On the hook! Taxpayers to foot much of £38 billion bill for Sizewell C farce.

“It is astounding that it is only now, as contracts are being signed, that the government has confessed that Sizewell C’s cost has almost doubled to an eye watering £38bn – a figure that will only go up”.
NFLA 22nd July 2025, https://www.nuclearpolicy.info/news/on-the-hook-taxpayers-to-foot-much-of-38-billion-bill-for-sizewell-c-farce/
As Energy Secretary Ed Miliband signals the go ahead to the Sizewell C nuclear power plant with today’s approval of the Financial Investment Decision,[i] it is notable that the estimated cost of building the UK’s latest nuclear white elephant has already almost doubled to £38 billion.
Taxpayers will be on the hook for billions, as Ministers have failed to secure the full private sector funding that they desperately wanted and as France has reined in its own commitment.
The UK government’s stake is now 44.9%, whilst Amber Infrastructure (7.6%), Centrica (15%), EDF Energy (12.5%), and La Caisse (20%) will also take stakes. The National Wealth Fund – the government’s principal investor and policy bank – is also making its first investment in nuclear energy.
Interestingly, although much was made of continued French Government involvement through its sole ownership of EDF, President Macron cannot have been very impressed with the hospitality he received on his recent visit to the UK as the French subsequently reduced their stake to 12.5%. Originally both the UK and French Government had each committed to taking a near 20% stake.
The previously published official cost for the project was £20 billion, with the plant expected to be generating in the mid to late 2030s. But sceptics never believed the claimed £20 billion figure and they placed little faith that the delivery date will be met given that Sizewell C is largely a remake of her older sister, Hinkley Point C, which is massively over budget and behind schedule.
This plant under construction in Somerset is now expected to cost £46 billion to complete, and it will be delivered up to six years late; but at least in the case of Hinkley Point C it is French-state owned EDF Energy that must stump up the extra cash.
Clearly some prospective investors baulked at the cost unknowns and project risks of the Suffolk white elephant, and Alison Downes, Director of Stop Sizewell C, said that consequently the latest project had “only crawled over the line thanks to guarantees that the public purse, not private investors, will carry the can for the inevitable cost overruns”.
Whitehall and industry insiders have previously revealed to the press that the £20 billion only represented half the true cost and Julia Pyke, Sizewell C’s Managing Director had conceded that the earlier £20 billion cost estimate failed to account for inflation or risk.
In Sizewell C’s media release today, Ms Pyke revealed the price hike:
“Our plan is to deliver Sizewell C at a capital cost of around £38bn. Our estimate is the result of very detailed scrutiny of costs at Hinkley Point C and long negotiations with our suppliers. It has been subject to third-party peer review and has been scrutinised by investors and lenders and has been subject to extensive due diligence as part of the financing process. A capital cost of £38bn represents around 20% saving compared with Hinkley Point C and demonstrates the value of the UK’s fleet approach.”[ii]
In response, Ms Downes added: “It is astounding that it is only now, as contracts are being signed, that the government has confessed that Sizewell C’s cost has almost doubled to an eye watering £38bn – a figure that will only go up”.
Also commenting, the Chair of a second local campaign group, Together Against Sizewell C (TASC), Jenny Kirtley, said,
“This decision is a financial and environmental disaster for the UK and a betrayal of future generations.
“We are in a climate crisis that needs immediate action, yet this government has chosen to squander billions of public funds on a project that will not be operational until the late 2030s and has already seen a staggering 90% uplift in cost over the last 5 years.
“At nearly double the original £20bn price tag, a figure still being touted by joint managing director Julia Pyke until recently, how can anyone believe that £38bn Sizewell C will provide ‘value for money’ for consumers and taxpayers. The scale of potential exposure of public funds to the Sizewell C project is revealed as a staggering £54.589 billion in the government’s Financial Investment Decision subsidy scheme[iii].
“So much for claims made by EDF and government that there would be huge cost savings from ‘lessons learned’ from the Hinkley Point C build.
“In TASC’s view, the cost of this risky project can only increase as there are still many unresolved issues, including the recently revealed hidden sea defences which were not included by EDF in the 2020 DCO planning application even though EDF knew they would be needed in 2017.[iv] Future generations will have the responsibility to protect the Sizewell C site until the late 2100s and are depending on us to get it right.”
Although disappointing, the news was not unexpected by campaigners. The Nuclear Free Local Authorities are therefore confident that they shall soon pick themselves up and continue the fight, and we shall stand alongside them as the battle continues.
US nuclear weapons ‘on UK soil’ for first time in 17 years.

Flight from New Mexico to RAF Lakenheath believed to have dropped off B61 nuclear bombs that can be carried by Britain’s new F-35A fighter jets
The US has stationed nuclear weapons in Britain for the first time in
nearly 20 years for potential deployment on a new squadron of British jets,
analysts have said. A transport plane was tracked on Thursday during a
ten-hour flight from Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, the US Air
Force’s main nuclear storage site, to RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk.
Analysts said that the route taken by the C-17 transport looked like a “one-way
drop-off” and meant that it was likely that the UK was hosting US nuclear
weapons for the first time since 2008. The US and the UK declined to
comment.
Times 21st July 2025, https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/us-nuclear-weapons-uk-soil-first-time-17-years-wvgz8m6wl
Investment decision to be made on Sizewell C nuclear.

The UK government is expected to reach a final investment decision on the
Sizewell C nuclear power plant on Tuesday. “We are in constructive,
commercially sensitive negotiations with a range of potential investors as
part of the equity raise process,” a spokeswoman for the Department for
Energy Security and Net Zero told Energy Voice in an emailed statement.
“A final investment decision will be made following the conclusion of the
process, which we are targeting for this summer.”
The Financial Times reported that the price tag for the planned nuclear power station in
Suffolk, a replica of Hinkley Point C, will hit £38 billion including
equity and debt. Ministers will reportedly unveil the cost of the project
by the parliamentary recess on Wednesday.
Campaign pressure group Together
Against Sizewell C (TASC)’s chair Jenny Kirtley said: “What
right-minded government would commit billions of public funds to a project
that has already seen a staggering 90% uplift in cost over the last 5
years? “This government and Sizewell C Limited both denied recent build
cost estimates of £40bn for Sizewell C stating there would be a 30%
reduction from Hinkley Point C’s costs due to ‘lessons learned’ so,
why would anyone believe government claims that £38bn Sizewell C will
provide ‘value for money’ for consumers and taxpayers?”
The group has called for a value-for-money assessment of the project to be independently
audited to establish what cost provisions have been included for
“unresolved issues”, including sea defences that were not in EDF’s
original development consent order application.
The main developer on the project, EDF, has reduced its equity stake in the project to 12.5%, valued at about £1.1bn, Energy Voice reported this month. British energy supplier
Centrica is expected to take a 15% stake in the nuclear power plant.
According to a report in Les Echos, Amber Infrastructure and Canadian fund
la Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec (CDPQ) now plan to take a
stake of between 25% and 30% in the project.
Reports suggest that a
consortium led by Brookfield Asset Management pulled out of its bid to take
a 25% stake in Sizewell C at the last minute. Greencoat Schroders, which
had entered the round with Brookfield, has also exited the bidding,
according to a separate report. This latest reshuffle would leave the UK
government with an implied minority stake of as little as 42.5%.
Energy Voice 22nd July 2025, https://www.energyvoice.com/renewables-energy-transition/576815/investment-decision-expected-on-sizewell-c/
Centrica really can’t lose at Sizewell

