Point Beach Nuclear Unit 1 Emergency Shut-Down
Point Beach Nuclear Unit 1 Emergency Shut-Down https://www.wortfm.org/point-beach-nuclear-unit-1-emergency-shut-down/?fbclid=IwAR0Eifn3QXNNDuLy5QPws3eiZlInEjxJecALKatmEb9Et3SrDwBITGppI1s
AUGUST 11, 2021 BY 8 O’CLOCK BUZZ On July 31, 2021, the Point Beach Nuclear Power Reactor experienced a number of valve and computer monitoring failures which could have been catastrophic, had it not been for manual overrides performed. Hannah Mortenson, Executive Director of Physicians for Social Responsibility WI, talks about the poorly publicized incident involving the 50-year-old complex (which was designed for a 40 year service period), and their request to the NRC to send an inspection team to the reactor site.
5.2-magnitude quake strikes off Japan’s Fukushima Prefecture, no tsunami warning issued
5.2-magnitude quake strikes off Japan’s Fukushima Prefecture, no tsunami warning issued http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/asiapacific/2021-08/22/c_1310141633.htmSource: Xinhua| 2021-08-22 TOKYO, Aug. 22 (Xinhua) — An earthquake with a magnitude of 5.2 struck off Japan’s Fukushima Prefecture on Sunday, according to the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA).
The temblor occurred at around 11:24 a.m. local time, with its epicenter at a latitude of 37.6 degrees north and a longitude of 141.7 degrees east, and at depth of 60 km.
The quake logged 4 in some parts of Fukushima Prefecture on the Japanese seismic intensity scale which peaks at 7.
So far no tsunami warning has been issued.
Canada’s nuclear reactors may not be fit for service
Canada’s nuclear reactors may not be fit for service, Rabble ca, Joyce Nelson, 11 Aug 21, On July 13, Bruce Power announced that two reactors at its Bruce Nuclear Generating Station in Kincardine, Ontario had violated its operating license.
It had “higher than anticipated readings” of hydrogen-equivalent concentration (Heq) in pressure tubes in two units. Pressure tubes must not exceed the allowable limit of 120 parts per million of Heq. Each pressure tube in a reactor contains 12 bundles of uranium, which are the basis for the nuclear reaction, but the pressure tubes also contain the coolant that keeps the fuel from overheating and triggering a meltdown. Pressure tubes with high levels of Heq can develop cracks and fractures, thereby compromising a reactor’s safety.
As The Globe and Mail reported:
“In response to Bruce Power’s contraventions, on July 13, the CNSC [Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission] ordered the company, along with fellow CANDU [Canada Deuterium Uranium] operators Ontario Power Generation (OPG) and New Brunswick Power, to review the fitness for service of their pressure tubes and report back no later than the end of July.”
Aging reactors
Many of Canada’s aging CANDU reactors are older than their design-life for pressure tubes, which originally was designated as 210,000 effective full power hours (EFPH), or about 30 years.
When Hydro Quebec’s Gentilly-2 CANDU reactor reached that limit, it closed the plant.
As The Globe and Mail reported:
“Thierry Vandal, chief executive at the time, testified before Quebec’s national assembly that he considered 210,000 EFPH ‘the extreme limit’ beyond which his management team dared not go. ‘I would no more operate Gentilly-2 beyond 210,000 hours than I would climb onto an airplane that does not have its permits and that does not meet the standards,’ he said, according to a translated transcript.”
Under industry pressure, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission subsequently raised the limit to 247,000 EFPH in 2014, and then to 295,000 EFPH in 2018.
In 2018, the CNSC extended OPG’s license for its Pickering Nuclear Generating Station for 10 years. Rather than require that OPG replace aging pressure tubes, the regulator mandated more frequent inspections.
When asked how often pressure tubes are checked, retired nuclear scientist and radioactive chemistry expert Dr. Frank Greening answered by email:
“Pressure tubes are checked for their hydrogen/deuterium concentrations about every two years, but it’s a little more complex than that. Each CANDU unit contains about 400 tubes and each tube is about six meters in length. This means it’s next to impossible to check every tube at every location, so only about 10 tubes are checked at a time. In addition, corrosion and [hydrogen/deuterium] pickup are expected to be most significant at the hot, outlet end of each tube, so samples are usually restricted to this location.”
