How to get filthy rich via Small Modular Nuclear Reactors.
30 August 2026 Noel Wauchope AIM Extra, https://theaimn.net/how-to-get-filthy-rich-via-small-modular-nuclear-reactors/
Well, I hasten to warn you that you need to be already rich, for this to work. It has already worked for some alert rich investors. What they did was – they noted the soaring share prices of small nuclear reactor companies, a soaring that was accompanied by an awful lot of media hype.
And then they noted some salient facts about those companies – for example:
OKLO – has a market cap of $8 billion, and its shares jumped more than 12% on Aug. 25 Sounds great doesn’t it? BUT:
- OKLO had a net loss of $81.6 million in the second quarter this year.
- It went public through a SPAC (special purpose acquisition company) in 2025.
- It generates no commercial energy income today.
- Its first Small Modular Reactor (SMR), the Aurora Powerhouse, isn’t expected to enter commercial operation for years.
- Oklo is incurring tens of millions in operating losses annually.
- It is $78.6 million in debt, so interest and loan payments eat into its earnings.
- OKLO is still in discussions with the regulator NRC, regarding the fuel, high-assay low-enriched uranium, or HALEU, and other supply chain issues.
Similarly, stocks of both NuScale Power, and Nano Nuclear have soared over the past year. Yet both are making little or no money, and both have suffered operational losses over this year. NuScale is now facing a class action by investors who claim that the company misrepresented the prospects for small nuclear reactors.
So – what have the smart rich investors done? Basically, they’ve gambled on these stocks being over-priced, and soon to go down. Investment strategies are not my strong point, but it seems that short selling is one hedge fund strategy. So these clever investors, noting the unsustainable rise in share prices, borrow shares and soon sell them at the inflated price, and can buy them back later as the price plunges down.
So , it’s estimated that investors made over $2 Billion over the past months by short selling shares in these three small nuclear reactor companies – OKLO, NuScale, and Nano Nuclear.
The rage for investing in SMRs is still on, as the world is gripped by the mania for AI hyperscalers. (AI hyperscalers are companies investing grotesque amounts of money in building data centres world-wide)
Neither the hyperscalers nor the small reactor companies are actually making money at present. But the hype is all-consuming.
This is the prevailing hype –
The AI Boom Is Making Nuclear Power Bankable Again – America’s nuclear power landscape is undergoing a dramatic transformation, driven by the immense energy needs of artificial intelligence. Tech giants like Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Meta are directly financing nuclear projects, committing billions to secure nearly 10 gigawatts of capacity. ………..
Almost everything tech companies are funding—Meta, Amazon, most of Google’s bets—is small modular reactors: compact designs.
Will AI kickstart a new age of nuclear power? IAEA Director General Manuel Grossi believes that the nuclear industry is destined to be the energy partner of the AI revolution. “Only nuclear energy can meet the five needs of low-carbon power generation, round-the-clock reliability, ultra-high power density, grid stability and true scalability”……………………..the IAEA is working closely with regulators and the industry to make them a viable proposition and we could soon be seeing large numbers of small reactors being deployed to meet the demand.
So- we have the Trumpian process in the USA, of the weakening of radiation and safety regulation of nuclear reactors, and of the government already funding 8 SMR companies.
With the claim that nuclear power combats climate change, with the accepted belief in the necessity for AI hyperscale, governments, academia, the corporate media, and the UN all promote this new marriage of nuclear and Big Tech. So – all the stars are aligned for the rise and rise of small nuclear reactors.
Incidentally, don’t look to the UN, the World Health Organisation (WHO)or anyone like that to cry foul. I think that most people have forgotten, if they ever knew it , but the 1959 agreement between the WHO and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) effectively prevents the WHO from criticising things nuclear.
One important part – “Whenever either organization proposes to initiate a programme or activity on a subject in which the other organization has or may have a substantial interest, the first party shall consult the other with a view to adjusting the matter by mutual agreement.”
And, in this time of vulnerability of nuclear sites, to war and terrorism, you wonder how Rafael Grossi, Director of the IAEA reconciles his conflicting duties, that of promoting nuclear power and of assuring of its safety.
But I digress. We are talking about money, and how to get rich through investing in small nuclear reactors. Well, that is still a goer. But perhaps you’d better be quick, as investment advisors are now dithering about the share price of commercial SMR companies, even though the Big Tech- SMR teams are apparently still booming.
However, the global nuclear lobby is now turning its attention to military microreactors, so there’s hope for future stock market gains as governments splurge tax-payers money into companies in that area.
Nuclearelectrica CEO steps down amid ‘shortcomings’ in 462 MW Doicești (NuScale) SMR project
August 26, 2026, by Vladimir Berbatović,
https://balkangreenenergynews.com/nuclearelectrica-ceo-steps-down-amid-shortcomings-in-462-mw-doicesti-smr-project/
Cosmin Ghiță, CEO of Romania’s state-controlled nuclear power producer Nuclearelectrica, has resigned amid “shortcomings” related to the joint venture developing a 462 MW small modular reactor (SMR) project in Doicești, as well as the project itself. Ghiță’s resignation comes after a government body identified the issues and recommended determining the accountability of Nuclearelectrica’s top executives and other individuals.
Last month, Acting Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan’s control body said that it had identified several shortcomings related to Nuclearelectrica’s partnership with state-owned energy company Nova Power&Gas in a joint venture called RoPower Nuclear, established to develop the nuclear power plant in Doicești using US-based NuScale’s SMR technology, according to Profit.ro.
The body said that it had also identified shortcomings related to the Doicești project itself, and it recommended “an analysis of the possibility of holding accountable” the top people of Nuclearelectrica and other individuals.
Shortcomings have also been identified concerning the SMR project itself
Nuclearelectrica has rejected the findings.
The Ministry of Energy said it “respects” the resignation and that it had been informed the CEO’s decision came “in the context of a new professional opportunity.”
