FirstEnergy Solutions bankruptcy restructuring likely, power plants would be closed or sold, Cleveland.com, 23 Mar 18 By John Funk, The Plain Dealer The Perry nuclear power plant, a source of jobs and tax revenues for 30 years in Northeast Ohio, could be shutdown or sold in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. The FirstEnergy Corp. subsidiary that owns the company’s power plants has an accumulated debt of more than $2.8 billion. The old plants cannot generate power as cheaply as new gas turbine plants and wind farms. FirstEnergy has not been able to persuade state lawmakers or federal authorities to create special fees to subsidize its nuclear power plants and has made it clear in recent months that it wants to become a fully regulated company again. A bankruptcy case could be filed within a week. (Plain Dealer file )
CLEVELAND, Ohio — Brutal competitive financial forces are poised to remake FirstEnergy into a utility without power plants and focused solely on delivering electricity.
The Akron-based power company that a decade ago hired former George W. Bush administration Solicitor General Ted Olson to bullystate lawmakers who were considering a return to state-regulated power prices now appears ready to sell or close its remaining coal and nuclear power plants because the state won’t subsidize them and neither will federal authorities.
Those include Perry nuclear plant in Lake County east of Cleveland and Davis-Besse in Ottawa County near Toledo.
The draconian move may come in a corporate “restructuring” plan that could get under way next week in a federal bankruptcy court, either here or any other federal jurisdiction where the company has offices.
Energy Watch Group 20th March 2018, During his state visit to India, France’s President Macron agreed with
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week to sell six French EPR
reactors for the largest nuclear power plant planned in Jaitapur.
Regardless of the fact that India has not yet signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. The plutonium from the reactors could be
completely used for the construction of nuclear weapons without
international control. In terms of energy, too, all EPR construction
projects in recent years are highly problematic. http://energywatchgroup.org/new-european-nuclear-reactors-prove-financial-technically-dangerous-disast
Nikkei Asian Review 18th March 2018 Another
setback looms for Tokyo’s infrastructure export drive. A Japan-led nuclear
power plant project in Turkey looks to cost more than twice as much as
initially projected, highlighting challenges for Tokyo’s push to export
Japanese infrastructure.
The Japanese and Turkish governments agreed on the
public-private project in 2013. The estimated total cost, pegged at around
2 trillion yen ($18.8 billion at current rates) at the time, has since
ballooned to more than 5 trillion yen, according to sources close to the
matter, due largely to the need to meet tougher safety standards
implemented after the March 2011 meltdowns at Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Holdings’ Fukushima Daiichi plant.
The plan is to build four reactors with
a total output of 4,500 megawatts in the Black Sea coastal city of Sinop,
using Atmea1 reactors Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is developing
with France’s Areva.
Though the goal is to put the first reactor into
service in 2023, in time for Turkey’s centennial, the cost problem could
cause that date to slip.
Japan views nuclear power as an integral part of
efforts to export infrastructure around the world. As Mitsubishi Heavy and
the others hash out the Turkish project, a group led by Hitachi is putting
the finishing touches on plans to build two nuclear reactors in the U.K.,
on the Welsh coast.
Yet the Fukushima accident still casts long shadows over the nuclear industry, and hurdles are growing higher. Vietnam has
cancelled orders for Japanese nuclear facilities amid financial concerns
and local opposition. Partly because of the rising cost of safety measures,
the financial risks of building nuclear plants abroad have grown too large
for companies alone to bear.
So Japan’s government has stepped in with
public financing and other aid, eager to support infrastructure exports,
which it considers a key economic growth strategy. Pursuing projects abroad
is in effect the only way for such companies as Mitsubishi Heavy and
Hitachi to maintain and profit from their nuclear technologies.
Costlier Than Pyramids: Finnish NPP Becomes World’s Second-Priciest Building, Sputnik News EUROPE 19.03.2018
The Finnish Olkiluoto-3 nuclear reactor has been touted as the “flagship of European nuclear energy,” but has taken more than a decade to complete and cost the Nordic nation an arm and a leg.
When completed, the third reactor at Finland’s Olkiluoto nuclear power plant will have the distinction of being the world’s second most expensive building, higher than that of a number of luxury hotels, sports arenas, skyscrapers and even pyramids, Finnish national broadcaster Yle reported.