Centrica’s £1.3 billion investment in Sizewell C guarantees substantial returns, even with cost
overruns. Now we know what Ed Miliband means by his “golden age of
nuclear” — golden for the companies putting their money into Sizewell
C. Yes, reactor projects have a habit of blowing up private investors. But
maybe not this one. It looks more like an exercise in transferring risk to
consumers and the taxpayer.
Times 22nd July 2025, https://www.thetimes.com/business-money/companies/article/centrica-really-cant-lose-at-sizewell-k33brftl2
Ukrainian bots want the BBC to endorse war crimes
Social media trolling takes a new and sinister turn
Ian Proud, Jul 23, 2025, https://thepeacemonger.substack.com/p/ukrainian-bots-want-the-bbc-to-endorse?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=3221990&post_id=168976248&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=1ise1&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
On 18 July I made a post on social media platform X in response to a BBC report entitled ‘Kill Russians, win points: is Ukraine’s new drone scheme gamifying war?’ It produced a spectacularly dark backlash from the Ukrainian bot community.
The BBC report explored a Ukrainian military scheme in which its soldiers could claim points for kills by First Person View (FPV) drones and use those points to buy the most preferred military technology in an ‘Amazon for war’.
While Paul Adams, the BBC diplomatic correspondent, touches briefly on the moral challenges that this scheme presents, he was clearly impressed.
‘The e-points scheme is typical of the way Ukraine has fought this war: creative, out-of-the-box thinking designed to make the most of the country’s innovative skills and minimise the effect of its numerical disadvantage.’
‘Points for kills. Amazon for war. To some ears, it might all sound brutal, even callous. But this is war and Ukraine is determined to hold on. By fighting as effectively, and efficiently as it can.’
Every day, military personnel on both sides of the conflict are killed by drones and other military technologies. That is why I have consistently called for the war in Ukraine to be ended through diplomatic means and is why I continue to do so.
The problem I had with the article was its heading – about killing Russian soldiers using drones – was accompanied by a photograph of a soldier (one might presume, Russian) with his back turned to the First Person View on screen with his hands in the air, suggesting surrender. I found this juxtaposition, on UK state-owned media, deeply troubling.
One might easily gain the impression by the headline and the photograph combined that the soldier’s fate was death. And if that was so, then that would constitute a war crime.
Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, “killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion” is a war crime in international armed conflicts
One cannot know the fate of the soldier and whether he is killed or taken prisoner. And the article goes on to point out that Ukrainian soldiers can claim higher points for encouraging a Russian soldier to surrender, though does not point out how this would be possible with an armed drone.
It is certainly the habit of the western media to churn out clickbait headlines in a bid to maintain waning public appetite for a war that Ukraine is losing and which Europe is funding at enormous expense.
However, it sets a dangerous precedent if the UK state-owned broadcaster is producing articles that infer war crimes are taking place and implicitly endorse the means of that happening.
I therefore included in my post a poll which asked people to vote on:
Do you want the BBC through its reporting implicitly to endorse war crimes and show images purporting to or giving the impression of the circumstances leading up to a war crime taking place?
I don’t have a huge X following, but my post garnered 20,000 votes over three days with over 90% of those who voted responding ‘no’, specifically that appearing to endorse war crimes in media reporting was wrong.
As I didn’t mention a specific country, some people argued that the allegation might also be levelled at BBC reporting of IDF atrocities in Gaza.
However, on 21 July my post was seized on by very-obviously-Ukrainian bots flinging all sorts of insults in my direction, such that I spent several hours blocking and reporting offensive content on my feed.
In a very short space of time, my account was swarmed by a blizzard of insults and false accusations, including of being an asset of the KGB (sic!).. being a Putin apologist, sucking Russian dicks and being a paedophile who uses teenage Russian prostitutes.
I was added to hate ‘Lists’ that x members keep, such as ‘nazi whore cowards’ and ‘vatniks’ (Russian propagandists).
All very annoying and intended to discredit me en-masse. But as Glenn Diesen joked when we spent some time together in Tblisi, in early June, ‘if you wanted to be popular, you should have sold ice creams’.
When one expresses a personal view on such an emotive topic as this pointless war in Ukraine, you are likely to get attacked from one direction or the other, or even both. However, some made more disturbing comments that can only be interpreted as threats of causing me physical harm.
Many made generalised comments about how any Russian solider in Ukraine should deserve such a fate (to die while surrendering) and so on. However, this was not the most sinister aspect of the response to my post.
In addition to voting that the BBC should not implicitly endorse war crimes, the other option was to vote for: ‘Please endorse war crimes’.
353 people voted in the poll before I closed my post to public comments. 213 people voted in favour of the BBC endorsing war crimes through its reporting of Ukraine. That’s right, just over 60% of, one assumes, mostly Ukrainian or Ukraine-supporting voters, endorses the BBC endorsing war crimes, in this context committed by Ukraine.
Herein the central truth of this and all wars; that they generate intense hatred of the other. That hatred fires the bloodlust that drives war crimes in any theatre of conflict. No war is free of war crimes. British, French, American, Russian and, yes, Ukrainian, service personnel have been documented as having committed war crimes, together with those of many other countries.
War reduces humanity to the darkest depths of depravity in which the most unconscionable acts are justified on the basis of defeating the hated other. Forgive me for believing that the BBC should not be glorifying that, even if implicitly, or encouraging others to do so.
I would far sooner they were pushing for a negotiated settlement to this terrible war.
Grave Nation: Ukrainian Cemetery Mega-Project Reveals Dimming Military Hopes

