initiation of a rule-making process with the goal of exempting some small nuclear reactors from traditional NRC oversight and handing it to state agencies instead.

Meanwhile, the startups have another pathway to get their reactors to market quickly. In August, the Department of Energy announced a pilot program with the goal of deploying at least three untested reactors by next July 4, to coincide with the 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Oklo plans to license its first Aurora reactor through this program, the company says, although its reactor won’t be ready by then.

The company says it still plans to license future reactors via the NRC, but it will benefit from a radically changed agency. The executive orders signed in May push the agency to approve new reactor licenses within 18 months and to further expedite approval for any power plants already OK’d by the Defense Department or the Energy Department, two entities that have never licensed a commercial reactor. The NRC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, a panel of experts who weigh in on safety issues posed by new designs, had its remit pared back to the “minimum necessary” required by law.

………………………..both the NRC’s general counsel and its executive director of operations were pushed out, two people familiar with those moves said. Trump fired one commissioner in mid-June, and a second resigned a few weeks later.

………………………………………… At a recent meeting with NRC employees, DOGE representatives handed out black ballcaps emblazoned with “Make Nuclear Great Again” alongside the logo for another nuclear startup, Valar Atomics, according to a former agency official familiar with the meeting……………………………………………………………………………

By this summer, it was clear that Churi and his team had won, and not only for Oklo. Their efforts have created an opening that other nuclear startups—and their Silicon Valley backers—can now draft behind. One of those companies, Deep Fission, plans to operate small nuclear reactors a mile underground, a concept that’s never been tried anywhere. Valar Atomics, which joined the lawsuit against the NRC in April, claims on its website that you can safely hold spent nuclear fuel from its reactor for five minutes in the palm of your hand—something that nuclear experts say would quickly kill anyone who tries it. Both companies were also recently chosen for the Energy Department’s new accelerated licensing program………………….. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-10-30/silicon-valley-s-risky-plan-to-revive-nuclear-power-in-america?embedded-checkout=true

November 4, 2025 Posted by | politics, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | 2 Comments

Busting the Spin on Small Modular Reactors – the CATO Institute !

At the heart of the case for SMRs is the claim that being smaller, they will be cheaper, quicker, and easier to build and easier to site. While this argument might appear plausible, it is not supported by any evidence.

the output of the 470MW Rolls Royce SMR is about the same size as that of the Fukushima Daiichi 1 reactor that melted down in 2011.

a large PWR or BWR will create less waste than the same capacity of SMRs.

 an operating reactor requires few permanent employees, and those workers typically have highly specific skills unlikely to be found among the local population. …………………..The number of factory jobs that are created is likely to be small and will mostly not be in the country buying the reactor.

The CATO Institute, Fall 2025 • Regulation
……………………………………………………………………Instead of another round of large nuclear plants, one of the focal points of the new renaissance is Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines SMRs as having an electrical output of 30MW–300MW.

Among their ostensible virtues:

  • They are cheaper and easier to build and so are less prone to cost and time overruns, making them easier to finance.
  • They are safer; for example, some are said to be meltdown-proof and “walk-away safe.”
  • They produce less waste (per kW of capacity) than large reactors.
  • Being smaller, there will be less opposition to their siting.
  • They will create large numbers of new jobs.

SMR proponents give the impression that large numbers of the units are being ordered around the world. These claims are unproven or misleading or simply wrong. No current SMR design is under construction, much less operating, so these claims—notably those on cost and construction time—are unproven and no more than marketing hype. There are two SMR-sized units under construction, in China and Russia, but they are prototypes or one-offs. The true SMR project nearest to construction start (as defined by pouring of first structural concrete) is the Darlington project for Ontario, Canada, for up to four GE–Hitachi BWRX–300s (explained below). The Ontario government approved construction of the first reactor in May 2025.

No SMR design that is expected to be offered as a commercial reactor has completed a full safety review by an experienced and credible regulator. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission will examine the design during the Darlington construction phase rather than before construction starts. Until a comprehensive safety review is successfully completed, it will not be known if the design is licensable or what the costs will be.

The designs most likely to progress to commercial availability are those based on the PWR and BWR designs in LWR large reactors. There are 65 years of operating experience with these types of reactors, so there is a reasonable expectation that SMR LWRs could be reliable, if not necessarily economic, sources of power.

Many designs for these units are said to be under development, but only a handful have progressed beyond the conceptual stage and are being offered by firms with the credibility to deliver a facility expected to cost several billion dollars. The main options are the GE–Hitachi BWRX–300, the Holtec SMR300, the Rolls Royce SMR, and the Westinghouse AP300. Below are overviews of these four designs, along with some other possibilities.

