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The non-existence of the International Nuclear Emergency Service – Iouli Andreev

….As in Chernobyl, the situation confirmed that nuclear industry is unable to deal with large scale accidents….

[…]

….In 1988 former director of the IAEA Dr. Hans Blix visited Chernobyl and met Spetsatom’s leaders. During the meeting he said that an organization like Spetsatom would have to be established in the structure of IAEA,
but it seems this idea was not supported by the staff of the Agency. Now it is easier to understand which arguments were at the base of the decision not to create an international nuclear emergency center…..

[…]

Nuclear Emergency Service

Why does this service not exist on the international scale?

Iouli Andreev
Former Scientific Director of Soviet Nuclear Emergency Service “Spetsatom”

BOKU Wien 08.03.2012
Beyond design accidents.

http://www.risk.boku.ac.at/WP/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Vortrag_Andreev.pdf

Screenshot from 2013-12-29 02:21:26

How frequently do they happen?
• 1 – Three Mile Island, 1979
• 2 – Chernobyl, 1986
• 3 – Fukushima, 2011
It is too early to produce statistics from several events, but we may predict that “beyond design accident” will inevitably happen in future.

Three Mile Island 1979
• Nuclear safety is too expensive to permit nuclear energy to be competitive, the USA decided after Three Mile Island accident.
• During more than 30 years no new nuclear power plants were built in America.
• This does not mean America has no risk from nuclear accidents.
• A TMI control room operator wrote a memo warning of “a very serious accident” if the condensate system problems were not properly addressed. He stated that “the resultant damage could be very significant.” Additionally, James Cresswell, an NRC inspector, warned for two years that a design flaw with U-shaped tubes could prevent coolant circulation and cause an accident like that which later occured at TMI. His warnings were ignored until the NRC met with him six days before the accident at TMI.
(Testimony of former NRC Commissioner Peter A. Bradford, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, March 24, 2009)

Chernobyl 1986
• Positive void coefficient, the main cause of nuclear explosion in reactor, is inversely to the grade of fuel enrichment. The wish of industry to use the cheap low enriched fuel was a cause of decreasing safety. After the accident enrichment of RBMK fuel was increased from 1,8 to 2,4%.
BOKU Wien 08.03.2012
• It was found immediately after the Chernobyl accident that nuclear industry and civil defense forces cannot deal with consequences of the reactor explosion. The Special Military Scientific Center was created in Moscow within two weeks and sent on the ChAES site. It had orders to develop methods for regular army formations to deal with the consequences of the accident.
• In 1988 the Russian Government decided to create the Nuclear Emergency Service (“SpetsAtom”) to deal with future large scale nuclear accidents.
• Nuclear Industry attempted to downplay the role of SpetsAtom, saying that accidents like Chernobyl would never happen again in the future.

In 1988 former director of the IAEA Dr. Hans Blix visited Chernobyl and met Spetsatom’s leaders. During the meeting he said that an organization like Spetsatom would have to be established in the structure of IAEA, but it seems this idea was not supported by the staff of the Agency. Now it is easier to understand which arguments were at the base of the decision not to create an international nuclear emergency center.

Fukushima 2011
• In Fukushima TEPCO reduced costs by insufficient preparedness for the impact of tsunamis.
• The design of GE’s reactors itself was too cheap to be safe.


TEPCO was never properly prepared for disaster –loss of power sources was not envisioned
(The Japanese government’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) released part of an unedited severe accident manual for Fukushima No. 1)

Japan has been hit by 195 tsunamis since the year 400. In the last three decades, there have been three waves that were more than 30 feet high. Yet Tokyo Electric’s seawall defenses at Fukushima were built to protect the nuclear reactors from waves reaching only 17 feet high. “That is ridiculous,” says Ryohei
Morimoto, a retired volcanology professor at the University of Tokyo, (as quoted by “The Japan Times”).

“Even if they couldn’t predict the size of tsunami, they should have at least prepared for waves similar to those in the past.”

• From the start of emergency operations in Fukushima it was clear that Japan was absolutely unprepared for this type of task. TEPCO was assigned the responsibility for this work.
In time reactor cores melted, buildings exploded, chaotic processes started in the waste fuel storage tanks. Reliable information on the situation was missing.
As in Chernobyl, the situation confirmed that nuclear industry is unable to deal with large scale accidents.

What could a hypothetical International Nuclear Emergency Center have done in Fukushima?
• Daichi NPP lost power supply. A ship with at least 2MW generators and emergency equipment
should have entered the bay immediately and connected cables to all Units.
Simultaneously the reconnaissance work should have started with the help of experience “s
talkers” and remote controlled devices.

• Headquarter of NEC should have been located on a second ship along with a hostel for the NEC staff.
• Large mechanical and electronic workshops with design offices should have been located on a third
ship to produce non-standard equipment for the emergency work on short notice.
• Barges with 50 000 t displacement half filled with fresh water and equipped with pumps should have entered the bay. This was necessary to cool the reactors and contain radioactive cooling water.
• All the ships must be equipped with radiation control devices and be ready to abandon the bay in case radiation levels became too high.

RCV and Robots
• “Robots” are autonomous machines that do not requires human guiding. Therefore they are not
used during emergency work and hardly will be used in nearest future.
“Remote Controlled Vehicles” or “RCV” for use during nuclear emergencies are mobile, flying, floating or stationary, depending on the task. Stereo vision is necessary to guide RCV. It is useful to have a modular structure of RCVs.

What prevented the world from cooperation in the area of emergency preparedness ?
Nuclear industry preferred to claim that each current large sсale nuclear accident was the last
one, due to comprehensive safety measures that would prevent accidents in future.
For instance, after Fukushima accident a series of “stress tests” were performed to prove that
NPPs are not vulnerable to the earthquakes and flooding.

What prevented the world from cooperation in the area of emergency preparedness ?
• But what about the lax regulators, linked to industry, about greedy investors, cheep reactors, low
qualification of operators?
• It looks like a lazy janitor, who puts sand on the particular spot where somebody broke his leg, not
on the whole yard, covered by ice.
• The industry prefers not to attract attention to the problems of nuclear accidents, not to remind
society of nuclear emergencies.

Experience of the emergency workers is being lost with every year!

Screenshot from 2013-12-29 02:20:18

Screenshot from 2013-12-29 02:49:10

At the foot of Emperor Franz-Josef 🙂

More from Iouli Andreev here..

Introduction in German and Speech in English

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December 29, 2013 - Posted by | Uncategorized

2 Comments »

  1. […] The non-existence of the International Nuclear Emergency Service – Iouli Andreev (nuclear-news.net) […]

    Pingback by Promoting a More Lively Planet | JAPANsociology | December 30, 2013 | Reply

  2. […] We could then help better in mitigating contamination in the many areas that are polluted around the world and better support the most badly effected from this disaster and that would make us consider effects further away from ground zero. We need effective testing that is not available now and an independent radiological measuring organization such as the effrts of (The non-existence of the International Nuclear Emergency Service – Iouli Andreev) […]

    Pingback by About nuclear meltdowns, explosions and other technical stuff! « nuclear-news | January 4, 2014 | Reply


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