Introduction: Nuclear Energy in Asia, by Mel Gurtov
The Fukushima nuclear disaster of March 2011 has raised serious questions about nuclear power.
In our work since Fukushima, we have tried to answer two questions: What is the current status of nuclear energy in Asia? Does nuclear power have a future in East Asia? By answering those questions, we hope to contribute to the global debate about nuclear energy. To be sure, questions of such magnitude can rarely be answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Decisions on energy are made at the national level, on the basis of both objective factors such as cost-effectiveness and notions of the national interest, and less objective ones, such as influence peddled by power plant operators, corruption, and bureaucratic self-interest. Nevertheless, by closely examining the status and probable future of nuclear power plants in specific countries, the authors of this volume come up with answers, albeit mostly of a negative nature.
At the start of 2017, 450 nuclear power reactors were operating in 30 countries, with 60 more under construction in 15 countries. Thirty-four reactors are under construction in Asia, including 21 in China. The “Fukushima effect” has clearly had an impact in Asia, however. In China, no new construction took place between 2011 and 2014, although since then there has been a slow increase of licenses. Nevertheless, the full story of China’s embrace of nuclear power, as told in this volume by M. V. Ramana and Amy King, is that the onset of a ‘new normal’ in economic growth objectives and structural changes in the economy have led to a declining demand for electricity and the likelihood of far less interest in nuclear power than had once been predicted.
On the other hand, in South Korea, which relies on nuclear power for about 31 per cent of its electricity, Lauren Richardson’s chapter which is presented here, shows that the Fukushima disaster and strong civil society opposition have not deflected official support of nuclear power, not only for electricity but also for export.
Meanwhile, the 10 countries that comprise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are divided about pursuing the nuclear-energy option, with Vietnam deciding to opt out in 2016, and Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines at various stages of evaluation. Even so, the chapter by Mely Caballero-Anthony and Julius Cesar I. Trajano shows that only about 1 per cent of ASEAN’s electricity will derive from nuclear power in 2035, whereas renewables will account for 22 per cent.
How viable nuclear power is finally judged to be will depend primarily on the decisions of governments, but increasingly also on civil society. ASEAN has established a normative framework that emphasises safety, waste disposal, and non-proliferation; and civil society everywhere is increasingly alert to the dangers and costs, above-board and hidden, of nuclear power plants.
As Doug Koplow’s chapter shows, for example, the nuclear industry, like fossil fuels, benefits from many kinds of government subsidies that distort the energy market against renewable energy sources. Costs are politically as well as environmentally consequential: even if construction begins on a nuclear power plant, it will be cancelled and construction abandoned in 12 per cent of all cases. It is important to note that of the 754 reactors constructed since 1951, 90 have been abandoned and 143 plants permanently shut down.
When construction does proceed, it takes between five to 10 years on average for completion (338 of 609), with some 15 per cent taking more than 10 years. And, in the end, old and abandoned reactors will have to be decommissioned, as Kalman A. Robertson discusses, with costs that may double over the next 15–20 years.
As Robertson points out, the problem of safe disposal of radioactive waste and the health risk posed by radiation released during decommissioning should be factored into the total price that cleanup crews and taxpayers will eventually pay. On top of all that, there isn’t much experience worldwide in decommissioning.
Then there is the issue of trust in those who make decisions. Tatsujiro Suzuki’s chapter shows that in Japan, the chief legacy of Fukushima is public loss of trust in Japanese decision-makers and in the nuclear industry itself. Several years after the accident, costs continue to mount, a fact that pro-nuclear advocates elsewhere in Asia might want to consider. They also need to consider the issue of transparency for, as Suzuki shows, the nuclear industry has consistently dodged the fairly obvious lessons of Fukushima with regard to costs, nuclear energy’s future, and communication with the public. Similarly, in Taiwan, as Gloria Kuang-Jung Hsu’s study shows, transparency about safety issues has been notoriously lacking, and a history of efforts to obfuscate nuclear weapon ambitions means that constant vigilance over nuclear regulators is necessary.