According to government spokesperson Ioana Dogioiu, Ghiță’s 90-day notice period may be shortened by mutual agreement, after which a selection process for a new CEO will take place.
Ghiță has been at the helm of Nuclearelectrica for nearly nine years, since September 2017. He previously served as advisor to Romania’s prime minister on energy security and energy policies, according to Nuclearelectrica’s website.
The Ministry of Energy also said that Nuclearelectrica and its Cernavodă nuclear power plant continue to operate as usual and that it will take all necessary steps to maintain the company’s stability and continuity.
Cernavodă, Romania’s only nuclear power plant, has been offline since August 13. The plant, which normally generates about 20% of Romania’s electricity, has been unable to ensure enough reactor cooling water from the Danube due to heatwaves and drought.
Three years on, Fukushima’s fishers still deal with impact of treated water release
Japan Times, By Phoebe Amoroso, Aug 24, 2026
March 11 is a date of indescribable weight in Japan — one that conjures images of the devastating earthquake and resulting tsunami that killed nearly 20,000, displaced hundreds of thousands and caused catastrophic damage to the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
But Aug. 24 has also become a date of significance for the Tohoku region and the rest of East Asia. On this day three years ago, power plant officials began releasing treated water into the Pacific Ocean — a move that, while necessary, is continuing to have an economic impact on the region’s seafood.
“There’s no single perfect method that will ensure understanding among the public (when it comes to the safety of Fukushima’s seafood),” says Tadaaki Sawada.
Sawada is deputy manager of the guidance section for the Fukushima Prefectural Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations (FS Gyoren). Even three years on, he laments the difficulty of eliminating the stigma attached to the northeastern coastal prefecture of Fukushima and its produce.
On the day Sawada spoke with The Japan Times, Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc. (Tepco) completed its 21st discharge of treated water currently held in storage tanks at the No. 1 nuclear plant. Three years into this process expected to take three decades in total, fears of reputational damage have not explicitly emerged within the domestic market, but other consequences have been profound: geopolitical tensions and an exposure of the vulnerabilities that underlie Japan’s fishing industry as a whole.
Difficult choices
Though the primary disasters of March 2011 are in the past, the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant is far from decommissioned.
Nuclear debris remains inside the damaged reactors and still produces heat, so water has to be circulated through the damaged reactors to keep them cool and eventually discarded. A method known as Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) can remove up to 62 radioactive compounds from this water to very low concentrations, but it can’t remove tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen. After ALPS and dilution with seawater, the concentration of tritium in the water reaches 1/40 of the maximum threshold mandated by government regulations.
With on-site water tanks nearing capacity, Tepco — backed by the Japanese government and the International Atomic Energy Agency — announced in 2021 that it would conduct periodic, controlled ocean discharges while monitoring the resulting tritium levels.
The decision provoked strong reactions, not least within Fukushima’s fishing industry. The government had promised fishermen that it wouldn’t release the water without the understanding of local communities, and the move was perceived by many as reneging on that commitment, provoking strong fears over further reputational damage.
But three years on, a strong consumer backlash within Japan has not materialized.
Takeshi Hamada, a professor of fisheries science at Sapporo’s Hokkai-Gakuen University, has studied the economic impact on Japan’s fishing industry. He argues that one key difference between domestic reaction in 2011 compared to the years that followed is related to media coverage.
“Following the Great East Japan Earthquake, most media outlets — including major ones — viewed government information with skepticism,” Hamada says via email. “However, during the ocean release of ALPS-treated water, there was relatively little coverage questioning its safety.”
Instead, criticism mostly emanated from somewhere far away from Japan’s northeastern coast: China.
On the day the first batch of ALPS-treated water was released, Beijing banned the import of all Japanese aquatic products (the ban was partially lifted in June 2025 before being reinstated that November after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments on Japan’s role in a hypothetical Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan).
The impact of the import ban on Japan’s fishing industry has been hard to quantify, but experts believe it has been significant. Compared to the year prior, Hamada calculates that Japanese seafood exports fell by about ¥75.8 billion (about $476 million) between September 2023 and August 2024. Analysis of the next 12 months found that exports had improved in some areas, but total seafood exports were still below the prerelease level.
For Fukushima, the exact costs cannot be isolated. Although it exported almost no seafood to China, export-bound Japanese seafood was redirected into the domestic market, weighing on prices. Based on shirasu (whitebait) prices, which were driven down by bumper catches elsewhere, Hamada estimates that average prices decreased by 8.2%.
The lack of clarity has a direct knock-on effect on compensation promised from Tepco as a condition of the water release. Fishers must demonstrate lower catch volume, catch value and sales value compared to pre-2011 to receive funds for the shortfall. Seafood processors, wholesalers and other retailers can also claim compensation by demonstrating reduced sales due to consumers or buyers avoiding their seafood products.
However, many of the costs remain hidden. In a November 2025 symposium held by the Tokyo Fisheries Promotion Foundation, Soichiro Kato, a lawyer representing affected businesses, said fishers were better placed to seek compensation because fishery federations could negotiate collectively, while many seafood processors without the same collective organizations in place had to deal with Tepco individually. He also criticized Tepco’s criteria as being too rigid and not capturing losses from reverse flow effects.
Fishing for solutions……………………………………………………………………..
Coastal landings are still subject to official radiation monitoring by Fukushima Prefecture, while FS Gyoren also conducts voluntary screening at fish markets to reassure buyers. After more than 100,000 inspections, the federation relaxed its system in April this year to cover fewer species and reduce screening from each landing or sales day to at least once a week. It hopes that this will speed up distribution and make the overall system more efficient, paving the way for expanded sales.
But each step back toward normalcy for Fukushima’s fisheries is a double-edged sword.
“When it comes to how wholesalers and distributors have reacted (to relaxed regulations), naturally, to be honest, no one directly criticizes us,” Sawada says. “But I think some people do have concerns internally. That may naturally result in transactions disappearing or decreasing. It does not appear openly, and it is difficult for us on the fisher and producer side to see.”…………………………………………………………………………….