As a result of such limited inspections, the industry relies on mathematical models to predict how long the untested tubes can safely remain in service. But this modeling is not necessarily accurate, as evidenced by the July 13 “higher than anticipated readings” at Kincardine.
Indeed, in March 2021, The Globe reported:
“Documents obtained under the federal Access to Information Act by Ottawa researcher Ken Rubin, and provided to The Globe, show that since 2017, CNSC staffers had grown increasingly concerned about unreliable data arising from OPG’s inspections of pressure tubes…The whole method by which operators assessed fitness for service of pressure tubes had been called into question.”
Another Fukushima?………………….
Canada’s nuclear reactors may not be fit for service
Limited consultation on UK’s commercial nuclear ships’ safety regulations.
On 9 August 2021 the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (Agency) published a Consultation (Consultation) on the draft merchant shipping (nuclear ships) regulations 2021 (Regulations). The Consultation seeks views from interested parties (Consultees) on the proposed Regulations which will transpose the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Convention) into UK law.
The proposed Regulations only cover commercial ships with nuclear propulsion systems and do not cover barge-mounted reactors for power generation or floating nuclear plants. Responses to the Consultation will be accepted until the 5th of October 2021.
JDSupra 13th Aug 2021
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/uk-issues-draft-regulations-governing-1636843/
Inconclusive findings on attempted sabotage of Belgian nuclear reactor.
The seven-year-long investigation into an attempted sabotage of the Doel
nuclear power plant in 2014 has ended inconclusively.
The incident took place on 5 August 2014, when the reactor at the Doel 4 installation shut
down automatically. Inspections revealed a disturbance in the steam turbine
in a non-nuclear part of the complex. It soon became clear that the problem
was an act of sabotage: someone had manually opened a valve in the plant
evacuation system, intended to quickly evacuate the 65,000 litres of oil
used to lubricate the turbine to an emergency reservoir in the case of
fire.
No order had been given to open the valve, and operators Electrabel
filed a criminal complaint for sabotage with the prosecutor’s office in
Dendermonde in East Flanders. But when the possibility of a terrorist
motive was raised, the investigation moved to the federal prosecutor’s
office, where all terrorist cases are handled.
One of the first discoveries made by investigators was the dubious status of the plant’s own security
measures. There were no CCTV cameras in strategic places – like the
vicinity of the blue valve that set off the alarm – to check who had
opened it.
Brussels Times 13th Aug 2021
Turkey’s Akkuyu nuclear station a cause for anxiety in the Eastern Mediterranean
Turkey’s Akkuyu nuclear power plant is a cause of concern https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/08/15/turkeys-akkuyu-nuclear-power-plant-is-a-cause-of-concern/ August 15, 2021 Dr Yiorghos Leventis
Turkey is an energy hungry economy. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assessment of Turkey’s energy needs in 2020, the country currently imports approximately 72 per cent of its energy demand.
To address the problem of increasing domestic energy demand, Ankara has been actively pursuing nuclear energy to lessen its high dependency on energy imports. Consequently, in May 2010, Russia and Turkey signed a cooperation agreement, under which Rosatom State Cooperation has since been constructing the Akkuyu nuclear power plant (NPP). This NPP will eventually contain four reactors with a combined capacity of 4800 MW. Other nuclear power projects in Sinop, Black Sea region and the Eastern Thrace region remain in the planning stages.
Construction of the Akkuyu NPP begun in December 2017. Its final cost is expected to rise to over 20 billion USD – roughly equivalent to the size of Cyprus’ economic output in 2020. The first reactor is expected to become operational in 2023, the year that marks the centenary anniversary of the Republic of Turkey. No doubt, Erdogan’s government is planning festivities for this significant event, to boost its plunging popularity.
Despite serious concerns about the safety of the Akkuyu NPP, located as it is, in the high seismic activity region of Mersin, construction continues. Every consecutive year in the following three years (2024-26) will see a new reactor coming into operation.