Of course, if public opinion does not count in a country—say, in China and Vietnam—the issue of trust is muted. But we know that, even there, people are uneasy about having a nuclear power plant in their backyard. Issues of hidden cost and public trust are also embedded in the biological and health threat posed by nuclear energy. Tilman A. Ruff, a long-time student of radiation effects on human health, demonstrates how these effects have been underestimated. He offers a detailed explanation of what exposure to different doses of radiation, such as from the Fukushima accident, means for cancer rates and effects on DNA. Timothy A. Mousseau and Anders P. Møller, who have undertaken field research for many years on the genetic effects of the Chernobyl accident, look at how nuclear plant accidents affect the health of humans and other species. Combined, these two chapters offer a potent, often overlooked, argument against the nuclear option.
This introduction by Mel Gurtov and the following article by Lauren Richardson are adapted from Peter Van Ness and Mel Gurtov, eds., Learning From Fukushima. Nuclear Power in East Asia. Australian University Press.
Protesting Policy and Practice in South Korea’s Nuclear Energy Industry , by Lauren Richardson
Japan’s March 2011 (3/11) crisis spurred a revival in anti-nuclear activism around the globe. This was certainly the case in South Korea, Japan’s nearest neighbour, which was subject to some of the nuclear fallout from Fukushima. This chapter examines the puzzle of why the South Korean anti-nuclear movement was apparently powerless in the face of its government’s decision to ratchet up nuclear energy production post-3/11. It argues that its limitations stem from the highly insulated nature of energy policymaking in South Korea; the enmeshing of nuclear power in the government’s ‘Green Growth Strategy’; and certain tactical insufficiencies within the movement itself. Notwithstanding these limitations, the movement has successfully capitalised upon more recent domestic shocks to the nuclear power industry, resulting in a slight, yet significant, curtailing of the South Korean government’s nuclear energy capacity targets.
Introduction….. The evolution of South Korea’s nuclear energy policy…… The bottom-up movement against nuclear energy…….. Phase 1: Pre-Fukushima…….. Phase 2: Post-Fukushima….. Explaining the limited policy change…… The insularity of nuclear power policymaking…… Nuclear power as ‘green’ energy……. Tactical insufficiencies in the anti-nuclear movement……..
New challenges to South Korea’s nuclear energy industry…… Corruption scandals…….. Cyber-attacks on nuclear power plants….
Fin24 29th Oct 2017, Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba says drastic steps are needed to help South
Africa’s ailing economy – including freezing senior civil servants’
salaries and selling chunks of state-owned enterprises. In an exclusive
interview with City Press on Friday, Gigaba unveiled the surprise moves,
which include slamming brakes on the country’s estimated R1 trillion
nuclear build programme, saying it is neither affordable nor currently
necessary. https://www.fin24.com/Budget/gigaba-says-no-to-nuclear-20171029-3
By Itai Vardi • Tuesday, October 31, 2017Kathleen Hartnett White, President Trump’s nominee to head the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), has recently made money from both leases on oil drilling and speaking fees at conferences sponsored by the fossil fuel industry. These new details come from Hartnett White’s financial disclosure, obtained by DeSmog.
If her nomination is confirmed, Hartnett White will be charged with interagency coordination of science, energy, and environmental policy and with overseeing crucial environmental review processes for new energy and infrastructure projects. The CEQ, a division of the Executive Office of the President, was established in 1969 as part of the landmark National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Hartnett White also enjoyed income from an interest in four oil leases — two in Texas and two in Kansas. These rigs were operated by Central Crude, Linn Operating, CHS Operating, and CVR Refining. Hartnett White indicated in her disclosure that she recently gifted these interests to her nephew.
Additionally, she reported royalties from her co-authored book Fueling Freedom: Exposing the Mad War on Energy, a text that copiously celebrates fossil fuels as the “lifeblood of the modern world.”
Other sources of reported income include a dog breeding business, co-owned with her husband, Beau Brite White.
Derek Seidman, a research analyst at the Public Accountability Initiative, a nonpartisan watchdog research group focused on corporate and government accountability, says that Hartnett-White’s recent earnings from fossil fuel interests is cause for concern.
