China’s Misunderstood Nuclear Expansion

How U.S. Strategy Is Fueling Beijing’s Growing Arsenal

Foreign Affairs, By M. Taylor Fravel, Henrik Stålhane Hiim, and Magnus Langset Trøan, November 10, 2023

Among the many issues surrounding China’s ongoing military modernization, perhaps none has been more dramatic than its nuclear weapons program. For decades, the Chinese government was content to maintain a comparatively small nuclear force. As recently as 2020, China’s arsenal was little changed from previous decades and amounted to some 220 weapons, around five to six percent of either the U.S. or Russian stockpiles of deployed and reserve warheads.

Since then, however, China has been rapidly expanding and modernizing its arsenal. In 2020, it began constructing three silo fields to house more than 300 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A year later, it successfully tested a hypersonic glide vehicle that traveled 21,600 miles, a test that likely demonstrated China’s ability to field weapons that can orbit the earth before striking targets, known as a “fractional orbital bombardment system.” Simultaneously, the Chinese government has accelerated its pursuit of a complete nuclear triad—encompassing land-, sea-, and air-launched nuclear weapons—including by developing new submarine- and air-launched ballistic missiles. By 2030, according to U.S. Defense Department estimates, China will probably have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads—a more than fourfold increase from just a decade earlier…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

writings and analysis since 2015 suggest that China’s nuclear expansion is less a shift in Chinese intentions than a response to what Beijing perceives as threatening changes in U.S. nuclear strategy, reflecting an acute security dilemma. Chinese analysts are worried that the United States has lowered its threshold for nuclear use—including allowing for limited first use in a Taiwan conflict—and that the U.S. military is acquiring new capabilities that could be used to destroy or significantly degrade China’s nuclear forces. Thus, many Chinese experts have concluded that China needs a more robust arsenal.

Given Chinese and U.S. fears about each other’s nuclear programs, increased communication may help to break the spiral. Based on Chinese fears, the United States should understand how changes in its nuclear capabilities and doctrine play a critical role in shaping China’s threat perceptions and perceived force requirements. Going forward, China will continue to respond to U.S. advances that are viewed as weakening China’s nuclear deterrent.

Similarly, Beijing should understand that the lack of transparency surrounding its rapid nuclear expansion has fueled worst-case assessments by the United States. Continued lack of transparency will lead to even greater U.S. suspicion—and feed an intensifying arms race between the two countries……………………………………………………………………………….

the 2018 review increased Chinese fears that the United States might engage in limited nuclear first use during a conventional conflict with China, most likely over Taiwan. According to Chinese arms control expert Li Bin, the document suggested that “the United States would use its nuclear weapons to respond to nonnuclear Chinese aggressions.”………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. more https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/chinas-misunderstood-nuclear-expansion