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CRIIRAD and the real dangers of recent radiation found in Europe! Nov 2017

IRSN-carte-Ru-106_20171109

CRIiRAD press release (Roughly translated from French to English) Image source; http://www.irsn.fr/EN/newsroom/News/Pages/20171109_Detection-of-Ruthenium-106-in-France-and-in-Europe-Results-of-IRSN-investigations.aspx

Valencia, November 10, 2017 (11H)
Commission of Research and Information
Independent on Radioactivity
29 courses Manuel de Falla / 26000 Valence / France
. 33 (0) 4 75 41 82 50 / bruno.chareyron@criirad.org

RUTHENIUM 106
Contamination with ruthenium 106
Radioactive releases are considerable and would come from Russia or from nearby countries!
Officials are finally concerned about the importance of the ruthenium 106 discharges
from September 2017, and the risks incurred as close as possible to the source term! At first, the Official releases have simply emphasized the absence of risk in France and Europe.

The CRIIRAD had alerted as early as October 5, but to no avail, about the risks incurred by local populations. However, we know since Chernobyl that we must act very quickly because the exposure is major in the first days and the first weeks.
Reminder: Abnormal presence of ruthenium 106 1 in European air detected at the end of September
In a press release 2 of 4 October 2017, IRSN stated that ruthenium 106 had been
detected in the air of several European countries and concluded, without any reservations on the levels at the accident site and in nearby areas: “Very low levels of contamination atmospheric ruthenium 106 observed to date by the European monitoring networks are without consequences for the environment and for health. Nevertheless, IRSN maintains vigilance monitoring of this presence of ruthenium in the air “.
CRIIRAD expressed concern on 5 October
In its communiqué of 5 October 2017, CRIIRAD stated: “The origin of the
phenomenon and risk levels closer to the source term “. “It is important that the origin of these rejections of ruthenium 106 is found. From this point of view, the lack of information is worrying. Yes, the installation at the origin of the discharges is not aware of it, it has not been able to put in place radiation protection, while the doses to residents or workers concerned may not be be negligible. If it is concealment, the situation is even more problematic. ”
The Russian track
More than a month has elapsed and, to our knowledge, the exact origin of this contamination is not elucidated. Simulations carried out by French radiation protection agencies (IRSN) and German (BfS), evoked an origin south of the Urals. The Russian authorities had reacted by denying any responsibility.
1
Ruthenium 106 is an artificial radionuclide (fission product), a radiation emitter beta period relatively long (1.02 years). It disintegrates, giving birth to rhodium 106, a radiation emitter beta and gamma period 29.8 seconds.
2
http://www.irsn.fr/FR/Actualites_presse/Actualites/Pages/20171004_Detection-ruthenium-106-en-
europe.aspx # .WgSLhXbkV8x
3
http://balises.criirad.org/pdf/CP_CRIIRAD_171005_Ru106_Europe.pdf
4
https://fr.sputniknews.com/international/201710111033422527-ruthenium-europe-russie/
Ruthenium 106 Europe
CHAREYRON – CRIIRAD

1 / 3A colossal rejection between the Volga and the Urals?
In a new press release of 9 November 2017, IRSN states that the assumption of the impact on earth of a ruthenium-containing satellite was rejected by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy).
Assume then that ruthenium 106 comes from landfill releases, and from
the simulation database, IRSN indicates “the most plausible zone of rejection lies between the Volga and the Urals without it being possible, with the available data, to specify the exact location of the point of discharge.
Indeed, it is in this geographical area that the simulation of a rejection of ruthenium makes it possible to better to reproduce the measurements obtained in Europe “and” For the most plausible rejection zone, the quantity of ruthenium-106 rejected estimated by the IRSN simulations is very important, between 100 and 300 terabecquerels. The release, accidental with regard to the quantity released, would have occurred during the last week of the month of September 2017 “.
If it is a question of emissions coming from a single installation of up to 300 Terabecquerels,
corresponds to a colossal amount, 300 thousand billion becquerels is a figure, as a
comparison, 375,000 times the maximum allowed annual discharge 6 of the Cruas nuclear power plant.
Ruthenium 106 is an artificial fission product that, once dropped on the ground and on the plant cover, will induce a lasting contamination, it takes more than a year for its radioactivity to be divided by two.
As the IRSN notes: “Due to the quantities rejected, the consequences of an accident of this magnitude in France would have required locally to implement measures to protect populations on a radius of the order of a few kilometers around the place of rejection. With regard to foodstuffs exceedances of maximum allowable levels (NMA) (1250 Bq / kg for ruthenium-106 and for products other than milk) would be observed over distances of the order of a few ens of kilometers around the point of rejection “.
It was therefore essential, as requested by CRIIRAD on 5 October 2017, to identify
the installation at the origin of the ruthenium 106 pollution and to implement
protection for the nearby population. And all the more because, as CRIIRAD has denounced several [times?]
Once again, the criteria for intervention 7 adopted by the French authorities to implement protective measures are excessively high.
However, the documents analyzed by CRIIRAD show that, as a first step, the official services in Europe have simply insisted on the absence of health consequences on the European territory.
This situation raises many questions about the effectiveness of the IAEA (International Energy AgencyAtomic) and official radiation protection agencies of European countries.
At the scale of Europe and France, why controls on aircraft likely to have
flew over the offending sectors have not been put in place?
Why did the embassies of the European countries not quickly put in place
in countries that are likely to be at the origin of these massive releases of
ruthenium 106 (collection of soil samples, plant cover, foodstuffs)?
5
http://www.irsn.fr/FR/Actualites_presse/Actualites/Pages/20171109_Detection-Ruthenium-106-en-france-et-en-
europe-result-of-investigation-from-IRSN.aspx # .WgR77nbkV8x
6
For fission and activation products beta and gamma emitters such as ruthenium 106.
7
IRSN for example refers to the applicable Maximum Admissibility Levels (NAM) for radioactive contamination food after a nuclear accident or other radiological emergency. CRIIRAD recalls that it has defeated against the adoption of these limits set at excessively high levels and based on a ratio expertise riddled with anomalies. In addition, the device should only be used in case of contamination massive barrier to access to uncontaminated food. Who wants to eat mushrooms containing 100 ruthenium becquerels 106 per kg on the pretext that in the event of an accident the authorized limit is 1,250 Bq / kg?

