The Shape of Nuclear Abolition

Nuclear Ban Daily, Vol. 4, No. 1  https://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/2msp/reports/17072-nuclear-ban-daily-vol-4-no-1

Editorial: The Shape of Nuclear Abolition
24 November 2023, By Ray Acheson

Writer Martin Amis describes nuclear weapons as instruments of blood and rubble. These days, blood and rubble seems to be everywhere, most of all, for the moment, in Gaza. Thousands of bombs dropped on apartment buildings, hospitals, bakeries. And still, this is apparently not enough blood or rubble. The genocidal bombing continues, as do the shipments of weapons to continue the genocidal bombing. And in the midst of all this bombing, an Israeli minister found it appropriate to muse about dropping a nuclear weapon on Gaza. His remarks have been condemned by many governments, but are they surprising, when the practice of nuclear-armed states is to commit massive amounts of violence wherever and whenever they desire?

Nuclear weapons are part of the spectrum of violence—at the possibly-world-ending end of the spectrum. Daniel Ellsberg recognised this, describing how the firebombing of Dresden, London, and Tokyo in World War II led to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, normalizing the concept of cities on fire, of civilians as targets. In this world of blood and rubble, every day that nuclear weapons exist is a day that they might be detonated, dropped on a city or a missile silo, tested on an island or in a desert, unleashing terrible forces of blast, heat, fire, and radiation on people’s bodies, into the land, water, and air. Every day that nuclear weapons exist is a day that a so-called political leader might decide to use them.

Blood and rubble are policy choices. Blood and rubble are planned for by all of those who shape and propagate the dangerous doctrine of nuclear deterrence. In his introduction to Einstein’s Monsters, Amis writes:

What is the only provocation that could bring about the use of nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons. What is the priority target for nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons. What is the only established defence against nuclear weapons? Nuclear weapons. How do we prevent the use of nuclear weapons? By threatening to use nuclear weapons. And we can’t get rid of nuclear weapons, because of nuclear weapons.

This is the relentless circular (il)logic of deterrence, the principal tenant of which is that the possession of nuclear weapons makes their use impossible and thus prevents war. But whether it is the United States attacking Iraq, Russia invading Ukraine, or Israel committing genocide in Palestine, it should be clear to all that nuclear weapons do not prevent war. They enable it.

Whether nuclear weapons are used or not, they facilitate other forms of violence. They are the backbone of a mentality that security can best be achieved through building up the capacity to commit mass destruction, and by committing mass destruction. Nuclear weapons are used as shields to prevent others from standing up to their possessors’ acts of aggression, to their war crimes. Financial investments in nuclear weapons provide profits for weapons manufacturers that also build conventional bombs, missiles, guns, fighter jets, and other technologies of war. Nuclear weapons provide sustenance to the war machine, and exist as the overarching, final threat of that machine.

The possession of nuclear weapons drives the development of self-destructive plans masquerading as national security. Governments willfully put people and the planet in harm’s way, arrogantly asserting that this is the best way to protect them. One example is the land-based missile silos in the United States, which are intended to serve as targets for enemy nuclear weapons with no concern for the communities or land upon which they are based. As part of his new ground-breaking project examining the US government’s plan to modernise its nuclear forces, Sébastien Philippe of Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security writes in Scientific American, “a key argument for the continued existence—and now the replenishment—of the land-based missiles is to provide a large number of fixed targets meant to exhaust the enemy’s resources.” Yet the most recent, 3000-page report from US government on these silos does not mention what happens if the missiles are attacked. But as Philippe’s modelling of these “sacrifice zones” shows:

A concerted nuclear attack on the existing U.S. silo fields—in Colorado, Wyoming, Nebraska, Montana and North Dakota—would annihilate all life in the surrounding regions and contaminate fertile agricultural land for years. Minnesota, Iowa and Kansas would also probably face high levels of radioactive fallout. Acute radiation exposure alone would cause several million fatalities across the U.S.—if people get advance warning and can shelter in place for at least four days. Without appropriate shelter, that number could be twice as high. Because of great variability in wind directions, the entire population of the contiguous U.S. and the most populated areas of Canada, as well as the northern states of Mexico, would be at risk of lethal fallout—more than 300 million people in total. The inhabitants of the U.S. Midwest and of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario in Canada could receive outdoor whole-body doses of radiation several times higher than the minimum known to result in certain death.

“Higher than the minimum known to result in certain death.” How can anyone read these words and think, “No, this is not relevant for a study on the impacts of our weapon systems.” Or, more broadly, that “No, this is not relevant for our consideration of the possession and deployment of these weapons at all. In fact, we will base our security strategy on the possibility of mass death and unspeakable suffering, and this is normal and fine for us and a few select others—this is how we will dominate. This is how we ‘win’.”