a shroud of occlusion wears heavy over the outcome of the war is because the West has done their utmost in hiding Ukrainian losses.
“The right question is not whether Ukraine has lost the war – that seems all too obvious to me – but how far it will lose it.“
the Ukrainian deputies who still have some brain left understand that with the current state of affairs in Ukraine, the country will soon cease to exist. All the Ukrainian “partners” who were verbally ready to fight for Zelensky’s regime have now completely “frozen” and don’t even want to contribute money.
Simplicius, Jul 22, 2025, https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/grave-nation-ukrainian-cemetery-mega?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=1351274&post_id=168791044&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=ln98x&triedRedirect=true&utm_medium=email
A new Le Monde article sends spider cracks through the facade of Ukrainian losses:
Right off the bat, they reveal that cemeteries throughout Ukraine are full, requiring a national project of building a large-scale network of new military burial sites:
The squares reserved for the soldiers are full. Everywhere, teams of architects are working on memorials that tell us as much about the scale of the slaughter as they do about the ongoing reflection on the idea of nationhood.
They visit one of the first under construction, which already has a main square of plots for 10,000, eventually to be expanded to 160,000 graves:
In the village, only a brand-new brown sign, the color reserved for national sites, currently marks the road leading the trucks to the construction site. It reads: “National Military Memorial Cemetery”. A first square of 10,000 graves, already partially dotted with wide, light-colored granite paths lined with benches and lime trees, will welcome the first “heroes” this summer. Eventually, however, “130,000 or even 160,000” deceased will be laid to rest on this future mortuary site, explains architect Serhi Derbin, wearing khaki linen pants and a straw panama, in the bright Saturday sunshine of July.
Rightly, the Le Monde staff turn to the issue of “official” Ukrainian casualty statistics. In a growing Western trend, they admit that the number of dead is likely “much higher” than Zelensky gives credit for. Of course, pro-UA zealots will ignore the fact that there is no such project in Russia, no inordinately exceptional outgrowth of military cemeteries anywhere. They’ll make excuses, pointing to the cliche of “Russia’s size” as somehow ‘concealing’ such markers of losses, ignoring that Ukraine itself is the largest country in Europe and remains oddly unable to ‘conceal losses’ in the same way.
In the same circles, there are increased talks of Ukrainian collapse by end of year. Le Figaro’s new article making the rounds offers such a prediction. The writers spoke to French military officers who believe the situation is turning dire:
A French military source:
Moscow’s “thousand cuts” strategy is intensifying. The front is not set in stone. Offensives are localized in a multitude of small battles fought over a few kilometers. The cuts are getting deeper, even though the Ukrainian army is already weakened. It is stretched over a front of more than 1,000 km. Lacking sufficiently frequent replacements and human resources, the units are becoming exhausted.
“The Russians are multiplying offensive sectors to disperse enemy reserves,” explains a French military source. Russia has deployed nearly 700,000 soldiers in Ukraine, more than the Ukrainian army. Patiently, it continues to nibble away at territory, at the cost of colossal human losses: up to a hundred dead a day; some 40,000 casualties (dead and wounded) a month. The Russian army has adapted its tactics, preferring to launch assaults with small infantry units or units mounted on motorcycles, in order to advance faster and more lightly.
They slip in the usual sop about the “costs” Russia is incurring, but then critically add:
But the army, the Ukrainian, it also lost some of the material she had received from Western for the past three years. Time plays against it with the risk of a break in a part of the front. “Forces of Ukraine are in [dire straits]… Can they last six months? A year? In reality, the war is already lost“, continued in the military source. In this war of attrition, the time changes everything.
And in another even more erudite offering, Figaro interviews French historian Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, who is particularly a leading expert on the First World War.
Utilizing his expertise on the Great War, he makes some fascinating parallels to the current Ukrainian conflict that are worth a deeper look.
First, he notes that in his opinion the Ukrainian war is only the third war of its particular type in recent history—the type being ‘siege warfare, but in the open country’:
You note another similarity between the First World War and the Ukraine, as both were wars of position…
There are few historical examples of this very recent form of warfare, as it requires armaments that only became available at the end of the 19th century. Structurally, it is siege warfare, but fought in open country over hundreds of kilometers. There have only been three conflicts of this type: the Great War (from late 1914 to spring 1918, not beyond); the Iran-Iraq war (from 1980 to 1988); the Ukraine war (from April 2022, not before).
He goes on to draw further parallels:
What are the invariants of such a war?
The main point is the superiority of the defensive over the offensive. Had this not been the case, Ukraine would have been beaten long ago. Already during the First World War, it was necessary to cross a “no man’s land” saturated with barbed wire, one of the most effective weapons of the early 20th century. Then there were the minefields we saw in Iran-Iraq and now in Ukraine. They are an extraordinarily compact barrier. The Ukrainians came up against it in the summer of 2023 during their failed counter-offensive, and the Russians since 2024. As a result, it’s impossible to break through dozens of kilometers wide and break the enemy’s front line.
He notes that due to these peculiarities, there is a kind of obligatory “regression” in each conflict, where previous means are no longer workable:
There is a kind of regression in all three conflicts. In Ukraine, helicopters and airplanes fly very little above and beyond the front line. Nor are there any major armored offensives. We’ve never seen anything like the Battle of Kursk in 1943. As a result, the battle is heavily infantry-based.
And at the same time, firepower…
Yes, that’s another invariant of this type of warfare. Initially, this firepower was linked to artillery, with the cannon dominating the battlefield during the First World War. This overwhelming dominance of the cannon can be seen again in Ukraine, until 2024. Unfortunately, Russia has always had very good artillery and, unlike the Ukrainians, has had the means to supply it, where the latter ran out of ammunition well into 2024.
But the point in setting the stage above, is that by analyzing these parallels, this preeminent historian has reached a final decisive conclusion: that Ukraine has already lost the war:
It was by considering these invariants that you came to a radical conclusion, set out at a Senate hearing in April: in your view, Ukraine has already lost the war…
Indeed, as we speak, Ukraine unfortunately seems to have lost the war, probably as early as the summer of 2023, when it became clear that its long-awaited counter-offensive had failed. One could imagine a spectacular turnaround, but it’s not clear how. Of course, when you say this, people are shocked because it’s unbearable to think that Ukraine has lost the war. It’s unbearable for me too.
He adds to the list of peculiarities of the war the fact that even Ukraine’s now-certain loss is not overtly visible:
But here’s the thing: there’s no point in remaining incantatory, we have to get out of a new denial, that of defeat, after that of the possibility of war itself. For I would add another characteristic of the war of position: defeat is not immediately discernible when it looms. It takes a long time to appear. It’s not like Stalingrad, where the vanquished leave the battlefield and the victor occupies it. It’s not like the blitzkrieg of May-June 1940. In a war of position, it’s two bodies in battle, slowly wearing each other down. Only in the end does it become clear that one has worn out faster than the other.
He hits the nail on the head, but likely in a way even he doesn’t fully understand—or at least not in a way he’s ready to admit. You see, the reason such a shroud of occlusion wears heavy over the outcome of the war is because the West has done their utmost in hiding Ukrainian losses. His final pithy admonition that only in the end does it become clear who lost the war of attrition inadvertently bears testament to this: only those of us who truly care about facts and uncovering the truth—not dogmatic reasoning and propaganda—are able to demystify the more-than-obvious signals that Ukraine is taking ungodly and unsustainable losses comparative to Russia.
He goes on to demonstrate his cause with an example:
Let’s do a little thought experiment. Let’s imagine that in early October 1918, a group of military experts, journalists and historians were gathered in a neutral country to ask their opinion on the situation. And now suppose someone had then suggested that Germany had already lost the war. Well, everyone would have cried out! At that time, the Reich was still occupying immense territories in the east at the expense of Russia, since the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It occupied the whole of Belgium and large parts of France. It’s true that the German army has been retreating since the summer, but nowhere has the front given way. The Germans are inflicting heavy losses on the Allies, since it is the Allies who are on the offensive and therefore taking the greatest risks. So where is the German defeat?
In reality, German defeat has been certain since July-August 1918. It has happened, but it is not yet apparent. Since the summer, the German General Staff has been well aware of this, and has called for negotiations to be launched. Except that the political powers don’t understand it, nor does German public opinion, and never will. This failure to understand the defeat of 1918 was one of the reasons for the rise of Nazism.
The interviewer lightly pushes back, stating that the Ukrainians are not yet visibly collapsing despite Russia’s slow-moving gains:
Here again, let’s think back to the First World War. When the Allies launched their counter-offensive in July 1918, it was a general one, but apart from the Americans, the soldiers were no longer capable of attacking. They were so used to throwing themselves on the ground at the first danger that everyone was extremely cautious. But we could have imagined that part of the front would be breached, in which case… Germany had no more reserves to plug the holes. That’s why I’m worried about the risk of a Russian offensive in Ukraine this summer: given the disproportion of forces, could it break through the front? We would then be entering a different configuration, as any break in the front would risk producing a powerful moral effect on the Ukrainian armed forces, on political power and on public opinion.
He concludes by stating that the right question is no longer whether Ukraine has lost—which is rhetorical at this point—but how far Ukraine will lose:
The right question is not whether Ukraine has lost the war – that seems all too obvious to me – but how far it will lose it. On the basis of the current balance of power, or on that of an even more unfavorable balance of power? This will determine whether or not the Ukrainian defeat represents a strategic victory for Russia.
On that note, Russia again launched one of the largest attacks of the war last night—at least according to frenetic Ukrainian commentators who, admittedly, could be playing things up for dramatic effect to curry sympathy:
There has been a surge of such attacks the last few weeks, particularly ones targeting Ukrainian recruitment centers operated by the notorious TCK (Territorial Recruitment Center). Farsighted Ukrainian officials have ‘brilliantly’ concluded this is a Russian effort to cripple Ukraine’s ability to round up meat for Zelensky’s conveyor belt of horror.
Likewise, Russian strikes have been completely erasing Ukrainian weapons industries. Many people watch the endless parade of explosions in a detached manner—at this point it has become passé to the point that people assume these strikes do little, or are just carrying out some vague ‘background work’. In reality, they have been neutering Ukrainian industries, halting many of the farfetched Ukrainian weapons ambitions which were at one point widely talked about.
For instance, a recent hit was said to have destroyed the Grom-2 production line, a big Ukrainian ballistic missile that was meant to be their answer to Russia’s Iskander. There’s a reason you don’t see much of the weaponry constantly talked about and billed as the next “wunderwaffen”: it’s because these ongoing, systematic Russian strikes are wiping out their industries, leaving Ukraine with no ability to produce anything other than small quadcopter drones in tiny boutique workshops which can be hidden anywhere. The larger facilities which were meant to produce more prestige-level systems, from mobile artillery, to various analogues of Russian air-to-ground and ballistic missiles, to artillery shell production lines, etc., have all been extirpated by these relentless systematic strikes.
More and more, top Ukrainian figures are panicking over this and concluding that if it continues on this way, Ukraine will have nothing left. Listen to the Ukrainian officer below, who states that “at this rate, Ukraine will be returned to the stone age”:
🇺🇦The chair under Zelensky is starting to shake more and more. After all, allowing such statements on the air of pro-Kyiv media was previously unimaginable👍
➖Apparently, the recent report about the production of Geran-2 drones and their quantity, along with massive attacks on Ukrainian military infrastructure, really forced the top officials of Zelensky’s office to activate the “brown” alert.
➖Because the Ukrainian deputies who still have some brain left understand that with the current state of affairs in Ukraine, the country will soon cease to exist. All the Ukrainian “partners” who were verbally ready to fight for Zelensky’s regime have now completely “frozen” and don’t even want to contribute money. Support is dwindling, and stealing is becoming difficult. The people fully realize that Zelensky will shout about VICTORY from his bunker or Europe until he is hoarse, while Ukrainians rejoice at the Geran-2 strikes on the TCC.
He’s referring in particular to the new videos showcasing Russia’s Geran (Shahed) drone production at the Alabuga factory in Tatarstan where hundreds of the drones are produced each day around the clock:
The full episode where the above excerpt is from, which deals with many other drone types being used in the Russian Army, can be viewed here.
One of the reasons, by the way, that the French historian, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, saw Russia winning the war despite parallels to ‘stalemated’ conflicts like the Iran-Iraq war, is because in previous examples he believes the industrial capacities and general capabilities of the combatants were likewise roughly static. But in the case of the Russo-Ukrainian war, he admits that Russian capabilities are growing each year, far out-pacing Ukrainian ones. This goes toward things like the previously-talked-about manpower gains of 100k per year—while Ukraine’s manpower shrinks—as well as the industrial growth of the arms industry.
That being said, there’s one last important point to be made. Many point to Russia’s “growing economic problems” as a counter-argument for why Russia could begin “losing” in the future, despite its seeming present dominance. I even saw one Western publication spin Putin’s announcement that Russia would be reducing its military budget next year as an “act of desperation” which means Russian military capability is finally “weakening”.
On the contrary, the signals here are the complete opposite: Putin’s plan to begin slowly reining in Russia’s military spending is the acknowledgement that Russia has finally reached a total equilibrium in the war, where current production levels are stable and sustainable indefinitely in relation to the losses. That means further inordinate military expansion is unnecessary, and Russia sees a successful path in defeating Ukraine at current levels.
This is obviously in conjunction with the fact that Russia has now attritioned the AFU to such an extent that it no longer requires the same disparity levels in military spending—as Ukrainian capabilities shrink, Russia likewise settles its war-making into a manageable level by taking things from overdrive to simply ‘autopilot’—if the analogy makes sense. Once again, dogmatic Western analysts incapable of impartial reasoning fail to pick up on this obvious cue, which totally spoils their analyses.
To leave off, here’s a typically comical new “threat” issued by beltway bugger Lindsey Graham against Putin. He boasts that Trump will “put a whoopin’ on your ass”, but then veers to say Trump will “punish” not Russia, but countries buying Russian oil:
This again proves the US has no cards against Russia, and must desperately punch Russia’s friends on the arm as a substitute threat. The problem is, this hurts the US and its relations with key foreign powers more than it does anything to Russia.
More and more Ukrainian commentators and political figures are cottoning on to the fact that “sanctions” were always nothing more than a desperate and hollow performative act:
The West, with its illusory economies, fraudulent GDPs based on hyper-financialized and leveraged debt, and miserably deteriorated industrial capacities has worn out its ‘sanctions’ cudgel—at least for anything more than performative ‘punishments’.
Sizewell’s Exploding Budget Exposes Europe’s Nuclear Blindspot