With a breathtaking price tag of €8.5 billion ($11 billion), Olkiluoto-3 is expected to be finished in 2019, 14 years after the start of the construction. For the sake of comparison, the Cheops Pyramid, the largest of the pyramids at Giza, took about 20 years to build. However, construction of the 4,500-year-old pyramid turned to be far more efficient, as it was built over roughly the same period of time and without access to modern technology. Also, its cost in today’s money has been estimated at only €4 billion ($4.9), half the Olkiluoto price tag.
New US nuclear submarines come with $128b price tag, 9 news, By Richard Wood
The total cost of the US navy’s new ballistic missile submarine fleet will be an “eye-watering” $US100 billion ($128b).
Earlier this week, Navy Secretary Richard V. Spencer said deep under the ocean remains the best best place to hide a nuclear deterrent – but it comes at a price.
The US Navy is seeking to build a fleet of 12 Colombia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), reports The Diplomat.
“All of sudden you’re talking about the submarines and there is a number that will make your eyes water. Columbia will be a $100 billion program for its lifetime.
“We have to do it. I think we have to have big discussions about it,” Spencer added.
Underwater has proved to date the most elusive environment for detecting an SSBN, he explained.
However, “it comes at a price,” the Navy secretary added.
Construction of the first Columbia-class sub is scheduled to start in 2021, with the US navy taking delivery from 2028.
Australian maritime warfare expert James Goldrick told nine.com.au the US is determined to keep its edge in submarine technology.
Despite recent developments in underwater detection, submarines remain difficult to pinpoint, he said.
“The sea is a very complex medium. It remains the most impenetrable environment, and I think the US is banking on this continuing.”
And Rear Admiral Goldrick said despite Russia and China unveiling new planned nuclear weapons, the US maintains an advantage in submarine technology.
Putin claims new weapons could strike ‘anywhere in the world’
“The Americans are well ahead of the Chinese. The Russians, however, have become well advanced in modernising their submarine fleet.”
The Columbia-class vessels are due to replace the US navy’s current Ohio-class SSBN fleet.
Technical details of the new vessels remain sketchy, but they are set to be the biggest sub the US navy has ever commissioned, The Diplomat reports.
Designed by General Dynamics Electric Boat, they measure 171m and have a beam of 13m.
France considers developing mini nuclear reactors, eyes cost Euro News , ByREUTERS 15/03/2018 PARIS – The French nuclear industry is considering developing Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), but will have to ensure these miniaturised generators are not only technically feasible but also financially viable, executives said.
CEA head of nuclear energy François Gauché said the agency would study the technical and financial feasibility of SMRs in the coming 18 months.
He said some organisations – notably NuScale, majority-owned by U.S. Fluor Corp – had submitted SMRmodels to their nuclear regulators for design approval.
Critics say SMR economies of scale will be limited because each reactor will need its own control and safety systems. They also point at the danger of spreading radioactive material more widely, increasing radiation and security risks.The British government said in December it would provide funding for research into mini nuclear plants. Rolls-Royce is part of a consortium of UK firms developing SMR technology…….. Reporting by Benjamin Mallet; Writing by Geert De Clercq; Editing by Dale Hudsonhttp://www.euronews.com/2018/03/15/france-considers-developing-mini-nuclear-reactors-eyes-cost
Truth Out 9th March 2018, Linda Pentz-Gunter:Countries Seek to Export Nuclear Energy Projects to
Keep Industry Alive. Ten years ago, The Washington Post called then-French president Nicolas Sarkozy “the world’s most aggressive salesman for nuclear
power.” Today, that mantle has been passed to the country’s current president, Emmanuel Macron — just another case of the French saying, “plus
ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” (“The more things change, the more they remain the same.”)
As if to dispel any remaining doubt about his commitment to the French nuclear sector, Macron was happy to accept an invitation to India to cement a French nuclear deal there, according to Indian officials.
France is not alone on the nuclear salesmanship world stage, however. It joins Japan, the United States and South Korea, whose nuclear projects are fading at home but who are happy to market their wares to countries such as Saudi Arabia, China and India — countries where resistance is likely to be either minimal or suppressed.
Anti-nuclear protesters in India, for example, have been met with violence, sometimes fatally, and have been barred from public meetings at gunpoint.
Sudan, Russia to sign accord to develop nuclear power: SUNA agency https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1GP0ME-OZATP Reuters Staff, 13 Mar 18KHARTOUM (Reuters) – Sudan will sign a“roadmap” with Russia to build nuclear power stations during a visit to Moscow by Khartoum’s electricity minister, state news agency SUNA said on Monday.