Although Tepco has made progress toward reducing newly generated water, the discharges are set to continue for decades to come. However, FS Gyoren’s call for more support for Fukushima’s fishing industry is unchanged.
“We want to continue fishing in Fukushima Prefecture as a livelihood, not only in our generation but into our children’s and grandchildren’s generations,” says Sawada. “We want the government and Tepco to provide firm support for that.”
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/08/24/japan/fukushima-seafood-treated-water-three-years-impact/
Cost Of New Nuclear Power Plant in Switzerland Could Be Up To €45 Billion, Says Report
By David Dalton,
The cost of building a new nuclear power plant in
Switzerland could be between CHF14bn and CHF43bn (€14.9bn and €45.8bn;
$17.4bn and $53.5bn) – a range that reflects varying assumptions about
reactor size, construction conditions and financing costs, according to a
report by the Swiss Academy of Sciences.
Nucnet 26th Aug 2026, https://www.nucnet.org/news/cost-of-new-nuclear-power-plant-in-switzerland-could-be-up-to-eur45-billion-says-report-8-3-2026
Big Oil Is Betting Billions On Nuclear Fusion
Oil Price, By Alex Kimani – Aug 25, 2026,
- Fusion is shifting from research toward commercialization, with private investment hitting a record $4.48 billion in 2025 and commercial plants targeted for the 2030s and 2040s.
- Eni is making one of Big Oil’s biggest fusion bets, backing Commonwealth Fusion Systems, committing $1+ billion to its future electricity and developing critical tritium fuel-cycle technology.
- Chevron, Equinor, Shell and Cenovus are also investing heavily, spreading bets across competing fusion technologies that could eventually transform global power generation.
After decades confined largely to laboratories, nuclear fusion is beginning to attract the kind of money and industrial planning normally reserved for technologies expected to make it onto the grid. Global private investment in fusion hit a record $4.48 billion in 2025, up 69% from a year earlier, while some of the world’s largest energy companies are moving beyond simply backing fusion startups.
Italian energy giant Eni S.p.A. (NYSE:E) now plans to deploy a commercial fusion power plant in Europe by the early 2040s or sooner, building on its investment in Commonwealth Fusion Systems and a more than $1 billion agreement to buy electricity from the startup’s first commercial U.S. plant. Eni is also looking beyond power generation, using decades of experience processing hydrocarbons and hydrogen to build a business around the fuel systems future fusion plants will need to operate.
“Competition is growing in the fusion industry after the technology and expectations had changed significantly in the past 5-6 years,” Francesca Ferrazza Eni’s head of magnetic fusion initiatives, told the Financial Times in an interview. “It was always considered research. Now we are considering it as an industry.”
Commonwealth Fusion Systems raised another $1 billion in July, bringing its total funding to $4 billion as it targets the early 2030s for its first commercial power plant. The planned 400-MW ARC facility in Virginia became the first fusion project to apply for interconnection with PJM earlier this year, while Google has agreed to buy 200 MW of its output. Eni has committed more than $1 billion to buying electricity from the plant.
Eni also wants to build a business supplying the fuel systems necessary to keep commercial fusion reactors running. The company plans to use its experience processing hydrocarbons and hydrogen to recover, purify and recycle deuterium and tritium, the two hydrogen isotopes used as fuel by many fusion reactor designs. To that end, Eni has formed a JV with the UK Atomic Energy Authority to develop and sell those services globally, giving the Italian company a potential source of fusion revenue beyond owning plants or selling electricity.
Tritium is much harder to extract than deuterium. Deuterium is stable and abundant enough to be extracted from seawater, where roughly one in every 6,700 hydrogen atoms is deuterium. Tritium is radioactive, has a half-life of just 12.3 years and exists naturally only in tiny quantities. A 1-GW deuterium-tritium fusion plant could consume roughly 55 kilograms of tritium per year, far beyond what could be supplied from naturally occurring sources.
That means commercial reactors will need to produce much of their own tritium and continuously recover and recycle unused fuel. In turn, that requires closed-loop systems capable of extracting tritium from reactor breeding blankets and exhaust, purifying it and feeding it back into the reactor. Eni is developing a large-scale tritium fuel-cycle facility at the UKAEA Culham Campus in Oxfordshire to test those processes under conditions designed to replicate future fusion plants. The facility is scheduled for completion in 2028.
Fusion’s Other Big Oil Backers
Equinor, Chevron, Shell and Cenovus have spent years building positions across the fusion industry, backing competing reactor technologies before any of them have produced commercial electricity. …………………………….
https://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/Big-Oil-Is-Betting-Billions-On-Nuclear-Fusion.html
Romania steps up efforts to restart Cernavoda nuclear reactors
By Iulian Ernst in Bucharest August 24, 2026, https://www.intellinews.com/romania-steps-up-efforts-to-restart-cernavoda-nuclear-reactors-462977/
Romanian authorities are changing their approach to restoring water levels at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant, with national waterways management company Apele Romane (Romanian Waters) building a temporary dam on the Danube and state-controlled hydropower group Hidroelectrica releasing additional water from its Olt River reservoirs to support the restart of at least one of the two reactors currently offline, according to G4Media and Radio Romania.
The measures follow several weeks of emergency interventions that included dredging and attempts to sink barges loaded with stone in an effort to raise water levels near the nuclear plant’s intake. Those measures produced insufficient results, leaving Romania dependent on more expensive electricity imports during peak consumption hours.
Under the revised strategy, Apele Romane is constructing a transverse guide dam on the Old Danube arm to redirect water towards the intake channel serving the plant. Emergency dredging is continuing in the Cernavoda area under the coordination of the Lower Danube River Administration and Apele Romane.
Hidroelectrica has meanwhile started releasing additional water from reservoirs on the Olt River. According to Antena 3, the company can release around 50 cubic metres per second for five days, although water reserves in the Olt system have also been reduced following several months of drought.