Michael Barnard, 20 July 25,
https://cleantechnica.com/2025/07/20/sizewells-exploding-budget-exposes-europes-nuclear-blindspot/
The recent announcement that the UK’s Sizewell C nuclear generation construction’s projected cost has doubled from £20 billion in 2020 to nearly £38 billion today is shocking but predictable. For anyone following Europe’s nuclear power saga, such an escalation is not an anomaly but rather a continuation of a deeply entrenched pattern. This project, part of Europe’s broader push for nuclear power to meet climate goals, is again raising fundamental questions about whether European governments and utilities have truly laid the groundwork for successful nuclear power scaling, or if they continue to underestimate the scale of the task.
To assess what has gone wrong, we can turn to a clear set of criteria for successful nuclear programs that history provides. These criteria are based on the best available evidence from nuclear build-outs globally, and importantly, are grounded in repeated successes and failures documented by energy historians and experts. Seven specific factors emerge as crucial: first, nuclear power programs require a strategic national priority with consistent government oversight and support. Second, successful nuclear programs historically have close alignment with military nuclear objectives, benefiting from established skill sets, infrastructure, and strategic imperatives. Third, reactor programs thrive only when standardized around a single, fully proven reactor design. Fourth, large-scale reactors in the gigawatt range provide significant economies of scale. Fifth, there must be a comprehensive, government-supported training and human resources program. Sixth, deployment should be rapid, continuous, and sustained over two to three decades to leverage learning effects. Finally, successful nuclear deployments involve constructing dozens of reactors, not just a few isolated units, to benefit from economies of scale and accumulated knowledge.
Evaluating Europe’s EPR (European Pressurized Reactor) program against these criteria provides a sobering picture. The strategic national priority criterion has only partially been met. European governments have indeed supported nuclear in principle, yet actual oversight has varied considerably, often shifting responsibilities between private entities, state regulators, and multinational utilities, diluting accountability. There has been no consistent, comprehensive governmental stewardship. Each reactor site faces a new web of bureaucratic complexity rather than benefiting from streamlined regulatory oversight.
The second criterion, integration with military objectives, is entirely absent in the European context. Historically, successful nuclear programs like those in France, the United States, or Russia have been intertwined with military nuclear efforts. The absence of military nuclear integration in contemporary European programs removes a critical element of strategic urgency, funding, and workforce stability. Europe’s nuclear effort remains civilian-only, losing these historical advantages.
Standardization of reactor design has also fallen short. Although the EPR was intended to be Europe’s standardized reactor, actual implementations have seen multiple design modifications, extensive site-specific customizations, and evolving regulatory requirements. Each new European EPR has effectively become another first-of-a-kind construction project, losing almost all potential learning curve benefits. The changes between Flamanville in France, Olkiluoto in Finland, and Hinkley Point C in the United Kingdom illustrate starkly how the promise of standardization has not materialized.
While the fourth criterion of large-scale reactors in the gigawatt class is technically met, this alone has not guaranteed success. Indeed, the EPR’s massive scale of around 1.6 GW per reactor, designed specifically to capture economies of vertical scaling, has perversely contributed to complexity and cost overruns due to an insufficiently mature supply chain, workforce, and management capability. Size alone cannot substitute for weaknesses elsewhere in the development ecosystem.
A major factor missing from Europe’s nuclear plans has been a centralized, government-led workforce training and human resource strategy. Nuclear construction is complex and requires extremely well-trained, specialized and security-cleared personnel who work effectively in teams. Europe’s nuclear workforce remains fragmented, project-based, and heavily reliant on temporary contractors. This workforce structure prevents accumulation of essential expertise and institutional memory. By contrast, successful nuclear builds historically, such as France’s 1970s and 1980s fleet or South Korea’s more recent nuclear expansions, relied explicitly on stable, state-backed workforces built over decades.
The sixth factor, rapid and sustained deployment over a defined two- or three-decade timeframe, has been consistently unmet in Europe. Instead, construction schedules stretch over a decade or longer for individual projects, with significant gaps between reactor starts. Olkiluoto took nearly 18 years from groundbreaking to full commercial operation, while Flamanville has similarly ballooned from a five-year schedule to more than 17 years. Such prolonged and intermittent build-outs destroy continuity, erase institutional memory, and eliminate any hope of learning-based improvements.
Finally, the criterion of dozens of reactors to benefit from learning economies and consistent improvements has not even been approached. The small number of participating European nations have each built just one or two reactors each, without sustained replication. Instead of dozens, Europe’s EPR build-out has delivered exactly two completed reactors outside of China, one each in Finland and France, both massively over budget and delayed. The United Kingdom’s ongoing struggles with Hinkley Point C and now Sizewell underscore the near-complete failure to leverage scale and experience across multiple similar projects.
Bent Flyvbjerg’s extensive research on megaprojects offers important context here. His data demonstrate consistently that nuclear projects routinely underestimate complexity, overestimate potential cost savings, and ignore historical evidence of prior overruns. Flyvbjerg’s findings indicate average overruns for nuclear reactors often range from 120 to 200% above initial estimates. Europe’s EPR experiences align closely with his analysis, underscoring that the fundamental issue is systemic rather than isolated mismanagement or technical miscalculations. The repeated pattern of underestimated costs and schedules aligns precisely with Flyvbjerg’s warnings.
Taking Sizewell C specifically, the now nearly doubled budget and uncertainty about its schedule mirror previous European EPR outcomes. Although the UK government adopted the regulated asset base model to theoretically reduce investor risk, the reality is consumers bear the brunt of these overruns, undermining the economic and political rationale for nuclear. This situation further confirms that without fundamental changes in approach, future EPR projects across Europe will likely replicate these troubling patterns.
The essential takeaway is clear. Unless European governments and industry stakeholders directly address and fulfill the criteria outlined above, nuclear power development in Europe will continue to repeat these costly cycles. Establishing clear national priorities, enforcing rigid reactor standardization, implementing centralized workforce training, committing to sustained rapid deployment, and genuinely standardizing the regulatory environment are non-negotiable if nuclear is to play a significant, reliable, and economically sensible role in Europe’s energy future.
In stark contrast to Europe’s nuclear struggles, renewable energy growth on the continent has significantly exceeded expectations during the same period. Between the mid-2000s, when the first EPR reactors entered construction, and today, Europe’s wind and solar capacity has expanded rapidly, consistently outperforming deployment targets and experiencing steady cost declines. Wind power, both onshore and offshore, has grown by more than tenfold, with major projects routinely delivered within budget and schedule.
Solar power installations have seen even more impressive expansion, driven by sharp decreases in module prices and efficient scaling of supply chains. Unlike nuclear, renewable projects benefit from short construction cycles, standardized designs, and continuous incremental improvements, underscoring Europe’s missed opportunity with nuclear and emphasizing the practical effectiveness of the renewables approach. These advantages show clearly in Flyvbjerg’s data, with wind and solar projects, along with transmission, being the three megaproject categories most likely to come in within initial budgets and schedules.
The stark doubling of Sizewell’s budget is not just a financial shock, it should be a wake-up call. The EPR reactor story in Europe does not have to remain one of perpetual disappointment, but without a realistic recognition of what successful nuclear scale requires, these overruns and delays will continue indefinitely, destroying the business cases that led to their approval in the first place. Europe must either meet these demanding but historically validated conditions for nuclear success or shift decisively toward alternatives capable of meeting its climate and energy goals without the drama and expense that have defined the European nuclear experience to date.
The Militarization and Weaponization of Media Literacy-NATO Invades the Classroom

