Iran didn’t have a nuclear weapon before this war. But you can see why it would develop one now
Simon Tisdall, 26 Apr 26, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/apr/26/iran-nuclear-weapon-war-develop-one-now
If lawless aggression by ‘might is right’ nuclear-armed powers spreads unchecked, what other option do middle-ranking countries have?
With every bomb dropped, ship seized and blood-curdling threat of annihilation, Donald Trump increases Iran’s incentive to reject his “grand bargain” peace deal and sprint instead to acquire nuclear weapons for future self-defence. Justifying his declaration of war on 28 February, Trump claimed that Iran – and primarily its nuclear programme – posed an “imminent threat”. But Iran does not possess nukes. The US and Israel do.
US intelligence chiefs and UN inspectors agree there’s no firm evidence that the regime, while developing its technical capabilities and keeping political options open, has built, or ever tried to build, a nuclear weapon since at least 2003, when a covert scheme was exposed. But after Trump’s second unprovoked attack in a year, and his vow to bomb Iranian civilisation back to the “stone ages”, that is very likely to change.
It’s increasingly difficult to argue with the view, attributed to the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps generals now running Iran, that nukes are the only sure way of deterring future onslaughts. The US and Israel have twice struck without warning, in the middle of diplomatic negotiations. Even if a peace deal were agreed, Iranians know the ever-vengeful Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu cannot be trusted. The US-Israel axis could sustain its aggression for years to come.
Trump’s focus on “obliterating” Iran’s nuclear programme is as woefully wide of the mark as any misdirected US Tomahawk cruise missile. Indigenous nuclear knowhow cannot be easily bombed away, no matter how many scientists Israel kills. And in any case, Tehran does not necessarily need to reconstitute the capacity and skills required to build nuclear weapons at home. It may be able to buy them off the shelf abroad.
North Korea, a longtime ally, would be the most likely source, while help from Vladimir Putin’s Russia (already collaborating on nuclear energy projects) cannot be entirely ruled out. Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang’s dictator, has steered clear of the war so far. But just as he covertly sent troops to assist Putin in Ukraine, he could yet secretly step in to arm Tehran. On nuclear proliferation, Kim has form.
Iran has joined a growing number of non-nuclear armed countries that have suffered grievously at the hands of domineering nuclear powers. In 1994, Ukraine surrendered its nukes in return for what turned out, when Russia first attacked it in 2014, to be valueless western security assurances. Iraq’s regime, lacking a nuclear deterrent, succumbed to US invasion in 2003. Would Trump have attacked Venezuela in January had it been nuclear-armed?
If the acknowledged nuclear weapons states honoured their 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) obligation to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nukes, others might feel less need of a nuclear shield. But they persistently break their word. Increasingly, the US and Russia abuse their dominant position – abuses that the NPT was specifically designed to prevent. Israel (unlike Iran) never signed the treaty.
Trump’s alarmingly irrational, impulsive and threatening behaviour creates uncertainty and insecurity by itself. But his militarism also fuels global nuclear weapons proliferation. The US is spending billions modernising its arsenal. Russia, North Korea, France and the UK are doing likewise, while China is rapidly, hugely expanding its forces. Yet Trump has refused to renew a series of cold war arms control treaties.
He trashed Barack Obama’s European-backed 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, a foolish decision that has led directly to today’s confrontation. On the first day of the war, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was targeted and killed. His binding fatwa expressly forbidding development of an Iranian bomb probably died with him.
Regarding Iran, Trump and Netanyahu labour under two fundamental misconceptions. Even if some form of cold peace is eventually established, Iranians will neither forgive nor forget atrocities such as the Minab school massacre, the wanton destruction visited on their country, and Washington’s diplomatic betrayals – whether or not the current regime remains in power. The “Iran threat” will persist. Second, Tehran still has options over which the US and Israel, despite military superiority, have no control.
Sanctioned, ostracised North Korea offers a possible template for Tehran. The Pyongyang regime originally developed its own atomic weapons using hidden market technology obtained from Pakistan. The Kim dynasty later made nuclear-related transfers to Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. It currently sells ballistic missiles to, among others, Iran and Russia.
It’s speculation at this point, but who’s to say Kim will not provide Iran with complete nuclear warheads? Or if that is too risky, he could supply highly enriched uranium, warhead designs and expertise in return for oil, suggested Mark Fitzpatrick, an International Institute for Strategic Studies non-proliferation expert and former senior US diplomat. If Kim did so, who would know and who could stop him?
Kim has grown increasingly emboldened since the failure of Trump’s embarrassing first-term charm offensive. Ignoring White House signals about renewed contacts when Trump visits Beijing next month, the North Korean leader ostentatiously test-fires new missiles, taunts South Korea and Japan, and stresses closer ties with China, Russia and Belarus. Speaking in March, he said US aggression in Iran “proved” North Korea was right to develop a nuclear deterrent. Tehran has surely heard that message.
If Kim is wrong, then why exactly does Trump treat North Korea so differently from Iran? After all, both countries menace their neighbours and embrace anti-western alliances, both are authoritarian regimes oppressing their citizens, and the North Korean nuclear threat is demonstrably genuine. The reason for the double standard seems obvious. Even Trump is not stupid enough to attack a nuclear-armed state.
The way Trump’s and Putin’s bellicose behaviour is legitimising arguments favouring the possession of nuclear weapons is prospectively disastrous for global non-proliferation efforts. If Iran does seek to acquire nukes to defend itself, will Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey follow? And that’s just in the Middle East. Like Ukraine, the Iran war also provides cover and precedent for other nuclear weapons states if they, too, decide to attack non-nuclear-armed countries. Might China follow suit in Taiwan? Given Iran’s fate, should Taipei rush to acquire nukes? Should Japan and South Korea?
Little wonder that an air of gloom hangs over the five-yearly NPT review conference, which opens in New York on Monday. Its challenges include ubiquitous nuclear weapons modernisation and expansion programmes; the collapse of arms control diplomacy; resumed nuclear testing; and what the Arms Control Association calls “rising nuclear dangers” and proliferation risks. “The idea of ‘global zero’, or a world without nuclear weapons, is seen to be steadily eroding,” a House of Commons Library research briefing warned this month.
This is no made-up story with which to scare the children. It’s real. Since invading Ukraine, Russia has repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons. So far, fortunately, it has not. In recent weeks, as Trump flailed in Iran, there was a flurry of reports, later denied, that the US, too, might resort to nukes. Sabre-rattling or not, such threats are becoming way too familiar. If a just and reasonable negotiated path can be found out of the present morass, Iran and similarly vulnerable middle-ranking countries may be persuaded to continue to forego nuclear weapons. But if lawless aggression by domineering “might is right” nuclear-armed powers spreads unchecked, the old cold war nightmare of mutually assured destruction will become today’s waking reality.
- Simon Tisdall is a Guardian foreign affairs commentator
Iran Survives Terrorist War and Emerges a Major Power Broker
From reports and observations we saw that many people, regardless of their political views, and including many who had returned home from other countries, were keen to defend their country from this foreign aggression. Not surprising, really.
Tim Anderson, Black Agenda Report, 22 Apr 2026 GOOD PHOTOS
Tim Anderson tours Iran during the US-Israeli war, showing different scenes from the terrorist targeting of civilians. He contends Iran has emerged with greater regional leverage, especially through its control over the Strait of Hormuz.
Originally published in Al Mayadeen English.
The unprovoked war against Iran by the USA and “Israel” has failed in spectacular fashion, with the Israeli colony in tatters, Washington looking for a way out while Iran holds the upper hand in peace “negotiations” proposed by Pakistan. Further, Tehran’s newly asserted control over shipping traffic passing into and out of the Persian Gulf (which neither the USA nor anyone else can shake) has given it tremendous new economic leverage.
Furthermore, the Iranian population has held together strongly under an extensive series of strikes on mainly civilian targets, which began with the assassination of the former Leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei and the murder of 168 people, mainly schoolgirls, at the primary school in Minab, in southern Iran. This coherence underwrites the stability and future of the Islamic Republic.
It is a strange war, as I was able to observe in its third and fourth weeks, with everyday life going on in most major cities, while terrorist atrocities take place in the background. As a bakery owner at Niloufar Square in Tehran told me, this is not a conventional war, like the US-backed Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, where militaries face each other across a frontline.
The bakery owner’s building had been demolished by an enemy missile which targeted the police station next door. The USraeli attack on the police station at Niloufar Square in Tehran also killed and wounded dozens at an adjacent café (see photo on original) and in surrounding residential apartments.
I was one of a group of four observers (a Turkish journalist, a Greek Lawyer and journalist and a North American videographer) hosted by the Iranian media, between 19 and 31 March. Our tour began in the northern city of Tabriz and wound its way down through Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Minab, the site of the schoolgirl atrocity. Mostly, we were observing the aftermath of USraeli attacks and the patriotic mobilisation of people virtually every evening in the major cities.
In every Iranian city we visited, tens of thousands poured out each evening in support of their country. That included a huge gathering for Eid prayers after Ramadan, at the Imam Khomeini Mosalla Mosque of Tehran (see photos), the first such gathering in 35 years that had not been addressed by the murdered Iranian leader Sayyed Ali Khamenei
From reports and observations we saw that many people, regardless of their political views, and including many who had returned home from other countries, were keen to defend their country from this foreign aggression. Not surprising, really.
It seems that Trump’s attack on Iran was encouraged by the Israeli propaganda against the Islamic Republic: the repeated claims that “the regime” was highly unpopular and isolated, often making use of heavily biased surveys. Israeli propaganda suggested that the Iranian people would rise up again this “regime” if it were decapitated. That, of course, did not happen, even after many leaders were assassinated.
This is the problem with “believing one’s own nonsense”, most of it generated by Israeli ‘Hasbara’ campaigns, which suggested that the Islamic Republic was hated and insubstantial.
