SMR’s are being hailed as the perfect solution for large industrial power consumers.
SMRs are currently being marketed like they’re the iPhone of nuclear energy: smarter, smaller, cheaper, scalable.
Despite the hype, there are currently no SMR’s operating on a commercial scale.
You can feel the buzz: nuclear is back. Or so we’re told.
From Brussels to Washington, a new wave of enthusiasm for so-called Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) is sweeping through policy circles, think tanks, and energy startups. These compact, supposedly plug-and-play nuclear units are being hailed as the perfect solution to power data centers, feed artificial intelligence’s growing hunger, and backstop our energy transition with clean, stable electricity.
There’s just one problem. Actually, there are many. None of them small.
The hype cycle is in full spin
SMRs are currently being marketed like they’re the iPhone of nuclear energy: smarter, smaller, cheaper, scalable. A miracle solution for everything from remote grids to decarbonizing heavy industry and AI’s server farms. Countries like the U.S., Canada, and the UK have announced ambitious deployment plans. Major developers, including NuScale, Rolls-Royce SMR, GE Hitachi, and TerraPower, have painted glossy timelines with glowing promises.
Except the fine print tells a different story.
There are currently no operational commercial SMRs anywhere in the world. Not one. NuScale, the U.S. frontrunner, recently cancelled its flagship Utah project after costs ballooned to over $9,000 per kilowatt and no investors could be found. Even their CEO admitted no deployment would happen before 2030. Meanwhile, Rolls-Royce’s much-hyped SMR factory hasn’t produced a single bolt of steel yet.
So, we’re betting on a technology that doesn’t yet exist at commercial scale, won’t arrive in meaningful numbers before the 2030s, and would require thousands of units to significantly contribute to global energy demand. That’s not a strategy. That’s science fiction.
Big nuclear hasn’t exactly inspired confidence either
Even the large-scale projects that SMRs claim to “improve upon” are struggling. Take the UK’s Hinkley Point C, once heralded as the future of nuclear energy in Europe. It’s now twice as expensive as originally planned (over £46 billion), at least five years late, and facing ongoing construction delays. The French-backed EPR reactor design it’s based on has already been plagued with similar issues in Flamanville (France) and Olkiluoto (Finland), where completion took over a decade longer than promised and costs ballooned dramatically.
Let’s be honest: if any other energy technology was this unreliable on delivery, we’d laugh it out of the room.
Price floors for nuclear, and price ceilings for reason
In France and Finland, authorities have now agreed to guaranteed minimum prices for new nuclear power, effectively writing blank checks to ensure profitability for operators. In Finland, the recent deal sets the floor above €90/MWh for 20 years. Meanwhile, solar and wind regularly clear wholesale power auctions across Europe at €30–50/MWh, with even lower marginal costs.
Why, exactly, are we locking in decades of higher prices for a supposedly “market-based” energy future? It’s hard to see how this helps consumers, industries, or climate targets. Especially when these same nuclear plants will also require major grid upgrades, just like renewables, because any large-scale generator needs robust transmission capacity. So no efficiency win there either.
The SMR promise: too small, too late
Back to SMRs. Let’s suppose the best-case scenario plays out. A couple of designs clear regulatory approval by 2027–2028, construction starts in the early 2030s, and the first commercial units are online before 2035. Even then, the world would need to build and connect thousands of these small reactors within 10–15 years to displace a meaningful share of fossil generation. That’s a logistics nightmare, and we haven’t even discussed public acceptance, licensing bottlenecks, uranium supply, or waste management.
For perspective: in the time it takes to build a single SMR, solar, wind, and battery storage could be deployed 10 to 20 times over, for less money, with shorter lead times, and with no radioactive legacy.
And unlike nuclear, these technologies are modular today. They’re scalable now. They’ve proven themselves everywhere from the Australian outback to German rooftops and Californian substations.
The elephant in the reactor room: waste and risk
Nuclear fans love to stress how “safe” modern designs are. And yes, statistically speaking, nuclear energy is relatively safe per kilowatt-hour. But it’s also the only energy source with a non-zero risk of catastrophic failure and waste that stays toxic for thousands of years.
Why, exactly, would we take that risk when we have multiple clean energy options with zero risk of explosion and waste streams that are either recyclable or inert?
You don’t need to be a nuclear physicist to ask this: how is betting on high-cost, slow-deploying, risk-bearing, politically toxic infrastructure a better idea than wind, solar, and storage?
A footnote in the transition, not the headline
Let’s be clear: nuclear power will likely continue to play a role in some countries’ energy mixes. France and Sweden have legacy fleets. New projects may go ahead in China or South Korea, where costs are contained and planning is centralized. But for the majority of the world, especially countries trying to decarbonize fast, new nuclear is not the answer.
SMRs, despite their branding, will not save the day. They will be at best a niche, possibly a small contributor in specific applications like remote mines, military bases, or industrial clusters where no other solution works. That’s fine. But let’s stop pretending they’re some kind of energy silver bullet.
Final thoughts
We are in the decisive decade for climate action. Every euro, dollar, and yuan we invest must yield maximum emissions reduction per unit of time and cost. By that standard, SMRs fall flat. Nuclear power, small or large, is simply too expensive, too slow, too risky, and too narrow in its use case to lead the energy transition.
So let’s cool the reactor hype. Let’s focus instead on the technologies that are already winning: wind, solar, batteries, heat pumps, grid flexibility, green hydrogen. These are not dreams. They’re deploying by the gigawatt, today. SMRs are fascinating, yes. But when it comes to decarbonization, we need workhorses, not unicorns.
Dan Tehan told Sky News he planned to visit Idaho to investigate developments relating to small modular reactors (SMRs). But the only significant recent SMR ‘development’ in Idaho was the 2023 cancellation of NuScale’s flagship project after cost estimates rose to a prohibitive A$31 billion per GW.
The NuScale fiasco led the Coalition to abandon its SMR-only policy and to fall in love with large, conventional reactors despite previously giving them a “definite no”.
SMR wannabes and startups continue to collapse on a regular basis. WNISR-2025 reports that two of the largest European nuclear startups Newcleo (cash shortage) and Naarea (insolvent) are in serious financial trouble.
Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation filed for bankruptcy protection in the US last year – just a year after a company representative falsely told an Australian Senate inquiry that it was constructing reactors in North America. The Nuward project was suspended in France last year following previous decisions to abandon four other SMR projects in France.
The latest edition of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report paints a glum picture for the nuclear power industry — the number of countries building reactors has plummeted from 16 to 11 over the past two years — and gives the lie to claims by the Coalition that Australia risks being ‘left behind’ and ‘stranded’ if we don’t jump on board.
That appears to be news to new Coalition energy spokesman Dan Tehan, who has taken over the portfolio from Ted O’Brien, the chief architect of the nuclear power policy that cost the Coalition around 11 seats in the May 2025 election.
Speaking to Sky News from the US, where he says he is on a nuclear “fact-finding” mission, Tehan said Sky News that “every major industrialised country, apart from Australia, is either seriously considering nuclear or is adopting nuclear technology at pace”.
Continuing with the theme, Tehan said: “Australia is going to be completely and utterly left behind, because we have a nuclear ban at the moment in place, and if we’re not careful, the rest of the world is going to move and we are going to be left stranded.”
The simple fact is, however, that there isn’t a single power reactor under construction in the 35 countries on the American continent; and the number of countries building reactors has plummeted from 16 to 11 over the past two years.
World Nuclear Industry Status Report
Tehan could — but won’t — read the latest edition of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report (WNISR-2025), released on Monday. For three decades, these annual reports have tracked the stagnation and decline of the nuclear industry.
There are two related factoids that nuclear enthusiasts can latch onto among the 589 pages of bad news in WNISR-2025: record global nuclear power generation of 2,677 terawatt-hours in 2024 and record capacity of 369.4 gigawatts (GW) as of December 2024. But they are pyrrhic wins. Both records are less than one percent higher than the previous records and they mask the industry’s underlying malaise.
Nuclear power generation has been stagnant for 20 years. Then, a relatively young reactor fleet was generating a similar amount of electricity. Now, it’s an ageing fleet. WNISR-2025 notes that the average age of the 408 operating power reactors has been increasing since 1984 and stands at 32.4 years as of mid-2025.
For the 28 reactors permanently shut down from 2020-24, the average age at closure was 43.2 years. With the ageing of the global reactor fleet and the closure of more and more ageing reactors, the industry will have to work harder and harder just to maintain the long pattern of stagnation let alone achieve any growth. Incremental growth is within the bounds of possibility; rapid growth is not.
Further, the global figures mask a striking distinction between China and the rest of the word. WNISR-2025 notes that in the 20 years from 2005 to 2024, there were 104 reactor startups and 101 closures worldwide. Of these, there were 51 startups and no closures in China. In the rest of the world, there was a net decline of 48 reactors and a capacity decline of 27 GW. So much for Tehan’s idiotic claim that Australia risks being “left behind” and “stranded”.