“It’s unsettling to learn about the close ties that White has to the very interests and entities that she’s been tasked to oversee at the CEQ,” says Seidman, who has reviewed the financial disclosure. “Her cozy relationship with the oil and gas drilling industry is particularly troubling. These types of conflicts undermine public trust in regulatory institutions and open the door to all kinds of potential problems and abuses.”
Kathleen Hartnett-White did not respond to a request for comment. A spokesperson for the Texas Public Policy Foundation said that she is not available for interviews.
The climate report, obtained by NPR, notes that the past 115 years are “the warmest in the history of modern civilization.” The global average temperature has increased by about 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit over that period. Greenhouse gases from industry and agriculture are by far the biggest contributor to warming.
The findings contradict statements by PresidentTrump and many of his Cabinet members, who have openly questioned the role humans play in changing the climate.
“I believe that measuring with precision human activity on the climate is something very challenging to do,” EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt said in an interview earlier this year. “There’s tremendous disagreement about the degree of impact.”
That is not consistent with the conclusions of the 600-plus-page Climate Science Special Report, which is part of an even larger scientific review known as the fourth National Climate Assessment. The NCA4, as it’s known, is the nation’s most authoritative assessment of climate science. The report’s authors include experts from leading scientific agencies, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NASA and the Department of Energy, as well as academic scientists.The report states that the global climate will continue to warm. How much, it says, “will depend primarily on the amount of greenhouse gases (especially carbon dioxide) emitted globally.” Without major reductions in emissions, it says, the increase in annual average global temperature could reach 9 degrees Fahrenheit relative to pre-industrial times. Efforts to reduce emissions, it says, would slow the rate of warming.
“This is good, solid climate science,” says Richard Alley, a geoscientist at Penn State University, who says he made minor contributions to the report’s conclusions on sea level rise. “This has been reviewed so many times in so many ways, and it’s taking what we know from … a couple of centuries of climate science and applying it to the U.S.”
The assessments are required by an act of Congress; the last one was published in 2014. Alley says this year’s goes further in attributing changes in weather to the warming climate, especially weather extremes. “More heat waves and fewer cold snaps, this is very clear,” he says. The report also notes that warmer temperatures have contributed to the rise in forest fires in the West and that the incidence of those fires is expected to keep rising.
Some of the clearest effects involve sea level rise. “Coastal flooding, you raise the mean level of the ocean, everything else equal you get more coastal flooding,” Alley says. The report notes that sea level has risen 7 to 8 inches since 1900, and 3 inches of that occurred since 1993. The report says that rate is faster than during any century over the past 2,800 years.
The report also points out that heavy rainfall is increasing in intensity and frequency across the U.S., especially in the Northeast, and that is expected to keep increasing.
Other connections are harder to nail down, Alley says, such as whether a particular hurricane can be attributed to climate change.
“The Climate Science Special Report is like going to a doctor and being given a report on your vital signs,” says environmental scientist Rachel Licker of the Union of Concerned Scientists. She notes that the authors assessed more than 1,500 scientific studies and reports in making their conclusions.
Alley adds that the new report “does a better job of seeing the human fingerprint in what’s happening.” He says that while he hasn’t read all of it yet, he sees no evidence that it has been soft-pedaled or understates the certainty of the science.
Alley notes that “there’s a little rumbling” among climate scientists who are concerned that the Trump administration will ignore this effort. “I think the authors really are interested in seeing [the report] used wisely by policymakers to help the economy as well as the environment.”
The report has been submitted to the Office of Science and Technology Policy at the White House. Trump has yet to choose anyone to run that office; it remains one of the last unfilled senior positions in the White House staff.
The UK’s race to get its own nuclear inspectors BBC News, 3 Nov 17, The government cannot guarantee Britain will have enough nuclear inspectors when it leaves the EU, MPs on the business committee were told.
The Office of Nuclear Regulation has recruited four new safeguards inspectors but says it needs more time to fill the specialised roles.
Nuclear minister Richard Harrington said there was “plenty of time” to recruit the staff needed.
