The Arctic Front Of The “Cordon Sanitaire” Is The Most Threatening To Russia

Andrew Korybko, Sep 16, 2026, https://korybko.substack.com/p/the-arctic-front-of-the-cordon-sanitaire
The military-technical developments there aim to greatly mitigate Russia’s nuclear second-strike capabilities via the Golden Dome in parallel with posing an unprecedented fifth-generation aerial threat via the F-35As that’ll outmatch Russia’s Su-57s by 10:1 without the US and 35:1 if it’s included.
RT reviewed the 2026 Russian Military Yearbook, which is sponsored by the state arms company and meant only for senior members of the national security apparatus. Their article can be read in full here, but the present piece will only focus on the part about “The Very Cold War”. This is in reference to escalating NATO-Russian tensions in the Arctic. The Yearbook details NATO’s large-scale military drills in the Arctic, its allies’ arms build-ups, and their deep displeasure with Russia’s Northern Sea Route.
Most alarmingly, the Yearbook mentioned that Finland plans to acquire 64 F-35As while Canada will receive 88 of them. It was separately reported that Norway already has 52 F-35As, which is more than double Russia’s estimated 20 or so Su-57s, its fifth-generation analogue. Sweden doesn’t yet have any fifth-generation fighters, but those other three Arctic states will have over 10x as many as Russia does. If the US’ over 500 F-35As are included, then Russia’s fifth-generation fighters will be outmatched by 35:1.
These statistics on their own show that the US is actively implementing its 2021 strategic plan for “Regaining Arctic Dominance” that was cited in the Yearbook, the latter of which also detailed some of NATO’s new radar, drone, ship, icebreaker, missile, and other military-technical plans. They altogether lend credence to one of the cited Russian experts who warned that “Washington never abandoned the thought of redrawing borders in that area.” Here are five background briefings on this new front:
* 14 January: “Greenland Is The Crown Jewel Of ‘Fortress America’”
* 21 January: “The US’ Acquisition Of Greenland Could Lead To A Deal Over Canada’s Arctic Islands”
* 21 May: “Finland Is On Track To Become One Of Russia’s Most Intractable Foes”
* 6 September: “The Historical Russian-Swedish Rivalry Is About To Be Revived Later This Fall”
* 15 September: “Norway’s Military Build-Up Against Russia Poses A Serious Threat To Arctic Security”
To summarize, Trump 2.0 is pursuing a three-pronged strategy against Russia: 1) build Golden Dome missile defense infrastructure in the Arctic to greatly mitigate Russia’s nuclear second-strike capabilities; 2) arm Canada and the Viking Bloc (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland) to threaten Russia; and then 3) likely push Russia’s limits along the Northern Sea Route for the purpose of provoking a crisis that would then render this corridor dangerous and thus greatly reduce its use at minimum.
The pressure that the US is placing upon Russia along the Arctic front via these means complements that which it’s also placing through Polish-led efforts in Central & Eastern Europe and Japanese-led ones in Northeast Asia. All of these fronts consist entirely of US mutual defense allies, but the Turkish-led one along Russia’s entire southern periphery doesn’t, yet a hypothetical special operation there (such as against Azerbaijan) might be deterred by the possibility of the US responding via the other fronts.
Simply put, a “cordon sanitaire” has been assembled around Russia, and this containment noose is being tightened the most by the military-technical developments along the Arctic front than anywhere else. Up till recently, this was the quietest front of the four, but that just shows that its members were moving silently to avoid attracting attention from Russia. The latest Yearbook proves that the Kremlin had been monitoring them all along and is thus planning its response, however, so this front will likely heat up.
US keeps boasting about militarizing space 60 years after Outer Space Treaty

The intention remains the same as decades prior – militarize space under the guise of “defense”.
Saturday, September 19, 2026, Drago Bosnic, independent geopolitical and military analyst, https://infobrics.org/en/post/103080
In recent days and weeks, the United States has openly started boasting about having orbital weapons, in direct violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), which effectively forbids the militarization of space. The mainstream propaganda machine has been trying to whitewash the Pentagon, claiming that this supposedly “ends decades of official ambiguity” about American military capabilities in space. However, many of my esteemed colleagues and I have been writing for years about US violations in space. According to US Air Force Secretary Troy Meink, Washington DC already has “on-orbit space control weapons” and that these are supposedly “intended to defend American forces against hostile action”. The US Space Force claims that these systems are “able to deliver disruption, degradation and even destruction of an adversary”.
The Pentagon is yet to reveal details about the types of weapons it operates in space, meaning we have no information on how long the US has had this capability or how many systems have been deployed. American officials have only talked about what they call “space control”, which is too broad a term to allow a better understanding of what kind of weapons we’re dealing with.
The US claims that “it’s important from a deterrence perspective”. In simpler terms, it’s virtually guaranteed that the system in question is offensive-oriented, as the vast majority of American weapons already are. The announcement also demonstrates Washington DC’s endless hypocrisy, as it spent years accusing others of militarizing space, particularly Russia and China. It’s now unequivocally clear these “warnings” were nothing but crocodile tears.
The Pentagon is now saying that the use of its space weapons “could extend to disabling or destroying an adversary satellite if it were being used to target American troops or a US spacecraft”. Obviously, this is yet another example of the aforementioned endless hypocrisy, as Washington DC has been using its own space capabilities to wage war against Russia during the NATO-orchestrated Ukrainian conflict. This includes the employment of systems such as SpaceX’s “Starlink”, which the Neo-Nazi junta forces use to guide drones against the Russian military and civilians. Unsurprisingly, the US still lives in the illusion that killing soldiers and civilians in other countries is “perfectly fine”, but won’t tolerate similar actions against its own occupation forces all across the planet (literally dozens of countries in the last several decades).
It should also be noted that Washington DC has been the main driving force behind the militarization of space for around half a century at this point. During the (First) Cold War, this culminated with the Reagan administration’s much-touted SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) program, now better known under its more popular name – “Star Wars”. On paper, it was one of the most ambitious military and space programs ever undertaken by any country. However, many of the projects formally launched by the US at the time never really left the drawing board. It later even turned out that the SDI was largely a PR stunt aimed at pushing Russia into yet another expensive arms and space race. It could be argued that it worked to some extent, as Moscow actually built space-based weapons, including orbital lasers.
Namely, back in 1987, Russia launched a laser-armed spacecraft called the “Polyus/Skif-DM”. Although the program was scrapped due to the unfortunate dismantling of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin kept its know-how. The US was quite lucky that the USSR didn’t get to implement its unprecedented space projects during the 1990s, as many of these were more ambitious and far exceeded the best space tech available even today. However, Washington DC has long been determined to militarize space, confident that its massive private space sector gives it an edge over the rest of the world. This notion is not entirely without merit, as neither Russia nor China have comparable private ventures with investment on such a scale (although both superpowers still have colossal state-run space programs and aren’t too keen on privatizing them).