Even in China, nuclear power is little more than an afterthought. Nuclear’s share of total electricity generation in China fell for the third year in a row in 2024, to 4.5 percent. Nuclear capacity grew by 3.5 GW, while solar capacity grew by 278 GW. Solar and wind together generated about four times more electricity than nuclear reactors.
Since 2010, the output of solar increased by a factor of over 800, wind by a factor of 20, and nuclear by a factor of six. Renewables, including hydro, increased from 18.7 percent of China’s electricity generation in 2010 to 33.7 percent in 2024 (7.5 times higher than nuclear’s share), while coal peaked in 2007 at 81 percent and declined to 57.8 percent in 2024.
Global data
In 2024, there were seven reactor startups worldwide — three in China and one each in France, India, the UAE and the US. There were four permanent reactor closures in 2024 — two in Canada and one each in Russia and Taiwan. The 2025 figures are even more underwhelming: one reactor startup so far and two permanent closures.
As of mid-2025, 408 reactors were operating worldwide, the same number as a year earlier and 30 below the 2002 peak of 438.
Nuclear’s share of total electricity generation fell marginally in 2024. Its share of 9.0 percent is barely half its historic peak of 17.5 percent in 1996.
The number of countries building power reactors has fallen sharply from 16 in mid-2023 to 13 in mid-2024 and just 11 in mid-2025. Only four countries — China, India, Russia, and South Korea — have construction ongoing at more than one site.
As of mid-2025, 63 reactors were under construction, four more than a year earlier but six fewer than in 2013. Of those 63 projects, more than half (32) are in China.
As of mid-2025, 31 countries were operating nuclear power plants worldwide, one fewer than a year earlier as Taiwan closed its last reactor in May 2025. Taiwan is the fifth country to abandon its nuclear power program following Italy (1990), Kazakhstan (1999), Lithuania (2009) and Germany (2023).
Nuclear newcomers
Only three potential newcomer countries are building their first nuclear power plants — Bangladesh, Egypt and Turkiye. All of those projects are being built by Russia’s Rosatom with significant financial assistance from the Russian state.
(According to the World Nuclear Association, only one additional country — Poland — is likely to join the nuclear power club over the next 15 years.)
The number of countries operating power reactors reached 32 in the mid-1990s. Since then it has fallen to 31. That pattern is likely to continue in the coming decades: a trickle of newcomers more-or-less matched by a trickle of exits.
Russia is by far the dominant supplier on the international market, with 20 reactors under construction in seven countries (and another seven under construction in Russia). Apart from Russia, only France’s EDF (two reactors in the UK) and China’s CNNC (one reactor in Pakistan) are building reactors abroad.
WNISR-2025 notes that it remains uncertain to what extent Russia’s projects abroad have been or will be impacted by sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions — including those on the banking system — have clearly delayed some projects.
Construction of nine reactors began in 2024: six in China, one in Russia, one Chinese-led project in Pakistan, and one Russian-led project in Egypt.
Chinese and Russian government-controlled companies implemented 44 of 45 reactor construction starts globally from January 2020 through mid-2025, either domestically or abroad. The one exception is a domestic construction start in South Korea.
Small modular reactors
Dan Tehan told Sky News he planned to visit Idaho to investigate developments relating to small modular reactors (SMRs). But the only significant recent SMR ‘development’ in Idaho was the 2023 cancellation of NuScale’s flagship project after cost estimates rose to a prohibitive A$31 billion per GW.
The NuScale fiasco led the Coalition to abandon its SMR-only policy and to fall in love with large, conventional reactors despite previously giving them a “definite no”.
Or perhaps Tehan was at Oklo’s SMR ‘groundbreaking ceremony’ in Idaho on Monday. Oklo doesn’t have sufficient funding to build an SMR plant, or the necessary licences, but evidently the company found a shovel for a ‘pre-construction’ ceremony and photo-op.
Worldwide, there are only two operating SMRs plants: one each in Russia and China. Neither of the plants meet a strict definition of SMRs (modular factory construction of reactor components). Both were long delayed and hopelessly over-budget, and both have badly underperformed since they began operating with load factors well under 50 percent.
WNISR-2025 notes that there are no SMRs under construction in the West. Pre-construction activity has begun at Darlington in Canada. But as CSIRO found in its latest GenCost report, even if there are no cost overruns in Canada, the levelised cost of electricity will far exceed the cost of firmed renewables in Australia.
Argentina began planning an SMR in the 1980s and construction began in 2014, but it was never completed and the project was abandoned last year.
SMR wannabes and startups continue to collapse on a regular basis. WNISR-2025 reports that two of the largest European nuclear startups Newcleo (cash shortage) and Naarea (insolvent) are in serious financial trouble.
Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation filed for bankruptcy protection in the US last year – just a year after a company representative falsely told an Australian Senate inquiry that it was constructing reactors in North America. The Nuward project was suspended in France last year following previous decisions to abandon four other SMR projects in France.
Nuclear vs. renewables
For two decades, global investments in renewable power generation have exceeded those in nuclear energy and are now 21 times higher.
Total investment in non-hydro renewables in 2024 was estimated at US$728 billion, up eight percent compared to the previous year.
In 2024, solar and wind capacity grew by 452 GW and 113 GW, respectively, with the combined total of 565 GW over 100 times greater than the 5.4 GW of net nuclear capacity additions.
In 2021, the combined output of solar and wind plants surpassed nuclear power generation for the first time. In 2024, wind and solar facilities generated over 70 percent more electricity than nuclear plants.
In April 2025, global solar electricity generation exceeded monthly nuclear power generation for the first time and kept doing so in May and June 2025. In 2024, wind power generation grew by 8 percent, getting close to nuclear generation.
Renewables (including hydro) account for over 30 percent of global electricity generation and the International Energy Agency expects renewables to reach 46 percent in 2030. Nuclear’s share is certain to continue to decline from its current 9 percent.
WNISR-2025 concludes: “2024 has seen an unprecedented boost in solar and battery capacity expansion driven by continuous significant cost decline. As energy markets are rapidly evolving, there are no signs of vigorous nuclear construction and the slow decline of nuclear power’s role in electricity generation continues.”
The crowd broke into laughter as the audience was invited to attend a planned “fun day” to learn more about nuclear.
“This event really highlighted the deep level of community concern and opposition to AUKUS … The officials did all they could to avoid answering the hard questions,” -WA Greens MLC Sophie McNeill
The agency in charge of arming the nation with nuclear submarines has sought to earn the trust of residents in Perth’s south by holding a community information session.
The event drew protesters opposed to the AUKUS pact and a local defence hub being used to maintain nuclear submarines.
The Australian Submarine Agency assured event attendees about nuclear’s safety and Australia’s sovereignty, but many people seemed unconvinced.
Rigour, precision and safety, safety, safety — these are the values of the “nuclear mindset” the agency in charge of arming the nation with nuclear submarines has urged Australians to adopt.
The Australian Submarine Agency (ASA) has taken its self-described first steps towards earning the trust of the public.
A line-up of uniformed naval officers and delegates travelled to Western Australia to front the City of Fremantle’s community on Thursday night.
The meeting was touted as an “information session”, but a protest outside the town hall just before it started gave an early indication of how the night would go.
Nuclear fun day
The agency’s AUKUS advocate, Paul Myler, leaned on the US and UK’s seven decades of nuclear experience to assure the crowd of its safety credentials.
“We don’t get to automatically rely on that reputation. We have to earn that part, that legacy, and build our trust with our communities — and that’s what we’re starting here,” he said.
But the delegates made it clear they were not there to pitch AUKUS.
“That decision has been made by a succession of Australian governments,” the crowd was told in a preamble before the floor was opened to questions.
The crowd broke into laughter as the audience was invited to attend a planned “fun day” to learn more about nuclear.
WA Greens MLC Sophie McNeill, who attended the session, said it was alarming how removed the government was from the communities on the doorsteps of AUKUS.
“This event really highlighted the deep level of community concern and opposition to AUKUS … The officials did all they could to avoid answering the hard questions,” she said.
“It felt like an episode of Utopia.”
S for safety and sovereignty
Safety and sovereignty were the hot topics being thrown at the ASA.
One local questioned the record of Australia’s AUKUS partners on nuclear, citing the UK’s weapons testing in the 1950s which has left nuclear contamination at the Monte Bello Islands off WA’s coast and at Maralinga and Emu Field in South Australia.
“Nuclear weapons and nuclear testing are a completely separate issue … Australia’s position on that is very, very clear,” the crowd was told in response.
“We are not, and will not be, a nuclear weapon state.”
The agency also returned with its own S-word, stewardship, which it said described the “responsible planning, operation, application and management of nuclear material”.
Part of that stewardship includes planning for how nuclear waste will be managed.
In short, low-level nuclear waste will be temporarily stored at the HMAS Stirling naval base on Garden Island.
“The technical solutions can keep that waste safe for many years, decades I believe as a contingency, [but] we do expect the waste to be able to be moved much sooner,” a spokesperson said.