The first controversy over the impact of this huge nuclear power project on the environment appeared already six years ago: on January 12, 2015, it was reported that the signatures of specialists on a Turkish government-sanctioned environmental impact report had been forged. The appointed specialists had resigned six months prior to its submission, and the contracting company had then made unilateral changes to the report. Naturally so, this revelation sparked protest within the Turkish Cypriot community. The proximity of the prospective Akkuyu nuclear power plant to our island could not be lightheartedly ignored. This powerful NPP will operate at about 110 kms from Nicosia. In the context of an unexpected nuclear accident caused by an earthquake or otherwise, north or south Cyprus becomes immaterial. A fatal nuclear accident carries the danger of overwhelming both parts of the island.
In this respect, it is vital that the leaderships of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots stand in unison: the Eastern Mediterranean environment and its protection is a common cause. More so as Ankara exhibits a mixed approach, to say the least, towards international legal instruments on nuclear safety: Whereas Turkey signed up to the Convention on Nuclear Safety which entered into force October 24, 1996, it has not done the same with the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management which entered into force June 18, 2001.
Dr Yiorghos Leventis is director of the International Security Forum: www.inter-security-forum.org
Widening concrete cracks in Seabrook Nuclear Station
Nuke Plant Cited Over Widening Concrete Cracks, The Town Common by Stewart Lytle, Thursday August 12, 2021 REGIONAL – The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) slapped the wrist of Seabrook Station Thursday for not projecting the likely deterioration of its structural concrete caused by alkali-silica reaction (ASR).
In a 20-page quarterly inspection report, the NRC issued a Green finding, its lowest level of citation, to NextEra. It found that the staff of the New Hampshire nuclear plant “did not adequately account for the future progression of ASR in their prompt operability determination for several Seabrook structures.
“Specifically, NextEra staff did not trend and project the periodic threshold monitoring data for the affected structural elements to ensure the structures would remain capable of performing their safety functions to the next scheduled inspection.”
Starting last fall, the NRC conducts inspections at Seabrook Station every six months.
During their walk-through of the plant, the inspectors also found that three structures – the emergency feedwater pumphouse, service water cooling tower and control and diesel generator building – had widening cracks that exceeded the design limits. The mechanical penetration area also has cracks that are approaching the limits.
Once a threshold limit is exceeded, more frequent inspections are required and may result in corrective action such as a structural modification to alleviate the condition, the report stated.
The 30-year-old atomic reactor has concrete infected by ASR, an irreversible type of concrete degradation, caused by water reacting with the concrete. It has been called “concrete cancer.”
The inspectors were also concerned with the degradation of the steel rebar in the concrete structures. …………….
relative to Seabrook’s ASR testing and monitoring program. While the Board ultimately approved the plant’s concrete management program, it did so with four new license conditions that direct NextEra Seabrook to conduct much more frequent and stringent monitoring and engineering evaluations in a number of situations. They were:
NextEra must increase the frequency of monitoring from 10 years to six months.- NextEra must develop a monitoring program to anticipate or monitor rebar failures.
- If the cracks in the concrete get worse, NextEra must monitor the concrete more often.
- Each concrete core extracted from Seabrook must undergo a detailed microscopic petrographic evaluation to detect microcracks.
“It’s frightening to think that were it not for C-10’s challenge, the inspection interval referenced in this report may have been as long as a decade,” Treat said. “Now NextEra has to perform them every six months. But collecting data without using it to model future trends in concrete degradation is of little use.” https://towncommonmedia.com/2021/08/12/nuke-plant-cited-over-widening-concrete-cracks/?fbclid=IwAR3kJs3XkRtmcl-0YqLg1HqGEvdIkeWkpDfJxzbyoXdovgK3PcU2gqOlrDI
Russian nuclear submarine lost propulsion in Danish waters, sails submerged outside Norway now
Russian nuclear submarine lost propulsion in Danish waters, sails submerged outside Norway now Danish Navy describes the situation as “dramatic” when the giant Oscar-II class submarine “Orel” drifted at 1,5 knots towards the island of Sejerø. Ropes were prepared for towing and two other Russian warships came to assist. Barents Observer, By Thomas Nilsen August 04, 2021 Orel” was sailing together with the navy tug “Altay” and the large anti-submarine missile destroyer “Vice-Admiral Kulakov” in an inter-fleet transit from St. Petersburg towards the Kola Peninsula when it got problems with propulsion and started to drift.