SUNA said Water Resources, Irrigation, and Electricity Minister Moataz Mousa, who left Khartoum on Monday, would meet the head of Russia’s state nuclear agency Rosatom. The trip comes four months after Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir told his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin he wanted to discuss nuclear power cooperation with Russia. SUNA quoted a spokesman for the ministry as saying the two sides would sign several memorandums of understanding including the roadmap“to implement a plan to develop nuclear (power) stations”. It did not elaborate. Reporting by Omar Fahmy, editing by David Evans
Areva-Siemens will pay TVO compensation of 450 million euros ($553.73 million), the Finnish company said in a statement.
TVO and Areva-Siemens were claiming billions of euros from each other due to the delays in the Olkiluoto 3 reactor project in southwest Finland. Its start was postponed last year to May 2019 – a decade later than planned.
The 4,800 megawatt Akkuyu plant is a intended to reduce Turkey’s dependence on energy imports but has been beset by delays since Russia was awarded the contract in 2010.
But Turkish companies have been put off by the size of the financing required as well as by concerns they will not receive a sufficient share of the lucrative construction side of the deal, two industry sources said.
The firms are also worried that the guaranteed electricity price could eventually be lowered, reducing future revenue, they said.
Rosatom did not respond to a request for comment. Officials for EUAS and the government declined to comment.
Rosatom last year said it would sell 49 percent of Akkuyu Nukleer AS, the company which will build and operate the plant, to a consortium made up of Kolin Insaat, Kalyon Insaat and Cengiz Holding – Turkish firms that have been awarded major infrastructure projects under Erdogan.
However, the final agreement was never signed and Rosatom said Kolin and Kalyon had decided to pull out of the project.
March 9, 2018, BY ORHAN COSKUN AND CAN Sezer ANKARA/ISTANBUL (Reuters) – Turkey’s first nuclear power plant is likely to miss its 2023 target start-up date as Russian builder Rosatom struggles to find local partners, two people familiar with the matter said.
The $20 billion project is part of President Tayyip Erdogan’s “2023 vision” marking 100 years since the founding of modern Turkey.
Rosatom is looking at four Turkish companies as possible partners, but little progress has been made so far, said one of the sources, both of whom declined to be identified because the information is not yet public.
Rosatom said last month it was in talks with state-owned power producer EUAS after a deal with a consortium of three firms collapsed
“Concrete progress has not been made in the talks so far, and this includes EUAS from the government side,” one source said, adding that Rosatom was keen to have a government entity such as EUAS as a shareholder.
Rosatom is looking for Turkish partners to take a 49 percent stake in the planned Akkuyu nuclear plant in southern Turkey.
But the government is wary of EUAS taking on the 49 percent stake by itself.
“A 49 percent stake still means $10 billion of funding even if it’s spread over years,” the source said. “It is a very big project, there are many details and issues that need to be worked on. We can’t expect this to be resolved soon.”
The project is to be financed by Rosatom and its partners and will involve loans from export-import agencies and banks, Anastasia Polovinkina, director of Rosatom affiliate Rusatom Energy International told a conference in June 2017.
FINANCING
The 4,800 megawatt Akkuyu plant is a intended to reduce Turkey’s dependence on energy imports but has been beset by delays since Russia was awarded the contract in 2010.
But Turkish companies have been put off by the size of the financing required as well as by concerns they will not receive a sufficient share of the lucrative construction side of the deal, two industry sources said.
The firms are also worried that the guaranteed electricity price could eventually be lowered, reducing future revenue, they said.
Rosatom did not respond to a request for comment. Officials for EUAS and the government declined to comment.
Rosatom last year said it would sell 49 percent of Akkuyu Nukleer AS, the company which will build and operate the plant, to a consortium made up of Kolin Insaat, Kalyon Insaat and Cengiz Holding – Turkish firms that have been awarded major infrastructure projects under Erdogan.
However, the final agreement was never signed and Rosatom said Kolin and Kalyon had decided to pull out of the project.
Russia to help with Ethiopia’s nuclear energy ambitions, African News
Source: Xinhua 2018-03-10 00:32:45
ADDIS ABABA, March 9 (Xinhua) — Ethiopia and Russia agreed on Friday to boost cooperation in nuclear energy during a visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
Speaking to local and international media, Lavrov said Russia will assist Ethiopia’s nuclear energy ambitions as part of efforts to strengthen political, economic and cultural ties between the two nations…..http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/10/c_137028152.htm
Much has been written about Saudi Arabia’s plans for nuclear power since the Trump administration announced last fall that it would conclude a civilian nuclear cooperative agreement with Riyadh. Almost all of this commentary suggests Washington must accommodate the kingdom’s desire to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium, two activities that bring states to the brink of making bombs. In particular, commentators repeatedly raise five points—none of which are sound.