There are no plans as of yet for where high-level nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel will be stored long term or disposed of. However,ASA said it would not be required until at least 2050.
The public also queried who would have command of Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines once they were built.
“I get asked a lot of hard questions. That one has a simple answer,” ASA director-general Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead said.
“Australian sovereignty, Australian officers, the Australian government — no other answer.”
Murmurs in the crowd indicated they were not convinced.
Protected or pawns
The room filled with claps and cheers when one local questioned the true intentions of AUKUS and labelled it an “appalling waste” of taxpayer dollars.
“We are being used as pawns to line up in a war against China, and it’s just not acceptable,” the resident said.
Mr Myler insisted it was about defence, and said developing Australia’s “strike capability” was key to protecting the nation.
“I can’t convince you, but I can only give you my own insight,” the AUKUS advocate said.
“Australian defence staff and Australian diplomatic staff and Australian government staff fight every day. Our sovereignty is absolutely at the core of everything we do.”
“They [Rio Tinto] paid no penalty, and then we found out that the maximum penalty for dropping [the capsule] in WA is only a thousand dollars,” they said.
Mr Myler offered a contrary view, describing the response to the missing capsule as impressive.
“It proved that West Australians had their act together, knew how to do this, knew how to respond, and the whole ecosystem coordinated and got that solved,” he said.
Mr Myler went on to say the “nuclear mindset” put the agency at a level “well above where private sector industry is”.
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) social licence adviser Cassandra Casey noted Australia’s nuclear experience with research and nuclear medicines at a facility in Engadine, in New South Wales.
“The community, which is also my community, has grown up around ANSTO, and today the nearest homes in Engadine are just 820 metres … from that facility,” she said.
The information session began with an introduction about ASA earning the nation’s trust. The reaction of attendees indicated few minds were changed, something Mr Myler acknowledged.
“We all understand the risks around some nuclear programs. We have to do a lot more to build confidence in our nuclear program,” he said.
Dr Paul Dorfman Letter: Further to your report “Deal with US to fast-track mini nuclear reactors” (Sep 15; letter, Sep 16), small modular reactors (SMRs) are defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency as reactors that generate up to 300MW power.
At 470MW, the Rolls-Royce design is not an SMR: it is larger than the UK Magnox reactor, more than half the size of the 900MW reactors that make up the bulk of the French nuclear fleet, and about a third the size of the very large EPR reactor design at Hinkley Point C.
This matters because the Rolls-Royce design will need big sites, standard nuclear safety measures, exclusion zones, core catchers, aircraft crash protection and security. All this is important because in calling its design an SMR, or small, Rolls-Royce appears to me to have been economical with the truth — and all that implies for its other claims, especially about time and cost.
As for the nuclear waste problem, the former chair of the US government Nuclear Regulatory Commission reports that SMRs would produce more reactive waste per kWh — the key parameter — than large reactors.
The United States hopes to use machine learning to create and distribute propaganda overseas in a bid to “influence foreign target audiences” and “suppress dissenting arguments,” according to a U.S. Special Operations Command document.
SOCOM is looking for a contractor that can “Provide a capability leveraging agentic Al or multi LLM agent systems with specialized roles to increase the scale of influence operations.” So-called “agentic” systems … can be used in conjunction with large language models, or LLMs, like ChatGPT, which generate text based on user prompts.
While much marketing hype orbits around these agentic systems and LLMs for their potential to execute mundane tasks like online shopping and booking tickets, SOCOM believes the techniques could be well suited for running an autonomous propaganda outfit. Whether AI-generated propaganda works remains an open question, but the practice has already been amply documented in the wild.
In May 2024, OpenAI issued a report revealing efforts by Iranian, Chinese, and Russian actors to use the company’s tools to engage in covert influence campaigns, but found none had been particularly successful. The military has a history of manipulating civilian populations for political or ideological purposes. A troubling example was uncovered in 2024, when Reuters reported the Defense Department had operated a clandestine anti-vax social media campaign.
Nuclear generation is expensive and slow to develop. Claims that past failures won’t recur have convinced politicians to socialize investments rejected by private capital markets.
An intensive influence campaign seeks to resurrect a “nuclear renaissance” from the industry’s slow-motion collapse documented in the independent annual World Nuclear Industry Status Report. Claims that past failures won’t recur have convinced many politicians that socializing nuclear investments rejected by private capital markets, weakening or bypassing rigorous safety regulation, suppressing market competition, and commanding military reactor and data-center projects as a national-security imperative will restore nuclear expansion and transform the economy.
This illusion neatly fits the industry’s business-model shift from selling products to harvesting subsidies.
A few awkward facts intrude. Even the most skilled firms and nations keep delivering big reactors with several times the promised cost and construction time. A swarm of startup firms that have never built a reactor are dubiously rebranding their inexperience as a winning advantage. New designs are said to be so safe they don’t need normal precautions (though not safe enough to waive nuclear energy’s unique exemption from accident liability). Political interference in nuclear licensing is eroding public confidence. Proposed smaller reactors cost more per kWh, produce more nuclear waste per kWh, and often need more-concentrated fuel directly usable for nuclear weapons.
And nuclear power faces the same fundamental challenges as fossil fuels: uncompetitive costs, runaway competitors, dwindling profits, and uncertain demand. Few if any vendors have made profits selling reactors — only fueling and fixing them. Nuclear electricity loses in open auctions, so only Congressional bailouts — $27 billion ($15 billion paid out) in 2005, $133 billion in 2021-22, tens of billions more in 2025 — saved most existing U.S. reactors from closure.
Now comes another vision: powering the glorious new world of artificial intelligence. This may be a trillion-dollar bubble, but it’s sellable until market realities intervene. The International Energy Agency expects data centers, mostly non-AI, to cause only a tenth of global electricity demand growth to 2030, doubling their share of usage — to just 3%. So AI won’t eat the grid. But IEA forecasts renewables will power data-center growth10-20 times over, while Bloomberg NEF predicts over 100. Nuclear lost the race to power the grid, so new reactors have no business case or operational need.
Each year, nuclear adds as much net global capacity as renewables add every two days. Soaring renewables generate three times more global electricity than stagnant nuclear power, whose 9% world and 18% U.S. shares keep shrinking. In 2023-24, China added 197 times more solar and wind than nuclear capacity, at half the cost. In May, China added 93 GW of solar, or 3 GW per day.
Despite having turned nuclear power into a minor distraction, renewables are dismissed as “intermittent.” Again, facts intrude.
Military and industrial installations already prefer 100% renewables for their most critical applications, including Apple’s data centers in four states. Ten kinds of carbon-free resources can balance variable (but highly predictable) renewables, keeping the grid stable. Using a small subset, power systems with modest or no hydropower already sustain such annual renewable fractions of electricity use as Denmark 88+%, South Australia 74% (expecting 100% in two years), and Germany 54%.
And since a nuclear kWh costs several to many times more than a renewable or saved kWh — even more if nuclear load-follows to “complement” rather than curtail renewables — nuclear displaces less fossil fuel per dollar (or year), making climate change worse.
Nonetheless, nuclear power is being boosted by fierce lobbying and federal policy as essential for new AI data centers vital for prosperity and security. This case can’t withstand scrutiny. My essay “Artificial Intelligence Meets Natural Stupidity: Managing the Risks” shows:
Data centers use about 4.5-5% of U.S. and 1.5% of world electricity, and lately caused only about 5% of world electricity demand growth. Of all data-center electricity, about one-fourth in the U.S. or one-ninth globally is for AI, the rest for traditional uses.
Claims of soaring AI electricity use are projections, not realities, except in a few “hot spots” like two Virginia counties. In 2023, AI added roughly 0.04% to world and 0.1% to U.S. electricity use.
Most proposed AI data centers are speculative and unlikely to get built; many built won’t thrive. Major power-supply investments risk getting stranded.
Demand for AI services is enormously uncertain. So is their business case: AI’s proven value in narrowly specialized technical applications looks too small to repay its immense investments. Many general users don’t need or want to pay for AI.
Big Tech firms rarely sign specific nuclear power purchase agreements. Much of the hype is about vague statements of interest in buying electricity timely at an attractive price, or modest, symbolic investments. Big Tech rightly prefers renewables as faster, surer and cheaper.
The efficiency of turning electricity into AI services roughly quadruples each year, so a new data center must roughly quadruple its sales of AI services each year for decades to keep using and paying for the same amount of electricity — a tall order.
This spring, innovators showed how operating AI data centers slightly more flexibly without compromising service can power at least the next decade of U.S. AI growth with no new generators, stranding more electricity and gas investments.
The coal industry’s 1999 campaign to create panic that the Internet would falter without huge power expansions misled investors, worsening a 2000-02 bloodbath when hundreds of new power plants weren’t needed. Today’s trends, pushing an AI case for unsellable and too-late nuclear and gas projects, rhyme with that disaster.