But he stopped short of offering a firm guarantee.
The government has stressed that nuclear safeguards – the processes by which the UK shows its civil nuclear material is not diverted into weapons programmes – are different from nuclear safety – the prevention of nuclear accidents.
Mr Harrington said the UK was committed to leaving Euratom, the agency which has regulated the nuclear industry across Europe since 1957, at the same time as it left the EU in March 2019.
Industry figures have warned about significant disruption to energy production in the UK if there is not a new inspection regime ready to go to, to replace the one currently overseen by Euratom.
The four senior figures who gave evidence to the business committee on Wednesday said there was no benefit to the UK from leaving Euratom………
Mr Harrington was also quizzed by the MPs about feared shortages of less skilled workers needed to build new nuclear plants, such as steel workers and welders.
Ben Russell, of Horizon Nuclear, the Japanese-owned firm planning to build a new nuclear reactor at Wylfa Newydd, on Anglesey, called for a special visa for infrastructure workers post-Brexit so they could continue to be recruited from EU countries.
He said projects like HS2 and the third runway at Heathrow meant the demand for staff would outstrip supply and there was not enough time to train up British workers.
David Wagstaff, the civil servant leading talks for the UK on the withdrawal from Euratom, said it would be up to the British government to decide on a post-Brexit visa regime.
‘No relationship’
There was also concern about the future of the world-leading nuclear fusion laboratory based in Oxfordshire, the Joint European Torus (JET), which is mostly funded by the EU……. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-41836855
House Tax Bill Trims Wind Tax Credit, Extends Nuclear Provision, Bloomberg, By Ari Natter,
GOP measure preserves threatened wind and solar tax credits
Legislation could change is it winds through Congress
Tax credits cherished by the wind and solar industry remain under a rewrite of the tax code revealed by House Republicans, but the measure would trim the wind energy’s production tax credit by more than a third.
The bill, unveiled by House GOP leaders Thursday, also extends an estimated $6 billion tax credit for the nuclear industry, which would benefit Southern Co. Without the extension, the credit may have gone unused before the 2021 deadline. Southern’s Vogtle project in Georgia faces construction delays and is not on track to be completed before the deadline.
The bill also adds tax credits for other energy sources, such as geothermal, small-scale wind and fuel cells that were left out of a 2015 budget and spending deal.
The House tax overhaul cuts the wind industry’s 2.3-cent-per-kilowatt hour tax credit to 1.5 cents. The solar industry’s 30 percent tax credit remains unchanged. Under that 2015 deal the wind credit begins phasing down this year before expiring in 2020 and the solar industry’s credit winds down before expiring in 2022. Those phaseouts continue as planned, but projects would now need to be completed by those dates to qualify…….
Zuma was responding to a question in parliament by opposition leader Mmusi Maimane who asked why finance minister Malusi Gigaba had said the expansion would be delayed while energy minister David Mahlobo said the opposite.
“We have a policy of mixed energy and that includes nuclear,” Zuma said. “We are not saying we have changed policy … Its a question of timing, when do we do it. We have been discussing that issue all the time in the government.”
, November 02, 2017 Under maintenance for the past three months, Unit 2 of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant has had its restart date postponed multiple times. This has once again raised safety concerns among activists who claim that substandard equipment has been used and are demanding that the expansion of the nuclear plant be stopped.
The second reactor was shut down on August 4 due to hydrogen concentration in the stator. It was originally expected to restart generation on September 4. However, the restart date was postponed to October 7, then to November 3 and now to November 15.
SV Jinna, Site Director at Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KNPP) has, however, blamed the delay on the overhaul of system.
With the 1000 MW second unit beginning commercial operations in March this year, activists wonder why the nuclear power plant had to be shut down so early on. “It is a very new plant. It has run only for a few weeks and such a plant need to be overhauled,” said G Sundarrajan, coordinator of Poovulagin Nanbargal, an NGO.