Myth #1: Saudi Arabia needs nuclear power to meet its growing electrical demand.
If Saudi Arabia is to have a prosperous economic future, we are told, it must meet its growing power requirements by burning less oil. For this, nuclear proponents insist, the Saudis need sixteen large reactors. Although often repeated, this is not true. In 2012, the Saudis announced their intention to build sixteen reactors by 2032. By 2017, Saudi planners had pushed this back to 2040. Shortly thereafter, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman backed an national development plan for 2030 that didn’t mention nuclear power, but instead focused on investing in renewables.
Most recently, the Saudis announced that instead of sixteen large power reactors, they are only building two. Some have argued that this slippage reflects the kingdom’s desire to finance reactor construction with its oil revenues. With the price of oil dropping from $100 a barrel several years ago to roughly $60 a barrel today, the schedule for nuclear construction had to slide. If true, this suggests the Saudi nuclear “imperative” is less than urgent.
A more compelling explanation is that Saudis don’t need nuclear power. In fact, recent studies found that the Saudis could more cheaply meet their energy and environmental requirements by developing its natural-gas resources and investing in renewables—photovoltaic, concentrated solar power and wind. They also found economic value in upgrading the kingdom’s electrical grid and reducing subsidies that artificially drive up electrical demand. This should not be surprising. The United Arab Emirates, Riyadh’s next-door neighbor, which began construction of four power reactors several years ago, just announced that the UAE would not be building any more nuclear plants. Why? Cheaper alternatives: in addition to plentiful natural gas and wind resources, the Emirates are now investing in photovoltaic systems and solar thermal storage systems, which together can operate twenty-four hours a day more cheaply than nuclear. These findings also apply to Saudi Arabia.
Myth #2: Without a formal nuclear cooperative agreement with Riyadh, America will forgo billions of dollars of nuclear hardware and know-how exports to the kingdom.
This point presumes that the kingdom will stick with its 2012 energy plan, which it has already backed away from. It also mistakenly assumes that America still manufactures export reactors. The only American-headquartered firm that is actively interested in exporting to the kingdom is Westinghouse. It is entirely foreign owned and is a reactor designer, not a manufacturer. It’s currently in bankruptcy proceedings, and is eager to be bought by a Canadian holding firm. Naturally, Westinghouse would like its prospective buyers to believe that it has a clear shot at the Saudi market.
Unfortunately it’s, at best, a long shot. Westinghouse’s design, the AP1000, has yet to operate anywhere. The reactor’s construction is embarrassingly behind schedule and over budget both in China and the United States. Mismanagement by Westinghouse caused two reactors in South Carolina to be terminated after an expenditure of $9 billion, which, in turn, nearly bankrupted Westinghouse’s Japanese owner, Toshiba. Finally, American nuclear know-how and other nonnuclear electrical generating parts can and have been exported in support of non-American reactors abroad without a formal nuclear cooperative agreement. These goods would likely make up a majority of American nuclear exports to the kingdom but, again, their export does not require negotiating a nuclear cooperative agreement.
Myth #3: If Westinghouse does not win the bid, the Russians or Chinese will, reducing American nuclear influence in the region.
This argument is perhaps the most egregious. Consider: an unspoken motive for the kingdom to pursue a nuclear program is to develop an option to make nuclear weapons, if needed, to deter Iran. This would all but preclude buying Russian. Rosatom, after all, is building Iran’s reactors. If Saudi Arabia buys Russian, it is all but asking Moscow to let Iran know exactly what the kingdom is doing in the nuclear realm. Consider also Russia’s recent ill-fated nuclear dealings with South Africa (a contributing factor in forcing President Zumafrom office) and Turkey (where Rosatom’s financial inflexibility prompted Turkey’s private financiers, who were underwriting half of the undertaking, to pull out of the project).
As for buying Chinese, doing so is also risky. The Chinese recently encountered “safety concerns” that delayed operation in Taishan of both its Westinghouse AP1000, and a French-based design. As for China’s top export nuclear design, the Hualong One (HPR 1000) reactor, the British won’t be done certifying it until 2022. China’s other possible export system, the CAP 1400, based on the yet-unproven AP1000, has yet to operate anywhere.