The incident happened on July 30 in the busy waters east of Denmark’s second-largest city Århus. “Orel” and the two other Northern Fleet vessels had a few hours earlier sailed under the Great Belt Bridge en route out of the Baltic Sea towards Skagerak.
Orel” was sailing together with the navy tug “Altay” and the large anti-submarine missile destroyer “Vice-Admiral Kulakov” in an inter-fleet transit from St. Petersburg towards the Kola Peninsula when it got problems with propulsion and started to drift.
The incident happened on July 30 in the busy waters east of Denmark’s second-largest city Århus. “Orel” and the two other Northern Fleet vessels had a few hours earlier sailed under the Great Belt Bridge en route out of the Baltic Sea towards Skagerak.
“The escort out of the Baltic Sea will go down in history as both dramatic and exciting, as the nuclear-powered submarine “Orel” of the Oscar-II class had problems with propulsion and lay dead in the water at Sejerø, where it drifted with 1,5 knots towards the island,” the crew on the Danish patrol vessel writes.
They elaborate by explaining how they could see a crowd of crew members came out on the front deck of “Orel”, all wearing life jackets.
The Northern Fleet navy tug “Altay” came closer and ropes were prepared for towing the large submarine. “MDMS Diana” offered help, but such assistance was “politely but nor surprisingly refused,” the Danish navy writes.
Radio communication did not take place directly with the submarine, but was answered by the crew on the Russian destroyer “Vice-Admiral Kulakov”.
After a while, the Russian submarine managed to get going again and all the rigged gear for towing was taken down.
“From Diana, we closely followed the situation on the submarine and our thought quickly turned to the film The Hunt for the Red October when we saw all the people on the deck of the submarine,” the crew on the Danish patrol vessel said and added: “VERY exciting to witness up close.”
No official comments
The Russian navy has not posted any information about why the submarine lost proposition or if the incident was linked to the operation of the nuclear reactors or any other parts of the auxiliary systems.
The press service of the Northern Fleet is not allowed to speak directly to foreign media, including the Barents Observer.
Norwegian military worried
As the nuclear submarine’s propulsion was restored in time to avoid a larger accident, the Russian navy ships continued north into Skagerak, the waters between Denmark and Norway’s southern tip.
At first, the submarine sailed in surface position, but it has now submerged underwater, Norway’s Joint Headquarters tells the Barents Observer.
The Norwegians are closely following the voyages with the Russian warships now sailing north outside the coast towards the Northern Fleet’s home bases at the Kola Peninsula.
“It is always worrying when a vessel of this type has problems with propulsion,” says spokesperson Major Elisabeth Eikeland with the Joint Headquarters.
She says it is normal that Russian submarines during such inter-fleet transits are followed by their own support and auxiliary vessels.
“But we also expect Russian authorities to contact us if they again have problems with this or other vessels in waters near Norway,” Major Eikeland underlines.
Additional to the nuclear-powered submarine “Orel” several other Northern Fleet warships are currently sailing north after participating in the Main Naval Parade outside St. Petersburg on July 25.
Currently outside Norway are the two nuclear-powered submarines “Vepr” and “Knyaz Vladimir”. While “Vepr” is an Akula-class multi-purpose sub, the “Knyaz Vladimir” is the Northern Fleet’s newest ballistic missile sub of the Borei-class………………….. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2021/08/russian-nuclear-submarine-lost-propulsion-danish-waters-sails-outside-norway-now
British Navy secrecy over nuclear submarine crashes
– The Royal Navy has refused to say whether anyone was disciplined following
an incident in which a nuclear submarine nearly crashed into a ferry
carrying 282 people off the Scottish coast. The navy also won’t say
whether it carried out an independent review to reduce the risks of future
collisions. This was recommended by government investigators concerned
about the near-miss and two other nuclear submarine crashes. Campaigners
accuse the navy of using the excuse of national security “to cover up
dangerous incompetence”. The Scottish National Party (SNP) condemns the
secrecy as “absolutely untenable”.