GE–Hitachi BWRX–300 / General Electric, along with Westinghouse, has by far the longest and most extensive experience in designing and supplying nuclear power reactors. The 300MW BWR is based on its ESBWR 1,500MW reactor design. Although the ESBWR completed US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) safety review in 2014, GE–Hitachi has won no orders, and it currently does not appear to be actively marketing the unit.

Like the ESBWR, the BWRX–300 relies heavily on passive safety features. GE–Hitachi received an order for up to four of the reactors to be built at the Darlington site. It has completed a pre-licensing review in Canada and a construction license has been given. A detailed review of the design will be carried out during construction prior to an operating license being granted.

The BWRX–300 was one of four designs shortlisted by Great British Energy–Nuclear (GBE–N), with the UK government-owned energy organization expected to choose two designs for installation in Scotland and England. But in June 2025, GBE–N announced only that it had selected the Rolls Royce SMR design, discussed below.

The UK Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is carrying out its Generic Design Assessment (GDA) on the BWRX–300, and it completed the first of the three stages of the GDA in December 2024 (primarily information exchange). GE–Hitachi has only committed to carry out the first two stages of review, and is unlikely to undertake the third stage given that it was not selected by GBE–N.

Holtec SMR 300 / Holtec has a long history in the spent-fuel handling and plant decommissioning sectors of the nuclear power industry, but not as a reactor designer and vendor. It launched its PWR SMR design in 2010, initially proposing a 160MW reactor. The unit is designed to be housed deep underground, relying on passive safety (claimed to be “walk-away safe”). In 2023, Holtec doubled the thermal output of the plant and renamed it SMR 300. It is not willing to say when it decided to make that change or why, but the most likely explanation is to gain scale economies.

Its main sales prospect is to initially build two reactors at Holtec’s Palisades site in Michigan, adjacent to an 801MW reactor Holtec owns and is preparing to reopen after it was idled in 2022.

It was one of the four designs shortlisted by GBE–N. ONR is carrying out its GDA on the Holtec SMR 300, but like GE–Hitachi, Holtec is unlikely to carry out the third stage given that it was not selected by GBE–N.

Rolls Royce SMR / Rolls Royce has a long history of supplying nuclear submarine reactors based on US designs. It is not clear how well this equips the firm to design and supply land-based power reactors. Its design is a 470MW PWR, making it significantly larger than the top of the IAEA’s range for SMRs.

Unlike the other three designs, it is much more conventional, not relying so much on passive safety and not housed underground. Its main sales prospects are in the UK and the Czech Republic. In the UK, it submitted a Final Tender to GBE–N in April 2025 and was selected by the government. ONR is carrying out its GDA on the reactor. It completed the second of the three stages in July 2024, and the third stage is expected to be completed in 2026.

Rolls Royce signed a deal in October 2024 with the Czech utility CEZ for it to help develop the design. It expects that three initial orders will be placed for the Czech Republic, with them coming online in 2034–2037. In February 2025, there were reports of tension between Rolls Royce and CEZ—in particular, over how much local Czech content there would be in reactor orders.

Westinghouse AP300 / Westinghouse has supplied substantially more power reactors worldwide than any other vendor. Its SMR design, the AP300 PWR, was launched well after its competitors in May 2023 and is based on the AP1000 large reactor design. It relies on passive safety.

In the UK, it applied for the design to undergo a GDA. In August 2024, it passed the government’s “readiness” test and was allowed to move on to a GDA. However, by December 2024, no funding package to pay for this process (expected to be funded by the vendor) had been agreed upon, and Westinghouse asked ONR to defer the start of the GDA. By May 2025, the GDA had not started, and there is no indication whether Westinghouse expects to proceed.

It chose not to respond to GBE–N’s Invitation to Submit Final Tenders for its project discussed above. Westinghouse has not commented on its decision not to proceed with the GDA or its decision not to submit a Final Tender to GBE–N. It may be that it has halted work until there is more concrete buyer interest in the design. If the design is not pursued, this would be the second time Westinghouse has carried out development work on an SMR design only to abandon it before it had won any orders, the previous attempt being halted in 2014.

Other possibilities / Besides those reactors, the French nuclear engineering firm Framatome began developing a design, Nuward, in 2019. It abandoned the design in the summer of 2024 in favor of a more conventional layout, and there is no timeframe for when this new design might be available.

A US firm, NuScale, has a design that has been under development since 2005. It started out as a 35MW PWR, then expanded to 40MW, 50MW, 60MW, and finally 77MW. The design, which successfully completed NRC review in May 2025, is “integrated” with all components housed within the reactor containment and would be built underground. It was designed to be built in clusters of 12 reactors, but the 77MW version is now also offered in clusters of four and six reactors. It appeared to have won an order in 2015 from Utah Associated Municipal Power (UAMPS) for a cluster of 12 reactors of 50MW, which then evolved into a cluster of six 77MW reactors, but the project was abandoned in December 2023 because of sharply escalating cost.