Consumers have the right to know and choose.

Ruthenium 106 Europe
CHAREYRON – CRIIRAD
2 / 3
If the European States did not underline the potential gravity of the situation for the populations and workers close to the facility, they could have at least worried about the protection of their nationals traveling or staying in the offending countries.
Protect people close to the place of emmision
To have lost more than 1 month to alert effectively is a serious mistake. In case of massive rejection of radioactive substances in the atmosphere, action must be taken quickly to limit the doses to populations close to the offending facility. In the absence of protective measures, the doses suffered could have gone well beyond health limits.
If it is probably too late to limit the risks associated with inhalation in the plume (we can think since the discharges have stopped for several weeks), the populations close to the facility are radiation-related radiation from ruthenium 106 and contamination by
ingestion of contaminated food. It is therefore important, depending on the levels of fallout, put in place appropriate countermeasures (evacuation or decontamination of soil).
It is equally important to advise them not to consume food that has been
foliar deposition or delayed contamination.
To the extent that some States are not able to ensure the radiological protection of citizens, it is more than ever necessary to support local NGOs and develop independent radiological controls .
For the French authorities there is nothing more to do?
With regard to the risks for people living in France, IRSN considers “on the one hand that the probability of a scenario that would see the importation into France of foodstuffs (especially mushrooms) contaminated with ruthenium-106 in the vicinity of the source of releases is extremely low and on the other hand, the potential health risk associated with this scenario is also very low. It does not appear necessary to put in place systematic controls of the contamination of imported food.
This position is taken up by ASN in its communiqué 8 of 9 November.
CRIIRAD considers, on the contrary, that it is essential to mobilize all States’ means
Europeans (controls on foodstuffs and products from the offending areas, actions at embassies) to precisely determine the origin of the discharges and to weigh
benefit from protective measures (even if they are late). We must think of local people and to nationals of foreign countries likely to be closer to the source term!
A systematic control of the imported food is not necessarily the most suitable, on the other hand, it is necessary for a specific radiological monitoring program to be implemented at European Union to verify ruthenium-106 contamination of risky foods from incriminated countries, but also by other less mobile radioactive substances that could be present in the local fallout without being detectable in the air at great distances.
Editor: Bruno CHAREYRON, nuclear physics engineer, director of the CRIIRAD laboratory.
Contact: bruno.chareyron@criirad.org
8
https://www.asn.fr/Informer/Actualites/Ruthenium-106-dans-l-air-ambiant-en-France-pas-de-risque-identifie-
for the population
Ruthenium 106 Europe
CHAREYRON – CRIIRAD

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November 10, 2017 - Posted by | Uncategorized

3 Comments »

  1. Reblogged this on nuclear-news and commented:

    It was therefore essential, as requested by CRIIRAD on 5 October 2017, to identify
    the installation at the origin of the ruthenium 106 pollution and to implement
    protection for the nearby population. And all the more because, as CRIIRAD has denounced several [times?]
    Once again, the criteria for intervention 7 adopted by the French authorities to implement protective measures are excessively high.
    However, the documents analyzed by CRIIRAD show that, as a first step, the official services in Europe have simply insisted on the absence of health consequences on the European territory.
    This situation raises many questions about the effectiveness of the IAEA (International Energy AgencyAtomic) and official radiation protection agencies of European countries.

    Comment by arclight2011part2 | November 13, 2017 | Reply

  2. Some guys went flying through that cloud!! Check what they found on https://youtu.be/nV7uNMQ9AgI

    Comment by Arctur Dent | November 14, 2017 | Reply

    • Using a gamma device to find Beta bearing energy isnt a good idea btw 🙂 music was dramatic though.. well done! i wont treat it as spam because i have a fondness for independent radiation monitors like CRIIRAD for example.. Keep up the good work and I hope you will not have to fly through a cloud of gamma bearing isotopes 😦 Namaste

      Comment by arclight2011part2 | November 14, 2017 | Reply


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