The Ferret 5th Aug 2021
Framatome’s sub-standard nuclear fuel is threatening the survival of France’s nuclear company EDF
It is not only in China, in the world’s first operational EPR nuclearreactor, that the fuel produced by EDF’s subsidiary, Framatome, is a problem. In France, in the Ardennes, an unprecedented incident on the nuclear fleet has just occurred in a reactor and potentially concerns ten reactors, to varying degrees of severity.
This nuclear fuel that poisons the life of EDF
by Martin Leers, Le Journal de l’energie 2nd Aug 2021
Metal guards that enclose the reactor fuel, called cladding, deteriorate too quickly. A problem far from trivial: fuel cladding plays a key role in the safety of nuclear reactors. This “accelerated” corrosion appeared between 2020 and 2021 in one of the two reactors at the Chooz power plant. A fault which currently forces EDF to extend its shutdown since March 2021 and has therefore already cost it more than a hundred million euros.
But the stakes for EDF are much more important than a shutdown of a reactor. The “M5” alloy sheaths, which wear out prematurely in Chooz reactor n ° 2, are fitted to all EPR reactors in France, Finland and China, as well as dozens of other reactors in France and abroad.
Is there a link between this incident in France and that of the leaking ducts of the first EPR reactor in service in the world in Taishan (China)?
Why do these latest generation sheaths wear out prematurely?
A burning question for EDF, which is trying to convince the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) and the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) to reuse cladding with questionable reliability in reactors.
How did the problem come to be at the Chooz nuclear power plant?
When the Chooz reactor n ° 2 was shut down in February 2021 to reload the fuel, particles were discovered on the fuel assemblies and in the water of the primary circuit [1] . “Numerous white migrant bodies of a few millimeters were either collected by the anti-debris devices or remained on the assemblies”, explained EDF in an internal letter to ASN, dated July 7, 2021. An abnormal phenomenon . These particles are zirconium oxide which originates from the surface of the fuel cladding. [2] Their presence indicates that the sheaths are degrading. “The consequence of an abnormally high corrosion rate”, clarified EDF in the letter to ASN.
These particles are very friable and cannot cause a loss of tightness in the nuclear fuel, explained Karine Herviou, deputy director general of IRSN, to the Journal de l’énergie .
The fuel claddings are tubes more than 4 meters long and less than 1 centimeter in diameter, very thin (0.6 mm thick) in which the uranium pellets are stacked. These sheaths, commonly called rods, are brought together in assemblies, each made up of 264 sheaths. The core of Chooz nuclear reactor No. 2 contains 205 assemblies. In Chooz reactor n ° 2, the abnormal wear is only in the upper part of certain assemblies.
What consequences for the safety of the nuclear reactor could have the accelerated wear of the fuel rods?
The cladding plays an important role for reactor safety: they form the first barrier between nuclear fuel, containing very dangerous radioactive substances, and the environment. They must prevent radioactivity from spreading in the water circulating in the nuclear core. However, “damage to the surface of certain fuel cladding calls into question the demonstration of the integrity of the fuel in service”, considers ASN. This means that this incident calls into question the parameters which guarantee, in the eyes of ASN, the safety of the reactor in normal operation and during accident scenarios.
“Accelerated corrosion is likely to weaken the cladding and increase the risk of loss of integrity of the rods concerned during accidental transients and therefore lead to rupture of the first barrier”, explains EDF in the internal letter to ASN from July 7, 2021. But EDF does not consider this scenario plausible.
What are the causes of abnormal wear of the fuel rods?
EDF estimated on July 7 that “at this stage of the investigations, no single cause appears at the origin of the phenomenon of accelerated corrosion (…) which rather finds its explanation in a combination of several unfavorable factors”. But the M5 alloy from which the sheaths are made “seems to be the trigger,” notes EDF.
The iron content of the sheaths singled out
It is the low iron content of the cladding alloy which is partly responsible for their degradation. Two production batches for low iron content sheaths have been identified by EDF. The most damaged sheaths come from these lots, which EDF calls “hyper sensitive castings”. But until the February 2021 incident on Chooz reactor no.2, slight variations in iron in the cladding alloy were not considered to be a factor in the degradation of the fuel rods. The variable iron content of fuel cladding does not appear to have been perceived as a problem in France by the fuel assembly manufacturer, Framatome, or by the operator EDF, or by ASN and IRSN.