Arguments for SMRs / At the heart of the case for SMRs is the claim that being smaller, they will be cheaper, quicker, and easier to build and easier to site. While this argument might appear plausible, it is not supported by any evidence. The first reactors from more than 60 years ago were 150 MW or less, and reactors subsequently became larger, increasing in size 10-fold, primarily to gain scale economies. The case for this is clear: A 1,500MW reactor vessel will, all things being equal, be cheaper than ten 150MW reactor vessels. So, SMRs start with a disadvantage compared to large reactors because of the lost scale economies over large designs.

However, there is no clear evidence on why the real cost of large reactors has continuously increased over the history of nuclear power. Is it because of their size or because of how complex the designs have become? If it is complexity, why would SMRs be less complex than large reactors? The most obvious way this could happen is if not all the safety systems added to large reactors over the past 40 years were required for SMRs. Given that the SMRs on offer are not that small, this seems unlikely. For example, the output of the 470MW Rolls Royce SMR is about the same size as that of the Fukushima Daiichi 1 reactor that melted down in 2011.

The history of the Westinghouse AP design reactors illustrates the nuclear industry’s confusing position on reactor size. Its 1989 AP600 design was found to be uneconomic and was scaled up to the AP1000 in 2002, then scaled up again in 2013 to the CAP1400 and, in 2023, scaled down to the AP300.

Safety Many SMR safety claims are based on their use of passive safety measures. The intuitive impression is that because passive safety does not require the operation of an engineered system, it would be cheaper and, because it is passive, it cannot fail (Ramana 2024). Neither assumption is true. Building reactors underground appears likely to increase site work and make it more difficult and expensive. The ESBWR and AP1000 large reactor designs are both heavily reliant on passive safety, yet the ESBWR was too expensive to win any orders and the AP1000 proved very expensive to build in practice. That experience does not support the contention that passive safety will reduce costs. If all the safety systems required for large reactors are required for SMRs, this will adversely affect their economics.

Ease of production The idea that SMRs would emerge in several modules from factories and be transported to the site on the back of trucks, requiring only bolting together at the site, also has an intuitive appeal. However, in practice SMRs are substantial-sized reactors and will inevitably require considerable on-site civil works to provide the foundations and services required.

The narrative of factory production lines conjures an image of a conveyor belt producing multiple identical reactor modules, perhaps similar to automobile production lines producing thousands of cars per year. However, this is not the expected reality. Rolls Royce plans to only produce two reactors per year. Although production lines can be a cheap method of manufacture, they must constantly operate at near capacity to pay off their high fixed costs. If demand is less than planned, the high fixed costs will not be spread across many units of electricity, and if the design changes, the production line will have to be re-tooled. The AP1000 was expected to be built in factory modules, yet this did not prevent all the projects using this design from going far over time and budget.

Waste All things equal, a large PWR or BWR will create less waste than the same capacity of SMRs. Former US NRC chair Allison Macfarlane has said that SMRs would increase the volume and complexity of waste between two- and 30-fold because of such factors as greater neutron leakage.

Jobs Both politicians and nuclear power advocates like to claim a new plant will create many new jobs. But an operating reactor requires few permanent employees, and those workers typically have highly specific skills unlikely to be found among the local population. Nuclear reactors do require large numbers of workers during construction, but they too have specific skills unlikely to be found in the local area, and sometimes these workers have to be recruited from abroad. This is very disruptive to the local area, requiring a large amount of short-term accommodation and facilities.

Moreover, if the promises that SMRs will be cheaper and quicker to build than large reactors are fulfilled, they will create less work and over a shorter period. If factories with production lines are efficient, they will require fewer workers than other manufacturing methods. To minimize costs, the number of factories will have to be minimized, and factories will not be built in most export-country markets. The number of factory jobs that are created is likely to be small and will mostly not be in the country buying the reactor……………………………………………………………………………………………………https://www.cato.org/regulation/fall-2025/next-nuclear-renaissance#small-modular-reactors

October 31, 2025 Posted by | Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment

What Ends the SMR Bubble?

In the up leg of any hype cycle, bad news is somehow massaged away.

The downleg of the SMR hype cycle should be epic.