The Ministry of National Defence has resumed support for the emergency works. Military specialists will carry out topobathymetric and geodetic measurements, while military divers will participate in underwater interventions.
The effectiveness of the measures remains constrained by the exceptionally low flow of the Danube. Water entering Romania’s section of the river is currently around 1,300 cubic metres per second, roughly one-third of the multi-annual average.
According to the forecast for August 22-29, the flow is expected to remain at around this level for the first three days before gradually increasing to approximately 1,550 cubic metres per second. The expected natural increase would therefore provide considerably more water than the temporary releases from the Olt reservoirs.
The engineering works could eventually have a larger effect by improving the flow towards the nuclear plant’s intake, but their impact is unlikely to be sufficient immediately. This leaves the timing of a reactor restart dependent primarily on the availability of adequate cooling water.
Cernavoda’s two reactors, each with an installed capacity of 680 MW, have been taken offline because of insufficient Danube water for cooling. Their prolonged outage has increased Romania’s reliance on electricity imports during a period of high summer consumption. Out of the 7,500 MW consumed by Romania during the peak hours, it imports 1,00-2,500 MW.
Could nuclear fusion become economically viable?
Prototype fusion power plants are under construction. And now scientists
have come up with a measure called “economic Q” to assess their
commercial viability. The idea — published last month in the Journal of
Fusion Energy and taking in such factors as construction costs and energy
price — aligns with growing investor confidence.
Privately held fusion
companies raised $4.5bn over the past year alone, according to the Fusion
Industry 2026 report. There are now more than 50 such companies. Last
month, General Fusion, a Canadian outfit backed by Jeff Bezos, became the
first publicly listed fusion company. These signals hint at an important
shift: fusion energy is gradually being perceived less as a scientific
challenge and more as an economic one. External factors — energy shocks,
geopolitical instability, climate change, energy-intensive AI — have also
cast this perpetually fledgling technology in a flattering light.
FT 25th Aug 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/9a1f39cf-e622-4c68-bb80-0fb93bcec3ec
Construction costs and financing of new nuclear power plants in Switzerland.
Source :
Neu U (2026) Construction costs and financing of new nuclear power plants in Switzerland. Swiss Academies Reports 21 (6)
This report provides a more detailed analysis of the observed development of construction costs for new nuclear power plants and discusses the potential costs of a new plant in Switzerland, as well as the associated uncertainties. Furthermore, it presents current financing models in Europe and the financial risks for the state and the economy associated with such construction.
In addition, current financing models in Europe and
the financial risks associated with construction for the state and the
economy are presented.
[Paul Dorfman says: The report is significant
because, unlike many other cost studies, it derives the risks from real
construction projects and, for the first time, also takes into account the
immense financing costs during the long construction period of a nuclear
power plant. It therefore estimates the expenditures to be 20 to 30 %
higher than estimates that consider only the pure construction costs.
According to the report, these account for around 70 % of the total costs
over the plant’s service life.
The study authors concludes, without billions in federal guarantees, no private investor would be willing to take on the financial risk.]
Swiss Academy of Sciences 21st Aug 2026, https://scnat.ch/en/uuid/i/5e8fa25a-bfa9-54ac-b33b-4e5f464f8561-Baukosten_und_Finanzierung_von_neuen_Kernkraftwerken_in_der_Schweiz
Sizewell C nuclear project suffers setback after road building delayed.
Galliford Try replaced as key contractor following disagreement about cost
of work. Construction of two key access roads for Britain’s Sizewell C
nuclear power station has been delayed, and the main contractor replaced,
in a setback at one of the UK’s biggest infrastructure projects.
The delay threatens to prolong disruption around the Suffolk construction site
and comes as Sizewell C seeks to demonstrate that it can avoid the delays
and cost overruns that have plagued its sister project, Hinkley Point C in
Somerset.
The main contractor for the access roads, construction group
Galliford Try, has been replaced after failing to agree with Sizewell C on
the cost of the work. Galliford had been awarded a contract worth between
£150mn and £200mn to build the Sizewell Link Road and Two Village Bypass,
designed to carry construction traffic to the £38bn nuclear plant while
diverting heavy goods vehicles away from nearby villages.
FT 25th Aug 2026,
https://www.ft.com/content/7a83b577-8d67-4435-9798-1e53d7fad4e9
British start-up to help US build nuclear-powered cargo ships.
Core Power has raised $200m from Japanese backers and will use its propulsion systems
in a fleet of American nuclear-powered merchant vessels. A British start-up
based on a west London trading estate is to help the American government
build a fleet of nuclear-powered cargo ships.
A public-private partnership
between the US Maritime Administration and Core Power, based in Chiswick
Park, was signed in Washington DC on Monday. The first-of-its-kind
agreement aims to accelerate construction of a US-flagged fleet of rapid
nuclear-powered merchant vessels, and revive a US shipbuilding industry
that has been decimated by cheaper competitors from China in recent years.
Times 24th Aug 2026, https://www.thetimes.com/business/companies-markets/article/british-start-up-to-help-us-build-nuclear-powered-cargo-ships-8xl7bmnk8
Polish billionaire’s financing plans for 14 UK SMRs analysed
“I think the price projections are utterly worthless. If you don’t know the construction cost and time, the cost of capital, the equity structure, not to mention the O&M (operation and maintenance) cost, you have no idea what the power price will be.”
“So if things don’t go to plan, it will be the government’s fault, not theirs. (SGE’s)”
– Stephen Thomas, professor at the University of Greenwich Business School, working in the area of energy policy.
25 Aug, 2026 By Tom Pashby, https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/polish-billionaires-financing-plans-for-14-uk-smrs-analysed-25-08-2026/
Financing plans from Polish billionaire Michał Sołowow’s SGE to enable the deployment of 14 small modular reactors (SMRs) in the UK have been revealed by NCE and analysed by an expert.
In July, SGE – described as a dedicated European SMR development and investment platform – announced its plans to build 14 GE Vernova Hitachi BWRX-300 Small Modular Reactors on three sites in the UK.