The latest risk to the AI/nuclear case came into focus in Sparks, Nevada, in June, when Redwood Energy (a new activity of dominant battery-recycler Redwood Materials) revealed North America’s largest microgrid.
Twenty MW-DC of photovoltaics are laid flat on level ground. Water-recovering Roomba-like crawlers clean them nightly. About 800 battery packs from retired or crashed cars — the world’s largest use of second-life batteries — are wrapped in white plastic and set on cinderblocks, safely separated. They’re good for another few years, then hot-swappable. Novel power electronics and software meld those diverse batteries into 63 MWh of storage with 2-48-hour nominal duration. (Redwood Energy is already engineering similar microgrids an order of magnitude larger, enough to run most existing data centers.)
The resulting 100%-solar microgrid produces 10 MW-AC of ultrareliable 24/7/365 power that runs modular Crusoe data centers onsite, eliminating transmission costs, losses and approvals. This all-solar power is more reliable than grid power, cheaper than the utility’s 8¢/kWh retail price, and allbuiltin four months.
Thus, we needn’t guess or debate whether a particular data center will get built and flourish. Instead, we can commit to build its onsite solar power plant, perhaps by competitive procurement, only when the data center’s 1.5 to 2.5 years of construction is mostly done. Needing no grid connection, the solar microgrid needs few if any approvals — just cheap land. It’s inherently safe, silent, automatic, virtually water- and maintenance-free, based on common commodities, zero-emission, portable and durably profitable.
The UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), University of York and University of Edinburgh, will invest £7.8m over the next five years to advance fusion energy research and post-graduate training. The funding will be distributed through UKAEA’s Fusion Opportunities in Skills, Training, Education and Research (FOSTER) Programme, which aims to develop the next generation of fusion energy specialists. This investment is intended to create new opportunities across collaborating universities for students to access level Seven (master’s degree) qualifications in fusion and relevant fields, supporting the FOSTER Programme’s mission to build a diverse fusion skills ecosystem.
Alberta Affordability Minister Nathan Neudorf jetted off Wednesday for a nice 10-day holiday in the United Kingdom — mostly at his own expense.
Not entirely at his own expense, though, since Alberta taxpayers will presumably be picking up the tab for his airfare in his other cabinet role as minister of utilities (with the exception, this being Alberta, of utilities that generate electricity of the renewable sort).
That ministerial job got him a nice invite to the World Nuclear Symposium in London and a corking “Canada-U.K. Nuclear Day” party on Wednesday at Canada House.
If you’re thinking you probably couldn’t afford a vacation like that, it’s nice to know the minister of making sure you can afford stuff (how’s that going, anyway?) will have the opportunity to “explore nuclear energy in London,” as the Alberta government’s news release put it Wednesday, with well-heeled nuclear industry lobbyists, CEOs and the like from all over the world.
In all, the MLA for Lethbridge-East (and perhaps soon to be the MLA for the new riding of Lethbridge-Gerrymander) will get to spend 15 days in Blighty, at least five of them in a very nice hotel, I’m sure.
“Alberta’s government is working hard to secure an affordable, reliable and sustainable energy future and nuclear can play a key role,” Neudorf said in the inevitable canned quote in the government’s news release Wednesday. “Gatherings like this one are an excellent opportunity to connect with international partners and I look forward to learning more about the potential of this technology and how it can fit into Alberta’s energy mix.”
I’ll bet. There’s nothing cheap about nuclear power. Even the so-called “small modular reactors” that the United Conservative Party is so enamoured of are multibillion-dollar megaprojects, and they never come in on budget. Indeed, SMRs may be nuclear reactors, but they’re not small and they’re not really modular. The term is a marketing gimmick.
“Nuclear projects are almost always subject to time and cost overruns,” explained the Calgary-based Pembina Institute in a news release this week, “with some being delayed by up to a decade and costing double the original projected amount.”
If you want cheap and reliable energy, as the Pembina news release rather plaintively pointed out, wind, solar and battery storage would be just the ticket. Those are things that Neudorf and the United Conservative Party aren’t about to consider, though, probably because of the turbines that spoiled the view at Donald Trump’s golf course in Scotland.
Nevertheless, tout le monde nuclear energy will be in London — even a senior official of Rosatom, the Russian state atomic energy corporation. (That said, you have to dig a bit to suss out the Rosatom connection.)
Meanwhile, the Alberta government wants to hear what you think about nuclear power — presumably as long as it’s the same as what they think. Otherwise, get lost!
Premier Danielle Smith struck yet another panel Monday, this one to sell Albertans on the idea of adopting nuclear power — pardon me, “to join the conversation on nuclear energy in the province.”
There’s even a survey — and I can tell you it’s not quite as obviously biased as the “Alberta Next” surveys, although I’d say it’s been designed to help suss out voter concerns so that talking points can be drafted quickly to tell you to have no fear for atomic energy……………………………………
If you worry about this stuff, nothing’s going to happen any time soon except more lobbying and conferences in interesting locales for UCP ministers to attend.
A small modular reactor project has never been successfully completed outside of China and Russia. Indeed, some say Rosatom’s Akademik Lomonosov, dubbed by some the “floating Chernobyl,” may be the world’s only working small modular reactor…..https://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2025/08/28/Alberta-Revives-Nuclear-Energy-Dreams/
Israeli news outlet Haaretz has published a harrowing report on starvation in Gaza which further discredits the Israeli narrative that the photos of skeletal children we’ve been seeing are antisemitic Hamas propaganda, for anyone who’s still clinging to delusions about such things.
Haaretz reporters were taken by doctors on video tours of hospitals in Gaza, conducting interviews with numerous medical personnel and obtaining many photos of civilians showing signs of extreme starvation. Throughout the report we encounter story after story of severely emaciated children, mothers unable to breastfeed starving babies because of their own starvation, people with preexisting conditions severely exacerbated by malnutrition, diseases spreading due to crippled healthcare infrastructure and ruined immune systems, and wounds failing to heal due to inadequate food intake.
The article is one of the more uncomfortable things I’ve seen throughout the entirety of this genocide, and that’s saying something.
“What we saw there left no room for doubt about the scale of the horror,” write Haaretz reporters Yarden Michaeli and Nir Hasson.
“Seventeen youngsters had deteriorated into a state of severe malnutrition without preexisting health conditions; 10 suffered from previous illnesses,” they write, saying “Anyone who claims that the images of starvation in the Gaza Strip are a result of acute genetic or other diseases, and not due to a grave shortage of food, are lying to themselves.”
This comes as the UN-backed Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) formally declares that the people of Gaza are suffering from a famine that “is entirely man-made”, which must be halted and reversed with extreme urgency.
Israel has of course denounced the IPC’s findings as antisemitic Hamas propaganda, with the Israeli Foreign Ministry saying that “The entire IPC document is based on Hamas lies laundered through organizations with vested interests,” and Benjamin Netanyahu branding the report “a modern blood libel, spreading like wildfire through prejudice.”
You might find this response ridiculous, and of course it is, but really, what else does Israel have left? When all major human rights institutions are accusing you of horrific crimes, your only options are either (A) admit the obvious fact that there’s no way every single mainstream humanitarian organization is lying about your actions, or (B) claim that they’re all in on a giant globe-spanning conspiracy because of a nefarious prejudice against your religion.
Of course they’re going to go with (B). This is Israel we’re talking about, after all.
When a nation keeps having to publish denials that it is intentionally starving civilians, you can safely assume it’s because that nation is intentionally starving civilians. If you saw someone on social media loudly denying the latest allegations that they are a child molester over and over again for two years, you probably wouldn’t let them babysit your kids.
I have never once felt the need to publish a denial that I am intentionally starving people, because I have never intentionally starved anyone. It’s not something I’ve ever found myself needing to say even one time, let alone many many times constantly.
You don’t see the government of Ireland constantly denying that Ireland is intentionally starving civilians, because Ireland is not intentionally starving civilians.
You don’t see pro-China spinmeisters frantically churning out propaganda denying that China is intentionally starving civilians, because China is not intentionally starving civilians.
You don’t see Brazilian internet trolls aggressively swarming the comments of anyone who says Brazil is intentionally starving civilians, because Brazil is not intentionally starving civilians.
You don’t see the Pakistani government paying social media influencers to assert on their platforms that Pakistan is not intentionally starving civilians, because Pakistan is not intentionally starving civilians.
You see an intense campaign of narrative management aimed at denying that Israel has been intentionally starving civilians because Israel is intentionally starving civilians. That’s why all the constant government denials, the endless propaganda and spin pieces and PR stunts, and relentless online trolling operations have been necessary.
Most Israel apologia at this point is just people pretending to believe things they don’t really believe. Palestinians aren’t really being starved. Gaza looks like a gravel parking lot because Hamas put explosives in all the buildings. The IDF has a low civilian-to-combatant kill ratio. Gaza’s entire healthcare infrastructure was destroyed because Hamas was hiding under all the hospitals. Nobody actually believes these things. They’re just pretending to believe them in order to justify genocidal atrocities and help ensure that they continue.