By Leonard Hyman & William Tilles – Oct 22, 2025, https://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/What-Ends-the-SMR-Bubble.html

  • Analysts warn that small modular reactors (SMRs) are caught in a classic boom-and-bust pattern.
  • Despite promises of faster, cheaper builds, early SMR projects in China, Russia, and Argentina have suffered cost overruns of 300–700%.
  • With hundreds of competing SMR technologies and no standardization, the market risks fragmentation and inefficiency.

We think the concept of the Small Modular Reactor (SMR) as a solution to many of our future energy needs is in the midst of a major bubble or hype cycle.  Think of the latter as an inverted “V”. In the up leg, investors feel great about prospects and profits, which are, they believe, soon on the way. In the down leg, investor disappointment sets in as earlier financial forecasts are seen as pure fiction, with reality being much worse. In a way, this is how free markets with imperfect information work. The question is: what triggers the down leg in the hype cycle for SMRs? Our answer is the year 2029.

Power supply forecasts, as our readers know, are made in three to five-year increments. We think 2029 is the forecast year in which energy planners acknowledge reality. The fleet of SMRs expected to be in service in the first half of the next decade (2030-2035) simply won’t be there. And we believe this will trigger the down leg in the hype cycle. That’s our thesis, simply stated, and we’ll discuss why in a moment.

First,  it helps to understand that the SMR is a reactive technology, meaning that its designers are reacting to a real problem. New gigawatt-scale nuclear plants take too long to build, and they’re too expensive. The last big nuclear plant built in the US, Plant Vogtle, cost three times its original budget and took twice as long as expected to build. The new French reactor at Flamanville was more than 200% over budget, also with extensive delays. Not the sort of experience to trigger a nuclear Renaissance.

This situation is what the SMR industry is responding to, saying that with modular, factory-built components, we can do nuclear new-builds much faster, hopefully in three to four years. As an aside, we should point out that construction firms may be able to build faster, but they can’t be cheaper than gigawatt-scale reactors because they’re engaging in an exercise of reverse economies of scale. What does this mean? 

 Let’s discuss this in terms of cars, not power plants, for a moment. The soccer parent goes to the new car showroom and says they need a car that seats eight. They purchase a minivan for $40,000. The capital cost to move each passenger is $5,000 ($40,000 divided by 8). A thrifty person goes to the same dealership but insists on only spending $20,000 and drives away in a slightly used two-seater. A thrifty person saved half as much on the total capital cost. But their cost to move each passenger ($20,000 /2) was twice as high, $5,000 vs $10,000. If we substitute the term kilowatts for “cost to move each passenger,” this demonstrates the issue. Like the bigger minivan, the smaller two-seater has to have all the same components as the bigger vehicle, only tinier. 

 We assume a similar logic applies in building new nuclear plants. Our guess is that electricity from SMRs will be at least 30% more expensive than best-in-class (on a cost basis) gigawatt-scale reactors based on relative capital costs. But the overall units, because they’re tinier,  will cost less per reactor than gigawatt-scale reactors.

But we don’t think the cost differential between SMRs and gigawatt scale reactors will make all that much difference, and won’t turn the hype cycle, at least not for a while, because early adopters of SMRs will be relatively price insensitive buyers like the military in extremely remote locales, and inside the fence industrial users like large chemical plants which require both electricity and steam, such as the Dow Chemical refinery in Baytown, Texas.

And here is where we have real concerns about SMRs. Consider the astonishing array of new competing technologies and the variety of sizes, all falling under the rubric of SMRs. A tiny SMR today is less than one megawatt, and a large one is 300 MWs. There are way too many different sizes and technologies, many extremely well-financed, for us to speculate about winners and losers at this point. But this looks like an awful lot of competitors for a finite market. However, there are certain definitive things we can say. First, all this variety ignores the advice of nuclear engineers who advocate construction of standardized designs in decent numbers in order to enjoy cost reduction benefits for the nuclear fleet as a whole. Second, it would take over 1300 SMRs (assuming each had a capacity of 100 MW)  to make a 10% impact on US power-generating capacity.  (Total US generating capacity was 1,326,000 MW at the end of 2024.)  The likelihood of completing so many projects within a few years is low.

JP Morgan’s 2025 energy report discussed SMRs on a global basis. There are only three completed SMRs in the world, one in China and two in Russia, with a fourth under construction in Argentina. The report noted cost overruns of 300% for China’s project, 400% for Russia’s, and 700% for Argentina’s. All units promised 3-4 year build times. It all took twelve years. When perusing the articles on the finances of these facilities, one finds the following explanations: design and manufacturing immaturity, lengthy periods for verification of passive safety systems, supply chain limitations in an immature industry, cost overrun challenges in FOAK (first of a kind) units. Sound familiar?

