The Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce: The wrong questions, the wrong team, the wrong answers

Policy Brief May 2026

The UK government’s 2025 Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce, established to cut “red tape” blocking nuclear expansion, is fundamentally misconceived. Historical evidence shows that failed nuclear projects collapsed due to financial risk, not regulatory failure. The Taskforce lacked expertise in radiation science, environment, and economics, its recommendations threaten regulator independence, and its reforms will consume government resources without delivering new capacity before the mid-2040s.

1.      Introduction

In February 2025 Prime Minister Starmer announced the setting up of a Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce with a press release¹ headed “Government rips up rules to fire-up nuclear power” and sub-headed “More nuclear power plants will be approved across England and Wales as the Prime Minister slashes red tape to get Britain building.” This set the tone for future announcements with emotive language and little substance but designed to generate headlines.

The narrative was clear. The planning and regulatory system had failed: “The industry pioneered in Britain has been suffocated by regulations and this saw investment collapse, leaving only one nuclear power plant – Hinkley Point C – under construction.” Any opposition to nuclear projects was trivial and should be ignored – “saying no to the NIMBYs” and “saying no to the blockers who have strangled our chances of cheaper energy, growth and jobs for far too long.”

In April 2025 the leader of the taskforce, John Fingleton, was announced². In May, the other four members were revealed and the terms of reference³ announced (see Annex 1). An interim report was published in August 2025⁴ with the Final Report published on 24^th November, 2025.⁵ Within two days of its publication, the government had accepted all its recommendations, promising a detailed response in February 2026 and full implementation within two years.⁶ It is not clear whether government had advance notice of the findings or whether it accepted them without detailed consideration.

The barrage of headline grabbing rhetoric continued throughout, for example, at the publication of the Interim Report, Fingleton described the regulatory system as “not fit for purpose”⁷. The Final Report said: “We are looking to recommend fundamental once-in-a-generation change in the regulatory system to enable the UK’s nuclear sector to thrive and take full advantage of the global resurgence of nuclear technology.”⁸

2.      Terms of reference

The Review’s terms of reference reflected the clear signals that this was not an open investigation to determine whether delivery of the UK’s nuclear ambitions could be accomplished. The conclusions the government required were signposted and reflected in the terms of reference, which are reproduced in full in Annex 1. In brief, they directed the Taskforce to: gain quick wins by accelerating existing work on international harmonisation, regulatory justification and ALARP; assess whether current practices remain fit for purpose; identify beneficial legislative amendments; reduce regulatory complexity and address resource constraints; refresh expected regulatory outcomes; evaluate regulatory culture and proportionality across the sector; determine how well current arrangements support new and novel nuclear technologies; and explore options for simpler exchange of technologies and companies with advanced nuclear states with aligned priorities.

Most of these are too non-specific to have any analytical value. The one that deserves comment is the first. Its title ‘quick wins’ is strange as what follows does not appear to lead to quick wins.

The specific mention of the application of the concept of keeping risk As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) is significant. It came in the same month as President Trump instructed the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission to effectively ignore the assumption every credible national and international regulatory and expert body makes, that there is no safe dose of radiation and that the risk increases in a ‘linear’ way with increased exposure: the Linear No Threshold (LNT) assumption. Trump said⁹:

“Adopt science-based radiation limits. In particular, the NRC shall reconsider reliance on the linear no-threshold (LNT) model for radiation exposure and the “as low as reasonably achievable” [ALARA] standard, which is predicated on LNT. Those models are flawed, as discussed in section 1 of this order.”

This is an extraordinary claim by a US President asserting that the assumption made by every credible regulatory body, LNT, was not science-based. There are detailed differences in emphasis between ALARA and ALARP (ALARP is used more in the UK) but for these purposes they are very similar. Starmer was not as explicit as Trump in questioning LNT but mention of ALARP made it clear that was precisely what he was doing. Making such an instruction calls into question a fundamental principle that should be behind every nuclear safety regulator, that it should be independent of the government.

At first glance, the final reference point, international harmonisation, seems common sense. However, given the record of regulatory bodies not anticipating any of the major accidents or safety challenges – Three Mile Island (1978), Chornobyl (1986), the 9/11 Terror Attack on New York (2001), Fukushima (2011) and now the risk to Zaporizhia from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – the plurality of separate regulatory bodies coming to their own conclusions, albeit with reference to the work of other regulators, would seem to be a strength worth retaining.

In practical terms, the new reactor designs under review by the UK – the Holtec, GE Vernova, and Rolls Royce Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) – were first reviewed in detail by the UK and are not yet under detailed review by France or the USA. The GE Vernova design only started review in Canada less than a year ago, well behind the UK. So, the demand for international harmonisation is a strawman.

3.      Did the Taskforce have the required skills?

The Taskforce comprised five members:

• John Fingleton, Taskforce Lead. He is an economist with much of his career spent in government competition authorities and with a strong record of advocating for the increase in reliance on competitive mechanisms.
• Andrew Sherry. Professor of Materials and Structure at Manchester University with a history of working with UK government-owned bodies such as the National Nuclear Laboratory.
• Mark Bassett. A career in national and international regulatory bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Office of Nuclear Regulation.
• Sue Ion. Nuclear engineer with a career primarily in government owned nuclear bodies such as British Nuclear Fuels and a vocal advocate for nuclear power.
• Mustafa Latif-Aramaesh. Planning lawyer with a history of drafting UK laws.

The skills offered by the Taskforce only make some sense if the Terms of Reference are an accurate representation of the issues that have impeded various UK government’s nuclear ambitions. There is no mention of economics or competition in the terms of reference, so it appears the Taskforce Lead did not bring any specific skills to the team. There are references to changes to laws so if it is the legal structure that is holding back nuclear deployment, Latif-Aramesh’s appointment has some logic. Otherwise, the strong impression is of a team comprising members with no record of bringing a critical perspective to the nuclear industry.

Only one member of the Taskforce appears to have specific experience of regulation, and none has any experience of building or operating nuclear plants. The first of the Terms of Reference, so-called ‘quick wins’, relies on a judgement on the Linear No Threshold assumption, yet there is nobody in the Taskforce with the fundamental scientific credentials to make such judgements. There is also considerable discussion of modifying environmental requirements, yet the Taskforce has no expertise in environmental issues. Only Latifah-Aramesh has experience in planning and as a lawyer.

4.      What is the evidence and where is the Taskforce’s analysis of it?

The government has been pushing a narrative that the UK is uniquely bad at building nuclear power plants, and that inefficiencies in the planning and regulatory system are to blame. We are told that the UK was a world leader in nuclear technology in the 1960s and reforms to planning and regulation would allow us to reclaim that position in a ‘globally resurgent nuclear industry’ and launch a ‘Golden Age’ for nuclear. What is the evidence for this diagnosis?

In Annex 4 we look at the first two decades of nuclear power in the UK, up to the mid-70s, portrayed as the period when the UK was a world-leader with nuclear power. The analysis shows after the two first Magnox stations, it was a period of decline from, at best, mediocrity. In 1977, Henderson an economist with experience at the UK Treasury stated¹⁰ that the AGR and Concorde programmes were “two of the three worst civil investment decisions in the history of mankind.”

4.1.     The Thatcher Programme: Sizewell B………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. https://policybrief.org/briefs/the-nuclear-regulatory-taskforce-the-wrong-questions-the-wrong-team-the-wrong-answers/

May 14, 2026 - Posted by Christina Macpherson | safety, UK