What’s left? The kingdom’s original bid requirements were for two reactors that would produce 2,800 megawatts. The only country that has a reactor that is operating, that is properly licensed, and that has been built roughly on time and on budget that could meet this requirement is Korea’s APR-1400. The Saudis only changed their original bid requirements after the United States, China, Russia and France all complained. Given Korea’s relative success in building four APR-1400 reactors on time and on budget in the United Arab Emirates, and its success in operating a licensed APR-1400 in South Korea, the Korean reactor is still the odds-on favorite to win the Saudi bid.
Myth # 4: It makes economic sense for the kingdom to enrich uranium to fuel its own reactors.
No, it doesn’t. Saudi nuclear backers argue that the kingdom should enrich, given the uranium reserves the Saudis have discovered. Uranium, however, is plentiful globally and priced at historic lows (less than $22 a pound), as are uranium-enrichment services. More important, the kingdom would have to spend billions on a variety of plants to enrich uranium and produce its own nuclear fuel. Starting such an undertaking might make economic sense if the kingdom had roughly a dozen large reactors up and running. It currently has none, and has only opened a process to buying two.
Myth #5: United States has more to gain by accommodating Saudi Arabia’s demand that it be allowed to enrich uranium than resisting it.
Trumpeting these myths, proponents of a permissive U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal argue that Washington lacks the leverage to secure a Saudi pledge not to make enrich or reprocess. The best Washington can do, it is argued, is to ask Riyadh to defer such dangerous nuclear activities for several years. Some even suggestthat acceding to Riyadh’s wishes is in Washington’s interest, since allowing the Saudis the capacity to make nuclear weapons–usable fuels might help “deter” Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
None of this seems sound. As already noted, the Korean APR-1400 is most likely to win the Saudi contract. Given this reactor’s American technical content, senior Korean officials are convinced they cannot export it to the kingdom unless the Saudis first reach a nuclear cooperative agreement with the United States. For this reason (and others besides), Seoul is inclined to take American guidance. Meanwhile, President Trump is trying to get the European parties to the Iran nuclear deal to devise a tighter follow-on understanding. A riskier approach would be for the United States to break from its policy (solidified in the 2009 U.S.-UAE nuclear cooperative agreement) to get non-weapons states in the Middle East to forswear enriching and reprocessing.
Besides the odd optics of looking like a version of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (which President Trump says is “the worst deal ever”), allowing Riyadh to enrich and reprocess would immediately excite the humors of the UAE and Egypt. Both have U.S. nuclear cooperative agreements that allow them to request their agreements be modified if the United States offers any of their neighbors a more generous nuclear deal. Then there’s Morocco and Turkey: their nuclear agreements with Washington are up for renewal in 2021 and 2023. They too are likely to ask for equal treatment as soon as possible. How this serves anyone’s long-term interest is, at best, unclear.
Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the author of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future. He served as deputy for nonproliferation policy in the office of the U.S. secretary of defense from 1989 to 1993.
If Saudi Arabia is to have a prosperous economic future, we are told, it must meet its growing power requirements by burning less oil. For this, nuclear proponents insist, the Saudis need sixteen large reactors. Although often repeated, this is not true. In 2012, the Saudis announced their intention to build sixteen reactors by 2032. By 2017, Saudi planners had pushed this back to 2040. Shortly thereafter, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman backed an national development plan for 2030 that didn’t mention nuclear power, but instead focused on investing in renewables.
Most recently, the Saudis announced that instead of sixteen large power reactors, they are only building two. Some have argued that this slippage reflects the kingdom’s desire to finance reactor construction with its oil revenues. With the price of oil dropping from $100 a barrel several years ago to roughly $60 a barrel today, the schedule for nuclear construction had to slide. If true, this suggests the Saudi nuclear “imperative” is less than urgent.
A more compelling explanation is that Saudis don’t need nuclear power. In fact, recent studies found that the Saudis could more cheaply meet their energy and environmental requirements by developing its natural-gas resources and investing in renewables—photovoltaic, concentrated solar power and wind. They also found economic value in upgrading the kingdom’s electrical grid and reducing subsidies that artificially drive up electrical demand. This should not be surprising. The United Arab Emirates, Riyadh’s next-door neighbor, which began construction of four power reactors several years ago, just announced that the UAE would not be building any more nuclear plants. Why? Cheaper alternatives: in addition to plentiful natural gas and wind resources, the Emirates are now investing in photovoltaic systems and solar thermal storage systems, which together can operate twenty-four hours a day more cheaply than nuclear. These findings also apply to Saudi Arabia.