On the other hand, while private space ventures aren’t always the best to rely on when it comes to strategic projects, the US is uniquely positioned to do so. Namely, its massive Military Industrial Complex (MIC) would be more than happy to lead the charge in the militarization of space, as this means countless billions more in funding for decades to come. Elon Musk’s erstwhile political alliance with Donald Trump could easily be resurrected, giving the former a major head start in virtually all American space projects. This would also further integrate SpaceX with the Pentagon at a time when its budget keeps growing. Not to mention that just a week after his inauguration, Trump pompously announced that “the construction of a state-of-the-art ‘Iron Dome’ missile defense shield will begin immediately and will be made right here in the USA 100%”.
It later turned out it was actually the “Golden Dome” and that he simply mixed up the name with the better-known Israeli system. However, the intention was the same as decades prior – militarize space under the guise of “defense”. Trump actually said that the system would “protect Americans” and noted that “President Ronald Reagan was interested in such a system during the Cold War, but America didn’t have the technology at the time”. Mentioning the SDI is quite peculiar, as it raises several important questions, the first of which is how viable this new “space defense” would be. Although the technologies required to implement some SDI elements exist nowadays, this is still extremely expensive, while its efficiency is just as questionable as it was 40 years ago. On the other hand, war is “good for business”, as Trump himself said several times.
Weapons in Space

The cost for the Golden Dome system would runs as high as $3.6 trillion as estimated by the American Enterprise Institute. Taxpayers for Common Sense, also based in Washington, in its report this year titled “Missing the Mark: Why Golden Dome is Bad for American Taxpayers” says: “Pursuing Golden Dome also poses serious strategic risks, including the potential to accelerate nuclear arms and space arms races and to undermine opportunities to secure verifiable arms control agreements that reduce the nuclear threat. The program has also raised troubling conflict-of-interest concerns involving individuals within the Trump Administration and companies vying for Golden Dome contracts.”
“Taxpayers should be wondering who will pay for the trillions of dollars” for this and other “offensive space programs—especially when the U.S. is $40 trillion in debt.”
Karl Grossman, CounterPuchSeptember 21, 2026
“U.S. says for 1st time it now has weapons in space” was the headline last week in USA Today. The subhead: “Air Force Secretary Troy Meink became the first U.S. official to publicly announce that the military has deployed weapons to space.” The article Tuesday began: “The U.S. has confirmed in a landmark revelation that the nation has deployed operational weapons in space.”
It was news that swept the world.
The headline in the British newspaper, The Guardian: “U.S. confirms for first time it has deployed weapons in space.” The subhead: “Analysts warn of an acceleration in high-risk arms race with Russia and China in Earth’s orbit.”
It should not have come as a surprise.
As the Associated Press reported Wednesday: “The revelation comes as the Trump administration puts a growing focus on space. In 2019, during his first term, Trump created the Space Force as a separate military branch. In his second term, he has announced the ‘Golden Dome’ missile defense system, which includes plans to put U.S. weapons in space.”
An earlier AP story published just after Donald Trump took office a second time, also reported on “plans to put U.S. weapons in space” as part of its planned “Golden Dome” program. This article by Tara Copp, an AP Pentagon and national security correspondent, said the “system was ordered by Trump during his first week in office, and if successful, would mark the first time the U.S. would place weapons in space that are meant to destroy ground-based missiles within seconds of launch.”
Trump is seeking U.S. “superiority” in space as he stated in an executive order titled “Ensuring American Space Superiority.” Issued in December 2025, in it Trump asserted: “Superiority in space is a measure of national vision and willpower.”
In his Secretary of War Peter Hegseth, Trump has a highly aggressive partner in this aim. As Hegseth said in a tour of U.S. aerospace companies in February 2026: “We have to dominate the ultimate high ground.” He also declared on that speaking tour: “The fight for space is the fight for the future of the world as we know it” and “We cannot afford to have a fair fight in space—I’m not interested in orbital parity. We demand orbital dominance plain and simple. Whoever controls space controls the fight.”
Adding to the acknowledgement of the U.S. deploying weapons in space, the AP also reported last week: “American troops need to prepare for combat not only in Earth’s orbit but around the moon, President Donald Trump’s top military adviser said Wednesday, looking ahead to a new frontier in warfare after the U.S. revealed for the first time that it has deployed weapons in space. Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told service members and industry figures at the Air, Space and Cyber Conference outside Washington that the U.S. military should adapt now so it “is prepared to fight, endure and win … from the seabed to cislunar space.” Cislunar space, AP added, “is a term that described the region between the Earth’s surface and the moon.”
Not only is none of this new or going back just a few days or years. It goes back many years.
As Bruce Gagnon, coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, noted in an interview, plans by the U.S. for dominating space go back decades. The Trump administration is conducting a major replay of these plans.
Gagnon cited, as an example, the “Vision for 2020” plan released in 1998 by the U.S. Space Command, the predecessor of the U.S. Space Force. It’s best to be seen to be believed. It can be viewed here.
“Vision for 2020” opens with a photo of four-star General Howell M. Estes, commander in chief of the Space Command, saying the publication “serves as a bridge in the evolution of military space into the 2lst Century.”
Below those words of Estes and presented like the crawl in the “Star Wars” movies is: “U.S. Space Command—dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment. Integrating Space Forces into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict.”
Yes, “to protect U.S. interests and investment.”…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
The weaponization of space is a violation of the intent of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Created by the U.S., United Kingdom and former Soviet Union—it. as The Planetary Society, based in Pasadena, California, explains, “is an international agreement that governs how nations act in space. Formally known as the ‘Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,’ it is one of international space law’s foundational documents. The overall purpose of the Outer Space Treaty is to keep space peaceful.”
There have been repeated attempts since at the United Nations to pass a resolution titled “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS) to assure that space be used for peaceful purposes. As notes the Federation of American Scientists, based in Washington, PAROS “reaffirms the fundamental principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and advocates for a ban on the weaponization of space.” It was first passed at the U.N. General Assembly in1981 by a vote of 129 in favor, zero against and 13 abstentions.
But the PAROS agreement to be enacted requires a unanimous vote in favor by the UN’s Conference on Disarmament which consists of 65 nations based on global regions. The U.S. has continually balked on supporting PAROS, and without unanimity it cannot be approved. I have been in Geneva and watched, as at a meeting of the Conference, the U.S. representative announcing the U.S. would not support PAROS.
Meanwhile, the argument by the U.S.—including in recent days with the acknowledgement by the U.S. of it deploying weapons in space—is that there is a threat of Russia and China doing this.
“This is a flagrant in-your-face lie,” says Alice Slater, a member of the board of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space and an attorney.
She faults media generally for “parroting” the U.S. claim and “disregarding the constant effort” by Russia and China to get the PAROS agreement enacted.