The Trump-Putin summit concluded with no ceasefire or formal deal on Ukraine after nearly three hours of talks. Yet, President Trump and his supporters are framing it as a resounding success, turning a diplomatically thin outcome into a narrative of triumph.
If you listened to Trump and his loyalists, you’d think history had just been made. Trump hailed the meeting as “very productive,” rating it a “10” in a Fox News interview with Sean Hannity. He emphasised “great progress” and “many points agreed to,” though specifics remain elusive. The White House, through Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, praised it was a restoration of dialogue benefiting U.S. interests – a claim critics argue overlooks the lack of enforceable commitments. Trump leveraged Putin’s remark that the Ukraine invasion “might not have happened” under his watch, spinning it as proof of his foreign policy prowess and a fix for “Democrat mess-ups.” The summit’s optics – red carpets, a joint press conference, and Putin’s ride in “The Beast” limo – were highlighted as symbols of American dominance, though skeptics dismissed them as stagecraft masking substantive failures.
MAGA’s Victory Lap
MAGA supporters amplified the victory lap, flooding social media with memes of Trump as a peacemaker, insisting that the world had witnessed leadership in action. Posts celebrated Putin’s praise as a global endorsement, with one user calling it a “clear winner for America” due to the “USA dominance narrative.” Others blamed Democrats for the war, framing the no-deal outcome as a deliberate dump of the “forever war” on Europe, setting the stage for future deals. The grandeur of flyovers and applause was touted as evidence of Trump’s negotiation mastery, dismissing critics as panicked. Yet, foreign policy analysts noted that without tangible concessions from Russia – such as troop withdrawals or guarantees on Ukrainian sovereignty – the summit risked being remembered as a photo op rather than a turning point.
The Spin vs. Reality
With no concrete outcomes, the summit’s legacy hinges on whose narrative sticks. Trump’s camp bets on spectacle overshadowing substance, while opponents warn that legitimising Putin without concessions undermines international law. As details emerge – and if Russian attacks continue – the “success” narrative may face harder scrutiny. For now, the world is left parsing theatrics from geopolitics, with Ukraine’s fate hanging in the balance.
In August 1945 the United States dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing more than 200,000 people, overwhelmingly civilians. Eighty years on from this slaughter – which the then US army commander and later president Dwight D. Eisenhower called “completely unnecessary” – is an apt time to ask how the world has changed since Japan’s skies lit up with atomic fire.
Many in the military as well as academics and nuclear theorists argue that a “third nuclear age” has begun. By this they mean that a new and different set of nuclear threats are emerging which fundamentally challenge the existing tenets of nuclear “deterrence”. The response, some argue, is to invest heavily in our nuclear weapons systems to secure ourselves against this new age of uncertainty.
To understand this claim, it’s worth looking back at the history of the nuclear era. Most (but not all) scholars working on “nuclear ages” accept that the first nuclear age, between 1945 and 1991, was characterised by the cold war nuclear stand-off between the world’s two nuclear armed superpowers: the US and the Soviet Union.
The second nuclear age, from 1991 to 2014, is usually understood to have started when the cold war ended. Policymakers worried about “proliferation” – the spread of nuclear weapons to new states and even non-state terrorist groups. Western policy focused on countering this process, often through military means.
The third nuclear age, which is thought to have begun in 2014, it thought to reflect a new set of challenges. This will involve the entry of more nuclear-armed states into the fray, erosion of longstanding non-proliferation and arms control agreements and the development of so-called “strategic non-nuclear weapons”. This term refers to non-nuclear technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI) command and control networks, hypersonic missiles and advanced missile defence systems.
There are fears that non-nuclear armed “adversaries” might use these systems to directly attack other states’ nuclear arsenals, undermining their ability to deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike. This is likely to pose a challenge to established practices on which the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is based.
But how much has really changed in the past decade? No new nuclear powers have emerged – the most recent was North Korea in 2006. China, often seen as the bogeyman of the third nuclear age, has had a nuclear weapons capability since 1964. AI integration into nuclear command and control systems, while extremely risky, has yet to happen.
Reliable missile defence against modern nuclear warheads is still widely considered to be technologically impossible. The impact of hypersonic missiles on the calculus of nuclear deterrence is debated, since intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are already very fast.
In short, what’s different this time around?
Western-centric thinking
A more penetrating line of questioning is to ask about the politics underlying the idea of a third nuclear age. Ideas are never neutral, and they shape our understanding of the world. The third nuclear age concept (like that of the second nuclear age before it) came out of the US defence establishment, which was trying to understand how it could remain globally dominant against challenges to its supremacy from China.
The idea has since been filtered through academia and back into the policy world, where it has started to gain “common sense status”: as night follows day, the dawn of the third nuclear age is around the corner. But this is neither objective nor inevitable. It’s a conceptual tool for thinking about nuclear politics in a particular way.
It’s a US-centric perspective reflecting a fear that western dominance of the nuclear arena is under threat. US and allied militaries need to progressively integrate new technologies into their nuclear systems and modernise their arsenals to deal with a “more uncertain” world, ignoring the fact that massive risk and uncertainty have always been a built-in feature of nuclear deterrence strategies.
Here, the biggest threats to nuclear stability come not from the thousands of nuclear warheads held by the established nuclear weapons states, but from would-be disruptors who can threaten nuclear arsenals with non-nuclear systems – echoing old second nuclear age fears about proliferation.
This is why Iran remains a villain of the story alongside China, as we can see from the hyperbole about Iran’s “hypersonic” missile capabilities and how its behaviour gave Israel and the US the excuse to launch “counter-proliferation” strikes against its nuclear facilities in June this year.
To be crystal clear: the nuclear world is as dangerous as ever. The problem is that third nuclear age thinking, with its focus on supposedly unprecedented disruptions, leads us to think that new solutions are necessary. “Old” ideas about nuclear disarmament become irrelevant, because the instabilities introduced by new technologies supposedly make it impossible for nuclear weapons states to give up their arsenals.
The third nuclear age becomes a conceptual stalking horse for a fresh nuclear arms race.
When the British armed forces chief Admiral Sir Tony Radakin warned of a dawning third nuclear age in December 2024, he was not making a neutral observation. He was arguing for resources to be funnelled into nuclear modernisation at the expense of welfare and healthcare programmes. Today, before any modernisation, Britain maintains a first-strike deliverable total of 31 megatons of nuclear explosive power. That’s more than 2,000 Hiroshimas’ worth of destruction.
So we should be sceptical of this concept. The threat of nuclear annihilation has been with us since August 1945 and comes – as always – from nuclear weapons and the states who operate them.
Japan was already defeated and dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[it was] no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at this very moment, seeking a way to surrender with a minimum loss of face.” – Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and future president
As we commemorate the 80th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings, the world is drifting as close to another nuclear confrontation as it has been in decades.
With Israeli and American attacks on Iranian nuclear energy sites, India and Pakistan going to war in May, and escalating violence between Russia and NATO-backed forces in Ukraine, the shadow of another nuclear war looms large over daily life.
Eighty Years Of Lies
The United States remains the only nation to have dropped an atomic bomb in anger. While the dates of August 6 and August 9, 1945, are seared into the popular conscience of all Japanese people, those days hold far less salience in American society.
When discussed at all in the U.S., this dark chapter in human history is usually presented as a necessary evil, or even a day of liberation—an event that saved hundreds of thousands of lives, prevented the need for an invasion of Japan, and ended the Second World War early. This, however, could not be further from the truth.
American generals and war planners agreed that Japan was on the point of collapse, and had, for weeks, been attempting to negotiate a surrender. The decision, then, to incinerate hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians was one taken to project American power across the world, and to stymie the rise of the Soviet Union.
“It always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse,” General Henry Arnold, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Forces in 1945, wrote in his 1949 memoirs.
Arnold was far from alone in this assessment. Indeed, Fleet Admiral William Leahy, the Navy’s highest-ranking officer during World War II, bitterly condemned the United States for its decision and compared his own country to the most savage regimes in world history.
As he wrote in 1950:
It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.”
By 1945, Japan had been militarily and economically exhausted. Losing key allies Italy in 1943 and Germany by May 1945, and facing the immediate prospect of an all-out Soviet invasion of Japan, the country’s leaders were frantically pursuing peace negotiations. Their only real condition appeared to be that they wished to keep as a figurehead the emperor—a position that, by some accounts, dates back more than 2,600 years.
“I am convinced,” former President Herbert Hoover wrote to his successor, Harry S. Truman, “if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan—tell them they can have their emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists—you’ll get a peace in Japan—you’ll have both wars over.”
Many of Truman’s closest advisors told him the same thing. “I am absolutely convinced that had we said they could keep the emperor, together with the threat of an atomic bomb, they would have accepted, and we would never have had to drop the bomb,” said John McCloy, Truman’s Assistant Secretary of War.