The irrationality of basing national security on the ability to execute or absorb catastrophic events like genocide is not lost on states parties and signatories to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). These governments understand that security must be provided for through other means. That it is both immoral and illogical to threaten to melt people, to turn them into shadows, or to subject them to a protracted, painful death from radiation poisoning, in order to—what, exactly? Exercise dominance within the so-called world order? Be able to wage wars of aggression against whomever one wants, whenever one wants?

The governments that join the TPNW are not just pledging against acquiring nuclear weapons themselves—they are also committed to achieving the abolition of all nuclear weapons, and to building a world that does not rely on massive nuclear violence for security. When these governments gathered with activists and others in 2017 to prohibit nuclear weapons, they changed the world. Not just rhetorically, but materially. The creation of a legally binding treaty outlawing the possession, use, and threat of use of atomic bombs has enabled unprecedented financial divestment and political stigmatisation of these weapons. It has changed discourse, even if it has not yet changed doctrines. But one follows the other.

Six years after the adoption of the TPNW, the nuclear-armed states and nuclear-supportive allies are still clinging to their arsenals of mass destruction. But the horrors these governments have collectively wrought upon the world are clearer—and more condemned—than ever. The masks are off, the wizards are no longer behind the curtain. Political leaders that condone mass death are being denounced; global inequalities are being exposed and opposed. The tide may not yet have fully turned, but the wave of opposition to permanent war and violent aggression is growing every single day. People are organising and getting organised. There is no time to waste, not when it comes to genocide and not when it comes to nuclear weapons.

This meeting of TPNW states parties is an opportunity to advance collective action against the bomb. The governments that have signed and ratified this treaty must adopt a strong declaration condemning nuclear deterrence and the continued possession and modernisation of nuclear arsenals. They must continue to implement last year’s action plan and work to get more countries onboard the treaty, especially those still trying to hide behind the false security promised by nuclear-armed states in exchange for sharing the economic and political burdens of nuclearism. The governments that aid and abet nuclear-armed states must relinquish this immoral space and join the rest of the world in renouncing the policies and practices of mass death.

But this meeting of states parties is not just about governments, it’s about people. It’s about the Indigenous Peoples upon whose bodies and lands nuclear weapons have been detonated, again and again and again. It’s about the communities who have been forced, without their consent or knowledge, to host uranium mines, nuclear laboratories, missile silos or bomber and submarine fleets, radioactive waste dumps. It is about all of us living with radiation from nuclear testing in our bodies, contaminated for generations by the hubris of political and corporate leaders who put their profits and sense of power above everything else. This meeting will be filled with people from affected communities, activist organisations, scientific groups, academic institutions, and more. Nuclear weapons have never just been about states. Nuclear weapons, fundamentally, are about human life, about all life. The nuclear-armed states have refused to acknowledge, let alone include, most people in conversations or policy making about their bombs. But the TPNW is a space for everyone to have a voice, to participate, and to determine how we fight for nuclear abolition, together.

“Nuclear weapons are mirrors in which we see all the versions of the human shape,” writes Amis. What shape do we want to reflect?

November 26, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Second Meeting of State Parties to Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to Be Held at Headquarters, 27 November–1 December

NEW YORK, 24 November (Office for Disarmament Affairs) — The second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will be held at the United Nations Headquarters from 27 November-1 December 2023.  Juan Ramón de la Fuente (Mexico) was elected as President of the Meeting.

The Treaty, the first multilateral nuclear disarmament treaty to be negotiated in more than two decades, was adopted on 7 July 2017 at the United Nations and entered into force on 22 January 2021.  United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has called the Treaty “an important step towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and a strong demonstration of support for multilateral approaches to nuclear disarmament.”

The second Meeting of States Parties is expected to hold a thematic debate on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.  States parties will also consider the status and operation of the Treaty, addressing issues that include universality; the total elimination of nuclear weapons; and victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance.  Other topics will include scientific and technical advice for the effective implementation of the Treaty, the complementarity of the Treaty with the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and implementing the gender provisions of the Treaty.

The Meeting is expected to adopt a political declaration. The period since the conclusion of the first Meeting of States Parties in April 2022 saw the appointment of a Scientific Advisory Group, which will present its initial reports at the second Meeting of States Parties.  Since the first Meeting of States Parties, seven States signed the Treaty, three ratified it and one acceded to it.

The Treaty contains, inter alia, a comprehensive set of prohibitions on participating in any nuclear-weapon-related activities.  This includes undertakings not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.  The Treaty also prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory as well as the provision of assistance to any State in the conduct of prohibited activities.

