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The Battle of Kursk probably won’t result in nuclear weapons use against Ukraine. But Russian escalation vis-à-vis NATO can’t be ruled out.

any nuclear use against Ukraine would be self-defeating for Russia.

involvement of the West turned Russia’s so-called “special military operation” (“SVO” in Russia) into a full-scale war. Consequently, nuclear signaling has been addressed to the West.

Russia’s central concern is the possible Western involvement in the war on the side of Ukraine, which can turn the tide at the front line. The most visible cause for such concern is the provision of modern Western arms to Ukraine, including long-range missiles capable of targeting deep into Russian territory.

Bulletin, By Nikolai N. Sokov | August 26, 2024

The successful Ukrainian offensive in the Russian Kursk oblast started in early August has once again triggered speculation about possible Russian nuclear use against Ukraine. The situation resembles the successful Ukrainian offensive in the late summer-fall of 2022 in the Kharkiv oblast, when many worried Russia would resort to battlefield nuclear use to stop advancing Ukrainian forces. On the face of it, there was reason to be concerned: Russian President Vladimir Putin did reference nuclear weapons in September 2022, and it became known more than a year later that the United States was “rigorously” preparing for that contingency.

A closer look reveals, however, that Putin’s 2022 reference to nuclear weapons sounded as an emotional impromptu remark made under stress, whereas the US assessment was reportedly based on an intercept of conversations among Russian generals rather than on tangible signs of preparation or data about discussions among policymakers. We now know that Moscow dealt with that situation in a different way: Partial mobilization helped beef up forces, which stopped the Ukrainian Kharkiv offensive.

Although the Kursk operation caught Russia by surprise once again, its military and civilian leadership are better prepared today to deal with surprise than in 2022.

One has reasons to be skeptical about the prospect of battlefield use of nuclear weapons. It was considered an acceptable option during the Cold War, especially its early years. Both the United States and the Soviet Union held large-scale exercises with live nuclear explosions in the 1950s, and both nuclear powers contemplated large-scale use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Today, however, is different. The “nuclear taboo,” which began to take shape in the 1950s, has grown very strong.

Not that nuclear use is technically impossible. But the political and ethical implications make such a decision daunting—and unlikely. Battlefield nuclear use in Ukraine, for whatever reason, would make Russia a true pariah state in the international system, turning countries—partners and neutrals alike, all critical for breaking the tight sanctions regime, which has been established by the G7 economies and their partners—against Moscow. In other words, any nuclear use against Ukraine would be self-defeating for Russia.

Nuclear signals. Russian nuclear signaling has been persistent, going up and down throughout the war, with high points in the fall of 2022 and the spring of 2024, when Russian official rhetoric was the loudest. (Unofficial and semi-official rhetoric has never really stopped.) This signaling, however, has been exclusively and explicitly directed at the West—the United States and its allies. Even the very first statement of Putin announcing the “special military operation” contained a message to the West: “Do not interfere.”

This is hardly surprising: The war is conceptualized in Russia as a proxy war with NATO. Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, has repeatedly said—most recently in March and June of this year—that involvement of the West turned Russia’s so-called “special military operation” (“SVO” in Russia) into a full-scale war. Consequently, nuclear signaling has been addressed to the West.

The Ukrainian operation in Kursk may carry certain risks, but these risks are different from what is commonly and hastily assumed as nuclear use against Ukraine.

Russia’s central concern is the possible Western involvement in the war on the side of Ukraine, which can turn the tide at the front line. The most visible cause for such concern is the provision of modern Western arms to Ukraine, including long-range missiles capable of targeting deep into Russian territory.

At a certain level, Western assistance may create serious, perhaps even insurmountable challenges for the Russian military. Each new step—including the provision of tanks, missile defense systems, tactical ballistic missile systems, and most recently F-16 fighter jets—triggers warnings about possible escalation. So far, Russia has coped with each new level of Ukraine’s military capability, but this may change in the future if Western assistance continues or even intensifies.

