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French nuclear weapons, 2025

Bulletin, By Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight-Boyle | July 15, 2025

France’s nuclear weapons stockpile has remained stable over the past decade and contains approximately 290 warheads for delivery by ballistic missile submarines and aircraft. Nearly all of France’s stockpiled warheads are deployed or operationally available for deployment on short notice. In addition, up to 80 warheads—the older TN75 warheads assumed to have been recently removed from the Le Vigilant submarine—are believed to be in the dismantlement queue and are likely no longer considered part of France’s stockpile.

The current force level is the result of adjustments made to France’s nuclear posture following former President Nicolas Sarkozy’s announcement on March 21, 2008, that the arsenal would be reduced to fewer than 300 warheads (Sarkozy 2008). As Sarkozy said in 2008, the 300-warhead stockpile is “half the maximum number of warheads [France] had during the Cold War” (Sarkozy 2008). By our estimate, the French warhead inventory peaked in 1991-1992 at around 540 warheads, and the size of today’s stockpile is about the same as it was in 1984, although the composition is significantly different.

President Emmanuel Macron reaffirmed the Sarkozy formulation of “under 300 nuclear weapons” in a speech on February 7, 2020 (Élysée 2020) (see Table 1 –on original). Under President Macron, France has engaged in a long-term modernization and strengthening of its nuclear forces, which have included significant budget increases to the deterrent force in recent years (Assemblée Nationale 2024). It is possible but unclear if the decision to add another nuclear air base will increase the stockpile.

Research methodology and confidence

The analyses and estimates made in this Nuclear Notebook are derived from a combination of open sources: (1) state-originating data (e.g. government statements, declassified documents, budgetary information, and military operations and exercises); (2) non-state-originating data (e.g. media reports, think tank analyses, and industry publications); and (3) commercial satellite imagery. Because each of these sources provides different and limited information that is subject to varying degrees of uncertainty, we crosscheck each data point by using multiple sources and supplementing them with private conversations with officials whenever possible.

As a democracy with an active civil society and media landscape, it is possible to obtain relatively higher-quality information about France’s nuclear arsenal compared to many other nuclear-armed countries. France is one of only two countries (the other being the United States) that have publicly disclosed the size of their nuclear stockpile. French policy and military officials also offer regular statements on France’s nuclear doctrine and associated modernization programs.

Despite these positive steps, some challenges persist in obtaining reliable information about France’s nuclear arsenal. France’s freedom of information laws are more restrictive than in the United States and United Kingdom, and since 2008, a law initially designed to limit proliferation of French nuclear information has in practice been implemented on such a broad scale that it has restricted the ability of researchers and journalists to effectively analyze and disseminate data about discrete elements of France’s nuclear stockpile (Cooper 2022; Légifrance 2008). As a result, it is highly challenging to verify information presented by official sources, particularly as such statements rarely contain technical details………………………………………………….

……………………………………The role of French nuclear weapons

Successive heads of state, including Presidents Sarkozy, Hollande, and now Macron, have periodically described the role of French nuclear weapons. The Defense Ministry’s 2017 Defense and National Security Strategic Review reiterated that the nuclear doctrine is “strictly defensive,” and that using nuclear weapons “would only be conceivable in extreme circumstances of legitimate self-defense,” involving France’s vital interests. What exactly these “vital interests” are, however, remains unclear. During and after the Cold War, French leaders considered France’s “vital interests” to extend beyond its national boundaries; this discourse has been revived in earnest with the presidency of Emmanuel Macron. In February 2020, President Emmanuel Macron announced that France’s “vital interests now have a European dimension,” and sought to engage the European Union on the “role played by France’s nuclear deterrence in [its] collective security” (Élysée 2020).