The Treaty requires States parties to assist individuals affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, as well as to take environmental remediation measures in areas under their jurisdiction or control that have been contaminated due to the testing or use of nuclear weapons.  States parties are required to cooperate with one another to facilitate the Treaty’s implementation.

To date, 69 States have ratified or acceded to the Treaty and 93 have signed it.

Media contacts for the second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons:  Suzanne Oosterwijk, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, UN Secretariat, S-30FW, telephone: +1 917-367-2556, email: suzanne.oosterwijk@un.org.

November 25, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, weapons and war | Leave a comment

We’re long past nuclear deterrence: Bring on mutually assured prevention

BY HARLAN ULLMAN,  https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4317456-were-long-past-nuclear-deterrence-bring-on-mutually-assured-prevention/ 21 Nov 23

The United States needs a replacement concept for deterrence, the theory that was a child of the Cold War. It no longer is fit for purpose. Why?

For those who believe the Clausewitzian view that the nature of war, not the character, was immutable, the two nuclear bombs destroyed that premise along with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A principal reason why deterrence is obsolete today was, as the presidents of America, China and Russia agreed, nuclear war must never be fought and can never be won. And thermonuclear weapons that are 1,000 times more powerful make that even clearer.

A war in which there were only losers and no winners produced deterrence. Deterrence rested on maintaining a survivable capability to retaliate and destroy the other after absorbing a first strike. And both sides knew that. 

During the Cold War, “MAD,” the ironic acronym for mutually assured destruction, became the shorthand basis for deterrence. At that time, nuclear deterrence was achieved by the threat of mutually assured destruction and retaliation. Deterrence was sufficiently broad that some thought it could be “extended” to non-nuclear war under the mutually assured destruction umbrella. The Cold War ended without a shot or nuclear weapon being fired in anger by the U.S. or USSR  

Deterrence was a bipolar condition that applied to the U.S. and USSR. How does deterrence now deal with the soon-to-be three nuclear superpowers? Deterrence assumed retaliation. But what happens if the deterrent notion of retaliation can actually lead to winning by losing?

As North Korea intends to build an intercontinental missile capable of reaching the U.S., this adds another strategic dimension. Whether Iran ultimately develops nuclear weapons or not will also affect this calculus.  

The Strategic Posture Review released in October addresses these issues. Its recommendations called for major increases in both U.S. nuclear and strategic forces. But it did not suggest the size or composition of these forces or, most importantly, the costs because of the sticker shock that would create.

Deterrence is also obsolete at the non-nuclear level because of a further tectonic change in the nature of war: winning by losing or by not losing a long-sustained conflict. Vietnam, the October War of 1973 and the war in Gaza are notable examples.  

Despite the nuclear imbalance, North Vietnam drove the U.S. out of Vietnam although it lost virtually every battle it fought.  

Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat knew that his army could only surprise and not defeat Israel when he started the October 1973 War. He planned on Israel retaliating. But he won back the Sinai peninsula that Israel had captured in June 1967 and still secured a peace treaty. Yet he lost the ground war.

Hamas is following a similar strategy of “winning” by losing, forcing Israeli retaliation even though the costs threaten its temporary eradication along with tens of thousands of Palestinians and the wholesale destruction of Gaza. Protests and unruly demonstrations have been ubiquitous. And surprisingly and tragically, antisemitism has been on the rise in America.  

What needs to be done? First, regarding the nuclear aspect of deterrence, a new concept of tri-deterrence must be developed to deal with this superpower triangle. As opposed to mutually assured destruction,  a new foundation is needed and it should be based on preventing war and a new “MAP” for mutually assured prevention.

Prevention, not deterrence or retaliation, now matters. Prevention applies tested means to this end. A series of “hot lines” and military-to-military talks, including the stationing of observers at each military headquarters in the three countries must be established. These are additional confidence-building measures to ensure wars by accident do not occur. The U.S. and USSR did this.

Second, arms control discussions must address the prevention of any form of nuclear war and the restoration of three-way trust and confidence. These discussions must include not only arms limitations but also acceptable agreements to balance offensive and defensive weapons and the impact of highly accurate non-nuclear weapons that can have a strategic impact if targeted against nuclear forces.

Third, prevention also applies to traditional forms of war when winning can be accomplished by losing and provoking retaliation, as in Gaza, which may ensure Israel’s geostrategic defeat. This means greater reliance on diplomacy to reduce the grounds for conflict. And the consequences of artificial intelligence that some believe pose a possible existential threat to humanity must be addressed.

How or if the U.S., China and Russia can begin discussions is crucial. Whether a new 21st century 1914  is looming or not, mutually assured prevention can ensure another never reoccurs.

Harlan Ullman Ph.D. is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” military doctrine.  His 12th book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.

November 22, 2023 Posted by Christina Macpherson | politics international, weapons and war | Leave a comment