In total, the investment is expected to be around £35bn and the first SMRs are hoped to be operational in 2034.
To achieve that, SGE has submitted an application under the UK’s Advanced Nuclear Framework (ANF) to develop the combined 4.2GW fleet which, if successful, could deliver 11% of UK power demand for at least sixty years.
Using the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, New Civil Engineer (NCE) has secured correspondence between SGE and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) where SGE set out more details about its ambitions to finance its SMRs.
SGE’s representatives at etara – a power, energy and infrastructure advisory firm – sent a letter from SGE to DESNZ deputy director for advanced nuclear Andrew Cooke dated 26 June.
The letter was addressed to the then DESNZ secretary of state Ed Miliband.
“We are writing to set out how SGE’s privately led SMR fleet deployment programme can support DESNZ’s priorities on clean power, energy security, industrial growth and reliable nuclear baseload, ahead of our application to the Advanced Nuclear Framework (ANF) which we plan to submit next week on the 1 July 2026,” it said.
SGE said it is “bringing forward one of the UK’s most mature privately led SMR propositions”, and this would be “on better value for money terms helping reduce the long-term impact on UK bill payers”.
It backed up the promise of value for money by saying: “Our fleet approach across Europe, including leveraging our regional exclusivity on the GE Vernova technology deployment and our 14 unit programme in Poland with our JV partner Orlen, gives us confidence that we can deliver on attractive economic terms
Their plans were shown to University of Greenwich emeritus professor of energy policy Steve Thomas, who shared his analysis with NCE. SGE provided NCE with responses to his analysis.
SGE’s letter said: “Our preliminary financial modelling is indicating that the CfD (contracts for difference) strike price is expected to be below that of Hinkley Point C with a lesser risk transfer than the Sizewell C Rab (regulated asset base) model, offering better value for money.”
Thomas said: “As I never tire of pointing out, CfD tells you nothing other than that the plant is not bidding into the market. Hinkley has one, so will Sizewell. The very big difference is that for Hinkley, the price is fixed and the investor income will be what it will be and for Sizewell, the investor income is fixed and the electricity price will be what it will be.
“I think the price projections are utterly worthless. If you don’t know the construction cost and time, the cost of capital, the equity structure, not to mention the O&M (operation and maintenance) cost, you have no idea what the power price will be.”
Responding to Thomas’s analysis, SGE said: “It is true that for Hinkley the CfD price is fixed and the pain of overruns is impacting the investors.
“For Sizewell it is true that the consumer will pay whatever it costs, but it is not quite right that there will be a CfD, there already are charges to consumers under the Rab model – well before the plant is constructed or produces power.
“The CfD model proposed by SGE, as with Hinkley pre-sets at FID the strike price, so keeps the completion risk and majority of cost outturn risk with the investors, hence the projections do matter for the investors and for the value for money evaluation by the government.
“As with all standard project appraisals, our financial model underpins the indicative strike price. It is informed by live data from construction of the first BWX300 SMR in Canada and benefits from economies of scale from our projects across Europe.”
The letter said SGE’s offer would involve “lesser risk transfer than the Sizewell C Rab model”.
Thomas said it was “interesting that this is implicit criticism of the Sizewell deal and I wonder how that will go with DESNZ, which sold Sizewell on the basis it was better for consumers than Hinkley, now we are going back to the Hinkley model because it is better than Sizewell.”
Responding to Thomas’s analysis, SGE said: “There is no criticism of the Sizewell model, just a factual reference to the relative risk allocation – the CfD model keeps a greater level of risk (e.g. completion risk) with the investors, not with taxpayers or consumers.
“It is common practice to benchmark, and this is all that the reference does. The proposed model draws on lessons from Hinkley Point C, Sizewell C and other reference projects across Europe.”
SGE’s letter said the success of its proposition is “subject to supportive government engagement” and said, “our delivery team with the capability of GE Vernova and Samsung is capable of delivering first power to the grid by 2034”.
Thomas said: “So if things don’t go to plan, it will be the government’s fault, not theirs.”
SGE responded, saying: “This is not a fault allocation point but a simple point that nuclear projects require state engagement – self-evidently, the CfD agreement needs the state’s agreement and signature.
“Delivery of any major infrastructure project requires close collaboration between government and the client organisation across planning, regulation, financing and delivery.”
The letter said: “To convert this mature proposition into delivery, we are seeking government support that is practical, targeted and designed to be off government balance sheet to mobilise our private capital.”
Thomas analysed, saying: “That sounds like the Rab process which didn’t go well as the government ended up having to take near enough half the project, so definitely not off the government balance sheet.”
SGE responded, saying: “The support proposed is not Rab but CfD. The ANF is seeking a structure that mobilises private capital. SGE is offering such private capital under CfD terms.
“Our proposal is designed to mobilise private capital through a structure that is intended to remain off the government balance sheet, subject to the final model and accounting treatment.”
Finally, the letter also said: “Utilising the CfD and SoSIA (Secretary of State Investor Agreement) contractual frameworks with specific modifications that take the lessons learnt from Hinkley Point C (HPC) and from a number of new nuclear projects across Europe that have since HPC been enabled under CfD structures.”
Thomas said: “I will give very good odds that one of the specific modifications is that the strike price is not fixed at the time of FID (final investment decision), but if costs go up, so will the strike price.”
SGE said: “As per the CfD structures in Europe that are referred to, there are pain share mechanisms, as well as gain share mechanisms, but not full pass-through to the strike price.
“SGE is an equity investor into a new nuclear programme and, along with its strategic partners, it intends to take development and construction risks – it will not simply transfer any cost increase into the CfD.
“Any modifications to the CfD and SoSIA frameworks would be subject to agreement with government and reflected in the agreed contractual and regulatory framework and be subject to the controls that exist for any state support regarding value for money considerations.”
Later in the correspondence between SGE and DESNZ officials, public relations staff working on behalf of SGE asked DESNZ officials to attend their press launch event in July and for a minister to provide a quote for their press release.