She also cites the “joint statement” by Russia and China last year upon, as its heading notes, the “80th anniversary of the victory in the Second World War,” in which the U.S., Soviet Union and China were allies. “The two sides [Russia and China] oppose the attempts of individual countries to use outer space for armed confrontation,” says their statement. It cites the need for the PAROS agreement “that would provide fundamental and reliable guarantees of preventing an arms race in outer space, weaponization of outer space.”
Immediately following the acknowledgement by the U.S. of having weapons in space, The New York Times reported a Russian government spokesperson saying, “We believe that space must be free of any weapons,” and a spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry saying: “We urge the U.S. side to stop…preparing for war in outer space,” and that China opposed an “outer space arms race.”
Gagnon, the coordinator of the Maine-based Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, said he believes the U.S. has acknowledged its deployment of weapons in space in a move to “make Golden Dome sound inevitable thus forcing Congress to appropriate the massive funds to secure the controversial project in the Pentagon pipeline.”
The cost for the Golden Dome system would runs as high as $3.6 trillion as estimated by the American Enterprise Institute. Taxpayers for Common Sense, also based in Washington, in its report this year titled “Missing the Mark: Why Golden Dome is Bad for American Taxpayers” says: “Pursuing Golden Dome also poses serious strategic risks, including the potential to accelerate nuclear arms and space arms races and to undermine opportunities to secure verifiable arms control agreements that reduce the nuclear threat. The program has also raised troubling conflict-of-interest concerns involving individuals within the Trump Administration and companies vying for Golden Dome contracts.”
Said Gagnon: “Taxpayers should be wondering who will pay for the trillions of dollars” for this and other “offensive space programs—especially when the U.S. is $40 trillion in debt.” He said “the aerospace industry long ago identified the ‘entitlement programs’ as their preferred source of funds” and “taking from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and the now tattered social safety net.”
As to consequences of war in space, he told of Apollo Astronaut Edgar Mitchell—“the sixth person to walk on the moon”—speaking at a “peace in space rally I organized in the now re-named Cape Canaveral Space Force Station. Mitchell told the assembled that a war in space would be the ‘one and only’ because so much space junk would be created—on top of the existing huge debris field—that we would not be able to get a rocket through the deadly trash orbiting the Earth. He said it would be like trying to ‘get through a piranha-laced river’ in the Amazon.”
Gagnon spoke of “a spiritual disconnection in the minds and hearts of those ‘leaders’ in Washington who believe that 4% of the global population in the U.S. should be the ‘Masters of Space’ [the motto of the Space Delta 8 unit of the U.S. Space Force]. It is a deep sickness. The time has come for the American people to take the toys away from the boys.”
The Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space was formed at a meeting in Washington, D.C. in 1992. Each year it holds a “Keep Space for Peace Week,” this year between October 3 to 10, with events. The 2026 theme is “Space Is a Global Commons—Not To Be Dominated.” The Global Network’s website is at space4peace.org.
A book I authored, published in 2001, Weapons in Space, quotes Gagnon as saying: “If the U.S. is allowed to move the arms race into space, there will be no return. We have this one chance, this one moment in history, to stop the weaponization of space from happening.”
Similar warnings are made by Gagnon and others in TV documentaries I wrote and presented: Nukes In Space: The Nuclearization and Weaponization of the Heavens, first out in 1995 and viewable now, and Star Wars Returns, out in 2012, which can be seen here.
I concluded another book I wrote, The Wrong Stuff, published in 1997, with: “As for space weaponry, we are living at an historic junction. We have the opportunity now to halt the expansion of a new round of the arms race into space. The Star Wars of the Reagan administration is clearly not over, as the U.S. military seeks to attain the ‘ultimate high ground’ and with nuclear-powered weaponry to dominate space and the Earth below. We have a chance to stop something wrong and dangerous before it happens, before it is too late.”
Karl Grossman, professor of journalism at State University of New York/College at Old Westbury, and is the author of the book, The Wrong Stuff: The Space’s Program’s Nuclear Threat to Our Planet, and the Beyond Nuclear handbook, The U.S. Space Force and the dangers of nuclear power and nuclear war in space. Grossman is an associate of the media watch group Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR). He is a contributor to Hopeless: Barack Obama and the Politics of Illusion.
The Real Danger Of AI Is That It Is Run By Evil Warmongers
Caitlin Johnstone, Sep 22, 2026
The biggest AI threat isn’t artificial superintelligence wiping out humanity in a fit of mechanical vengeance like some digital Old Testament God, it’s the same oligarchs and empire managers as usual inflicting the same evils and abuses as usual upon their fellow man.
We’re already presently watching the empire building AI into its killing machines and causing all kinds of horrifying problems while these technologies become more and more complex and unpredictable.
CNN reports that US military AI “almost started a war” with China when it hallucinated intelligence showing a Chinese ship transporting nuclear weapon components to Iran; US military planes were apparently already in the air preparing to attack the vessel before human intelligence picked up on the error.
A recent Pentagon report has officially concluded that an over-reliance on Palantir’s AI-powered command-and-control system Maven contributed to the bombing of a school in Minab which killed 120 children attending classes on the first day of the US-Israeli war with Iran.
We learned early on in the Gaza holocaust that the IDF was using AI to help it bomb suspected Hamas members when they are at home with their families rather than when they are out in the battlefield using a program called “Where’s Daddy?” — a bit of Israeli humor about the fact that they would be killing the children of Palestinian resistance fighters when their fathers came home.
We’re seeing politicians like Bernie Sanders voice concerns that “AI could soon be smarter than humans and function outside of our control,” but the most obvious and imminent threat right now is not that artificial intelligence will outsmart us and escape our control, it’s that it is being fully controlled by humans who are stupid and evil.
Again, we know for a fact that powerful nuclear-armed military forces are knitting AI into all their systems. We’re watching them do it, right in front of our faces. An increasingly complex and confusing element has been added to an environment of already tense and dangerous military standoffs around the world as the US and its allies work to absorb the few remaining nations who have managed to retain sovereignty into the imperial power umbrella. And yet recent weeks have seen the mass media flooded with punditry speculating about possible scenarios under which AI might perhaps wind up leading to human extinction.
We already know the most likely scenario under which AI will get us all killed. If it happens, it will be because rich and powerful sociopaths knit these technologies into war machinery that is designed for killing humans at mass scale. Duh.
These developments are unfolding in the context of a frenetic new arms race with China in which nobody’s willing to tap the brake pedal for fear of falling behind. Any talk of regulation or slowing things down before they get out of control is dismissed because the competition-based systems which currently govern human behavior have thrust us into a nightmare of constant military expansionism and brinkmanship instead of collaboration and harmony, all fueled by the fact that this paradigm makes tech plutocrats and war profiteers obscenely wealthy.
That’s clearly the most immediate existential threat that AI poses to our species right now. There’s also the only slightly less frightening threat of artificial intelligence enabling our rulers to use mass surveillance and autonomous weapons systems to stifle any revolutionary political movement before it gets off the ground, locking us into this freakish capitalist dystopia until the planet is an uninhabitable wasteland.