That campaign made use of a wave of violence instigated by Mossad and the CIA in January 2026, as Israeli media and former CIA boss Mike Pompeo admitted, which infiltrated economic protests (after a currency collapse) and killed over 3,000 people (officially 3,117), including hundreds of police and volunteers (Basij).
In Iran, our group saw people of all sorts, but mainly women, coming out to defend their nation and their military. The aim of the Trump-Israeli war was never clearly spelt out, though it is plain that the Israelis wanted to destroy or dismember Iran. The lack of any clear pretext for war led to many of the US allies distancing themselves, while less discriminate ‘allies’ instinctively went along with whatever the US said or did.
As it happened, Iran’s formidable deterrent force of missile and drones punished the Israelis for more than a month, while partially or totally destroying all 13 US bases in the Arab Monarchies of the Persian Gulf. US ships could not approach the Persian Gulf for fear of Iranian missile strikes. For similar reasons, there was no US ground invasion.
Yet we saw traumatised family after traumatised family as we passed through the cities………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Though our observations were anecdotal, the Iranian Red Crescent informed us in Tehran that there had been 81,000 strikes on civilian sites. By the time we reached Shiraz, this had risen to 85,000. By early April, the Red Crescent said over 2,100 people had been killed and 115,000 civilian facilities damaged.
We did see reports of USraeli attacks on military sites (such as the large but futile attacks on the missile mountain at Yazd), but a senior security official in Shiraz told me that, for that province and by late March, there had been 53 military and 72 civilians killed.
Neither the US nor the Israelis respect Iranian cultural heritage. We saw serious damage to the historic Golestan palace and the Pahlavi palace-museum complex in Tehran, from bunker buster bombs. There was similar shockwave damage to the Chehel Sotoun palace in Isfahan. The latter had been damaged by attacks on the nearby provincial governor’s offices. In each case sheets of plastic with UNESCO blue shield insignia had been laid out, to designate cultural property to be protected in the event of armed conflict; to no avail. Colonial aggressors have little regard for indigenous heritage.
Traveling down the Persian Gulf coast from Bushehr – where we saw destruction of the Meteorology station and the main hospital – we eventually arrived at Bandar Abbas and then Minab, site of the schoolgirl massacre. After visiting one bereaved family, we went to the graveyard, where mothers and fathers were still encamped, mourning their lost children. Some graves were being reinforced after the flooding rain of previous days.
Many held clothing and the shattered backpacks of children, which have become symbols of the massacre. Moving to the school, we examined the site to satisfy ourselves that there were no military facilities in the vicinity. In fact, the site had been a military compound, many years ago. It was handed over to the Health and then to the Education Ministry, and the primary school was constructed 13 years ago.
Amidst the obfuscation over this massacre (Trump at first tried to falsely blame the Iranians) a blunt assessment fell to former U.S. Army Counterterrorism Intelligence Officer Josephine Guilbeau. She said the attack, involving multiple Tomahawk missiles, was a clear case of deliberate terrorism and that US intel would have known very well that the site was a school and, at that time of day, full of children. She named USS Spruance Commander Leigh R. Tate and Executive Officer Jeffrey E. York as the officers to be held accountable for this terrorist atrocity.
Returning to the port city of Bandar Abbas, our visit to Hormuz Island – facilitated by the governor of Hormuzgan Province – was interrupted by the drone bombing of the port at the island. As a result, we went out into the straits in a boat and observed the many ships sitting offshore.
From Iranian reports and interviews (of the Governor of Hormuzgan and s specialist energy sector journalist at Bandar Abbas) I gathered the following: the Straits of Hormuz were not “closed” but shipping linked to the enemy had been blocked by the IRGC, while shipping from some of the other Persian Gulf states was being taxed (with a toll), and ships from friendly states (e.g. Iraq and China) were passing freely. This was clarified repeatedly over the following weeks. At an early stage, the main shipping insurance companies recognised IRGC security clearance as a factor in reducing risk premiums and therefore the financial viability of passage.
While the Straits had been open to all before the US-Israeli war, there was now security regulation, enforced by Iran. Washington has not even come close to seizing control of the Straits.
Overall, many years of Iranian “strategic patience” came to an end with the direct attacks on Iran by Washington, and that, in turn, delivered a powerful new weapon to Tehran, control of the gateway to 20% of the world energy supplies.
The Western media reacted with chagrin. Australian state media, the ABC, seeing that there was a fellow Australian at Hormuz, contacted me, but not to ask any details of what I had seen. Rather, reporter Henry Zwartz asked me if I had been paid to appear in an “Iranian propaganda video”. That shows how little interest the Australian state media had in the details of any new war; they would prefer to smear anyone appearing to contradict their official story.
As it happened, the USraeli war against Iran was failing badly and desperately trying to cover its tracks. The US military could neither invade Iran nor enter the Persian Gulf, for fear of Iranian missiles and drones. Trump ranted and raved about how he was winning and how Iran had been “crushed” and the Western media reported this credulously. Washington claimed virtually no casualties, after they had lost at least a dozen warplanes and a dozen military bases across the Persian Gulf. Those hidden casualties will emerge under some cover, down the track.
Importantly, Iran asserted sovereign control over passage through the Straits of Hormuz (regulating what is called “innocent passage” under the customary law of territorial seas – neither Iran nor the USA are parties to UNCLOS) and Washington was unable to undo this, resorting eventually to a secondary blockade of the Straits. Peace talks in Pakistan failed due to intransigence on the US side.
The better Anglo-American commentators have recognised not just the failure of this war but the fact that its failure signals an end to the era of US unilateralism. Professor John Mearsheimer said that Iran, had gained the lever of Hormuz, unregulated before the war, and oversaw the Israelis “poison[ing] their relations with the United States”. British analyst David Hearst said that Trump’s bile and stupidity had effectively enhanced Iran’s power in the Persian Gulf.
Researcher Ali Mamouri wrote “No matter how the blockade plays out, Iran will be in a far better position in the long term when it comes to maintaining control over the strait – not the US.”
The likely larger cost of US defeat will be withdrawal of all US bases from the Persian Gulf – now a key Iranian demand – and strategic retreat along the lines of that set out by Nixon after defeat of the US in Vietnam. In 1969, President Richard Nixon announced his ‘Guam Doctrine” from a Pacific island base. The claim will be – now as then – that Washington is “rebalancing” its commitments and leaving greater responsibility for its “allies”.
Some embedded journalists have already argued this was Trump’s approach in his first term, when he sought to make allies pay more for their own security. It might better be seen as a cover for a humiliating defeat and yet another step in the decline of the US global hegemony. Remember that China is also committed to Iranian (i.e. independent) control of Hormuz and thus of its key source of energy. That is, of course, why Beijing continues to support Iran in logistics, defence technology and intelligence. In any case, Trump will be looking for some face saving consolation prize to cover up this monumental failure.
Tim Anderson is the Director of the Sydney-based Centre for Counter Hegemonic Studies. https://blackagendareport.com/iran-survives-terrorist-war-and-emerges-major-power-broker
10 takeaways from Trump’s senseless Iran war

Walt Zlotow West Suburban Peace Coalition Glen Ellyn IL , 23 April 26, https://theaimn.net/ten-takeaways-from-trumps-senseless-iran-war/
1. First time a foreign power, Israel, goaded, indeed demanded America launch a criminal war
2. Trump’s capitulation to Israel’s war demand is destroying his presidency and will likely hand over Congress to Democrats in November
3. Air power alone has not and will not achieve victory over Iran
4. Ignoring Iran’s ability to close Strait of Hormuz gave strategic advantage to Iran to force stalemate, if not achieve outright Iranian victory
5. US has greatly degraded world economy and may spiral it into recession, possibly even depression if it doesn’t end war soon
6. All US Gulf States bases have been damaged or destroyed and may never be rebuilt due to loss of US security credibility to Gulf States
7. Israel has largely destroyed its support among young Americans disgusted with its endless manipulation of US to support both its Gaza Genocide under Biden and war to destroy Iran under Trump
8. If desperate Trump resumes bombing to destroy Iranian infrastructure, Iran will retaliate destroying Israeli and Gulf States infrastructure, possibly all Middle East oil production
9. A peaceful settlement on Iran’s sensible terms is the only path to Middle East peace
10. As long as the war continues, Israeli use of nuclear weapons remains a possibility
GOP Senator Suggests Trump Should “Finish” Iran With Nuclear Bomb

The senator, Roger Marshall, said Trump has to “take everything into consideration” if ceasefire progress stalls
.By Sharon Zhang , Truthout, April 22, 2026, https://truthout.org/articles/gop-senator-suggests-trump-should-finish-iran-with-nuclear-bomb/?utm_source=Truthout&utm_campaign=9a9827f3a8-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2026_04_22_09_22&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_bbb541a1db-9a9827f3a8-650192793
epublican Sen. Roger Marshall (Kansas) said in an interview on Wednesday that President Donald Trump faces issues on par with those of World War II with regard to the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran, seeming to suggest that Trump should nuke Iran in order to prevent the country from ever having nuclear weapons.
Marshall was asked by a Newsmax anchor if he believes that the U.S. military will “have to go in and finish this job” if negotiations between the U.S. and Iran for a permanent ceasefire continue for several more weeks.
“I think that’s right,” said the senator. “Previous presidents have had the same issues on what to do. Think about President Truman’s decision on dropping the bomb, and D-Day for President Eisenhower.”
“You’ve got to take everything into consideration,” Marshall said, including whether negotiations are “truly making progress or not.”
Earlier in the interview, the senator said that the U.S.’s aggression against Iran is necessary because “Iran can never, never, ever have a nuclear weapon.”
Related Story
“If Iran had a nuclear weapon, gasoline would be $10 a gallon, and for generations to come, Americans’ lives would be threatened,” the lawmaker said.
The statements echo Trump’s genocidal rhetoric toward Iran, including his threat to “blow up the rest of their Country” if negotiations falter on Tuesday. Legal experts have said that Trump’s indiscriminate threats against Iran as a whole, as well as his pledges to target civilian infrastructure like power plants, constitute threats to commit war crimes.