Myth #2: Without a formal nuclear cooperative agreement with Riyadh, America will forgo billions of dollars of nuclear hardware and know-how exports to the kingdom.
This point presumes that the kingdom will stick with its 2012 energy plan, which it has already backed away from. It also mistakenly assumes that America still manufactures export reactors. The only American-headquartered firm that is actively interested in exporting to the kingdom is Westinghouse. It is entirely foreign owned and is a reactor designer, not a manufacturer. It’s currently in bankruptcy proceedings, and is eager to be bought by a Canadian holding firm. Naturally, Westinghouse would like its prospective buyers to believe that it has a clear shot at the Saudi market.
Unfortunately it’s, at best, a long shot. Westinghouse’s design, the AP1000, has yet to operate anywhere. The reactor’s construction is embarrassingly behind schedule and over budget both in China and the United States. Mismanagement by Westinghouse caused two reactors in South Carolina to be terminated after an expenditure of $9 billion, which, in turn, nearly bankrupted Westinghouse’s Japanese owner, Toshiba. Finally, American nuclear know-how and other nonnuclear electrical generating parts can and have been exported in support of non-American reactors abroad without a formal nuclear cooperative agreement. These goods would likely make up a majority of American nuclear exports to the kingdom but, again, their export does not require negotiating a nuclear cooperative agreement.
Myth #3: If Westinghouse does not win the bid, the Russians or Chinese will, reducing American nuclear influence in the region.
This argument is perhaps the most egregious. Consider: an unspoken motive for the kingdom to pursue a nuclear program is to develop an option to make nuclear weapons, if needed, to deter Iran. This would all but preclude buying Russian. Rosatom, after all, is building Iran’s reactors. If Saudi Arabia buys Russian, it is all but asking Moscow to let Iran know exactly what the kingdom is doing in the nuclear realm. Consider also Russia’s recent ill-fated nuclear dealings with South Africa (a contributing factor in forcing President Zumafrom office) and Turkey (where Rosatom’s financial inflexibility prompted Turkey’s private financiers, who were underwriting half of the undertaking, to pull out of the project).
As for buying Chinese, doing so is also risky. The Chinese recently encountered “safety concerns” that delayed operation in Taishan of both its Westinghouse AP1000, and a French-based design. As for China’s top export nuclear design, the Hualong One (HPR 1000) reactor, the British won’t be done certifying it until 2022. China’s other possible export system, the CAP 1400, based on the yet-unproven AP1000, has yet to operate anywhere.
What’s left? The kingdom’s original bid requirements were for two reactors that would produce 2,800 megawatts. The only country that has a reactor that is operating, that is properly licensed, and that has been built roughly on time and on budget that could meet this requirement is Korea’s APR-1400. The Saudis only changed their original bid requirements after the United States, China, Russia and France all complained. Given Korea’s relative success in building four APR-1400 reactors on time and on budget in the United Arab Emirates, and its success in operating a licensed APR-1400 in South Korea, the Korean reactor is still the odds-on favorite to win the Saudi bid.
Myth # 4: It makes economic sense for the kingdom to enrich uranium to fuel its own reactors.
No, it doesn’t. Saudi nuclear backers argue that the kingdom should enrich, given the uranium reserves the Saudis have discovered. Uranium, however, is plentiful globally and priced at historic lows (less than $22 a pound), as are uranium-enrichment services. More important, the kingdom would have to spend billions on a variety of plants to enrich uranium and produce its own nuclear fuel. Starting such an undertaking might make economic sense if the kingdom had roughly a dozen large reactors up and running. It currently has none, and has only opened a process to buying two.
Myth #5: United States has more to gain by accommodating Saudi Arabia’s demand that it be allowed to enrich uranium than resisting it.