In any case, this isn’t a new threat. It’s the same old threat with new toys. Capitalism must end, and the empire must fall. Our very existence depends on it.
Submission to AUKUS Inquiry -AUKUS deal is a catastrophic misjudgment – Leo Kerr

No Exit Clause Without Penalty: Australia has committed to this path with limited
ability to withdraw without incurring substantial sunk costs and diplomatic damage.
The deal’s structure locks Australia into decades of expenditure regardless of changing strategic circumstances.
The AUKUS deal will transform Australia into a permanent repository for high-level
nuclear waste—a burden the nation is entirely unprepared to manage.
Accepting Foreign Waste: Most alarmingly, the deal permits the US and UK to
dispose of low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste from their own submarines in
Leo Kerr n.103
Subject: Opposition to AUKUS Pillar I (Nuclear Submarines) on Grounds of Cost,
Sovereignty, Nuclear Waste, and Strategic Miscalculation
- Executive Summary
The AUKUS agreement, particularly Pillar I concerning nuclear-powered submarines,
is fundamentally not in Australia’s national interest. While framed as a necessary
response to strategic challenges, the deal imposes crippling financial costs, creates
an unresolved nuclear waste legacy, severely compromises national sovereignty,
rests on unrealistic delivery timelines, and damages Australia’s regional relationships.
This submission argues that AUKUS represents a profound misalignment of strategic
priorities that will leave Australia less secure, financially weaker, and more dependent
on foreign powers for generations.
2. Prohibitive and Unsustainable Financial Cost
The AUKUS submarine program is the most expensive defence project in Australian
history, with estimated total costs of $368 billion over several decades. This figure
does not include the substantial additional costs of base upgrades, workforce
training, and nuclear safety regulation.
Opportunity Cost: $368 billion represents an extraordinary concentration of defence
spending that will inevitably crowd out investment in more agile, relevant capabilities.
Cyber defence, long-range strike missiles, unmanned aerial and maritime systems,
and enhanced intelligence capabilities would deliver more immediate and flexible
security benefits for Australia’s unique geographical circumstances.
Distortion of Defence Budget: The submarine program will consume approximately
40% of the defence capital investment budget for decades, starving other services
and capabilities. The Royal Australian Air Force and Army face significant
modernisation needs that will be compromised.
Subsidising Foreign Industries: A significant portion of Australian spending will
directly support US and UK shipyards, supply chains, and workforce development.
Australia is effectively paying to solve the industrial capacity problems of allied
nations while receiving no firm guarantees on delivery timelines. This represents an
unequal arrangement where Australian taxpayers bear enormous risk while allied
defence contractors secure long-term revenue.
No Exit Clause Without Penalty: Australia has committed to this path with limited
ability to withdraw without incurring substantial sunk costs and diplomatic damage.
The deal’s structure locks Australia into decades of expenditure regardless of
changing strategic circumstances.
3. Catastrophic and Unresolved Nuclear Waste Liability
The AUKUS deal will transform Australia into a permanent repository for high-level
nuclear waste—a burden the nation is entirely unprepared to manage.
Sovereign Responsibility for High-Level Waste: Under the agreement, Australia
accepts sole and permanent responsibility for all nuclear waste generated by its
submarine fleet, including highly radioactive spent fuel that remains dangerous for
hundreds of thousands of years. There is no existing permanent high-level nuclear
waste storage facility anywhere in the world. The United States and United Kingdom,
which have operated nuclear submarines for over 60 years, have still failed to
develop permanent storage solutions.
Accepting Foreign Waste: Most alarmingly, the deal permits the US and UK to
dispose of low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste from their own submarines in Australia. This provision makes Australia a designated dumping ground for other
nations’ toxic military legacies with no reciprocal benefit.
No Domestic Waste Management Plan: Australia currently has no permanent,
community-agreed solution for even its existing low-level medical and research
waste. Successive governments have failed for nearly three decades to site a single
waste facility in the face of sustained opposition from communities and Traditional
Owners. Recent legislative attempts to compel facility construction have been widely
criticised for granting government the power to unilaterally designate sites without
proper consultation or consent.
Intergenerational Inequity: The nuclear waste problem will remain dangerous for millennia, far beyond the lifespan of any government or institution. Current decision-
makers are imposing a permanent environmental and security burden on all future generations of Australians without their consent and without any credible plan formanagement.
4. Severe Erosion of National Sovereignty
AUKUS fundamentally subordinates Australian defence and foreign policy to United
States strategic interests, compromising hard-won independence in national
decision-making.
Lack of Independent Operational Control: Australian commanders will not have
independent control over these submarines. The vessels, their nuclear reactors, their
weapons systems, and their support infrastructure are so deeply integrated with US
military systems that the concept of independent Australian operation is illusory.
Critical maintenance, refuelling, and weapons replenishment can only occur at US
facilities, meaning Australia cannot sustain these submarines without continuous US
approval and support.
Enmeshment in US Conflict Decisions: The agreement’s emphasis on
“interchangeability” and “integrated deterrence” strongly implies that AustraliaEnmeshment in US Conflict Decisions: The agreement’s emphasis on
“interchangeability” and “integrated deterrence” strongly implies that Australia would be compelled to support the United States in any future conflict involving
China—including over Taiwan. The AUKUS framework does not preserve Australia’s
right to make independent decisions about war and peace. Rather, it assumes
Australian participation as a condition of the alliance.
Ceding Control of Australian Territory: AUKUS requires significant expansion of
Australian military facilities, including HMAS Stirling in Western Australia for
submarine basing and RAAF Tindal in the Northern Territory for nuclear-capable B-52
bomber rotations. These expanded facilities will host US military personnel,
equipment, and potentially nuclear weapons. Australia has a longstanding policy of
not confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, meaning
the public and Parliament will have no assurance about what is being hosted on
Australian soil.
Vulnerability to US Domestic Politics: The entire AUKUS project is vulnerable to the
whims of US electoral politics. In 2025, the Pentagon initiated a review of the
agreement to ensure compliance with the “America First” policy agenda. This
demonstrates that US interests will always take precedence. If a future US
administration decides the agreement no longer serves American interests—or
demands Australian participation in a conflict Australians do not support—Australia
will have no meaningful recourse. Our strategic future is held hostage to US political
volatility.
Explicit Opt-Out Rights for Allies: Both the United States and the United Kingdom
have explicit opt-out rights under the agreement, allowing them to withdraw if their
own national requirements are not met. Australia has no equivalent protection. A
senior Australian Defence official has conceded that if the US or UK walked away,
Australia’s “Plan B” is non-existent.
5. Unrealistic Delivery and Capability Gaps
The timeline and technical assumptions underlying AUKUS are deeply unrealistic,
leaving Australia with a dangerous capability gap.