Marshall also bragged about the harm that the U.S. is causing civilians with Trump’s blockade on Iran.
“We also have this embargo working as well, the blockade, and we’re literally starving them,” said Marshall, “both financially and they can’t feed themselves either, very long.”
The use of starvation as a weapon of war is prohibited under international law.
The UN indeed warned last month that an additional 45 million people may be “pushed into acute hunger by price rises” if the conflict and closure of the Strait of Hormuz continue through June, adding to the already record high of 319 million people currently facing acute food insecurity. Iran previously pledged to open passage through the strait as a term of the temporary ceasefire agreement, but is still prohibiting ships from crossing due to Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and the U.S.’s blockade of Iranian ports, which Iranian officials have said are both violations of the ceasefire.
Republicans have previously called for the usage of nuclear weapons with impunity. Last May, Rep. Randy Fine (R-Florida), said that Israel should drop a nuclear weapon on Gaza. “We nuked the Japanese twice in order to get unconditional surrender. That needs to be the same here,” he said. “There is something deeply, deeply wrong with this culture and it needs to be defeated.”
The staunchly pro-Israel lawmaker’s statements were condemned by rights advocates — but, just weeks later, Republican leaders granted him a seat on the high-powered House Foreign Affairs Committee.
This followed a remark by another Republican House lawmaker, Rep. Tim Walberg (Michigan), who said in March of 2024 that Gaza should be attacked “like Nagasaki and Hiroshima.”
No Peace, Only Escalation: The Push Toward Total War With Iran
April 22, 2026 , https://scheerpost.com/2026/04/22/no-peace-only-escalation-the-push-toward-total-war-with-iran/
As ceasefire talks collapse, retired Col. Douglas Macgregor warns that Washington is not negotiating—it’s preparing for a devastating, infrastructure-targeting war that could reshape the global order.
The language of peace still lingers in official statements—but on the ground, the machinery of war is accelerating.
In this stark and deeply unsettling conversation, retired U.S. Colonel Douglas Macgregor joins Glenn Diesen to dismantle the illusion of diplomacy surrounding the Iran conflict. What’s being sold as negotiation, he argues, is little more than theater—designed to calm markets, not stop bombs.
Behind the headlines, a far more dangerous reality is taking shape: a coordinated buildup for what Macgregor describes as a potential “total war” scenario, one that moves beyond military targets and toward the destruction of an entire state’s infrastructure.
If he’s right, the question is no longer whether the war will escalate—but how far it will go, and how much of the world it will drag with it.
A cause for major concern—one that cannot be repeated enough—is this warning from Macgregor:
“There was no real path to an agreeable solution—because there was no real negotiation. When the vice president steps out mid-meeting to take a call from Netanyahu, it tells you everything. These aren’t negotiations. It suggests that Netanyahu—not Trump—is effectively calling the shots on whether we go to war.”
Highlights
- “There were no real negotiations.”
Macgregor argues the so-called peace talks were never genuine, describing them as political theater meant to project stability while preparing escalation. - Power behind the scenes:
He suggests decision-making is not fully in Washington’s hands, pointing to Israeli influence shaping U.S. military direction. - From war to state destruction:
The next phase, he warns, targets not just military assets—but bridges, power plants, oil infrastructure, and civilian systems—a shift toward dismantling Iran as a functioning state. - A global economic shockwave:
Disruptions in the Persian Gulf could trigger fuel shortages, fertilizer collapse, and famine risks across the Global South. - The limits of U.S. power:
Fighting thousands of miles from supply lines while Iran operates defensively at home creates what he calls a “home court advantage” that undermines U.S. strategy. - End of the old order:
Macgregor frames the conflict as part of a larger collapse of U.S. dominance—warning that the petrodollar system and global unipolarity may already be breaking down. - No clear path to victory:
Even with overwhelming force, he sees no realistic military outcome that delivers control—only deeper instability.
Did Iran ever Really Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?
Fariba Amini, 04/21/2026, https://www.juancole.com/2026/04/nuclear-weapons-program.html
Interview of Dr. Mehran Mostafavi by Fariba Amini
In a resolution against nuclear war initiated by philosopher Bertrand Russell and endorsed by Albert Einstein just a week before his death, they wrote: “We appeal, as human beings, to human beings, remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you do so, the way lies open to a new paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.” — July 1955, letter addressed to President Roosevelt, the Russel-Einstein Manifesto
Dr. Mehran Mostafavi* is a nuclear expert who teaches at some of the most prestigious institutions in France. Throughout the years, he has also been on various French and Iranian media outlets speaking about Iran’s nuclear energy while a vocal critic of the Islamic Republic for its repressive rule. He is also the son-in-law of a very famous Iranian, the late Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, the first President of Iran (1980-1981) who left Iran clandestinely and passed away in a suburb of Paris.
He is the 2026 recipient of Medal of Honor from CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique).
FA: What is your field of expertise?
MM: I am a physical chemist and a professor at Université Paris‑Saclay. I have been following Iran’s nuclear policy for 20 years, and I have written several dozen articles and given hundreds of interviews about it.
FA: As an expert on nuclear energy who has done extensive research on the subject, how do you evaluate Iran’s nuclear energy program?
MM: Iran’s nuclear policy began in the late 1980s. At that time, Iran was in a difficult position in its war with Iraq, and Iraq was using chemical bombs provided by the West against Iran. In Iran, the idea gradually took shape that to deter and confront Israel, it would be better for Iran to have an atomic bomb. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic decided to complete the Bushehr reactor,
much of the work on which had been done by the Germans before the revolution, with Russian help, and various projects were launched in this field. However, Iran was forced to abandon the military program in 1992. In the civilian sphere, Iran has only the Bushehr power plant, which generates less than 2 percent of Iran’s electricity, and its fuel is supplied by the Russians.
FA: Did the Islamic Republic intend to make the bomb as Israelis have claimed? We know that Netanyahu has been declaring that Iran would have the bomb in six months since 1984. It is now 2026.
MM: Yes, Israel, even though it knows that since 1992 Iran has not been active in building a bomb and had only carried out rudimentary work before then, regularly claims that Iran will build an atomic bomb any day now—a big lie that has been repeated countless times without evidence. All Western intelligence agencies, including the U.S. one, have reported that Iran does not have a bomb-building program.
FA: The nuclear power plants were built under the Shah in the 1970’s initially in Bushehr with the help of the German company Siemens KVU. But the project was abandoned after the 1979 Revolution, damaged during the Iran-Iraq, and later completed by Russia. At that time, did anyone object to this project?
MM: At the beginning of the revolution, it was decided that Iran did not need a nuclear power plant and that it was not cost-effective to complete the Bushehr plant. This position was particularly championed by Mehdi Bazargan and Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and was eventually approved. However, in the 1990s the Islamic Republic once again resumed construction of the plant with Russian assistance.
FA: To build a nuclear bomb, you need to enrich to more than 60 percent uranium. In your opinion, was this ever done?
MM: Yes, you need to enrich it up to 90%
FA: Why did the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) build its nuclear facilities in Natanz and Bushehr or near cities which ultimately could be dangerous for the people?
MM: It is not particularly significant that these facilities are located a few dozen kilometers from towns. There is no risk of a nuclear explosion, but there is a risk of radioactive contamination or chemical pollution. In this respect, the facilities in Iran, even following very intense bombing by the Americans and Israelis, have not caused any serious problems.
FA: According to several U.S. intelligence services Iran was no imminent threat to the U.S. Why then did Trump push for war?
MM: Trump is a compulsive liar! Let me remind you that, following the attacks in June, he claimed that the US had destroyed Iran’s nuclear facilities, and then in March he attacked Iran on the grounds that it posed an imminent threat. We know full well that this is not true. He started the war in response to demands from Israel, which does not want any regional powers other than itself in the Middle East.
FA: We know that upon coming into office in 2016, Trump tore up the JCPOA [the 2015 nuclear deal], at the advice of the man in Tel Aviv. Today, if an agreement is made, it will probably be little different from the one that the Obama administration agreed to. Do you think there will be any significant differences?
MM: I do not believe that they will do a similar agreement.
FA: Do you believe that the IRI ever had the intention to use nuclear weapons against Israel as they claim? We know that the Israelis, even if they have never been open about it, have at least 300 nukes. So, isn’t all a sham?
MM: No, because Iran has never had the full technical capability to build a bomb. Iran is still a long way from having a bomb. Even if Iran enriches uranium to 90%, it will still take a long time – perhaps a year – before it had the capability to use the bomb. Israel has never declared its facilities and has never complied with international law. Israel is in no position to lecture other countries
FA: Don’t you think that for the IRI, this whole idea was more defensive rather than offensive?
MM: I think that over the last 20 years, Iran has used its nuclear policy to bargain with the West, and in recent years its intention has been to demonstrate that it can become a nuclear-capable country.
FA: In a recent New Yorker article dated April 6, 2026, a former CIA operative says that he was involved in getting Iranian nuclear scientist defect or be killed. We know that Mossad has been involved in the assassination of several scientists in Iran, approximately eighteen of them. Do you know of any defections?
MM: I am fully aware that Israel has eliminated several Iranian scientists. It is very interesting to note that Iran and Israel worked together in a consortium to develop the only synchrotron in the Middle East, in Jordan. It was a peaceful project for a facility intended for physicists. One of the Iranian representatives was Prof. Massoud Ali Mohamadi. The Israelis met him in Jordan during the meetings and knew him well. He was assassinated by the Israelis. He was very intelligent but was not involved in the Iranian nuclear program. He was simply assassinated because he was a great physicist.
Is There a Way out of the Iran War? (w/ John Mearsheimer) | The Chris Hedges Report.
As ceasefire talks hang by a thread, rising tensions over the Strait of Hormuz reveal a stark reality: escalation could trigger a global economic catastrophe—and the United States may have far less control than it claims.