The sheaths which deteriorate are “in conformity” with the specifications
“The iron content of these batches is within the standards”, explains IRSN. “The products supplied by Framatome comply” with the specifications, “iron was not considered as a characteristic parameter for the behavior of the rods in the core. », Adds ASN.
Following the incident, EDF informed ASN that the iron content will be increased in the cladding which will be used in reactor No. 2 at Chooz from “cycle 20”. Not the next time the reactor is reloaded, but the next.
A “multifactorial” phenomenon
The iron content of pencils is not the only culprit. EDF puts forward other causes to explain the degradation of the fuel cladding. The temperature is higher at the top of the nuclear core in the most powerful reactors, those of 1450 MW, than in the less powerful reactors, those of 1300 MW. It is in this area that the cladding deteriorated in two 1,450 MWe reactors in France. What would happen if low iron cladding was introduced into EPR reactors, even more powerful than the 1450 MW reactors?
Another unfavorable element: the positioning of the fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel. “The corrosion rate depends on the place of an assembly in the reactor core during the first cycle”, particularly in the four most powerful reactors in the French fleet, explains EDF in an internal document. [3]
An unprecedented incident in France but not abroad
If this wear had never been observed in France, it had already occurred on three nuclear reactors in Brazil and Germany, two of which used the same M5 alloy. [4] As at the Chooz power station, the most worn cladding was the one with the lowest iron content. “The phenomenon of accelerated corrosion observed at the end of cycle 18 of Chooz B2 is comparable to other events in Konvoi reactors abroad”, notes EDF in the internal letter to ASN. Therefore, why was this incident not anticipated in France when the nuclear operators and institutions say they maintain a permanent dialogue on safety at the global level?
The nuclear safety experts from the German GRS institute have not been able to fully identify the causes of the corrosion of the cladding on German reactors, adds Karine Herviou of IRSN.
M5 alloy sheaths are fitted to all EPR reactors in France, Finland and China, as well as dozens of other reactors.
Designed to be more corrosion resistant than previous alloys and to improve nuclear fuel efficiency, the M5, manufactured by Framatome, is widely used in nuclear power worldwide.
“A large majority of reactors in France use assemblies with M5 cladding,” explains Karine Herviou of IRSN. Framatome claims its M5 sheaths are used in 96 nuclear reactors around the world, in a 2018 brochure .
The same cladding is used in the EPR reactors at Flamanville (Manche), Olkiluoto in Finland and Taishan in China. M5 alloy sheaths had many leakage problems in the 2000s, says a 2008 IRSN report:
“Between 2001 and 2008, around thirty fuel assembly leaks with M5 alloy cladding were detected. To date, EDF has identified three types of faults causing leaks in fuel rods with M5 alloy cladding. »Defects now corrected……………
10 nuclear reactors in France affected by the cladding defect discovered at the Chooz power plant
For the moment, ten nuclear reactors in France are directly or indirectly affected by the defect in the cladding discovered on the reactor n ° 2 at Chooz.
“To date, seven 1,300 MWe reactors and three 1,450 MWe reactors have at least one rod with a low iron content, in the core or in the management reserve,” ASN told the Journal de l’énergie .
But the inventory of potentially defective rods is still in progress, “even if it should not change”, added ASN. In addition to the two production batches for low iron content sheaths, EDF identified other batches of concern and informed ASN of them in an internal letter. How many ? Mystery.
“An inventory of the iron content of each of the rods of each of the assemblies present in the reactor or in reserve is being drawn up”, specifies ASN…………..
Is EDF’s priority to save fuel even if it means playing stunts with nuclear safety?
EDF is therefore forced to adapt the operation of the two reactors to the defective ducts with “compensatory” measures. EDF proposes that Chooz reactor no. 2 only operate at 92% of its power during its next cycle. For Chooz reactor n ° 1, the operator proposes to reduce load monitoring. [6] “Depending on the elements, EDF could be required, on reactors 1 of Chooz, 1 and 2 of Civaux and 3 of Cattenom to take compensatory measures (either to limit maneuverability or to operate at a drop in power)” , announces the operator in the internal letter of July 7, 2021 to ASN.