Perhaps more consequential for Russia, although less visible, is the provision of intelligence, which has helped Ukraine to select targets and significantly constrains Russia’s ability to clandestinely concentrate and move forces and supplies……………………………….

Russians often repeat that a nuclear state cannot be defeated. This is true only to an extent, but there is realization in the Kremlin and beyond that defeat in the ongoing war cannot be tactical. Not only it will end the political regime—which the Kremlin equates with sovereignty—but consequences will affect the entire country for decades. If Russia considers itself de facto at war with the United States and NATO and believes the West seeks its “strategic defeat,” then nuclear weapons legitimately enter the picture under the existing 2020 Decree on Nuclear Deterrence and the 2014 Military Doctrine.  This is precisely the situation the United States has tried to avoid: ………………………………

Russian nuclear signals to the West can be divided into two categories.

The first is public statements, especially coming from the most authoritative source, Vladimir Putin, which have been relatively rare—namely, the “SVO” announcement and the September 2022 warning referenced above. ………………………. If someone’s actions will threaten our sovereignty and territorial integrity, we consider it allowable to use all means at our disposal.” Putin also declared that ndeclaredew threats may force Russia to change its nuclear doctrine, hinting that the nuclear threshold might be lowered.

The second category of nuclear signals is arguably more tangible: actions that change Russia’s nuclear posture and/or alert level. Such actions notably include nuclear sharing arrangements with Belarus, whose implementation began in the summer of 2022—after it became clear that war with Ukraine would be protracted, and Russia could not prevent the West from providing assistance to Ukraine—and was completed already in mid-2023. Other highly visible examples are exercises with tactical nuclear weapons, which have been held in three stages in May, June, and August of 2024………………….

Fuzzy red lines. Without doubt, publicly playing with the prospect of nuclear war is dangerous—in addition to be morally reprehensible—but one must admit that Moscow has been relatively restrained in its threats so far; it could certainly make more threats and make them more openly. So why has Russia shown such restraint as it conducts a full-fledged war?

……………………………………………………………………………………….The Russian leadership itself may not know what exactly constitutes a red line. So far, it seems to make such judgement after the fact, evaluating each new level of assistance to determine its impact on the course of the war. If and when such impact reaches a level that puts Russia on the brink of a “strategic defeat,” it may be classified as having crossed a red line…………………..

Evaluation of each new step takes time—from weeks to months. The absence of visible reaction may create a false sense of safety, potentially emboldening U.S. and Western officials. Then, if and when a Russian reaction takes place, it may catch Western allies by surprise and be perceived as unjustified and unprovoked, for the precise reason that the red line was unknown.

No doubt that Russia is very reluctant to launch an escalation that could result in nuclear use: The costs to Russia itself would be enormous—probably unbearable for the country and its leadership. ……………………………….

 ………the riskiest circumstances will happen after a red line has been crossed, not before. Each side will balance between caution and the perceived strategic need to act. Worse, a long sequence of moves that did not result in escalation may create a false sense of security and increase propensity for risk-taking on the part of Western military officials and political leaders.

…………………..The crossing of a red line in the war in Ukraine may not result in nuclear use. A more likely contingency is escalation starting with something relatively small, but visibly consequential………………………………………. The threat of nuclear use is expected to force the West to retreat, because its stakes in the conflict are believed to be lower than those of Russia in the war in Ukraine.

……………………………………………………………………..It can be predicted with reasonable confidence that Russia will not threaten, much less use, nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Escalation vis-à-vis NATO, however, is a different matter: That likelihood appears higher, but knowing in advance how high it is may be impossible.