Arguing that the overall quality of different components and equipment used in the Kudankulam Nuclear Power plant is substandard, Sundarrajan points to the fact that the Russian Federal Prosecutors had in 2007 arrested the procurement director of ZiO-Poldolsk, a subsidiary of Rosatom, the country’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation on accusations of corruption. ZiO-Poldolsk was accused of knowingly selling inferior equipment manufactured for nuclear reactors. The same Russian company had supplied material and reactor parts to the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant.
But it’s not just Unit 2 that has faced maintenance problems. Since its inception in 2013, the 1000 MW Unit 1 of KNPP has shutdown multiple times.
The activist alleged that to camouflage the failures of Unit 1 and Unit 2, the project is being expanded further. “Unit 1 and 2 have already been a failure because they have used substandard components and the project was not properly implemented. They are trying to make Unit 3 and 4 a successful project because one and two will definitely die a natural death,” said Sundarrajan.
Construction for units 3 and 4 is presently going on and is expected to become operational by 2022-23.
Demanding that the Centre scraps the decision to expand the project, he explained, “The nuclear plant is itself a risky proposition. This is a nuclear park. Nowhere in the country do we have a nuclear park installed with 6000 MW power.”
While arguing that the government focus on renewable energy instead, he said, “Unit 1 and 2 has been installed but at least they should stop expanding. Second thing is disposing nuclear waste is becoming an issue in the entire world and there is no place to dispose it. Other countries are reducing use of nuclear power.”
Meanwhile, NPCIL SK Sharma had justified he maintenance shutdown at Unit 2 stating that “certain uncertainties” could crop up in the initial days of a new reactor.
Hitting out at the BJP and the previous Congress government, activist SP Udayakumar, who spearheaded the protests against the project in 2011, said, “They claimed it was brand new technology and started it. After five months, they are saying there could be some uncertainties once they start again. What is the real problem? Why can’t they tell us? They are accountable to the nation. The Congress and BJP government have been hiding all the irregularities.”
Calling the government anti-people, Udayakumar said, “Thousands of people have been protesting against the Unit 1 and 2 for more than two-and-half years if there is any kind of respect for democracy, the central government should hear the people and stop it.”
SAUDI Arabia has announced plans to go nuclear and extract uranium domestically in order to develop its nuclear power programme amid rising tensions over North Korea’s missile ambitions. Express UK By WILL KIRBYA senior government official insisted the uranium would only be used for “peaceful purposes” to allow the oil-rich nation to diversify its energy supply.
It comes amid soaring tensions on the Korean peninsula as Kim Jong-un continues to build his nuclear arsenal threatening the outbreak of World War 3.
But Saudi Arabia insists its nuclear power plans are for peaceful purposes.
Saudi Arabia is working towards “self-sufficiency” in producing atomic fuel, a senior official explained, and extracting its own uranium makes economic sense before it starts building its first nuclear reactors next year.
Energy Minister David Mahlobo repeated the mantra on the trillion-rand nuclear programme; that it will be done at a scale and pace the country can afford. Gaye Davis | about 4 hours ago
However, in his comments after Gigaba’s medium-term budget policy speech, Mahlobo appeared to favour a more bullish approach.
Democratic Alliance National Council of Provinces (NCOP) member Farhat Essack put the question: “You said that no one has the figures for a nuclear programme and that the government owns the numbers. Please explain to this House what exactly did you mean by that?”
Mahlobo repeated the mantra on the trillion-rand nuclear programme; that it will be done at a scale and pace the country can afford. Mahlobo says the opposition’s focus on nuclear has nothing to do with policy.
“It has everything to do with who gets the tender. I’m not in the business of tenders. I’m in the business of ensuring that you have energy here to pump our economy and we’re not going to be deterred in doing that.”
LISTEN: Will new Energy Minister push nuclear deal through?
Malloy signs Millstone nuclear bill, By Ken Dixon, Ct Post, Tuesday, October 31, 2017 HARTFORD — A bill that environmentalists and consumer advocates charged would allow the Millstone nuclear power plant the ability to compete with renewable sources of power, was signed into law Tuesday by Gov. Dannel P. Malloy, following its passage last week in the Legislature…..