Nevertheless, Truman initially took an absolutist position, refusing to hear any Japanese negotiating caveats. This stance, according to General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of Allied Forces in the Pacific, actually lengthened the war. “The war might have ended weeks earlier,” he said, “If the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor.” Truman, however, dropped two bombs, then reversed his position on the emperor, in order to stop Japanese society from falling apart.
At that point in the war, however, the United States was emerging as the sole global superpower and enjoyed an unprecedented position of influence. The dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan underscored this; it was a power play, intended to strike fear into the hearts of world leaders, especially in the Soviet Union and China.
First Japan, Then The World
Hiroshima and Nagasaki drastically curbed the U.S.S.R.’s ambitions in Japan. Joseph Stalin’s forces had invaded and permanently annexed Sakhalin Island in 1945 and planned to occupy Hokkaido, Japan’s second-largest island. The move likely prevented the island nation from coming under the Soviet sphere of influence.
To this day, Japan remains deeply tied to the U.S., economically, politically, and militarily. There are around 60,000 U.S. troops in Japan, spread across 120 military bases.
Many in Truman’s administration wished to use the atom bomb against the Soviet Union as well. President Truman, however, worried that the destruction of Moscow would lead the Red Army to invade and destroy Western Europe as a response. As such, he decided to wait until the U.S. had enough warheads to completely destroy the U.S.S.R. and its military in one fell swoop.
War planners estimated this figure to be around 400. To that end, Truman ordered the immediate ramping up of production. Such a strike, we now know, would have caused a nuclear winter that would have permanently ended all organized life on Earth.
The decision to destroy Russia was met with stiff opposition among the American scientific community. It is now widely believed that Manhattan Project scientists, including Robert J. Oppenheimer himself, passed nuclear secrets to Moscow in an effort to speed up their nuclear project and develop a deterrent to halt this doomsday scenario. This part of history, however, was left out of the 2023 biopic movie.
By 1949, the U.S.S.R. was able to produce a credible nuclear deterrent before the U.S. had produced sufficient quantities for an all-out attack, thus ending the threat and bringing the world into the era of mutually assured destruction.
“Certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated,” concluded a 1946 report from the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and future president, was of the same opinion, stating that:
Japan was already defeated and dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary…[it was] no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at this very moment, seeking a way to surrender with a minimum loss of face.”
Nevertheless, both Truman and Eisenhower publicly toyed with the idea of using nuclear weapons against China to stop the rise of Communism and to defend their client regime in Taiwan. It was only the development of a Chinese warhead in 1964 that led to the end of the danger, and, ultimately, the détente era of good relations between the two powers that lasted until President Obama’s Pivot to Asia.
Ultimately, then, the people of Japan were the collateral damage in a giant U.S. attempt to project its power worldwide. As Brigadier General Carer Clarke, head of U.S. intelligence on Japan wrote, “When we didn’t need to do it, and we knew we didn’t need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn’t need to do it, we used them [Japanese citizens] as an experiment for two atomic bombs.”
Tiptoeing Closer To Armageddon
The danger of nuclear weapons is far from over. Today, Israel and the United States – two nations with atomic weaponry – attack Iranian nuclear facilities. Yet their continued, hyper-aggressive actions against their foes only suggest to other countries that, unless they too possess weapons of mass destruction, they will not be safe from attack. North Korea, a country with a conventional and nuclear deterrent, faces no such air strikes from the U.S. or its allies. These actions, therefore, will likely result in more nations pursuing nuclear ambitions.
Earlier this year, India and Pakistan (two more nuclear-armed states) came into open conflict thanks to disputes over terrorism and Jammu and Kashmir. Many influential individuals on both sides of the border were demanding their respective sides launch their nukes – a decision that could also spell the end of organized human life. Thankfully, cooler heads prevailed.
Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine continues, with NATO forces urging President Zelensky to up the ante. Earlier this month, President Trump himself reportedly encouraged the Ukrainian leader to use his Western-made weapons to strike Moscow.
It is precisely actions such as these that led the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists to move their famous Doomsday Clock to 89 seconds to midnight, the closest the world has ever been to catastrophe.
“The war in Ukraine, now in its third year, looms over the world; the conflict could become nuclear at any moment because of a rash decision or through accident or miscalculation,” they wrote in their explanation, adding that conflicts in Asia could spiral out of control into a wider war at any point, and that nuclear powers are updating and expanding their arsenals.
The Pentagon, too, is recruiting Elon Musk to help it build what it calls an American Iron Dome. While this move is couched in defensive language, such a system – if successful – would grant the U.S. the ability to launch nuclear attacks anywhere in the world without having to worry about the consequences of a similar response.
Thus, as we look back at the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 80 years ago, we must understand that not only were they entirely avoidable, but that we are now closer to a catastrophic nuclear confrontation than many people realize.
By April 1945, with the Nazi regime in a state of collapse and Japan’s defeat imminent, the threat that served as the original justification for the bomb’s development had all but vanished.
The true target of the first atomic bomb wasn’t, in fact, Tokyo, but Moscow, with the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki sacrificed on the altar of American global imperial ambition.
Szilard emphasized that the atomic bomb wasn’t just a more powerful weapon but a fundamental transformation in the nature of warfare, an instrument of annihilation.
Oppenheimer explained, “When you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success. That is the way it was with the atomic bomb.”
That climate of deference fostered a culture of complicity, where questions of social responsibility were subordinated to uncritical faith in authority.
What Can We Learn From the Birth of the Nuclear Era?
By Eric Ross, Common Dreams
In recent months, nuclear weapons have reemerged in global headlines. Nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan approached the brink of a full-scale war, a confrontation that could have become an extinction-level event, with the potential to claim up to 2 billion lives worldwide.
The instability of a global order structured on nuclear apartheid has also come into sharp relief in the context of the recent attacks on Iran by Israel and the United States. That system has entrenched a dangerous double standard, creating perverse incentives for the proliferation of world-destroying weaponry, already possessed by nine countries. Many of those nations use their arsenals to exercise imperial impunity, while non-nuclear states increasingly feel compelled to pursue nuclear weapons in the name of national security and survival.
Meanwhile, the largest nuclear powers show not the slightest signs of responsibility or restraint. The United States, Russia, and China are investing heavily in the “modernization” and expansion of their arsenals, fueling a renewed arms race. And that escalation comes amid growing global instability contributing to a Manichean world of antagonistic armed blocs, reminiscent of the Cold War at its worst.
The nuclear threat endangers not only global peace and security but the very continuity of the human species, not to speak of the simple survival of life on Earth. How, you might wonder, could we ever have arrived at such a precarious situation?
The current crisis coincides with the 80th anniversary of the Trinity Test, the first detonation of an atomic weapon that would soon obliterate the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and so inaugurate the atomic age. So many years later, it’s worth critically reassessing the decisions that conferred on humanity such a power of self-annihilation. After all, we continue to live with the fallout of the choices made (and not made), including those of the scientists who created the bomb. That history also serves as a reminder that alternative paths were available then and that another world remains possible today.
A Tale of Two Laboratories
In the summer of 1945, scientists and technicians at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico worked feverishly to complete the construction of the atomic bomb. Meanwhile, their colleagues at the University of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory mounted a final, ultimately unsuccessful effort to prevent its use.
The alarm spreading in Chicago stemmed from a sobering realization. The Manhattan Project that they had joined on the basis of a belief that they were in an existential arms race with Nazi Germany had, by then, revealed itself to be a distinctly one-sided contest. Until then, the specter of a possible German atomic bomb had conferred a sense of urgency and a veneer of moral legitimacy on what many scientists otherwise recognized as a profoundly unethical undertaking.
Prior to the fall of Berlin, Allied intelligence had already begun to cast serious doubt on Germany’s progress toward developing an atomic weapon. By April 1945, with the Nazi regime in a state of collapse and Japan’s defeat imminent, the threat that served as the original justification for the bomb’s development had all but vanished.
No longer represented as a plausible deterrent, the bomb now stood poised to become what Los Alamos Director J. Robert Oppenheimerwould describe shortly after the war as “weapons of terror, of surprise, of aggression… [used] against an essentially defeated enemy.”
For the scientists at Chicago, that new context demanded new thinking. In June 1945, a committee of physicists led by James Franck submitted a report to Secretary of War Henry Stimson warning of the profound political and ethical consequences of employing such a bomb without exhausting all other alternatives. “We believe,” the Franck Report stated, “that the use of nuclear bombs for an early, unannounced attack against Japan [would be] inadvisable.” The report instead proposed a demonstration before international observers, arguing that such a display could serve as a gesture of goodwill and might avert the need to use the bombs altogether.
One of that report’s signatories, Leo Szilard, who had been among the bomb’s earliest advocates, further sought to prevent what he had come to recognize as the catastrophic potential outcome of their creation. With Germany defeated, he felt a personal responsibility for reversing the course he had helped set in motion. Echoing concerns articulated in the Franck Report, he drafted a petition to be circulated among the scientists. While acknowledging that the bomb might offer short-term military and political advantages against Japan, he warned that its deployment would ultimately prove morally indefensible and strategically self-defeating, a position which would also be held by 6 of the 7 U.S. five-star generals and admirals of that moment.