April 21, 2026, Joshua Scheer, https://scheerpost.com/2026/04/21/is-there-a-way-out-of-the-iran-war-w-john-mearsheimer-the-chris-hedges-report/
The illusion of control is collapsing.
The story being told to the public is one of control—measured escalation, strategic pressure, and a superpower shaping outcomes in a volatile region.
The reality is something else entirely.
As the ceasefire deadline approaches, the United States is not dictating terms—it is reacting to them. Iran, through its ability to constrict or reopen the Strait of Hormuz, holds a form of leverage that no amount of rhetoric can override. Oil flows, fertilizer supply chains, shipping routes, and global food systems all run through this narrow corridor. And right now, that corridor is unstable.
What makes this moment especially dangerous is not just the risk of war—but the structure of it.
This is not a chaotic breakdown. It is a system under strain: competing pressures from Israel pushing for continued escalation, economic realities demanding de-escalation, and a U.S. leadership apparatus that appears, at times, unable or unwilling to reconcile the two. The result is a policy environment defined less by strategy than by contradiction.
In this conversation, Professor John Mearsheimer offers a blunt assessment: the United States cannot win an escalatory confrontation with Iran under these conditions. The longer the conflict continues, the more leverage shifts away from Washington and toward Tehran. Meanwhile, the global economy—already weakened—absorbs the shock in real time: energy disruptions, fertilizer shortages, rising food costs, and the creeping threat of systemic breakdown.
The war’s original objectives—eliminating Iran’s nuclear capacity, weakening its regional alliances, asserting dominance—remain unmet. In some cases, they have been reversed.
What remains is a narrowing set of options. Escalation risks triggering an economic crisis that could reverberate worldwide. De-escalation requires concessions that Washington—and its allies—have long resisted.
Between those two paths lies a fragile, temporary possibility: a ceasefire that holds just long enough to delay collapse.
Whether that window remains open is now the central question—not just for the region, but for the global system itself.
FULL TRANSCRIPT (CLEANED FOR PUBLICATION)
Iran, after initially balking, will send negotiators to Islamabad for a new round of talks with the United States less than 48 hours before the ceasefire is set to expire. Iran, however, has criticized the U.S. for violating the ceasefire from the beginning of its implementation, citing the U.S. naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz since April 13 and the seizure of an Iranian container ship……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. https://scheerpost.com/2026/04/21/is-there-a-way-out-of-the-iran-war-w-john-mearsheimer-the-chris-hedges-report/
Iran Says It Won’t Negotiate With ‘Erratic’ Trump After Genocidal Threat to ‘Blow Up’ Whole Country

“Our assessment is that Trump effectively lacks both a coherent plan and the capacity to secure even a temporary agreement,” the official said. “His decision-making appears to be grounded in Israeli political and security assessments, conveyed to him on a daily basis.”
“Our assessment is that Trump effectively lacks both a coherent plan and the capacity to secure even a temporary agreement,” an Iranian official said.
Stephen Prager, Common Dreams, Apr 19, 2026
Iran says it has no plans to negotiate with the US after President Donald Trump said Sunday that “the whole country is going to get blown up” if Iran refuses to make a deal.
Trump claimed that Iranian officials were heading to Islamabad for another round of talks Monday with Vice President JD Vance, his son-in-law Jared Kushner, and Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff.
But Iran’s official IRNA news agency later reported that claims Iran was coming to negotiate were “not true” and described the announcement as “a media game and part of the blame game to pressure Iran.”
The Tasnim News Agency, which is linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, reiterated the government’s previous position that it would not negotiate unless Trump lifts his blockade of Iranian ports, which Tehran considers a violation of the ceasefire between the US and Iran.
After Trump said the blockade would continue, Iran again shut down travel through the Strait of Hormuz on Saturday, following a brief reopening Friday following the announcement of a ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel.
IRNA added that negotiators decided not to return because of “Washington’s excessive demands, unrealistic expectations, constant shifts in stance, repeated contradictions, and the ongoing naval blockade.”
An unnamed Iranian official familiar with Tehran’s internal deliberations told Drop Site News on Sunday that Tehran is prepared for a long war.
He said negotiators would prefer to make a deal with the US that would give Iran the right to enrich uranium, provide sanctions relief, and establish a long-term non-aggression framework.
But the official said Trump’s erratic behavior and maximalist demands—including that Iran surrender all its enriched uranium—are causing Iranian officials to sour on the idea that he could ever be a trustworthy negotiating partner.
“Our assessment is that Trump effectively lacks both a coherent plan and the capacity to secure even a temporary agreement,” the official said. “His decision-making appears to be grounded in Israeli political and security assessments, conveyed to him on a daily basis.”…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, said Sunday that Trump’s apparent belief that he can use threats of mass violence to bully Iran into a favorable deal is pushing Tehran further from the negotiating table
“Due to poor discipline, Trump ends up prioritizing the optics of victory over actually getting a deal,” Parsi said. “Instead of using deescalatory signals from Iran to get closer to a deal, he declares victory and seeks Iran’s humiliation, and by that, he undermines his own diplomacy.” https://www.commondreams.org/news/iran-no-talks-trump-threats
Beyond Nuclear statement on threat to Iran’s reactor

“Secretary Grossi is ignoring two key factors,” Pentz Gunter said. “The first is that the IAEA actively promotes the use and expansion of nuclear power around the world, so the agency must take responsibility for its role in the extreme danger we have found ourselves in, first in Ukraine and now Iran, with nuclear plants embroiled in war. Second, the “seven pillars” make an assumption we can now recognize as entirely unreliable — that the world leaders expected to abide by these protocols are sane and rational.
April 7, 2026, https://beyondnuclear.org/beyond-nuclear-statement-on-threat-to-irans-reactor/
Trump’s threats to obliterate power plants in Iran could lead to a fatal nuclear disaster affecting the Middle East and beyond
The recklessness of the US and Israeli bombing attacks on Iran that now threaten to potentially destroy the Bushehr commercial nuclear power plant there, represents a radiological risk of monumental proportions, warned Beyond Nuclear today.
The 1,000 megawatt Russian built VVER reactor sits on the Iranian coast. It is the same design as the reactors in Ukraine where alarm has already been raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international authorities, should any be struck or seriously damaged by Russian missiles as the war in Ukraine continues to drag on.
But there has been significantly less international comment about the similar risks at Bushehr, a disturbing trend as the US president dispenses with all the norms and protocols of war and threatens to obliterate all of Iran’s critical infrastructure including power plants by midnight on Tuesday if no agreement with Iran is met by then.
“Hitting the Bushehr civil nuclear power plant would be a war crime,” said Linda Pentz Gunter, executive director of Beyond Nuclear. “The Geneva Convention specifically defines a war crime to include hitting facilities that, if damaged or destroyed, would result in extensive loss of non-combatant life,” Pentz Gunter added. “A commercial nuclear power plant certainly falls into this category.”
The particular dangers at Bushehr stem from the highly radioactive uranium fuel inside the reactor and stored in cooling pools and on-site casks. Any extended loss of power caused by an attack or a direct hit could see the fuel overheat and ignite, potentially leading to explosions. The resulting radiological releases would result in long-lasting radioactive fallout affecting vast areas in Iran, neighboring countries and beyond, contaminating agricultural land as well as sea water, an essential drinking water source for a region that relies on desalination.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s director general, Rafael Grossi, has called for restraint, citing the “Seven Indispensable Pillars” he created to try to discourage attacks on nuclear power plants.
“Secretary Grossi is ignoring two key factors,” Pentz Gunter said. “The first is that the IAEA actively promotes the use and expansion of nuclear power around the world, so the agency must take responsibility for its role in the extreme danger we have found ourselves in, first in Ukraine and now Iran, with nuclear plants embroiled in war. Second, the “seven pillars” make an assumption we can now recognize as entirely unreliable — that the world leaders expected to abide by these protocols are sane and rational.
“Grossi is effectively clinging to his pillars like a barrelman hanging onto the mast of a storm-tossed ship about to hit the rocks while his cries of alarm are drowned out by the mayhem around him,” Pentz Gunter said.
Nuclear meltdowns deposit radioactive contamination where the wind blows, coming down during rainfall as fallout. The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power disaster resulted in a 1,000 square mile exclusion zone, still too radiologically contaminated for human habitation even today.
Japan experienced a triple meltdown in March 2011, when three of the four Fuskushima Daiichi reactors exploded. The long gestation period for some diseases caused by persistent exposure to radiation, means that the true health outcomes from that disaster, whether fatalities or debilitating diseases, will not be known for many years.
“To set up the possibility of another Chernobyl or Fukushima in the Middle East is criminally irresponsible,” Pentz Gunter concluded. “And even though we know Iran’s nuclear facilities were merely the pretext for the US-Israeli attack, we must remember that it was President Trump during his first term who effectively tore up a perfectly effective nuclear inspection and verification agreement — the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — that ensured Iran stayed within the boundaries of a civil nuclear program. Maintaining the JCPOA would have been the sensible way to keep those nuclear safeguards in place.”
Trump may want out of the Iran war, but the first round of negotiations showed the challenges ahead

It seems clear that Donald Trump realizes that this war has been a catastrophe for him, regardless of what he says publicly. As the global economy barrels toward recession, he sees little use in persisting. His only option is to increase pressure on Iran with more destruction, which would only bring more Iranian retaliation and lead to an even greater global economic catastrophe.
Iran is not willing to sacrifice what it sees as its national right to enrich its own uranium for civilian use, something permitted them under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which they are a signatory, and, notably, Israel is not.
By Mitchell Plitnick April 17, 2026, https://mondoweiss.net/2026/04/trump-may-want-out-of-the-iran-war-but-the-first-round-of-negotiations-showed-the-challenges-ahead/
When U.S. Vice President JD Vance took to the podium after a long day of talks to end the American and Israeli war of choice on Iran, he made one thing clear. This had not been a serious attempt to reach a deal.