Let’s return to our original point about hype cycles and what makes them turn. Markets are like tolerant parents in a room full of children. They may tolerate a lot, but there are certain things they won’t stand for. Right now, the market seems to be indifferent to reactor size, technology, or even economics. Which is another way of saying financing to the industry remains available on very easy terms. And as investors, we would probably continue to play this from the long side at least for the near-term.

But the one thing investors won’t tolerate is if new SMRs experience the lengthy construction delays and eye-watering cost increases that have plagued new gigawatt-scale reactors. This early evidence, albeit skimpy, of just three new facilities, is not encouraging. But we don’t think investors in the West will worry. Not yet. In the up leg of any hype cycle, bad news is somehow massaged away. So for us, 2029 is the year forecasters in the West begin to acknowledge the impact of disappointing SMR construction delays (probably similar to delays experienced in China and Russia) and that the new SMRs that energy buyers expected “in the early 2030s”  won’t be there. But it gets worse. The industry will then realize that by pursuing SMRs they got the same intolerably long construction periods and all the huge cost overruns, but at far worse price points, thereby jeopardizing the entire commercial viability of SMRs. The downleg of the SMR hype cycle should be epic.

We will give the last word to noted energy expert, Vaclav Smil, who said this in response to a question about the impact of SMRs: “Call me or send me an email once you see such wonders built on schedule, on budget, and in aggregate capacities large enough to make a real difference.“ He added that he didn’t expect a call for ten or twenty years.

October 28, 2025 Posted by | Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, spinbuster | Leave a comment

The hidden military pressures behind the new push for small nuclear reactors

The neglected factor is the military dependence on civil nuclear industries.

By funding civil nuclear projects, taxpayers and consumers cover military uses of nuclear power in subsidies and higher bills – without the added spending appearing in defence budgets

October 28, 2025, Phil Johnstone, Visiting Fellow, School of Global Studies, University of Sussex; University of Tartu; Utrecht University, Andy Stirling, Professor of Science & Technology Policy, SPRU, University of Sussex Business School, University of Sussex

Donald Trump’s recent visit to the UK saw a so-called “landmark partnership” on nuclear energy. London and Washington announced plans to build 20 small modular reactors and also develop microreactor technology – despite the fact no such plants have yet been built commercially anywhere in the world.

The UK prime minister, Keir Starmer, promised these plans will deliver a “golden age” of nuclear energy that will also “drive down bills”. Yet the history of nuclear power has been decades of overhype, soaring costs and constant delays. Around the world, the trends point the wrong way.

So why the renewed excitement about going nuclear? The real reasons have less to do with energy security, or climate change – and far more to do with military power.

At first sight, the case may seem obvious. Nuclear supporters frame small modular reactors, or SMRs, as vital for cutting emissions, meeting rising demand for electricity from cars and data centres. With large nuclear plants now prohibitively expensive, smaller reactors are billed as an exciting new alternative.

But these days even the most optimistic industry analyses concede that nuclear – even SMRs – is unlikely to compete with renewables. One analysis in New Civil Engineer published earlier this year concluded that SMRs are “the most expensive source per kilowatt of electricity generated when compared with natural gas, traditional nuclear and renewables”.

Independent assessments – for instance by the formerly pro-nuclear Royal Society – find that 100% renewable systems outperform any energy system including nuclear on cost, flexibility and security. This helps explain why worldwide statistical analysis shows nuclear power is not generally linked to carbon emissions reductions, while renewables are.

Partly, the enthusiasm for SMRs can be explained by the loudest institutional voices tending to have formal pro-nuclear remits or interests: they include the industry itself and its suppliers, nuclear agencies, and governments with entrenched military nuclear programmes. For these interests, the only question is which kinds of nuclear reactors to develop, and how fast. They don’t wonder if we should build reactors in the first place: the need is seen as self-evident.

At least big nuclear reactors have benefited from economies of scale and decades of technological optimisation. Many SMR designs are just “powerpoint reactors”, existing only in slides and feasibility studies. Claims these unbuilt designs “will cost less” are speculative at best.

Investment markets know this. While financiers see SMR hype as a way to profit from billions in government subsidies, their own analyses are less enthusiastic about the technology itself.

So why then, all this attention to nuclear in general and smaller reactors in particular? There is clearly more to this than meets the eye.

The hidden link

The neglected factor is the military dependence on civil nuclear industries. Maintaining a nuclear armed navy or weapons programme requires constant access to generic reactor technologies, skilled workers and special materials. Without a civilian nuclear industry, military nuclear capabilities are significantly more challenging and costly to sustain.

Nuclear submarines are especially important here as they would very likely require national reactor industries and their supply chains even if there was no civil nuclear power. Barely affordable even vessel by vessel, nuclear submarines become even more expensive when the costs of this “submarine industrial base” is factored in.