Szilard emphasized that the atomic bomb wasn’t just a more powerful weapon but a fundamental transformation in the nature of warfare, an instrument of annihilation. He already feared Americans might come to regret that their own government had sown the seeds of global destruction by legitimizing the sudden obliteration of Japanese cities, a precedent that would render a heavily industrialized, densely populated country like the United States especially vulnerable.
Moreover, he concluded that using such weapons of unimaginable destructive power without sufficient military justification would severely undermine American credibility in future arms control efforts. He observed that the development of the bomb under conditions of extreme wartime secrecy had created an abjectly anti-democratic situation, one in which the public was denied any opportunity to deliberate on such an irrevocable and consequential decision.
As Eugene Rabinowitch, a co-author of the Franck Report (who would later co-found The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists), would note soon after, the scientists in Chicago were growing increasingly uneasy in the face of escalating secrecy: “Many scientists began to wonder: Against whom was this extreme secrecy directed? What was the sense of keeping our success secret from the Japanese? Would it have helped them to know that we had an atomic bomb ready?”
Rabinowitch concluded that the only “danger” posed by such a disclosure was that the Chicago scientists might be proven right, and Japan might surrender. “Since there was no justifiable reason to hold the bomb secret from the Japanese,” he argued, “many scientists felt that the purpose of deepened secrecy was to keep the knowledge of the bomb… from the American people.”
In other words, officials in Washington were concerned that a successful demonstration might deprive them of the coveted opportunity to use the bomb and assert their newly acquired monopoly (however temporary) on unprecedented power.
The Road to Trinity and the Cult of Oppenheimer
Seventy scientists at Chicago endorsed the Szilard Petition. By then, however, their influence on the project had distinctly diminished. Despite their early contributions, notably the achievement of the first self-sustained nuclear chain reaction in December 1942, the project’s center of gravity had shifted to Los Alamos.
Recognizing this, Szilard sought to circulate the petition among his colleagues there, too, hoping to invoke a shared sense of scientific responsibility and awaken their moral conscience in the critical weeks leading up to the first test of the weapon. Why did that effort fail? Why was there so little dissent, debate, or resistance at Los Alamos given the growing scientific opposition, bordering on revolt, that had emerged in Chicago?
One answer lies in Oppenheimer himself. In popular culture and historical scholarship, his legacy is often framed as that of a tragic figure: the reluctant architect of the atomic age, an idealist drawn into the ethically fraught task of creating a weapon of mass destruction compelled by the perceived exigencies of an existential war.
Yet the myth of him as a Promethean figure who suffered for unleashing the fundamental forces of nature onto a society unprepared to bear responsibility for it obscures the extent of his complicity. Far from being a passive participant, in the final months of the Manhattan Project, he emerged as a willing collaborator in the coordination of the coming atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
When Oppenheimer and physicist Edward Teller (who would come to be known as “the father of the hydrogen bomb”) received Szilard’s petition, neither shared it. While Oppenheimer offered no response, Teller provided a striking explanation: “The things we are working on are so terrible that no amount of protesting or fiddling with politics will save our souls.” He further rejected the idea that he held any authority to influence the bomb’s use. “You may think it is a crime to continue to work,” he conceded, “but I feel that I should do the wrong thing if I tried to say how to tie the little toe of the ghost to the bottle from which we just helped it escape.”
Teller later claimed to be in “absolute agreement” with the petition, but added that “Szilard asked me to collect signatures… I felt I could not do so without first seeking Oppenheimer’s permission more directly. I did so and Oppenheimer talked me out of it, saying that we as scientists have no business meddling in political pressure of that kind… I am ashamed to say that he managed to talk me out of [it].”
Teller’s explanation was likely self-serving given his later acrimonious rift with Oppenheimer over the hydrogen bomb. Yet further evidence indicates that Oppenheimer actively sought to suppress debate and dissent. Physicist Robert Wilson recalled that upon arriving at Los Alamos in 1943, he raised concerns about the broader implications of their work and the “terrible problems” it might create, particularly given the exclusion of the Soviet Union, then an ally. The Los Alamos director, Wilson remembered, “didn’t want to talk about that sort of thing” and would instead redirect the conversation to technical matters. When Wilson helped organize a meeting to discuss the future trajectory of the project in the wake of Germany’s defeat, Oppenheimer cautioned him against it, warning that “he would get into trouble by calling such a meeting.”
The meeting nonetheless proceeded, with Oppenheimer in attendance, though his presence proved stifling. “He participated very much, dominating the meeting,” Wilson remembered. Oppenheimer pointed to the upcoming San Francisco Conference to establish the United Nations and insisted that political questions would be addressed there by those with greater expertise, implying that scientists had no role to play in such matters and ought to abstain from influencing the applications of their work.
Reflecting on his mindset at the time, Oppenheimer explained, “When you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it and you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your technical success. That is the way it was with the atomic bomb.” In a similar vein, his oft-quoted remark that “the physicists have known sin” was frequently misinterpreted. He was not referring, he insisted, to the “sin” of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but to pride for “intervening explicitly and heavy-handedly in the course of human history.”
When situated within this broader context of a professed commitment to scientific detachment, Oppenheimer’s behavior becomes more intelligible. In practice, however, his stated ideals stood in stark contrast to his conduct. While he claimed to reject political engagement, he ultimately intervened in precisely such a manner, using his position to advocate forcefully for the bomb’s immediate military use against Japan without prior warning. He emerged as a leading opponent of any prospective demonstration, cautioning that it would undermine the psychological impact of the bomb’s use, which could only be realized through a sudden, unannounced detonation on a relatively untouched, non-military target like the city of Hiroshima. This position stood in sharp contrast to that of the Chicago scientists, of whom only 15% supported using the bomb in such a manner.
That climate of deference fostered a culture of complicity, where questions of social responsibility were subordinated to uncritical faith in authority. Reflecting on that dynamic, physicist Rudolf Peierlsacknowledged, “I knew that Oppenheimer was on a committee and was briefing with the high-ups. I felt there were two things one could rely on: Oppenheimer to put the reasonable ideas across, and that one could trust people. After all, we are not terrorists at heart or anything… Both these statements might now be somewhat optimistic.”
Ultimately, the only member of Los Alamos to register dissent was Joseph Rotblat, who quietly resigned on ethical grounds after learning in November 1944 that there was no active Nazi atomic bomb program. His departure remained a personal act of conscience, however, rather than an effort to initiate a broader moral reckoning within the scientific community.
“Remember Your Humanity”
The legacy of Oppenheimer, a burden we all now carry, lies in his mistaking proximity to power for power itself. Rather than using his influence to restrain the bomb’s use, he exercised what authority he had to facilitate its most catastrophic outcome, entrusting its consequences to political leaders who soon revealed their recklessness. In doing so, he helped lay the groundwork for what President Dwight D. Eisenhower would, in his farewell address to Congress in 1961, warn against as “the disastrous rise of misplaced power.”
Yet we are not doomed. This history should also remind us that the development and use of nuclear weapons was not inevitable. There were those who spoke out and a different path might well have been possible. While we cannot know exactly how events would have unfolded had dissent been amplified rather than suppressed, we can raise our own voices now to demand a safer, saner future. Our collective survival may well depend on it. How much longer a world armed with nuclear weapons can endure remains uncertain. The only viable path forward lies in renewing a commitment to, as Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell urged, “remember your humanity, and forget the rest.” With ever more nations developing increasingly powerful arsenals, one thing remains clear: As the Doomsday Clock moves ever closer to midnight, there is no time to waste.
Eric Ross is an organizer, educator, researcher, and PhD Candidate in the History Department at the University of Massachusetts Amhers
Israel is inviting over 500 delegations of social media influencers to tour Israel and learn the right message to spread to their millions of followers because Israel realizes it is losing the PR war.
For Israel this is the hard part: completing a genocide while making it look like you are not completing a genocide. In an age of mobile telephone cameras and wireless transmission of images from virtually anywhere by anyone, genocide while few are looking is a thing of the past.
Israel’s quest to cleanse Gaza of Palestinians through expulsion or extermination keeps getting interrupted for photo ops of aid airlifts or a few aid trucks to satisfy feigned Western grievance, writes Joe Lauria.
Winning the public relations war is proving to be a lot more difficult for Israel than the genocide against the Palestinian people.
As the conscience of Western publics pushes their governments to stop supporting Israel’s historic crimes, U.S. and European governments are forced to make displays of scolding Israel.
But that act is getting old. The money and guns keep flowing as the killing and starvation keeps growing.
Western allies want Israel to make a gesture that it still has a shred of humanity left. At various junctures during the slaughter, U.S. and European governments have disingenuously leveled criticism of Israel’s treatment of Palestinian civilians to keep their own populations at bay.
For instance, during the last U.S. presidential campaign, with a large number of Democrats condemning Israel for their actions, Joe Biden and then Kamala Harris had to issue criticism of Israel while insincerely repeating that they were working “tirelessly” for a ceasefire.