Although the talks went on for more than twenty hours, it’s just one day of negotiations. The very fact that the headline was that there had been no “breakthrough” in just one day displayed a fundamental lack of seriousness.
Despite Vance’s attempt at drama, neither side shut the door on continuing negotiations. The U.S. has even proposed extending the ceasefire, as Pakistani emissaries have arrived in Tehran to arrange further talks. Washington has even pressed Israel for a ceasefire in Lebanon, something that does not sit well with either Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or the Israeli Jewish population.
At the same time, the United States has moved to block Iranian ships from using the Strait of Hormuz, a sort of counter-blockade, and has dispatched thousands more troops to the region.
What does all of this mean?
Trump wants a way out of this war, but does he have one?
It seems clear that Donald Trump realizes that this war has been a catastrophe for him, regardless of what he says publicly. As the global economy barrels toward recession, he sees little use in persisting. His only option is to increase pressure on Iran with more destruction, which would only bring more Iranian retaliation and lead to an even greater global economic catastrophe.
In that context, Trump’s move to “blockade Iran’s blockade” in the Strait of Hormuz is best understood as an attempt to appear strong before being forced to accept terms that end this war with Iran in a stronger position than it was before.
Trump even went so far as to force Netanyahu to accept a brief pause in Lebanon. That’s not an easy feat, as Netanyahu is reeling in Israel from the lack of positive results from the wars in both Iran and Lebanon. Israeli Jews support both wars but believe Netanyahu has not handled them correctly, based on the lack of tangible political gains for Israel since they began, in contrast to what they see as military triumphs.
But while Trump may want a way out of the war, finding that exit may still be difficult.
One option is for Trump to simply leave the ceasefire in place without an agreement. That means the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, whether by Iran alone or by both Iran and the United States. Iran and Israel would continue to fight, but the fighting would likely be limited to those two countries, leaving the Gulf Arab states out.
That isn’t a very appealing option for Trump. He could talk about having “changed the Iranian regime,” but the reality of economic depression, ongoing fighting, and a strengthened Iran would be clear.
Moreover, Israel has been more vulnerable to both Iranian and Hezbollah attacks, as their supply of interceptors has dwindled. The U.S. can replenish them, but probably not at prior levels and not as quickly as Israel would need. The image of Israel getting pounded by Iranian and Hezbollah missiles is not one Trump wants his constituents to see.
Another option is simply to double down on force. Iran has already shown what the result would be if Trump chooses that option. Their recent attacks on Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, which serves as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz for the export of oil, were a warning of Iran’s ability to do a lot more damage to oil exports from the region. Iran has also threatened to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea. Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen have shown they can do this at will and that there is little the U.S. can do about it.
The third option is a realistic agreement. This seems to be the one Trump wants to take. The problem he faces is that American demands are unrealistic, and the compromises he would have to make would be extremely hard to sell as anything but capitulation.
According to reports, the talks in Islamabad crashed on the key issues of Iran’s nuclear program, its support of armed non-state actors in the region, and control of the Strait of Hormuz.
That was backed up by the words of a U.S. official who told Axios reporter Barak Ravid that the American red lines were that Iran would:
- End all uranium enrichment;
- Dismantle all major nuclear enrichment facilities;
- Surrender all highly enriched uranium;
- Accept an American peace, security and de-escalation framework that includes regional allies;
- End funding for regional allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Ansar Allah;
- Fully open the Strait of Hormuz, charging no tolls for passage.
If the American spokesperson was accurate in calling those “red lines” rather than negotiating points, they’re non-starters.
Iran has offered to suspend all nuclear enrichment activity for five years, countering a U.S. demand that they agree to a twenty-year suspension. Iran had, before the war, agreed not to stockpile enriched uranium, which would make it impossible for them to ever accumulate enough nuclear material for a bomb.
But Iran is not willing to sacrifice what it sees as its national right to enrich its own uranium for civilian use, something permitted them under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which they are a signatory, and, notably, Israel is not.
Demanding Iran give up that option is not realistic. Yet that very unrealistic demand has been made more pressing by the war itself. By attacking Iran, Israel and the United States have reinforced the evidence for what happens to countries that abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iran can look at itself along with Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine on one hand and North Korea on the other to see this obvious logic.
The path out of that paradox is Iran’s returning to the nuclear monitoring that it agreed to before Trump tore up the nuclear deal, and the U.S. accepting that Iran can enrich its own uranium, within reasonable limits. That creates a mutual deterrence; Iran would have to break off the inspections to even begin enriching uranium beyond its immediate needs, which it wouldn’t do unless the U.S. and Israel continue their belligerence.
It appears that such a resolution would be acceptable to Iran, but it would mean a significant climbdown for Trump. And, obviously, Israel will not accept it and would have to be strictly restrained by the United States. Yet it remains the only reasonable way out.
It is notable that there was no mention of Iran’s missile and drone capabilities among the red lines. That seems to imply that the United States has already backed away from a condition that amounts to convincing Iran to disarm itself in the face of not only American and Israeli aggression but also the understandably renewed hostility toward it from the Gulf Arab states.
That realization by the Americans reflects someone getting in Trump’s ear and making some headway on issues that are just absurdly unrealistic. Similarly, while Vance might have included support for non-state allies in his talks, that has not featured prominently in White House statements or in Trump’s stream-of-consciousness ramblings since the talks in Islamabad.
The nuclear issue seems to have the most prominent position, and that is always better. It is the issue on which Iran has the most flexibility, largely because it is based on Western fears and propaganda more than it has been based on reality until now. Yes, the war has probably made Iran’s nuclear ambitions much more real. The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei means his fatwa against nuclear weapons is no longer in effect, and, as noted, Iran has been given much more incentive to pursue a nuclear weapon than ever before.
Still, the fact that they were even willing to offer a five-year suspension of nuclear activity and have not stated any opposition to the idea of international inspectors would indicate that Iran is open to significant compromise on the nuclear issue.
The Strait of Hormuz may be more problematic. Iran has always and will always have the ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait. No American threat or international anger can change that simple fact of geography.
On the other hand, while neither Iran nor the United States has ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which guarantees safe and unimpeded passage to peaceful vessels through many waterways including the Strait, most of the world views Iran’s threats to passage in the Strait and to its plan to collect tolls for passage as unacceptable.
Iran wants to use its ability to threaten passage through the Strait to help press for the reparations they need and, more importantly, to ease the sanctions that have restricted Iran’s ability to participate in the global economy, particularly regarding trade with Asia and Europe. It is likely that they would abandon the legally dubious idea of collecting tolls in the Strait if they can re-enter the Asian and European markets and receive reparations for this war.
Again, though, this would be a huge concession from the United States. It would be impossible to sell such a concession as anything but a massive defeat, even to Trump’s most sheepish supporters. Iran would be significantly stronger and economically healthier than it was before the war. There’s no way to dress that up.
Israel’s Lebanon land grab
Finally, there is Lebanon. Trump surely had to exert extreme pressure to get Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire, even a brief one.
Israel has not tried to hide the fact that this aspect of the war is a pure land grab. Netanyahu intends to extend Israeli control, if not its border, north to the Litani River. He is not about to abandon that goal lightly, even if he is forced to accept that his long-sought war on Iran is a failure.
The talks in Washington between Israel and Lebanon are a farce. No agreement there is possible, because what Israel wants is a permanent presence in Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah.
This Lebanese government would be open to a reasonable agreement with Israel, but those terms are obviously unreasonable. No country, especially not one as small as Lebanon, would simply give up a huge chunk of its territory.
But this Lebanese government wanted to address Hezbollah. They wanted to bring Hezbollah into the Lebanese military, thus disarming them and integrating them into a single, national force. That was never going to be easy, but Israel never stopped attacking Lebanon during the so-called “ceasefire” brokered in late 2024. If they really wanted the Lebanese government to eliminate Hezbollah as an independent fighting force, that was exactly the opposite of what they would have done.
The Lebanese are attending these meetings to help convince Trump to rein Israel in. Israel is doing it to convince Trump that they are willing to cooperate with his effort to end the Iran war. In both cases, the effort is merely a show.
Trump will take the exit from Iran as soon as he can find it, and Israel will find it hard to bring him back in again now that he has seen why all other U.S. presidents didn’t fall for Netanyahu’s “bomb Iran” pitch. But he will have little reason to exert the political influence that would be needed to keep Israel from occupying southern Lebanon permanently. Israel and Iran will also likely continue lobbing missiles at each other, even though Israel’s ability to fight Iran without direct American support is extremely limited.
That’s the best-case scenario for Trump, and it’s not a good one. It is entirely possible that, rather than admit a huge defeat, he will decide to keep fighting Iran to no possible better outcome.
Trump made this bed. He can either lie in it or take one of the less disastrous options to get out of it. Unfortunately for the world, he is not a man prone to making good decisions. .Plitnick is correct a fatwa in shiism if comes it from your marja is considered binding and upon his death is rescinded, apologies. I asked an al khoei who called for an unrelated reason. it’s not like that in sunni practise, can one never safely assume, i thought it would be ok this time.
THE US HAS NO ROUTE TO VICTORY IN IRAN WHICH WILL LIKELY EMERGE STRONGER
THIS ADVENTURE MAY DO TO AMERICAN COLONIALISM WHAT SUEZ DID TO THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH
Ian Proud, Apr 19, 2026, https://thepeacemonger.substack.com/p/the-us-has-no-route-to-victory-in?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=3221990&post_id=194637482&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
I was pleased to meet Laith Marouf, a War Correspondent and Executive Director of Free Palestine TV for the first time.
As Laith is based in Lebanon, we discussed the recently announced 10 day ceasefire with Israel, and whether it might endure. This ceasefire had clearly been imposed on Netanyahu by Trump, but what was the prevent Israel from returning to position normal after any putative peace deal over Iran? Laith laid out the historical and religious reasons why Iran would never abandon Lebanon purely to obtain a peace deal with the USA. Other people I have spoken to talk about the muti-confessional nature of Lebanon but that, come what may, Hezbollah remains a powerful force in politics, that won’t be eradicated by air strikes.