July 10, 2025, Nolan Higdon and Sydney Sullivan, https://www.projectcensored.org/military-weaponization-media-literacy/
This Dispatch is informed by our forthcoming 2025 article, “Media Literacy in the Crosshairs: NATO’s Strategic Goals and the Revival of Protectionist Pedagogy,” from the Journal of Media Literacy Education, Volume 17, Issue 2.
During President Donald Trump’s second term, education has remained a central battleground in American politics. Republicans claim that classrooms have become hotbeds of “woke” indoctrination, accusing educators of promoting progressive agendas and tolerating antisemitism. In contrast, Democrats argue that conservatives are systematically defunding and dismantling public and higher education precisely because it teaches values like diversity, equity, and inclusion. While these partisan skirmishes dominate headlines, they obscure a much deeper and more enduring issue that encompasses all of these issues and more: the influence of corporate and military power on public education.
For decades, scholars have warned that corporations have steadily infiltrated the classroom—not to promote critical thinking or democratic values, but to cultivate ideologies that reinforce capitalism, nationalism, and militarism. Critical media literacy educators, in particular, have called attention to the convergence of tech firms and military entities in education, offering so-called “free” digital tools that double as Trojan horses for data collection and ideological control.
One striking example is the rise of programs like NewsGuard, which uses public fears over fake news to justify increased surveillance of students’ online activity. Relatedly, in 2018, the Atlantic Council partnered with Meta to perform “fact-checking” on platforms such as Facebook. In 2022, the US Marine Corps discussed developing media literacy trainings. It remains to be seen what training, if any, they will develop. However, what is known is that a large global player has entered the media literacy arena: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While NATO presents its initiatives as supportive of media literacy and democratic education, these efforts appear to be oriented more toward reinforcing alignment with its strategic and political priorities than to fostering critical civic engagement.
NATO was created in 1949, during the Cold War, as a military alliance to contain communism. Although the war officially ended in 1991, NATO has expanded both its mission and membership. Today, it encompasses more than thirty member nations and continues to frame itself as a global force for peace, democracy, and security. But this self-image masks real conflicts of interest.
NATO is deeply intertwined with powerful nation-states and corporate actors. It routinely partners with defense contractors, tech firms, think tanks, and Western governments—all of which have a vested interest in maintaining specific political and economic systems. These relationships raise concerns when NATO extends its reach into education. Can a military alliance—closely linked to the defense industry and state propaganda—credibly serve as a neutral force in media education?
In 2022, NATO associates collaborated with the US-based Center for Media Literacy (CML) to launch a media literacy initiative framed as a strategic defense against misinformation. The initiative included a report titled Building Resiliency: Media Literacy as a Strategic Defense Strategy for the Transatlantic, authored by CML’s Tessa Jolls. It was accompanied by a series of webinars featuring military personnel, policy experts, and academics.
On the surface, the initiative appeared to promote digital literacy and civic engagement. But a closer look reveals a clear ideological agenda. Funded and organized by NATO, the initiative positioned media literacy not as a means of empowering students to think critically about how power shapes media, but as a defense strategy to protect NATO member states from so-called “hostile actors.” The curriculum emphasized surveillance, resilience, and behavior modification over reflection, analysis, and democratic dialogue.
Throughout their webinars, NATO representatives described the media environment as a battlefield, frequently using other war metaphors such as “hostile information activities” and “cognitive warfare.” Panelists argued that citizens in NATO countries were targets of foreign disinformation campaigns—and that media literacy could serve as a tool to inoculate them against ideological threats.
A critical review of NATO’s media literacy initiative reveals several troubling themes. First, it frames media literacy as a protectionist project rather than an educational one. Students are portrayed less as thinkers to be empowered and more as civilians to be monitored, molded, and managed. In this model, education becomes a form of top-down, preemptive defense, relying on expert guidance and military oversight rather than democratic participation.
Second, the initiative advances a distinctly neoliberal worldview. It emphasizes individual responsibility over structural analysis. In other words, misinformation is treated as a user error, rather than the result of flawed systems, corporate algorithms, or media consolidation. This framing conveniently absolves powerful actors, including NATO and Big Tech, , of their role in producing or amplifying disinformation.
Third, the initiative promotes a contradictory definition of empowerment. While the report and webinars often use the language of “citizen empowerment,” they ultimately advocate for surveillance, censorship, and ideological conformity. Panelists call for NATO to “dominate” the information space, and some even propose systems to monitor students’ attitudes and online behaviors. Rather than encouraging students to question power—including NATO itself—this approach rewards obedience and penalizes dissent.
Finally, the initiative erases the influence of corporate power. Although it criticizes authoritarian regimes and “hostile actors,” it fails to examine the role that Western corporations, particularly tech companies, play in shaping media environments. This oversight is especially problematic given that many of these corporations are NATO’s partners. By ignoring the political economy of media, the initiative offers an incomplete and ideologically skewed version of media literacy.
NATO’s foray into media literacy education represents a new frontier in militarized pedagogy. While claiming to promote democracy and resilience, its initiative advances a narrow, protectionist, and neoliberal approach that prioritizes NATO’s geopolitical goals over student empowerment.
This should raise red flags for educators, policymakers, and advocates. Media literacy is not a neutral practice. The organizations that design and fund media literacy programs inevitably shape those programs’ goals and methods. When a military alliance like NATO promotes media education, it brings with it a strategic interest in ideological control.
Educators must ask: What kind of media literacy are we teaching—and whose interests does it serve? If the goal is to produce informed, critically thinking citizens capable of questioning power in all its forms, then NATO’s approach falls short. Instead of inviting students to explore complex media systems, it simplifies them into a binary struggle between “us” and “them,” encouraging loyalty over literacy.
True media literacy must begin with transparency about who and what is behind the curriculum. It must empower students to question all forms of influence—governmental, corporate, and military alike. And it must resist the creeping presence of militarism in our classrooms. As educators, we must defend the right to question, not just the messages we see, but the institutions that shape them.
Nolan Higdon is a political analyst, author, host of The Disinfo Detox Podcast, lecturer at Merrill College and the Education Department at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Project Censored Judge. Higdon’s popular Substack includes the bi-weekly Gaslight Gazette, which chronicles important and well-researched examples of disinformation, character assassination, and censorship in the United States.
Sydney Sullivan is an educator, author, and researcher specializing in critical media literacy, student well-being, and digital culture. She is a lecturer in the Rhetoric and Writing Studies department at San Diego State University and a co-host of Disinfo Detox. Her popular Substack series @sydneysullivanphd explores how digital habits shape student mental health, media literacy, and classroom culture.
EU opens door to funding nuclear energy in next budget