Rolls-Royce is an important link here, as it already builds the UK’s submarine reactors and is set to build the newly announced civil SMRs. The company said openly in 2017 that a civil SMR programme would “relieve the Ministry of Defence of the burden of developing and retaining skills and capability”.

Here, as emphasised by Nuclear Intelligence Weekly in 2020, the Rolls-Royce SMR programme has an important “symbiosis with UK military needs”. It is this dependency that allows military costs (in the words of a former executive with submarine builders BAE Systems), to be “masked” behind civilian programmes.

By funding civil nuclear projects, taxpayers and consumers cover military uses of nuclear power in subsidies and higher bills – without the added spending appearing in defence budgets.

When the UK government funded us to investigate the value of this transfer, we put it at around £5 billion per year in the UK alone. These costs are masked from public view, covered by revenues from higher electricity prices and the budgets of supposedly civilian government agencies.

This is not a conspiracy but a kind of political gravitational field. Once governments see nuclear weapons as a marker of global status, the funding and political support becomes self-perpetuating.

The result is a strange sort of circularity: nuclear power is justified by energy security and cost arguments that don’t stand up, but is in reality sustained for strategic reasons that remain unacknowledged.

A global pattern

The UK is not unique, though other nuclear powers are much more candid. US energy secretary Chris Wright described the US-UK nuclear deal as important for “securing nuclear supply chains across the Atlantic”. Around US$25 billion a year (£18.7 billion) flows from civil to military nuclear activity in the US.

Russia and China are both quite open about their own inseparable civil-military links. French president Emmanuel Macron put it clearly: “Without civilian nuclear, no military nuclear, without military nuclear, no civilian nuclear.”

Across these states, military nuclear capabilities are seen as a way to stay at the world’s “top table”. An end to their civilian programme would threaten not just jobs and energy, but their great power status.

The next frontier

Beyond submarines, the development of “microreactors” is opening up new military uses for nuclear power. Microreactors are even smaller and more experimental than SMRs. Though they can make profits by milking military procurement budgets, they make no sense from a commercial energy standpoint.

However, microreactors are seen as essential in US plans for battlefield power, space infrastructure and new “high energy” anti-drone and missile weaponry. Prepare to see them become ever more prominent in “civil” debates – precisely because they serve military goals.

Whatever view is taken of these military developments, it makes no sense to pretend they are unrelated to the civil nuclear sector. The real drivers of the recent US-UK nuclear agreement lie in military projection of force, not civilian power production. Yet this remains absent from most discussions of energy policy.

It is a crucial matter of democracy that there be honesty about what is really going on.

October 28, 2025 Posted by | Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Small reactors, big problems: the nuclear mirage behind AI’s energy hype


Enrique Dans, Medium.com, 12 Oct 25

In the debate over the energy infrastructure required for the rapid growth of AI, small (nuclear) modular reactors (SMEs)are being touted in some quarters as a reliable, dense and zero-carbon way to supply data centers and critical networks.

A seductive idea for industries looking to justify colossal investments, it also demands rigorous and critical scrutiny. After all, a nuclear reactor is a nuclear reactor, with inherent dangers, and multiplying the number of installations also multiplies the risk vectors. An SMR on a truck: what could possibly go wrong?

The promise of “safer”, “modular”, “quick to deploy” and “low carbon” energy doesn’t hold up in the face of history, economics, or risk analysis. Modular designs have been explored before, and they faced the same obstacles: uncontrollable costs, complex engineering, difficulties in scaling and operational problems. The simple truth is that small nuclear reactors can’t compete with renewables today. Instead, the arguments are based on political, financial and institutional motivations, fueled by a mentally ill person who hates renewables.

First, the technical and operational risks. A reactor, large or small, is based on fissile materials; radioactive, very hot and requiring complex cooling systemsThere are no………………………………………………………….. (Subscribers only) https://medium.com/enrique-dans/small-reactors-big-problems-the-nuclear-mirage-behind-ais-energy-hype-77f93a3a4460

October 14, 2025 Posted by | Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment

US and investors gambling on unproven nuclear technology, warn experts

 The US government and investors have made a $9bn gamble on small nuclear
reactors to power the AI boom and lower emissions — but experts warn the
technology could prove too costly to be viable.

Data compiled by the FT
shows that since 2019, government agencies including the energy and defence
departments have committed over $6bn to developers of small modular
reactors (SMRs) through awards, loans and cost sharing agreements. Private
investment has also soared, with over $3bn raised in the same timeframe.

The technology promises a one-stop solution to data centres’ power needs
by providing clean, reliable and cheap electricity for companies to train
and run their AI models. Investor enthusiasm has lifted the share prices
and valuations of companies with little or no revenues or operating
projects.