Officials were unavailable for the launch event.
In response to the request for a quote, a DESNZ official said: “As the submission of a proposal is part of a routine administrative process, consistent with the department’s approach to comparable processes such as entry into the Generic Design Assessment (GDA), DESNZ does not provide public quotes or commentary at the point of application.
“This approach helps ensure that the department remains impartial throughout the assessment process and avoids any perception that a submission has been endorsed or prejudged prior to the completion of the relevant assessment and decision-making processes.
“Should a proposal be successful, there may be opportunities for communications and stakeholder engagement at the appropriate stage. However, at the point of submission, the department will not be providing a quote.”
An SGE spokesperson told NCE: “SGE’s interactions with DESNZ have been and remain positive and constructive.
“We understand the department’s approach that reflects its standard policy in relation to the ANF process. We look forward to continuing our engagement with DESNZ as we progress our UK project.”
South Korea helps Egypt expand Russian-built nuclear plant
South Korea’s growing role in Egypt’s Russian-built El Dabaa nuclear plant has helped shield the project from sanctions and enabled expansion
The New Arab Staff, 22 August, 2026
South Korea’s growing role in Egypt’s Russian-built El Dabaa nuclear power plant has helped Cairo shield the project from Western sanctions and paved the way for a major expansion of the site, according to senior Egyptian energy officials.
Electricity and Renewable Energy Minister Mahmoud Esmat said in televised remarks that Egypt was studying the addition of at least two more nuclear units at El Dabaa, with the possibility of eventually expanding the complex from four reactors to six or even eight.
Senior sources at Egypt’s Ministry of Electricity and Energy told The New Arab that the proposed expansion reflected “a state of confidence” surrounding the project following South Korea’s entry as a partner alongside Russia’s Rosatom.
They said South Korean involvement had enabled Egypt to gain access to Western-linked technology while limiting the exposure of companies working on El Dabaa to US and European sanctions imposed on Russian firms following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
According to the sources, the South Korean government is expected to provide financial and technical support for future expansions of El Dabaa, alongside its existing role in completing control systems and turbine-related work.
The arrangement has allowed Russia to retain control of the project’s nuclear core while South Korean companies handle major elements of its conventional power-generation infrastructure.
The sources said South Korea had taken on work that US company General Electric did not proceed with following the outbreak of the Ukraine war.
Egypt currently plans four Russian-designed VVER-1200 reactors at El Dabaa, with a total capacity of 4.8 gigawatts.
The proposed expansion could eventually increase capacity to 9.6 gigawatts by 2040, according to the sources.
Nuclear energy experts said Esmat’s remarks “open the door to transforming El Dabaa from a four-unit plant into a larger nuclear complex”.
No cost estimate, reactor models or timetable have yet been announced for the additional units.
However, the experts said Cairo increasingly views El Dabaa as “the nucleus of a long-term nuclear programme, rather than a standalone project that ends with the operation of four reactors”.
South Korea’s involvement in the project expanded rapidly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine complicated Western-linked supply chains.
Experts at Egypt’s Nuclear Energy Authority told The New Arab that Russian nuclear energy company Rosatom accelerated moves to bring Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power into El Dabaa as the key supplier for the turbine island and associated control systems for the four Russian units.
Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power signed a $2.25 billion contract with Russia’s Atomstroyexport in Cairo on 25 August 2022, months after the outbreak of the war and the introduction of Western sanctions…………………………………………………
https://www.newarab.com/news/south-korea-helps-egypt-expand-russian-built-nuclear-plant
Golden Dome Secrecy Poses Challenge for Estimating Costs.
The Pentagon has said it expects the program to cost $185 billion to build over the next 10 years, but think tank experts and government analysis have argued the bill for what Trump’s executive order articulated will likely be much higher. One of the first outside estimates, released last year by the American Enterprise Institute, projected costs ranging anywhere from $250 billion to $2.4 trillion. In May, the Congressional Budget Office pegged the program’s cost at $1.2 trillion.
COMMENT, by Alice Slater. Don’t forget that Russia and China have been urging us for years to negotiate a treaty to prohibit weapons and war in space which the US and our Peace Movement generally ignores! Most recently, they issued a Joint Proposal on the 80th Anniversary of WWII last summer for more global cooperation., criticizing the Golden Dome and urging that we negotiate their draft treaty to ban weapons and war in space, pledging never to be the first to put weapons or war in space!!! Why aren’t we all urging the US government and its allies in crime to take up this proposal and save one and a half trillion dollars on the Golden Dumb!! See Russian and Chinese proposal here: http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/6310
Aug. 19, 2026 | By Courtney Albon, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/golden-dome-secrecy-challenge-cost-estimates/
While Pentagon officials have revealed some details about the architecture behind the Golden Dome missile defense project, crafting an independent cost estimate for a largely classified program remains a challenge, experts said Aug. 19.
President Donald Trump issued an executive order in January 2025 directing the Pentagon to build a multilayered missile defense shield to protect the U.S. from traditional and advanced missile threats, to include hypersonic weapons. Defense Department officials have said the system will consist of command-and-control nodes, satellite sensors, and ground-and- space-based interceptors, but the finer details of that architecture—including numbers of satellites and interceptors—remain shrouded in secrecy.
The Pentagon has said it expects the program to cost $185 billion to build over the next 10 years, but think tank experts and government analysis have argued the bill for what Trump’s executive order articulated will likely be much higher. One of the first outside estimates, released last year by the American Enterprise Institute, projected costs ranging anywhere from $250 billion to $2.4 trillion. In May, the Congressional Budget Office pegged the program’s cost at $1.2 trillion.
These wide-ranging projections point to the lack of a common, unclassified understanding of what systems and technology will underpin the program, which experts said is the fundamental challenge of estimating Golden Dome’s cost.
Speaking at a Brookings Institute event, CBO’s Director of National Security Analysis David Mosher said the organization was tasked by lawmakers to put a price tag on the scope laid out in Trump’s initial executive order rather than try to estimate what the Golden Dome program office is actually building—an important distinction.