Decades-Long Delivery Timeline: Even under the most optimistic projections, the
first Virginia-class submarines will not be delivered until the early 2030s, and the final
Australian-built SSN-AUKUS submarine will not enter service until the 2050s—
approximately 40 years from the agreement’s announcement. This timeline exceeds
the planning horizons of any government or military strategy.
Ailing Allied Industrial Bases: Both the US and UK submarine industrial bases are in
poor condition. The UK has experienced periods where it could not deploy a single
operational submarine due to maintenance backlogs. Its skilled workforce and supply
chains have atrophied. The US Navy faces its own pressures to maintain fleet
numbers and has warned that diverting submarines to Australia could degrade
American undersea capabilities. US law prohibits the sale of nuclear submarines if it
would “degrade the United States’ undersea capabilities,” giving Congress a
permanent veto over deliveries to Australia.
Collins Class Capability Gap: Australia’s existing Collins-class submarines are
scheduled to begin retirement from the 2030s. Even optimistic AUKUS timelines leave
a gap of 5–10 years with no submarine capability. The government has no credible
interim solution. Plans to extend Collins-class service life face significant technical
challenges and workforce constraints. The gap leaves Australia without a
fundamental strategic capability at precisely the time proponents claim the strategic
environment is most dangerous.
Unproven Technology: The SSN-AUKUS submarine design does not yet exist. No
nuclear-powered submarine has ever been designed and built in Australia. The fusion
of British design and American propulsion technology has no precedent and faces
immense technical, regulatory, and safety hurdles. Every nuclear submarine program
in history has experienced significant cost overruns and delays.
- Damaging Impact on Regional Relations and Economic
Security
AUKUS has damaged Australia’s standing in Southeast Asia and the Pacific while undermining our most important economic relationship.
Provocative and Exclusionary: Regional neighbours, including Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Pacific Island nations, have expressed serious concerns about AUKUS. It is widely
perceived as a provocative, exclusionary military pact designed for great power
confrontation. This undermines ASEAN-centred regional architecture, which has been
built on principles of inclusivity, consultation, and non-confrontation. AUKUS risks
triggering a regional nuclear arms race, which would make Australia less safe, not
more.
Damage to Relations with China: AUKUS has been explicitly framed as a response
to China’s rise. While prudent deterrence is legitimate, the manner in which AUKUS
was announced—without prior consultation with regional partners and in a manner
designed to exclude and confront—has poisoned the strategic atmosphere. The
agreement has reduced mutual trust in the bilateral relationship with Australia’s
largest trading partner. China accounts for approximately 25% of Australian exports,
and a stable, functional relationship is essential for Australian prosperity. A growing
number of Australians question the logic of sacrificing economic well-being for
uncertain strategic guarantees from an ally with divergent interests.
Strategic Contradiction: Australia is simultaneously pursuing the most expensive
military buildup in its history while relying on China for export income that funds
government services, infrastructure, and social programs. This contradiction is
unsustainable. If Australia genuinely believes China poses a direct military threat
requiring nuclear submarines, then continued deep economic integration is
strategically incoherent. If China does not pose such a threat, then AUKUS represents
a catastrophic misallocation of resources.
Marginalising Pacific Concerns: Pacific Island nations have consistently identified
climate change as their primary security threat. AUKUS diverts attention, diplomatic
energy, and financial resources away from climate action and towards military
competition. This damages Australia’s reputation as a responsible regional partner
and cedes influence to other powers that are more responsive to Pacific priorities.
7. A More Prudent Path Forward
It is not too late to change course. A growing number of former defence officials,
diplomats, and strategic analysts have called for Australia to fundamentally revisit the
AUKUS decision.
Immediate Recommendations:
- Commission an independent cost-benefit analysis of AUKUS against alternative
defence investments, including an updated conventionally-powered submarine
program, long-range strike capabilities, and enhanced cyber and space assets. - Reject the nuclear waste provisions and maintain Australia’s longstanding policy of
not accepting foreign nuclear waste on its territory. - Reassert parliamentary sovereignty over war and peace decisions, clarifying that
no alliance commitment overrides the Australian Parliament’s exclusive authority to
authorise military action. - Redirect defence investment toward capabilities more suited to Australia’s
geography, including long-range maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned underwater
vehicles, distributed sensor networks, and precision-strike missiles. - Pursue genuine strategic independence by diversifying defence partnerships and
avoiding exclusive reliance on any single ally for critical capabilities.
8. Conclusion
The AUKUS submarine deal represents a catastrophic misjudgment. It imposes an
unprecedented financial burden, creates a permanent and unresolved nuclear waste
liability, erodes Australian sovereignty, rests on unrealistic delivery assumptions, and damages our most important regional relationships. The justification for AUKUS
relies on an exaggerated threat perception and blind faith in allies who have placed
their own interests first—explicitly, in writing, in the agreement’s opt-out clauses.
Australia does not need nuclear submarines to be secure. We need a defence
strategy appropriate to our geography, our budget, and our democratic values—not
one designed by foreign industrial lobbies and imposed under the guise of alliance
solidarity. For these reasons, I urge this Committee to recommend that the Australian
Government withdraw from the AUKUS Pillar I submarine agreement and pursue a
more independent, proportionate, and responsible defence posture.

No Exit Clause Without Penalty: Australia has committed to this path with limited
ability to withdraw without incurring substantial sunk costs and diplomatic damage.
The deal’s structure locks Australia into decades of expenditure regardless of changing strategic circumstances.
The AUKUS deal will transform Australia into a permanent repository for high-level
nuclear waste—a burden the nation is entirely unprepared to manage.
Accepting Foreign Waste: Most alarmingly, the deal permits the US and UK to
dispose of low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste from their own submarines in
Leo Kerr n.103
Subject: Opposition to AUKUS Pillar I (Nuclear Submarines) on Grounds of Cost,
Sovereignty, Nuclear Waste, and Strategic Miscalculation
- Executive Summary
The AUKUS agreement, particularly Pillar I concerning nuclear-powered submarines,
is fundamentally not in Australia’s national interest. While framed as a necessary
response to strategic challenges, the deal imposes crippling financial costs, creates
an unresolved nuclear waste legacy, severely compromises national sovereignty,
rests on unrealistic delivery timelines, and damages Australia’s regional relationships.
This submission argues that AUKUS represents a profound misalignment of strategic
priorities that will leave Australia less secure, financially weaker, and more dependent
on foreign powers for generations.
2. Prohibitive and Unsustainable Financial Cost
The AUKUS submarine program is the most expensive defence project in Australian
history, with estimated total costs of $368 billion over several decades. This figure
does not include the substantial additional costs of base upgrades, workforce
training, and nuclear safety regulation.
Opportunity Cost: $368 billion represents an extraordinary concentration of defence
spending that will inevitably crowd out investment in more agile, relevant capabilities.
Cyber defence, long-range strike missiles, unmanned aerial and maritime systems,
and enhanced intelligence capabilities would deliver more immediate and flexible
security benefits for Australia’s unique geographical circumstances.