“There’s a lot of cheerleading happening, but the amount of
capital that you need to cross the finish line is huge,” said Chris
Gadomski, head of nuclear research at BloombergNEF, which estimates data
centre power needs will more than double by 2035. “What I see happening
with SMRs and data centres reminds me of the internet boom and bust of the
early 2000s.”

 FT 5th Oct 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/8a18e722-3efa-404e-9f2a-709eed877f18

October 8, 2025 Posted by | business and costs, Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment

Small Nuclear Reactors Will Not Save The Day

By Leon Stille – Sep 23, 2025, https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Small-Nuclear-Reactors-Will-Not-Save-The-Day.html

  • SMR’s are being hailed as the perfect solution for large industrial power consumers.
  • SMRs are currently being marketed like they’re the iPhone of nuclear energy: smarter, smaller, cheaper, scalable.
  • Despite the hype, there are currently no SMR’s operating on a commercial scale.

You can feel the buzz: nuclear is back. Or so we’re told.

From Brussels to Washington, a new wave of enthusiasm for so-called Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) is sweeping through policy circles, think tanks, and energy startups. These compact, supposedly plug-and-play nuclear units are being hailed as the perfect solution to power data centers, feed artificial intelligence’s growing hunger, and backstop our energy transition with clean, stable electricity.

There’s just one problem. Actually, there are many. None of them small.

The hype cycle is in full spin

SMRs are currently being marketed like they’re the iPhone of nuclear energy: smarter, smaller, cheaper, scalable. A miracle solution for everything from remote grids to decarbonizing heavy industry and AI’s server farms. Countries like the U.S., Canada, and the UK have announced ambitious deployment plans. Major developers, including NuScale, Rolls-Royce SMR, GE Hitachi, and TerraPower, have painted glossy timelines with glowing promises.

Except the fine print tells a different story.

There are currently no operational commercial SMRs anywhere in the world. Not one. NuScale, the U.S. frontrunner, recently cancelled its flagship Utah project after costs ballooned to over $9,000 per kilowatt and no investors could be found. Even their CEO admitted no deployment would happen before 2030. Meanwhile, Rolls-Royce’s much-hyped SMR factory hasn’t produced a single bolt of steel yet.

So, we’re betting on a technology that doesn’t yet exist at commercial scale, won’t arrive in meaningful numbers before the 2030s, and would require thousands of units to significantly contribute to global energy demand. That’s not a strategy. That’s science fiction.

Big nuclear hasn’t exactly inspired confidence either

Even the large-scale projects that SMRs claim to “improve upon” are struggling. Take the UK’s Hinkley Point C, once heralded as the future of nuclear energy in Europe. It’s now twice as expensive as originally planned (over £46 billion), at least five years late, and facing ongoing construction delays. The French-backed EPR reactor design it’s based on has already been plagued with similar issues in Flamanville (France) and Olkiluoto (Finland), where completion took over a decade longer than promised and costs ballooned dramatically.

Let’s be honest: if any other energy technology was this unreliable on delivery, we’d laugh it out of the room.

Price floors for nuclear, and price ceilings for reason

In France and Finland, authorities have now agreed to guaranteed minimum prices for new nuclear power, effectively writing blank checks to ensure profitability for operators. In Finland, the recent deal sets the floor above €90/MWh for 20 years. Meanwhile, solar and wind regularly clear wholesale power auctions across Europe at €30–50/MWh, with even lower marginal costs.

Why, exactly, are we locking in decades of higher prices for a supposedly “market-based” energy future? It’s hard to see how this helps consumers, industries, or climate targets. Especially when these same nuclear plants will also require major grid upgrades, just like renewables, because any large-scale generator needs robust transmission capacity. So no efficiency win there either.

The SMR promise: too small, too late

Back to SMRs. Let’s suppose the best-case scenario plays out. A couple of designs clear regulatory approval by 2027–2028, construction starts in the early 2030s, and the first commercial units are online before 2035. Even then, the world would need to build and connect thousands of these small reactors within 10–15 years to displace a meaningful share of fossil generation. That’s a logistics nightmare, and we haven’t even discussed public acceptance, licensing bottlenecks, uranium supply, or waste management.

For perspective: in the time it takes to build a single SMR, solar, wind, and battery storage could be deployed 10 to 20 times over, for less money, with shorter lead times, and with no radioactive legacy.

And unlike nuclear, these technologies are modular today. They’re scalable now. They’ve proven themselves everywhere from the Australian outback to German rooftops and Californian substations.