Considering the risks outlined above, one obvious question is whether the West should continue and perhaps increase support of Ukraine. I believe that questions about the Kursk invasion and whether the West should continue aiding Ukraine are essentially unrelated. Regardless of which decision is made in regard to Western aid, the risks of that policy must be known and understood. Nothing good can come out of policy that is consciously blind to possible challenges. To the contrary, full information can enhance chances for success and lessen the likelihood of escalation.  https://thebulletin.org/2024/08/the-battle-of-kursk-probably-wont-result-in-nuclear-weapons-use-against-ukraine-but-russian-escalation-vis-a-vis-nato-cant-be-ruled-out/?utm_source=Newsletter&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=MondayNewsletter08262024&utm_content=NuclearRisk_RussianEscalationVisAVis_08262024

August 27, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment

Zelensky’s Misadventures in Kursk

This operation is likely to be working upside-down to what we are reading in corporate media.

Not long prior to the incursion, the Biden regime had given Kiev dispensation to use U.S.–made weapons against Russian targets so long as these were deployed in self-defense and against military targets.

the question remains. What is the point as the Kursk operation continues?

By Patrick Lawrence / Original to ScheerPost, 23 Aug 24

It has been three weeks since ground units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine crossed into the Kursk province in southwestern Russia, surprising — or maybe not surprising — the U.S. and its clients in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Two days later, the AFU began artillery and drone attacks in Belgorod, a province just south of Kursk. It has been a little more than a week since explosions at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, which lies in what is now Russian territory along the Dnipro River, ignited a fire in one of the plant’s two cooling towers. All six reactors are now in cold shutdown. 

In the still-to-be-confirmed file, BelTA, the Belarusian news agency, reported last weekend that Ukraine has amassed significant forces along the Belarus–Ukraine border. Aleksandr Lukashenko, the Belarusian president, put the troop count at an improbable 120,000. Further out in speculative territory, RT International reported at the weekend that the AFU is “preparing a nuclear false flag—an explosion of a dirty atomic bomb,” targeting nuclear-waste storage sites at the Zaporozhye plant. RT cited “intelligence received by Russia” and a military correspondent and documentarian named Marat Khairullin. 

Hmmm. 

When I began my adventures in the great craft at the New York Daily News long years ago, two of the better shards of wisdom I picked up were, “Go with what you’ve got” and “When in doubt, leave it out.” Let us proceed accordingly as we consider Ukraine’s latest doings in the proxy war it wages. I will leave aside the BelTA and RT International reports pending further developments, but with this caveat: Amassing units along the Belarus border would be entirely in keeping with the AFU’s recent forays into Russian territory. As for the imminence of a dangerous false flag op at the Zaporozhye plant, I would not put it past a regime that has acted recklessly and irrationally on numerous occasions in the past. 

Why, we are left to ask of what we know to be so, did the AFU send troops, tanks, artillery, drone units, and assorted matériel into Kursk on Tuesday, Aug. 6? And then the ancillary operation in Belgorod? Everyone wondered this at first—supposedly everyone, anyway. This is our question, and I will shortly get to the “supposedly.” 

On the eve of the incursion, Kiev was losing ground steadily to a new Russian advance in eastern Ukraine. Critically short of troops, the Ukrainian forces are, indeed, about to lose a tactically significant town, Pokrovsk, on their side of the Russian border. The thought that the AFU would sustain and expand its Kursk operation to bring the war to Russian territory in any effective way is prima facie preposterous. What was the point? Where is the strategic gain? 

In his speech Monday evening at the Democratic Party convention in Chicago, Joe Biden defended his proxy war in Ukraine as a just war waged in the name of democracy and liberty. Oh? setting aside the emptiness of this characterization, the question remains. What is the point as the Kursk operation continues? The AFU now holds one Russian town and six villages, according to the latest reports, which also indicate they have set about destroying bridges critical to Russian supply lines. But where to from here? I do not see a sensible answer. 

There is no question the Russians were caught off guard when the AFU crossed into the border village of Sudzha and proceeded with evidently little initial resistance further into Russian territory. Hundreds of thousands of Russians have been evacuated; the governor of Belgorod quickly declared a state of emergency after the drone and artillery strikes of Aug. 14. 