This was fake because if the Biden or now Trump administrations really want to stop the killing they can do it almost immediately: tell Israel no more guns and money if the killing doesn’t stop.
The German authorities, who seem to relish the opportunity to enforce a new genocide, could do the same, as Germany is Israel’s second largest arms supplier after the U.S.
Losing on the PR Front
Whenever Western governments start feeling the heat they tell Israel to cool it for a while and stage some kind of show of humanitarian aid.
Israel usually complies because they are fighting two wars: one of ethnic cleansing and/or extermination of the Palestinians, and the other a public relations war with the Western public, particularly its youth.
As Consortium News reported last week, Israel is inviting over 500 delegations of social media influencers to tour Israel and learn the right message to spread to their millions of followers because Israel realizes it is losing the PR war.
“Foreign Ministry officials say the tour delivers significant media, advocacy, and diplomatic benefits – and represents a strategic shift, as traditional outreach is no longer sufficient to shape public opinion. … We’re working with influencers, sometimes with delegations of influencers. Their networks have huge followings, and their messages are more effective than if they came directly from the ministry.”
On Friday, Britain, France and Germany issued a joint statement saying the Gaza “humanitarian catastrophe must end now.” They said Israel must “immediately lift restrictions on the flow of aid.”
“The humanitarian catastrophe that we are witnessing in Gaza must end now,” the joint statement says. “Withholding essential humanitarian assistance to the civilian population is unacceptable.”
Italy separately said, “We can no longer accept carnage and famine.” Barack Obama chimed in too, also on Friday. On Monday, Donald Trump said: “There is real starvation in Gaza — you can’t fake that.”
France said it would recognize the State of Palestine, a step too far for Britain, Germany and Italy, and which the U.S. condemned.
These leaders’ consciences would be shocked if they indeed have a conscience. They’ve seen reports like this one from the BBC confirming that desperately starving people have been shot and killed as they try to reach the only food aid distribution points by the Israeli forces and private U.S. contractors.
And yet they keep sending 2,000 lbs. bombs and F-35 spare parts.
Nevertheless, Israel realizes it must win the PR war fought not against the Western leaders who back them, but against the Western public. (Western leaders are engaged in their own PR war with their people.) Thus on Sunday Israel announced it would begin an airlift of food into Gaza.
It’s surely part of a genocidal plan to occasionally respond to this criticism, hold some fire and make a big show of letting in aid before resuming the gruesome task. It sure makes finishing a genocide more difficult.
The Hard Part
For Israel this is the hard part: completing a genocide while making it look like you are not completing a genocide. In an age of mobile telephone cameras and wireless transmission of images from virtually anywhere by anyone, genocide while few are looking is a thing of the past.
One way to mislead the public is to kill at a pace intended to fool them into thinking there is more or less routine combat going on in Gaza and an unfortunate number of civilians are just being killed in the crossfire. (There was an uproar over the Australian Broadcasting Corporation last week ignorantly reporting the deliberate murder of unarmed, starving civilians at the aid distribution points as having died in “the crossfire.”)
So Israel needs to keep the official daily death toll in Gaza to around 100. Don’t start wiping out entire encampments, killing thousands a day. Make it look more or less like a normal war. Leave doubt in people’s minds. Netanyahu did say this would take a very long time.
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz openly says the plan is to concentrate the entire 2 million plus population of Gaza in a camp in the south to ready them for expulsion. And if Egypt and others refuse to take them? The rate of killing in this concentration camp may well explode if Western governments keep tolerating this evil.
But for now, the rate of killing allows a propagandist like Bret Stephens to argue in The New York Times that it can’t be genocide because the killing is too slow. He actually wrote this:
“If the Israeli government’s intentions and actions are truly genocidal — if it is so malevolent that it is committed to the annihilation of Gazans — why hasn’t it been more methodical and vastly more deadly? Why not, say, hundreds of thousands of deaths, as opposed to the nearly 60,000 that Gaza’s Hamas-run Health Ministry, which does not distinguish between combatant and civilian deaths, has cited so far in nearly two years of war? It’s not that Israel lacks the capacity to have meted vastly greater destruction than what it has inflicted so far.”
Quick, somebody show the Genocide Convention to Stephens. It defines genocide in black and white:
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Stephens falls prey to a common misconception of genocide, namely that it depends on the number of people killed. Acts must be “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part.”
The hardest part of proving genocide is intent. Israeli leaders have provided folders full of statements of genocidal intent. It was then followed by actions that systematically destroyed the conditions of life for the Palestinians of Gaza.
One by one they wiped out the infrastructure of Palestinian culture and civilization: schools, universities, mosques, churches, museums, theaters, libraries, hospitals and incalculable residential buildings, while people were still living in them. There has been a wholesale assassination of journalists, artists, academics and doctors — and an imposed starvation.
This is textbook genocide.
The Big Lie sent out from Israel, parroted almost word-for-word by the likes of Stephens and Alan Dershowitz, Israel-defender supremo, and by an Israeli zealot who appeared on Piers Morgan’s show last, week with piercing, fanatical eyes is this: This is war, unfortunately civilians get killed and there is no army in the world that takes greater care to avoid civilian casualties than Israel’s, none.
The zealot with Morgan went a step further to say he was “proud” of the conduct of the IDF in Gaza, to which Haaretz columnist Gideon Levy, also on the panel, said, “I’m sorry, only Nazis spoke like that.”
There is also a Big Truth. If Western governments and media repeated it and more crucially acted upon it, it would cause Israel to lose both wars: public relations and the elimination of the Palestinian people.
Lately there has been a mounting noise on behalf of more nuclear power in Scotland, pleas for John Swinney to do a u-turn on his ruling out of new nuclear reactors.
Calls for Scotland to embrace nuclear have been greeted with a certain amount of enthusiasm in some quarters, including many SNP voters. But what troubles me, in the current debate, is that all too often it feels like we are stuck in an old vision of the grid – and one of the terms that suggests this is ‘baseload’.
Baseload is defined as the minimum amount of electricity required by a grid to meet the continuous demand for power over a day. Currently, it’s mostly used to refer to the generating capacity that we need to always be there if the wind stops and the sun doesn’t shine. Britain Remade, for instance, talks about nuclear in terms of “clean, reliable baseload power”.
But what if nuclear is actually a technology that does not suit a modern renewable grid? What if wind and nuclear are not good bedfellows and, as a baseload, new plants will only make our electricity more expensive?
In a recent Substack, David Toke, author of Energy Revolutions: Profiteering versus Democracy, described the “accepted truth” in the media that new nuclear power is needed because there is no other practical or cheaper way to balance fluctuating wind and solar power, as “demonstrably false”.
He said it “runs counter to the way that the UK electricity grid is going to be balanced anyway” – which, he noted, is by gas engines and turbines “that are hardly ever used”. Simple gas fired power plants, he said, are many times cheaper per MW compared to nuclear power plant.
Toke advocated for a system balanced by more batteries and other storage as well as gas turbines or engines which will proved “capacity” rather than generate much energy. He has a strong point. Of course, the problem with gas, is that it is, famously, a fossil fuel and produces greenhouse gas emissions.
However, if, as Toke says, that gas is an increasingly small percentage of electricity generation, about handling the moments when demand is not met by wind and solar, the 5% predicted by the UK Government’s Clean Power 2030 Action Plan, to be what we require, perhaps that’s no big deal. It’s a bigger deal, though, if the gas power station emissions required to balance the grid are, as another Substack write calculated recently more like 19 percent.
Interestingly, Toke, whose main criticisms of nuclear are its high cost of electricity generation and lack of grid balancing flexibility, also noted that if we are thinking about the financial costs of reducing emissions we might be better off spending our money in other ways. For instance: “setting up a scheme to pay £15000 each to 500,000 residents not on the gas grid to switch to heat pumps will likely save as much carbon as Sizewell C is likely to save”.
But it seems to me the question is not whether nuclear power is simply right or wrong, but what its place is within the kind of modern grid we are developing, a grid which faces transmission challenges between Scotland, already producing more energy than it uses, and elsewhere, and whether the costs are worth it. Too often those that argue for nuclear sell it via the concept ‘baseload’.
But you only have to do a quick scan of the internet to see it is brimming also with articles about how baseload is extinct or outdated. These critics point out that what the grid actually needs is more flexible sources, both of storage and power. One of the problems is that traditional nuclear power stations tend to be all on or all off. Torness, for instance, has either one or both of its reactors, either at full or zero capacity.
That kind of inflexibility in nuclear plants has already led to constraint payments being made to wind farms, which have been switched off because there was too little demand even as the nuclear power stations kept producing. In 2020 energy consultants Cornwall Insight estimated the quantity in MWh of constraints that could have been avoided had nuclear power plants in Scotland been shut during two recent years. It found that, in 2017, 94 per cent worth of windfarm output that had been turned off (constrained) could have been generated had nuclear power plant not been operating.
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