The elephant in the reactor room: waste and risk

Nuclear fans love to stress how “safe” modern designs are. And yes, statistically speaking, nuclear energy is relatively safe per kilowatt-hour. But it’s also the only energy source with a non-zero risk of catastrophic failure and waste that stays toxic for thousands of years.

Why, exactly, would we take that risk when we have multiple clean energy options with zero risk of explosion and waste streams that are either recyclable or inert?

You don’t need to be a nuclear physicist to ask this: how is betting on high-cost, slow-deploying, risk-bearing, politically toxic infrastructure a better idea than wind, solar, and storage?

A footnote in the transition, not the headline

Let’s be clear: nuclear power will likely continue to play a role in some countries’ energy mixes. France and Sweden have legacy fleets. New projects may go ahead in China or South Korea, where costs are contained and planning is centralized. But for the majority of the world, especially countries trying to decarbonize fast, new nuclear is not the answer.

SMRs, despite their branding, will not save the day. They will be at best a niche, possibly a small contributor in specific applications like remote mines, military bases, or industrial clusters where no other solution works. That’s fine. But let’s stop pretending they’re some kind of energy silver bullet.

Final thoughts

We are in the decisive decade for climate action. Every euro, dollar, and yuan we invest must yield maximum emissions reduction per unit of time and cost. By that standard, SMRs fall flat. Nuclear power, small or large, is simply too expensive, too slow, too risky, and too narrow in its use case to lead the energy transition.

So let’s cool the reactor hype. Let’s focus instead on the technologies that are already winning: wind, solar, batteries, heat pumps, grid flexibility, green hydrogen. These are not dreams. They’re deploying by the gigawatt, today. SMRs are fascinating, yes. But when it comes to decarbonization, we need workhorses, not unicorns.

September 26, 2025 Posted by | Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, spinbuster | Leave a comment

More hype about Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), but  they may curb nuclear development .


Energy Revolutions by David Toke, 15 Sept 25

The amount of hype about SMR development seems to grow at inverse
proportion to the likelihood of real SMR deployment. We are now witnessing
a blast of PR about SMRs timed for the visit of Donald Trump to the UK. In
practice the imaginary SMR surge, which appears mostly in press releases
rather than real projects, may well signal a lack of development of nuclear
reactors in the West.

In an earlier post I discussed how so-called SMRs do
not exist as a concept. That is as a concept distinct from earlier attempts
to develop mainstream nuclear power using reactors that are smaller than
today’s mainstream projects. The nuclear industry gradually increased the
size of reactors to reduce costs per MW through capturing economies of
scale. Logic dictates that SMRs will be more, not less, costly than the
conventional contemporary nuclear projects.

However, SMRs could be more of
a burden for the nuclear industry than a boon. That is because instead of
building large conventional projects, small ones are being done ..
For example, in the USA the last completed nuclear reactor project, Vogtle
3&4, is around 2200 MW. Projected SMRs are in the 100-400MW range. The
policy drive for SMRs has recently been doubted by the former Chairman of
the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Alison Macfarlane. Her (co-authored
analysis) implies that nuclear waste problems from SMRs will be worse than
with conventional reactors. The paper also says that ‘many studies show
that the economics of SMRs will be much costlier than that of large LWRs,
thereby will not be competitive or profitable.’ https://davidtoke.substack.com/p/two-stories-1-how-smrs-may-curb-nuclear

 

September 20, 2025 Posted by | Small Modular Nuclear Reactors | Leave a comment

Rolls Royce “Small” nuclear reactors are not at all small!

Dr Paul Dorfman Letter: Further to your report “Deal with US to
fast-track mini nuclear reactors” (Sep 15; letter, Sep 16), small modular
reactors (SMRs) are defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency as
reactors that generate up to 300MW power.

At 470MW, the Rolls-Royce design is not an SMR: it is larger than the UK Magnox reactor, more than half the size of the 900MW reactors that make up the bulk of the French nuclear fleet, and about a third the size of the very large EPR reactor design at Hinkley Point C.

This matters because the Rolls-Royce design will need big
sites, standard nuclear safety measures, exclusion zones, core catchers,
aircraft crash protection and security. All this is important because in
calling its design an SMR, or small, Rolls-Royce appears to me to have been
economical with the truth — and all that implies for its other claims,
especially about time and cost.

As for the nuclear waste problem, the former chair of the US government Nuclear Regulatory Commission reports
that SMRs would produce more reactive waste per kWh — the key parameter — than large reactors.

Times 17th Sept 2025. https://www.thetimes.com/comment/letters-to-editor/article/times-letters-ethics-of-danny-krugers-defection-to-reform-uk-3rbg90m3b

September 20, 2025 Posted by | Small Modular Nuclear Reactors, spinbuster, UK | Leave a comment