Trumpeting these myths, proponents of a permissive U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal argue that Washington lacks the leverage to secure a Saudi pledge not to make enrich or reprocess. The best Washington can do, it is argued, is to ask Riyadh to defer such dangerous nuclear activities for several years. Some even suggestthat acceding to Riyadh’s wishes is in Washington’s interest, since allowing the Saudis the capacity to make nuclear weapons–usable fuels might help “deter” Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
None of this seems sound. As already noted, the Korean APR-1400 is most likely to win the Saudi contract. Given this reactor’s American technical content, senior Korean officials are convinced they cannot export it to the kingdom unless the Saudis first reach a nuclear cooperative agreement with the United States. For this reason (and others besides), Seoul is inclined to take American guidance. Meanwhile, President Trump is trying to get the European parties to the Iran nuclear deal to devise a tighter follow-on understanding. A riskier approach would be for the United States to break from its policy (solidified in the 2009 U.S.-UAE nuclear cooperative agreement) to get non-weapons states in the Middle East to forswear enriching and reprocessing.
Besides the odd optics of looking like a version of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (which President Trump says is “the worst deal ever”), allowing Riyadh to enrich and reprocess would immediately excite the humors of the UAE and Egypt. Both have U.S. nuclear cooperative agreements that allow them to request their agreements be modified if the United States offers any of their neighbors a more generous nuclear deal. Then there’s Morocco and Turkey: their nuclear agreements with Washington are up for renewal in 2021 and 2023. They too are likely to ask for equal treatment as soon as possible. How this serves anyone’s long-term interest is, at best, unclear.
Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the author of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future. He served as deputy for nonproliferation policy in the office of the U.S. secretary of defense from 1989 to 1993.
Help on the way for ill Hanford workers Tri City Herald, BY ANNETTE CARY, acary@tricityherald.co, – March 07, 2018
Ill Hanford workers will no longer have to prove to the state that their poor health was caused by working at the nuclear reservation.
On Wednesday, Gov. Jay Inslee signed sweeping legislation that should help more Hanford workers win approval for state worker compensation claims.
“Washington state has recognized the often terrible price Hanford workers on the front lines of nuclear production and cleanup have to pay for their service to the nation,” Tom Carpenter, executive director of the Seattle-based watchdog group Hanford Challenge, said in a statement………
Workers who spend as little as one eight-hour day at many areas of the nuclear reservation will no longer have to show that working at Hanford caused illnesses ranging from respiratory disease to many cancers.
Instead, the state Department of Labor and Industries must presume that the sickness was the result of a chemical or radiological exposure at Hanford.
The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that proves other causes for the disease, including smoking, lifestyle, hereditary factors, physical fitness or exposures to toxic substances at other jobs or at home.
The bill was first introduced in 2017 out of concern for central Hanford workers who can be exposed to toxic chemical vapors associated with chemicals held in underground tanks.
In March 2017, Lawrence Rouse stood before a state Senate committee and attempted to talk about his illness called toxic encephalopathy, a brain dysfunction caused by exposure to chemicals. He had worked at Hanford for more than 20 years.
As he struggled to get a few clipped words out, his wife took over saying, “He doesn’t speak well. I pretty much speak for him all the time.”
Hanford Challenge and the pipefitters union Local 598 promoted the bill, saying tank farm workers have developed serious neurological and chemical diseases from exposure to chemical vapors………
Under the new law, workers, and families of workers who have died, and been denied compensation in the past can refile a claim under the new standards, according to Hanford Challenge.
…………The claims may be filed any time within the lifetime of the worker, since many illnesses can take years to develop after exposure.
………. Covered diseases under the law include:
▪ respiratory disease
▪ beryllium sensitization or disease
▪ heart problems experienced within 72 hours of an exposure
▪ neurological disease
▪ many cancers, including leukemia, some lymphomas and cancer of the thyroid, breast, esophagus, colon, bone, brain and others, with some exceptions.
The state compensation program is separate from a federal program, the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, that also offers compensation and medical coverage for cancers and other diseases that could have been caused by Hanford exposure.
DOE plans to open a new center to help ill Hanford workers and their survivors sort out their options for compensation and care, including available federal and state programs.
The center is expected to open this spring at 309 Bradley Blvd., Suite 120, Richland.
But understanding exactly which companies your funds invest in – and how those entities make money for you – is anything but straightforward.
A new financial report, titled “Don’t Bank on the Bomb,” hopes to shed light on one pervasive and profitable industry that’s powered in part by 401(k)s, pensions, individual retirement accounts, and other private funds: nuclear weapons.
“Financial institutions have a choice, either to contribute to the end of nuclear weapons, or to provide the financing that will allow nuclear weapons to end us,” said the authors of the 2018 report, which was provided to Business Insider in advance of its publication.
