Canada’s silence on the U.S. and Saudi Arabia’s nuclear agreement isn’t neutrality. It’s something much worse

July 28, 2026, By Lloyd Axworthy, Contributor, Lloyd Axworthy is a former longtime MP who served as Canadian foreign minister from 1996 to 2000. https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/canadas-silence-on-the-us-and-saudi-arabias-nuclear-agreement-isnt-neutrality-its-something-much-worse/article_99b7a436-6aa5-4627-9a04-15c688fcc5a7.html

Canada’s nuclear story has always been one of choice. In 1946, with Hiroshima still smouldering, Canada could have become a nuclear weapons state. It possessed the uranium, the scientific expertise, the industrial base, and the Manhattan Project experience that would have made it possible. The St Laurent government chose differently, pushing for international control of nuclear arms while directing Canadian nuclear power toward civilian ends. That was not weakness. It was judgment.

That decision forged a legacy of principled support for nuclear non-proliferation. But somewhere along the way, Canada lost its nerve. Today it speaks firmly against adversaries, grows cautious with allies and falls silent when principle would demand risk. The moral inconsistency is hard to miss.

Consider NATO. In 1998, Parliament did not rubber-stamp the government’s position on the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. It held hearings across the country, listening to Canadians, experts, and international voices. The skepticism about nuclear dependence that emerged was not an elite whim; it was the product of genuine democratic scrutiny, and Parliament pressed NATO to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War world.

That tradition has withered. Canada remains outside the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, hovers at the margins of disarmament diplomacy, and supports the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty mostly in ways that preserve the system without challenging its glaring contradictions. Canada talks as if the nuclear order is stable, even as norms crumble under selective enforcement and expanding arsenals.

Which brings us to now. The United States and Saudi Arabia are negotiating a nuclear arrangement that could normalize sensitive nuclear know-how and open the door to enrichment capabilities. Meanwhile, Washington uses its military force to stop Iran from pursuing the very same path. The message is unmistakable: nuclear restraint is demanded of some, relaxed for others when strategic or commercial interests beckon.

Canada has said almost nothing. That silence is not neutrality. In matters of nuclear proliferation, silence in the face of double standards is complicity. If enrichment is too dangerous for Iran, it is too dangerous for Saudi Arabia. If latent weapons capacity is unacceptable in one context, it cannot be tolerated in another simply because the recipient is a partner.

Canada has learned, at some cost, what can happen when civilian nuclear cooperation outpaces strategic caution. In the 1960s and 1970s, Canadian-supplied technology and uranium helped power India’s nuclear program, which was later diverted toward weapons development. That episode reshaped Canada’s export controls and helped define its modern non-proliferation posture. It stands as a reminder that intent can change, safeguards can erode and today’s partner can become tomorrow’s proliferator.

The commercial dimension sharpens the point. Westinghouse, poised to profit from Saudi nuclear contracts, is owned by Brookfield Asset Management, which acquired the company in 2023. A former chair of Brookfield is now our Prime Minister. This does not prove wrongdoing. But in nuclear policy, the appearance of conflict can be as corrosive as conflict itself, because credibility depends on the public belief that decisions rest on principle, not convenience.

A serious Canadian response would begin with a simple standard: civilian nuclear cooperation must be judged by the same rules, regardless of the country involved. That means no weakening of safeguards, intrusive verification, strong IAEA oversight, and full transparency.

It is time for another cross-country parliamentary examination of Canadian nuclear policy: a genuine national inquiry for a more dangerous nuclear age. The last serious parliamentary engagement shaped Canada’s thinking in the 1990s. The world has changed. Nuclear rivalry has returned, arms control is fraying and civilian nuclear deals are becoming vehicles for strategic ambiguity once again. Canada needs a fresh review that hears from Parliament, experts, Indigenous communities, diplomats, arms-control advocates and alliance partners

Such an inquiry should ask uncomfortable questions. What does Canada actually believe about nuclear deterrence? How should it respond when allies weaken non-proliferation norms? What standards should govern Canadian approval of civil nuclear cooperation, and should Canada remain on the sidelines of nuclear-ban diplomacy? Most importantly, how does it reconcile its commitment to international law with the strategic bargains being negotiated?

Canada does not need to abandon its alliances to recover its voice. It needs to recover its judgment. The country that once chose not to become a nuclear weapons state (despite having every means to do so) should not now stand silent while others normalize nuclear pathways under the banner of peaceful use. The country that once used Parliament to re-examine its nuclear assumptions should do so again.

The challenge is not merely to condemn nuclear danger where it is politically easy, but to do so everywhere it appears, including among friends, allies and trading partners. That is the standard Canada should set for itself. Parliament should help it reclaim that standard.