Measures that would have a financial impact. The aim, explains ASN, is “not to allow a reactor operating mode where this corrosion acceleration is possible”.
IRSN must deliver its opinion on EDF’s proposals in a few weeks, then ASN will decide.
Why does EDF not give up using potentially defective cladding in reactors? Is it about saving fuel even if it means doing acrobatics with nuclear safety?
Neither EDF nor Framatome answered questions from the Journal de l’énergie . https://journaldelenergie.com/nucleaire/combustible-nucleaire-empoisonne-edf/
The incident that caused the shutdown of the Taishan nuclear power plant occurs regularly in France
The incident that caused the shutdown of the Taishan nuclear power plant
occurs regularly in France. An expert will have to determine whether the
responsibility of the French fuel manufacturer, Framatome, is engaged in
the incident at the Chinese plant.
France TV info 3rd Aug 2021
A 1967 Solar Storm Nearly Caused A Nuclear War
A 1967 Solar Storm Nearly Caused A Nuclear War, Earth Sky, Lia De La Cruz,August 3, 2021
The great 1967 solar storm
On May 23, 1967, more than two decades into the high drama of the Cold War, surveillance radars on far-northern parts of the globe (northern Alaska, Greenland, and the U.K.) suddenly and inexplicably jammed. These radars were designed to detect incoming Soviet nuclear missiles. An attack on them by another nation was considered an act of war.
It was a time when tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union were running high. U.S. military commanders did consider that the jammed radars might be an attack by our enemies. On that fateful day in 1967, these commanders ordered a high alert. They authorized aircraft armed with nuclear weapons to take to the skies. Luckily, before they did, another reason for the jammed radar emerged.
In the end, an unlikely set of heroes – some of the earliest space-weather forecasters – emerged to save the day. They realized that the effects of a powerful solar flare had jammed the radar. Their knowledge of the sun averted what might have become an all-out nuclear war.
Atmospheric physicist Delores Knipp of the University of Colorado and the National Center for Atmospheric Research (both in Boulder, Colorado) collaborated with retired U.S. Air Force officers to bring this story to light in 2016. Their article – how a solar flare nearly triggered a nuclear war – was published on August 9, 2016, in the American Geophysical Union’s journal Space Weather. The authors wrote:
We explain how the May 1967 storm was nearly one with ultimate societal impact, were it not for the nascent efforts of the United States Air Force in expanding its terrestrial weather monitoring-analysis-warning-prediction efforts into the realm of space weather forecasting.
How could this happen?!
Solar flares are massive bursts of radiation from the sun, associated with sunspots. They’re our solar system’s largest explosive events, lasting from minutes to hours. They’re seen as bright patches on the sun’s surface. But solar flares are ordinary events. Especially near the peak of the sun’s 11-year cycle of activity, they happen often………….
As the flare’s effects on Earth unfolded, the three different Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar sites – the Clear Air Force Station in Alaska, Thule Air Base in Greenland, and Fylingdales in the U.K. – all stopped working. The sudden influx of solar radio waves had overwhelmed their systems, the study authors wrote…………..
According to the study authors, it was NORAD’s correct diagnosis of the solar storm that prevented the U.S. military from taking disastrous action. Knipp noted in their paper that the critical information was likely relayed to the highest levels of government. It possibly even reached then-President Lyndon B. Johnson……….
How would a space superstorm affect us today?
The solar storm demonstrated why reliable forecasting of what’s come to be called space weather is so important. The world learned this lesson: intense solar flares are capable of disrupting radio communications……….
Bottom line: The U.S. Air Force began preparing for war on May 23, 1967, thinking that the Soviet Union had jammed a set of American surveillance radars. But military space-weather forecasters intervened in time, telling top officials that a powerful sun eruption was to blame. Physicists and Air Force officers described the close call in an August 2016 paper published by the American Geophysical Union.
Source: The May 1967 great storm and radio disruption event
Via Phys.org https://earthsky.org/human-world/1967-solar-storm-nearly-caused-nuclear-war/
Over a month after radioactive leak, China decides to shut down Taishan nuclear reactor ”for maintenance”
China has shut down a nuclear reactor for “maintenance” because of what it said was minor fuel damage, after an increase in radiation levels prompted warnings from its French designers of an “imminent radiological threat”.