Distortion of Defence Budget: The submarine program will consume approximately
40% of the defence capital investment budget for decades, starving other services
and capabilities. The Royal Australian Air Force and Army face significant
modernisation needs that will be compromised.
Subsidising Foreign Industries: A significant portion of Australian spending will
directly support US and UK shipyards, supply chains, and workforce development.
Australia is effectively paying to solve the industrial capacity problems of allied
nations while receiving no firm guarantees on delivery timelines. This represents an
unequal arrangement where Australian taxpayers bear enormous risk while allied
defence contractors secure long-term revenue.
No Exit Clause Without Penalty: Australia has committed to this path with limited
ability to withdraw without incurring substantial sunk costs and diplomatic damage.
The deal’s structure locks Australia into decades of expenditure regardless of
changing strategic circumstances.
3. Catastrophic and Unresolved Nuclear Waste Liability
The AUKUS deal will transform Australia into a permanent repository for high-level
nuclear waste—a burden the nation is entirely unprepared to manage.
Sovereign Responsibility for High-Level Waste: Under the agreement, Australia
accepts sole and permanent responsibility for all nuclear waste generated by its
submarine fleet, including highly radioactive spent fuel that remains dangerous for
hundreds of thousands of years. There is no existing permanent high-level nuclear
waste storage facility anywhere in the world. The United States and United Kingdom,
which have operated nuclear submarines for over 60 years, have still failed to
develop permanent storage solutions.
Accepting Foreign Waste: Most alarmingly, the deal permits the US and UK to
dispose of low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste from their own submarines in Australia. This provision makes Australia a designated dumping ground for other
nations’ toxic military legacies with no reciprocal benefit.
No Domestic Waste Management Plan: Australia currently has no permanent,
community-agreed solution for even its existing low-level medical and research
waste. Successive governments have failed for nearly three decades to site a single
waste facility in the face of sustained opposition from communities and Traditional
Owners. Recent legislative attempts to compel facility construction have been widely
criticised for granting government the power to unilaterally designate sites without
proper consultation or consent.
Intergenerational Inequity: The nuclear waste problem will remain dangerous for millennia, far beyond the lifespan of any government or institution. Current decision-
makers are imposing a permanent environmental and security burden on all future generations of Australians without their consent and without any credible plan formanagement.
4. Severe Erosion of National Sovereignty
AUKUS fundamentally subordinates Australian defence and foreign policy to United
States strategic interests, compromising hard-won independence in national
decision-making.
Lack of Independent Operational Control: Australian commanders will not have
independent control over these submarines. The vessels, their nuclear reactors, their
weapons systems, and their support infrastructure are so deeply integrated with US
military systems that the concept of independent Australian operation is illusory.
Critical maintenance, refuelling, and weapons replenishment can only occur at US
facilities, meaning Australia cannot sustain these submarines without continuous US
approval and support.
Enmeshment in US Conflict Decisions: The agreement’s emphasis on
“interchangeability” and “integrated deterrence” strongly implies that AustraliaEnmeshment in US Conflict Decisions: The agreement’s emphasis on
“interchangeability” and “integrated deterrence” strongly implies that Australia would be compelled to support the United States in any future conflict involving
China—including over Taiwan. The AUKUS framework does not preserve Australia’s
right to make independent decisions about war and peace. Rather, it assumes
Australian participation as a condition of the alliance.
Ceding Control of Australian Territory: AUKUS requires significant expansion of
Australian military facilities, including HMAS Stirling in Western Australia for
submarine basing and RAAF Tindal in the Northern Territory for nuclear-capable B-52
bomber rotations. These expanded facilities will host US military personnel,
equipment, and potentially nuclear weapons. Australia has a longstanding policy of
not confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, meaning
the public and Parliament will have no assurance about what is being hosted on
Australian soil.
Vulnerability to US Domestic Politics: The entire AUKUS project is vulnerable to the
whims of US electoral politics. In 2025, the Pentagon initiated a review of the
agreement to ensure compliance with the “America First” policy agenda. This
demonstrates that US interests will always take precedence. If a future US
administration decides the agreement no longer serves American interests—or
demands Australian participation in a conflict Australians do not support—Australia
will have no meaningful recourse. Our strategic future is held hostage to US political
volatility.
Explicit Opt-Out Rights for Allies: Both the United States and the United Kingdom
have explicit opt-out rights under the agreement, allowing them to withdraw if their
own national requirements are not met. Australia has no equivalent protection. A
senior Australian Defence official has conceded that if the US or UK walked away,
Australia’s “Plan B” is non-existent.
5. Unrealistic Delivery and Capability Gaps
The timeline and technical assumptions underlying AUKUS are deeply unrealistic,
leaving Australia with a dangerous capability gap.
Decades-Long Delivery Timeline: Even under the most optimistic projections, the
first Virginia-class submarines will not be delivered until the early 2030s, and the final
Australian-built SSN-AUKUS submarine will not enter service until the 2050s—
approximately 40 years from the agreement’s announcement. This timeline exceeds
the planning horizons of any government or military strategy.
Ailing Allied Industrial Bases: Both the US and UK submarine industrial bases are in
poor condition. The UK has experienced periods where it could not deploy a single
operational submarine due to maintenance backlogs. Its skilled workforce and supply
chains have atrophied. The US Navy faces its own pressures to maintain fleet
numbers and has warned that diverting submarines to Australia could degrade
American undersea capabilities. US law prohibits the sale of nuclear submarines if it
would “degrade the United States’ undersea capabilities,” giving Congress a
permanent veto over deliveries to Australia.
Collins Class Capability Gap: Australia’s existing Collins-class submarines are
scheduled to begin retirement from the 2030s. Even optimistic AUKUS timelines leave
a gap of 5–10 years with no submarine capability. The government has no credible
interim solution. Plans to extend Collins-class service life face significant technical
challenges and workforce constraints. The gap leaves Australia without a
fundamental strategic capability at precisely the time proponents claim the strategic
environment is most dangerous.
Unproven Technology: The SSN-AUKUS submarine design does not yet exist. No
nuclear-powered submarine has ever been designed and built in Australia. The fusion
of British design and American propulsion technology has no precedent and faces
immense technical, regulatory, and safety hurdles. Every nuclear submarine program
in history has experienced significant cost overruns and delays.
- Damaging Impact on Regional Relations and Economic
Security
AUKUS has damaged Australia’s standing in Southeast Asia and the Pacific while undermining our most important economic relationship.
Provocative and Exclusionary: Regional neighbours, including Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Pacific Island nations, have expressed serious concerns about AUKUS. It is widely
perceived as a provocative, exclusionary military pact designed for great power
confrontation. This undermines ASEAN-centred regional architecture, which has been
built on principles of inclusivity, consultation, and non-confrontation. AUKUS risks
triggering a regional nuclear arms race, which would make Australia less safe, not
more.