By Kate Abnett, July 18, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/eu-opens-door-funding-nuclear-energy-next-budget-2025-07-17/
BRUSSELS, July 17 (Reuters) – The European Commission wants to open up part of its proposed 2 trillion euro EU budget for 2028-2034 to nuclear energy, a move likely to divide the bloc’s member states, which Germany immediately rejected.
In an annex to its mammoth budget proposal published on Wednesday, the Commission listed nuclear power as an activity countries can fund through their national share of the budget – specifically, “new or additional fission energy capacity installed in GW”.
Around 865 billion euros of EU funding will be available under these national spending plans.
The move would be a sea change for the EU, whose current budget does not fund conventional nuclear power plants – reflecting a long-running conflict between pro-nuclear EU members like France and Sweden and traditionally anti-nuclear countries like Germany and Austria.
“Germany rejects any subsidization of nuclear power from the EU budget,” its environment minister Carsten Schneider said on Thursday, adding that Berlin respected the choice of other countries to build reactors.
“However, respect for national sovereignty in energy matters also means not claiming EU funds for this expensive path, a quarter of which comes from German taxpayers’ money,” Schneider said.
France’s energy ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Swedish energy minister Ebba Busch declined to comment.
The Commission’s budget proposal marks the start of years of intense negotiations among EU nations, which must all approve the final budget.
EU countries have long been at loggerheads over whether to promote atomic power to reduce CO2 emissions, a dispute which has delayed policymaking on climate change and energy in the bloc.
That dynamic had appeared on the cusp of a shift earlier this year, when German Chancellor Friedrich Merz signalled Berlin would no longer object to treating nuclear power on a par with renewable energy in EU policies.
Countries including Denmark and Italy had also signalled a shift in their past opposition to nuclear power.
However, some EU diplomats said that this softening of positions had not extended into support for EU funding.
“There is no chance EU money goes to new nuclear,” one EU country diplomat said.
The EU’s current budget explicitly bans member states from building nuclear power plants using their share of hundreds of billions of euros in regional development funds – although the budget offers some limited funds for nuclear research and decommissioning of old reactors.
Reporting by Kate Abnett; additional reporting by Simon Johnson, Holger Hansen, America Hernandez, Riham Alkousaa; Editing by Hugh Lawson
Oxford fusion pioneer risks running out of cash within months

First Light scrambles for funding despite Labour promise to invest £2.5bn in nuclear
research. A British nuclear fusion pioneer has warned it risks running out
of cash within six months as it races to raise millions of pounds in
funding to secure its future. First Light Fusion, which is based in Oxford,
is in talks with investors to raise £20m after burning through tens of
millions of pounds to develop its novel fusion technology. The start-up,
founded in 2011, had sought to develop what it called “projectile
fusion”, developing a giant gas-powered gun that would fire a 5p-sized
projectile at extreme speeds into a fuel source, sparking a fusion
reaction. However, the company abandoned plans to build a prototype reactor
earlier this year as it struggled to raise funds.
Telegraph 20th July 2025, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/07/20/oxford-fusion-pioneer-running-out-of-cash/
Pay danger money to communities impacted by nuclear projects, say NFLAs