“The Golden Dome they’re building is perhaps different than the Golden Dome in the executive order,” Mosher said. “We couldn’t have costed what they’re building because nobody knows what they’re building yet.”
With the executive order as the baseline, the report constructed an architecture with the elements included in Trump’s directive and then sized it “to protect what we thought was a sort of plausible, relatively large attack from North Korea, or a modest attack from Russia or China,” Mosher said. The resulting notional architecture features four interceptor layers designed to target multiple missile types and to operate either independently or in concert with an associated command-and-control network:
- A space-based constellation of 7,800 satellites designed to take out up to 10 intercontinental ballistic missiles launched near simultaneously as well as hypersonic glide vehicle threats
- An upper wide-area surface layer comprised of three Ground-Based Midcourse Defense sites, each with 60 Next-Generation Interceptors or Ground-Based Interceptors focused on engaging ICBM threats
- A lower wide-area surface layer with four U.S.-based sites, each equipped with 48 SM-3 Block IIA interceptors to defeat ICBMs or hypersonic glide vehicles
- A “regional sector” layer with 35 interceptor and radar sites loaded with THAAD, SM-6 Block IB, and Patriot interceptors that can target ICBMs, glide vehicles, and cruise missiles
The space-based interceptor constellation would be the most expensive element of this architecture by far, costing $743 billion over 20 years, or 60 percent of the total cost. The report, which calls its architecture a “middle ground” between more limited and high-end alternatives, estimates each SBI-equipped satellite would cost $22 million and have a five-year service life.
CBO’s report also includes the cost of a satellite sensing layer—which it projects would require about $90 billion to develop, field, and maintain—as well as the battle management and communication systems needed to coordinate the broader architecture. The sensing layer would include satellites such as the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, which the Space Development Agency is fielding as part of its low-Earth orbit missile-tracking constellation, and space-based air moving target indication satellites, which the Space Force is currently developing.
Golden Dome Director Gen. Michael Guetlein has pushed back on CBO’s estimates, saying they’re built on inaccurate assumptions about what his team is actually building. According to Guetlein, the report’s assumptions are based on technology envisioned in the early 2000s “for a different fight”—one focused on point defense, or defense of a limited area, rather than the regional, homeland defense mission that underpins Golden Dome.
“That is not what we need for the homeland,” he said in May. “In a regional defense, there’s a different architecture. And you can’t just take what we’ve done in the past and multiply it forward or you’re going to get large numbers like CBO got.”
Mosher acknowledged the report is detached from the program office’s architecture, pointing out multiple times that CBO and the general public do not have access to those details. He said CBO has asked for briefings but hasn’t been able to meet with program officials.
“I know nothing about what they’re actually building except what I read in publications,” Mosher said.
According to Guetlein, a key difference between the architecture envisioned in the CBO report and what the Pentagon is pursuing through Golden Dome is the use of “next-generation” technology like AI, advanced computing, and directed energy.
Mosher said that for the most part, the report used existing systems as a baseline because they’re a known quantity. He said it’s true that harnessing advanced technology could lower costs over time, especially for some space-based elements of the architecture. However, other technologies like high-energy lasers in space aren’t yet ready for prime time, which means it’s likely not a near-term differentiator.
“We tend to estimate what we see,” he said. “New technologies might provide the opportunity for that, I think we mentioned that as a possibility, but it’s not what you would have in the near term, which is what they’re trying to do.”
Private investors are not rushing into nuclear. The Netherlands has chosen another path
The Dutch government has therefore opted for a wholly state-owned company.
the Dutch government is also responding to recommendations from the International Atomic Energy Agency
Martin Voříšek, 19 August 2026, https://oenergetice.cz/en/nuclear-power/private-investors-are-not-rushing-into-nuclear-the-netherlands-has-chosen-another-path
The Dutch government is gradually preparing a financing model for two new nuclear power plants in the country. After assessing investor interest, it concluded that private investors are unwilling to bear a substantial share of the construction risks. The state has therefore taken the leading role through the wholly state-owned company NEO NL. The state will also bear the costs of at least the initial phase of construction of the new units, in order to accelerate their delivery as much as possible.
The Netherlands is one of the less visible European countries pursuing the construction of new nuclear units. This is only because its preparations are still at an early stage. Its preparations follow a broader European trend in which new large-scale nuclear projects increasingly resemble anything but ordinary private investments. The state therefore acts in the project not only as regulator and provider of support, but directly as investor, lender and future owner of the project.
The Netherlands’ current advantage is that its project is only at the beginning of preparations. It can therefore still be adapted relatively painlessly to the current realities of the European market in order to ensure the earliest and least costly possible completion.
Private investors are not “rushing” to build
One of the key questions in the preparations was whether the project could be developed and delivered by private investors. However, as government documents show, private companies are prepared to participate only if the state assumes virtually all risks associated with preparing and building the power plants.
Construction of Hinkley Point C. Source: EDF
The current risks associated with building nuclear power plants are well known: in particular, long construction periods, uncertainty over costs, the duration of permitting processes, interest rate developments and future revenues in the electricity market. The combination of these factors has long constrained the ability of major nuclear projects to secure commercial financing without extensive public support.
A promising investment can thus very easily become an investor’s nightmare, entirely beyond the investor’s control.
NEO NL: State company responsible for building new units
The Dutch government has therefore opted for a wholly state-owned company, Nucleaire Energie Organisatie Nederland, abbreviated as NEO NL. Its task will be to prepare, build and operate the new nuclear power plants, with the state as its sole shareholder.
NEO NL was established on 16 February 2026 and is set to assume the role of future owner and operator of the units. In doing so, the Dutch government is also responding to recommendations from the International Atomic Energy Agency, according to which the future operator should become involved in project preparations as early as the design and construction phase.
The state expects this arrangement to provide greater control over the project, particularly over the choice of technology, risk allocation and the long-term operation of the plants.