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the heightened possibility of nuclear use in Europe, this discourse came under greater scrutiny and analysis. In October 2022, Macron clarified that France’s vital interests “would not be at stake if there was a nuclear ballistic attack in Ukraine or in the region,” apparently attempting to avoid being seen as expanding French nuclear doctrine (France TV 2022). Explicitly ruling out a nuclear role in case of Russian nuclear escalation in Ukraine appeared to contradict France’s statement at the August 2022 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which explained that “for deterrence to work, the circumstances under which nuclear weapons would [or would not] be used are not, and should not be, precisely defined, so as not to enable a potential aggressor to calculate the risk inherent in a potential attack” (2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2022).

The discussion around the role of France’s deterrent in Europe has intensified after the election of Donald Trump as US President, and even more so given the Trump administration’s open disdain for the United States’ European allies, overtures toward Russia, and threats to stop supporting Ukraine. While the broad contours of France’s nuclear posture will likely remain largely unchanged for the near future, how it is communicated and demonstrated appear to be evolving (Maitre 2025).

In addition to statements about France’s vital interests in Europe, Macron announced in March 2025 the addition of a nuclear air base at Luxeuil in eastern France, which will become the first base to house France’s new hypersonic nuclear cruise missile by 2035 (Élysée 2025). And when French jets (including Rafale jets from the nuclear base at Saint Dizier) deployed to northern Sweden in April 2025, France’s ambassador to Sweden explicitly stated: “As President Macron has said, it is of course the case that our French vital interests also include the interests of our allies. In that perspective, the nuclear umbrella also applies to our allies and of course Sweden is among them” (Granlund 2025)…………………….

………………..France does not have a no-first-use policy and reserves the right to conduct a “final warning” limited nuclear strike to signal to an adversary that they have crossed a line—or to signal the French resolve to conduct further nuclear strikes if necessary—in an attempt to “reestablish deterrence” (Élysée 2020; Tertrais 2020). Although France is a member of NATO, its nuclear forces are not part of the alliance’s integrated military command structure. …………………………..

……………………………………………………………………….. Command, control, and communication

France maintains strict and centralized control over its nuclear arsenal, with the president having sole and final authority as to the decision to use nuclear weapons. However, in practice, the implementation of such a decision would involve additional military personnel—namely the highest- and second-highest-ranking military officers: the Chef d’État-Major des Armées (CEMA) and the Chef de l’État-Major Particulier du Président de la République (CEMP), who is the president’s top military advisor.

Only one of those officials—the CEMA—is enshrined in the French defense code as the responsible official for ensuring that the president’s order is executed (Légifrance 2025). However, conflicting accounts appear to exist regarding the CEMP’s role, with testimony reportedly indicating that under previous administrations, the president and the CEMP each carried one half of the nuclear codes (Pelopidas 2019; Wellerstein 2019).

The primary command post for the president to transmit nuclear orders is called “Jupiter” and is located underneath the Élysée Palace ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles

The French force of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) constitutes the backbone of the French nuclear deterrent. Under the command of the Strategic Ocean Force (Force Océanique Stratégique, or FOST), the French Navy (Marine Nationale) operates four Triomphant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped with nuclear-armed long-range ballistic missiles—Le Triomphant (hull number S616), Le Téméraire (S617), Le Vigilant (S618), and Le Terrible (S619)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Air-launched cruise missiles

The second leg of France’s nuclear arsenal consists of nuclear ASMPA (air-sol moyenne portée-amélioré) air-launched cruise missiles for delivery by fighter-bombers operated by the Strategic Air Forces and the Naval Nuclear Aviation Force………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

The nuclear weapons complex

France’s nuclear weapons complex is managed by the Direction des Applications Militaires (DAM), a department within the Nuclear Energy Commission (Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies renouvelables, or CEA). DAM is responsible for research, design, manufacture, operational maintenance, and dismantlement of nuclear warheads………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2025-07/french-nuclear-weapons-2025/?utm_source=ActiveCampaign&utm_medium=email&utm_content=French%20nuclear%20arsenal%20today&utm_campaign=20250724%20Thursday%20Newsletter%20%28Copy%29

July 30, 2025 Posted by Christina Macpherson | France, weapons and war | Leave a comment