The Nuclear Free Local Authorities have called on government ministers to
make the operators of nuclear plants pay their neighbouring communities
‘danger money’ to properly compensate them for living with the risk.
The Department of Energy Security and Net Zero has just concluded a
consultation on plans to introduce a mandatory scheme obliging energy
generators to pay community benefits. The amount of money payable annually
would be based on one of two models, the potential generating capacity of
the plant or the actual amount of electricity generated.
Ministers would make the scheme applicable to nuclear plants, as well as larger renewable
energy projects, but the NFLAs want them to factor in a premium on payments
made by nuclear operators to reflect the potential for accidents, the
environmental contamination caused during their operations, and their
legacy of deadly radioactive waste. We also want nuclear plants to make
payments through their lifecycle, including during the period of
decommissioning and waste management after closure.
NFLA 18th July 2025, https://www.nuclearpolicy.info/news/pay-danger-money-to-communities-impacted-by-nuclear-projects-say-nflas/
Nuclear: more than 3,000 radioactive drums discovered off the coast of Brest!

More than 3,000 radioactive drums have been discovered in the waters off Brest. Very old nuclear fuel.
Jean-Baptiste Giraud, July 17, 2025,
https://lenergeek.com/2025/07/17/nucleaire-3-000-futs-radioactifs-brest/
In the nuclear sector, the issue of radioactive waste storage is posing increasing problems. During a mission off the coast of Brest, Ifremer and the CNRS counted more than 3,000 drums deposited on the seabed. They could pose a threat to France.
Nuclear waste is accumulating at the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean
The return of a scientific mission off the coast of Brest has shaken the scientific community. After a month of intensive research, a team of experts revealed they had located more than 3,000 radioactive drums submerged in the Atlantic Ocean , a discovery that inevitably raises the question: should we be worried?
Behind this large-scale mission, a specific objective: to understand the fate of nuclear waste dumped between 1946 and 1993 by several European countries . During this period, more than 200,000 drums containing radioactive waste were dumped in international waters, at depths reaching 4,700 meters in the abyssal plain of the northeast Atlantic. The NODSSUM (Nuclear Ocean Dump Site Survey Monitoring) project has mapped an area of 163 km² where these drums are concentrated, some of which are in an advanced state of degradation.
The mission, led by the CNRS and Ifremer with the support of several national and international partners, used cutting-edge technologies to study the abyss. Aboard the ship L’Atalante, scientists deployed an autonomous submarine, UlyX, equipped with a sophisticated sonar system, allowing them to probe the seabed and obtain precise images of the condition of the 3,350 barrels.
No worrying radioactivity… for now
After several weeks of research, the good news is that the mission did not observe any “anomalous radioactivity” in the areas analyzed. For the researchers, there is therefore, as of yet, no reason to panic. However, not everything is that simple. Although the radioactivity does not appear to have crossed any worrying thresholds, some drums have shown signs of advanced corrosion, suggesting that material leaks may be occurring. The mission reveals that these leaks, although still difficult to identify precisely, could be due to the presence of bitumen, a material often used to seal waste in drums.
However, this is only a hypothesis. Future sampling will be necessary to better understand the exact nature of these substances and their impact on the marine environment.
This discovery raises many questions about nuclear waste management. Why were these drums submerged at a time when radioactive waste management was not as strictly regulated? While the practice of dumping waste has been banned since 1993, the question of the environmental impact of these repositories remains open. The results of this mission, still preliminary, underline that special attention will need to be paid in the future.
The next stage of the research will be to analyze the sediment, water and marine organisms in the area to detect possible contamination . In addition, a new mission is already planned for the coming years to study the barrels more closely and take additional samples , particularly of marine fauna that could be affected by this waste.
Ministers set to admit Sizewell C nuclear plant price-tag has soared to £38bn.

New official estimate reflects surging construction inflation and
contingency costs. Sizewell C nuclear plant will cost £38bn to build, the
UK government is set to admit for the first time next week as it reveals
the terms of an expected deal for private investors to fund a small portion
of the bill,
The new official estimate is a big increase from a £20bn
figure given by French energy giant EDF and the UK government for the
project in 2020, reflecting surging construction inflation and new
contingency costs.
A trio of private companies are set to invest around
£9bn of equity in Sizewell, but the majority of the construction will be
funded by loans underpinned by a levy on consumer bills, according to
people familiar with the matter.
The UK government is expected to remain
the largest investor in the project with a 47.5 per cent stake, the
Financial Times previously reported. The £38bn cost, details of the deal
and how the financial risk of the project will be shared is set to be
announced before the parliamentary summer recess begins on Wednesday, the
people said.
FT 18th July 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/d4315905-e7b5-4c2c-a0d1-32dd302e7761
“They want to impose a whole nuclear world on us without asking our opinion”: activists fight against the Orano nuclear fuel pools project.

by Lucas Hobe, 07/20/2025 , https://france3-regions.franceinfo.fr/normandie/manche/on-veut-nous-imposer-tout-un-monde-nucleaire-sans-demander-notre-avis-des-militants-luttent-contre-le-projet-des-piscines-d-orano-3190563.html
Nearly a thousand people marched on Saturday, July 19, 2025, in Vauville (Manche) to protest against the Aval du Futur project at the Orano La Hague site, which plans to install three new nuclear fuel storage pools.
” FukushiManche, no thanks! “, ” Stop Downstream of the Future ” could be read this Saturday, July 19, 2025 on placards held during the march organized in Vauville (Manche) against the project for new nuclear pools .
Monitored by law enforcement, the 1,000 people present marched to the beach, expressing their anger at the “world’s largest industrial project,” namely the expansion of the Orano site at La Hague to store spent nuclear fuel.
” It’s a project that’s pretty crazy,” laments Gilles, an activist . “We’ve been told for 40 years that scientists will find solutions for waste. And in the end, we haven’t found any solutions. La Manche is a department that’s already heavily nuclearized, so we’re fed up with these malfunctioning power plants and these high-voltage lines that disfigure the landscape .”
“Nuclear power can cause disasters”
Participants in the Vauville demonstration, which was part of the Haro anti-nuclear festival, are concerned about the future of the English Channel coastline if new 6,500-ton swimming pools and nuclear power plants are built. They are also concerned about their safety and health, given the potential for problems at these types of high-risk sites.
We see with the Flamanville EPR that it took years to build, there are still problems, and it cost us a lot of money. Nuclear power can cause disasters. We saw it at Fukushima and Chernobyl. – Gregory , Anti-nuclear activist opposed to the Aval du Futur project on the Orano site
Activists believe that the issue of the new nuclear pools at La Hague ”
is part of a larger picture. They’re still trying to sell us nuclear power as the energy of the future. They want to impose a whole nuclear world on us without asking our opinion. It’s scary. It’s important to fight against it .”
” We’ve taken up this Norman legend of the little fairies of La Hague who defend themselves when someone offends their land. We’re out in force, determined to show our anger, ” concludes the co-organizer of the anti-nuclear Haro festival.
2027, the calendar date for new factories
Announced in October 2024, the “Downstream of the Future” program has been launched. However, the exact timeline remains to be determined. According to Orano, more clarity should become available within two years, in the summer of 2027.
” The current plants are designed to last until 2040 ,” says Nicolas Ferrand, a specialist in nuclear waste reprocessing
. “We’re seeing if we can extend them beyond that, until 2050, 2055, 2060. By the end of 2026, we’ll have their lifespan and based on that, we’ll be able to schedule the commissioning of the new plants .”
Local website reveals city’s secret nuclear weapons programme

