A balanced look at the Iran nuclear dilemma

Iranian representatives would no doubt argue that legal obligations freely entered into (e.g. NPT obligations) are different in nature from legal obligations imposed on a state against its will, especially obligations imposed by an instance that Iranians may well think of as a “kangeroo court”.  Iran could also point out that it is not the only UN member state to have defied the will of the Security Council.  Some others (e.g. Israel) appear to have been able to do so with impunity.

IRAN, THE IAEA, AND NUCLEAR MYTH-MAKING | Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran, 15 Sept 10, The IAEA’s latest report sheds no new light on whether Iran intends to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, in contravention of the NPT. The most suggestive technical indications of a nuclear weapons intention (apart from the dual use potential of uranium enrichment, and the high plutonium-producing potential of the reactor under construction at Arak) remain Iran’s experiments with polonium 210 and uranium metal, its possession of a blueprint for uranium metal hemispheres, and what the IAEA refers to as “alleged studies” (see below).

But the experiments took place prior to the uncovering of Iran’s clandestine programme in 2003, and the blueprint has been in Iran’s possession since the late 1980s.  So these could as well be indications that Iran once had the intention of manufacturing nuclear weapons as that Iran still has that intention.  And all these pointers can as well indicate an intention to acquire a “threshold” or “break-out” nuclear capability as an intention to produce weapons.

The report indicates that the inspectors are no further forward in their investigation into allegations that Iran has undertaken research that implies an interest in manufacturing nuclear weapons (the “alleged studies”).  Iran continues to state that the evidence on which these allegations are based has been fabricated.

……..The report suggests that Iran is continuing to adopt an ultra-legalistic view of its safeguards obligations, complying with the letter but not the spirit of its agreement with the IAEA.  The wisdom of this policy is questionable, since an ultra-legalistic approach encourages the inference that Iran has something to hide.  But that inference is not necessarily correct.  In this case ultra-legalism can equally well be seen as a consequence of Iran’s belief that IAEA reporting of Iran’s pre-2003 safeguards violations to the UN Security Council was unjust (and that the subsequent reaction of the Security Council to those violations has also been unjust)—as retaliation for injustice, in other words.  And it is not in itself illegal for states under safeguards to restrict cooperation and access for inspectors to the letter of the standard NPT safeguards agreement…….

The report makes clear that Iran is continuing to defy the will of the Security Council.  That puts Iran on the wrong side of the law, since UN chapter VII resolutions are legally binding on UN member states.  Iranian representatives would no doubt argue that legal obligations freely entered into (e.g. NPT obligations) are different in nature from legal obligations imposed on a state against its will, especially obligations imposed by an instance that Iranians may well think of as a “kangeroo court”.  Iran could also point out that it is not the only UN member state to have defied the will of the Security Council.  Some others (e.g. Israel) appear to have been able to do so with impunity.

IRAN, THE IAEA, AND NUCLEAR MYTH-MAKING | Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran

September 16, 2010 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Iran, politics international | antinuclear, nuclear, nuclear secrecy, nuclear weapons | 1 Comment