Opponents of the bill charged that allowing Millstone to compete with renewables, could costs consumers an extra $300 million a year in a state with some of the nation’s highest charges for electricity……
channelling revenues ultimately funded by electricity consumers towards a joint civil-military national nuclear industry base
Evidence from Andy Stirling and Philip Johnstone: As the early part of the process of the BEIS Committee Brexit Inquiry has unfolded, the salience of this civil/military link is being further underscored in statements in which a number of relevant senior civil servants and ministers are confirming that the priority attached to UK military submarine capabilities is deeply entangled in strategic commitments to civil nuclear industry strategy 6 . Several possibly serious implications therefore arise in relation to the particular circumstances of Brexit.
Written evidence from the University of Sussex, Science Policy Research Unit (BRN0015)
We submit this evidence to the inquiry on Brexit and the Implications for UK Business.s. The content draws on a detailed submission by the same authors to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), discussed at the PAC witness session on Monday 9 th October 2017, which informed illuminating exchanges with senior civil service witnesses to that Committee and was subsequently published by PAC 1 . A number of potentially important implications arise in relation to issues under discussion around Brexit.
2: This earlier evidence to PAC addressed the otherwise difficult-to-explain intensity of Government commitments to civil nuclear power in the face of growing recognition of the relative competitiveness of alternative UK low carbon energy investments. Multiple grounds were found for inferring that this persistent Government attachment is due, at least in part (and with no public discussion), to perceived needs to engineer a cross-subsidy from electricity consumers to help cover costs of a national nuclear industrial base that is deemed to be essential for maintaining UK military nuclear infrastructures 2 .
3: The issues that arise are central to the general remit of the BEIS Committee. For instance, this recent evidence to the PAC documents significant statements by the National Audit Office, which suggest that UK military nuclear infrastructures are being bolstered by revenue flows to UK industry strategy in other sectors 3 . Many statements in support of this interpretation are cited from defence policy discussions, acknowledging incentives to “mask” costs of military industrial strategy behind civil energy programmes 4 . As a result, it is evident that Government-negotiated, high-price, guaranteed long-term contracts for civil nuclear power, are channelling revenues ultimately funded by electricity consumers towards a joint civil-military national nuclear industry base, whose full costs probably could not otherwise feasibly be covered by defence budgets alone. Resulting implications for wider industry strategy and energy policy have received effectively zero Parliamentary or other policy scrutiny.
4: Much other evidence was presented in submission to PAC, concerning this evidently significant-buthidden influence on civil industry policy by military nuclear considerations 5 . As a result, it seems that undetermined but likely large cross-subsidies are being engineered from UK electricity consumers, in order to cover otherwise insupportable costs of military nuclear industry strategies. In the present evidence we outline key implications for the BEIS Committee inquiry on nuclear implications of Brexit
5: As the early part of the process of the BEIS Committee Brexit Inquiry has unfolded, the salience of this civil/military link is being further underscored in statements in which a number of relevant senior civil servants and ministers are confirming that the priority attached to UK military submarine capabilities is deeply entangled in strategic commitments to civil nuclear industry strategy 6 . Several possibly serious implications therefore arise in relation to the particular circumstances of Brexit.
6: First, there are well-documented general concerns that Brexit-related pressures on the UK industrial base are likely to have a particular impact on large infrastructure projects, specifically including new nuclear build. If these developments unfold, then pressures are likely to intensify around the interlinkages between UK civil and military nuclear infrastructures. With foregone opportunities for industry strategy in other sectors (like offshore wind), the these Brexit-related implications for UK industrial strategy are central issues for the BEIS Committee, which remain unexplored elsewhere 7 .
7: Second, there are concerns that the economic effects of Brexit may include current and possible continuing future depreciation of Sterling. If these effects transpire as variously predicted, then economic pressures will likely intensify to find ways to cross-subsidise growing military nuclear costs in some fashion that mitigates the impact on public spending. Brexit may thus exacerbate incentives to ‘mask’ otherwise-unbearable wider industrial costs of military nuclear submarine infrastructures behind strategic support for civil nuclear supply chains ultimately funded by electricity consumers 8 .