The authorities switched off the new-generation European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) at Taishan in Guangdong province today, more than a month after saying minor fuel rod damage had led to the “common
phenomenon” of a build-up of radioactive gases that were no cause for concern.
“After lengthy conversations between French and Chinese technical personnel, Taishan Nuclear Power Plant decided to shut down Unit 1 for maintenance,” China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) said. It added that it was putting safety first and wanted to be “conservative in decision making”.
Times 30th July 2021
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission doing a ‘special investigation’ at Davis-Besse nuclear station.

“It’s so severely cracked that concrete could fall off the exterior of the containment and take out safety systems down below. In that sense, the containment could cause the meltdown,”
Federal commission launches ‘special inspection’ at Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Ottawa County, https://www.cleveland19.com/2021/07/30/federal-commission-launches-special-inspection-davis-besse-nuclear-plant-ottawa-county/By Jim NelsonPublished: Jul. 30, 2021 OAK HARBOR, Ohio (WOIO) – The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced it has launched a special inspection at the Davis-Besse plant in Ottawa County.
The facility is one of two nuclear plants in Ohio; the other is the Perry Plant in Lake County.
The agency said the inspection stems from multiple diesel generator failures during testing and maintenance and a complicated reactor trip.
“The six-person inspection team will review the company’s response to each diesel generator failure, including the company’s cause analysis, extent of condition reviews, maintenance practices and system design,” the NRC said in a news release issued Wednesday. “The team will also focus on the circumstances affecting the recent complicated automatic reactor shutdown, which was triggered by a turbine trip, assessing equipment performance and operator response.”
Since the early 2000′s, several incidents and problems have been reported by the NRC at Davis-Besse.
In 2002, a football-sized hole in a reactor vessel head was discovered. Corrosion was determined to be the cause. The NRC called it a near-failure and ruled it a serious nuclear safety incident.
Years later, cracks were discovered in the reactor building’s concrete.
Just two years ago, a radiation watchdog expressed serious concerns during a briefing with The Environmental and Energy Study Institute in Washington, D.C.
“It’s so severely cracked that concrete could fall off the exterior of the containment and take out safety systems down below. In that sense, the containment could cause the meltdown,” said Kevin Kamps, who represents Maryland-based nonprofit Beyond Nuclear.
To be clear, the NRC has not indicated such event is imminent or even likely.
An email to media representatives at Energy Harbor, Davis-Besse’s parent company, has not been returned.
Taishan nuclear reactor shut down for repairs to damage.
China Nuclear Reactor Shut Down For “Maintenance”, Says Operator NDTV, 30 July 21
Beijing:
A reactor at a nuclear plant in southern China has been shut down because it is damaged, the operator said Friday, but it insisted there were no major safety issues.
China General Nuclear Power Group said both reactors at the plant have “maintained safe and stable operations throughout” and that the faulty unit is “completely under control”.
Chinese authorities last month blamed minor fuel rod damage for a build-up of radioactive gases at the Taishan plant in Guangdong province, describing it as a “common phenomenon” with no need for concern.
French nuclear firm Framatome, which helps operate the plant, last month reported a “performance issue” which caused the US government to look into the possibility of a leak.
“After lengthy conversations between French and Chinese technical personnel, Taishan Nuclear Power Plant… decided to shut down Unit 1 for maintenance,” China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) said Friday in an online statement.
French energy giant EDF — the majority owner of Framatome — also previously blamed the build-up of radioactive gases on deteriorating coating on some uranium fuel rods.
EDF said it was first informed about the fuel rod problem in October, but only learned about the gas build-up in mid-June……….
based on earlier data provided by Chinese officials, the deterioration of the structural integrity of some fuel rods “appears to be continuing, and is being permanently monitored”, the firm added.
The problem is the latest blow to the European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) design, which is being used to build power plants in France, Britain and Finland that have racked up delays and billions of euros in cost overruns. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/china-nuclear-reactor-shut-down-for-maintenance-says-operator-2498717
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