So, Israeli conquest of Lebanon will likely never be possible for as long as Iran remains a powerful force in the region.
We therefore discussed the US and Israel’s inability to inflict a defeat on Iran. There is no evidence that the US has the capability or the political capital at home to endure an extended military engagement with a country, thousands of miles from the US, geographically and by population size far bigger than any adversary confronted in the twenty first century, and with the support of the two big regional military and economic powers, Russia and China.
The only way that the US can impose a defeat on Iran is to precipitate regime change and despite Trump’s ramblings about regime change equating to a change of leader (sic!) the proposition that a modern-day Shah can be returned to the throne in Tehran have never looked possible or remotely likely.
That leaves the US militarily stuck in a conflict that is causing global economic shocks that are mobilising both the developing world and parts of the western world against American hegemony. Iran may be to US colonialism what Suez was to the British and French.
Laith situated this latest war in the context of what he describes as the 100 years of humiliation for the Muslim world.
Iran differs from the Arab world in having civilisational integrity and history that will endure this latest attempt at subjugation by western powers. War in the other hand is putting significant pressure on the smaller more fragmented governments across the Arab world which are reliant for survival on the umbrella of US hegemony which is collapsing.
We briefly considered the risk of nuclear escalation in Iran and the likelihood that this, ultimately, would backfire spectacularly on the west with a potentially enormous flood of refugees heading west, not to mention the intense ecological damage and the impact that would have on the global economy. Lots of people pontificate about Israel using tactical nukes, which, while I consider Netanyahu desperate to cling to power, I consider unlikely if only because it would likely sever the hitherto ironclad relationship with the US and lead to more immediate and existential risks to the functioning and integrity of Israel as a state.
We discussed Israel’s nuclear capability and how it can coexist in a more peaceable way with other countries in the region. Laith drew on the example of Apartheid South Africa which was also nuclear armed but which gave up its nuclear programme and completely shifted its model of governance to abandon the rule of white supremacists.
In the completely hypothetical scenario of Israel doing the same – which looks wholly unlikely anytime soon – I asked about the position of Jewish people in Israel under theoretical Palestinian rule. We considered the outlier role of the Jewish community in Iran which is the only major subset of Judaism that isn’t hardwired into the ecosystem of Zionism as a potential model.
In the final analysis, whenever the war against Iran ends, however it ends, Iran appears likely to emerge in a stronger position as a regional superpower than it held before the war started, indeed, before Donald Trump abandoned the JCPOA deal. US power and influence, on the other hand, continues to shatter, ushering in a multipolar world with greater clarity.
A genuinely thought-provoking discussion which I’d encourage you to watch via the link above. I had a microphone problem so my audio is terrible, though still audible.
Israel Destroys a Synagogue; US Media Yawn
“Iranian Jews are viewed by Iranians as indigenous,” he said. “They’re the original Bundists,” a nod to the Jewish political movement that “stood not just for socialism, but for do’ikayt—Yiddish for ‘hereness,’” the concept that a Jew’s homeland was in whatever nation they resided in (New York Times, 4/6/26).
Ari Paul, April 16, 2026 https://fair.org/home/israel-destroys-a-synagogue-us-media-yawn/
An Israeli missile attack destroyed a Tehran synagogue during the Jewish Passover holiday (Religion News Service, 4/9/26). The Israeli military “expressed regret over what it called ‘collateral damage’ to a synagogue in Tehran caused by an overnight strike,” which was “targeting a senior Iranian commander,” said the Middle East Eye (4/7/26).
Photos of the wreckage at the Rafi-Nia Synagogue have accompanied many of these pieces. The Council on American-Islamic relations condemned the attack in a statement (4/7/26):
We strongly condemn the Israeli regime’s bombing of a synagogue in Tehran, which was the predictable end result of the indiscriminate US/Israel bombing campaign against mosques, hospitals, schools, apartments and other civilian sites across Iran.
The group challenged “various Israel advocacy groups and politicians that support this war in the name of protecting Israel to condemn Israel’s synagogue attack.”
Buried at best
The story of the attack on the Tehran synagogue was, at best, buried in the US corporate media. CNN posted a brief video (4/7/26) about the bombing but had no online article about it. The New York Times (4/7/26, 4/7/26) mentioned the attack, but as background in broader stories about the US/Israel war on Iran.
A search for “Rafi-Nia” on the Washington Post website yields no results. Ditto for the AP, although the news service did post a video to YouTube (4/7/26). Al Jazeera’s coverage (4/7/26) of the attack was a mélange of AP and AFP copy. CBS News (4/7/26) also used a few paragraphs of AFP copy to report on the attack, although it was buried in the middle of a general timeline about the war.
The Wall Street Journal (4/7/26) had the story, but led with Israel’s contrition over the destruction; that’s not a journalistic construction we see in US news coverage when it comes to the Israeli bombings of other civilian structures in Iran, Gaza or Lebanon. When Israel destroys a hospital, apartment building, encampment, etc., the stories don’t lead with official regret, but rather include Israeli claims that the civilian facilities were actually legitimate military targets. The Journal’s lead provided the government with public relations cover over the sensitive issue of destroying a Jewish house of worship.
Newsweek (4/8/26), once a bigger player in the US media landscape, led with condemnation of the attack from Jewish Iranian leaders, who declared “their unwavering solidarity with Iran in defending the homeland.”
Jewish presence in Iran
Underplaying the story obscures not only the wantonness of Israel’s aggression, but the actual nature of Iranian society, which is portrayed as obsessed with wiping Jews off the map (ADL, 6/25/25). “Iranian foreign policy freely mixes anti-Israel furies with anti-Jewish ones,” wrote New York Times columnist Bret Stephens (1/13/26), a pro-war cheerleader (2/22/26, 3/24/26).
In fact, while Israel is obviously the center of Mideastern Jewish life, the Iranian Jewish population dwarfs those elsewhere in the Middle East. “Estimates range from 9,000 to 20,000 Jews currently living in Iran,” according to the Forward (6/18/25).
Wrote the Palestine Chronicle (3/6/26): “The Jewish presence in Iran is among the oldest continuous Jewish communities in the world, with roots that historians trace back more than two millennia.”
Yes, Iran is a theocracy; the government is no model for an open society. But there is a Jewish member of Iran’s parliament, who even went on record this year openly criticizing Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s handling of popular unrest (i24, 1/29/26).
‘Well-protected second-class citizens’
US media have covered the Jews of Iran before. USA Today (8/29/18) did a story in 2018, reporting from Tehran. Former Forward reporter Larry Cohler-Esses (8/12/15, 8/12/15, 8/18/15, 8/27/15) reported extensively and critically on Iranian Jews, indicating that the country was at least open to letting a reporter for a Jewish publication do their job.
Cohler-Esses told FAIR that Jews in Iran are “well-protected second-class citizens.” In fact, when he read about the attack, he “wondered if it was the synagogue I spent Shabbat in, but it wasn’t,” because there are more than a dozen active synagogues in Tehran—a reflection of the size of the Jewish community there.
Recalling his 2015 reporting trip, Cohler-Esses said that on Shabbat, Jews would spill out of their synagogues and mingle in the street after services, a sight he didn’t often see in many places in Europe. In one instance, after he left a synagogue service, one of the congregants ran after him through a street teeming with people, wearing a kippah and a tallit (traditional religious attire), and “no one batted an eye.”
The Jews of Iran do suffer discrimination, because Muslims are favored in the legal code over all non-Muslims, Cohler-Esses said. He noted that the Jewish population of Iran has shrunk significantly since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
“Iranian Jews are viewed by Iranians as indigenous,” he said. “They’re the original Bundists,” a nod to the Jewish political movement that “stood not just for socialism, but for do’ikayt—Yiddish for ‘hereness,’” the concept that a Jew’s homeland was in whatever nation they resided in (New York Times, 4/6/26).
Cohler-Esses was hopeful that coverage of the synagogue’s destruction in the Jewish and Israeli press (JTA, 4/7/26; Jerusalem Post, 4/7/26) had the “potential to make Jewish readers of Jewish media outlets go, ‘Oh, they have synagogues there.’” But with the underplaying of the story in US media, it’s a missed teachable moment for news consumers generally.
More robust press coverage of the attack could have taught Americans that the Jews of Iran do have something to fear: Israel.
Confused Closures and Opaque Openings: Continuing Dramas in the Hormuz Strait
19 April 2026 Dr Binoy Kampmark, https://theaimn.net/confused-closures-and-opaque-openings-continuing-dramas-in-the-hormuz-strait/
Reading messages from President Donald J. Trump is an exercise in taunting masochism. It is one inflicted on commentators and the press corps the world over, and they are not better for it. The latest – and here, the latest will become distant and dated shortly – is that the Strait of Hormuz, predictably controlled by Iran with devastating global effect, was to be reopened for commercial traffic under certain conditions. Trump thought this undertaking absolute and indefinite, a rich suggestion coming from a man with such a fair-weather mind. “Iran has agreed to never close the Strait of Hormuz again. It will no longer be used as a weapon against the World!”
This proved typically premature: within a matter of hours, Iran’s decision was, if not reversed then heavily qualified. (The Strait technically always remained open to vessels favoured by the Iranian authorities.) On April 17, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Eshmaeil Baghaei affirmed two key principles in Tehran’s policies: Iran retained the right to control traffic moving through the Strait, and that it would not surrender enriched uranium, an issue “sacred to us as Iranian soil” and non-negotiable. The latter was certainly aimed at Trump’s dotty claim that Washington and Tehran would jointly deploy “lots of excavators” to remove fissile material (“nuclear dust”) and shift it to the US. On CBS News, the president claimed that “Our people, together with the Iranians, are going to work together to get it.” This all suggested much confusion on the part of the Americans.