by Paul Linford , 18 Jul 2025, https://www.holdthefrontpage.co.uk/2025/news/local-website-reveals-citys-secret-nuclear-weapons-programme/
A city news website has revealed a university’s role in a programme to develop a new nuclear warhead.
The Sheffield Tribune, part of Mill Media, found evidence of a secure cell established at the Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre – part of the University of Sheffield.
The unit was set up by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) – an MoD body responsible for developing nuclear weapons — with the purpose of helping develop a new warhead for the UK’s nuclear arsenal, known as Astraea.
Data journalist Daniel Timms pieced together the story from documents already in the public domain, including a set of minutes from a meeting of parish councillors in Berkshire.
Danie spent four months working on the story and has written a first-person piece about how he uncovered the scoop.
Local website reveals city’s secret nuclear weapons programme
by Paul Linford Published 18 Jul 2025

A city news website has revealed a university’s role in a programme to develop a new nuclear warhead.
The Sheffield Tribune, part of Mill Media, found evidence of a secure cell established at the Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre – part of the University of Sheffield.
The unit was set up by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) – an MoD body responsible for developing nuclear weapons — with the purpose of helping develop a new warhead for the UK’s nuclear arsenal, known as Astraea.
Data journalist Daniel Timms pieced together the story from documents already in the public domain, including a set of minutes from a meeting of parish councillors in Berkshire.
Daniel, pictured, spent four months working on the story and has written a first-person piece about how he uncovered the scoop.
The key breakthrough came when he read a set of minutes from a meeting of Berkshire parish councillors around the AWE’s Aldermaston HQ in November 2023 which was addressed by an AWE director, Andrew McNaughton.
Wrote Daniel: “Unsurprisingly, AWE publishes very little. But they do have occasional meetings with local parish councillors around their Berkshire site. And in the published minutes, I finally find what I’d been searching for.
“It was the 108th meeting of the committee, in November 2023. Andrew McNaughton, the executive director for infrastructure on the fissile programme, explained that AWE had not had to design new warheads for decades, and taking this on will require new buildings and facilities.
“But in the meantime, they were doing some work elsewhere. And this was where the key admission was made.
“‘We already have a secure cell in Sheffield (part of Sheffield University) where we have some of the equipment we have been using… where we are going to be trialling the processes and training some of our employees,” McNaughton said.”
The Tribune gave both the Ministry of Defence and the university the opportunity to dispute its reporting, but they did not.
Added Daniel: “I’ve been working on this story for four months. I have no previous experience with the defence sector, and I assumed it would be an interesting diversion that would ultimately lead nowhere.
“Instead, largely by relying on freely available documents, I’ve been able to reveal where a significant aspect of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme is taking place — in a building with apparently minimal security just outside Sheffield.
“It’s possible that others with more of a headstart — and with less benign motives — have been able to do the same. But, given the lack of pushback (we haven’t been asked not to publish) perhaps the parties involved aren’t too concerned.”
A spokesperson for the university told The Tribune: “Our work at the AMRC involves developing and testing new technologies and processes for manufacturing companies and does not involve production of components for deployment.
Local website reveals city’s secret nuclear weapons programme
by Paul Linford Published 18 Jul 2025

A city news website has revealed a university’s role in a programme to develop a new nuclear warhead.
The Sheffield Tribune, part of Mill Media, found evidence of a secure cell established at the Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre – part of the University of Sheffield.
The unit was set up by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) – an MoD body responsible for developing nuclear weapons — with the purpose of helping develop a new warhead for the UK’s nuclear arsenal, known as Astraea.
Data journalist Daniel Timms pieced together the story from documents already in the public domain, including a set of minutes from a meeting of parish councillors in Berkshire.
Daniel, pictured, spent four months working on the story and has written a first-person piece about how he uncovered the scoop.
The key breakthrough came when he read a set of minutes from a meeting of Berkshire parish councillors around the AWE’s Aldermaston HQ in November 2023 which was addressed by an AWE director, Andrew McNaughton.
Wrote Daniel: “Unsurprisingly, AWE publishes very little. But they do have occasional meetings with local parish councillors around their Berkshire site. And in the published minutes, I finally find what I’d been searching for.
“It was the 108th meeting of the committee, in November 2023. Andrew McNaughton, the executive director for infrastructure on the fissile programme, explained that AWE had not had to design new warheads for decades, and taking this on will require new buildings and facilities.
“But in the meantime, they were doing some work elsewhere. And this was where the key admission was made.
“‘We already have a secure cell in Sheffield (part of Sheffield University) where we have some of the equipment we have been using… where we are going to be trialling the processes and training some of our employees,” McNaughton said.”
The Tribune gave both the Ministry of Defence and the university the opportunity to dispute its reporting, but they did not.
Added Daniel: “I’ve been working on this story for four months. I have no previous experience with the defence sector, and I assumed it would be an interesting diversion that would ultimately lead nowhere.
“Instead, largely by relying on freely available documents, I’ve been able to reveal where a significant aspect of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme is taking place — in a building with apparently minimal security just outside Sheffield.
“It’s possible that others with more of a headstart — and with less benign motives — have been able to do the same. But, given the lack of pushback (we haven’t been asked not to publish) perhaps the parties involved aren’t too concerned.”
A spokesperson for the university told The Tribune: “Our work at the AMRC involves developing and testing new technologies and processes for manufacturing companies and does not involve production of components for deployment.
“Our collaboration with partners in the defence sector helps them to overcome sustainability and productivity challenges, and support UK security and sovereign capabilities.”
Joshi Hermann, proprietor of Mill Media commented: “This is a fantastic story from Daniel Timms, revealing the existence of a secret nuclear weapons programme in Sheffield.
“If he can work this out from sources and the minutes of a parish council meeting in Berkshire, then the Russians/Chinese can too.”
-
Archives
- April 2026 (194)
- March 2026 (251)
- February 2026 (268)
- January 2026 (308)
- December 2025 (358)
- November 2025 (359)
- October 2025 (376)
- September 2025 (257)
- August 2025 (319)
- July 2025 (230)
- June 2025 (348)
- May 2025 (261)
-
Categories
- 1
- 1 NUCLEAR ISSUES
- business and costs
- climate change
- culture and arts
- ENERGY
- environment
- health
- history
- indigenous issues
- Legal
- marketing of nuclear
- media
- opposition to nuclear
- PERSONAL STORIES
- politics
- politics international
- Religion and ethics
- safety
- secrets,lies and civil liberties
- spinbuster
- technology
- Uranium
- wastes
- weapons and war
- Women
- 2 WORLD
- ACTION
- AFRICA
- Atrocities
- AUSTRALIA
- Christina's notes
- Christina's themes
- culture and arts
- Events
- Fuk 2022
- Fuk 2023
- Fukushima 2017
- Fukushima 2018
- fukushima 2019
- Fukushima 2020
- Fukushima 2021
- general
- global warming
- Humour (God we need it)
- Nuclear
- RARE EARTHS
- Reference
- resources – print
- Resources -audiovicual
- Weekly Newsletter
- World
- World Nuclear
- YouTube
-
RSS
Entries RSS
Comments RSS