Damage to Relations with China: AUKUS has been explicitly framed as a response
to China’s rise. While prudent deterrence is legitimate, the manner in which AUKUS
was announced—without prior consultation with regional partners and in a manner
designed to exclude and confront—has poisoned the strategic atmosphere. The
agreement has reduced mutual trust in the bilateral relationship with Australia’s
largest trading partner. China accounts for approximately 25% of Australian exports,
and a stable, functional relationship is essential for Australian prosperity. A growing
number of Australians question the logic of sacrificing economic well-being for
uncertain strategic guarantees from an ally with divergent interests.
Strategic Contradiction: Australia is simultaneously pursuing the most expensive
military buildup in its history while relying on China for export income that funds
government services, infrastructure, and social programs. This contradiction is
unsustainable. If Australia genuinely believes China poses a direct military threat
requiring nuclear submarines, then continued deep economic integration is
strategically incoherent. If China does not pose such a threat, then AUKUS represents
a catastrophic misallocation of resources.
Marginalising Pacific Concerns: Pacific Island nations have consistently identified
climate change as their primary security threat. AUKUS diverts attention, diplomatic
energy, and financial resources away from climate action and towards military
competition. This damages Australia’s reputation as a responsible regional partner
and cedes influence to other powers that are more responsive to Pacific priorities.
7. A More Prudent Path Forward
It is not too late to change course. A growing number of former defence officials,
diplomats, and strategic analysts have called for Australia to fundamentally revisit the
AUKUS decision.
Immediate Recommendations:
- Commission an independent cost-benefit analysis of AUKUS against alternative
defence investments, including an updated conventionally-powered submarine
program, long-range strike capabilities, and enhanced cyber and space assets. - Reject the nuclear waste provisions and maintain Australia’s longstanding policy of
not accepting foreign nuclear waste on its territory. - Reassert parliamentary sovereignty over war and peace decisions, clarifying that
no alliance commitment overrides the Australian Parliament’s exclusive authority to
authorise military action. - Redirect defence investment toward capabilities more suited to Australia’s
geography, including long-range maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned underwater
vehicles, distributed sensor networks, and precision-strike missiles. - Pursue genuine strategic independence by diversifying defence partnerships and
avoiding exclusive reliance on any single ally for critical capabilities.
8. Conclusion
The AUKUS submarine deal represents a catastrophic misjudgment. It imposes an
unprecedented financial burden, creates a permanent and unresolved nuclear waste
liability, erodes Australian sovereignty, rests on unrealistic delivery assumptions, and damages our most important regional relationships. The justification for AUKUS
relies on an exaggerated threat perception and blind faith in allies who have placed
their own interests first—explicitly, in writing, in the agreement’s opt-out clauses.
Australia does not need nuclear submarines to be secure. We need a defence
strategy appropriate to our geography, our budget, and our democratic values—not
one designed by foreign industrial lobbies and imposed under the guise of alliance
solidarity. For these reasons, I urge this Committee to recommend that the Australian
Government withdraw from the AUKUS Pillar I submarine agreement and pursue a
more independent, proportionate, and responsible defence posture.
The United States claims to now have space weapons and to prepare to fight around the Moon

Voltaire International Newsletter
Fri, 18 Sep 2026, https://www.sott.net/article/508501-The-United-States-claims-to-now-have-space-weapons-and-to-prepare-to-fight-around-the-Moon
US Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink said on September 14, 2026, at the National Harbor Air, Space & Cyber Conference that:
“The United States now has space control weapons in orbit capable of defending joint forces against hostile action.
“For more than a decade, we have expressed our concern about the development of space weapons by the Chinese, Russians and other countries. We are working to ensure our protection and our ability to operate in this environment, as we have done for decades.”
Contrary to Troy Meink’s statements, Russia and China have always claimed that they do not deploy weapons in space. By signing the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the United States committed itself not to place weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbit.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine said at the end of the conference:
“Our task, my friends, is to adapt right now, so the Joint Force is prepared to fight, endure, and win in global contested environments, from the seabed to cislunar space.
“Our United States Space Force must provide unrivaled space superiority and sustain the associated networks, domain awareness, data advantage that the joint force needs to win in space both now and in the future.
“We must now assume that our forces will be tracked by autonomous systems, scrambled across the entire spectrum and tracked in real time.
“AI is already a reality and it is transforming the way the armed forces perceive, analyze, decide and act.”
Comment: USA has deployed first space-based weapon:
The United States now has an “on orbit” space weapon and will use it to protect American forces, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink announced Monday, in a not-so-subtle warning to China and Russia.
It marked the first time the United States has acknowledged it has its own offensive capability in space after years of warning that China and Russia have been practicing offensive maneuvers in orbit, such as using lasers or jamming that put U.S. satellites at risk.
Meink would not specify what type of weapon is now in space but hinted that it will be used for “space control.” A U.S. official said it could include the military taking out an enemy’s satellite if it’s being used to target American troops or a U.S. satellite.
The United States also is developing a web of space-based missiles that are envisioned as part of the future Golden Dome missile defense system.
Meink would not elaborate on why the disclosure of the new U.S. capability was being made now, saying only that “there’s a lot of factors that go into how we talk about these things. It’s important from a deterrence perspective.”
Iran sends peace terms to US

Tehran is awaiting US President Donald Trump’s response to its conditions for restarting negotiations, security chief Mohsen Rezaei has said
19 Sep, 2026 , https://www.rt.com/news/645996-iran-sends-peace-terms-us/
Iran has conveyed its peace terms to the US through Qatari mediators, the country’s top security official, Mohsen Rezaei, has said, arguing that it is in America’s interests to accept them.
The 60-day period provided under the US-Iranian memorandum of understanding to negotiate a settlement expired last month without a deal, while disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz continues to drive up energy prices.
“Seven conditions set by Iran for the start of any negotiations have been conveyed to the US administration. Tehran’s message is clear and unambiguous: If Washington wants to escape the predicament it has created for itself and avoid becoming further entangled in it, it has no choice but to recognize Iran’s rights and accept its conditions,” Rezaei wrote on X on Saturday.
In an interview with Al Jazeera, Rezaei, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the terms include “an end to the war on all fronts, the release of our frozen funds and an end to the naval blockade.”
Iranian officials previously said they are also seeking the withdrawal of US forces from the region and compensation for the US and Israeli strikes launched on February 28.
“Trump’s threats will not achieve any results. We are prepared for a decisive war,” Rezaei added.
US President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that “hopefully we are toward the end of the war” and suggested that Iran wants to make a deal. The following day, however, he once again threatened to “annihilate” the Iranian leadership if the conflict does not end on his terms.
The US military revealed on Friday that the nearly seven-month conflict has cost $43.6 billion, with nearly two-thirds of the bill going toward replenishing depleted munitions.
According to Bloomberg, widely reported ammunition shortages could delay arms deliveries to US allies by several years. Trump and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth have denied that the conflict has left the US short of missiles and bombs.