Iran’s moves on the Strait were always going to be governed by other impediments. There was the demand, for instance, that Washington release $20 billion in frozen Iranian assets. This was rejected. Trump has also insisted on a continued blockade of Iranian ports, which currently employs over 12 warships and something in the order of 100 fighter and surveillance aircraft. As he told Fox News, “we’re not going to let Iran make money on selling oil to people that they like and not people that they don’t like.” Maritime intelligence on this, however, suggests that the blockade has not been quite as effective as heralded by US officials. Martin Kelly, Head of Advisory at EOS Risk Group can point to the successful passage of sanctioned tankers and vessels of the shadow fleet such as LPG carriers Crave, Raine and NV Aquamarine.
On April 18, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy issued a statement that “no vessel is to move from its anchorage in the Persian Gulf or the Sea of Oman.” A number of vessels had successfully managed to pass through under supervision since Friday night, but the Strait would be closed till the US ceased blocking Iran’s ports. “Approaching the Strait of Hormuz will be considered cooperation with the enemy, and the offending vessel will be targeted.”
The IRGC have been true to their word. According to UK Maritime Trade Operations, the Master of a tanker reported “being approached by 2 IRGC gun boats” without a VHF challenge, “then fired upon the tanker.” No injuries were sustained. Another report documented “a Container Ship being hit by an unknown projectile which caused damage to some of the containers.” There were no fires or environmental impacts reported. A third incident involved the sighting by the Master of a cruise ship of “a splash in close proximity to the vessel” regarded as suspicious.
The ongoing US blockade, argues Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), was also a violation of the ceasefire agreement between Tehran and Washington. As Tehran revealed in a statement, passage through the Strait would only take place through a “designated route” and only with Iranian authorisation. The opening or closing of the Strait, along with pertinent regulations governing it would be “determined by the field, not by social media.” The Council has also revealed that it is reviewing new proposals from the US that may form the basis of future talks.
Trump has also huffed that the latest developments in the Strait were “not tied, in any way, to Lebanon,” a barely plausible contention. Iran has insisted that any lasting ceasefire manoeuvres would have to include a cessation of Israeli strikes on Lebanon and Hezbollah positions, even if negotiations between the US and Lebanon did not involve any mention of the Shia militia. The US president duly went on Truth Social to bluster that Israel “will not be bombing Lebanon any longer.” They were “PROHIBITED from doing so by the USA. Enough is enough.”
The somewhat devalued currency of a ceasefire did not, as it was subsequently confirmed, prohibit Israel from resorting to its right to self-defence, a right so latitudinous as to be boundless. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promised that things were far from concluded. “I will say honestly, we have not yet finished the job.” Remaining rocket and drone threats needed neutralisation. Hezbollah would have to be dismantled through a “sustained effort, patience, and careful navigation in the diplomatic arena.”
There was also much room for lashing reluctant allies. “Now that the Hormuz Strait situation is over,” declared Trump, “I received a call from NATO asking if we would need some help.” With the usual flourish of petulance, he dismissed the call: Stay away unless you want to load up with oil. “They are useless when needed, a Paper Tiger!” Increasingly, the US imperium is resembling that tiger, incapable of stalking and capturing its far more resourceful prey.
The Art of the Deal Is War
April 11, 2026, ScheerPost Staff, https://scheerpost.com/2026/04/11/the-art-of-the-deal-is-war/
In a moment that was supposed to signal de-escalation, the United States and Iran announced a temporary two-week ceasefire—only for it to begin unraveling almost immediately. Within hours, accusations of violations surfaced, Israeli airstrikes hit Lebanon, and the fragile illusion of diplomacy gave way to a more familiar reality: war continuing under a different name. As makes clear, this is not an end to conflict—it is a transition into a more dangerous and uncertain phase.
Ben Norton’s latest analysis cuts through the fog with clarity and urgency. His reporting lays out a pattern that is as old as U.S. foreign policy itself: agreements made publicly, undermined privately, and ultimately discarded when they no longer serve imperial interests. Norton points to immediate violations following the ceasefire announcement, particularly Israel’s bombing campaign in Lebanon, which Tehran argues was explicitly included in the terms of the deal. Washington denies this. Both sides claim victory. Both cannot be telling the truth.
At the heart of Norton’s analysis is a deeper indictment—not just of this ceasefire, but of a broader strategy. The so-called diplomacy surrounding Iran, he argues, often functions less as a path to peace and more as a tactical pause: a chance to regroup, rearm, and reposition. This aligns with a long historical record in which negotiations are used as cover for escalation rather than resolution. From the collapse of the nuclear deal to repeated ceasefire breakdowns in Gaza, the pattern is consistent—and deadly.
But this moment is not just about broken promises. It is about shifting global power. Norton highlights how Iran has leveraged its strategic position—particularly control over the Strait of Hormuz—to exert real pressure on global energy markets. The consequences are already rippling outward: rising oil prices, supply chain disruptions, and the early tremors of what could become a global economic crisis. Even in the unlikely event that peace were to hold, the damage has already been set in motion.
Perhaps most striking is the contradiction at the center of this ceasefire. The U.S. reportedly issued sweeping demands—limiting Iran’s military capacity, restricting enrichment, and reshaping regional alliances—while Iran presented its own conditions, including the lifting of sanctions, withdrawal of U.S. forces, and a halt to all aggression, including in Lebanon. Each side claims the other agreed. The reality, as Norton bluntly frames it, is simple: someone is lying.
This is why Norton’s video is essential viewing. It doesn’t just recount events—it exposes the mechanics of power behind them. It forces us to confront uncomfortable questions: What does a ceasefire mean when bombs continue to fall? What is diplomacy worth when it is used as a weapon? And how should the world respond when the architects of “peace” are the same actors perpetuating war?
For ScheerPost, reposting and amplifying this analysis is not just about sharing information—it is about challenging the narratives that normalize endless conflict. Because if this moment teaches us anything, it is that war no longer begins with declarations. It begins with agreements.
And sometimes, it never really stops.
From the very start of his video, Norton underscores a crucial reality often buried beneath headlines: this ceasefire is temporary, fragile, and possibly strategic rather than sincere. He warns that even in a “best-case scenario,” the war has already triggered a global energy shock—one that will take months, if not years, to fully unfold. Inflation, supply chain breakdowns, and rising food and fuel prices are not side effects—they are central consequences of this conflict. The war doesn’t pause when bombs stop falling; it continues through markets, shortages, and economic strain felt worldwide.
At the heart of Norton’s analysis is a deeper indictment—not just of this ceasefire, but of a broader strategy. The so-called diplomacy surrounding Iran, he argues, often functions less as a path to peace and more as a tactical pause: a chance to regroup, rearm, and reposition. He points specifically to how a two-week ceasefire could allow U.S. and allied forces to restock depleted weapons systems and prepare for the next phase of escalation. This aligns with a long historical record in which negotiations are used as cover for escalation rather than resolution.
Norton also highlights one of the most revealing contradictions: both Washington and Tehran claim the other agreed to their demands. The U.S. reportedly pushed a sweeping 15-point plan, while Iran published its own 10-point proposal, including sanctions relief, recognition of its regional position, and an end to attacks across all fronts—including Lebanon. These positions are fundamentally incompatible. As Norton bluntly frames it, one side is not telling the truth—and history suggests where skepticism should fall.
Perhaps most striking is his breakdown of what he calls Trump’s “art of the deal” in practice: agreements are made, selectively followed, and then reinterpreted to justify further escalation. It is not diplomacy—it is leverage through deception. And in this case, it may already be unfolding again.
But this moment is not just about broken promises. It is about shifting global power. Norton emphasizes that Iran has demonstrated significant leverage through its control of the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply passes. That leverage has already disrupted global markets and forced the U.S. to the negotiating table—whether in good faith or not.
This is why Norton’s video is essential viewing. It doesn’t just recount events—it exposes the mechanics of power behind them. It forces us to confront uncomfortable questions: What does a ceasefire mean when bombs continue to fall? What is diplomacy worth when it is used as a weapon? And what happens when economic warfare becomes indistinguishable from military conflict?
A conflict of attrition: Iran’s bet on asymmetric warfare

Destabilizing the global economy is perhaps Iran’s most visible and salient use of asymmetric warfare. Tehran has used artillery strikes, sea mines, and electronic warfare to impede transit through the Strait of Hormuz, dominating a vital maritime chokepoint through which a significant portion of the world’s fossil fuels and fertilizers transit.
By Spenser A. Warren | Analysis | April 7, 2026, https://thebulletin.org/2026/04/a-conflict-of-attrition-irans-bet-on-asymmetric-warfare/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=Iran%20s%20bet%20on%20asymmetric%20warfare&utm_campaign=20260409%20Thursday%20Newsletter
Around midnight on March 30, crewmembers on the bridge of the oil tanker Al Salmi were rocked by a large explosion. Hours later, fires still raged on the ship’s deck. The explosion was caused by an Iranian drone strike. The Al Salmi is not an adversary warship; its crew are not enemy combatants—it is a civilian vessel owned by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.
Like others on civilian oil tankers, this attack was intended to disrupt energy supplies and threaten regional security. In short, it’s part of Iran’s asymmetric warfare effort—which includes the use of several types of disruptive technologies—over the course of its ongoing conflict with the United States and Israel.
For Iran—in overall military terms far weaker than the United States—an asymmetry strategy attempts to counter expensive, often exquisite US capabilities with cheaper, lower-tech weapons and tactics designed to target critical American vulnerabilities. Most visibly, this strategy has included the use of mines, drone boats, and anti-ship missiles to close the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, Iran has used drone strikes against US assets and those of its regional partners, cyberwarfare, and missile strikes against economic and civilian targets in Israel and the Gulf States. These drone attacks deplete the stockpiles of interceptor missiles defending US and allied bases and infrastructure, degrading air-defense capabilities and increasing political and economic pressure against continued American engagement.