8: Third, there are prospects that demand for UK access to overseas specialist nuclear skills may be aggravated by Brexit-related constraints on labour movement. If this occurs, then competition can be expected to accentuate between recruitment needs for national civil and military nuclear industries. Since key military nuclear skills in particular must for obvious reasons be disproportionately UKbased, so Brexit may reinforce upward pressures on costs of military nuclear infrastructures and so help further increase the pressures for cross-subsidy documented in the earlier PAC evidence 9
9: Fourth, there is the likely effect of Brexit in reinforcing pressures towards Scottish independence. If this transpires, then strong opposition in Scotland to continued associations with the current UK nuclear weapons infrastructure, mean that Brexit will make it more probable that a move will be required of key military nuclear facilities away from Scotland. The result will be a very large Brexitrelated increase in military nuclear costs, further exacerbating pressures for cross-subsidies 10 . 10: We hope it is useful to draw these emerging issues to the attention of the BEIS Committee – both in relation to the above specific repercussions around Brexit and to their wider implications for UK energy strategies, industrial policy and more general qualities of national democratic accountability 11 . October 2017
Extensive references are given on the original document .
Gigaba says no to nuclear, Fin 24, 2017-10-29 – Sipho Masondo and Setumo Stone, Johannesburg – Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba says drastic steps are needed to help South Africa’s ailing economy – including freezing senior civil servants’ salaries and selling chunks of state-owned enterprises.
In an exclusive interview with City Press on Friday, Gigaba unveiled the surprise moves, which include slamming brakes on the country’s estimated R1 trillion nuclear build programme, saying it is neither affordable nor currently necessary.
“There was a time when it was felt that nuclear is necessary and it must be implemented and programmes were started. But it became clear, as the economy took a serious dip, that we were not going to afford nuclear, that the country couldn’t afford it and the budget couldn’t afford it,” he said.
“It is quite clear that, at present, we can meet our electricity needs and we can even meet them into the future, given the excess electricity that we have.”
Nuclear power, Gigaba said, will remain part of the country’s energy mix. However, this will only happen when the economy is growing fast, when there is “high uptake of electricity from intensive users, when we can see that we are reaching the stage where existing capacity is being fully utilised and the demand and supply margin is very narrow”.
Gigaba said it was not a “malicious view” to shelve the nuclear programme for now, considering the R50bn budget shortfall, a rising budget deficit, National Health Insurance, demands for free higher education, and a national debt to GDP ratio which is set to breach the 60% threshold by 2022.
“If you look at Eskom’s balance sheet, they will not be able to afford nuclear, they will need a guarantee from government. Government guarantees are ultimately state debt, because when a state-owned company cannot afford to pay the guarantees, the national fiscus needs to step in and pay. That is what happened at SAA,” he said…….http://www.fin24.com/Budget/gigaba-says-no-to-nuclear-20171029-3
Jeremy Corbyn’s shadow minister for peace has said a Labour government would sign a global anti-nuclear weapons treaty that would effectively confine the Royal Navy’s Trident submarines to port. Fabian Hamilton MP, in comments that risk reigniting the party’s internal divisions over the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, told i that while the issue of
Trident was “dead in the water” as it had been approved by Parliament,
a future Corbyn government would sign a UN treaty that bans nuclear weapons
and prohibits their use.
France to decide by end 2018 how many nuclear plants to shut: minister PARIS (Reuters) 29 Oct 17, – France will detail at the end of 2018 how many nuclear reactors will close to meet a target on reducing atomic energy, Environment Minister Nicolas Hulot told French daily Le Monde on Saturday.
France aims to cut the share of atomic energy in power generation to 50 percent by 2025 from 75 percent now.
Nuclear plant closures represent a touchy topic, as the sector employs thousands of people and renewable energy alternatives struggle to grow fast enough to ensure energy needs are fulfilled.
According to France’s National Council of Industry, the nuclear sector supports about 220,000 jobs, directly and indirectly.
Hulot will lay out his so-called “green deal” on energy transition in the first half of 2018, he told Le Monde in an interview.