Canada issues notice about nuclear waste repository as possible national interest project

biggest concern with the potential fast-tracking of federal approvals is whether the long-term effects of nuclear waste transportation will be considered, as this is not mentioned in the Canada Gazette listing,
$26-billion project proposed near Ignace and Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation
Sarah Law· CBC News : Sep 22, 2026
Canada’s first deep geological repository (DGR) for nuclear waste may be designated as a project of national interest, meaning possible streamlining of federal approvals for the $26-billion endeavour.
The federal government first announced the possible designation for the project — proposed near Ignace and Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation in northwestern Ontario — in June. The site could see the country’s nuclear waste buried hundreds of metres underground.
Notice of the possible designation was published in the federal government’s official newspaper, the Canada Gazette, on Saturday.
The federal Building Canada Act “enables the government to streamline federal approval processes for projects determined to be in the national interest, helping such projects to move forward efficiently while protecting Canada’s environment and upholding the rights of Indigenous Peoples,” the Canada Gazette notice says.
Officials in Ottawa provided comments on the project in a news release on Friday.……………………………..
‘Federal government, think again’

The DGR has come under heavy scrutiny by environmental advocates and First Nation leaders over concerns with the storage, transportation and maintenance of nuclear waste.
We the Nuclear Free North is a coalition of groups that’s spoken out against the project for years.
Brennain Lloyd is project co-ordinator of Northwatch, which is part of We the Nuclear Free North.
Her biggest concern with the potential fast-tracking of federal approvals is whether the long-term effects of nuclear waste transportation will be considered, as this is not mentioned in the Canada Gazette listing, she explained.
“In the Gazette notice, the federal government describes the project as being a 160-year project — so that means we lose any assessment of the long-term safety issues, the long-term impacts of this project,” she said in an interview with CBC News on Monday……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
A public comment period on the potential designation of the DGR as a project of national interest is open until Oct. 26. People can email DGRComment-CommentaireDSCGP@mpo-bgp.gc.ca. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/canada-dgr-project-national-interest-project-9.7352825
Trump administration dives into U.N. Secretary General race

Signs of the Times, Karen DeYoung, The Washington Post, Mon, 24 Aug 2026
The next leader of the United Nations could, for the first time, be a woman. But first she’ll need Trump’s approval.
This year, for the first time in its 80-year history, the United Nations may select a woman to serve as its secretary general. Of the eight candidates nominated so far for the position, five are women, and many U.N. members argue that it’s finally their turn.
But as the U.N. Security Council undertakes its months-long, ultrasecret selection process, hopefully making its choice before Portugal’s António Guterres reaches the end of his five-year term on Dec. 31, other factors are at play beyond gender.
The Trump administration, which has veto power on the council, is working overtime to ensure that the new leadership is in sync with its plans to continue cutting the U.N. budget and workforce. Beyond long-standing funding concerns, it wants to effect fundamental change across the global body, in particular the way it handles the three “pillars” of its charter — peace and security, development, and human rights — and adherence to international law.
“This institution desperately needs strong, effective leadership,” Mike Waltz, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., told a Senate hearing this spring. U.S. priorities, he said, were “reform, reform, reform … and getting back to basics on peace and security will be at the top of our criteria.”
This summer, high-level officials at the U.S. mission to U.N. headquarters in New York have conducted multiple interviews with six of the candidates — two new ones emerged this month, and there may be further nominations before any final decision.
President Donald Trump has not commented on a report last month by the New York Post that he wants Gianni Infantino, head of the world soccer federation FIFA, to have the job. But “there are tons of rumors about an October surprise,” said a longtime U.N. insider, one of several who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the secret voting process.
“They have until the end of December,” said a second person familiar with the process and its backroom machinations. The question, this person said:
“Does [Trump] come in at some point — everybody at the U.N. is waiting for this — and say, ‘I want … Infantino, [or] his daughter [or son-in-law Jared] Kushner.’ … Then the whole process gets set back as somebody figures out the politics of backing him down.”
One senior U.S. official acknowledged deep U.S. involvement but said that the interviews were more akin to “conversations,” adding that the administration does not have a preferred candidate among current or possible future nominees.
“We want the best candidate. Period. We’re not focused on anything that would limit the most talented people around the globe from putting their names up.”
While they may differ on how it is done, few member states disagree with the need for reform. Peter Yeo, senior vice president of the U.N. Foundation and a longtime expert on U.S.-U.N. relations, said:
“This particular race is different from all the others. Fundamental questions are being asked about the future role of the organization … what the U.N. does, what is its mandate, what programs it should be running, how it should be financed. It’s not just the United States asking.”
Trump, who has denigrated a host of international organizations, has sharply criticized the U.N. as ineffective, wasteful and out of tune with U.S. priorities. He has canceled U.S. membership and voluntary donations to many of its agencies — most prominently the World Health Organization — while U.S. humanitarian and development aid has been shunted away from international programs toward bilateral assistance that reflects “America First” priorities.
Annual member dues to the regular U.N. budget are assessed according to a formula that includes gross national product and population, and the U.S. has long been the biggest contributor. But until recently, the Trump administration had paid nothing while it pushed for severe budget cuts and organizational changes.
Early this year, as Guterres warned that the U.N. faced “imminent financial collapse,” the administration paid about $160 million of last year’s more than $800 million assessment, according to the U.S. official. On Aug. 4, following staff and budget cuts in which the U.S. was heavily involved, the administration notified Congress that it intends to pay $725 million of this year’s dues.
Technically, the secretary general is elected by a majority vote in the 193-member General Assembly. But only once, in 1950, has there been more than one person on the ballot delivered to the assembly by the 15-member Security Council. The council’s approval requires at least nine votes, though each of the five permanent members — the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and France — has veto power.
It has long been agreed that the secretary general should not be from one of the permanent five members, who already wield tremendous power with their vetoes, and that the position will rotate among different regions of the world. Since the U.N. was founded in 1945, some of the nine who have held the office, including Guterres, have served two consecutive five-year terms. Africa, Asia and Europe have had multiple chances, but only one secretary general has come from Latin America — Peru’s Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who served from 1982 to 1991.
All five of the currently nominated women are Latin Americans, as is one of the three men. The other two men are from Africa. All are former U.N. or national officials in their home governments, or both, and most have campaigned strenuously for the job.
Beginning this summer, council members are periodically holding secret straw votes in which they “encourage,” “discourage” or offer no opinion on each candidate. In officially unreleased but widely disseminated results of the first vote, held in late July, the top three were Rebeca Grynspan, former Costa Rican vice president and former head of U.N. Trade and Development; Carolyn Rodrigues Birkett, former foreign minister and current U.N. ambassador from Guyana; and Rafael Mariano Grossi, an Argentine diplomat who has been director general of the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency since 2019.
In a second straw vote Friday, all three were reportedly still out in front, but no one looked like a runaway……………………………………………………… https://www.sott.net/article/508526-Trump-administration-dives-into-U-N-Secretary-General-race
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