The Trump administration appears to have been taken off guard by at least some of Iran’s tactics, including attempts to close the Strait of Hormuz. A degree of uncertainty is unsurprising given the nature of both asymmetric warfare and disruptive technologies. However, such tactics have been at the center of Iranian strategy for decades, and analysts have explicitly predicted the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a US-Iran war.
Thus far, Iran’s warfare has to some degree degraded American and Israeli capabilities, increased pressure on Washington, and hampered the global economy. While Iran has employed emerging or evolving technologies as part of its efforts, it is also using older technologies to significant effect. But Tehran’s strategy has serious limits, and the United States and Israel have exacted a significant toll on Iran’s military capabilities over the course of the war, now in its sixth week. Overall, this war has shown both the ways that weaker opponents can leverage asymmetric advantages to significant effect and how stronger opponents may still be able to limit the ultimate impact of asymmetric tactics.
Use of asymmetric warfare and disruptive tech. Recognizing its marked conventional imbalance against countries such as the United States and Israel, Tehran has been preparing to fight such a war for years and thus developing a range of technologies and strategies. Iran’s war effort has one overarching goal: survival. To try to achieve it, Iran has pursued tactics that appear to be aimed at three instrumental sub-goals: it has sought to degrade American and Israeli offensive capabilities; attempted to increase political pressures to end the war quickly; and sought to disrupt the global economy to increase economic pressure on Washington.
To target American, Israeli, and partner assets, Iran has used both ballistic missiles and drones. Coming into the war, Iran had a large and diverse missile force that included short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Some estimates placed the number of the Iranian ballistic missile arsenal at around 3,000. Recently, Iran showcased a possibly extended range for some of its ballistic missiles, firing two at a joint US-UK base at Diego Garcia, well beyond the stated maximum range of their capabilities. At this range, Iranians could strike parts of Europe, Africa, and Asia, as well as naval targets in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, previously thought safe. To conduct the attempted strike, it’s possible that Iran modified space-launch assets. However, the reliability of such strikes is questionable: One of the two missiles broke up during flight, while the second proved vulnerable to air and missile defenses from Diego Garcia.
Iran’s drone arsenal, which dates to the 1980s, has yielded significant innovations despite producing mostly cheap and expendable, drones. The low cost of these systems, combined with their accuracy and reliability, has allowed Iran to deploy large numbers of them against specific targets, overwhelming defenses. This means Iran can launch enough drones to make a survival rate of only 10 to 20 percent acceptable.
Israel, the United States, and other American partners in the Persian Gulf have succeeded in intercepting many Iranian missiles and drones, limiting the effectiveness of Iran’s strikes. But the interceptions have taken a significant toll on American and partner forces. The United States reports a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) intercept success rate of 90 percent. But this level of effectiveness comes at a high burn rate, potentially using more than 30 percent of its total stockpile of THAAD interceptors in the first 96 hours of Operation Epic Fury alone.
The financial burden of interception alone is staggering. Iran’s Shahed-136 and several other of its variants are estimated to cost between $20,000 and $50,000 per unit. Interceptor costs vary significantly depending on which system a defender is using but can involve multimillion-dollar assets. Beyond the financial bottom line, the depletion of interceptor stockpiles will take many years to rectify, substantially weakening the United States regionally and globally. A reportspecifically on Terminal High Altitude Area Defense depletion suggests that just replacing these assets could take three to eight years.
Iran initially used its improving missile force and drone capabilities to strike American bases in the region but pivoted towards softer civilian targets. Among Iran’s nonmilitary targets is water infrastructure in the Gulf. On March 8, it struck a critical desalination plant in Bahrain. This strike exhibited a level of symmetry instead of asymmetry, with the attack occurring after Iran accused the United States of striking an Iranian desalination plant. Iran’s other targets have included airports and hotels, disrupting travel, tourism, and the domestic economies of several Gulf Arab states, as well as global air travel and logistics networks.
Destabilizing the global economy is perhaps Iran’s most visible and salient use of asymmetric warfare. Tehran has used artillery strikes, sea mines, and electronic warfare to impede transit through the Strait of Hormuz, dominating a vital maritime chokepoint through which a significant portion of the world’s fossil fuels and fertilizers transit.
Civilian ships have reported strikes from unknown projectiles that are likely mobile or shore-based artillery. Iranian forces have also rammed vessels with explosive-laden uncrewed “kamikaze boats.”
As of March 24th, Iran has also laid approximately a dozen Maham 3 and Maham 7 limpet mines in the Strait. Further, Tehran has made extensive use of electronic warfare targeted at military and civilian assets in and around the Gulf. While the broader use of electronic warfare has had limited effects, it has proven significantly successful in targeting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Maritime data and intelligence company Lloyd’s List Intelligence has tracked Iranian’s global navigation satellite systems in and around the Strait, logging more than 1,700 jamming incidents affecting 655 vessels, usually lasting around three to four hours each.
The Strait of Hormuz is not completely shut. Iran is allowing shipping from some friendly or neutral states to transit the waterway, so long as vessels comply with IRGC requirements and acquiesce to their inspections. Previous Iranian strikes on neutral shipping, however, has limited the credibility of this claim. As such, the threat of Iranian strikes, concern for seafarer safety, and exorbitant insurance costs have resulted in transit grinding to a near halt.
New and old technologies. Much has been written about the impacts of emerging and novel technologies on strategic outcomes, escalation dynamics, stability, and warfighting. Some of the technologies that Iran has used, such as uncrewed speedboats, are emerging—or at least evolutionary. However, Tehran has proven that many of its old, dated technologies, such as artillery, can still be effective tools of asymmetric warfare.
Both drones and cyber capabilities figure heavily in past literature on emerging disruptive technologies. It may be difficult to describe either, as well as electronic warfare systems, as emerging or novel today. But Iran’s capabilities are evolutionary, with its drone, cyber, and electronic warfare systems becoming increasingly advanced and effective over the past several decades. This is particularly true for Iran’s drone forces, with the country being among the pioneers of drone warfare.
Ballistic missiles, which Iran has used for strikes against US bases and softer, nonmilitary targets, are fundamentally a mid-20th century technology, even if Iran took longer to develop them. Short-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, in particular, emerged more than 70 years ago. Similarly, sea mines are an old technology, not an emerging one, and their impact on the US-Iran war has been limited not by their technological characteristics, but by intentional American strikes against minelaying vessels.
Global impact and wider implications. Iran’s asymmetric warfare has implications beyond the ongoing war and the greater Middle East. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has led to an increase in global oil prices. And those prices are threatening to rise further if the war doesn’t end or the strait isn’t reopened. Additionally, food prices are likely to rise due to a shortage of fertilizer, as the region is one of the main producers of nitrates necessary for crops. Further, up to 20,000 seafarers and several ships are stranded in the Persian Gulf, complicating global shipping, while the inaccessibility of Middle Eastern airports has exacerbated supply chains around the world.
The conduct of the war also provides possible lessons for future conflicts. The use of cheap drones and relatively rudimentary ballistic missile capabilities to draw down interceptor stores is indicative of forthcoming issues that United States would have if fighting a larger conventional adversary unless the American defense industrial base can rapidly ramp up production. Even then, Iran’s successes with $35,000 Shahed drones against multimillion dollar interceptors indicates a balance that favors offensive capabilities in the missile-interceptor race. Conversely, the unwillingness of the United States Navy to traverse the Strait or attempt to clear it alone indicates a balance favoring defensive capabilities and Anti-Access/Area Denial (which restricts adversaries in an area by prohibiting or limiting their ability to operate at a level of acceptable risk) strategies in naval warfare. Iran has successfully limited the world’s most powerful navy’s freedom of navigation despite losing most of its own navy—as well as most of its air force—in the war’s opening days.
Iran’s asymmetric successes may provide lessons for a potential United States-China conflict, though experts should use caution when trying to understand the similarities between the current crisis and a hypothetical one in the Taiwan Strait. First, the United States is likely to bring more forces to bear on China than it has against Iran. Second, the Taiwan Strait is far wider than Hormuz, making certain capabilities that China may use less effective. Third, additional actors—including the Taiwanese and Japanese—would play a significant role, with Taiwan seeking to counter Chinese movements in the Strait and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force potentially joining the fight, one much larger than partner navies are currently playing in the Persian Gulf. Finally, the Chinese military, especially the Chinese Navy, is far more capable than their Iranian counterparts. Despite these important differences, the United States should draw lessons about the missile-interceptor balance and the effectiveness of adversary Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities.
Analyzing Iran’s many tactical and operational successes and their implications for future conflicts may be conducive to overstating their broader military successes. Despite blocking off the strait, depleting United States’ and partner interceptor stocks, and hitting military, political, and economic targets with kinetic and cyberattacks, Iran has had several military and political setbacks and has faced stark losses.
The United States has attacked Iranian minelaying ships attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, potentially destroying several dozen of such vessels, if the Defense Department estimates are accurate. The destruction of so much of Iran’s minelaying force has likely contributed to its inability to deploy more than maybe a dozen mines in the Strait. While Iran has continued missile strikes against American, Gulf Arab, and Israeli targets, American and Israeli precision strikes and sabotage have degraded Iran’s missile capabilities, placing a ceiling on their ultimate effectiveness.
Militarily, Iran is likely to be defeated in this war, facing mounting losses with mounting time. But the war is also taking a major strategic toll on the United States. The cost of achieving America’s shifting war aims—including the decapitation of Iran’s pre-war leadership, degrading Iran’s missile forces, and potentially weakening its ability to restart a nuclear program—has been steep. The United States has burned through a large portion of its interceptor stockpile. The war has placed a high level of stress on the U.S.S. Gerald Ford aircraft carrier and its crew, hampering its future readiness. And Iran has struck and destroyed some critical assets, most important an E-3 Sentry aircraft that is part of the airborne warning and control system. Each of these losses reduces American readiness to respond to crises or counter great power adversaries in the short to mid-term future.
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