State control over technology selection was, after all, also one of the priorities of the Czech government. It first excluded suppliers from China and Russia from the tender to supply units at Dukovany, while the final choice was also the result of agreement between ČEZ and the state.
The state will take over project financing, at least during the first construction phase
As early as October 2025, the Dutch government stated that, according to its analysis, fully state-backed financing was the least costly option in terms of the project’s total costs. The state can generally obtain funding on better terms than a private company. While a higher share of private financing could reduce the impact on the budget, it would make the entire project more expensive.
Once the power plants are completed, the interest rate is to be set at the yield on Dutch government bonds plus one percentage point. In its documents, the Dutch government specifically refers to the Dukovany project, whose public-support model for one unit inspired it.
In June this year, the cabinet confirmed that the state would bear all financing costs for the two new large power plants, at least during the first phase of their construction. Private financing remains theoretically open for later refinancing or a potential equity contribution by the supplier, but not as the main source of funding in the early phase of the project.
Two locations under consideration, two main suppliers
Alongside the financing model, the question of the unit supplier is also gradually becoming clearer. The Netherlands initially assessed options from France’s EDF, US-based Westinghouse and South Korea’s KHNP. However, KHNP withdrew from the technology selection process in March 2025. Two Western technologies therefore remain in contention.
The project currently covers two large units, but the government is considering including an option for two additional reactors in the contract. Here, too, the Czech approach is an evident inspiration: the current contract with KHNP represents an order for two reactors at the Dukovany site and an option for two further reactors at Temelín. Such an approach could shorten preparations for the third and fourth units while improving the negotiating position in agreeing the price and delivery terms.
The site selection has not yet been fully finalised. Although the government excluded several initially considered options in June this year, it is still deciding between Eemshaven in the province of Groningen and a site near Terneuzen in Zeeland.
From the perspective of the transmission system, Eemshaven is the most favourable option. TenneT states that 3.2 GW of new capacity can be connected there without additional investment beyond the network expansion already planned. Terneuzen, by contrast, requires significant measures. According to TenneT, connecting 3.2 GW of new nuclear capacity would require further extensive grid upgrades, or potentially redispatching at costs of up to hundreds of millions of euros annually.
The cabinet wants to decide on its preferred site by the end of 2026. A proposal for a formal siting decision is to follow in the first half of 2027.
The Netherlands follows the Czech construction model
For Czechia, the Dutch development is important above all as further confirmation that the private financing model for large nuclear units in Europe is receding into the background. In both countries, the state is taking on the role of principal investor and establishing a structure intended to reduce financing costs while enabling long-term management of the project.
The Netherlands is directly drawing inspiration from the Czech approach to an interest-free loan during construction. However, the Czech model for Dukovany is more developed and entails a broader transfer of construction and financial risks to the public sector.
The difference lies primarily in the institutional arrangement. The Netherlands is creating a separate company, NEO NL, which is to prepare, own and operate the project, whereas the Czech project is being implemented through EDU II, with the state still holding a dominant stake and with a possible increase in the state’s share to as much as 100% through the nationalisation of parent company ČEZ.
The Small (Modular Reactor) Short -Nuclear investors see “an industry bubble that is already deflating”
August 18, 2026, https://beyondnuclear.org/the-small-modular-reactor-short/
Nuclear investors see “an industry bubble that is already deflating”
Guess who’s making money from the alleged small modular reactor boom? Or rather, guess, who’s not making a profit? We’ve been calling the SMR schemes “crypto nukes” for a while, because they seemed like the same kind of scam as the crypto currency racket. But, it turns out, the SMR mirage has more in common with the US subprime mortgage scandal.
That debacle, which played out from 2007 to 2010, was immortalized in the excellent 2015 docudrama, The Big Short. It dramatized the true story of financial outsiders who realized that the US housing market was propped up on bad loans doomed to fail. By betting against those loans (the “short” of the title), before the market collapsed, they made themselves significant fortunes.
On August 18, the Financial Times(opens in new tab) ran a headline, “Short sellers reap $2bn profit as modular nuclear reactor stocks tumble.” (The article is behind a paywall, so we’ll paraphrase and quote it instead.)
It revealed how, predicting the “hype cycle” was about to collapse, and the fact that the three SMR companies in question — NuScale Power, Nano Nuclear and Oklo — were “lossmaking and have little or no revenue,” the short sellers pounced, reaping $2.1 billion in profits.
The article, replete with graphs showing plunging loss lines, paints a damning picture of an over-inflated industry with no actual there there. “A total of $30.3bn has been wiped off their collective market value since their peak in October last year amid growing concerns over the lack of immediate revenue and the long build-out timelines for the technology,” the Financial Times reported.
Beyond the three companies shorted, another of the close to 80 small reactor startup projects, X-energy, also “shed $5.8bn in market value since the surge that followed its initial public offering in April,” wrote Ramsey Hodgson, the FT reporter.
Predictably, the nuclear-promoting Breakthrough Institute tried to spin the whole thing as normal, with its nothing-to-see-here claim that the earlier over-inflation and current collapse of stock prices is “very typical of a company that is in this early, pre-consistent revenue phase,” the institute’s Adam Stein reassured the FT. Just birth pains, not a stillbirth, he appeared to insist.
But other financial experts interviewed for the story took a rather less rosy view. Enthusiasm for SMRs is waning now that it has become clear that most of the reactor startup companies have no revenue — and no reactors — to show for their efforts, and no sign of either on the horizon until at least 2030, an optimistic view to put it mildly.
Nano Nuclear has generated zero revenue and “posted a $14mn operating loss in the first quarter of the year,” the FT said. NuScale is facing a class action suit for defrauding investors after its plans collapsed. Oklo has yet to secure a regulatory license.
As we have repeatedly pointed out here at Beyond Nuclear, and as the FT reiterates, “timelines for delivery of the unproven reactors remain uncertain.” Or maybe not so uncertain. They simply won’t arrive at all.
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