But we cannot count this as any kind of astute strategic move. I do not pretend to have an inside read as to Russia’s apparent intelligence failure or what looks like its flat-footed response. But I do not think we can correctly mark down events to date to the AFU’s superior strength or the Russians’ weakness or incompetence. Western correspondents are having a fine old time reporting that klutzy, clumsy Moscow is once again stumbling, but I buy none of it. In my view this is probably another case of Russian restraint: The AFU is using U.S. — and NATO — supplied weapons, and the Kremlin has all along been acutely sensitive to the risk of escalation against Kiev’s Western sponsors. 

My conclusion: No one’s script has flipped. This operation is likely to be working upside-down to what we are reading in corporate media. The best explanation they have come up with so far is that Kiev’s plan was to draw Russian forces away from the front on the Ukrainian side of the border. That has plainly not happened, however much The Times indulges in denial on this point. “And now Moscow has begun withdrawing some troops from Ukraine in an effort to repel Kyiv’s offensive into western Russia, Constant Méthuet reported Aug. 14 — before adding “according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.” Crapulous journalism. Simply crapulous. There is no evidence of this whatsoever—only of further Russian gains as noted above. 

Inversely, the Kursk adventure required a lot of Ukrainian units to get going and more now to sustain. It is Kiev that is wasting resources on what is bound to end in retreat. The Russian military has not marshaled anything approaching its full force. This is likely to end when Moscow decides it should, and in the meantime the Russians appear to wage the same wearing war of attrition that has reduced the AFU to something close to a desperate force on the home front. 

The initial press reports of the Kursk adventure had it that top officials in Washington were caught entirely by surprise and were as perplexed as the rest of us as to the “Why?” of the thing. I do not accept this at face value, either. The Times ran a lengthy report on the Ukrainians’ preparations, featuring residents in the towns bordering Kursk remarking for weeks about the buildup of AFU units and matériel before the operation began. Russian intelligence took note, The Times also reported. And the Pentagon, the intelligence agencies, and the administration were all taken by surprise? To quote an East European emigre I knew in the old days, “Gimme break.”

Not long prior to the incursion, the Biden regime had given Kiev dispensation to use U.S.–made weapons against Russian targets so long as these were deployed in self-defense and against military targets. And the only reason the U.S. is at all interested in Ukraine, we must remind ourselves—forget about freedom and democracy, for heaven’s sake—is for its use in prosecuting the West’s long, varied campaign to subvert “Putin’s Russia.” This remains the ultimate objective. In the matter of Washington’s hand in directing the Zelensky regime from one adventure to another, Biden’s national security people wear more fig leaves than you find on a tree in Tuscany. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Maybe Zelensky wants some Russian real estate as a bargaining advantage in negotiations with Russia he has come to accept as inevitable. It is possible but does not fit with his adamant insistence that the full restoration of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, is non negotiable — a precondition to any diplomacy. And as in Netanyahu’s case, a settlement would put his political future greatly in doubt. 

In any case, Zelensky chose badly when the AFU crossed into Russian territory at Kursk. The Red Army’s defeat of the Wehrmacht at Kursk, in 1943, was the largest battle in the history of warfare and left roughly 1.7 million Russians dead, wounded, or missing. Along with Stalingrad, it marked a decisive moment in the Allied victory over the Reich.  Russians do not forget this kind of thing, especially when German weapons are part of the AFU’s arsenal. The thought of Ukrainian troops and tanks holding Kursk is another of the miscalculations that litter the story of this war since it began with the U.S.–inspired coup 10 years ago.    https://scheerpost.com/2024/08/22/patrick-lawrence-zelenskys-misadventures-in-kursk/

August 25, 2024 Posted by Christina Macpherson | Russia, Ukraine, weapons and war | Leave a comment