Peace organisations have assembled the report each year since 2013. This year, the report covers publicly disclosed investments made by financial institutions from January 2014 through October 2017, and it excludes those “made by governments, universities, or churches.”
About $US525 billion was managed by “329 significant investors” that include “banks, insurance companies, pension funds and asset managers from 24 countries” – all of which, according to the report, “invest significantly in the top 20 nuclear weapon producers.”
What the report found
Below is the report’s list of companies that perform nuclear-weapons work, and how much investment they received over about 3.75 years.
“The research includes all outstanding loans and credit facilities during the research period, not only new loans issued,” the report said.
“Don’t Bank on the Bomb” also includes a “Hall of Shame” list that covers the hundreds of investors which contributed to these 20 companies.
The chart below – created by Business Insider using report data – highlights the top 20 of these financial institutions and their total contributions.
These total amounts, in the tens of billions, are impressive. But the nuclear-weapons-producing companies listed above dabble in all sorts of industries, so they use the money to create everything from air conditioners and aeroplanes to rockets and satellites.
The 2018 “Don’t Bank on the Bomb” report does not specify how much of the investments it listed specifically went toward the business of nuclear weapons – work that includes research,development, and maintenance. Similarly, details on the investing side also weren’t provided, and some investors listed above manage trillions of dollars in assets per year.
Business Insider contacted the top three companies and top-three financial institutions listed above to determine funding allocations. Most did not return our calls or respond to our emails in time for publication.
A Honeywell representative did respond, though he declined to comment and instead directed us to the company’s latest financial report. Along with the financial statements of other companies, it does not provide a detailed ledger of business related to work on nuclear weapons.
Beatrice Fihn, the executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and 2017 Nobel Peace Prize winner, wrote a forward to the “Don’t Bank on the Bomb” report.
“Nuclear weapons, like other weapons of mass destruction, are now forbidden by international treaty,” Fihn said
Fihn’s comment refers to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – a legally-binding ban that she helped the United Nations pass in July 2017. (The US and eight other nuclear-armed nations have yet to sign or ratify the treaty.)
“By divesting from nuclear weapon producers,” she added, “we can make it harder for those that profit from weapons of mass destruction and encourage them to cut the production of nuclear weapons from their business strategies.”
Yet lack of government investment data is notable in terms of an effort to ban nuclear weapons. That’s because US taxpayers fund a significant amount of the work: about $US16-$US25 billion a year through the Department of Defence’s enormous and growing budget.
President Donald Trump also plans to modify and expand a Obama-era nuclear weapons modernisation program that may cost US taxpayers more than $US1.7 trillion over 30 years.
The report also excludes government investments made by China, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, and Russia – the latter of which recently claimed that it has created “invincible” nuclear armaments.
Dispelling Claim 2: Thorium did not get a chance in the nuclear energy development because it is not usable for military purposes Thorium ‒ a better fuel for nuclear technology? Nuclear Monitor, by Dr. Rainer Moormann 1 March 2018
In the early stages of nuclear technology in the USA (from 1944 to the early 1950s), reprocessing technology was not yet well developed. Better developed were graphite moderated reactors that used natural uranium and bred plutonium.
For the use of thorium (which, other than uranium, does not contain fissile components), enriched uranium or possibly plutonium would have been indispensable.
Initially, neither pathway for thorium development was chosen because it would have automatically reduced the still limited capacity for military fissile materials production. (Thorium has a higher capture cross section for thermal (that means slow) neutrons than U-238. For that reason, it needs as fertile material in reactors a higher fissile density than U-238.)
Only when the US enrichment capacity at about 1950 delivered sufficient enriched uranium, the military and later civil entry into thorium technology started: in 1955 a bomb with U-233 from thorium was exploded, and a strategic U-233 reserve of around 2 metric tons was created. The large head-start of the plutonium bomb could not be overtaken any more, and plutonium remained globally the leading military fission material (although, according to unconfirmed sources, Indian nuclear weapons contain U-233).
The US military research concluded in 1966 that U-233 is a very potent nuclear weapon material, but that it offers hardly any advantages over the already established plutonium. Because light water reactors with low-enriched uranium (LEU) were already too far developed, thorium use remained marginal also in civil nuclear engineering: for instance, the German “thorium reactor” THTR-300 in Hamm operated only for a short time, and in reality it was a uranium reactor (fuel: 10% weapon-grade 93% enriched U-235 and 90% thorium) because the amount of energy produced by thorium did not exceed 25%.
